EARLY INDIAN BHAKTI WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO KABIR,

A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS AND RE-INTERPRETATION.

"by

Krishna Sharma

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

at the University of London

December., 196U 0
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 2
ABSTRACT

This thesis rejects the current definition of hhakti

and seeks a reorientation of the present academic opinion

about hhakti and the Bhakti Movement. It questions the basic

assumptions responsible for the existing views, and points

out the error of treating bhakti as a cult and a doctrine,

and of its identification with Vaishnavism.

e
The present study suggests that bhakti cannot be

confined to Vaishnavism and that a personal concept of God,

a dualistic view of Reality, and an antagonism to jfiana are

not its necessary concomitants. It brings forth evidence to

show that the concept of an impersonal God, a non-dualistic

view of Reality, and an emphasis on jftana can also be the

legitimate constituents of a bhakti tradition. Taking this

position it prepares the ground for a re-evaluation of the

Bhakti Movement and suggests a new approach to the study of

Kabir and his nirguna school.

Chapter I examines the existing opinion on the

subject. Tracing its origin, growth, and perpetuation It

shows the western bias which shaped it. Pointing out the

inapplicability of the western standards of judgement in

the Hindu context, the nature of Hindu Theism and Monotheism

has been reassessed and a new approach to bhakti is suggested.

 3

Chapter II is a study of the classical texts which

are invariably cited to substantiate the current theories.

It shows that the hhakti of the Bhagavad*G-ita, the Bhagavata-

Purana and the Bhakti~Su.tras of Narada and £>andjl$ya is in

fact incompatible with the present definition of bhakti.

Chapter III shows that the difference between

Sankara and the Vaishnava acharyas does not rest on bhakti,

but is caused by Sankara’s challenge to Vaishnavism and the

Vaishnava loyalties of the Vaishnava acharyas.

Chapter IV re-evaluates Kabir and attempts to trace

his antecedents.

The conclusion sums up the main arguments advanced

in this thesis.
 ACKNO WhEDG-EMENTS

I do not find the right words to thank my supervisor,

Professor A.L* Basham. His interest in this study gave me

the confidence to pursue it on the present lines and his

constant encouragement was a strong incentive to complete it.

I am grateful to the organisations which financed me

during the period of this research. I thank the British

Federation of University Women for awarding me their Crosby

Hall Scholarship, and the International Federation of

University Women for their Winifrid Cullis grant. 1 am also

thankful to the British Council for their travel grant, and

to the Sir Ernest Cassel Educational Trust for their timely

assistance.

I take this opportunity to thank Dr. De Casparis

for translating for me Professor G-onda's article on Bhakti

from the Dutch Journal T i t

1dischrift voor Philosophie, and

my friend Miss Padma Misra for helping me with the Sanskrit

texts. I also should like to thank Mrs. M. Morris for

having agreed to type this thesis at a very short notice.

Finally I wish to express my gratitude to the Delhi

University for granting me the necessary leave, without which

this work could not have been undertaken.

 GpJTTENTS

Page

ABSTRACT . . ........... ........ ........... ....... 2

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS......... ...................... .. k

PREPACK c o o , * . ........ ..... ............... 7

CHAPTER I A NEW APPROACH TO BHAKTI ........ .. .. 11

(i) The Existing Opinion on Bhakti:

Its Nature and Limitations . 11

(ii) The Artificial Formation of the

Bhakti Theories.,, .«.................... 27

(iii) The Main Bias Behind the Bhakti

Theories and Its Western Back­
ground . 0o...... ...... . .„ . . 56
(iv) A Re-assessment of Hindu Theism
and Monotheism............ .. 88

(v) Bhakti Reinterpreted............ 97

(vi) Bhakti Theories and the Bhakti

Movementpo«ooo..«oo.o>o.oo«ao..o 110

CHAPTER II BHAKTI IN THE CLASSICAL TEXTS......... 116

(i) The Bhagavad Gita............... H7

a. The Distinction Between Bhakti
and Braddha . • • • .• 122
h . Gradations of Bhakti ........ 12*4-
c. The Trilogy of Bhakti, Jfiana,
and Yoga. ..... 127
d. The Gita and the Personal
Concept of God....... 1-30
.

(ii).. The Bhagavata-Purana 138

.

a. The Categories of Bhakti 1*4-1

h. Nirguna Bhakti in the
Bhagavata Purana............. 1*4-3
c. Bhakti In relation to Jftana,
Karma, and Vairagya....... 1*4-*+
.

(iii) The Bhakti-Sutras of Narada and

Sandilya: A Comparative Study... 1*4-7
 Page

CHAPTER III BHAKTI IN THE MEDIEVAL CONTEXT 160

(i) The Existing View of* the Bhakti

M o v e m e n t 160

(ii) Bhakti &in Sankaracharya....... 16*4-

(iii)Sankara and the Vaishnava

Acharyas 0 ..... .......... 172
a. The Place of Sankara’s Vedanta
in Hinduism and the Problem of
the Astika unity.. ..... 176
ho Sankarafs Challenge to
V a i shnav
o
lsm o . o . . c > . o . o . . . o o o . o 186
c , The Vaishnava Response •»...•• 190

(iy) Bhakti in the Vaishnava Acharyas 197

a. Ramanuja. • 197
b . Nimbarka . » ».. 199
c • Madhva • . o . . * ........... . . 201
d. Vallabha..................... 20*+

CIIAPTER IV KABIR AND THE CURRENT CONCEPT OP

BHAKTI: A REAPPRAISAL ............... 210

(i) Kabir’s Bhakti......... . 217

(ii) KabirTs Concept of God.......... 222

(iii )Kabir and Jhana. • 0. ........ . .*.. 227

(iv) Kab l r 1s Monism••..•••••••••••••. 233

(v)
X * Kabir and Vaishnavism..
9 ... ...... 239

(vi) The Antecedents of Kabir........ 2*+*+

CONGLUSION o o o o o o o o o o o o o « o Q a o » a o o o « o o o o o o o Q . o o o Q o o o 268

BIBLIOGRAPHY • .oo.oo«Qt>«oee..aQO.o*o^aaoo.DO.oooo.o 277

 PREFACE

The present work on hhakti was originally undertaken

as an introduction to the study of the social, political and

religious implications of the Bhakti Movement. In this

connection we wanted to concern ourselves chiefly with the

mutual interaction of Islam and Hinduism and the changing

opinions and attitudes of the two in relation to each other.

We were particularly interested in Kabir’s nirguna school

and its contribution to medieval thought and religion.

Because of the universally accepted views on bhakti

and the Bhakti Movement, our initial approach was determined

by certain basic assumptions about the subject. We had

naturally to start therefore with the initial premises that

the doctrine of bhakti was opposed to the idea of an

impersonal God, and that it was based on a loving faith

towards a personal Deity. We had to regard bhakti as a

special religious tradition antagonistic to the Advaita

Vedanta and the path of jfiana. Also, in accordance with

existing opinion, we had to view the Bhakti Movement as an

assertion of the bhakti religion against the path of jfiana

and the ideology of the Advaita Vedanta. We had to accept

the Vaishnava acharyas, Ramanuja, Nimbarka, Madhva, and

Vallabha as the prophets of bhakti, and ganakaracharya as

their opposite pole. In the light of such a representation

of hhakti and the Bhakti Movement, a common ideology of

hhakti had to he attributed to all the medieval bhaktas.

Their connection with the Vaishnava-acharyas had to be

recognised and their difference from Sankara and the Advaita

Vedanta had to be taken for granted.

But in the course of our research we soon became

aware of the inherent errors of these assumptions. They

obviously placed serious limitations on the study of the

medieval religious movements. It was clear that the approach

of the medieval bhaktas was not always the same, that there

were serious ideological differences between the saguna and

the nirguna bhaktas, and that the teachings of the nirguna

bhaktas like Kabir had more in common with the Advaita

Vedanta of Bankaracharya than with the theology of the

Vaishnava acharyas. Going through the works of Kabir we

could not avoid the conclusion that his devotional ism did

not at all conform to the present technical and academic

definition of bhakti. Obviously there was something

inherently wrong with the current views about bhakti and the

Bhakti Movement,

In order to resolve these inconsistencies a clearer

understanding of the concept and doctrine of bhakti was

necessary. But the study of the religious texts which are

generally cited to support the existing definition only

increased our doubts. Neither the Bhagavad-Gita nor the

Bhagavata Purana, nor the Bhakti-Sutras of Narada and

Jsaridilya corroborated the current definition of bhakti. An

approach from the doctrinal standpoint of Sankara and the

Vaishnava acharyas did not help either, but only gave rise

to further questions. We did not find Gankara’s position

antagonistic to bhakti nor did we find in the bhakti of the

Vaishnava acharyas a uniform conceptual system or doctrine

opposed to the path of jfiana. On the contrary, bhakti was

present in Gankara, and the bhakti of the Vaishnava acharyas

did not exclude jfiana.

There were reasons to believe therefore that the

current views on bhakti were artificial and erroneous. But

since they are universally accepted in academic circles

today and have the sanction of the scholarship of more than

a century, it was not easy to uproot them. Nevertheless,

the study of the growth of the current opinion showed us the

way and gave us the confidence to contradict it. A closer

examination of the works of the 19th century on Hinduism

established clearly that the current definition of bhakti

was. of gradual growth and was based on certain western

standards of judgement.
 Once the artificial nature of current opinions was

revealed, it was possible to formulate a more consistent

approach for a re-examination of bhakti. If the original

'V£.
connotation of the word bhakti could be^covered, fresh

grounds could be established for a more correct evaluation

of the medieval religious currents which are collectively

known as the Bhakti Movement. We have carefully examined

certain fundamental texts with this in view, and our study

has confirmed our hypothesis.

We have therefore confined this thesis to the

refutation of the existing views about bhakti and the Bhakti

Movement by suggesting an alternate approach. Perhaps the

position taken in this work can provide the right framework

for further studies in the Bhakti Movement and Kabir.

 CHAPTER 1

A NEW APPROACH TO BHAKTI

i. The Existing Opinion on Bhakti : Its Nature and

himitations

Bhakti is a generic term, hut it has acquired a

technical meaning which is both artificial and erroneous.

1
The current theories about bhakti describe it as a religion
2
and a cult. They define and analyse it as a doctrine and

a theology.^ In the light of these theories, bhakti is

viewed as a special religious tradition of India, and is

completely identified with Vaishnavism.^' It is studied and

explained strictly from a Vaishnava standpoint, and its

history is traced on the basis of the earliest known antece­

dents of Vishnu worship.

1. R.C. Majumdar, The History and Culture of the Indian

People, Bharatiya Vidya~ Bhavan, Bombay ^195o,~ Vo 1.IV, p„U7«
Tara Chand, Influence of Islam on Indian Culture,
Allahabad, 19 3"6, ppT25” 2 S .

2. Yusuf Hussain, "Islam and the Cult of Bhakti’*, in:

Glimpses of Medieval Indian Culture, Asia Publishing
House, Bombay, 1957*

3. Munshi Ram Sharma, Bhakti K a Vikas, Chaukhamba Vidya

Bhavaft, Varanasi, 195§.

i\.0 I-KCo Raychaudhuri, Materials for the Study of the Early

History of the Vaishnava Sect, University of Calcutta,
Calcu11a 1*920, p .6. ”**
 But disengaged from its present standardized

definition, the term hhakti means nothing more than a loving

devotion to God* By itself it indicates only an attitude of

mind and heart, and not a set of specific ideas and beliefs.

Considering the wider implications of its meaning, bhakti in

the sense of religious devotion therefore can neither be

defined as a doctrine nor can it be restricted to any one

particular sect of the Hindus* It has found different modes

of expression in their different religious traditions and

has been emphasised by thinkers and poets belonging to

different schools of thought.

The existing academic conceptions about bhakti are

of very recent formation and can be traced back to the last

guarter of the nineteenth century* They are the direct

result of certain artificial theorisations by western

scholars who wrote about Hinduism during that period and saw

the real signs of a true monotheism in Krishna-worship and

Vaishnavism, and called it the Bhakti Religion. Their

writings, which were to serve as the basis of all future

researches on the subject, have restricted the general

meaning of bhakti and have lent in its present technical and

 1
academic definition.

As a result of the theories offered by them, and

the subsequent researches undertaken to substantiate them,

a personal conception of G-od and a belief in the truth of

the ever-existent duality between the Deity and the devotee

are understood today as the essentials of the bhakti

religion. Loving praise and adoration of a personal God

A.-
as the Lord and father and an absolute dependence of Him as

the Saviour are described as the path of bhakti as different

from that of knowledge ( jhana) and self-realisation. Moreover

the worship of a personal God is recognised as an indication

of a theistic religion and as a reaction against the

impersonal explanations of God as the nirguna Brahman.

Keeping in line with these postulations, bhakti is summed

up as "a personalistic faith, a reaction against the

- 2
imp er sonali stic monism of a dominant Vedanta tradition”

1 . The present theories about bhakti were initiated by

Albrecht Weber, and were later supported by many western
scholars, although some of them differed from Weber on
the question of the influence of Christinaity on the
Bhakti Religion of India. The most prominent of them are
Auguste Barth, Sir Monier-Williams, Edward Washburn
Hopkins, Richard Garbe, L.D. Barnett and George Abraham
Grierson, The basic concepts related to the nature and
meaning of bhakti have not been questioned by the Indian
scholars. Sir R.G. Bhandarkar, the first to write on
bhakti on the modern lines from the Indian side had
concerned himself with the question of the antiquity of
bhakti and its pre-Ghristian origins only.

2. Herbert H. Farmer, Revelation And Religion, Nisbet & Co.,

London, 195b 9 P .158'.
and as a religion of Love and Grace juxtaposed to the

Brahmanical intellectualism and an antithesis of classical

Vedanta,
The character and definition assigned to the religion

of hhakti were further explained and elaborated by western

scholars through their special observations on Vaishnava

beliefs and practices. Applying the concept of a personal

God as an essential test of true theism they fixed the Hindu

monotheism in Vaishnavism
« and in its elevation of Vishnu
# to

the position of the supreme deity. In Vishnu they found

God as a personality, in his exclusive selection from amongst

the numerous Vedic deities, a true monotheism, and in the

Vaishriava modes of worship a religion of simple love and

devotion. It must be mentioned here that whenever

Vaishnavism was so described as a monotheism, every other

evidence of monotheism in the religio-philosophical thought

of the Hindus was set aside either as pantheism or as

philosophical monism. A single strand, that of Vaishpavism,

was pulled out of the intertwining threads of Hindu theism

and was named the Bhakti Religion.

This representation of bhakti and its equation with

Vaishnavism was sustained and given a rationale through

certain other generalisations about Hinduism. Ignoring the

underlying unity of the vast complex of Hinduism, a division

was made "between Brahmanism and Hinduism, and "between the
1
Vedic Religion and the Hindu sectarian traditions. Their

formal differences were regarded as more fundamental than

their common ground in religious thought and their identifi-

cation in the theistic unity of Hinduism. Without giving

full recognition to the free intermixture of philosophy and

religion in Hinduism, the true elements of religion were

thus sought "by the western scholars in areas outside

philosophy. As a result of this, theism was associated only

with sectarian Hinduism, and the classical thought of the

2
Hindus was set apart as pure philosophy.

The above postulations about the nature of bhakti,

its identification with Vaishnavism, and the relevant

generalisations about Hinduism which support them are

universally accepted in every discussion on the subject of

1* Auguste Barth, The Religions of I n d i a Keg an Paul, London,

1906.
Monier-Williams, Brahmanism and Hinduism or Religious
Thought and Life in India, as based on the Veda and other
sacred books of the Hindus, John Murray, London 1891*

2. This approach to Hinduism was so well established that

Macnicol had to introduce his study of Indian Theism with
the following remark: ,!India has always been recognized
as so determinedly pantheistic in its religious thought
that Indian Theism will seem to many an unnatural collo­
cation of words,” Nicol Macnicol, Indian Theism from the
Vedic to the Mohammadan Period, Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 1915* pll.
bhakti. To the extent that the medieval religious

renaissance is called the Bhakti Movement, they are held

valid for the purposes of the study of the thought and

religion of that period. But as explained earlier, bhakti

or religious devotion is not something which can be

restricted to any one denomination of the Hindus. Since the

medieval period was a time of great religious upsurge, and

since Hinduism consists of a multiplicity and variety of

sectarian and philosophical traditions, the devotional

expressions of Hinduism in that age were also varied and

manifold. But ignoring both the wider meaning of bhakti,

and the multiple and variable aspect of devotional manifest­

ation possible within Hinduism, the different religious,

currents of the medieval period are studied collectively as:

the Bhakti Movement and are interpreted in the light of an

artificially fixed definition of bhakti.

Due to the basic errors in the hypotheses which have

shaped the present definition of bhakti as a religion and a

doctrine, its application in the study of medieval religious

movements has also led to many misconceptions and mis­

judgements. In spite of the evidence of personalities like

Kabir and Nanak and of their movements in favour of nirguna

bhakti aimed at popularising the impersonal and the nirguna

conception of God, the medieval Bhakti Movement is described

as a religious effort which strengthened the forces of

monotheism by laying emphasis on the personal nature of God

against the impersonal representation of Him. In the total

context of Hinduism it is represented mainly as a reaction

against the Advaita Vedanta of Sahkaracharya. To substantiate

this, the entire expression of Hindu devotionalism of the

medieval period is collectively viewed as an assertion of an

emotional religion of love and grace in which reasoning and

knowledge (jfiana) had no share.^ furthermore, since bhakti

is completely identified with Vaishnavism, the whole of the

Bhakti Movement is approached from a purely Vaishnava angle

in spite of the variations existing in it. Consequently

the Vaishnava acharayas, Ramanuja, Nimbarka,Madhva and

Vallabha are regarded as the apostles of bhakti and their

systems of Vedanta as its doctrinal foundations. The

difference of their Vedanta from that of Sankara is inter­

preted as the difference between the path of bhakti (devotion)

and jfiana (knowledge). In the light of an artificial and

restricted definition of bhakti, a uniform view is taken of

the medieval saints and poets in spite of the fundamental

differences noticeable amongst them* As a result of this,

1. Tara Chand, ibid.. p p . H 3 f f .

Yusuf Hussain, ibid., pp.3ff., 27 .

2. R.C. Majumdar, ibid., Vol.VI, p.3^8.

the hhakti of Tulsidas and Chaitanya who were the devotees

of personal deities, Rama and Krishna, is wrongly coupled

with that of Kabir and Nanak who were clearly the worshippers
1
of the Nirguna Brahman«

On account of the obvious limitations placed by the

present definition of bhakti a similar ideology is attributed

to both these groups of saguna and the nirguna bhaktas and

the difference of their approach Is not fully weighed and

acknowledged. But a monolithic view can be taken of the

medieval Bhakti Movement only if bhakti is understood in its

wider meaning. If on the other hand it is accepted in its

present restricted and technical sense, the ideological

differences existing within the medieval religious movements

must be fully recognized.

In short, the term bhakti is accepted today as a

designation of "a type of religion1' which is alleged to have

had "a long history in India alongside the prevailing monism

p
of philosophical. Hinduism." The present views on bhakti

and the Bhakti Movement carry with them the sanctity of

1. Kshitimohan Sen, Medieval Mysticism of India, Luzac & G o .,

London, 1930* ftiAstw
H.G. Raychaudhuri, ibid., p.l.
R.C. Majumdar, ibid., Vol.IV, p«60.

2. Nicol Macnicol, Foreword in W.G-. Orr, A Sixteenth Century

Indian Mystic, Lutterworth Press, London’19I47* p\£.
about one century of scholarship related to this subject.

But although they are very firmly rooted in our academic

thinking today, there are some valid reasons for questioning

them. A sound assessment of the medieval religious movements

of India is not possible without a correct understanding of

bhakti. It is necessary therefore to re-examine the exist­

ing academic theories about bhakti which are fallacious and

are artificially conceived.

But the initial acceptance of bhakti as a special

religion is in itself a mistake* To explain it as a

doctrine is equally misleading. The current concepts about

bhakti, which are chiefly the creation of western scholarship,

are the result of the initiation and development of an

opinion with regard to Hinduism which assigned the whole of

Hindu devotionalism or bhakti to the Vaishnava sect and

ascribed the Hindu understanding of the oneness of God to

the selection of Vishnu from amongst the numerous Hindu

deities for the supreme position of the single Divine

Personality.

No such exclusive definition of bhakti can be found

in the Hindu religious texts which can completely corroborate

the present conception of it in its full implications. Nor

is the subject of bhakti found restricted to any one body of

sectarian literature. On the contrary, texts such as the

Bhagavad G-ita, the Bhagavata Purana, and the Bh ah ti-SQ.tr as

Harada and £>andilya, which are invariably quoted to

uphold the present academic stand, have obvious possibilities

1
of different and wider interpretations of bhakti*

The origins of the present associations of ideas

related to bhakti can be traced back to the later half of

the nineteenth century. They received a more definite and

technical formulation during the last quarter of it. By the

end of the first decade of the present century, the theories

about bhakti had assumed a fixed character and were generally

current* But they had evolved gradually and the early stages

of their formulation show them in a more nebulous and less

positive form.

It was H.H. Wilson who first mentioned bhakti as a

religion. He had done it in a very casual and general

manner without implying any of the ideas which are associated

with bhakti today. Writing on the religious sects of the

Hindus in 181^6, Wilson had made a stray observation about

2
bhakti in connection with the Vaishnavas of Bengal. But

he did not define it in the manner in which it is defined

1. Bhakti in the Bhagavad Gita, the Bhagavat Purana, and

Bhakti-Sutras of Narada and SlnSiiya are discussed
in Chapter II.

2. H.H. Wilson, Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus*

Bishop College Press, Calcutta l8iji>, p p .100-102.
today* Nor did he identify it with Vaishnavism as a whole,

which became an accepted rule in the later stages. This is

an evident fact since Wilson mentions bhakti only in connect­

ion with the Vaishnavas of Bengal and does not mention it

again in his treatment of the other Vaishnava sects of the

1
Hindus* But later, and not too long after Wilson, certain

academic theories about bhakti started taking shape in the

hands of scholars like Albrecht Weber and Sir Monier

Williams. By 1909 however, Bhakti was incorporated in the

Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics as a religion and a

doctrine, fully equipped with all its present technical

implications.2

Although the modern theories of bhakti are equally

well established in Indian scholarship today, they were

initially formulated by western scholars. They were shaped

by them in the light of their own concepts of God and

religion, and were not based on any axiomatic, evidence

provided by Hinduism. The basic material for the construction

of the bhakti theories has been provided by western conceptual

categories of theism, monotheism and pantheism, and a purely

1. Wilson gave a list of 2.0 sects of the Vaishnavas, ibid.5

see p. 21, But he had mentioned bhakti in connection with
only the Gosvamis of Bengal.

2. George A. Grierson, ,,Bhakti-Marga,f, Encyclopedia of

Religion and Ethics, (ERE) edited by'” James Hastings, 1909>
Vol.II, pp.539-551*
personal concept of God and a clear line of division between

religion and philosophy have guided the entire course of their

formation. The strict adherence by the western scholars to

certain preconceived notions and fixed attitudes, rooted in

their Christian thinking, made it difficult for them to under­

stand and judge Hinduism on its own terms.

The application of conceptual categories which derive

their character not from the Hindu but an alien background,

the treatment of Hindu religion and philosophy in isolation

from each other, and the rejection of all impersonal explana­

tions of God as. non-theistic, are largely responsible for the

artificial nature of the present theories about bhakti. The

fundamental error of treating Vaishnavism as a specially

theistic and devotional religion, and naming it as bhakti can

also be traced back to the initial mistake of regarding faith

in a personal deity as the only true indication of religious

feeling and theism. It must also be mentioned here that when­

ever Hindu theism is evaluated on these lines, certain

essentials of Hindu thought, such as Vedanta, are always set

aside as merely the philosophical and intellectual activities

of the Brahmins, and their actual religious significance is

very often minimised and misinterpreted.

However, the concepts and standards of judgement

which mark the attitudes and writings of scholars who

initiated the present theories on hhakti were formalized in

the west. As will he shown at a later stage, they were the

result of the Christian reaction against the growing tendency

in modern European philosophy to disregard the Christian view

of God and to explain Him as the Ultimate Reality in abstract

1
and impersonal terms. Since they were shaped strictly in the

light of Christian beliefs and the Christian concept of the

Deity, they could have no validity in the context of Hinduism,

in which philosophy and religion have not had separate develop­

ments and an impersonal view of God has characterised religious

thinking from the very start. But in spite of their obvious

limitations, it is these concepts and attitudes which have

shaped the entire development of the bhakti theories, and can

account for their artificiality.

Our understanding of bhakti is bound to get more con­

fused when bhakti is described as a monotheism and a special

"theistic expression’' in the midst of the intellectual panthe­

ism of the Hindus. But the conceptual theories and categories

of Theism, Pantheism and Monotheism, which are the real cause

of all such assessments, are of recent and purely western

p
origin. They carry with them a strong bias of isolation of

Vi tie Infra. p. €6-3*

2. A.E, Taylor, "Theism", ERE, ed. 1921, Vol.XII, p.26l.

Taylor also says that a "certain vagueness about the
meaning of the word in current English" exists, ibid.
religion and philosophy and of a personal conception of the

Deity. Theism, as different from mere philosophical

explanations of the Ultimate Reality, and monotheism as

different from philosophical monism and pantheism became

sharply defined as conceptual categories in the west to

distinguish between the religious and the philosophical

thought* The association of ideas which accompany these

terms are easily understandable against the background of

Christianity and the evolution of the clear distinction

between religion and philosophy in the west 0

The above theories however, can be of no assistance

in ascertaining the nature of Hindu theism and monotheism

because the evolution of Hindu thought and religion

constitutes a pattern of its own, very different in character

from that of Christianity. Their application therefore can

further confuse, but cannot clarify the complex pattern of

Hinduism. But since bhakti is described as a monotheism and

a theistic religion different from the intellectualism of the

Brahmins and their philosophical pantheism, a further

explanation of the concepts of Monotheism and Pantheism might

help us in gaining a clearer idea of a part of the current

fallacy related to bhakti.

Theism, as a name for a "philosophical theory as

distinct from a practical religious faith" is a thing of

"purely modern formation" distinguishing a technically

correct definition of belief in God from the indefinite

1
generality of faith in God* The theoretical representation

of theism today generally presupposes an acceptance of the

idea of a personal God and a rejection of all impersonal

and philosophical representations of Him* Making faith in

a personal God its basic content, theism is distinctly

marked out as different from belief in the oneness of God,

and as a theory, it is carefully distinguished from all

philosophical ideas of the unity of God. The latter are

included in the category of pantheism which is kept distinct

from monotheism, a term, the technical use of which is

always kept confined to the belief in the oneness of a

personal God. Monotheism is described as "sharply opposed

to a very wide range of beliefs and teachings", and a demand

for an abandonment & "often with contempt or aversion,

fit o
many older beliefs, fears and customs...". The Deity as a

person is regarded as the central point of true monotheism,

and it is argued that if "we mean by deity nothing more

than the ultimate independent substance, whatever may be

its nature, then every monistic theory of the universe

1. A.E.Taylor, ibid.

2. J'osiah Royce, "Monotheism", ERE, ed. 1915# Vol.VTII, p.817*

"becomes pantheistic and indistinguishable from materialistic

monism and other philosophical theories of singularism.

Pantheistic thought, which goes hand in hand with monism, is

further understood as mere "intellectual craving for unity"

1
and a "vague apprehension of God as theism conceives Him."

As suggested earlier, the above conceptual theories

have received their present formulation essentially from a

Christian standpoint. The use of these categories in discuss­

ions on Christianity and other religions of a common Semitic

background may be completely valid but their application in

the study of Hinduism is not only unwarranted, but has led to

errors of judgement. The study of Hinduism through the medium

of these theories has been largely responsible for interpreting

Vaishnavism as Hindu monotheism, and Vishnu-worship as Hindu

devotionalism or bhakti. However, the nature and evolution of

Hindu theism and monotheism must be understood in their own

terms. Similarly, the nature of the different manifestations

of Hindu devotionalism can be correctly ascertained only in

relation with the characteristic pattern of Hindu theism and

monotheism. The failure to do so, and the free application

of the conceptual categories of theism and pantheism, which

are irrelevant in the Hindu context, can account for the

artificial nature of the present theories about bhakti. A

1. Frank Thilly, "Pantheism", ERE, ed. 1917# Vol.IX,pp.6l3ff.

closer examination of the growth of the bhakti theories, and

of the western bias which has conditioned them, will explain

this more clearly.

ii* The Artificial Formulation of the Bhakti Theories

The artificial nature of our present understanding

of bhakti becomes more glaring when the whole process of their

gradual formation and establishment in academic works is fully

taken into account. Western observers in the earlier stages of

Indology showed a very different approach to Hindu monotheism

and Vaishnavism,
o 9
the two themes which later constituted the
it f l C i
very basis of the bhakti theme-s. The same subjects however,

were understood and judged very differently by the later

scholars. Those who were writing at the end of the eighteenth

and the first half of the nineteenth century showed a greater

tendency to accept Hindu montheism on its own terms. They did

not take any special notice of Vaishnavism as a monotheistic

or bhakti cult, as was done by scholars who wrote during the

later half of the nineteenth century.

Neither the present definition of bhakti nor the

supporting theories which go with it find any mention in the

earlier studies on Hinduism. While referring to the totality

of Hinduism the earlier writers on Indian history and culture

did not draw a sharp line of division between Indian religion

and philosophy. The later* writers however, clearly separated

one from the other in a fundamental manner. At the same time,

unlike the latter, the earlier authors do not make use of any

standardised and technical theory of theism as a measure of

their judgement of Hinduism and Hindu monotheism. Although

some of them show a keen awareness of the absence of a parallel

of the Christian deity in Hinduism and of the uniqueness of

the Christian approach to God as compared to the Hindu, on the

whole they clearly accept and acknowledge the state of inter­

mixture of religion and philosophy in Hinduism and the

individual nature of the monotheism known to the Hindus.

The later scholars on the other hand, not only treated

the Hindu religion and philosophy as two different compartments

of Hinduism but also went to great lengths to prove the exist­

ence of the true element of religion in Hindu sectarianism

and in the worship of personal deities, such as Vishnu and his

avatar as, Rama and Krishna. They not only made a free use of

the technical definitions of theism and monotheism as

conceived in the west to an alien and unidentical situation,

but they went further and constructed their own theories about

Hindu monotheism, which lie at the root of the existing

theories about bhakti. They suggested, and then laboured to

prove, that Vishnu worship was the most outstanding theistic

expression of Hinduism, and that Vaishnavism alone possessed

"the essential elements of a genuine religion", and that Hindu

monotheism could he traced in the worship of the single

personal deity, Vishnu.

A survey of the sequence of opinions expressed by

western scholars on the relevant aspects of Hinduism will show

more clearly the artificial nature of the accepted views on

bhakti, particularly from the standpoint of the fundamental

change caused in the approach to the totality of Hinduism in

course of time, and of the gradual and laboured process of the

formulation of the present theories about bhakti. Both the

change of attitude and the growth of new opinion can be traced

and can explain the present certainties, which have remained

unquestioned till now in spite of their artificiality.

At first the Hindu pattern of monotheism was duly

recognized on its own terms. It was duly acknowledged'by

earlier writers like J.Zo Ilolwell and Luke Scrafton that "the

Hindus were aware of one supreme God", Holwell had gone to the
extent of describing Hinduism as one of the three religions uKteK

&S0L believed in "one supreme being", which "manifestly"

carried the "Divine stamp of God". Dow, writing the History

1. J.Z. Holwell, A Review of the Original Principles^

Religious and Moral of the Ancient Bramins: comprehending
an Account of the Mythology, Cosmology, Fasts and Festivals
of the Gentoos, D. Steel, London 1779# P*31*
Luke Scrafton, Reflections on the Government of Indostan,
London, I7 63 , p.5.
of Hindustan in 17 68, said that the "Brahmins, contrary to the

ideas formed of them in the west, invariably believe in the

unity, eternity, omniscience and omnipotence of God" and that

the polytheism of which they had been accused was "no more

than a symbolical worship of the divine attributes" of God.'1'

A similar view was expressed by Charles Wilkins in his

introduction to the translation of the Bhagavad-Gita. He also

described the Brahmins as Unitarians who believed"*., but in

2
one God, an universal spirit." Summing up the theism of the

HindusjH.T, Colebrooke suggested that "if the doctrines of the

Veda and even these of the Puranas

0 "were taken into account,7

"the Hindu theology will be found consistent with monotheism

though it contains the seeds of polytheism and idolatry."-'*

Writing the history of India in 181+1, Elphinstone made a clear

and categorical statement that the "primary doctrine of the

Vedas is the unity of God" and that the Hindu texts repeatedly

state that there is "but one Deity, the Supreme Spirit, the

1. Alexander Dow, The History of Hindostan, London 1803,

Vol.Ij p.LXII.
2. Charles Wilkins, The Bhagvat Geeta; or, dialogues of
Kreeshna and Ar.ioon. in eighteen lectures with not_e.s..
Translated from the original in Sankreet, London, 1785*
p *2l+o
3. II.T. Colebrooke, Miscellaneous Essays, 3 Vols., Trtlbner &
Co., London 1873, Vol.II, pp.209-210.
Lord of the universe,
1 According to Elphinstone the

doctrine of monotheism prevailed throughout the Hindu

p
Institutes. Even a man like William Ward, who untiringly

continued to point out the idolatrous practices of the

Hindus, and who had very little respect for the views of

those "apologists for Hindoo ism" who pleaded that Hinduism

should not "be judged by "present appearances"*^ "It is true

indeed", he said, "that the Hindoos believe in the unity of

God" and that "one Brumhu, without a second is a phrase very

commonly used by them when conversing on subjects which

relate to the nature of God..,."^

None of these early writers^ saw the elements of true

monotheism| in the Vaishnava sect - a thing which was commonly

done by the later scholars. The attitudes which so

predominantly characterised the later approaches to Vaishna­

vism are completely absent in them. On the contrary,

Vaishnavism was viewed very often by them as a source of

1. Mounts-tuart Elphinstone, The History of India, John

Murray, London l 8ifL, Vol.I, p*72*

2. Ibid•, p •73•
3* William Ward, A View of the History, Literature and
Mythology of the Hindoos: including a minute description
of their manners and customs, and translations from their
principal works, London 1822, 3 Vols., Vol.I, p.CLXV.

U. William Ward, ibid., Vol.Ill, p.l.

idolatry and polytheism. They neither found an essential

theism nor a fully developed image of a personal God in it.

No special religion of "bhakti is mentioned in connection

with the Vaishnavas by the earlier writers, nor are Vishnu

and the incarnations, Rama and Krishna, given any pre­

eminence as the more adequate representations of God as a

person in the total context of Hinduism. On the contrary

they saw nothing more than the worship of inferior

divinities in sectarian religions like Vaishnavism, and

regarded the Vaishnava deities Rama and Krishna as deified

heroes only. The higher theism of the Hindus and their

belief in one God, they freely attributed to their "philoso-

phical heritage upheld by the learned Brahmins.”

Dow noticed that the "learned Brahmins with one voice

deny the existence of inferior divinities” and that "all

their religious books of any antiquity confirm this

assertion.”"^ Sir William Jones did not see a special or

separate doctrine in Krishna-worship, isolated from the total

Hindu view of religion and God. Speaking of the "figurative

notions” of the Hindus, he explained that they consider God

"in three characters of Creator, Regenerator and Preserver”

and suppose that "the power of Preservation and Benevolence

1. Alexander Dow, ibid., Vol.I, p.LXIII.

 1
to have become incarnate in the person of Crishna*"'

Colebrooke saw nothing more in the Vaishnava religion than

the worship of "deified heroes" William Ward took a

similar view of the Vaishnavas

o
and described them as those

"who choose Vishnoo for their guardian deity", but he did

not mention them as the votaries of a special religion of

bhakti* Referring to Rama and Krishna^ Ward described them

merely as "deified heroes"^* and saw neither in them nor in

Vishnu any indication of the fulfilment of the religious

truth of a Personal God* In spite of his strong Christian

bias for a personal conception of the Deity, Ward did not

attribute any higher ideas of a personal God to the Vaishna­

vas but stated instead that "speaking of God in His abstract

state, some of the Hindoo sages could express sublime

conceptions though mixed with error*"

6 KLphinstone

1* William Jones, The Works of Sir William Jones with the

Life of the Author, edited by Lord Teignmouth in thirteen
volumes, John Stockdale, London 1807? Vol.IV, p*221.

2 * H •T * Colebrooke, ibid., Vol*II, p.211.

3. William Ward, ibid** Vol. III, p. 8 .

k* Ibid., Vol.I, p.LXXlV.

5* In spite of taking note of the wide popularity of Vishnu

worship, Ward could not see anything more in Vishnu than
an "image of a black man with four arms a creature
half bird, half man."
William Ward, ibid*, Vol.I, pp.LXXVII f£*

6 , Ibid*, Vol.I, p.XLIV.

described the sectarian Vaishnava
•
deities.* Rama and Krishna
s o

as "deified mortals" and saw in their worship only a negation

1
of the Hindu principles of monotheism. Although he described

the Vaishnavas as the most popular religious group, he did not

see in the worship of these personal deities anything more than

a corruption of the "more sublime" parts of Hinduism which

were already "corrupted by the introduction of deified heroes

• . ©11O2
Some of the later Indologists, those who evolved the

bhakti-theories, took a very different view of the situation.

They made a new approach to the study of Hinduism which became

a standing model for the subsequent scholarship in that field.

Starting with the initial premises of an essential and

inevitable difference between religion and philosophy, they

used the two measurements separately and classed the major

bulk of the religio-philosophical thought of the Hindus as

Brahmanism, and their sectarian religious manifestations as

3
Hinduism.

1 . Mountstuart Elph ins tone, ibid., Vol.I, p.lSl.

2* Ibid., Vol.I, p.l 6U.

3. Monier-Williams described the religion of "the higher,

cultured, and thoughtful classes as Brahmanism", and "of
the lower, uncultured, and unthinking masses as Hinduism".
Brahmanism And Hinduism, ibid., p.XI. He also acknowledges
that "these names are not accepted by the Hindus, ibid.,
p.XVIIIc
See also Auguste Barth, Bulletin on the Religions of
India, Reprint, Indian Studies Past and Present,
Calcutta I 960, p.l.
 3 5

Regarding the religion of the Vedas as a mere

expression of "reverential awe of the foroes of Nature and a

p
desire to propitiate them",' and Brahminism as "simply an
2
Indian variety of pantheism", Monier-Williams forwarded the

theory that "Vaishnavism alone" possessed "the essential

elements of a genuine religion."^ According to him it was the

only Hindu system worthy of being called a religion "notwith­

standing the gross polytheistic superstitions and hideous

idolatry to which it gives rise*"^ The main argument behind

Monier-Williams* thesis was that "there can be no true religion

without personal devotion to a personal God.,,",^ "Who can

doubt that a God of such a character was needed" he explained,

"a God who could satisfy the yearnings of the heart for a

religion of faith, love, and prayer rather than of knowledge

and works? Such a God was believed to be represented by

Vishnu,

1. Monier-Williams, ibid,t pp*96~7.

2. Ibid*, p.97.

3* Monier-Williams, "The Vaishnava Religion, with special

reference to Sikshan Patri of the modern sect called
Svami Narayana", in: The Journal of the Ro.yal Asiatic
Society of Great Britain and Ireland, (JRAS) Trttbner 5c C o .,
London 1882, p p ,295-6*

2|, Monier-Williams, Brahmanism and Hinduism, ibid,, p.98.

5* Monier-Williams, "The Vaishp.ava Religion", ibid,, p*296,

6 * Monier-Williams, Brahmanism and Hinduism, ibid*, p.97.

 In his judgements, Monier-Williams was obviously-

guided by the orthodox and formalised Christian concepts

of God and religion. No description of God and His unity

other than their representation through a Divine Personality

could satisfy him, since philosophical explanations of God

and His unity could not be truly regarded as religion from

1
a Christian standpoint. Therefore in spite of acknowledging

in his earlier writings that even "the most profound forms

of Indian pantheism rest on the fundamental doctrine of

G o d 1s unity" and that "even the ordinary Hindu, who

practises the most corrupt form of polytheism is never

found to deny the doctrine of God's unity", in his later

works, Monier-Williams saw the true ingredients of a

monotheistic religion in Vaishnavism only. In that alone

he saw an "abolition of the triune equality of Brahma

Sava and Vishnu in favour of Vishnu, especially as

manifested in his two human incarnations Krishna

o 0
and Rama"

1 , The Christian bias of Monier-Williams stands out quite

clearly in his studies of Hinduism, He had recommended
that the knowledge of Sanskrit must also be used for the
"elucidation of Indian religious systems with a view to
their refutation". Monier-Williams, Bpahmanisrn and
H induism, ibid*, p.VII.
2 . Monier-Williams, "Indian Theistic Reformers", The Journal
of the Royal Asiatic Society., (JRAS) Trtlbner & Co.,
London, 1881, p « l a
and described it as ”the only real religion of the Hindus” .’*'

He found in Vaishnavism an. ’’approximation towards the

Christian idea of G o d ’s Unity and Personality”,^ for ”it must

be admitted” he said, ”that it has more common ground with

Christianity than any other form of non-Christian faith.

These opinions were expressed by Monier-Williams during the

period 1875 to 189^-.

The earlier background of these theories- about

bhakti and Vaishnavism can be found in the works of H.H.

o

Wilson and A. Weber. As pointed out earlier, Wilson was the

first western scholar to mention bhakti as a religion and a

doctrine in his ’’Religious Sects of the Hindus”, published

in 1.6k6 . He had mentioned it in connection with the K^ishna-

cult of the VaishrLavas of Bengal, the followers of Chaitanya.

He pointed out that ”in opposition to the Vedanta belief of

the negative properties of God” the followers of Chaitanya

believed in His ’’real attributes”.^ According to Wilson

their ”whole religious and moral code” was ”comprised in

1. Monier-Williams, ”The Vaishnava Religion”, JRAS, ibid.,

1882, p . 295.

2. Monier-Williams, ’’Indian Theistic Reformers”, JRA.S,

1881, p . 2.

3. Monier-Williams, Brahmanism and Hinduism, p. 96 .

k* H.Ho Wilson, ibid., p.100.

the one word, Bhakti, a term that signifies the union of

the implicit faith with incessant devotion..*"* Wilson saw

in their doctrine of the efficacy of bhakti", an "important

1
innovation upon the primitive system of the Hindu religion."

The Yedas, the very source of Hinduism had no attraction

for Wilson. He described their object as the same "that

was defused throughout the old pagan world", and stated

that "the fervent adoration of any one deity superseded all

this necessity, and broke down practice and speculation,

2
moral duties, and political distinctions." Wilson made a

special mention of the Bhagavat Purarxa also, pointing out

its teachings that worship is more efficacious than

abstractions and knowledge of the Divine Nature. Religious

Sects of the Hindus, WilsonTs first standard work of its

own kind on Hinduism, was bound to have a far-reaching

effect on western opinion on this subject. Although Wilson

3
did not connect bhakti with the whole of Vaishnavism, the

way in which he connected it with the Krishna-cult of

Bengal was in itself significant. Bhakti, a general term,

1 . Ibid.. p. 100 .
2* Ibid., p.101*

3* Wilson had given a list of 20 sects as Vaishnavas but

had mentioned "bhakti" only in relation to the Vaishnavas.
of Bengal. H.H.Wilson, ibid., p.21.
was now equated with Krishna-worship and was thus to assume
a very restricted meaning.

This equation between Krishna-worship and bhakti

was further strengthened and perpetuated by the German

1
Indologist, Albrecht Weber. His main aim, however, was to

trace the influences of Christianity on Krishria-hhakti. He

pointed out many parallels between the two. He saw in the

exclusive emphasis on Kfishpa!s personality and in the

fervent and emotional worship of Krishna, a pattern similar

to Christianity. He even pointed out the similarities

between certain incidents of the life of Christ and the facts

of the Krishpa legend. Weber did this in order to prove

that the elements of monotheism and of fervent faith,

noticeable amongst the worshippers of Krishna, were in

reality borrowed from Christianity. He also suggested that

the later developments in the direction of monotheism among

those Indian sects which worshipped a personal God were due

to the same influence.

In his discussions on the similarities between

Krishpa-worship and Christianity, Weber had also made a

special reference to bhakti in relation to Kpishna-worship,

1. Albrecht Weber, IJber die Krishnajanmashtarni (Krishna's

Geb^rtsfest), Akademie der Wissenschaften, l 86t ; see in
particular pp. 321ff.
and had translated it as Kraft des Glaubens or the power of

faith and belief in God. He had explained the term further in

the sense of "begging for His grace" to bring it nearer to the

Christian parallel. Although Weber's theory of Christian

influence in Krishna-worship was refuted by many scholars,

both European and Indian, the links created in his writings

between Krishna-worship and bhakti and monotheism, were to

assume a lasting significance. Krishna being the incarnation

of Vishnu, a wider view of Krishna-worship as the worship of

Vishnu,and of Krishna-cult as a form of Vaishnava religion,

strengthened the connection in the minds of the western

scholars between bhakti, monotheism, and Vaishnavism. Thus the

writings of Weber were mainly responsible for the formulation

of the bhakti theories. His observations on bhakti marked out

the lines for the subsequent growth of the academic opinion

on that subject,
1

Bhakti, now described as a distinct devotional

religion of grace identified with and restricted to Krishna

worship, was later associated with the Bhagavad-Gita. Since

Krishna whose worship and personality provided scope for

1. Auguste Barth, a contemporary of Weber, can be quoted here

as a clear testimony to this. Barth stated that the bhakti
theory "in its scientific form belongs entirely to
Professor Weber and which that scholar has developed from
time to time...." Auguste Barth, ibid., p . 220.
initial theorisation about bhakti occupied a central position

in the Gita narrative, the western scholars found it easy to

connect it with their speculations on bhakti. If Gita could

be connected with Krishna-worship, it could be connected with

the Bhakti Religion^ too. At the same time, certain points of

similarity between the teachings of the Bhagavad-GIta and

those of Christianity were also attracting the attention of

some scholars. The theories propounded by Weber coupled with

this new approach to the Gita, added a greater significance

to the connection between the bhakti theories and the Bhagavad-

Gita. The latter was soon to be recognized and referred to as

an authoritative text of the Bhakti religion.

Soon after Weber's paper on Krishna's Geburtsfest or

.Krsnajanmastami, delivered to the Akademie der Wissenschaften

in I 867, Dr. Lorinser in an appendix to his translation of the

Bhagavad-Glta showed traces of the "Christian writings and

ideas" in that text. This created a still more new and special

connection between the Bhagavad~Gita and the bhakti theories

which were taking shape in the west at that time. Whereas

Weber had referred to only the legend of the. white island or

£>veta-dvipa in the Mahabharata, the Nar ada- Panchar a tr a and

1, The German translation of the Bhagavad Gita by Dr.

Lorinser was published in Breslau in 1869 . The English
translation of the above mentioned Appendix appeared in
the October issue of the Indian Antiquary, 1873*
 1
Svapnesvara's commentary on Sandilya-Bhakti-Sutra in

connection with his explanations of the bhakt^i doctrine,

Lorinser’s indications with regard to the Bhagavad-G1ta now

made it the focal point of the bhakti theories. The Gita

which in fact is acknowledged as an authority by both the

so-called "philosophical Brahminism" as well as the

"sectarian Hinduism" was now represented as a special

Vaishnava text and as the most outstanding exposition of

the bhakti doctrine.

It must be noted here however, that a representation

of the Bhagavad-Gita mainly as a Vaishnava text was also the

result of the growth of an artificial opinion about the nature

of that work* The Hindus have never regarded the Gita as a

sectarian work* On the contrary** as a religious text the Gita

is always placed in line with the Up an i shads and the Vedanta

sutras. The three together constitute the final source of all

Hindu theological opinions. Aj)art from this Hindu position,

amongst the western scholars themselves, the earlier opinions

expressed about Gita stand out as very different from the later

ones. Sir William Jones has described the Bhagavad-GIta as "a

work containing all the grand mysteries of the Brahminical

2
Faith...". Charles Wilkins, the first English translater of

1. Albrecht Weber, ibid., pp.319-21.

2. William Jones, ibid., Vol.II, p.23.

the Bhagavad-Gita had clearly observed, that the Brahmins

esteemed that work as the source of their religion, and that

the "principal design" of the Oita was "to unite all the

prevailing modes of worship" and to show the unity of God as

Universal spirit*
1 The earlier western opinion was thus

inclined more to accept Gita as the first scientific and

allegorical "systematisation of the scattered tenets" of

2
Hinduism.

However, the habit to represent Gita as a purely

Vaishnava text is clearly the result of the change in

western opinion* The changing opinions, here again, had

followed a gradual and artificial course. This is clearly

noticeable in the works of Sir Monier-Williams. In 1875, he

described the Bhaga~vad-G11a as an eclectic work which

■3
"abounded in sentiments borrowed from the Upanishads". In

1882 he described it as the Bible of the Vaishnavas.^ This

gave more weight to his theory that Vaishnavism was a

1. Charles Wilkins, ibid., P*23*

2. Charles Wilkins, ibid.,pp.5-6.

3. Monier-Williams, Indian Wisdom orExamples of the

Religious,Philosophical and Ethical Doctrines of the
Hindus: with a brief History of the Past and Present
Condition of India, Moral and Intellectual, 2nd ed.,
H,Allen & Co •, London, 1875, P*135*

Monier-Williams, fiThe Vaishnava

* 0 Religion", ibid*,pp.296-97»
religion in itself, that it was a religion of bhakti, and

that its theology was clearly enshrined in the Bhagavad-GIta.

The Bhagavata Purana was also treated as an authoritative

text of the bhakti religion for the same reasons.

The academic theories describing bhakti as a religion

were thus worked out in a gradual fashion. Gradually, but

surely bhakti was equated with Vaishnavism and Krishna-

worship, and the Bhagavad-G11a was fixed as the earliest

authoritative source of the bhakti religion. These theories.

were finally bound together in a neat system by George

Grierson who now spoke of a "Bhakti Church of India", and

described bhakti as a "school of religion", a cult, and a

doctrine .1 Grierson defined the bhakti religion as- the

"descendant of the noble thoughts found in the Bhagavad-

Gita ",2 strongly opposed both to the^Advaita Vedantist

doctrine of salvation by knowledge and to the Mimamsa

tJb
doctrine of salvation by works." He explained^ in more

definite terms as a religion of "devoted faith directed to

a personal God", a thing "essentially typical of monotheistic

religion".^ Grierson now described bhakti more clearly as

1. G.A. Grierson, The Modern Hindu Doctrine of Works, JRAS,

1908, po337•
2. Ibid.

3. George A. Grierson, Narayania and the Bhagavatas,

Reprinted from Indian Antiquary, British India Press,
Bombay 1909* P«l*
 1
''the monotheistic religion of ancient India" "in contra-
2
.
distinction to the pantheistic Brahmanism" , He attributed

the conception of God, a monotheos, to the Bhagavatas and

designated that as the true Hindu religion and monotheism.

According to Grierson the worshipper of Vishnu was

"essentially a monotheist"^ and Vedanta was nothing more

than a "belief in a passionless, impersonal, supreme Deity,

unmoved by prayer and adoration,*,".

Equipped with more crystallized theories about the

bhakti religion, Grierson went a step further than the

earlier scholars and constructed a history of it, seeking

evidence of the spirit of bhakti in the classical literatures

and putting forward his own theories about the processes

through which the Bhagavata or the Vaishnava religion had

1. George A, Grierson, The Monotheistic Religion of Ancient

India and its Descendant, the Modern Doctrine of Faith,
read at the Third International Congress for the History
of Religions, held at Oxford in September 1908, (A,
Bradford, Printer, Yorktown, Surrey),

2, George A, Grierson, Narayania and the Bhagavataa, ibid,,

p •/+,
3* Ibid,, p , 6 .

George A* Grierson, The Monotheistic Religion of Ancient

India, ibid,, p ,4*

5* George A. Grierson, "Modern Hinduism and its Debt to the

ITestorians", JRAS., 1907, Pt.I, p. 313.
formalised its distinct theology as different from the
1
pantheistic Brahmanical philosophies.

To the list of the textual authorities quoted so far

to e^splain the nature of the hhakti doctrine, Grierson now

added his careful study of the Narayania section of the

Mahabharata, hoping "it will not be difficult to separate the

kernel of bhakti" from "the Brahmaist shell in which it has

been enclosed #"2

Grierson gave yet another dimension to the theories,

of bhakti by concentrating on its medieval manifestations in

the Vaishnava acharyas of the south as well as. the devotional

poets of the north. He could speak with authority on the latter

on account of his special knowledge of the medieval Hindi

literature in general. To a great extent it was the medieval

bhakti which served as the starting point for him, whence he

took off to build and elaborate his more definite and advanced

theories which have survived to this day. The retrospective

and artificial nature of his approach can be clearly seen

sometimes in his writings# For instance, describing the

medieval bhakti movement he says: "suddenly, like a flash of

lightening, there came upon all this darkness a new idea. No

Hindu knows where it came from nor one can date its appearance,

1. George A, Grierson, "Bhakti-Marga", ERE. Vol.II, p p *539-551.

2# George A# Grierson, The Narayania and the Bhagavatas,

ibid,, p.l.
 4 7

"but all the official writings which describe it and which

can he dated with certainty were written long before the

Christian era. This new idea was that of bhakti. Religion

was. now no longer a matter of knowledge. It became a matter

of emotion. It now satisfied the human craving for a supreme

personality to whom prayer and adoration could be addressed

in as much as bhakti, which may be translated by faith or

devotion, requires a personal not an impersonal God.”

The general theories initiated by the western writers

in connection with bhakti have got well established in Indian

scholarship/' too• Although in the beginning some differences

of opinion were registered by men like R.G. Bhandarkar on

certain aspects of these theories, but the basic definition of

bhakti, as formulated by the western orientalists, and its

total identification with Vaishnavism was never questioned by

the Indian scholars. In their initial speculations on the

subject on modern academic lines provided by the west, the

Indian scholars had devoted their attention to only one thing

in particular - the question of the Christian origins of the

Bhakti religion. The theories advanced by Weber and others to

prove the Christian influence in bhakti had to be refuted, and

the indigenous character of bhakti had to be established on a

sure footing.

1. George A. Grierson, "Modern Hinduism and its Debt to the

Nestorians", ibid., pp. 313ff*
 . Bhandarkar !s approach was obviously dominated by

these considerations. Therefore without examining the full

implications of bhakti against the background of Hinduism,

and without paying attention to the extremely restricted and

improper usage of the term by the western scholars, Bhandar-

kar proceeded on to establish the indigenous nature and

antiquity of bhakti with the support of epigraphic and

1
literary evidence. But in so far as he did not question

the artificial nature of the modern academic definition of

bhakti, and to the extent that he used it as his premises

to prove the antiquity of bhakti, Bhandarkar was also

responsible for perpetuating its current usage in Indian

scholarship,

To prove that bhakti was older than Christianity

Bhandarkar sought every possible evidence of the worship of

Krishna-Vasudeva in the period before the birth of Christ. In

this connection he drew attention to the inscriptions of

Ghosundi and Nanaghat belonging to the 2nd and the 1st

centuries B.C. Similarly he pointed out the significance of

the Garudadhvaja, the emblem of Vishnu in the column of

Heliadora at Besnagar belonging to the second century B.C.

1, R.G. Bhandarkar, Vaishnavism., Gaivism and Minor Religious

Systems, J . Trttbner, Slrassburg, 1913/ PP * 3 t " 29> 3$•
 4 9

Bhandarkar referred to the occurrence of the name of Vasudeva

in P a n i n i ^ too, and argued that the worship of Vasudeva

1
must he regarded as old as Panini. He identified Heracles

mentioned by Magasthenes as the God worshipped hy the

Sifaurseni dynasty of Mathura/ with Vasudeva Krishna and

quoted this as a proof of Vasudeva worship in the fourth

century B.C. Thus in his own words Bhandarkar had brought

forth ’'irrefragable evidence of the existence, three or four

centuries B.C., of a religion with Vasudeva as its central

figure and a school of his followers, known by the name of

Bhagavatas.’’^

The main purpose of Bhandarkar was to establish the

indigenous nature of what was being called the Bhakti

religion. But in his attempt to do so, he had succeeded in

proving the antiquity of Krishna-worship only. Since

Bhandarkar did not question the equation of Krishna-worship

and bhakti as fixed by the western scholars, his arguments

were taken as a proof of the antiquity of bhakti in general

and provided a stronger base for the future writings on the

1. R.G. Bhandarkar, ibid., pp.3~^-*

2. Ibid., p. 9*

3. Ibid., p.4.
 1
subject •

Wot only did Bhandarkar accept the word bhakti in the

restricted sense of Krishna-worship and Vaishnavism, but he

also accepted it as a designation for Hindu monotheism as

assigned by the western scholars. Accepting the concept of a

personal God as an essential characteristic of monotheism, he

traced the equivalent of it in the Ekantika— dharma mentioned

in the Narayania section of the Mahabharata. He described it

as the religion of the Satvatas*^ and connected it with the

Panchratras and the Bhagavatas*^ This description and analysis

of the Ekantika-Dharma was quite compatible with Vaishnavism,

a sectarian religion which had become identified with bhakti

in current scholarship, Bhandarkar ■.**» traced the history of

the Ekant ik a-Pharma, as manifest in the Panchratras and

Bhagvatas, from its earliest representation in the Narayania.

section to its more mature manifestations in the Bhagavad-GIta.

He now described the Bhagavad-Glta

i■ vi...
■
as the ,fearliest exposition

of the Bhakti-system or the Ekantika-T>harma,,. Bhagavad-G-ita,

!• According to Grierson the paper read by Bhandarkar in 1886

at the Vienna Oriental Congress, had opened the way for all
subsequent researches in the subject, G-.A.Gr ierson, JRAS.,
For the First Half Year of 1910, p.172.
2, R.G-, Bhandarkar, ibid., pp.U-8.
3. Ibid., pp.8-13.
Ibid., pp. 38-Ul.
5* Ibid,, p.liu
which is an amalgam of many philosophical influences and is

recognized as an authoritative religious text by all denomina­

tions of the Hindus, and which throws enough weight in favour

of an impersonal view of God, was thus represented by Bhandarkar

as a Vaishnava text, and as a work chiefly devoted to a person­

alisation of the impersonal Brahman.

Through this particular approach to the Gita,

Bhandarkar was trying to show that a monotheistic religion,

having a personal deity as its nucleus, was promulgated in the

Bhagavad— Gita. Here the impact of western opinion on Bhandarkar

is quite clear. In attributing a special religion of that

nature to the Bhagavad-Gita, Bhandarkar was only trying to

build up his case to refute the western opinions directed

towards showing the Christian influence on the teachings

contained in that text. He was. able to show the Hindu ante­

cedents of that religion in the earlier evidence of Krishna-

worship, and in the Ekant ik a-Dh arm a of the Narayania section

of the Mahabharata. But in so doing, Bhandarkar had stuck to

the western definition of monotheism. Without going into the

question of the fundamental nature and indigenous pattern of

Hindu monotheism, he had confined himself to the areas

initially explored by the western writers in their search for

the monotheistic element in Hinduism. In spite of expressing

his doubts about the western understanding of the nature of

Hindu theism he continued to follow the established patterns

and spoke of Hindu monotheism in terms of Vaishnavism and

Krishna-worship. Thus Bhandarkar's observations on bhakti

were based entirely on the premises of an artificial

definition of bhakti as provided by western scholarship. He

had accepted Vaishnavism as bhakti, and bhakti as- Hindu

monotheism. He had also accepted the western postulation

that bhakti and monotheism were possible only in relation to

a personal God.

Since the days of Bhandarkar a lot more has been

written on Vaishnavism and bhakti by Indian scholars, but

without any effort for a fresh start. Every subsequent

study of bhakti, therefore, has turned out to be a study of

Vaishnavism and vice versa* The history of Vishpu-worship

and the evolution of Vaishnavism

o has been treated as a

historical development of bhakti, and bhakti is examined

invariably from a Vaishnava viewpoint.

1 However, sometimes,

along with this general concentration on Vaishnavism, the

1. See for example:

H .C . Raychaudhuri, ibid.
Munshi Rama Sharma, ibid.
Baladeva Prasad Upadhyaya, Bhagavata Pharma, Nagari
Prach'ar^nifeabha, Benanas, 1953*
Mrinal Dasgupta, "Graddha and Bhakti in Vedic Literature",
Indian Historical Quarterly. 1930? PP«315~333 and ^ 87-513.
Mrinal Dasgupta, "Early Visnuism and Narayania Worship",
Indian Historical Quarterly! 1931? pp .93-115? 3^-3~358,
655-735 , ibid., 1952, p-p.bIl.-8U.
spirit and doctrine of bhakti itself is made the focal point

in its study. The spirit of bhakti is then traced back to

the Vedas^particularly to such hymns as addressed to the

1
deity Varuna in the Rig-Veda. But in all such contexts

bhakti is invariably understood as a religious feeling,

possible only in relation to a personal God. Therefore,

although certain passages of the Upanishads are also some­

times pointed out as eloquent expressions of theistic

devotion, great hesitation is shown at the same time to

acknowledge them as expressions of bhakti in view of the

absence of a supreme image of a personal Deity in the

Upanishads. It is argued that there was no scope for a

bhakti system in the purely abstract and intellectual

language of the Upanishads. "The anticipation of later

bhakti doctrines", for this reason, are sought in the

sectarian doctrines which conceive Brahman in more human and

emotional terms. It is explained that the earlier

"indefinite" and "incb^ate"

J spirit of bhakti was later

defined and systematised in the Bhagavad-Gita and the Bhakti-

1 . "If bhakti means faith in a personal God, love for Him,

dedication of everything to His service and the attain­
ment of Mok§a or freedom by personal devotion, surely we.
have all these elements in Varuna worship." S. Radhak-
rishnan, Indian Philosophy, George Allen & Unwin Ltd.,
London 1923? p. 108 .

2. Vide infra, p .lo^

 54

1
Sutras of Narada and Efandilya. Thus the original hypothesis

enunciated hy the western scholars, that bhakti is possible

only in relation to a personal God, and the initial equation

made by them of bhakti with Krishna-worship and Vaishnavism,

have persisted in Indian scholarship.

In spite o.f this fixed and definite approach to

bhakti, certain vagueness and ambiguity of opinion is some­

times detectable in scholars with regard to its exact nature

and origins. But such instances however do not indicate any

deviation from the established viewpoint on bhakti. Never­

theless they are a proof and an indication of the initial

errors involved in treating bhakti as a special religious

doctrine that had assumed a definite shape through a contin­

uous process of development. This can be well illustrated

by the following observation made by Radhakrishnan* ^Bhakti

is a vague term he states^extending from the lowest form of

worship to the highest life of realisation.” At the same

time he adds that it '’has had a continuous history in India

p
from the time of the Rig-Veda to the present day.”
& J ---
Similarly, K. De who otherwise accepts the current

academic theories about the meaning, origin, and history of

1 . Mrinal Dasgupta, "£>raddha and Bhakti in Vedic Literature”,

ibid., p . 332.

2. S. Radhakrishnan, ibid., Vol.II, p.70U.

bhakti remarks that the origins of bhakti ,!are lost in far

off antiquity” and that ,!its spread over centuries of

obscure religious, cultural, and literary influences has

1
made the stages of its growth erratic and undefined.”' But

on the whole, both Radhakrishnan and Be assiduously adhere

to the established technical definition of bhakti and accept

it as a definite and continuous religious tradition standing

distinct and separate in the general mass of Hinduism.

However, the current technical definition of bhakti

is universally accepted by both the Indian and the western

scholars, although it is completely untenable from the stand­

point of the wider meaning and implications of the term

bhakti in the total context of Hinduism. We have already

discussed the errors and limitations of the present approach

to bhakti. We have also shown in the preceding pages that the

existing ideas about bhakti were artificially conceived by

certain western scholars in the nineteenth century, and that

they were formalised in the light of an alien bias.. To a

great extent the approach of the western scholars was

determined by certain preconceived notions and value judge-

ments derived from their own western background. A better

grasp of their basic measures of judgement and their

1. Sushil Kumar De, Barly History of the Vaishnava Faith

and Movement in Bengal, Calcutta 1942, p . 2.*'
inapplicability to Hinduism, can help us in seeing more

clearly the artificial aspects of the theories propounded

by them.

iii. The Main Bias Behind the Bhakti Theories and Its

Western Background

As shown above, the existing theories about bhakti

rest mainly on two principles and are the result of a total

reliance on them as the basic measures of judgement for

evaluating the nature of Hindu theism. One is the recognition

of an essential division between religion and philosophy. The

other is the acceptance of a personal conception of God as the

only adequate proof of theism. The distinctions of the

conceptual categories of Theism, pantheism, and monotheism

which lend a more definite character to the present ideas on

bhakti also rest on an unequivocal acceptance of these two

principles..

But neither these basic principles nor the fixed and

current technical distinctions of theism, pantheism and mono­

theism are applicable in the Hindu context. Philosophy and

religion have never stood apart as two separate entities and

have not followed separate courses of development in the

evolution of Hinduism 0 Judging from the Hindu standpoint, an

impersonal view of God can hardly be regarded as an indication

 5 7

of an atheistic or non-theistic approach. The standardized

distinction of pantheism and monotheism also cannot hold its

ground in the Hindu situation^ since in Hinduism the idea of

the oneness of G-od and that of the oneness^ of Reality do not

exclude each other, hut are always found as intertwined and

inseparahle.

Thus the concepts and standards of judgement which

have shaped the bhakti theories have in fact no relevance to

Hinduism, Their application hy western scholars in their

analysis of Hinduism was not caused hy any direct deductions

made hy them on the hasis of their acquired knowledge of the

Hindu religion, hut was a direct result of a hias derived

from their own western background to the study of an entirely

different situation. The academic principles of making a

strict division between religion and philosophy, and of

explaining both religion and theism in terms of a belief in a

personal God had taken shape in the west as a result of the

Christian reaction against the growing trends in modern

European philosophy to disregard the Christian view of God,

and to explain Him instead^, in purely abstract and impersonal

terms. They were inspired by Christian thinking, and were

formulated in the light of Christian beliefs and the Christian

conception of the Deity,

In the nineteenth century the two forces of religion

and philosophy had reached their final parting of ways in

Europe and the definition of religion was given now a more

formalised character in isolation from philosophy* Technical

and academic explanations about the true nature of theism

strictly from a Christian standpoint of a personal concept of

God was a significant outcome of these developments. The

nineteenth century Indologists whose names we have connected

with the initiation of the bhakti theories were clearly under

the influence of the contemporary Christian opinion on the

subject of theism and religion, particularly in relation to

philosophy. Therefore, seeking in the Hindu religion/ a pattern

which would fit their own concepts of God and Religion, and of

Theism and Monotheism, they perhaps saw their most fitting

example in Vaishnavism and Vaishnava forms of devotion, and

named it the bhakti religion,,

1

The origins therefore, of the main principles on

which the current ideas about bhakti are based lie in the

history of the development of modern philosophy in Europe and

the Christian reaction to it. Although they can be clearly

understood in relation to Christianity, they can have no

intrinsic validity in the context of a religion which is

totally dissimilar and has had a different mode of development.

Principles which are a direct outcome of a European situation,

1. Vide i
caused by the struggle of religion and philosophy in the

west, need not be accepted in the Hindu context. But they are

freely applied in the study of Hinduism, and it is the un­

questioned adherence to them which has resulted in the

perpetuation of an artificial definition of bhakti.

A detailed study of the conflict which arose in Europe

between religion and philosophy is undertaken in the following

pages to explain the origins of the bias inherent in the

principles which have shaped the current technical definition

of bhakti. A closer examination of certain developments in

western philosophy and their challenge to Christianity shows

more clearly the reasons for the growing bias in the west in

favour of a strict division between religion and philosophy.

Similarly, a careful observation of some of the salient

features of Christian thinking in defence of religion against

philosophy shows how and why the concept of a personal God

got finally established in academic deliberations as the sole

criterion for determining the presence or absence of theism

in any system of thought or set of beliefs.

The main purpose of the following discussion is to

substantiate our stand that the principles and measures of

judgement responsible for the formulation of the existing

ideas about bhakti are of purely western origin and background.

It is to show that since they are a direct outcome of a very

 6 0

different situation and are conditioned by dissimilar

factors, they are not relevant in the context of Hinduism.

Such an analysis is necessary to prove our thesis that the

current definition of hhakti has been artificially conceived

in the light of certain alien standards, of judgement. A

clearer understanding of the western bias against the- total

background of the European conflict between religion and

philosophy should provide us with the necessary freedom to

break away from the present academic position and make a

fresh approach to bhakti and to Hindu theism and monotheism.

In the seventeenth century, the beginning of modern

philosophy in Europe/ marked a clear break from medieval

Christian scholasticism and ushered in a long period of

conflict between religion and philosophy and between faith

and reason. Whereas earlier it had been possible for men like

St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas to demonstrate the harmony

1 it was now becoming increas­
and compatibility of the two,

ingly difficult for the Christian thought to maintain a

similar position in the face of the modern intellectual

developments. The development of the modern schools of

1. As a thinker Augustine had become the norm in every

department of philosophical enquiry for the succeeding
centuries. Warfield, ’'Augustine", ERE, Vol.II, 1909>P«222.
Thomism had become a substitute of AristotS&i'^&u
 61

philosophy in Europe in the eighteenth century and its

dominantly rational and empirical trends later created a

gulf he tween philosophy and religion in western thought

which continually grew wider throughout the nineteenth

century.

This resulted in a period of long trial for Christ­

ianity, the like of which had not heen witnessed before.'*"

Christianity which had guided and controlled European thought

for so long, and was accepted as a revealed truth, was now

in danger. So far the Christian truths had been regarded as

perfect in their revelation, but now a new bias of truth was

being discovered in philosophy, which to a new class of

philosophers was of deeper significance than the revealed

truths of Christianity. Reason was now installed by them as

the new criterion of truth. Reason, which dwelt in man and

was self sufficient. It did not require the authority of

revelation, for no revelation could be totally complete from

the standpoint of reason. Truth could be discovered through

human effort and investigation for man was endowed with the

faculty of reason/ and could formulate his discoveries without

the aid of divine revelation. Christianity which rested on the

1. Paul Hazard, European Thought in the Eighteenth Century,

Translation by J.Lewis May, Hollis and Carter, London,
195k9 see in particular "Christianity on Trial”, pp. 3-93*
truth of a divine revelation and was upheld hy faith was hound

to he the first casualIty in this new age of reason. Nothing

could remain exempt from the final tests of reason and nothing

could he accepted as a final mystery, not even the Divine

Revelation embodied in the Christian religion. The mystery of

God also could perhaps be solved by an intellectual enquiry

and a correct application of reason unaided by the authority

of the Gospels and of revelation. But to question the Biblical

revelation was the same as questioning the truth of the

Biblical God, the God of Moses, the God of David. Thus not

only the institutional Christianity, but the Christian God

1
himself was now on trial•

The incompatibility of Faith and Reason became grow-

ingly apparent with the growth of modern European philosophy

in view of the incompatibility of philosophical explanations

of God and the Biblical representations of Him. The concept

of a personal God, fundamental to Christian beliefs, was being

constantly assailed by the philosophers, and Revelation and

Divine Mediation were now exposed to the glaring light of

Reason, Not the dependence on God and obedience to His will

and laws, but the development of subjective life with the aid

of Reason and Morality inherent in man, were held forth as a

1. Paul Hazard, ibid., see "The God of the Christians

Impeached", p p .4U-59•
new value. Not the God who had made His covenant with Adam

and had re-affirmed it in Jesus Christ, hut Consciousness,

the Soul, and Spirit were heing described as the Ultimate

Reality# The new prophets of Reason had not been slow in

their efforts to understand and explain God, They were

describing Him in terms of abstractions such as. " infinity”

and "perfection", as the "Absolute" and the "Ultimate", as

a "cause" and a "substance". The God of the philosophers

had no personality. He was not the author of the Divine

Revelation embodied in the Bible. How could this impersonal-

ised God, an$ intellectual abstraction, be the true object

of Christian worship.

From the standpoint of orthodox Christianity, all

these developments had resulted from the indifference and

disregard for the authority of the Bible. Christian thinking

therefore had been suspicious of modern philosophy from the

very early days of their mutual confrontations. It had become

1, The nature of this dilemma which now confronted the

Christian thinkers stands out very clearly in Pascal (16231
62). The following words are a part of the "memorial"
found stitched up in his doublet after his death:
God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob,
Not of philosophers and savants
* * #

He is only found by the ways taught in the Gospel

• o. that they may know thee
The only true God and him thou has sent
Jesus Christ
W.J.Cobb, "Pascal", ERE IX, 1917* P . 65U.
increasingly imperative for Christianity to reassert its old

certainties with a fresh vigour. Biblical truths were fixed

truths. The advance of philosophy could not be allowed to

tamper with the personal notion of God whose true nature, the

truth of whose perfect revelation, and whose mediation in

human affairs were so clearly conveyed in the Bible. The

philosophical explanations of God and the intellectual

reasoning which supported them could be combated only with

the force of the Christian faith in the Biblical God, who was

not an Idea or Spirit, but was Personal in character. He was

the God who had revealed Himself in history, who had sent His

Son Jesus Christ for the redemption of the sins of man, and

who had made His will known to mankind.

Thus in the light of Christianity, religion could

mean only faith and trust in a personal God. Attempts to

understand Him on other grounds were only deviations.

Explanations of God in abstract and impersonal terms could be

regarded only as philosophical speculations, but not as

religious truths. If faith and reason, and religion and

knowledge failed to attain a workable compatibility, the

division between religion and philosophy must be clearly

marked out.

Reasoning and knowledge might serve a faith fixed in

a Personal God, but could not supersede it, for religion and
God were matters of the heart and not of the intellect. Not

knowledge of God hut love for Him as a Person was the very

essence of religious devotion. The Christian truth of a

personal God therefore was not to he compromised with the

philosophical advances. Religion was a different realm from

philosophy and the God of the philosophers could not he the

God of religion, the personal God that the Christians had

known and revered. Nineteenth century Evangelism and theology

were able to establish all this on a doctrinal basis through

Christian reasoning. It was finally proved that religion was

a realm separate from that of philosophy and was self-suffic-

ient and true in itself.

The following analysis of the challenge of philosophy

to Christianity, from Descartes to Hegel, brings out certain

salient points of attack on Christianity. At the same time it

broadly outlines some characteristic features of Christian

defence showing its main strongholds and essential objectives

the fundamentals for which Christianity fought its battles

and the grounds on which it gained its lasting victories. It

is also shown how by the nineteenth century the Christian

thinking was able to isolate religion from philosophy, faith

from reason, and the personal representation of God from the

impersonal speculations about Him.

Descartes, who represents the central position of the

new rationalism did concern himself with questions related to

the existence and nature of God, "hut did not formulate his

answers in accordance with the Christian faith* Although he

continued to he a Catholic, he did not recognise God in his

thought system in the light of Christian beliefs* He laboured

to prove instead, the existence of God on grounds of his own

categories of "innate ideas’1 and through an analogy of

mathematical truth* According to him, the innate awareness of

the finite man of his imperfection was in itself a proof of

1
something infinite and perfect* Though he did not attack the

Christian God, Descartes subjected God to mathematical logic,

and in so doing impersonalised Him* "You can substitute the

mathematical order of nature for God, whenever I use the

Q
latter term", said Descartes, Descartes' recognition of an

"innate idea", God, however, was a departure from his logical

(Xc.fcovehl'WJ' ifc Ware
position^frhat. all truths self-evident, and which otherwise

did not allow for any assumptions in reasoned thinking* At

the same time Descartes did not conform to the Christian

acceptance of God on the basis of faith and revelation. Thus

1. Rene Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy",

Meditation III in: The Discourse on Method and Metaphy-
physical Meditations. Trans, by Gertrude Burford Rawlings,
Walter Scott, London, 1901.

2. Descartes, quoted, Crane Brinton, Ideas and Menf

Jonathan Cape, London 1951* p»350.
 67

neither did he keep God outside his logical system (which

would have at least maintained a division “between religion

and philosophy from the start), nor did he work out a

concept of God completely consistent with the totality of

his thought and logic* He left behind a philosophical

situation which was uncertain either way.

The Cartesan explanation of God however was later

questioned “by Locke, whose rigid empiricism did not allow for
*1
any "innate ideas". Locke was against all a priori methods,

and was not concerned with the question of spiritual substance,

whether of the individual self or of God. According to him,

certainty could be brought to knowledge only by studying the

source and origin of an idea. As ideas could be derived only

on grounds of sensation and reflection, no idea could ever

p
exist outside human experience. If there was a substratum,

"a something" which was the cause of ideas, Locke did not wish

to probe into it. Philosophy^suggested Locke, should not

concern itself with enquiry into realms which cannot be

explored by scientific methods of observation.

Since Locke treated philosophy as completely inde­

pendent of religion it could.now push forward without

1. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,

Book I, Clarendon Pre ss, Oxford 192 k .

2* Ibid*a Book II.

 6 8

necessarily concerning itself with the questions related to

the nature and existence of God, At the same time Locke

could separate Christianity from his philosophy and could

discuss it on its own terms on grounds of its own scriptural

evidence without its interfering with his otherwise empirical

stand. He saw no need to work out their compatibility, for

according to Locke, the one necessary article of faith for

a Christian was to regard Jesus Christ as the Messiah and

Saviour, and to follow the path shown by Him and His

1
apostles, A similar stand of viewing religion in separation

from o n e ’s general intellectual attitude had been taken

earlier by Hobbes, "The scripture”, according to Hobbes,

’’was written to show unto men the kingdom of God and to

prepare their minds to become His obedient subjects, leaving

the world and the philosophy thereof to the disputations of

2
men for,the exercising of their natural reason,"

The ideas of Descartes on God were picked up in a

different spirit by Spinoza, Taking a stand very different

from Locke, Spinoza tried to establish the idea of God in

philosophy through a consistent and logical process. Working

1, John Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, as

delivered in the Scriptures, Awnshawn John Churchill,
London 1695 •

2 0 Hobbes, quoted by E,J,E0 Woodbridge in: "Hobbes",

ERE, VI, 1913.
with the concepts of mathematics like Descartes, hut avoid­

ing his dualism of mind and matter, Spinoza managed to

arrive at a new metaphysics* According to Spinoza, God and

nature were two different names for the same substance, and

there was no need of proving either of them. For him God

was "eternal existence" and could he known through the

science of intuition (scientia intuitiva) which was for him

1
a higher category than perception and reason. All things

flowed from eternal existence, and the things known as. well

as the knowing mind shared in it*

Spinoza clearly rejected the anthropomorphism of

Christian theology and the Christian belief in Revelation.

His God could not he explained as a personality because hy

God he meant, "... a being absolutely infinite a

substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each

2
expressed eternal and infinite essentiality." According to

Spinoza, things were not created by God at a certain point

in history but they flowed from His nature from eternity to

eternity. The ultimate end of man in relation to God lay

not in the attitude of obedience and surrender to His will

1. E.E.Kellet, "Spinoza", ERE, XI, 1920, pp.776-77.

See also Spinoza*s Ethics, Part II, prop.XL note ii,
Everyman*s Library, London 1910.

2. Ibid., Part I, def. VI.

and His defined laws, but in the efforts to gain knowledge
of Him. Man oould gain knowledge of God only through

Knowledge of his own eternity. This knowledge and conscious­

ness of God constituted for Spinoza a loving attitude towards

God. He described this love as amor intellectualis Del, or

1
the intellectual love of God. The concept of a personal

God was not^necessfJc^B' in Spinozafs doctrine. According to

him, "God in so far as he loves himself, loves man, and

consequently the love of God towards men and the intellectual

love of the mind towards God are identical."

The position taken by Locke and Spinoza, so different

from each other on the question of God and religion were

bound to have an impact on the subsequent philosophical

speculations on the themes. Spinoza was essentially a meta­

physician and God occupied a central position in his thought

system. Locke on the other hand was a staunch empiricist

who did not occupy himself with philosophical questions

related to the. subject of God. Spinoza made no compromises

with theological ideas of a personal God, and had no

respect for the traditional faith in the Revelation. Locke

whose philosophy did not entertain speculation on that

1. Ibid., Part V, proposition XXXII (corollary), proposition

XXXIII and XXXIV.

2, Ibid., Part V, proposition XXXVI, corollary.

subject could view religion in isolation from bis intellectual

conviction and could thus endorse the "Reasonableness of

Christianity".

Both these attitudes - to explain God in terms of an

Absolute in philosophy, and to keep Him out of philosophical

speculation - can be seen in the later philosophers. Whereas

new queries were posed, and new answers were elicited in

metaphysics on grounds of the former attitude, the latter

type of approach opened up the possibilities of a complete

segregation of religion and philosophy, as well as of

scepticism regarding the validity of God and religion as they

could not fully withstand the tests of empiricism. If on one

hand, Leibniz and Berkeley struggled with the metaphysical

questions, David Hume, on the other, raised a new and

meaningful voice of scepticism on the subject of God and

religion, which influenced the whole of the eighteenth

century thought.

Both Leibniz and Berkeley, through pure rationalism

and empirical reasoning respectively, tried to repudiate the

position of Spinoza by placing God outside the universe.

Leibniz, in his scheme of harmonious, self-sufficient, and

active monads, thought of a sufficient reason, existing out­

side the universe, which alone could explain its creation and

harmonious functioning. This reason was the God of Leibniz-—

 72

Wihta
a God/was the author of the "pre-established harmony1® of the

monads, and the creator of the universe« But though existing

outside the universe, and its primary cause, philosophically

the God of Leibniz was not very much more than an "original

simple substance11 The God of Berkeley, on the other hand

with His position fixed as separate from the universe, was

more active than the God of Leibniz.. Berkeley conceived God

as the "Eternal Invisible Mind"^ who produces and sustains

all things, and who can affect man "every moment with all the

sensible impressions" he perceives. Ideas are not self-

sufficient. They require an entity in which they can abide.

Although Leibniz too had emphasised the nature of God as the

creator and His entity as separate from the Universe, it was

the philosopher-priest Berkeley, who succeeded in explaining

God in terms more acceptable to Christians, for he was able

to formulate an idea of God in the field of metaphysics which

was, compatible with the Christian beliefs. He described God

as the Divine Creator and Guide who alone could sustain and

lend meaning to the human phenomenon.

1. G-.W. Leibniz, The Monadology and other Philosophical

Writings, transl. by R.Latta, Clarendon Press, London
1898, Section U7.
2 0 George Berkeley, "Principles of Human Knowledge", section
Skf in: Essays, Principles, Dialogues with Selections from
Other Writings, edited by M. Whiton Calkins, Charles
Scribners & son, London 1929•
 7 3

But even the "spiritual Realism" of Berkeley could

not stop the rising tides of doubt and unbelief on subjects

pertaining to God and religion. Hume, a contemporary of

Berkeley suggested that metaphysics of God and soul did not

constitute rational knowledge. Although H u m e fs stand was that

of a sceptic, and not of an atheist he had no sentiment or

respect for the Christian religion. The scepticism of Hume,

armed with his theories of human nature, causality, and belief;

brought the greatest damage to Christianity. Through his

analytic method Hume tried to reach the very source and nature

of religion and analysed it as an aspect of human nature. "An

opinion or belief", according to Hume was only "a lively idea

1
related to, or associated with, a present impression". Sure
belief could be formed only through an apprehension of the

content of an impression or our immediate experience* Beliefs

based on indirect evidence and hearsay were only vague and

uncertain ideas, the mystery of which could be solved by

tracing the original impressions which caused them* Hume

therefore wanted to subject religious beliefs to drastic,

abstract, and experimental reasoning. Speaking of Christianity,

he said, "Our most holy religion is founded on faith, not on

reason, and it is a sure method of exposing it, to put it to

1, David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part III,

Section VII, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1888.
such a trial as it is hy no means fitted to endure."^-

Hume's "grand academic design", The Natural History

of Religion, was a psychological and historical analysis of

the phenomenon of religion, which had no relevance to

Christianity, and was the opposite pole of all ideas about

God Derived from a basic faith in Divine Revelation. Hume was

not concerned with an enquiry into the nature of philosophi­

cal religion, but was to probe into "the religious beliefs

and behaviour of the masses of mankind, viewing them

clinically as a widespread reality of conduct and not as an

p
approach to truth." He had clarified his aim at the very

outset. His Natural History of Religion was an enquiry into

the foundations of religion in reason, and its origin in

humanrnature. This was a position far-removed from the

simple but unfailing trust in Divine Revelation and the

conception of a personal God, the two factors of great

significance for Christian belief.

1. Hume, quoted, Basil Willey, The 18th Century Background,

London, 1957* p.129.

2. Frank E. Manuel, The Eighteenth Century Confronts the Gods.,

Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass,., 1959> p.170.

3- David Hume stated "As every enquiry which regards religion

is of the utmost importance, there are two questions in
particular which challenge our attention, to wit, that
concerning its foundation in reason, and that concerning
its origin in human nature." David Hume, Four Dessertat-
ions By David Hume, A.Miller, London 1757 > p«l»
 The guestions concerning the nature and existence of

God were finally brought to a blind alley by H u m e !s scepticism*

His approach not only made a mockery of Christian faith and

theology, but also raised doubts about the efficacy and

validity of all speculative attempts at a cognition of God*

In view of H u m e ’s approach to religion and metaphysics not

only the Christian God but also the God of the philosophers

stood in need of further justification on fresh grounds* It

was Emmanuel Kant, who finally found the way out of H u m e ’s

scepticism and placed European philosophical thought on a new

and more definite track* But Kant was not concerned with the

question of the ultimacy of God as. an entity existing outside

of man* Although in his earlier works, Kant had spoken of "an

unconditionally necessary being1' and of a ,fnecessary extra-

mundane substance1', and had sought rational proofs for the

"Being of God", in the more vital years of his philosophical

career he declared that all questions connected with the

existence of God fall "outside the legitimate limits of

1 He examined the rationally
speculative investigation".

possible proofs of the existence of God and dismissed them as

mere fallacies.

The forces of reason now, in the newly fashioned garb

of Kantian philosophy, reasserted their former challenge to

1* A.E. Taylor, "Theism : Kant", ERE XII, 1921, pp.275-276.

traditional Christianity. In his Critique of Pure Reason,

Kant marked out a new way of reasoning, which by its very

nature was. to prove detrimental to every form of faith

derived from authority, every concept of the ultimacy of

God as the power residing outside the human, and all beliefs

in divine intervention* For Kant, not God, but the human

mind, was the centre of all things. According to him all

causal relations could be found in human reason, which was

capable of operating alone, without resorting to anything

other than itself. For Kant the unconditioned, the real,

and the positive could reside only within man, in his reason

and in his moral sense.

God as an acting agent separate from man, His will

and mediation, had no significance in Kantian philosophy. Kant

believed in an "intelligible realm of spirit", which, carrying

the force of a moral law within it, vindicated itself as, a

moral agent. The only possible religion, according to him,

was that of "Duty" and "morality". Not the divine will, but

principles capable of universal application, and the moral

sense innate to man, were regarded by Kant as the foundations

of such a religion. Kant explained this as the ^Religion

within the Limits of Mere Reason*. This was a very different

position from that of Christianity.

£-
The new vistas thrown open by Kant s transcendent
reason for metaphysical speculations found a rich expression

in the German Idealists during the first half of the nineteenth

century. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel were all concerned with

the ultimate nature of existence and made "mind" the pivotal

point of their thought. They evolved a philosophy of the

’spirit’ and ’self’, the Absolute, which Hegel tried to make

compatible with the God of religion.

Fichte formulated a metaphysical viewpoint on the

basis of K a n t ’s epistemology and logic. Accepting the Kantian

principle of the.unity of self-consciousness, Fichte developed

his idea of the "ego", a unity which could include everything

in existence and knowledge. Fichte described the principle

of self-consciousness as self-luminious which required no

proofs, but could be known through intellectual intuition.

Schelling developed the idea of the ego still further by

removing the difference between the ’ego ’ and the ’non-ego’

of Fichte. Rejecting the dualism of nature and spirit, he

explained the universe as an organism dominated by a common

soul. Schellingfs philosophy was a philosophy of identity, in

which reason or intelligence was the self-identical absolute,

and self-consciousness, the highest form of intelligence. The

philosophical position of both Fichte and Schelling was far

removed from the Christian ideology.

1

1• History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western, edited by

S. Radhakrishnan, 2 Vols. George Allen & Unwin, 19539
Vol.II, pp.263-268.
 It was Hegel who finally made out a rational and

confident case for an agreement between religion and philosophy

over the fundamental question of the Ultimate or the Absolute*

Religion according to him was not a sphere of reality, hut

was an attitude towards it as "the object of the religious-

attitude is the Absolute in its unity, in its completeness,

in its truth". Philosophy, he pointed out, was concerned with

the understanding of the same reality* Both deal with the

same content, though the way they grasp it assumes different

forms* The Absolute of philosophy was not different from the

G-od of religion, Hegel stated, since there could not be two

truths about the Absolute, which is the Supreme Truth and is

One• ^

Although Hegel showed some eagerness in pointing out

the common ground between religion and philosophy, as is

understandable in the light of his early theological training

and his Christian sentiments, he never compromised the ultimacy

of philosophy and its innate superiority over religion. Only

the former, as a system of pure reason, could serve as the

final repository of truth. Religious forms were only symbolical

representations, and were therefore inadequate in explaining

the essential nature of God as Absolute Spirit. Hegel

1. J.B. Baillie, "Hegel”, ERE V I . 1913, pp.5&+-87

 7 9

explained that a symbolical representation of truth was com­

pelled by its own dialectic to pass on to the supreme form of

the "notion", which alone could embody the finality of truth.

According to Hegel the realm of !notions! was philosophy, and

not religion.

On grounds of a similar logic, Hegel forged ahead to

establish the finality of the Absolute of philosophy in

relation to the God of religion. Hegel viewed Reality as a

development of the Absolute mind going through the unceasing

process of dialectic. The Absolute of Hegel, in other words,

was a self-evolving spirit - the Absolute Idea of his Logic -

which was infinite and self-determinant in character. Only a

spiritual and an idealistic relationship could be sustained

between this Absolute and the universe. The Absolute was

grasped in religion only through "symbolical representations"

and "pictorial thinking", but its true essence lay in the

Idea. The description of God in religion as the Creator, the

King, and the Father, were only pictorial representations

of the Absolute and were therefore limited explanations of

reality.'*'

According to Hegel, though the modes of realisation

were essential to both religion and philosophy, it was. in

philosophy and not in religion that the highest expression

I* Ibid.. p.566.
of the self-conscious spirit could he found. Speculation was

the final stage and crown of the life of spirit. Feeling,

essential to religion, and the Idea, essential to speculation,

led to the same end according to Hegel, because the self-

manifestation in religion as well as the self-articulation in

speculative science proceed from the same spirit. When spirit

realises itself by recovering itself from its self-alienated

otherness, it becomes the Absolute* Thus the "revelation of

God to man in religion and God's revelation of Himself to

1
Himself in infinite spirit" were one and the same thing.

Although Hegel accepted the notion of religion as real in its

essence, and as an expression of the Absolute Spirit, he also

pointed out that in religion "the real is cast in the mould

of history and is bound up with the course of time", making

the evolution of the notion of religion also an evolution of

a historical reality,

Hegel's philosophy came as a fresh challenge to

Christian thought. The earlier philosophers had either

rejected the traditional ideas on God and religion, or had

cautiously questioned their validity. Some of them had not

concerned themselves with these questions, whereas some others

had formulated their own ideas on them. Hegel on the other

hand clearly recognized the validity of religion and the truth

1. Ibid,. po585o
of God represented in it* But he created a crisis by asserting

the superiority of philosophy over religion, and of the

Absolute of philosophy over the God of religion. This was

perhaps a greater danger for Christianity than those which it

has confronted before.

Faith in the Biblical God was fundamental to Christ­

ianity. From the Christian standpoint therefore, philosophy

could not be allowed to tamper with the personal notion of

God whose true nature, the truth of whose perfect revelation,

and whose mediation in human affairs were so clearly conveyed

in the Bible. The Biblical truths were fixed truths and must

be held as sacrosanct in spite of the advances made in human

knowledge and reasoning. This was the attitude which

determined the line of Christian defence against the dangers

caused by the new trends in philosophy. Both the Christian

image of a personal God and the authority of the Bible were

now freshly emphasised.

But the attempts made by Christian thought in that

direction could ignore neither the new intellectual climate

nor the two great watchwords of the age, "Reason" and "Nature".

For a long time scriptural exegesis and religious publications

aimed at arguing out the case for Christian beliefs, through

the accepted norms of reasoning, to prove their compatibility

with the new found laws of Reason and Nature. The old Christian
 8 2

certainty of* faith were cast in the new mould of reason with

the free application of "both the rationalism of Descartes and

the empiricism of Locke, as a result of which, soon a new kind

of Christian scholarship took shape which relied more on

methods of intellectual explanation and rational persuasion

than on appeals to faith and innate religious feelings of the

heart

Although an intense intellectual activity of this

kind was a predominant feature of the Christian response,

the greater and more effective support for the Christian

certainties however came not from them, hut from another

source, the main inspiration of which was rooted essentially

in faith and religious feelings. Movements such as that of

John Wesley contributed much more towards religious revivalism

than the rational efforts of the theologians and Christian

intellectuals. For Wesley the true Christian faith was not

an intellectual acceptance of the orthodox opinion hut was a

vital act of faith and a hahit of soul trusting in Christ and

abiding in Him. This habit of Christian devotion could be

cultivated only through a constant awareness of the personal

and Biblical God, and the eternal hope of salvation in Christ,

His Son. Belief in God as a person and in His revelation

through the person of Christ was therefore a fundamental

1* I?u^Ka21aIl(3-> ibid.« pp.73-86.

characteristic of the more powerful movements of religious
revivalism.

Another important feature of religious revivalism of

the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was a greater and a

more strict adherence to the Gospel. A complete acceptance of

the Scriptural authority, as an act of faith, was declared

essential for Christian devotion. Intellectual explanations

and understanding of the Scriptural truths had not proved

sufficient and could never serve as proper substitute for the

blessedness of a fervent faith. On the contrary, theological

activities in that direction had confused the true nature of

faith, which by its very nature could be self-sufficient and

needed no support from the intellect. The Gospel must be

approached in the spirit of faith and not in that of

intellectual enquiry. The latter path had shown many pitfalls

and had led some theologians to exercise so much freedom in

interpreting the Biblicab text that finally they had lapsed

into expounding views which were far removed from the basic

position of the Christian faith.

The Evangelical movement of the nineteenth century

which contributed so much towards religious revivalism was a

vigorous affirmation of the completeness of the Biblical

truths and the value of a fixed religious faith. It clearly

pointed out the "divine inspiration, authority, and the self-

sufficiency of the Holy Scriptupes" and was primarily

dedicated to the promotion of the interests of ”Scriptural

W ». of in « . ~ntt„
depravity of human nature”, the incarnation of the Son of

G-od and His atonement for the sins of mankind, and the

Trinity of the Persons in the unity of Godhead, were some

of the points which served as the doctrinal basis of the

Evangelical .Alliance of 181+6.

Both the eighteenth century Methodism enunciated by

John Wesley and the subsequent expression of Evangelism in

the nineteenth century show the same spirit. There is an

evidence in both of the Christian keenness to uphold the

personal image of God and to emphasise the value of simple

faith and religious feeling as against the intellectual

approach to religion and doctrinal theology. The emphatic

assertions of Methodism and Evangelism in these directions

i^ere a culmination of similar assertions made by Christianity

at the very outset of its trial against philosophy. In the

seventeenth century, the same attitudes were reflected in the

p
development of the "Covenant Theology" and the contemporary

movement which is generally referred to as "Pietism". The

1. David S. Schaff, ".Evangelical Alliance", ERE V . 1912, p.601.

2. W. Adams Brown, "Covenant Theology", ERE IV, 1911, pp.216-

22k.

3. E.S. Waterhouse, "Pietism", ERE X, 1918, pp.6-9.

emphasis on the idea of the Covenant in theology was at the

same time an equally strong assertion of the idea of a

personal God. Similarly, seventeenth century Pietism was an

expression of the Christian awareness of the incompatibility

of "Faith” and "Reason”. Spener, the leading figure of the

Pietist movement had explained that neither "correct

knowledge” nor the "illumination of understanding” was so

important to religion as; the feelings of the heart and the

"stimulation of the will” .

Another important development of the nineteenth

century deserves our attention in the present context. A new

basis for modern Protestant theology was. now offered in an

academically reasoned manner by the German philosopher-priest,

Schleiermacher. Schleiermacher explained feeling as the most

fundamental part of religion. Although he stated that the

different religions of the world represented different forms

of "Fundamental religious consciousness”, he closely connected

his theory of religionjas feeling^with Christianity. Christ­

ianity, according to him was not a body of doctrine, but was

a "condition of heart" - a mode of consciousness making itself

known in a devout feeling of dependence on God. In this

reliance on feeling, we find in Schleiermacher a continuation

of the Pietist Stand of Spener and others who had earlier

1, W.B. Selbie, "Schleiermacher” . ERE XI, 1920, pp.236-239*

 8 6

explained the nature of religion on those lines. He further

fortified that Stand and gave it the status of a doctrine

and a philosophical theory.

Although Schleiermacher was inclined towards

philosophy, he was essentially a Christian theologian and

never denied the necessity of a personal G-od as the object

of devout religious feelings. He saw in Christianity a

religion of redemption and reconciliation - the ’'action of

God in response to” the strivings of man, and in Jesus Christ

’.'the one Mediator to men” , Schleiermacher sought a philoso­

phical basis for religion, opening up possibilities of

reasoning in theology, he always accepted the Christian

premises of a personal Cod, Revelation, and Divine mediation.

His theological efforts were in fact directed towards

reforming and re-stating Protestant theology by ’’making

religious experience or the sense of dependence on Cod

mediated through Jesus Christ, the norm of dogmatic theology

rather than the Creeds, the fathers or the unaided human

p
reason” . Modern Protestant theology, subsequent to

Schleiermacher, reflects his basic attitude of reasoning and

philosophical theorisation about religion, accompanied by

strong affirmation of the Christian certainties.

1. Ibid,, p ,238 •

2, Ibid., p.237.
 87

Thus not hy pure reasoning hut hy upholding the

authority of the Gospel, Christianity was ahle to win its

final victories through an assertion of its old certainties

on grounds of faith and religious feeling* Only a personal

concept of God could trulyvindicate the truth of the Biblical

God, who was not to he confused with the God of the philosoph­

ers, Religion and philosophy had to he recognised as two

clearly separate Only a fixed faith in a personal

God and the doctrinal feelings caused hy such a faith could

he accepted as the true ingredients of Religion'and Theism,

Intellectual enquiry and reasoning ahout God and the

descriptions of Him in impersonal and abstract terms, could

he viewed only as philosophical speculations.

As discussed earlier, the academic attitudes based

on these considerations have played a great part in the

shaping of the bhakti theories, identifying it with Vaishna-

vism, and explaining Vaishnavism as Hindujfcheism and monotheism.

But whereas the division between Religion and Philosophy can

he easily understood and accounted for in the Christian

context against the background of the long struggle between

the two in the west, generalisations on its basis to regard

Religion and Philosophy as exclusive of each other in a

completely dissimilar situation can hardly he justified. The

treatment of philosophy and Religion as two different and

separate areas of thought may he perfectly valid in the

former case, hut the extension of the same principle and its

application to the Indian situation, where the two are always,

found interlinked, has led only to misconceptions. It is

necessary therefore to make a fresh reappraisal of bhakti and

of Hindu theism and monotheism in isolation from these

considerations.

iv• A Re-assessment of Hindu Theism and Monotheism

The formulation of the present ideas of bhakti as a

Hindu archetype of monotheism, its complete identification

with Vaishnavism,
* 7 and its further elaboration in terms of a

theistic religion of loving devotion to a personal God as

opposed to the intellectual approach and exclusive character

of Brahminism, could he possible only through an evasion of

the real nature and indigenous pattern of Hindu monotheism.

We have argued that such ideas could take shape only with the

assistance of certain technical theories about the essentials

of theism, and with the guidance of a line of division between

philosophy and religion. Only in the light of these considera­

tions could monotheism be placed in the Vaishnava sect and

the true characteristics of religion, as different from

philosophy, attributed to it, to make it stand apart from the

Brahminic thought.
 It was the search for a Hindu pattern which would fit

the western definition of monotheism, which resulted in

interpreting the exaltation of the personality of Vishnu to

the highest position hy the Vaishnavas, as an expression of

true monotheism.^ But if Vaishnavism is regarded as a

monotheistic expression of Hindu religion on these grounds,

all similar Hindu sectarian phenomena for identical reasons,

must also he regarded as the same. Paradoxically enough, on

the hasis of the same argument, Hinduism can appear as an

amalgam of many monotheisms - a position, which can hardly he

regarded as tenahle. Hindu monotheism however must he

examined in its proper perspective without preoccupation with

non-Hindu definitions of monotheism.

1. Grierson's exposition of Vaishnavism as the monotheistic

religion of India was clearly inspired hy this considera­
tion. He introduced his study "The Monotheistic Religion of
Ancient India and its Descendant the Modern Indian Doctrine
of Faith" as a refutation of the following view expressed
hy an eminent English divine: "One of the greatest
obstacles to the spread of Christianity amongst educated
men in India is the fact that a false philosophy has gone
far to undermine and destroy the presuppositions of natural
religion which render the evidence for the truth of Christ­
ianity credible. When the idea of a personal God, Who has
created and rules the world and Who cares for and loves the
creatures whom He has made, has been obscured and lost, it
is difficult to bring home to men the probability of a reve­
lation or the reasonableness of the Incarnation." - Grierson
explained that the above view pertained to the "pantheism of
the Vedanta school of Indian philosophy" which was "pro­
fessed only by a certain number of learned Brahmans" and
that "monotheism could be traced in Vaishnavism, which as a
religion was as monotheistic as Christianity»" George A.
Grierson, The Monotheistic Religion of Ancient India,
ib i d .. PP*3"Uj see also pp.11-12.
 It is important to recognize that Hindu monotheism

has not taken shape through the denial of gods for God, hut

has been the result of the identification of all gods in God.

It is equally important to bear in mind that Hindu philosophi­

cal monism, which is described as Hindu pantheism by the

western scholars, can in no way be regarded as an antithesis

of monotheism in the Hindu context.

It is not possible to define Hindu theism in terms

of a single dogma or doctrine. Hor can its nature be clearly

outlined on grounds of any one scriptural text, as is possible

in the case of the Christian and Islamic theisms which are

directly rooted in the Bible and the Quran. Hindu theism can

be properly ascertained only in the light of some central idea

or belief, common and essential to every practising sect and

every articulate expression of Hindu religious thinking. In

spite of the wide, scope of Hinduism and its multiple doctrinal

aspects, it should not be difficult therefore to define its

basic theism without resorting to the fixed western theories

about religion, and the line of division between religion

and philosophy. But this new ground cannot be discovered

without abandoning the present academic habit of applying

ready-made theories of western origin to the Indian situation

and without directing our attention to the indigenous

classification and distinction of the astika and nastika

religions, which the Hindus have always known and recognized.

 The true nature of Hindu theism must he sought in

those bonds of common belief which were responsible for

holding together numerous thought systems and sects in the

larger unity of the astikas and by asserting which, the

astikas were always able to maintain their theistic unity

against the atheistic or the nastika trends of thought. The

strongest link uniting all the astikas was the common belief

in the ultimate Reality of the Atman or the soul and in its

eternity and immutability. On account of this, every astika

explanation of God, irrespective of its particular source of

origin, could make Him consonant with the principle of the

Atman. This holds true of both the diversity of the religio-

philosophical speculations of the astika systems and of the

worship of the numerous deities by the various astika sects.

Thus, amongst the Hindus, the final acceptance of one God has

taken shape around the understanding of God through an imper­

sonal abstraction of Him in an idea, and through the recogni­

tion of all philosophical speculations concerning God not as

mere intellectual abstractions but as an integral part of

religious thinking.

The use of the western criteria therefore, of the

concept of God of an essentially personal nature and of a

definition of religion which must isolate it from philosophi­

cal thinking was bound to cau.se some serious errors in the

understanding of the Hindu theism.and 4 strict adherence to

them has been responsible for the present explanations of the

total Hindu theism in terms of the worship of personal deities

such as Vishnu and in terms of some aspecWthe Hindu sectarian

zeal to maintain the supremacy of the personal character of

the sectarian deities. The significance, however, of the

impersonalised idea of God, and the constant identification

of religion and philosophy in Hinduism must not be under­

estimated in a proper assessment of the Hindu theism, for it

has a distinct character of its own. Neither the presence or

absence of a concept of a personal God nor the dividing line

between religion and philosophy can have any validity in

judging the nature of Hindu theism.

The Hindu theism does not emanate from any belief in

a Divine Revelation fixable in historical time, nor is it

based on a belief in God's declaration of the finality of His

will and law through any one personality. The beginnings of

Hindu theism cannot be traced back to a revelation of God

as an outward cosmic force seeking out man and working for

his redemption, but can be detected rather in man's awareness

of Him as the One and only cosmic truth in the human yearning

to know and understand Him. A contemplative .and philosophical

approach to God clearly marks the entire evolution of Hindu

theism, and the authoritative scriptures of the Hindus, for

that reason, are regarded as the works of seers and are not

viewed as an embodiment of the "revealed will of God". An

equally important feature of Hindu theism is the abstract and

impersonal representation of God, accepted by all Hindus in

spite of their sectarian differences and the different deities

worshipped by them. Thus in Hinduism, as acknowledged by Renou,

religion and philosophical speculation "have gone hand in hand

i
from the very outset"* Consequently, an impersonal and

immanent view of the Godhead has always formed an integral

part of Hindu theism. It must be fully recognized that the

Hindu philosophy, in spite of its hair-splitting polemics has

always been concerned with the religious; and that the Hindus,

in spi t® of the multiplicity of the vulgar manifestations of

their religion, have always accepted the speculative approach

as religious* Thus metaphysics and philosophy cannot be

separated from Hindu theism* The latter therefore, must be

determined in the light of the total religio-philosophical

thought of the Hindus,

As in the case of Hindu theism, a correct understand­

ing of Hindu monotheism also requires a different perspective

from the one offered by western theorisation in general about

the true nature of monotheism* As pointed out earlier, the

present conceptual category of monotheism with its full

implications can be held valid only in relation to religions

1* Louis Renou, Hindu!sm, London 1961, p # 8 .

of Semitic origin, and cannot be correctly applied to the

Hindu situation. The shaping of Hindu monotheism constitutes

a very different pattern from that of the Christian and

Islamic monotheisms which had assumed their present shape on

grounds of revelation, and the subsequent negation of all the

gods worshipped before in favour of the One true God who was

conceived as a personality* In the total context of Hinduism,

however, the final acceptance of the Deity as an Impersonal

Absolute and the identification of all the gods with it, have

served as the keystone of monotheism. These factors, and not

the final emergence of the personality of any one deity as the

one true God, are the base on which Hindu monotheism rests.

This must be fully recognized if its nature is to be properly

understood.

Although a number of gods are mentioned in the Vedas,

they are finally reduced to an Absolute in the Upanishads

1 The notion of
through a process of intuition and analysis.

the Atman disposed of many gods, as well as the one God

& 2
conceived as somthing different from the human soul. The

speculation and reasoning which is freely used in the

1* Karlo Formishi, "The Dynamic Element in Indian Religious

Development", Visva-Bharati Quarterly^ 1926-27? April
1926, pp.16-28, July 1926, pp.113-24, October 1926,
pp.213-235, 333-350.

2* Ibid.., p.34U.
Upanishads to explain the Absolute cannot be regarded as non­

religious nor can this Absolute of Hindu metaphysics be

regarded as different from the Hindu concept of God, Here God,

the Absolute, who supersedes all the other deities, and in

whom they are all subsumed, does not appear as an outward

personal force, but is felt and known and takes shape in the

human mind itself. In the Hindu context, whenever speculation

and discursive knowledge fail, the understanding of God takes

shape in human intuition* For example, according to the Katha

Upanishad, "He is framed by the heart, by the thought, by the

1 ' /
mind." Similarly Svetas^ivatara Upanishad states that "God

the maker of all, the Great Spirit is fashioned by the heart,

2
the understanding and the will." God understood as this has

been recognized as one, from the very early stages of Hindu

speculation, in spite of the multitude of gods mentioned in

their scriptures* The truth of the oneness of God, the

Ultimate Reality, remains the same, though it is variously

explained. God as the Absolute and "Ultimate Reality is not

thought of as a mere philosophical abstraction or a lifeless

intellectual doctrine, but is mentioned with all the fervour

and adoration that religion can claim for Him. It is not a

1 o Kathopanishad, VI •9 •
^vet^s^vat^ra Upanishad IV.17*

3 * Rig Veda I.16U.U6; X.11^.5.

•9.................
dead and "chilling’' "intellectual abstraction" hut is

fervently regarded as the goal which all the Vedas rehearse

and all the austerities proclaim. It is described as the

Reality which captures affection in changing forms because

2
it is eternal and everlasting.

The Hindu monotheism has thus taken shape around the

"idea" of the oneness of God, and not through the acceptance

of any one unique divine personality as God superseding the

lesser gods. The belief in the oneness of God here does not

remain only a matter of faith and acceptance of the supremacy

of the personality of an accepted Higher God, but is linked

with the knowledge and understanding of Him as an impersonal

truth. The Hindu worship of personal deities such as Vishnu,

£>iva and the host of others would have meant nothing more

than a gross polytheism without the super-imposition of this

idea of the oneness of God. In the total context of Hinduism,

it is the identification of these personal deities with that

idea which lends validity to their worship as God*

The Hindu personalistic polytheism thus converges

into a monotheism through the acceptance of the truth of the

philosophical idea of the oneness of God. Manifestations of

1* Kathopanishad 11.1 5 *

2® Atharva Veda X.8.23*

 9 7

polytheism could continue only on the grounds of the universal

acceptance of the oneness of God in that sense* The sects for

which the worship of a particular personal deity is of

fundamental importance, at least in their theology always

? Y
identified the# sectarian deities with this idealised view

of God. It is only hy doing so that they were ahle to exalt

a particular deity to the supreme position of exclusive

significance in relation to the others. Since this is done

not hy one, hut many sects to uphold the worship of their

sectarian deities, such an exaltation of a personal deity to

the highest single status hy one particular sect can hardly

he accepted as the culminating point of Hindu monotheism.

v. Bhakti Reinterpreted

The word hhakti is derived from the root hha,i hy

adding the suffix ktin (ti). The suffix ktin is usually added
*1
to a verh to form an action or agent noun. According to the

rules of Panini, hhakti indicates a hhava or condition^

( v/Sha j+ti) „ The root hha,j however can convey any of the

following meanings: - to partake of, to engage in, and to turn

and resort to, to pursue, practise or cultivate; to declare

for, prefer, or choose; to serve and honour, and to love and

1 . Panini, Ashtadhyayi, III.3*9U.

P. Ihid., 111.3,18.
adore. Thus, “bhakti can mean participation as. well as

resorting to. It can mean experience as well as. practice and

1
cultivation. It can also mean reverence, love and adoration.

Bhakti, therefore is a general and a relative term,

which can be used in any of the above meanings in a wide

range of contexts, the object of bhakti remaining a variable

2
factor. Its nature, therefore, can assume a characteristic

and particular form, only when it is viewed in relation with

the object towards which it is directed.

Nevertheless, the word bhakti is generally used in

1 . A closer look at the usage of the term bhakti in the

classical Sanskrit literature can testify this. The
semantic studies of bhakti by E.Washburn Hopkins, MrInal
Dasgupta and J. G-onda deserve a mention here. Hopkins
provides us with a study of its usage in the Mahabharata,
and M. Dasgupta of that in the Vedic literature. G-onda
however has chosen a much wider scale and includes the
writings of the medieval Vaishnava acharyas in his study.
All these studies show that the word bhakti is not used in
the classical texts in its present technical meaning. All
the three authors agree on that and make definite state­
ments to that effect. Nevertheless, none of these scholars
has. rejected the modern academic definition of bhakti in
spite of these findings.
E.W.Hopkins, ”The Epic Use of Bhagavat and Bhakti’’, UNAS,
1911, for second half year, pp. 727-73^*
Mrinal Dasgupta, ”&raddha and Bhakti in Vedic Literature”,
ibid.,
J.Gonda, ”Het Begrip Bhakti”, Tijdschrift voor Philosophic,
Utrecht, Feb. 19kQ*

2. Panini, ibid., IV.3*95-100.

the context of religion and in the sense of devotion to God.

But even in its particularised religious meaning, as long as

hhakti is directed to God as the one Ultimate Reality, it can

mean devotion only in a general way irrespective of the

variations and distinctions caused in its form and manner hy

the conceptual difference of beliefs and doctrines regarding

the nature of God* To the extent that the different traditions

of the Hindus have conceived and worshipped God in different

ways, bhakti has found different formal expressions in them.

At the same time in the sense of devotion, it remains common

to all the theistic religio-philosophical systems of thought.

Consequently, instances of ready agreement between different

schools of philosophy on grounds of devotion are also not rare.

Our understanding of bhakti therefore, must take into account

its general character as devotion and must recognize the

possibilities of its different expressions. Similarly, our

assessment of the nature of bhakti in a particular religious

tradition must bear relation with the nature of the cognition

of God found therein.

It is wrong, therefore, to confine bhakti to certain

sects alone. It is equally wrong to explain that it is

compatible with only those religious patterns which provide

the image of a personal God# Bhakti in its general sense as

shown above has intrinsic possibilities in relation to both,

 100

the saguna and the nirguna view of God since "both find recog­

nition in the totality of Hindu "beliefs and Hindu modes of

worship® To the extent that the devotee accepts and worships

God in His nirguna aspect his hhakti is towards the nirguna

Brahman, and he too is a bhakta. Similarly, hhakti cannot "be

confined to the Vishnu hhaktas alone® Vaish:p.ava devotion

whether towards Vishnu

o
or towards his incarnations,' Rama and

Krishna can he interpreted only as Vishnu-bhakti and not as

hhakti pure and simple® The different ways of explaining the

nature of God however, are related rather to the realm of

Siddhanta than to that of Sadahna.

Thus hhakti hy itself does not imply any special

/concept or doctrine pertaining to the nature of God* To

describe hhakti as a kind of religion or a religious doctrine

is also a fallacy* In the Hindu context the word dharma can

he regarded as the nearest equivalent to religion. Religious

doctrines are described as Siddhanta and also as Mata* It

must he mentioned here that hhakti is never referred to as a

dharma* nor is it ever called a Siddhanta or Mata* For example

in the two well known medieval compendia of the prevalent

Siddhantas and Matas, the Sarva-Siddhanta^Sangraha of

B'anknacharya and the Sarva-Dar sana~San.gr aha of Madhavacharya,

hhakti is nowhere explained as a religion or doctrine. Even

in their treatment of Vaishnavism

o and of Vaishnava
* Vedanta,7
 1
hhakti is not discussed as their particular religion.

But hhakti is usually understood as a marga. Whereas

siddhanta and mata refer to the doctrinal aspect of religion,

and dharma to the general principles which ultimately

assimilate the doctrinal and the practical aspects in one

2
whole, marga indicates the way of the mata and siddhanta.

In other words, it is a particular doctrine which paves a

particular way. If the siddhanta or mata is concerned with

explaining the nature of God as the intimate Heality, the

marga is the path shown for knowing and worshipping Him,

Bhakti however, is recommended under various matas and

siddhantas, and is upheld hy groups of varying denominations

and convictions. Therefore hhakti, even as a marga, cannot he

given a fixed and limited meaning in the sense of a special

religious conviction.

In modern scholarship, whenever hhakti is described

as a marga, it is usually done so in contra-distinction to

the karma-marga (the path of action) and the jhana-marga

(the path of knowledge). They are explained as alternatives,

exclusive of each other, and hhakti in particular is always

1. Gankaracharya, Sarva-Siddhanta-Sahgraha, Chapter IX

(Vedavyasapaksha prakaranaTT
Madhavacharya, Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha, Chapter IV, XX
(Ram anu jad ar sanamj*

2. N.Ao Thoothi, The Vaishnavas of G u f

jarat, Longmans Green
& Co., Calcutta, 1935s p*65«
explained as Juxtaposed to the path of jjfiana or knowledge.

The view that they are two different and separate paths must

he of a very recent origin, since we do not find any early

standard and authentic exposition of hhakti setting the two

1
as distinctly apart and exclusive of each other. At the same

time the Hindu scriptures, which are usually quoted to support

the aforesaid statements, do not show evidence of such a view.

Neither in the Bhagvad-G-ita nor in the Bhagavata Pur ana, the

two texts regarded as the most authoritative in relation to

hhakti, is such a line of division drawn between knowledge

and hhakti. On the contrary, they appear in them as completely

compatible and inclusive of each other. The same is true of

the Bhakti-Strtras of Narada and 3andilya, which are also so.

1 . In this context, the following fact strikes us as very

significant. In his Sanskrit English Dictionary, Monier-
Williams has offered a number of meanings for the term
hhakti, such as trust, homage, worship, piety, faith, love
and devotion etc. These renderings of.hhakti are supported
by illustrations from the classical Sanskrit texts. But
over and above this, Monier-Williams, translates hhakti
also as a "religious principle or means of salvation to­
gether with Karman, ’w o rks’ and jhana, ’spiritual
knowledge’." This particular rendering of hhakti however
is not illustrated by the usage of the term in that sense
from any Hindu text, hut is supported by Monier-Williams’
own definition of it. Therefore, to illustrate the meaning
of hhakti as a "religious principle", different from that
of jhana, Mo nier-Williams refers to his own works Indian
Wisdom and Religious Thought and Life in India (also called
Brahmanism and Hinduism. j This should also lend some weight
to our contention that the present theories about hhakti
which define it as a special religious doctrine, different
from that of jftana, are of an artificial nature.
Monier-Wil1 iams, Sanskrit English Dictionary*
often quoted to substantiate the current theories about

bhakti

The treatment of bhakti and jfiana as counter agents.,

has caused some serious misjudgements. For example, bhakti

is interpreted as an antithesis of the principles of

classical Vedanta, a thought system held in high esteem by

the Hindus, and a philosophy which can hardly be pushed

p
aside as non-religious and non-devotional. However, the

above position is maintained on the ground that the latter

is only a philosophical system which lays down the path of

jnana, different from that of the truly theistic religion,

bhakti. Furthermore, the seeming consistency of this assumed

position is maintained by interpreting jfiana or knowledge as

an intellectual and scholastic understanding only, in spite

of the clear evidence that the Vedantins do not use the term

jftana in that sense. In the final analysis however, the

Vedantins always describe jfiana as(knowing in terms of

spiritual experience. The difference between the knowledge

derived from personal spiritual experience and the knowledge

derived from textual scholarship is often made clear and the

superiority of the former is always acknowledged by them.^

1. Bhakti in the Bh ag avad- Gita, Bhagavata Purapa, and Nar ad a

and Efahdllya Bhakti.-Sfitraa, are discussed in Chapter II.

2. Vide infra, pp, 127^ WH

3- Vide infra, pp„ IS*-36*

A misconception thus lies at the base of the related theories

which explain bhakti as an antithesis of the classical

Vedanta and the so-called 11intellectual ism" of the Brahmins .

A similar inexactitude is perpetuated by the

assertion that bhakti is incompatible with non-dualistic

explanations of the Ultimate Reality, and with the nirguna

and impersonal view of God. It is always argued that bhakti

or loving devotion requires an essential dualism, for there

must be one who loves, and another who is loved. Also, that

it is not the unfeeling impersonal Brahman, but God as a

person, who can arouse the feeling of love and devotion in

the human heart. Bhakti is thus explained as a kind of

devotion which has no validity in relation to the philosophi­

cal stand of the Advaita Vedanta, and the belief in the

nirgupa character of God,

To interpret bhakti or devotion in the above sense,

in the context of Hinduism, amounts to a negation of a funda­

mental devotional aspect of the Hindu pattern of religious

and spiritual pursuit. The path of self-realisation through

self-knowledge is an essential part of the Hindu view of

religious life and devotion. It would not be incorrect to

state that it has found due recognition in all the Hindu

sects, irrespective of the varying degree of its actual

practice in them. The Advaita^Vedantin of course, is committed

to it the most fully, and upholds it in a more non-compromising

manner than the others. But the form and manner of spiritual

pursuit advocated hy the Advaita Vedantin is often explained

as the exaltation and glorification of the self*and since it

is explained that bhakti as love needs the "other" to love

and requires an essential dualism, bhakti is set off against

this position of the Advaita Vedanta with its emphasis on the

self.

However, it must be remembered that when the Vedantin

speaks of self-realisation and self-knov/ledge, he means not

the empirical self but the self most high, the Atman, the

Brahman. It is that and not the empirical self which must be

known and realized. The Vedantin also must need God and

attachment to Atman to know and realize it. In that respect

he also requires bhakti in his spiritual quest. For the

Vedantin, the ever-existent duality exists within himself,

in the polarity of his higher and his lower self. That in

itself opens up the possibilities of love and devotion.

The devotee does not love himself1, but loves the Self most

high. Only the love and yearning for It can result in

knowing and realizing It. To live In It, is to continue to

love it. Here too, bhakti is an act of love and surrender,

although the object of bhakti is not a personal deity. The

beginning of it is an act of faith, and the culmination of

it, a participation in the Divine* It is the loving devotion

to God, the ONE Ultimate Reality, as Brahman, which makes

both the quest and the end possible. This bhakti does not

require a personal God. The relationship of "I” and "THOU"

between the devotee and God, as axiologically separate and

different from each other, is no longer necessary. Both

"I" and "THOU" exist and function within the devotee in the

act of devotion. This pattern of Hindu devotionalism can

be defined as nirguna bhakti, and is fully compatible with

the ideology of the Advaita Vedanta.

In Hinduism, the genesis of nirguna bhakti can be

traced as far back as the conception of the: nirgupa character

of God. To the degree that the latter is accepted by the

varying groups included in the theistic unity of Hinduism,

nirgupa bhakti is possible within their sectarian limits as

well. Its spirit is evident in the up as an a of the Upanishads

The Atman, though seen as impersonal, is described as the

1 and is glorified
"Dear One" in the Brihadaranyaka-Upanishad,

in lyrical rapture in some other Upanishads also. This Atman

cannot be known through learning, nor through the knowledge

of Vedas, but it reveals itself to "whomever it chooses".

1 . Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, I V . 22.

2 * Kathopanishad 1.2 *23, also Munftakopanishad III.2.3 •
 Bhakti in relation to God, when conceived of as an

Impersonal principle, must be understood in its etymological

meaning of "participation", The nirguna bhakti, in other

words, can be accepted as a fervent devotion for the soul's

participation in the Divine. This bhakti is of a different

order from the simple worship of the person of Vishnu, or his

avataras Rama and Kpishpa, for it has no need of a personal

image of God. However, it may be entertained and practised

by a Vaishnava,a
o *
Rama or Krishna
o I
bhakta in so far as he

conceives Vishnu, Rama and Kpishpa as not different from the

Nirguna Brahman or Atman. It must be mentioned here that the

identification of Vishnu, Rama and Krishna with the Nirguna

Brahman is a common characteristic of the Vaishnava

scriptural texts. Such- a process of identification in

itself opens up the possibilities of the transformation of

the worship of the personal deity into the bhakti for the

Nirguna.

Thus saguna bhakti, such as Vishnu worship, has always

recognized and made place for nirgupa bhakti. For example,

Vallabhacharya, who out of all the medieval Vaishnava acharyas

did the most to establish on a scholastic level, the super­

iority of Kpishna-bhakti of a personalistic form, recognized

1 • Mahabharata, Bhagavata Purana, and the VishnU-Purana

testify this.
the distinctive and fundamental nature of nirguna hhakti when

he called his path of personalistic devotion to Krishna' as

Pushti-Bhakti and the one for the Brahman as Maryada-Bhakti

and accepted the validity of hoth.

1 But nirguna hhakti on the

other hand does not accept the intrinsic validity of the

saguna hhakti in a similar manner. Nirguna hhakti as para-

hhakti or the highest form of devotion may tolerate and ahsorh

within itself every other form of devotion hut it need not

necessarily uphold and recognize the worship of personal

deities such as Rama and Krishna. On the contrary, it may even

deny the latter in the course of asserting itself. This

aspect of nirguna hhakti stands out very prominently in the

medieval nirguna hhaktas like Kahlr who caused a mass-movement

n
in favour of Jtfirguna hhakti and who represent its most popular

and widespread manifestation. They neither recognize nor

tolerate the worship of personal deities and demand an

p
uncompromising adherence to hhakti for the Nirguna.

As shown ahove, nirguna hhakti has a character of its

own and it has certain aspects which openly clash with our

standardized ideas ahout hhakti. But as it does not completely

conform to the current accepted definitions of hhakti, the

recognition of nirguna hhakti on its own terms has heen

1 • Vide infra, pp ^ *7 -fsj-

Vide infra, pp tf"%
largely evaded. For this reason eminent scholars like

Bhandarkar and Radhakrishnan are unable to identify it with

hhakti in spite of their recognition of the theistic and

devotional aspects of the Upanishads. Bhandarkar, though he

points out the "germs of hhakti" in the upasana of the

Upanishads, is reticent ahout calling it hhakti. Tracing the

indigenous character of hhakti he quotes from the Brihadaran-

yaka Upanishad hut describes the relevant passage only as

the nearest approach to hhakti with the substitution of

Impersonal Atman for a Personal God ,

1 Similarly, Radhakrish­

nan, taking note of the devotional fervour of the same

Upanishad, feels the need for explaining it as "spiritualised

hhakti" and is unable to give it the status of hhakti. These

evaluations by Bhandarkar and Radhakrishnan are obviously the

result of the application of the modern standardized definition

of hhakti, which as suggested earlier is artificial and not

free from errors. Bhakti for that reason can not assume a

consistent form for Bhandarkar without a Personal God, and

Radhakrishnan cannot help noticing a marked difference between

hhakti and hhakti spiritualised „

1 . R.G. Bhandarkar, ibid., p c23.

2. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol.I, p . 233*
Vi« Bhakti Theories and the Bhakti Movement

Both the current academic definition of bhakti and

the consequent inhibition to recognize nirguna bhakti on its

own terms, place a serious limitation on the understanding of

the medieval religious currents which are collectively known

as the Bhakti Movement, The fixed monolithic view of medieval

bhakti, current in the academic circles today, is obviously

the result of regrading bhakti as a special religion^Its

initial identification with Vaishnavism^and of the unqualified

acceptance of a personal conception of God as its necessary

condition.

But the medieval Bhakti Movement however, has two

distinct facets to it, one laying emphasis on the worship of

personal deities. Rama and Krishna, and the other which regards
1

Nirguna Brahman alone as the sole object of devotion. Whereas

one represents the medieval neo-Vaishnava movement which can

be connected with Vishnu bhakti, the other is an expression of

an equally powerful movement to popularise the teachings of

classical Vedanta, the belief in an impersonal God, and the

path of nirguna-bhakti. Bhakti of Tulsidas, Surdas and Mira

is a constituent of the former, that of Kabir* Nanak and Dadu

of the latter. The two groups stand for different ideologies

and convictions, although spiritualism and devotion is common

to both. As the leading figures of the Bhakti/*Movement they
can be treated as a single group in spite of their differences

only if the word bhakti is understood in its general meaning

of religious devotion. But if bhakti is regarded as a doctrine

in its present academic meaning then they must be recognized

as two separate groups and their ideological difference must

be marked out more clearly.

The teachings of nirguna bhaktas like Kabir and Nanak

cannot be connected with the Vaishnava

0 traditions and Vishnu-
o
bhakti. They believed not in a personal but an impersonal

God. Not a dualistic but a non-dualistic view of Reality

characterises their religious thinking. Their bhakti is not

opposed to, but is in complete harmony with the spirit of

AdvaitafVedanta. All this stands out in clear contrast with

the present academic definition of bhakti. The devotionalism

of Kabir and other medieval saints of the nirguna school can

be understood only if nirguna bhakti Is understood within

its own framework and not in accordance with the current

technical definition of bhakti.

The popular manifestation of nirguna bhakti in Kabir

is not only incompatible with the accepted definition of bhakti

but it also disproves some of the current ideas about the

position of the Advaita/-Vedanta in Hinduism. The authors of

the bhakti theories had set aside monistic Vedanta as a mere

philosophy and a system of ideas confined only to Brahmins

and incapable of satisfying the religious needs of the common
1
man. But a movement for the popularisation of the essential

principles of the Advaita/Vedanta amongst the common people

constitute a vital part of the Bhakti Movement. Kablr^ oxifi.

unlettered and low castsman^advocated a religion, the spirit

of which cannot he understood in isolation from that of the

Vedanta* K a b i r Ts religious faith is deeply rooted in the

monistic philosophical tradition of Hinduism. His impersonal

concept of the Deity, his non-dualistic view of Reality and

his emphasis on reasoning and self-knowledge confirm this.

Although conceptually we do not find anything new in

Kabir’s monism his own treatment of it and his contribution

towards making it a living part of people*s religion on a

wide scale cannot he minimized. What had been systematised

and elaborated through erudition and argumentation by the

Brahmin GaAsaracharya was now being said in a simple and

direct manner by Kabir in the language of faith and

personal conviction. If £>ahkara Ts main objective was to

establish the doctrinal infallibility of the Advaitav

1. It may be pointed out here that the Indologists like Max

Mdller, who recognized Vedanta as a system "chiefly con­
cerned with the soul and its relation to God" and who acc­
epted it both as a philosophy and a religion, did not con­
cern themselves at all with the bhakti theories. On the
other hand, A.Weber, Monier Williams and G.A.Grierson whose
writings can account for the current theories about bhakti
could never view Vedanta as a religion. On the contrary,
they always represented it as a philosophy which could not
meet the real demands of religion. For Max MtLller's opinion
on Vedanta see, Three Lectures on the Vedanta Philosophy
delivered at the~Royal Institution, London 1694,p p *2 ,o,
11-13, 29.
Vedanta, K a b i r Ts mission was to make its essentials a

matter of common bel-ief. His plain logic and commonsense

and his direct and sincere appeal to human reason must have

done more to make them popular amongst the masses than the

learned commentaries on the AdvaitaM/edanta.

Judged as a bhakta, certain fundamental aspects of

Kabirfs thought and personality are very often evaded and

under-estimated on account of the general acceptance of

bhakti as an antithesis of Advaita^Vedanta. However, whereas

the historians continue to treat the Bhakti Movement as a

unity irrespective of the variations existing within it, a

tradition has taken roots in the historical studies of

Hindu literature to take into account the distinctive

features of the Nirguna and laguna schools of bhakti. Hindi

1. The first history of Hindi literature was attempted by

George A. Grierson in 1889. He classified the bhakti-poets
in two groups, the Rama-bhaktas and the Krishna-bhaktas,
This classification provided the framework for the subse­
quent works on the subject till 1929, when a more detailed
study was made by Ramachandra Sukla. The latter pointed
out the existence of two different currents of bhakti
saguna, consisting of Rama and Krishna bhakti, and the
Nirguna, running in two different channels, one dependent
on jhana as in Kabir, and the other dependent on prema
as in Jayasi and other Sufi-poets of Hindi. This division
is now universally observed in Hindi scholarship, but the
same definition of bhakti is invariably applied to both
the nirguna and the saguna bhaktas.
G.Ao Grierson, Hindi Sahitya Ka Prathama Itihasa, the
Modern Vernacular Literature of Hindustan, translated
into Hindi by Kishorilal Gupta, Hindi Pracharaka
Pustakayalaya Benar&s, 1957»
Ramachandra^£>ukla, Hindi Sahitya ka Itihasa, Kasi Nagari
Prachariinl SabhS, 10th ed., 1955.
scholars naturally are more inclined to take cognisance of

the exact nature of K a b i r Ts thought because of their closer

understanding of his verses, which are composed in Hindi.

Nevertheless, they too have not been able to free themselves

of the pre-conceived notions about bhakti, and much

uncertainty still exists in Hindi scholarship over certain

fundamental questions connected with K a b i r rs ideology* Even

when the ideological difference between Kabir and Tulsidas

is clearly seen, when it comes to the question of bhakti,

its nature and antecedents the established definition of

bhakti is always adhered to and attempts are made to

1
correlate the two personalities in the light of it.

Similarly, though the evidence of the concept of Advaita/-

Vedanta in Kabir is sometimes duly recognized by Hindi

scholars, in order to make his devotion consonant with the

technical definition of bhakti, they try to harmonize their

understanding of bhakti and their discovery of the nirguna

quality in Kabir. Such attempts have led to serious

inconsistencies and misjudgements.

As suggested earlier, the medieval religious currents

which are collectively known as the Bhakti/-Movement cannot be

assessed properly without settling the present anomalies in

1* For example, see Munshi Ram Sharma, ibid., p.UlO.

our understanding of* bhakti. A correct assessment of the

thought and personality of Kabir, and of the antecedents of

his nirguna school is also not possible without this. An

attempt is made in the subsequent pages to remove some of

these anomalies and to prepare the ground for a more

consistent and unbiased approach to the study of Kabir and

the other nirguna bhaktas. of medieval India.

 CHAPTER II

BHAKTI IN THE CLASSICAL TEXTS

Certain classical texts are always cited in support

of the current definition of hhakti. They are the Bhagavad-

Gita, the Bhagavata Purana and the Bhakti-Sutras of Narada

and handilya. But a closer examination of the expositions of

hhakti in these texts does not hear out the existing ideas

about bhakti and the theories connected with them. None of

these works provides us with any exclusive, uniform or

standardised definition of bhakti to confirm them.

Neither a fixed belief in a personal God, nor a

rejection of a monistic view of Reality appear as the necessary

pre-requisites of bhakti in these texts. They do not describe

bhakti as opposed to Jfrana, but recognize and point out the

interconnection of the two. Bhakti is not represented in them

as something incompatible with a monistic and nirguna ideology.

On the contrary, bhakti for the Hirguna is sometimes clearly

described as a higher form of devotion and is upheld with the

help of the monistic principle of Vedanta. Both the saguna

and the nirguna forms of bhakti can be found in the Bhagavad-

Gita, the Bhagavata Pur ana and the Bhakti-Sutras. They make

it clear that bhakti can manifest itself in different forms-.

Not a simple faith directed towards a personal God, but an

active spiritual endeavour on the part of the individual is

very often described as a necessary constituent of bhakti*

The following textual study of the Bhagavad-Gita

the Bhagavata Pur ana and the Bhakti-Sutras of Narada and

Gand.ilya, explain this at greater length*

i* The Bhagavad-GIta

To establish the antiquity of bhakti in the light of

its current definition, the Bhagavad-GIta is always cited as

its earliest literary exposition* Therefore, whenever the Gita

is mentioned in connection with bhakti, it is. invariably

treated as a purely Vaishnava text, and a strictly personal

theism is attributed to it* It is regarded as "an expression

of the earliest attempt made in India to rise to a theistic

p
faith and theology" and its monotheism is explained as a

stage different from the pantheism of the Upanishads. It is

also represented as a vindication of a popular religion

independent of the Vedic tradition*^

In G-ita Ts exaltation of Krishna is seen the emergence

of a personal image of God* It is considered unique for its

1. R* Garbe, "Bhagavad-GIta" ERE, Vol.II, ed. 1909, pp.535-533.

See also S„N. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy,
Vol.II, Cambridge 1932, p.532.

2 . J.No Earquhar, An Outline of the Religious Literature of

,
India, Humphrey Milford,~ 1920 p .86 .

3 . G.Ae Grierson, Bhakti Marga, ibid.. pp.539-551•

notion of "bhakti which is regarded as 11almost a new note in
\
Hindu religious speculation*^ and it is suggested that the

inspiration of Gita Ts hhakti came not from the Upanishads hut

from certain popular forms of religion. It is also argued

that the schemes of salvation suggested in the Upanishadic

speculation were reinterpreted in the G-ita in terms of its

personal theism, and that it recommended the path of hhakti

as a counterpoise to the path of knowledge? Consequently,

the personal theism of the Gita is taken as a result of the

transformation of the Absolute of the Upanishads into a

personal God through the identification of the God of the

Vaishnavas with the Brahman of the Upanishads.

These interpretations of the Bhagavad-Gita are the

obvious result of the application of the artificial theories

about hhakti, and the use of the western conceptual categories

of theism and pantheism in the study of Hinduism. J But if we

free ourselves of the current approach and judge the Bhagavad^

Gita from a strictly Hindu standpoint and evaluate its

ideology in the light of its text alone, the assessment of

its position in the Hindu thought and of its theism and

1, F. Edgerton, The Bhagavad-Gita, Translated and Interpreted

Harvard Oriental Series, Cambridge," Mass^. 1 9U6, p *71 •

2* J.N. Farquhar, ibid., pp. 87- 88 .

3. The general errors inherent in this approach have already

been pointed out in Chapter I. Vide supra, p.
bhakti are bound to be different.

Gita is recognized by the Hindus as one of the

prasthantrayi, the three authoritative textual sources of

all religio-philosophical opinions. The other two placed in

the same category are the Upanishads and the Bpahma-Sutras..

But for the modern opinions, Gita’s philosophy was never

placed at variance with that of the Upanishads by the Hindu

theologians. On the contrary, they usually refer to the

Gita as the repository of the very essence of the Upanishads .1

Similarly the theism of the Gita is not viewed as different

from that of the Upanishads and the Vedanta. That the Gita

conveys the knowledge of the Brahman, was always recognized

by the general Hindu opinion, and no new concept of a

personal God, separate, opposed, and different from the

Brahman, was ever attributed to it.

But due to the fixity of the modern academic opinion

about bhakti and its relation with the Bh agav ad— Git a » the

total viewpoint and the composite nature of G i t a ?s philosophy

is easily ignored. Whatever influence of the Upanishads

that is found in it, is explained away as the result of the

imposition of the Brahmanic thought on the Bhagavata

2
religion. Gita is consistently treated as a Vaishnava
■' il. U ■ 0

1. See for example the colophon of the Bhagavad-Gitao

2. Fo Edgerton, ibid., p,32,
 120

scriptural text which could draw freely from other

philosophies "because the latter had not assumed their

systematic forma at the time of its composition.^ This is

done in spite of the recognition of the influence of the

prevailing philosophic currents in Sahkhya, Yoga, and

Vedanta on the Bhagavad~GIta. The inability to "break away

from the fixed approach has sometimes led to apparent

contradictions in scholarly opinions about the nature of

Gita Ts bhakti and theism.

For example, writing about the bhakti of the Gita,

Radhakrishnan suggests that devotion to the "Supreme is

possible only with a personal God, a concrete individual

full of bliss and beauty". "Personality implies a capacity

for fellowship", and there is always, the personal need for

a personal helper, for "we can not love a shadow of our

minds". In the course of the same discussion however,

Radhakrishnan states at another place that the Gita

"recognises nirgupa bhakti, or devotion to the qualityjless,

as superior to all else", and acknowledges that the absolute

monism is the completion of the dualism with which the

2
devotional consciousness starts.

1• Ibid., p .6.

2. S. Radhakrishnan, ibid., Vol.I, see pp#559 and

 A similar contradiction is noticeable in Carpenter’s

observations on the Gita. He makes it clear that behind the

"worshipper’s adoring love, evoked by the sense of the divine

beneficence of the cosmic scale as well as G o d ’s personal

dealing with the individual soul", there lie only two

fundamental conceptions in the Bhagavad-Gita - the spirit

in man and the spirit in the universe. The highest reality

of the universe is the spirit and it is called by different

names. The highest reality in man is also spirit and has

1
kinship with the supreme spirit. It must be mentioned

here that Carpenter, in spite of making this assessment of

the theism of the Bhagavad-Glta, is unable to break away

from the fixed theories about bhakti and accepts them with
2
all their implications.

However the following analysis shows that the bhakti

of the Bhagavad-Gita does not fit in with the current

definitions of it and needs understanding in a different

perspective. The word bhakti is not used in the Gita as an

equivalent of a simple loving faith. On the contrary, it is-

1. J.E. Carpenter, Theism in Medieval India. London 1921,

p.253.

2* Ibid. See for Bhakti as a marga p .2kk* Ramanuja as a

systematizer of bhakti p .2^5; bhakti and the Narayainiyct'
section of the Mahabharata p.265; Narada’s and £>ahdiiya’s
bhakti p.lfL9.
clearly distinguishable from it. No fixed and invariable

concept of bhakti is offered by the Gita. It is graded and

the possibilities of its variations are also indicated. The

Gita does not install bhakti as a counterpoise to jftana, but

maintains perfect compatibility between the two. They are

represented as interdependent on each other. Finally, bhakti

in the Gita does not suggest any essential and ever existent

dualism between the devotee and God, nor does it necessitate

the idea of a personal God.

(a) The Distinction between Bhakti and Sraddha

In the Bhagavad—Gita bhakti is clearly distinguished

from mere faith or sraddha. The latter manifests itself in

numerous forms of religious worship, caused by the difference

of gunas inherent in men. The sattvikas worship the devas,

rajasikas the yakshas, and tamasikas the pretas and the

- 1
bhutas. The sraddha of each is according to his natural
2
disposition. But whether Sattvika, rajasika or tamasika in

nature, s'raddha is efficacious in every form in winning G o d ’s

grace. It is necessary for every act of worship. That which

is practised without it is asat and is invalid. Thus the

1. The Bhagavad Gita, XVII,4,

2 . Ibid,, XVII.3; VII.20,

3. Ibid., VII.21,22,
element of faith or sraddha is recognized in every form

irrespective of the higher or lower categories of the objects

of worship*
jo cvrix ~
Bhakti-Yoga, however, is coupled only with/sraddha

or supreme faith* ’’Those who fixing their mind on me worship

me eversteadfas;t, endowed with supreme .sraddha. they are the

best versed in yoga” says Krishna in the discourse on bhakti-

1
yoga* This par a-sradclha which is considered necessary for

bhakti-yoga, is described as something beyond the three-

categories of gunas.

Although the Bhagavad^-Gita carries a note of condes­

cending recognition of all forms of worship if they are caused

and accompanied by faith, the true bhaktas seem to stand

apart from the worshippers who are led by mere faith. The
3 k
bhaktas are described as virtuous, and noble, and as those

who cross over the divine illusion caused by the g u n a s T h e y

are different from the others, who are deprived of discrimina­

tion and therefore follow different rites and devote themselves

1* Ibid., XII.2.

2. Ibid** VII.21,22.

3* Ibid., VII.16.

k. Ibid., VII.18*

5* Ibid*a VII.Ih*
 1 2 4

to different gods, 'bound "by their own nature.1 According to

p
^he G-ita the latter are "men of little understanding” .

Thus although the Gita recognizes the value of faith

0I* Braddha in all its manifestations, its bhakti-yoga is

possible only through y ara~dvaddha, which is free of the

three gunas and is therefore nirguna in character. It

indicates a greater degree of spiritual involvement than the

other three categories of sraddha. Although every form of

worship and every expression of faith and love for God is

recognized in the Bhagavad-Gita, hhakti is represented more

in the nature of an active and passionate search of the self

for the Divine. It means much more than just an attitude

of faith, or acts of worship, or a code of conduct to he

fulfilled, "as heard from the others”

(h) Gradations of Bhakti

Different types of hhakti and its gradations are also

indicated in the Bhagavad-Gita. ”Dour kinds of virtuous men

worship m e ” says Krishna and the four are described by him

as the distressed (arta) the one who seeks some gain (arthar-

thl), the one who seeks knowledge (jijhasu), and the one who

1. Ibid.. VII.20.

2 . Ibid., VII.23.

3. Ibid., XIII.25.
 125

1 _
is wise (ffla.nl). The jhani bhakta is described by Krishna as

the highest amongst the bhaktas and as the one dearest to

him.^

This distinction of four types of hhaktas is not

hased on any difference of gunas as is done in the case of

sraddha. Nor is it attributed to the difference in the nature

of the object of bhakti, for it is clearly recognised that

all four of them worship the same deity Krishna# It is not

made on grounds of greater or lesser degree of moral character

either, for all the four are regarded as virtuous and noble*

The distinction, seems to emerge therefore from the fact of

their different attitudes* It lies in their motivation and

the nature of their emotional involvement with God. The

distressed seeks solace, the seeker of knowledge wants to

know, and the man desirous of gain wants the fulfilment of

his desires. The jfrani alone represents a state of attainment.

The dhani bhakta of the Gita is the one who knows and has

attained the state of self-realization.

The bhakti of the Jftani which is regarded as the

highest form of devotion in the Bhagavad--GIta is different

from the bhakti of the other three types of bhaktas. It does

not merely seek comfort from God, nor the fulfilment of any

desires. Nor is it aimed at gaining formal and intellectual

1° Ibid.. VII.16.

2. Ibid.. VII.17.
 1 2 6

knowledge about Him. It is the hhakti by which, with the mind

ever steadfast, the bhaktfltis established in Him alone and

through which the distinction between the Deity and the

devotee disappears. It is this element of his bhakti which

makes the jfianl different from the other three types of

bhaktas. Krishna says "noble indeed are they all, but the
1
wise one I regard as my very self".

Again in his discourse on the bhakti-yoga, Krishna

points out the superiority of the contemplative bhakti which

has its base in Jhana and yoga. The fixing of one's mind and

intellect in God, and the effort to move towards Him are

considered higher than the effortless act of surrender and

complete dependence. The worshipful attitude devoid of ;}frana

and yoga is recommended only for those who are weak and do
v'b
not aspire rqr the highest goal.

Various options are offered for the cultivation of

the bhakti-yoga in a qualitative gradation. "Fix thy mind in

p
Me only, place thy intellect in Me" says Krishna and adds

"if thou art unable to fix thy mind steadily on Me, then try

to reach me through abhyasa-yoga, ^ if thou are unable to

1. Ibid.. VII.18.

2. Ibid.. XII.8.

3. Ibid.. XII.9.
 1 2 7

1
practice abhvasa-ryoga. perform actions for my sake, if unable
p
to do even this, then take refuge in M e.H Here the contem­

plative hhakti is regarded as the highest and the one obtained

through abhyasa yoga as the next in order of merit* Bhakti in

the sense of surrender is clearly graded as the lowest,

(c) The Trij&logy of Bhakti, Jflana and Yoga

In the BhagavacL~G-ita, bhakti does not stand apart

from Jftana and yoga. On the contrary, the three are fully

interwoven into each other. In the discourse on the bhakti-

yoga, bhakti is clearly connected with o'hana and yoga and both

the bhakta and the Jftani are described in similar t e r m s T h e

virtues attributed to the bhakta are the same as those

attributed to the yogi and the true yogi is also considered

k
a bhakta. Personal excellence, contemplation and detachment

are demanded of the true bhakta,^ Mere obedience to a personal

deity and a simple loving faith in him are obviously not

considered sufficient.

1. Ibid., X I I .10.

2. Ibid., XII.11.

3* Ibid., XII,13ff* What is said here of the bhakta is also

said of the sthitaprarjna, See IX .55*58•

^ Ibid.. VI.Ai7.

5» Ibid., XII.13-20.
 1 2 8

The tendency to regard bhakti and Jlana as essentially

different from each other has influenced the interpretations

of the hhakti of the Bhagavad— GIta in relation to jfiana.

Edgerton tries, to prove that the path recommended hy the Gita

is that of hhakti as against the difficult path of knowledge*

According to him the Grita was trying to displace *3nana through

1
hhakti* Radhakrishnan and Dasgupta hold similar points of

view as far as the hhakti aspect to the Bhagavad-GIta is

2
concerned. But these interpretations do not seem satisfactory

The passages quoted hy Edgerton in support of his view are

taken not only in isolation from the total philosophy of the

Gita, hut are sometimes cited without due regard to their

immediate context. Radhakrishnan quotes the Band ilya-Sutra

to hring out the distinction between knowledge and hhakti of

the Gita without making any direct reference to the Bhagavad-

Gita itself.-^

The hhakti of the Gita does not exclude 3'hana* On

the contrary, jftana constitutes a necessary part of hhakti

1. R 0 Edgerton, ihid*, p p *71,72.

2, S. Radhakrishnan, ihid*, Vol.I, pp.556-565.

S*N. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge 1932, Vol.II, p.532.

3. S. Radhakrishnan, ihid*, Vol.I, p.556.

and the conscious intellect has a full share in it. The Gita

does not lay down a path of hhakti which would exclude the

knowledge of the Upanishads and the Vedanta, hut lends its

full support to them. Knowledge is described as the purifier

1
hy the .Bhagavad^GIta. When ignorance is destroyed hy the

knowledge of the self, the new knowledge, like the sun

p
reveals the supreme. In the discourse on the Kshetra and the

Kshetrajha Krishna describes the knowledge of the two as the

3
highest knowledge. It is this knowledge, he explains;which is

sung hy the Rishis in the various metres and the passages of

'khe Brahma-Sutra^ "By knowing the Kshetra, jflana and the

jfleyam" says Krishna "the devotee is fitted for my state.

The Gita views knowledge in a twofold way. A clear

distinction is made between jfrana and vi .jflana in the Bhagavad-

Glta. Jflana is better than mere abhyasa and there is also the

jnana coupled with dhyana which is rated higher than the

3nana itself. Whereas the knowledge of a philosophical system

like Sankhya is also sometimes referred to as a means of

!• B h .G ., V.17,

2* Ihid., V,l6.

3* Ibid., XIII. 12, 17*

k* Ihid., XIII.U.

5. Ibid., XIII.18.
spiritual knowledge,! v ijhana is always mentioned in the sense
2
of self realisation. Jhana and vi jflana in the particular

sense of the knowledge attained through self realisation,

constitute an essential part of hhakti in the Gita.

(&) The Gita and the Personal Concept of God

During the process of the formulation of the current

theories ahout hhakti, the Bhagavad-Gita was specially picked

out hy the western scholars to illustrate that hhakti is

possible only for a personal God. They considered it as an

exception in the Hindu context on account of the supremacy of

the personality of Krishna in it. They saw in Gita's identifi­

cation of Krishna Vasudeva with the Upanishadfs Brahman the

emergence of a personal God and the makings of the theistic

cult of hhakti. In the light of these ideas the presence of

the impersonal view of God found in the Gita was interpreted

as a mark of Brahminical imposition. Similarly, accepting

only a dualistic view of Reality as the true basis of theism

and hhakti, the presence of the monistic elements in the Gita

was explained away through the same theory of imposition.

These views ahout the nature of Gita *s theism and of

its concept of God have been consistently upheld in the

1. Ihid., XIII.2k*

2. Ibid., VII.2.
academic circles since then, particularly in all discussions

related with hhakti* Bhandahkar explained that the Gita

adheres to the philosophical elements of the Upanishads hut

1
they are personalised in it* According to Dasgupta, God in

the Upanishads had only majesty hut not the personal form

which He acquired in the Gita*^ Radhakrishnan also interprets

the Purushottama of the Gita in terms of a personal God and

states that tffor those who insist on devotion as the final

nature of spiritual life, the end is not an immersion into

■3
the Eternal Impersonal hut a union with the Purusottama" *

Edgerton goes to the extent of stating that the impersonal

Brahman is subordinated to the idea of a personal God in the

Bhag avad-Git a .^

But in spite of Krishna heing the central figure in

the Gita its ultimate representation of God revolves round

His impersonal and inmanifest nature* It is the unmanifest

that must he worshipped, says Krishna. In the Bhagavad-Gita*

the description of the state finally attained through hhakti

leaves very little room for the idea of a personal God and

the dualistic relationship hetween the Deity and the devotee.

I* R.G* Bhandarkar, ihid., p.27*

2.. S.N. Dasgupta, ihid., p*53^«

3* S. Radhakrishnan, ihid*, Vol.I, p. 565 .

U* E* Edgerton, ihid.. p.1+9*

 ■* q O
.1. HJ

According to the Bhagavad-Gita the bhakta who takes refuge in

God "attains Him",^ "enters into Iiim",^ "abides in Him",^

and "lives in Him".^ Krishna says in the Gita, "The bhaktas

6 "they enter into Me", 6 "those
are in Me and I am in them",
7
who worship me are fitted for becoming Brahman",1 and "the
8
highest yogi sees all in me and me in all."

These aspects of the Bhagavad-Gita are completely

ignored whenever it is assessed to elaborate the bhakti

theories. The Gita is then interpreted mainly from the stand­

point of a personal conception of God and a dualistic view of

Reality. For reasons shown above, such assessments are not

free from serious contradictions.

To take the examples of Radhakrishnan and Edgerton,

Radhakrishnan admits that absolute monism is "the completion

of the dualism with which the devotional consciousness

Q
starts". Similarly, Edgerton also has to point out that

1. Bh ♦Q •. IV.10.

2. Ibid.. XI.55.

3* Ib id.. VII.23.
Ibid., X I I .8.

5* Ibid., IX.29.
6. Ibid., XVIII.55

7. Ibid., XIV.26.
8 * Ibid., VI.29.

9* S. Radhakrishnan, ibid., Vol. I, p.565.

"through its God, Gita seems after all to arrive at an
1
ultimate monism".

The narrative form of the Bhagavad-Gxta and the

position of Krishna in it are the real cause of all the

theories which explain it as the authoritative exposition of

a religion characterised by a personal conception of God. In

the Bhagavad^G 11a Krishna speaks not only as* God but he

directly addresses Ar juna who, in doubt and despair, seeks

guidance and solace from him. The human situation represented

in Arjuna, and the appearance of Kyishna as God provides a

very personal image of the deity which is further strengthened

when Krishna speaks as the God who appears on earth for the
2
protection of the good and the destruction of the wicked.

The personal image of the Deity becomes more vivid when

Krishna enjoins upon Arjuna to remember him and to follow him

and ensures salvation and his protection to those who worship

him.-' As a result of a concentration on those aspects of the

narrative, with Kyishna addressing Arjuna in the first person,

the final definition of God offered by the Bh ag avad-GIt a is

ignored and overshadowed.

1. F. Edgerton, ibid.. pp.kk-kd*

2. Bh.G•, XV.6,8*
3. Ibid.. IX, 26ff.
 1 3 4

The colophon of the Gita however, describes the text

as "the essence of the Upanishads, the knowledge of the

cc
Brahman, the Scripture of yoga, and also as the dialogue
/_
Between Sri Krishna and Aryuna". Both these aspects of the

text deserve equal attention • The inclusion of the

personality of Krishna in the Bhagavad~GIta and the dialogue

form of the narrative, should not he allowed to overshadow

its view of God./

Although the utterances of Krishna carry a strong

personal note, Krishna himself states at one place !,the

foolish regards Me, the unmanifest as come into manifestation

- not knowing my supreme state."

1 ''This deluded world knows
p
Me not, the unhorn, the immutable". Krishpa describes the

worshippers who try to reach him through wrong methods as

those who do not know his real nature. As shown below, in the

final analysis, it is not Krishna, the manifest, but it is

unmanifest, which is regarded as the Ultimate Reality. This

constitutes the final view of God in the Bhagavad-GIta. when

the personality of Krishna is totally merged in the unmanifest

form.

It is the unmanifest and universal form which is made

manifest to Arjuna by Krishna through his divine yoga, over-

1* Ibido, VII.24• See also IX.11.

2* Ibid., VII.25*

3* Ibid.. XI.47.
awed by which Aryuna asks him to come back to his manifest

form. The manifest form which Aryuna asks Krishna to resume

fits in with the image of Vishnu also. "Diademed, bearing a

mace and a discus, Thee I desire to see as before" says

Aryuna "assume that same four armed form, 0 Thou, the

1
universal form." Thus both Krishna and Vishnu are representec

as manifest here, different from the unmanifest, the Isvara-

Rupa, the Visva-Rupa, the ancient Purusha. According to

Krishna,
. # ' it is this unmanifest form which can neither be knowx
through the Vedas nor by austerity, and which is unattainable
2
through sacrifices and gifts, for it can be known by bhakti

alone, and by knowing it the bhakta enters into Him.^

Thus it is not the Absolute or the Brahman which is

being personalised in the Bh ag avad-G-i ta, but it is the

deified personality of Krishna which is being raised to the

status of the Brahman. Krishna, the manifest clearly describes

his highest state as the unmanifest (Avyakta). Therefore the

monotheism of the Bhagavad-^Gita does not arise out of the

final installation of the personality of Krishna as the

supreme deity or fully evolved idea of a personal God but is

the result of the identification of the deified hero Gtzz.

1. Ibid., XI.45,46.

2 . Ibid., XI.48,53.

3. Ibid., XI.54.
Krishna with the Absolute and the impersonal Atman of the

Upanishads. It must be remembered that the Mahabharata in its

present form contains enough evidence to show that Krishna

was either absent or was regarded only as a human hero in the

original version of that work and that he was deified at a

much later stage.^ In some parts Kyishna is represented as an

ordinary mortal and to a certain extent the evolution of the

Krishna cult itself can be traced through the various stages

of the development of the Epic. It is therefore maintained

by many scholars that Krishiya-worship had either not origin­

ated at the time of the composition of the Mahabharata, or

was still in its infancy. In view of this, to interpret the

God of the Gita not in the light of its total thought content

but only from the point of the personality of Krishna is

hardly justifiable.

II. The Bhagavata Purana

If the Bh ag avad^Gita is regarded as the earliest

expression of bhakti, the Bhagavat Purana is recognized as its

more articulate and exuberant expression. Because of its

definite Vaishnava bias, its extreme emotionalism and its

decided concentration on the life and personality of Krishna,

the Bhagavata Purana could fit in more easily with the modern

1. J.N. Parquhar, ibid., pp.49,78, 83,87,89,100.

 1 3 7

definitions of bhakti which have identified bhakti so complete

1y with Vaishnaism and Krishna-worship.

The preoccupation of the Bhagavata Purana with the

personality of Krishna is more than clear. The purpose of

Vyasa in undertaking to write this Purana is explained at the

very beginning. It is stated that when Vyasa, after having

written the Mahabharata was still not satisfied, Narada gave

him the suggestion to write something exclusively about the

1
glories of Vasudeva. The Bhagavata Purana dwells a great

deal on the life and personality of Kyishna and the whole of

the tenth book of this Purana

« is devoted to the Krishna
o • theme
This aspect of the Bhagavata Purana provides an ample scope

for a personal conception of the Deity.

Similarly, acts of worship which can fit in only with

a personal image of God, are recommended and described at

length in Bhagavata Purana. Most of the nine acts of worship

which are named as the navadha bhakti can be conceived only

in relation to a personal deity and the Vaishnava traditions

2
of idol worship. At the same time the loving devotion for

Krishna is described in highly emotional terms in the

Bhagavata Purana. In such contexts of personal devotion,

bhakti is described as a surging emotion ’'which chokes the

speech, makes the tears flow and the hair thrill with pleasur­

1. Bhagavata Purana, 1.5.1-lU.

2 . Ibid., VII.5.23.
able e x c i t e m e n t " T h i s state, it is explained, is produced

hy gazing at the image of Krishna, singing his praises,

keeping company with his devotees and hearing ahout his might?

deeds.

These features of the Bhagavata Purina make it a

suitable text for illustrating the current theories about

bhakti. It is therefore universally proclaimed as the most

important text on bhakti and is often described as the

"supreme scripture of devotion". Accepting it as a bhakti

text Dr* Tara Ghand states that the Bhagavata Purana marked

the transition from the ancient religion of works to the

2
medieval religion of bhakti. Although Dr. Radhakrishnan

acknowledges the—faeti that the paths of karma and ;jhana find

due recognition in the Bhagavata Purana he emphasizes the

3
fact that its main stress is on bhakti. These opinions are

of course stated from the standpoint of the modern definition

of bhakti. Thus a restricted and single doctrinal meaning is

attributed to the bhakti of the Bhagavata Purana in spite of

1. Ibid.. XI.Hi.23-26.

2. Tara Chand, Influence of Islam on Indian Culture, ibid. t

P.13U*
3. S. Radhakrishnan, Foreword to Siddhesvar Bhattacharya,
The Philosophy of £>rimad Bhagavata. Visva-Bharati;
^antia Niketan, i 960 , pp.vii-viii.
the awareness of its manj^sidedness.

But in spite of its Vaishnava hias and its emphasis

2
on the personality of Krishna hoth the saguna and the nirguna

ideologies are expounded in the Bhagavata Purana through the

personality of Krishna. The Ultimate Reality is very often

explained in impersonal and abstract terms on the lines of

^aftkhya and Vedanta^ Krishna is identified with the Purusha,

Par am atm an. and Brahman.^ He is described as .hahsa*suparna

*5
and avvakta, and also as one who can be attained through
6
ghana and yoga. Thus both the saguna and nirguna elements

co-exist in the Bhagavata Purana. and throughout this

popular religious text the sagupa is interpreted as the

nirguna, and the nirguna as the saguna.

Naturally therefore, bhakti is also described in

both its saguna and nirguna forms in the Bhagavata Purana

and no single, definite, and exclusive meaning or definition

can be attributed to it. If it is steeped in deep emotional

1. J.N. Farquhar makes a note of the ’’many-sided devotion of

the great Purana’*, ibid., p . 232-*

2. Bhattacarya, ibid., see pp.5U-128.

3* Bhagavata Purana III. 32.33 .fi**

k* Ibid., III. 32 .26.

3. Ibid., XI.5.23.

6 . Ibid., III.32.30ff.
attachment to Krishna, it also includes jflana and vairagya

in its contemplative form. If it is in keeping with the

Vaishnava traditions of the temple ceremonies and idol-

worship, it is also adjusted to the philosophies of Vedanta,

Sahkhya and yoga. If the hhakti of the Bhagavata Purana is

meant for Krishna, it is also directed towards Brahman and

the Atman.

The hhakti of the Bhagavata Purana thus stands in

direct connection with the Purana as well as the Vedanta

traditions of the past. It has the suppor't of the sectarian

beliefs and practices of the Vaishnava as well as of the

metaphysical beliefs of the Upanishads. Judging from the point

of the current theories of bhakti, it is a significant fact

that the two traditions could be represented simultaneously

in a Vaishnava text such as the Bhagavata Purana. and that

both the saguna and the nirguna forms of bhakti could find

equal recognition in it. Bhakti is not only not confined to

its saguna form as devotion to a personal deity in the

Bhagavata Purana but is also not marked out as a path separate

from that of jnana. The most important fact is that the two

traditions exist together in the Bhagavata Purana. and that

both the nirguna and the saguna forms of bhakti are mentioned

in it and no separate path of bhakti is chalked out as

exclusive of jnana and vairagya.

(a ) The Different Categories of Bhakti

Bhakti does not appear in any fixed form in the

Bhagavata Parana, and its possible variations are sometimes

made quite clear.

In answer to Devahuti's question about the distinctive

features of the bhakti-yoga, Kapila explains that bhakti

manifests itself in a number of ways and can be of different

kinds. The difference in its expression is caused by the

inherent difference in the natural tendencies and attributes

of people. Kapila then goes on to enumerate three kinds of

bhakti caused by the three gunas# The bhakti caused by pride

or ill will is called tamasika, that caused by some desire or

end in view as rajasika which manifests itself in the worship

of idols, and that by which a man performs the prescribed

rituals and dedicates the fruits thereof to the Lord as

sattvika. To these three, Kapila adds yet another category

that of nirguna bhakti, which is described separately as

1
distinct from the other three.

Again, explaining the Sahkhya and the yoga philosophie

as the supporting factors of the devotional tendencies of the

mind, Kapila mentions two types of bhaktas. In one group he

places those who, impelled by the natural tendencies of the

1. Bhagavata Purana, III.29. 7 -12 .

 142

mind, bear bhakti for Hari as an emendation of sattva. In the

other are placed those who are engaged in serving the l o r d Ts

feet, whose acts are directed and consecrated unto Him and
1
who delightfully discuss His glorious powers and deeds.

When the Bhagavata Purana dwells on nirguna-bhakti,

it also upholds and elaborates the necessary precepts which

alone can maintain it. Therefore whenever bhakti is mentioned

in relation with self-realisation, the relevant underlying

principles of 3ankhya, Vedanta, and Yoga are used to explain

2
its nature. The principle of the non-duality of soul is

stressed, and the recognition of a separate and independent

existence to the soul is regarded as an error and a delusion

of the mind. The enquiry after the Self and the tattva is

described as the real aim of life and the importance of

religious rites and of the outer forms of worship is minimised

This is in clear contrast with the pattern of sagunafbhakti

of the Bhagavata Purana which is directed to the personal

deity Krishria and expresses itself in externalised acts of

worship, listed under the requirements of navadha-bhakti.%

Although the promise of salvation is held out for

both groups, nevertheless, they do stand apart as different

1, Ibid., 111,25. 32-37*

2 . Ibid.> III.32. 23-35*

in character. The common factor which entitles them both to

salvation (mukti) is disinterested or selfless devotion.

(ahaituki bhakti), which can be a counterpart of nirguna as

well as saguna bhakti irrespective of their mutual difference.

However, the distinction drawn between the two groups

of bhaktas makes the difference between the nirguna and saguna

bhakti very clear. The expression of the two is entirely

different. One expresses itself in idol-worship, whereas the

other represents a contemplative approach to God. For the

saguna bhaktas, he is "dear as a son" and "a friend in

confidence"; for the nirguna bhaktas, He is of the nature of

sattva. Thus the yogi and the t

inanl on the one hand and the

man who worships Him in the idol, sings His praises and listens

to His glorious deeds, on the other, are both recognized as

bhaktas.
1

(b) Nirguna-Bhakti in the Bhagavata Purana

The presence of saguna bhakti in the Bhagavata Purana

is duly recognized. But the nirguna bhakti, standing in close

relationship with the philosophies of Vedanta^ Sankhya and

Yoga, is seldom suspected in the Bhagavata Purana, although

bhakti for the nirguna is clearly represented in it as a

distinct and separate category.

!• Bhagavata Purana, III,25*30~ W n

 In the Bhagavat Purana, Sanat Kumar a talks of the

hhakti unto o n e ’s soul and recommends unflinching devotion to

the soul which is identical with the nirguna Brahman* He

declares that when through devotion the soul unifies with the

nirguna Brahman then the devotee hy virtue of his knowledge

of truth and through his dissociation from the worldly

objects of attachment destroys the egoism of his mind and

feels free from the desires that make the knowledge of the

real difficult. Through devotion,the devotees disentangle

themselves from the world. The knowledge of the self or tattva

jnana then dawns upon them, and with the advent of this know­

ledge of the self, they are ahle to meet their real Self. The

sense of otherness between God and His devotee disappears in

such a meeting.

(c ) Bhakti in Relation to Jhana, Karma and Vairagya.

In the 20th adhyaya of the 11th skandha of the

— _ in
Bhagavata
1 "■'■ ■ Purana.
.— Karma is recommended for the ahirvinna
9M or

the attached, jhana for the nirvinna or the detached, and

bhakti for those who are neither excessively attached nor too
p
detached from the fruits of action.~ Here hhakti serves as a

1. Ibid.. IV.22.18-30.

2. Ibid.. XI. 20 . 7ff.

 145

■balance between Karma and Jnana. But later, ^ in the same text,

bhakti and jTiana are mentioned together as means of salvation,

3hakti is described as the means through which one acquires

OHana and Vairagya, which become the objects to be attained

through bhakti. It is pointed out however, that bhakti can

exist without knowledge too. Bhakti generates vairagya and

one who has vairagya cherishes bhakti towards Krishna* Thus

bhakti is described as an end as well as a means„ In one sense

it indicates the mental attitude of the aspirant, in the other,

it stands for an accomplished state of mind.

Hhakti here is not established as a separate category

in relation to jnana and Karma. As far as Karma is concerned,

it is mentioned only in the beginning. It seems to fade away

completely later on and the tri/zflogy under discussion is then

formed by bhakti jhana and vairagya, the three remaining inter­

linked with each other. It is made clear that all three are

important for beholding the Paramatman. Aided by the knowledge

of the self, dispassion and devotion, the jiva is able to

perceive the supreme soul. Thus irrespective of whether it is

described as a means or an end, bhakti in the Bhagavata Purana,

does not stand exclusive of the other two, jftana and Karma,

Either it leads to them or is their result.

XI.20.29-37*
 In the 32nd adhyaya of the 3rd skandha, describing

the characteristics of bhakti to Devahuti, Kapila explains

that through jflana, Yoga and vairagya, the .iiva attains the

highest state* At the end of his exposition, he tells her ”1

have expounded unto you both the doctrine of Yoga and that of

bhakti. By practising one or the other of these, a person

attains divinity.” The Yoginr, says Kapila, must fix his

1
thought with unflinching devotion on Brahman. Passages are

also not rare in the Bhagavata Purana where bhakti is stated

to lead to a complete identification of the jlva with the

Brahman, and through which the bhakta attains the state of

2
divinity.

In the Bhagavata Purana, therefore, bhakti is not

represented as a separate spiritual discipline exclusive of

jnana and vairagya. Nor is it viewed as a kind of devotion

possible only in relation to a personal conception of God.

On the contrary, bhakti is supported by jnana and vairagya

and has inherent possibilities in relation to the Nirguna

Brahman as well. Knowledge of philosophy and the practice of

yoga are considered a legitimate counterpart of bhakti in the

Bhagavata Purana. Even when Devahuti pleads she is a woman

1. Ibid., 111.32.31-33.

2. Ibid., IV. 22.26ff.

and of meagre powers of understanding, and asks Kapila to

give an exposition of that kind of devotion which would lead

more easily to salvation; Kapila explains that the ’’sequence

of the categories of thought of Saftkhya philosophy as well

as the process of yoga extends the devotional aspect of

o n e ’s mind”.*L

Thus Jflana and hhakti go hand in hand in the Bhagavata

Purana and its recommendation for hhakti is very often

accompanied with a nirguna ideology also. It is urged that one

2
should contemplate on the Atman with hhakti and Jflana, and

hhakti is described at one place as a characteristic feature

of the knowledge of the nirguna (nirguna-Jflana)

III. The Bhakti-Sutras of Narad a and £>an d ilya

The Bhakti-Sutras of Harada and £>ahdilya are referred

to as the two most authoritative texts dealing with the Bhakti

doctrine. This is obviously due to the fact that these two

works are primarily concerned with explaining the nature of

hhakti and are thus distinctly different from all other works

in which the origins of the hhakti ideology are usually sought.

Here hhakti is not Just one part of some wider philosophical

1. Ihid.. 111.25.28-30.

2* Ihid., III.26.72.

3. Ihid.. III.32.32.
or religious systematisation, "but is the very object of the

enquiry and analysis. This is made quite clear hy both Narada

and ^andilya in their opening sutras. Nevertheless, they do

not treat bhakti as a special religion (dharma) or doctrine

(siddhanta) in these sutras. They analyse the form, the nature,

and significance of bhakti, only in its general meaning of

devotion. Not only is bhakti not treated here as a fixed

religious doctrine, but even as devotion, it is not approached

by the two sutrakaras in exactly the same manner and spirit.

Although the Narada and Sandilya sutras are very

often grouped together on account of their common theme of

bhakti, there exists an obvious dissimilarity of spirit between

the two. This shows that at the time of their composition

different opinions were being expressed on the subject of

bhakti, and that it could be approached from different points

of view. In the context of Sanskrit literature however, the

sutra-form in itself largely pre-supposes the existence and

currency of certain trends of thought on the subject. Moreover

£>aMilya mentions earlier interpreters of bhakti also such as

KasVapa and Badarayana .2 Similarly, Narada, a later sutrakara

than ^ahdilya mentions the views of Parasara, Garga, and

1. athato bhaktim vyakhyasyamcik,Narada Bhakti '-Sutra» I

athato bhaktiS
jhasa; gandilya Bhakti-Sutra I.

2* ^andilyat-Bhakti-Sutra. 29,30.
 .149

£>an&ilya, before stating his own.^ These names however* are

found repeatedly in many religious texts spreading over a

wide range of time* and can he connected with a number of

different traditions. Their occurrence here therefore* does

not necessarily indicate the existence of different systems

of bhakti expounded by these men. Nevertheless, it does

suggest that long before* and also at the time of the composi­

tion of these Sutras, attempts were being made to define and

expound bhakti in the light of different views held by the

2
different schools of thought,
A comparative analysis of the Bhakti-sutras of

Narada and Bandilya however, indicates the existence and

acceptance of at least two different points of view on the

subject of bhakti. Whereas ^andilya's approach is more in line

with the classical systems of Sankhya and Vedanta* Narada

shows a greater leaning towards the Puranic tradition and the

sectarian modes of the Bhagavatas. It has been argued earlier

that bhakti can in no way be restricted to the Vaishanvas

*T ®
alone and that there is no antagonism between bhakti and the

Vedanta. The difference of approach between Narada and

1 . Narada* Bhakti*-Sutra* 16,17,18.

2. Ibid., 83 .
handilya and the nature of Sandilya's exposition of hhakti,

lend further support to these two points.

If the hhakti Sdtras of Narada and ^andilya are to he

regarded as textual authorities on hhakti, there is evidence

here that hhakti need not necessarily have a Vaishnava bias,

and that its inspiration can come from the TJpanishads as well*

If on the one hand Harada draws his inspiration from the

Bhagavata Purana"^, Sa&dilya looks up to the TJpanishads and

- 2
describes the Brahma-Kanda as the Bhakti-Kanda, whereas
_ tu 1
.r-nm -c -
■ - J__. _ —

Narada attaches great importance to the ritualistic modes of

* . 3
Vaishnava hhakti, generally known as the dasadha hhakti,

Bahdilya does not show the same regard for those observances,

hut allows them only an inferior position. Acts of worship

like sravana and kirtana which constitute an integral part of

the dashdha hhakti and which have an important place in the

Vaishnava tradition, do not enjoy the same importance in

^andilya^ exposition of hhakti. He describes them as secondary

forms of hhakti, which can have value only in so far as they

b
lead to the primary and essential form of hhakti. Singing of

1. Uarada Bhakti-Sutra. 68 ,

2* ^andilya Bhakti*-Sutra, 26,

3 . Narada, 82 .
handily a ,, 56 , 57 *
hymns and worship through narration of God*s attributes etc.

could lead to only a secondary form of devotion. £>andilya

defines the primary form of devotion in accordance with the

1
spirit of the Bhagavad**GIta, and describes it as exclusive

self“devotedness. A personal deity is obviously not the object

of his bhakti. Sandilya makes it very clear that his bhakti

should not be confused with Deva-bhakti „^ At the same time he

also draws a very careful distinction between Sraddha (faith)

■3
and bhakti„

The bhakti of Sandilya is much more contemplative in

nature as compared to that of Narada, which is definitely

more emotional/1
* ^andilya defines bhakti as a form of extreme

attachment to God," and as a state of mind, by attaining

which, a man lives, moves, and has his being in Him. According

to ^andilya, bhakti can be cultivated with the help of other

means such as 'jnana and yoga as well.^ But it is essentially

a state of mind and an experience. It includes the means and

is beyond and other than them. According to ^andilya, bhakti

1 . Ibid., 83 .
2. Ibid., 18 .

3. Ibid., 2k.

k* Narada, 68 .

5 * handilya, 19 *
6 , Ibid.t 19.
is an act of recognition and therefore is itself a form of

knowledge. Just as an act of recognition pre-supposes former

knowledge and in itself is an expression really of renewed

knowledge.

Narada also describes bhakti as intense attachment to

1 2
God, but on a more emotional level. On obtaining bhakti or

union with God man does, not desire anything else and thus

rises above the feeling of pleasure and pain.^ He is over­

joyed, and satisfied.^* For Narada, bhakti has the nature of

asakti or attachment. He speaks with great fervour about

acts of worship directed towards the personal form of the

deity. To adore His greatness and beauty, to worship Him, to

serve Him, and to love Him is described as bhakti by Narada. 5

That bhakti is possible only in relation to a personal

God is an opinion which cannot hold ground when judged from

the standpoint of Narada and handily a Bhakti-Siitras. Although

their main theme is bhakti and they are not really concerned

with the question of the nature of God as such, there are

1. Narada, 2.»

2.• Ibid., 68 .
3 o Ibido, 5 .

^-1
** Xb id., 6 .

5. Ibid., 82 .
sufficient indications in these Sutras to provide us with the

ideas of the two sutrakaras on this subject. However, none of

them points out that a personal view of God is a necessary

condition of bhakti, although Narada Ts bhakti, due to his

Vaishnava bias, clearly suggests a personal and saguria concept

of the Deity.1" He is clearly very much inspired by the

tradition of Krishna-bhakti
£ 0 and the dasadha
i.1 bhakti as
m.iL.ii.

mentioned by him can have meaning only in relation to a

p
personal deity. But if there is such an indication in Narada,

it is equally evident in Gandilya, that the latterTs view of

God is more impersonal and is not so close to the Vaishnava

image of a personal Deity. It is evident however, that they

both uphold and emphasise the value of bhakti in spite of

their difference of approach.

^aiidilya-Sixtra is constantly cited in support of the

general theory that bhakti is not possible without the faith

in a personal God. It must be pointed out however, that

£>andilya!s God is not of a personal nature. Although he refers

to Isvara both as the transcendant Lord as well as an

immanent principle, his cosmology on the whole, stands very

close to the dualistic principle of Sankhya. Reality according

1. Narada, 79, 9ff.

2. Ibid., 82.
to him is composed of only TchitT and TachitT. There is

nothing which exists out of it. Gandilya's God is therefore

of the nature of chit and does not seem very different from
1
the Purusha of Sankhya. The difference noticeable between

the two is that whereas the Purusha of Bahkhya is ultimately

removed from, and is independent of Prakriti, 3andilya*s chit

2
works through achit and the two remain united. ' He does not
-z
establish God as a third principle. Therefore without

looking for a separate and distinct entity as God, if

Efandilya’s bhakti is placed within his own dualism of chit

and ach i t , it can be easily interpreted as a unifying

principle„

Describing God (Isvara) as both a transcendant Lord

and an immanent principle, does not create any problem for

G a M i l y a in defining his ideas on bhakti.^* For him both

Isvara and the Atman can be the objects of bhaktiP The

difference of the philosophical points of view about their

nature do not matter with him, for according to him, their

1 . handilya. 37-40.
2. Ibid., 41.

3* Ibid.3 4-0.

4. Ibid.. 38.

5* Ibid., 29,30,31*
unity lies in the recognition of one as the other* Recognition

Isvara and the Atman as one, in no way diminishes the

greatness of Isvara. Isvara can never lose His superiority

states ^ahdilya, because of His very nature for He continues

to work through prakr iti as the superior principle*

1 Thus the

immanent nature of G-od and the impersonal principle of the

Atman are fully recognized in Gandilya’s hhakti. The idea of

God's immanence is not absent in Narada either. It can be

seen in his description of the divinity of great souls or

mahatmas* According to Narada, bhakti can be attained through

divine compassion as well as through the grace of the divine

2
men* He not only describes them as men of God, but also
3
suggests that there is no distinction between God and His men.

Here the mahatmas or the great souls seem to share His

divinity.

Neither Sahdilya nor Narada represent bhakti as a

path separate and opposed to that of jhana or knowledge.

Bhakti is described by both as a state and an attitude of mind

and heart. Expounding bhakti in these terms they attach the

1. Ibid.* 37.

2 . Narada, 38*
3* Ibid., 14-1.

I4-. ^ n d i l y a , 3*
 156

highest value to it and describe it as the final spiritual

end to he attained.

In the relative context of jfiana, karma, yoga, and

hhakti, handilya is preoccupied mainly with explanations of

the correct relationship between jnana and hhakti# Bondage

according to Gandilya is due to the want of devotion and not

1
to the want of knowledge# Whereas knowledge is necessary for

hhakti, the final liberation comes only through the attainment

of the latter# When hhakti appears it destroys the existing

o
knowledge and leads to new knowledge. &andilyars hhakti thus
X
consists of the experience of this renewed knowledge,*^ which

is different from knowledge through the intellect alone. It

is a knowledge caused by the final disappearance of buddhi#

Narada regards hhakti as higher than karma, ;jnana,

k ^ .
and yoga hut he does not create any antagonism or harrier

between jhSna and hhakti# When Narada speaks of the superior­

ity of hhakti, he offers two explanations for it. First, it

is superior because it is its own reward, and does not require

any other support. Second, because God has an aversion for

1 # Ibid#, 98 *
2 . Ibid#, 9 6 .
3* Ibid*, 15.

k* Narada, 25*

5* Ibid., 26 *
 15 ?

the egoist, and love for humility. Karma jhana and yoga are

thus set aside as inferior not because they are antithetical

to hhakti, hut because they can never he self-sufficient.

Besides, if devoid of hhakti, they can even generate egoism

and pride. Thus Narada does not lay down an exclusive and

superior path of hhakti as against that of Karma, yoga and

jnana hut emphasises the self-sufficiency of hhakti and points

out the insufficiency of the others without h^Kjti. According

to him, hhakti is superior to knowledge, because it is the

1 It is spontaneous and it takes shape
fruit of its own self*

of its own accord.

Although certain points of distinction and difference

can he found between the Bhakti-Sutras of Narada and &andilya,

in the final analysis, hhakti remains for both, a "state of

mind" which is essentially a matter of individual experience.

According to Sanjilya, it comes as an act of recognition

based on previous knowledge. According to Narada, through

the spontaneous attachment which finally results in an act

of complete absorption.

Even Narada, who shows a greater leaning towards

Vaishnava and ritualistic modes of worship, while describing

the ten formal acts of worship (da^adha hhakti), makes it

1. Ibid., 30.
 158

clear that they are only different manifestations of the

essential hhakti which is just one. Bhakti in general is

described by Narada, not as an act of worship, but as a

state of mind to be attained, and as an experience to be

experienced. It is in the nature of a subtle experience,

and is beyond description, as is the taste of a thing tasted

by the dumb.^

Thus neither the Bhagayad— Gita nor the Bhagavata

Furana. nor the Bhaktl-Sutras of Narada and SaAdilya provide

us with a definition of bhakti which would corroborate its

technical meaning as it is current in the academic circles

today. The above analysis of bhakti in these texts, their

concept of God in relation to the different gradations of

bhakti provided by them and the recognition of an interrelation

between bhakti and jfiana substantiates this. Bhakti for the

impersonal God is very often described in these texts as a

higher form of devotion, and a monistic ideology accompanies

all such descriptions of nirguna bhakti. A strictly personal-

istic devotion is attributed to these texts only on account

of the accepted artificial definition of bhakti. It must be

1. Ibid.. 82.

2 . Ibid., 5k*
3 * lb id.» 52 , see also 51 *
mentioned here again that there is no indication in these

texts to suggest that hhakti is possible only in relation to

a personal God and within the doctrinal framework of a dual-

istic view of Reality# They do not represent hhakti as an

antithesis to the religio-philosophical position of the

Vedanta and the Upanishads. On the contrary, ^aAdilya for

example has clearly described the ^ahma-KSnda as the Bhakti-

Kanda#
$"

1 # Gandilya, 26 #
 CHAPTER III

BHAKTI IN THE MEDIEVAL CONTEXT

i. The Existing View of the Bhakti Movement

When the great religious resurgence of the medieval

period is summed up as the Bhakti Movement, the epithet

hhakti is not understood in its general meaning of religious

devotion, hut is used as a name for a specific pattern of

religious devotionalism, possible only within the ideological

framework of the concept of a personal God, a non-monistic

view of Reality, and m a n ’s reliance on emotion rather than

reason in religious life.

Furthermore, hhakti so defined, is viewed in the

medieval context chiefly as an antithesis of Sankara’s

monistic v edanta, his impersonal view of God, and his

insistence on knowledge. The doctrine and religion of hhakti

is then attributed to points of view opposed to that of

£>ahkara, and the medieval development of Vaishnava Vedanta is

described as its chief theological expression. The Vaishnava

acharyas, Ramanuja, Nimbarka, Madhva, and Vallabha are thus

represented as the apostles of hhakti, and their systems of

Vedanta, as its doctrinal base. It is also argued that this

was an assertion of an emotional religion of "loving

devotion", and that it was very much needed at this time

because of the vacuum created by the "cold intellectualism"

of Gankar acharya.
 Since this is how the Bhakti Movement is generally

approached, the Vaishnava acharyas are always accepted as the

inspirational source of the religious thought and beliefs of

all the medieval bhaktas, of both the nirguna and the saguna

schools. Because of the same approach,the total expression

of religious devotion of that age, irrespective of the

variations so clearly seen in it, is interpreted as a reaction

against the religious values upheld by &ankaracharya.

Consequently, the Bhakti Movement as a whole is studied as

an expression of Vaishnavism as opposed to the influence of

^aAkaraTs Advaita Vedanta.

But this position can hardly be accepted as correct.

What is known as the Bhakti Movement shows evidence of both

a flowering of neo-Vaishnavism, and a remarkable popularity

of the nirguna ideology of the Advaita^edanta. The

Vaishnava movement, in the light of which the Bhakti

Movement is always assessed, constitutes only one part of

the religious resurgence of medieval India* But during the

h
medieval period,^Vaishnavism found its poets in Tulsidas,

Surdas, and other Rama and Krishna^bhaktas, the bhakta-poets

like Kablr and Nanak advocated nirguna ^bhakti with equal

fervour. If theologians like Ramanuja were adding new

philosophical dimensions to the simple and popular faith of

the Vaishnavas
o by evolving Vaishnava
o systems of Vedanta, the
more obstruse philosophical principles of the classical

Vedanta were now reaching the common man through poets like

Kab'Ir, in a simple, spontaneous, and non-scholastic language.

Both these currents had flowed into the bhakti-

stream of the medieval period, although they were different

in origin and inspiration. Vishnu-worship and a personal

conception of God was essential in one. An impersonal view

of God and the concept of the Nirguna Brahman was of primary

importance in the other. Whereas the Vaishnava movement of

Rama and Krishna bhakti can be easily connected with the

Vaishnava acharyas, the nirguna school of bhakti is not

related to them in any significant way. There is nothing in

common between the Vaishnava acharyas and the Nirguna

bhaktas like Kabir, Nanak and Dadu. In fact their respective

positions strike us as basically different. Whereas the

former established a personal image of God in their theology

and emphasized on saguna-bhakti, the latter, like

Sankaracharya, took a strictly impersonal view of God and

advocated bhakti for the Nirguna Brahman.

But in spite of the evidence of complete harmony

between &ahkara and the nirguna bhaktas who constitute a

vital part of the Bhakti Movement, the latter is invariably

described as a reaction against SankaraTs Advaitavada. It

is always represented as an assertion of bh a k t i ‘against

jnana* In all such contexts, hhakti is attributed to the

Vaishnava acharyas, and. jhana to Sankara. The present

position however, implies and. rests on the following

factors. Firstly, it is implied, that hhakti was absent in

Sfetnkara. Secondly, an intellectual ism incompatible with and

devoid of religious devotion, is attributed to Sankara, and

the emphasis he laid on Jhana is misinterpreted as his

emphasis on abstract and scholastic knowledge * Thirdly, the

difference between Sankara and the Vaishnava Acharyas is

described as the difference between the path of Jnana and

the path of bhakti* Lastly, it is assumed that the

Vaishnava acharyas had evolved a definite and uniform

doctrine of bhakti which was opposed to the principle of

jfiana and a monistic view of Reality* It is also suggested

that their ideology made room for the dualism and distance

between the devotee and the deity, necessary for bhakti*

But these arguments which sustain the existing views

about the Bhakti Movement in relation to Gankara and the

Vaishnava acharyas need a more careful examination, A reass­

essment of the position of Sankara and that of the Vaishnava

acharyas is undertaken here to clear some of the mis­

conceptions mentioned above* The following study shows that

bhakti is not absent in &ahkaracharya* It explains, though

briefly, what Sankara meant by jhana and proves there is no

antagonism between SankaraTs jnana and bhakti» The points

of difference between Saiikara and the Vaishnava acharyas

are also reviewed here to show that their difference did not

arise from the difference between jhana and bhakti but were

caused by the challenge of Advaita^Vedanta to the Vaishnava

o

tradition of the worship of personal deities. We have also

analysed the various definitions of bhakti provided by the

Vaishnava acharyas to point out the absence of that fixed

and uniform concept of bhakti which is so often attributed

to them. Neither their collective approach to bhakti nor

their individual views on it fit in with its current

technical definition.

ii. Bhakti and Jflana in ffankaracharya

•ESahkara’s position can in no way be regarded as the

opposite pole of bhakti. In fact, he eulogizes bhakti, and

attaches great importance to it as a means of salvation.

Nevertheless, it must be remembered that Sankara*s Vedanta

is usually viewed as an absolutism, and in contradistinction

to it, the Vaishnava Systems of Vedanta are regarded as

theistic. Bhakti is considered incompatible with the

absolutism of Sankara, and is attributed to the theism of

the Vaishnava acharyas.

 This method of explaining hhakti in relation to

Efankara is the result of the misleading application of an

alien concept of theism in the study of Hinduism, the

limitations of which have "been discussed in Chapter I. From

the Hindu point of view however, &aftkarafs position is

neither non-theistic, nor non-devotional. On the contrary,

Sahkaracharya is revered for the part he played in

strengthening the forces of theism against those of atheism.

A man whose entire life was devoted to religious pursuits,

whose religious fervour was responsible for the rise of many

monastic orders, and whose inspiration had led to the

now
estahlishment of the four religious centres/sacred to the

Hindus in the far corners of the Indian sub-continent, can

hardly be regarded as a man opposed to theism and religious

devotion.

But Sankara's theism rests on an impersonal view of

Cod and his bhakti remains constantly in line with his

nirguna ideology and exists within the framework of his

monistic beliefs,, EfeiAkara is not only not opposed to

bhakti, but has provided us with his own definition of it.

Bhakti according to Sankara is an enquiry and a

search after the real form of one's own self (Sva-svarupa).

1. Svasvarupanusandhanam bhaktirityevabhidhiyate
Viveka-Chudamani Of Sa&karacharya, ed. by Swami Madhavan
anda, Advaita Astirama, Calcutta, oth ed., 1957> v*39*
To support this, EfaAkara mentions the opinion of those who

maintain that 'bhakti is a quest for the substance and reality

n
of o n e ^ own self (Svatma-tattva)» The difference between

the terms sva-svarupa and svatma-tattva is only that of

phraseology* Sankara therefore regards them as one and does

not distinguish one from the other, for they stand for the

same Reality, the Atman, which is sought by bhakti,

Sankara places bhakti in line with graddha and yoga^

and describes the three as the necessary means of salvation.^

But out of them, Efaftkara rates bhakti as the highest in a

very positive and emphatic manner* It sustains the

aspirant in his search after the self, and culminates in

that state of self-realisation, or Atmafl-3ftana, which is

described by Sankara as the only way to salvation or moksha.

Here we can take graddha as the faith with which the quest

begins, Yoga as the active will, and bhakti as the emotional

involvement which arouses the passion and the longing for the

quest. Sankara fs bhakti constitutes the emotive part of the

act of self-contemplation.

&ahkara regards bhakti not only as a means but also

as an end in itself. The highest form of bhakti according

1 . svatmatatvanusandhanam bl^ctirityapare jaguh, ibid., v. 32 .

2 . sraddhabhaktidhyanayogamiumukshoh, ibid0, v. •

3 . mokshakaranasamagryam bhaktireva gariyasi, ibid., v. 31 •

 187

to him, is jnana-nishta or the state of abiding in the

■a '
1
knowledge of the self. Thus bhakti which acts as a means

in the initial spiritual endeavours, finally becomes an end

in itself when it culminates in the experience of the self,

for it exists both in the search for the Self as well as in

the state of abiding in It.

These views of Saftkara on bhakti are in complete

harmony with his impersonal conception of God. Therefore,

the suggestion that Sahkara made room for bhakti by putting

forth a dual definition of Brahman as para and apara, one

as the object of knowledge and the other as that of devotion,

is unwarranted. Although Sankara provides us with two

concepts of parjt and apart! Brahman, the nature of his bhakti

does not need the support of their distinction and difference.

We do not find any incompatibility between his Para~Brahman

and his bhakti, Sankara has his own concept of bhakti in

relation to Nirguna Brahman and therefore does not require

the help of an extra conceptual category for its sake. On

the contrary Sankara mentions bhakti-bhava in relation to

p
his apar^i or Nirguna Brahman and enjoins that his verses

1 . 'jnananishtha para bhaktirityu^safee,

Sahkaracharya, Gita Bhashya, XVIII. 55 >
2 • Br ahm a ~S u tr a ank ar a ■-Bha shy a e d . by Anant Krishna Gastri,
Nirhaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1938* 1.1.31•
 1 8 8

1
on self contemplation should be sung with bhakt i-bhava,

Again, according to Sankara, the devotee should worship Om

with £>raddha and bhakti,^ as it is not possible to grasp

the Nirguna Brahman without it.

What Efaftkara means by bhakti becomes still more

clear through the distinction he makes between bhakti and

up a sana. SaiikaraTs definition of bhakti is entirely in

keeping with his idea of the Nirguna Brahman, but his

description of up a sana is related with the concept of the

Saguna Brahman. Sankara explains that the gunas are

attributed to the Nirguna Brahman for the purpose of upasana.

Whereas Upasana is regarded by Sankara in its dual aspect,

both as meditation and as outward acts of worship, bhakti

is always described by him as an internalised attitude of

mind and heart. According to Saftkara, upasana can lead only

to nearness (samipata and salokata) with the ultimate

1 . sva-svarupanusandhana-rupam stutim yah

pathed-adarat-bhaktibhavo manushyah, see ’’Vijnana Nauka",
v . ’9, ins M inor Works of £?ankaracharya, ed. by Hari
Raghunath Bliagavat, Ashtekar" & Co., Poona, 1925* P« 3 «
For the devotional attitude advocated by &arkaracharya
towards Nirguna Brahman, see also his Para Puja and
Nirguna-Manasa-Puja, ibid., p. 363 and 360-1.

2 . s'raddha-bhaktibhyam bhavavis'eshena cha omkare avesayati,

^ankaracharya, Brihadaranyaka Upanishad Bhashya, V .I .I .

3 * The Brahma-Sutra Bha. shya, III 02.12-15 •

Reality, but bhakti results in that feeling of oneness and

identification (sayulvata and svarupata) which alone can

lead to Atman- ;jhana and m ok ska ♦

The Nirguna Brahman of Sankara is not juxtaposed

to the saguna, but includes it within itself.'*’ The Reality

is only one and rests within one's own self. The formal

difference of the categories of thought and names which are

used to explain it are immaterial since they are all

indications of the same thing. Adhering to this position,

Sankara does not find it difficult to accept different

names for God in spite of his strictly qualitiless view of

it. It is in this spirit that he deals with the Bhagvatas,

their bhakti, and their deities. He interprets their

concepts in his own language, and in the process, he

sometimes attributes his own ideas of bhakti to them. For

example, he explains the devotion for the Sagup.a Idvara as

_ O
bhakti for the Isvara who dwells within one's own self.

When Sankara is described as an exponent of the

path of ‘jnana as opposed to that of bhakti, not only is his

1. V.H. Bate, Vedanta Explained. 2 Vols,, Booksellers Publish­

ing Co., Bombay,~ 195^, Vol'Y II, p.515*

2. sva-karmana antaryaminam Idvaram pujayitva kevaljhana-

nishthanushthana-yogyata-lakshana-siddhih bhavati, quoted,
Swam! Atmanand, £>ri Gadkara^s Teachings in His own Words,
Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, "i960 , p . m .
 1 7 0

own concept of "bhakti not taken into account, hut his idea

of Jnana is also misinterpreted and he is viewed as a

champion of intellectual and abstract knowledge* But there

is no contradiction between bhakti and Jnana in 3ahkaracharya,

for he does not recommend the path of Jfrana as opposed to

bhakti, nor does he uphold Jnana in the sense of learning

and intellectual excellence* Whenever Sankara uses the

term Jnana in an absolute sense, he means by it, the

spiritual knowledge of the self through experience, and not

knowledge through intellect* This stands out very clearly

in Sankara for he does not attach any final value to

scholastic knowledge and to intellectual attainments.

1

According to £>ankara, the highest knowledge lies in

the experience of the Brahman (Brahmanubhava)> which

2
transcends all empirical knowledge* This knowledge has no

reference to human intellect, but is rooted in the self.

It can be attained only through personal experience, and

not through the help of learned man*^ £>ankara views all

other forms of knowledge as merely instrumental in nature*

1 * The Brahma-Sutra -Bhashya, 11 60

2, YoH* Date, ibid.* Vol.II, pp*U52ff.

3® Brahma-Sutra-Khashya, 1.1.2.

Z-U Yiveka-Ghudamani * v. 5k*

u a » n iw « ^ i^ m *in i i. in. i i i j i u m hunrtiiii myn Q ... u*
 1 7 :i

They have value only in so far as they purify the soul which
1
is stained by ignorance/

The scriptures also lose their pre-eminence when

2
Sankara speaks of jftana as personal spiritual experience.
The Sastras or Scriptures can guide and render knowledge

of the practical aspects of religion (dharma-.jhana), hut

not of the Brahman (Br ahm a- ffiana) ♦^ Whereas in the case of

the dharma-.jhana, the knowledge derived from the Sruti can

he useful, in the case of Brahma-Jftana, the fact of experience

alone can he taken as authoritative# The study of Scriptures

without the knowledge of the highest tattva is of no use,

and with the attainment of the knowledge of that tattva, it

no longer remains necessary.^ The network of words can

jr
lead to useless wanderings says Sankara.

Thus the path of knowledge upheld hy Sankara is the

path of Self-realisation and of Self-knowledge. It does not

stand for the pursuit of intellectual attainments and

3** Atmahodha, v in Minor Works..., ibid., p.13*

2. Swami &tmananda, ibid., pp.^Sfi**

3* Brahma^Sutra-Bhashya. l.l.U#

U. avi jfiate pare tatve ^astradhltistu nishphala, vij ftate

pare tatve sastradhitistu nishphala, Vivekakhudamani,
r-r ■ 1, 1,1 " <#
v ^9 . s

5. ^ahda^alani-maharanyam^chittahhramanakaranam, ibid., y 60 *
scholastic knowledge. Sankara makes a distinction "between a

man of experience and a man of learning. He calls the former

1
a mahatma, and the latter a vidvan, and regards the mahatma

as. greater than the vidvan. To describe Sankara as an

exponent of the path of Jnana, without giving sufficient

importance to these factors, amounts to stating a half-truth.

iii. £>ahkara and the Vaishnava Acharyas

The hhakti of the Vaishnava acharyas and the jhana

of Sankara are not counterpoised to each other. In fact,

hhakti in the sense of devotion, and Jhana in the sense of

self-knowledge, are common to hoth Sankara and the Vaishnava

acharyas. This does not imply however, that there are no

serious differences between them. The Vaishnava systems

of Vedanta, the Visisfcljiadvaita of Ramanuja, the Dvaitad’

v aita

of Nimbarka, the Dvaita of Ivladhva, and the Guddhadvaita of

Vallabhacharya were definite deviations from the Advaitavada

of Sankara, and the Vaishnava acharyas had put forward

very different views from his on questions of the nature of

God, the relationship between God and man, and the

1. Ibid., v 160.
 1 7 3

relationship between God and the phenomenal world# But the

real cause of disagreement between Gahkara and the Vaishnava

acharyas does not arise out of any existing controversy

between ;jnana and bhakti#

The disagreement of the Vaishnava acharyas with

Sankara’s Vedanta can be easily explained on grounds of

their primary loyalty to Vaishnavism. The growing popularity

and general acceptance of Sankara's Advaita^Vedanta had

created special problems for the Vaishnavas# In his efforts

to combat the nastika influences, 3aftkara had worked for

the unity of the different astika traditions. He was able

to achieve it by concentrating on those aspects of their

beliefs which alone could serve as their meeting ground.

But Sankara had explained the fundamentals of the astika

beliefs in terms of Vedanta, and had interpreted Vedanta in

strictly monistic terms. The Advaita Vedanta of Sankara,

which takes an impersonal view of God was bound to create

problems for the Vaishnavas who belonged to the astika group,

but whose characteristic religious modes could lose their

pre-eminence if they were to be constantly exposed to the

influence of Sankara’s Advaita and its emphasis on the

impersonal nature of God# Vaishnavas viewed God primarily

as a person, and the worship of the personal deity Vishnu

and his avataras Rama and Krishna was of fundamental

 1 7 4

importance to the Vaishnava religion. An impersonal concept

of God and the idea of the Nirguna Brahman on the other

hand was the very essence of the Advaita Vedanta of

&ankaracharya. Vaishnavas, as an astika group, were now

faced with the task of upholding their traditional faith

and practices, and also of reiterating their astika Beliefs.

In the post~£>ankara period however, the latter could he

ifo
achieved only through the language of,xVedanta.

As £>ankara Ts influence Became more Broad Based, the

need for evolving a Vaishn.ava thought-system in terms of

Vedanta must have Become more and more apparent. If this

popular religion, Vaishnavism, was to retain its traditional

Beliefs and modes of worship, it was necessary for it now,

more than ever, to have a status of its own in philosophy

and metaphysics and to have its own theological sanctions

intellectually explained. The Best way to achieve this was

to interpret Vedanta from the Vaishnava viewpoint. The

four great theologians of the medieval period, Ramanuja,

NimBarka, Madhva, and VailaBhacharya were to fulfill this

need of Vaishnavism,
0 * each in his own manner. The four

systems of Vaishnava Vedanta, as evolved By them, were in

the nature of a reasoned and a scholastic response of

Vaishnavism to the challenge of Sankara. They were an

expression of the Vaishnava efforts towards the preservation

and re-orientation of their thought and "beliefs.

The main difference between Sankara and the Vaishnava

acharyas lies in the Vaishnava sympathies of the latter who

laid great stress on the personality of Vishpu and his

avatar a Krishna in their systems of Vedanta, As Vaishnava^

it was very important for the Vaishnava acharyas to establish

this aspect of their faith in the Vedanta. Therefore, even

when most of them were able to make certain adjustments with

*L
Sankara !s Vedanta, on the question of the unity of the

Brahman, none of them showed any compromise with his Nirguna

or impersonal Brahman. Although we find different shades of

opinion amongst the Vaishnava acharyas on the question of

the Advaita and the Dvaita, there is perfect unanimity

amongst them regarding the Saguna or the personal nature of

God. Thus the emphasis laid by the Vaishnava Acharyas on a

personal God was caused by their Vaishnava faith, and need

not therefore, be interpreted as a counterpart of any special

religion or doctrine of bhakti propounded by them.

Some major misconceptions about the Bhakti Movement

can be removed if the differences between Sankara and the

Vaishnava acharyas are studied on the lines suggested above.

In the following pages therefore, the position of 3ankara-

charya is examined against the total background of Hinduism

d* Vide Infra, pp.|£|l-*T§*

and that of the astika
4“ 1
unity* His achievement of the astika

unity is explained here in the light of his formulation of

the Advaita Vedanta* The repercussions of this 011 Vaishna-

vism are duly weighed, and the position of the Vaishriava

acharyas in relation to Sankara is reviewed mainly from the

standpoint of the Vaishpava cause.

(a) The Place of gahkara and His Vedanta in Hinduism, and

the Problem of the Astika Unity

^ahkara occupies a very unique place in the history

of Hinduism. This is not entirely on account of his

brilliant academic exposition of the Advaita-Vedanta, but

is also due to the significant role he played in the revival

of Hinduism in its struggle against the Buddhist forces,

^ahkara was not only a philosopher and a man of exceptional

intellectual attainments, but was also a man of action

inspired by the great sense of religious mission.

A great deal of diversity existed within Hinduism

in spite of the common agreement regarding fundamentals and

the acceptance of certain doctrines by all the groups and

philosophical systems. Certain amount of ideological

agreement, and a serious effort towards a possible synthesis

was necessary if they were to stand together as one. To

defend Hinduism against other forces demanded at once a

sense of solidarity, a conscious unity, and some unifying

principles* That alone could enable Hinduism to hold its

own against Buddhism, Jainism and other prevalent creeds

which lay outside its orthodox fold* Sankara must have been

aware of this when he started his work for the revival and

reorganization of Hinduism*

The Indian religio-philosophical traditions can be

viewed in two broad divisions, those that are astika> and

the others that are nastika, Whereas the former accept the

principle of Atman, the latter rest on the principle of

nairatmya* The astika tradition consists of many religious

groups and ideologies and the astika thought is represented

by the six orthodox systems of philosophy* The Buddhist

tradition has proved the most significant and dynamic in the

nastika group *

The philosophical systems which draw inspiration

from the Upanishads conceive Reality as the Soul or the

Atman, and regard it as eternal and immutable* All religious

groups which accept this viewpoint fall into the astika *

group. The nastikas take a very different stand* They

disregard the authority of the Upanishads and deny the

existence of an inner and immutable unifying principle of

Reality* According to the Buddhists, everything is

 .1 7 8

discontinuous, separate and momentary, and to regard Reality

as otherwise is only an illusion horn out of wrong belief or

avidya. Whereas according to the Upanishadic tradition,

bondage arises out of the ignorance of the self and a wrong

identification of the Self with the non-self, according to

the Buddhist, avidya or ignorance is born out of wrong belief

in the Atman.

Although all systems of philosophy and all the

religious groups which accepted the principle of Atman and

the authority of the Vedas could be grouped together as

astikas, unity of their thought and belief could be regarded

as more of an implicit than an apparent fact. Each thought

system had evolved its own metaphysics and had followed a

separate course of development. Starting from a common

source, the different schools of philosophy had thus drifted

apart. Many religious groups existing within the astika

fold had their own sectarian loyalties and distinct

traditions too, which were not always directly derived from

the Vedic background and which they had retained in spite

of their acceptance of the Yedic authority and the Upanishadic

principle of the Atman. Each religious group was bound to

be zealous of its separate identity, and each thought system

of its own particular standpoint.

But in spite of their mutual differences and their

 179

separate identities, they were in complete agreement on two

points. The common "bonds of the astika systems lay in their

HUM— IrtlW V V

common acceptance of certain underlying philosophic axioms

on the one hand, and their firm acceptance of the gruti on

the other. In so far as they "believed in an eternal and

immutable entity, the Atman, and they accepted the authority

of the Vedas, there was no scope for difference of opinion

amongst them. On the question of the ultimacy of the Atman

and the £?r.utia they formed a composite group against the

nastikas, who took a totally different position on these

issues*

&aAkara was faced with the task of upholding the

astika position against that of the nastikas. This could be

achieved by highlighting the points of mutual agreement

amongst the astikas and by making them aware of their main

difference with the n astika group. £&dkara therefore,

strongly emphasised the two factors which could keep the

astikas linked together, their common adherence to the ffruti

and their underlying philosophical unity on the question of

the Ultimate,

Sankara drew a clear line of division between the

astikas and nastikas, and made a case for the unity of the

astika systems on grounds of their common adherence to the

Vedas, Describing the Bauddhas, the Lokayat^s and the Jainas
 .180

as those 11who hold it as an established conclusion that the

Vedas are not author it at iven , he called upon all those who

accepted the authority of the Vedas to refute their systems

by means of logical reasoning* Similarly he pointed out the

philosophical unity of the astikas by explaining that they

all agreed in their final understanding of the Ultimate

2
Reality. Furthermore, in the light of this £>aftkara strongly

emphasised the oneness of the Being who, he explained, is

variously understood by various philosophical controversial­

ists in their several systems of philosophy", but who is

indeed "the one and the only Brahman".^

.Although in such explanations of the essential unity

of that Being, &a:nkara was only repeating an old and familiar

idea of the Vedas,^ this idea must have carried a new

meaning in an atmosphere of fully evolved philosophical

diversities and multiplicity of cults and practices. Such

an approach could help in viewing the mutual philosophical

differences in the right perspective, and might set the

forces of synthesis to work. It might also direct the

1 • Sarva-Siddhanta-Sangraha of S'ahkaracharya, ed*

by M. Rangacharya, Madras, 1909, 1.25 •

2* Ibid., passim .

3* Ibid.* 1*1.

U. R ig-Veda, I.164.U6; X.llU.5.

 181

people*s attention to certain points of fundamental

similarityo

Whereas the ultimacy of the Vedas was always

maintained hy the astika schools, and the idea of the

essential oneness of the Reality was easily acceptable to

them, much greater effort was required on the part of

J?ankaracharya to formulate a thought system which would

cement all the astika schools into a more positive and

definite philosophical unity. Out of all the orthodox

systems of philosophy perhaps he saw a greater potential in

the Vedanta as a cementing force for achieving such a

synthesis.

Because of the very nature of its development,

Vedanta had remained closest to the Upanishads, and was more

suitable as a meeting ground for all the philosophical

systems which were directly rooted in them. It had taken

shape as^result of a continuous effort to give a systematic

form to the philosophy contained in the Upanishads* As the

Upanishads did not exist in the form of systematised

treatises, different interpretations were always possible,

and the system of Vedanta therefore, though directly rooted

in them, always enjoyed a certain amount of flexibility.

Various points of view were always possible within its

framework, and yet its close connection with the Upanishads

could always be retained.

The work of systematically explaining the philosophi­

cal contents of the Upanishads was first undertaken by

Badarayana. But this first exposition of the Vedanta was

offered in the form of Sutras, which on account of their

cryptic nature, could be differently interpreted. Thus, in

the course of its development, Vedanta was explained in

different ways and had remained flexible enough to

accommodate a wide range of differences without losing its

substantial unity, which was formally based on the Vedanta-

SUtras of Badarayana, On account of this flexibility,

Vedanta had also developed a great capacity for assimilation

of other influences. For example, it had not been shy even

of the influence of the opposite forces of the nastika group,

and long before Sankara, Vedanta had absorbed some of the

Buddhist concepts as well.

An earlier Vedantin, Gaudapada, shows a considerable

1
influence of Buddhist thought, A similar phenomenon is

1 , According to Chandradhara Sharma, Gaudapada represents

the best that is in Nagarjuna and Vlfsubandhu. Radhakrish-
nan describes the Karika of Gaudapada as an "attempt to
combine in one whole the negative logic of the MadhySmikCs
with the positive idealism of the Upanishads1' and states
that Gaudapadafs "liberal views enabled him to accept
doctrines assocaited with Buddhism and adjust them to the
Advaita-Vedanta",
Chandradhar Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy,
Rider & Co., London .1960, p. 239»
So Radhakrishnan, ibid., Vol.II, p 0^-65 ,
seen in Sankara, who clearly included in his system of

Vedanta certain Buddhist elements such as the doctrine of

Maya and the value of monastic ism. This ability of Vedanta

to incorporate the strong influence of Buddhist philosophy

was perhaps its additional strength. It could help in

extending its influence and popularity in view of the

predominant impact of Buddhism on Indian life and thought.

the
Gankara used/Vedanta as a platform for unifying the

astika systems. He used it as a medium to transmit a

unified philosophy, complete in itself, fundamentals of

which would be acceptable to all the astika groups. He

established it now on a stronger footing in relation with

the other systems of philosophy. He crystallised it and

gave it a new shape through his clear cut philosophy of

Advaitavada or non-dualism. At the same time he argued and

proved that out of all the systems of philosophy it was

Vedanta which stood closest to the meaning and the wisdom

of the Vedas.

In his introduction to Sarva-Siddhanta-Sadgraha,

Gankara discusses the auxiliary limbs (angas). the secondary

limbs (upangas) of the Vedas, and the supplementary Vedas

fourteen branches of knowledge

1 • Sarva-Siddhanta -Sangraha, 1.2.

 the
mentioned under them, he regardq/Mimansa, which is devoted

to the enquiry into the meaning and aim of all the Vedas, as
1 -
the highest* The Purva-Mini ansa, he explains deals only with

rituals or Karma, whereas the Uttara-Mimansa is divided into

two parts - one dealing with the deities (Pevata-Kanda)* the

i
«v - a P
other with Jnana or wisdom (Jnana-Kanda) . The explanatory

commentary written on the Jnana-Kanda is described by SaAkara

the
as Vedanta* Although Sankara connects/MImansa as a whole

with the "meaning and aim of the Vedas", he regards only the

Jnana-Kanda of Uttara-MImansa as Vedanta, the end and the aim

of the Vedas * As far as other systems of philosophy go,

the
Sankara points out that they all culminate in/Vedanta.

According to him, the conclusions of all the other systems

tend towards the same as those of Vedanta.^"

Sankara’s desire to create a philosophical synthesis

of the astika sohools in terms of Vedanta can be clearly

seen in the opening and the concluding remarks of his Sarva-

Siddhanta~San.graha* He mentions at the outset that "the

Brahman, who is differently understood by different

controversialists of philosophy, can be realised in the

1. S ar v a -S iddh ant a «*SaAgr aha, 1.16,17 .

2. Ibid .3 I*20a

3. Ibid., I. 22 *

A. Ibid., X I I a .
 1 8 5

1
Vedanta." He concludes his account of the different systems

of philosophy and religion with the remark that "he who hears

in the proper order these well abridged conclusions of all

the systems culminating in the Vedanta becomes the knower of

p
things and a learned person in the world."

Sankara not only established an infallible position

the
for/Vedanta as the main purport of the Vedas and a meeting

ground of the fundamentals of different philosophical

trends, but was also able to give it a new dimension as a

philosophical system in itself. The systematisation of

Vedanta by Sankara in terms of Advaita created a thought-

system "which in consistence, thoroughness and profundity,

holds the first place in Indian philosophy". According to

Thibaut, "the doctrine advocated by Sankara is, from a

purely philosophical point of view, and apart from all

theological considerations, the most important and

interesting one which has arisen on Indian soil; neither

those forms of the Vedanta, which diverge from the view

represented by £>aAkara nor any of the non-Vedantic systems,

can be compared with the so-called orthodox. Ved’

anta in

boldness, depth and subtlety of speculation 0 £>a3ikaraTs

1. Ibid., 1 .1.

2. Ibid., XII, 99.

3. Thibaut, quoted. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, ibid.,

Vol.II, p p .
 1 8 6

the
treatment of/Vedanta was .thus unique* In the words of

Radhakrishnan his Advaita-Vedanta stands forth complete as

a philosophy ’'needing neither a "before nor an after” *

(h ) gahkara's Challenge to Vaishnavism

The superiority of Vedanta, thus established by

Sankara not only affected the relative position of the other

orthodox systems of philosophy but had serious repercussions

on Vaishnavism too* The Vaishnavas were a religious group,

astika in nature but held together mainly on the basis of

the worship of a common deity, Vishnu* They had no distinct

and exclusive thought system of their own comparable to the

six classical schools of philosophy. Vishnu-worship

constituted the very essence of their religion, and their

formal theology had evolved as a result of the influences

p
of the prevailing systems of philosophy* That the

Vaishnava thought on the whole had drawn freely from all

the astika philosophical schools is clear from the speculat­

ive parts of their scriptures which show that such an

1 . Ibid., p.M-l-6 *
2* This can be seen in the important literary texts of the
Vaishnavas such as the Bhagavat Purana and the Vishnu
Purana * It may be added here however that the Vaishnava
Samhitas also, when they consist of four parts, one°of
which is called the Jnana^pada, show similar influences*
assimilative process was going on from an early stage. In

the pre-£ahkara period, however, the Vaishnavas had relied

more definitely on the Sankhya philosophy for the development

of their theology, and the deity Vishnu was upheld hy them

***# 1
in the Sankhya terminology as pure Sattva,

The growing popularity of Saftkara's philosophy and

the new status acquired hy Vedanta came as a challenge to

the Vaishnavas, Vaishnavism had always had a great following

and had served as one of the main astika strongholds against

the nastika group till now. When Sankara used Vedanta as

the touchstone for testing the validity of all astika

systems of thought and was successful in establishing it as

the meeting ground of all the theistic groups, it became

increasingly important for the Vaishnavas also to explain

the
their religious beliefs in terms of/Vedanta if they were to

1 • Sarva-Siddhanta~Sangrahat Chapter X I ,

2, Prabodha^Chandrodaya, an allegorical and popular Sanskrit

play of the 11th century, gives a clear indication of
this, Vishnu-bhakti is represented in this play as the
repository of the true sraddha and dharma at a time when
the Upanishad was undergoing a period of crisis. It is
Vishnu-bhakti which finally brings about a meeting of the
Upanishad and viveka who had got separated from each
other. The atheists find it difficult to combat Vishnu-
bhakti and it is she who finally succeeds in gaining*
victory for viveka,
Krishna Mishra, Prabodha».Chandrodaya, Chowkambha Vidya
Bfiavan, Banaras, 1955> Acts II, III, V, VI,
maintain and uphold their former position. An absence of an

independent philosophical system exclusively their own, and

their reliance on the principles of Sankhya in their theology,

are clearly indicated in Sankara’s observations on them in

his Sarva-Siddhanta-Sahgraha, It will not be wrong to

mention here that no special religion or doctrine of Bhakti

is attributed to the Vaishnavas by Sankara in this work.

In the Sarva-Siddhanta-Sahgraha, Sankara does not

deal with the Vaishnava Siddhanta separately but gives an

account of their doctrines and beliefs in his discussion

on the Veda-Vyasa-Paksha, where he mentions Vishnu-worship

and the supremacy of the deity Vishnu as recognized by the

1
BhagavataSo The system of Veda-Vyasa is described by

Sankara as the essence of the Vedas as given out by Veda

Vyasa in the Mahabharata, He also explains that their views

were derived from the Sankhya system by the believers of the

o
Vedas. As is clear from this, ^ahkara had fully recognized

the astika nature of the Vaishnavas. Nevertheless, in view

of Sankara's challenge, the Vaishnavas. had now to explain

their religious beliefs in terms of Vedanta if they were to

maintain and uphold their former position.

Although Sahkara had not raised any objections to

1. Sarva--Siddhanta-Sah.graha, XI, 55? 55, 59? 66,

2. Ibid., XI. 1.
 18 9

Vishnu-worship and had given his general sanction to the

religious modes of the Vaishnavas, his impersonal and

monistic view of Reality was obviously at variance with

1
their essential beliefs,, First and foremost,9 the Vaishnavas
*

worshipped Vishnu and his avataras as personalities. No

amount of theological manipulations to explain Vishnu as the

Brahman could change this basic position of the Vaishnava

religion. Similarly, certain religious modes closely linked

with the temple-culture and idol-worship were an integral

2
part of Vaishnavism, They were an easy accompaniment to

the anthropomorphic view of the deity Vishnu, £>ahkara1s

position however, was basically opposed to this. His concept

of the jflirguna Brahman was not at all compatible with the

personal image of the deity. Nor could his non-dualistic

explanation of Reality be conducive to idol-worship, But

an essential dualism and a sense of otherness between the

Deity and the devotee were a necessary counterpart of

personality cults such as that of Vishnu-worship• If God

was to be worshipped as a person, He must be regarded as

1 • Br ahm a - Su tr a -Bha shy a , II, 2* JLj-2-W-W

2, The Pancharatra Samhitas, for example, lay great stress
on temple-building*(mandira-nirmana) and image-making
(pratishtha-vidhi). Detailed accounts of these can be
found in'the Kriya-Pada of the Samhita literature.
P. Otto, Schrader, Introduction to the Pancaratra and the
Ahirbudhnya Samhita, Adyar Library, Madras, 1916, pp* 22f f •
 .190

definitely other than the devotee. How could the non-

dualism of £>ahkara provide for this?

(c) The Vaishnava Response,

In face of Sankara’s challenge therefore, the task

before the Vaishnava theologians was twofold. Not only was

it necessary for them to explain their religious beliefs

through the system of Vedanta, but it was equally important

for them to assert the essential elements of the Vaishnava

tradition with a fresh vigour. The personality of Vishnu

and of his avataras had now to be reinstated in the language

1
■■" ■ ■■■*

of the Vedanta, irrespective of Sankara’s impersonal

representation of God, Similarly, provision had to be made

within the framework of Vedanta for the deity as a clearly

separate entity against SankaraTs non-dualistic view of

Reality. Neither the worship of Vishnu nor that of his

avataras could have full significance without the sense of

the otherness of the personal deity. The personality of

Vishnu and that of his avatara Krishna had to be synchronised

somehow with the Vedantic Brahman. At the same time this

personal image of the Vaishnava God had to be placed in

logical relationship with the Vedantic principles of G o d Ts

immanence and of the unity of individual souls and God,

This emphasis on the Vaishnava elements can be

clearly seen in the four systems of Vaishnava Vedanta.

Neither bhakti nor theism,7 but Vishnu-bhakti

*
and Vaishnavism
t>

are the real points of difference between E>aftkara and the

Vaishnava acharyas. The latter worked within the framework

of Vedanta and did not so much aim at negating the Vedantic

concepts of the unity of the Brahman as safeguarding the

fundamentals of the Vaishnava religion. However, the

Vaishnava acharyas show ready adjustments and compromise

with the Advaita Vedanta in so far as their Vaishnava

t

beliefs are not superseded and to the extent that they find

themselves in a position to retain their Vaishnava bias in

relation to it. Each Vaishnava system of Vedanta, as well

as the general nature of the progression of the Vaishnava

movement from Ramanuja to Vallabhacharya shows this.

Although Ramanuja objects to S^ankara^ non-dualism

and qualifies it, he does not entirely oppose it. Like

Sankara he also conceives Reality as a unity. As the term

itself indicates, the Visishtadvaita of Ramanuja lays as

much stress on the non-dualistic nature of Reality as it

does on the difference which qualifies it. The inseparable

unity of matter, souls, and God constitute the Brahman of

Ramanuja. The main disagreement between Sankara and

Ramanuja, is that whereas Sankara’s Advaita is an undiffer­

entiated monism, RamanujaTs advaita is visishta, or qualified.

 Qualifying Sankara’s monism, Ramanuja lays down

three ultimate realities (tattva-traya): God (isvara), Soul

(chit) and matter (achit). But he also establishes the

principle of an internal relation of inseparability

(apr4thaka~siddhi) amongst them, which serves as the pivot

9
1
on which his whole philosophy runs. Soul and matter are

distinct from God, but are not separate from Him. They are

attributes (prakara) of God. They are the controlled

(niyamya) the supported (clharya) the parts (ansas) and the

accessory means (desha). God is their substance (prakyiti).

controller (niyanta),support (adhara)» whole (adsl),

and the principal end (seshi). He is free from all

internal (sajatlya) as well as external (vijatlya)

differences because there is nothing similar or dissimilar

which is external to or other than Him. ■ Ramanuja!s

Absolute is therefore an organic unity - a concrete whole

(Visishta) consisting of interrelated and interdependent

subordinate elements which cannot exist by themselves in

separation from the substantive element (Viseshya)* The

distinction and the supremacy of God or Isvara is thus

established by Ramanuja within the non-dualistic unity of

1. M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, George Allen

& Unwin, London, 1932, p.399ff.

2. Chandradhar Sharma, ibid., p.3^7*

 .193

the Ultimate Reality.

Like Ramanuja, Madhva also "believes in the three

distinct entities of matter, soul, and God. But he does not

support Ramanuja’s principle of inseparability. On the

contrary, Madhva dwells more on the principle of difference

and separation amongst them. Madhva clearly rejects

^aAkara’s monistic Vedanta and offers his own which is

clearly dualistic. He puts forward a clear and fundamental

difference "between soul and God. Against Efaftkara’s

description of the jiva as the pratib m b a of Brahman,

Madhvafs dualism or Dvaitavada provides for the bimba-

pratibimba relationship between the two. Although Madhva

acknowledges Brahman as the independent source of Reality,

he states that the consciousness and the activity of the

jiva cannot be experienced without dependence upon the

Brahman. The bimba-pratibimba relationship according to

1
Madhva cannot be annulled and must remain eternal.

But in spite of this dualism, Madhva also leaves

some room for unity between the Brahman and jiva. He

substitutes the idea of identity of &aftkara and that of

/ p
inseparability of Ramanuja with his own idea of ahsatva.

1, BoN.Ko Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya. Bharatiya

Vidya Bhavan, Bombay,1962, p. 216 f f ,

2. Ibid., p. 227.
Madhva regards jiva as similar to Brahman to the degree that

the former possesses the letter’s characteristics of reality,

consciousness and bliss. Speaking in this strain, Madhva

sometimes identifies the jiva with the Brahman and describes

a free soul as akin to God. So much so, that on these

also
grounds sometimes the followers of Madhva/claim their

position to be monistic.1

Like Ramanuja and Madhva, Nimbarka also conceives

Reality in three parts - God, Soul and matter. But his

Dvaitadvaita Vedanta is really a dualistic monism. Nimbarka

accepts the difference as well as the non-difference between

the Brahman and the individual souls, and between Brahman

and the phenomenal world. According to him soul and matter

have no independent existence and are not different from

God. Individual souls are not the rays of Brahman

individualised, as suggested by the Vivartvadins, but are

essentially of the nature of knowledge (jflana - svarupa).

Matter and souls are not attributes of God, but they

2
constitute parts and power of God.

Vallabhacharya takes a completely monistic stand.

His Guddhadvaita or pure monism explains the whole universe

1. K, Narain, An Outline of Madhva Philosophy. Udayana

Publication sT,"A1TahabadT^96^2, p .'TT23"•

2. Chandradhar Sharma, ibid., p. 376 ff.

as Brahmano Neither the individual souls nor the inanimate

world has any separate existence. God is the whole and the

individual is a part thereof. According to Vallabha, the

relation between the two is that of the spark and the fire.

The universe is neither an illusion nor a manifestation of

Brahman, but is its natural emenation. God is the one

supreme inner ruler of the universe (antaryamin)» The

material world is only a manifestation of His aspects of

existence and knowledge. Brahman as bliss remains obscure

in the material world, states Vallabha, but from His nature

as Bliss, spring forth the antaryamins who are the residing

1
deities of the souls and are as numerous as the souls.

Thus in spite of their differences with Sankara,

the Vaishnava acharyas show some agreement and compromise

with his advaitavada. On the whole they acknowledge the

oneness of the jiva and the Brahman or of soul and God. As

a group occupied with the task of developing a different

view of Vedanta from that of Sankara in spite of seriously

modifying his views they seem to gravitate more towards the

non-dualistic than a dualistic view of Reality. Each one of

them had put forward his. system of Vedanta in refutation of

Sankara, but out of the four Vaishnava acharyas, it was

only Madhva who took a clearly dualistic stand. Ramanuja

1. S.N. Dasgupta, ibid., Vol.IV, p. 331£‘£<>

 1 9 6

and Nimbarka were content with modifications of non-dualism.

Vallabhacharya went to the extent of evolving his own non­

dualism, though different from that of Shankar a. It is

therefore wrong to regard these systems of Vedanta as

assertions of the sense of dualism and otherness between man

and God for the propagation of bhakti or devotion.

The more serious difference between £>a:dkara and

the Vaishnava acharyas lies in the uniform insistence by the

latter on a personal view of God, All of them uphold

Isvara or God as perfect personality (Purushottama) and

describe Him in terms of good qualities (saguna). But

although the categories of Isfvara and Purushottama are the

same as that of Brahman in the Vaishnava acharyas, their

views in this respect are absolutely different from that of

Sankara who always regards Brahman in its final form as

nirguna and impersonal.

In their personal view of God however, the Vaishnava

acharyas were asserting only their Vaishnava bias. The

worship of the personal deity Vishnu and of the deified

personality of Krishna was an integral part of Vaishnavism.

It was necessary to keep the supreme position of these

personalities intact if Vaishnavism

c
was to retain its own

character while speaking the language of Vedanta. In the

Vaishnava-Vedanta, the concept of the Purushottama provided

 ample scope for bringing in the anthropomorphic view of God,

which was a vital part of the Vaishnava religion. Ramanuja

and Madhva installed and exalted Vishnu in their Vedanta as

Purushottama and the Brahman. Similarly Nimbarka and

Vallabha concentrated a great deal on the personality of

Krishna in theirs. But this emphasis on God as a person,

and on Vishnu and Krishna, was for the purpose of upholding

the Vaishnava religion. These personal conceptions of God

the
were not evolved in/Vaishnava-Vedanta for the propagation of
any
/bhakti religion or doctrine,

iv. Bhakti in the Vaishnava Acharyas.

(a) Ramanuja

Both the Upanishadic and the Vaishnava elements are

present in RamanujaTs scheme of §adlffha. Inspired by one,

he lays stress on contemplation) individual efforts, and

internalised forms of devotion. Guided by the other, he

gives full recognition to overt and ritualistic modes of

worship followed by the Vaishnavas. On the one hand Ramanuja

emphasises the importance of dhyana, jnana, and yoga. On

the other he talks of the path of complete surrender, devoid

of all these as sufficient. But on the whole he recognizes

the path of self effort, contemplation and jftana as the

 1
higher one and identifies it with bhakti.

Rajnanuja lays down two categories of sadhana, that

of hhakti and prapatti. They are defined differently and

are recommended for different types of aspirants. Neverthe­

less one is definitely declared to he higher than the other.

The path of hhakti is recommended for the three upper castes,

and only the path of prapatti is left open for the sudras.

Whereas meditation, knowledge, and spiritual experience are

declared essential for hhakti, the mere act of surrender is

considered as sufficient for those who follow the path of

2
prapatti. Considering this distinction made hy Ramanuja

between hhakti and prapatti, it is wrong to interpret his

hhakti as the path of simple surrender opposed to that of

jfrana.

Ramanuja does not describe hhakti as a form of faith

or doctrine, hut describes it in very clear terms as an act

of constant memory. In this context memory is explained hy

Ramanuja as meditation or dhyana. According to him it is

this memory or smriti which adopts the nature of, and

culminates in an immediate intuitive perceptior or

pratyakshata. Those who are attached to this state, obtain

1. Hiriyanna, ibid., pp. klO ff.

2. Radhakrishnan, ibid., Vol.II, pp. 705-6.

See also Chandradhara Sharma, ibid., pp*352ff.
liberation on account of their intense love for the object

of their memory. In other words, Ramanuja's bhakti is

aimed at and results in a kind of intuitive knowledge.

Therefore, if in the context of spiritual endeavour or

aadhna, jflana is correctly understood in the sense of

spiritual knowledge derived from personal experience,

Ramanuja's bliakti must be considered synonymous with it.

Thus Ramanuja defines bhakti as an experience which is the

result of devout meditation, is accompanied with love, and

is also a kind of knowledge.

Ramanuja is generally described as the chief

protoganist of the path of bhakti against that of ‘jnana.

But this is a mistaken judgement. As shown above, bhakti

is described by him as a particular kind of knowledge or

o
jflana~ visesha, to which one is infinitely attached.

According to him, it is this knowledge which leads to the

extinction of all other interests and desires.

(b) Nimbarka.

Although Nimbarka views bhakti from a more emotional

angle, and describes it as Madhurya and rasa, it is the

1. Jo G-onda, "Het Begrip Bhakti", ibid., pp.651 ff.

2. S.No Dasgupta, ibid.., Vol. Ill, p 0l 6 l 0
 200

intuitive perception of the Brahman, Brahmas aksha tkara,

which remains the ultimate aim of his sadlma. According to

him the end of spiritual endeavour is to attain the feeling

of oneness with God and to ahide in Him as a part of His

1
' energy • This can he achieved only through bhakti, Both

thought and devotion are required in it, because the nature

of the Brahman is revealed only through a process of

spiritual realisation. According to Nimbarka, meditation

on the nature of God and participation in Him as His

2
constituent is the same as continuous devotion for Him,

Nimbarka does not see any conflict between *3nana

and bhakti. He does not only relate bhakti with knowledge,

but regards the two as interdependent. According to him,

liberation is caused by knowledge which is brought about by

God's grace, which itself is due to devotion.-^ In a way

Nimbarka regards knowledge as superior to bhakti^ because

his bhakti at once requires the knowledge of the Supreme

Reality as well as that of the individual soul.

Nimbarkafs bhakti does not exclude the element of

1. S.No Dasgupta, ibid., Vol.Ill, p.UlU.

2, Ibid., p.415*
3# Chandradhara Sharma, ibid.5 P«376.
 2 0 1

individual endeavour either. On the contrary, the latter is

considered necessary for the attainment of Brahma-^nana and

Brahma-Sakshatkara * Neither the idea of G o d Ts grace nor

that of prapatti eliminate this from his thought, Nimbarka

recognizes prapatti as a means of salvation and states that

those who show it are favoured by God who engenders bhakti

in them* Nevertheless, he maintains that it is only through

the efforts of the devotee himself that God is moved to

grant His grace, Prapatti or surrender to Him has value

only in so far as it arouses bhakti and finally leads to the

intuitive perception of the Brahman, But it is the latter

which always remains the ultimate end of NimbarkaTs bhakti*

(c) Madhya •

Madhva describes bhakti as a state of loving

attachment born out of the knowledge and regard for the

object of devotion. The knowledge and correct understanding

of the greatness of God is necessary for bhakti because

devotion, in order to be meaningful, must be founded on a

1
firm and adequate knowledge of the object of devotion.

Since the purpose of bhakti is to manifest the true relation

of jlva to Brahman, it is the knowledge of God alone which

1. S,No Dasgupta, i M d., Vol.IV, pp.317-18.

See also B,N,K, Sharma, ibid., pp. 293 ff*
can produce the feeling of love and absolute dependence on

Him.1

Thus there is no antagonism between devotion and

knowledge in the philosophy of Madhva who regards jftana as

a direct constituent of bhakti, and bhakti a combination of

knowledge and love. The principle of interdependence between

the two is established by Madhva in very explicit terms. Not

only this, but he goes even further and establishes the

superiority of knowledge over bhakti. This is evident in

the
the categories and/gradations made by him of bhakti, bhaktas,

moksha and IsVar a -p r asada.

According to him, different
2
souls are capable of different kinds of devotion. Madhva

mentions three stages of bhakti, that which precedes

Paroksha-JInana, that which follows it, and that which comes

after direct realisation and wins the absolute grace

(atyarthaprasada) of God.*^ The final and highest stage of

bhakti is reached only when the true relationship between

t
jiva and Brahman is realised, and the grace of God comes to

the devotee only when he attains a stage of direct realisa-

tion. It is also clear from these gradations that in spite

1. So Radhakrishnan, ibid., Vol.II, p.7U7*

2. BoNoK. Sharma, ibid., p,292.

3. Ib ido, p . 296.
of his emphasis on the principle of Divine Grace, Madhva

did not in any way minimise the importance of individual

1
effort in spiritual endeavour.

These aspects of MadhvaTs bhakti, existing within

the framework of his dualistic Vedanta, support our contention

that the term bhakti was at no stage used by the Vaishnava

acharyas in its present meaning. If we accept the current

definitions of bhakti, at least Madhva, as an exponent of

the Dvaita-Vedanta, should have drawn a more clear line of

demarcation between the path of devotion and that of

knowledge. But even the dualistic philosophy of Madhva does

not make it necessary for him to make such a division between

bhakti and $Tana. The accepted definition of bhakti however

vitiates our understanding of Madhvafs exposition of it.

Some studies of his philosophy, such as those of K. Narain

and B.K.N. Sharma, suffer seriously from this defect. In

order to conform to the existing view of bhakti, these

scholars quote freely from the Bhagavata-Purana and other

Vaishnava works to define bhakti in general, and they then

judge Madhva*s bhakti in their light, instead of basing

2
their understanding of it on Madhva*s work alone. That

1, In the words of B.N., K« Sharma, !,Madhva ’s peculiar

doctrine of intrinsic gradation of fitness among various
orders of souls enables him to correlate the different
forms of devotion to different orders of s e l v e s i b i d . ,
p.292.

2. Ibid., See Chapter XLVIII.

 2 0 4

Madhva should have given greater importance to knowledge in

spite of giving locus-standi to bhakti is noted rather

1
apologetically by both Narain and Sharma. On the one hand

therefore, an exaggerated view is taken of the place of

bhakti in its present meaning in Madhva, on the other, great

surprise is shown why he did not create a superior place for

bhakti in relation to jllana. This attitude is obviously due

to the acceptance of the present fixed and artificial

definition of bhakti and judging Madhva*s bhakti in its

light, instead of accepting it on its own face value.

(d) Vallabha.

Of the four Vaishnava acharyas, Vallabha deserves

our special attention from the standpoint of the current

ideas, about bhakti, for it is his exposition of bhakti which

1. In order to make the bhakti of Madhva compatible with the

current concept of bhakti, Sharma feels the need for
introducing his discussion on Madhva1s bhakti by quoting
Jayatirtha instead of Wladhva himself. He explains
apologetically that the "point in Madhva!s insistence on
mahatmya jfiana as one of the constituents of Bhakti is
that a blind and ignorant devotion is of no philosophical
worth4'. Similarly, Narain observes that "it would
unmistakenly occur to us that bhakti in his system could
not acquire that supreme status as was expected from a
doyen of the bhakti .movement"• Narain tries to explain
away the importance attached by Madhva and his followers
by suggesting that this was due to "the fear that the
futility of knowledge as a means to liberation would
establish the futility of their labour in writing works
on ph ilo sophy".
B.N.K. Sharma, ibid., pp.287 and 289; K.Narain, ibid., 17U.
 2 0 5

the
conforms/most to them. A clear and definite emphasis on a

personal God, complete reliance on emotions and on G o d Ts

grace, and a separation from the path of knowledge are the

chief characteristics of the path of Vallabhacharya, which

is known as the Fushti-Marga.

In his Bhakti-Vardhanl, Vallahha describes prema

(love) as the seed of bhakti. He defines bhakti as an

overwhelming affection for God, accompanied by a full sense

of his greatness. Amongst the followers of Vallabha, bhakti

is generally interpreted as a combination of love and service

Bhakti as seva can exist for the name (nama-seva), as well

as for the form (rupa-seva)„ Seva or service may be of the

'body (tanuja) of material wealth (vittaya)» or of the mind

(manasa) • The bhakti of the Vallabha school has an intensely

emotional angle. The seven stages of bhakti^ mentioned by

Vallabhacharya himself - of bhava, prema, pranaya. sneha,

raga, anuraga and vyasana - indicate purely emotional

states of love. According to him the devotee attains the

highest state of bhakti only when his love for God assumes

the nature of a passion (vyasana)•

Jnana or knowledge does not have much significance

1. ScNo Dasgupta, ibid., Vol.IV, p.355*

2* Ibid.» p.3^7*
3. Ibid.. p.356.
 £ 0 6

in the emotionalism of Vallabhafs bhakti. Similarly no

importance is attached to individual effort in his Pushti-

marga, They are not necessary for "bhakti nor for salvation.

According to Vallabha, the devotee must depend entirely on

G o d Ts grace or Pushti,for according to him bhakti is itself

%
a product of pushti. Bhakti is arotised and the sins are
©
destroyed through the grace of God, and the same ends which

are otherwise achieved through Jflana, karma and upasana,

can be attained through the pushti-marga.

A completely personal image of God, as seen in

Krishna, completes the pattern of Vallabhafs bhakti. Since

Krishpa is recognized as the Supreme Deity by Vallabha,

Krishna-worship forms the nucleus of his religious inspirat­

ion. A great importance is attached to the life and

personality of Krishna, particularly to the accounts of his

which
childhood in the Vallabha School in/ love, service and

surrender are conceived and understood only in relation to

the personal deity Krishna.

Although these aspects of Vallabha!s devotionalism

conform to the current ideas about bhakti, it must be

remembered that even Vallabhacharya does not offer any

single and fixed definition of bhakti limiting it to his

own views, Vtfhen he elaborates on bhakti, he does so to

emphasise his own pattern of it, that of Pushti-bhakti. The

 2 9 7

general connotation of the term "bhakti however, is not

limited by him. On the contrary, the variability of* its

character according to the nature of the object towards

which it is directed, is duly recognised by Vallabha.

Although he himself is in favour of the Pushti-bhakti and

o
recommends it in terms of K^ishria-worship and an emotional

approach to religion, he gives full recognition to the bhakti

1
directed to the Nirguna Brahman. This is clear from the

division made by Vallabhacharya between Pushti-bhakti and

Maryada-bhakti.

According to Vallabha, the souls are either Godly

or demonic. Each acts according to his own nature. Whereas

the latter remain excluded from gadlma, the former are always

capable of bhakti. Vallabha divides the Godly souls into

two categories - those who follow the path of Marvada -

2
bhakti and the others, who follow the path of Pushti-bhakti.

This distinction is explained by Vallabha as that of Pushti -

marga and the Maryada-Marga. We have already mentioned the

salient features of the former. The latter however, is

described by Vallabha as the Vedic path in which bhakti is

attained by Karma. .Iflana and up as ana, and in which liberation

can be attained only through individual effort.

1. Ibid.. pp. 35U-56o

2. Jadunath Sinha, A History of Indian Philosophy. Central

Book Agency, Calcutta, 1952, Vol.II, p. 718.’
 Thus Vallabha gives us two alternate categories of

bhakti, the Mary ad a -bh alet i and the pushti-bhakti. Whereas

the former is described as a constituent of the Vedic path,

compatible with jfiana and self-endeavour, the latter, it is

said, can be cultivated entirely through a loving dependence

on G o d Ts grace. The distinction of these two categories of

bhakti becomes still more clear when Vallabha explains that

those who follow the Maryada-bhakti , attain the Akshara

Brahman, but those who practice the pushti-bhakti, attain

the Puru sh o 11 am a or the Supreme Person,

The above analysis shows that the Vaishnava acharyas

were not evolving any conceptional system of bhakti to give

it the status of a doctrine. It also shows that they had

no uniform and restricted definition of bhakti to work with.

Moreover, the bhakti of the Vaishnava acharyas does not

conform to its current definition, for they do not regard

it as incompatible with jfrana and divorced from the path of

self-realisation.

Thus the Vaishnava acharyas were not expounding any

special religion of bhakti against Sankara!s path of jftana.

Their differences with Sankara were due to their sectarian

loyalty to Vaishnavism and their systems of Vedanta were

in the nature of a Vaishnava defence against the challenge

of SankaraTs Advaitavada. As shown above, bhakti is not

absent in Sankara and he does not uphold the path of

intellectual and abstract knowledge against that of bhakti.

Certain corrections are therefore called for in the current

view of the Bhakti Movement in relation to Sankara and the

Vaishnava acharyas.
 CHAPTER IV

KABIR AND THE CURRENT CONCEPT OP BHAKTI : A REAPPRAISAL

The fixity and the general currency of the present

theories about bhakti and the Bhakti Movement place a

serious limitation on attempts at an adequate understanding

of the exact nature of Kabir !s religious and intellectual

position. The tendency to judge and analyse him in the

light of an artificial definition of bhakti has led to many

misconceptions about him. Kabir fs religious faith, which

is rooted in his personal spiritual experience does not

arise out of any formally fixed ideology or doctrine of

bhakti. What is found in his verses, not only does not fit

in with the current view of bhakti but clearly contradicts

it.
Kabir believes not in a personal but an impersonal

God. His bhakti does not depend upon a dualistic view of

Reality but rests on his keen awareness of the essential

oneness of things. Furthermore, the emotional intensity of

his devotionalism does not rule out the path of self-

knowledge or jfiana. Although Kabir shows no respect for

scholasticism, he attaches great importance to jfiana in the

sense of self-knowledge which he regards as the highest

spiritual end.

But all these aspects of Kabir*s thought are not

weighed properly in their own right and are not accepted at

their face valuec Instead of ascertaining his position

directly from his verses, enquiries into his thought and

religion are invariably undertaken in the light of a fixed

definition of bhakti. His devotional ism is therefore,

interpreted sometimes as love for a personal God, and his

bhakti as an antithesis of the path of knowledge or jnana.

Again, for the same reasons, to the extent that bhakti is

identified with Vaishnavism, Kabir as a b h a k t a . is represented

as a Vaishnava without taking cognizance of the fundamental

difference between his standpoint and that of Vaishnavism.

As pointed out earlier, similar difficulties are

caused in the assessments of Kabir when the various vital

currents which shaped the medieval religious renaissance in

India are collectively viewed as a Bhakti Movement in the

light of the present restricted meaning of bhakti. Without

going into the general implications of the term, and

rejecting its wider meaning, Kabir, a nirguna bhakta is

easily placed in line with the Vaishnava bhaktas. The

origins of his religious inspiration are then sought in

Vaishnavism and the source of his bhakti is traced back to

the medieval Vaishnava acharyas, although he has very little

in common with them. These attitudes create obvious

difficulties in tracing the antecedents of Kabir and his

nirguna school.
 2 1 2

However, Kabirfs Nirguna school constitutes a

distinct bhakti tradition* Its strong emphasis on the idea

of an impersonal God, the evidence of Advaita philosophy

and Yoga in it, and its emphasis on Self-knowledge and

reasoning do not detract from its essential character of

"bhakti. That such factors can accompany bhakti is a

position not difficult to take, if the word bhakti is under­

stood in its broader meaning, and not as a special religion

or cult.

It must be pointed out here that no set and

restricted definition of bhakti was current in the medieval

period. This is quite clear from the Bhakta-Mala of

Nabhadas which is the earliest known account of the medieval

bhaktas to be found in a single work. Nabhadas takes a

very general view of bhakti and does not regard it as any

fixed doctrinal position. Nor does he restrict it to Vishnu-

worship and the Vaishnava religious modes alone. The Bhakta-

Mala includes a variety of religious personalities of

different philosophical viewpoints in its list of bhaktas.

1
The Advaita Vedantin ^aftkara, the Vaishnava commentator of

the Bhagavata Purana, Sridhara, and the Vaishnava acharyas,

1. Nabhadas, Bhakta-Mala) 2 Volumes, Banares 190ij--9j

Ghhappaya 37".' (Abbrev. Chappaya: Ghh)

2* Ibid.) ChhoUO.
 213

Rtoanuja^ Madhva, Nimbarka etc*1 are all listed together as

bhaktas* Similarly, the medieval nirguna bhaktas like

p h
Kabir, Pipar and Raidas are mentioned along with the
8 6
Vaishnava devotees such as Tulsidas^ and Surdas.

That Nabhadas should not represent bhakti in purely

Vaishnava terms is all the more significant when we know

that he himself was a Vaishnava

O
and find his Vaishnava
•

sympathies otherwise so clear in his work. Furthermore,

bhakti is not treated here as a religion based on a sense of

the otherness of God. Nor is the sense of duality between

the bhakta and Bhagavan accepted as a necessary pre-requisite

of bhakti."^ Similarly, knowledge and philosophical thought

are nowhere represented as antagonistic to bhakti. On the

contrary, Nabhadas pays tribute to the bhakta JfranesVara of

q
Maharashtra for his profound thinking, and describes bhakta

1. Ibid., Chh • 2k.

2. Ibid., Chh. 55.

3. Ibid., Chh. 61 .

4-. Ibid., Chh. 5k.

5* Ibid., Chh. 12k.

6. Ibid., Chh • k l .

7. On the contrary Nabhadas points out the oneness of bhakta,

bhakti, and Bhagavat , ibid.» doha 1.

8. Ibid., Chh. k3*

 214

Kilhadeva of G-ujerat as one who strengthened the viewpoint

1
of Sankhya-yoga* Similarly yoga is also not regarded hy

Nabhadas as incompatible with bhakti, for he speaks also of

2
the yogic excellence of bhaktas like Krishnadas.

There is no indication in the Bhakta-Mala of any

contradiction between bhakti and the non-dual1stic philosophy

of Sahkaracharya either• That Nabhadas* list of bhaktas

includes the name of Cankaracharya is a fact which has

hitherto been completely ignored by scholars in their

researches on bhakti and the Bhakti Movement. This fact

however, deserves our special attention particularly when

the medieval upsurge of bhakti is so often and so clearly

explained as a reaction against the"cold intellectualism"of

&aAkara and as a path separate from that of jhana or

knowledge* The inclusion of &a:dkara in the Bhakta-Mala is

in itself the strongest possible proof that there exists

no antagonism between jfiana and bhakti, and that bhakti is

completely compatible with £faftkaraTs ideology*

To the extent that the general nature of bhakti, so

clearly seen in Nabhadas, is recognised and accepted, there

1* Ibid*, Chh.35.

2. Ibid*, Chh.33*
remains no cause to question the unity of the Bhakti-

Movement and the medieval b h & t a s . But if bhakti is equated

with Vaishnavism and is understood in terms of specific

doctrines and sets of beliefs, a clear and definite division

between the Vaishnava bhls&tas like Tulsidas and the nirguna-

bh&ctas such as Kabir becomes necessary* The two groups

that they represent would then stand apart, for they

advocate different ideas and attitudes. Whereas the worship

of Vishnu and his avataras is of fundamental importance to

the Vaishnava bh&t a s , the nirguna bhaktas consider the

Nirguna Brahman alone as the object of worship. To one,

the sense of the otherness of God remains important for

bhakti, to the other, the understanding and realisation of

His non-otherness is the first step to it* For one, love,

supplication, and surrender to the deity are the modes of

reaching out to Him in worship, for the other, the love and

passion for self realisation, and the constant effort of

the self for it, are the only means of attaining Him. But

since bhakti is common to both and continues to be under­

stood in a restricted meaning, which it has artificially

assumed, there is a constant effort in scholarship somehow

to hold the two groups together, in spite of taking note of

their differences. Whenever the distinction between the

two groups is taken into account, the basic points of

disagreement which distinguish the nirguna from the

Vaishnava bhaktas are either completely ignored or are some­

how explained away in order to maintain the perfect

compatibility between the nirguna bhaktas and the present

definition of bhakti.

Consequently, Kabir, a nirguna bhakta, has not been

studied with the freedom that a sound academic enquiry

requires. He is invariably approached from the standpoint

of certain pre-conceived notions about bhakti. However, the

exact nature of his thought, the true source of his religious

inspiration, his impact on the life and the thought of

medieval India, and the immediate antecedents of his school

cannot be properly ascertained without the necessary freedom

from this fixed position. Therefore, a closer look at Kabir

as a bhakta in relation to the current theories about bhakti

is necessary for a correct evaluation of his personality and

thought.

The object of the following analysis of the nature

of Kabir !s bhakti, his concept of God, his attitude to

jnana and the Advaita ideology, and his position in relation

to Vaishp.avism is to seek a rectification of some of the

current misconceptions about him. After disassociating him

from Vaishnavism, and from the ideology which is attributed

to him on account of the existing views about bhakti, an

attempt is made to trace the antecedents of his nirguna

school against the total background of the religio-

intellectual climate of his age.

(i) Kabir *s Bhakti

It is wrong to relate Kablr's devotional ism to the

present standardized definition of bhakti and the ideology

attached to it. Regarding him as a Vaishnava, attributing

to him a belief in a personal God, and representing him as.

an upholder of the path of bhakti as opposed to jftana and

the Advaita Vedanta have led to only a gross misinterpre­

tation of his thought. Kabir was always pointing out the

meaninglessness of the differences of religious doctrines

and practices. His position therefore can hardly conform

to a sectarian tradition, Vaishnavism, with which bhakti is

so completely identified today. Similarly, his bhakti,

which is clearly directed towards an impersonal and nirguna

God, does not conflict with monistic Vedanta.

That Kabir’s bhakti is not opposed to jfiana and is

directed not towards a personal but towards an impersonal

God, and that it rests not on a sense of otherness, but on

one of the final oneness of God and man, will become clearer

in our subsequent discussions. At this stage however, we

shall concern ourselves with the two remaining major aspects

 2 1 8

of KabirTs devotion, which are equally incompatible with the

that
current definition of bhakti„ Firstly,/Kabir's bhakti does

not appear as a doctrine or a religion; and secondly, that

Kabir does not describe bhakti as a simple and easy path of

surrender•

Although Kabir speaks fervently of bhakti and bhakti

remains the main inspiration of his poetry, he never

expounds it as special religion or doctrine and does not

formally outline its nature« Nor does he describe it as a

fixed form of belief <> On the contrary, he repeatedly points

out the impossibility of describing and explaining the

exact nature of the spiritual experience which he regards

as both the means and the end of bhakti.

Kabir uses the word bhakti in its basic and intrinsic

meaning, in the sense of a bhava or feeling, and implies by

it a mental attitude, and not a formal belief. He very

often uses the phrase bhava-bhakti in the sense of devotion.

Bhava-bhakti, explains Kabir, can be known only through

personal experience. It is not a matter of verbal

exposition, nor can it be explained and known through

1
argumentation and hearsay. God must be worshipped through

1. kathanift badnin sab janjal, bhava bhagati aur Ham niral,

kathai badai°sunain sab koi, kathen na hoi kiyeh ho^«
Kab 1 r Granthavali » ed4 Shyam Sunder Das, H a g a n
Pracharani Sabha, Kasi, 7th ed., 1959, P*13U
(Abbrev* KG)
 1 ’k*10
this bhava-bhakti he cause/worshipful acts of devotion and
o
other religious performances can have no meaning without it*

For Kabir bhakti is not a path of passive surrender,

but is an arduous process requiring self knowledge and

courage and a constant effort towards self-realisation*

According to him only the brave and the valiant can tread

the path of bhakti* Those who are devoid of courage, are

unable to cope with it, for bhakti is like the sharp edge of

a blade* One who wavers or trembles is bound to cut himself*

Only the one who is able to stand firmly on it can attain

liberation with safety* Mounted on the steed of love with

the sword of knowledge in his hand the devotee can conquer

death*-'

1* bhava bhagati sHn Hari na aradha, janam maran ki miti na

sadha KG p. 209*
sach sil ka chauka dijai, bhava bhagati ki seva kijai.
KG *, p. 210*

2* kya jap kya tap sanjamah, kya tirath brat asnan

jo pain jugati na janiye, bhava bhagati Bhagavan. KG*p*110*

3* bhagati duheli Ham ki, nahi kayar ka kam,

sis utare hathi kari, so lesi hari nam*
bhagati duheli Ram ki, jaisi khande ki dhar*
je dolai tau ka'fi padai, nahih tau utarai par.
bhagati duheli Ram ki, jaisi agani ki jhal.
daki pade te ubare, dadhe kautigahar.
Kabir ghocLa prem ka, chetani chadhi asavar*
gyan shacLag gahi kal siri, bhali’machai mar. KG* p . 62*
 Thus bhakti is not just a simple act of faith for

Kabir, but is a reasoned and an individual act of spiritual

striving. According to Kabir bhakti is caused by and

attained only through divine love which is not easy to find*

The devotee must strive for it and remain constantly

occupied with it* The divine love does not grow in the

fields, nor is it sold in the public places* Whether a king

or a commoner, only he who holds it dearer than his own life

1
can obtain it* The door that leads to bhakti is narrow

and difficult, and the house of God*s love is not within

easy reach* Only he who is ready to surrender everything

2
and lay down his life has the right to enter it* The wine

of divine love is not easy to receive* The one who serves

■3
it asks for your very life before pouring it out to you,

for there are so many who wait, but only he who can lay

down his life for it will be able to drink of it.^ The ways

1. prem na khetaun nlnpajai, prem na hati bikaya*

raja paraja jis ruchai, sir de so le°jaya. KG* p*62.

2 0 Kabir yahu ghar prem ka, khala ka ghara nanhi

sis utarai hathi kari, so paise ghar mahhi. ibid*

3* Ram rasayan prem ras, plvat adhik rasal.

Kabir plvan dulabha hai, rnangai sis kalal. KG. p#l^.

k* Kabir bhathl kalal ki, bahutak baithe aya*

sir saumpe sol pivai, nahln to piya na jaya* ib id *
of love are not easy, nor can the heloved he found with

easy laughter. The search for him involves pain and suffer­

ing, and only he who knows the anguish of separation can

1
hope to find him.

Since hhakti is for Kabir a matter of feeling and

experience, and not a matter of any fixed or formal

religious belief or doctrine, he clearly points out the

2
possibilities of its different modes of expression. God

can be felt and realized in various ways^ and the modes of

his worship assume different forms.^ But Kabir*s recognition

of the different manifestations and modes of bhakti does not

minimize the definiteness of his individual preference and

views. Kabirfs own bhakti is rooted in mysticism and

clearly arises, and takes shape from his personal spiritual

experience. The beliefs with which he supports this pattern

1. hansi haAsi kamta na paiye, jini paya tini roya.

Jo hahsenhi hari milai, tau nahin duhagani koya.

haAsi khelauA hari milai, tau kauna sahai sharasan.

kam krodha trishnaA tajai, tahi milai Bhagavan.
KG, p.8.

2. bahut bhagati bhausagara, naniaA bidhi nahnah bhav.

jihi hiradai srihari bhetiya, so bhed kahuA kahuA thauA.
KG. p.86.

3* bhav bhagati puja aru pati, atamaram mile bahubhaAti.

KG. p.204«

anek jug bandigi bibidh prakar ki,

anti gunn ka guAn hiA hamanhln. KG., p.134*
of bhakti are in complete harmony with Gankara's Advaita**'

Vedanta and his nirguna ideology. Kabir professes bhakti

in the above sense, clearly and definitely, as the desired

finality in spiritual endeavour* He has no patience with

the other ways, which he regards as mistaken and meaningless.

Very often he raises a loud voice against the external forms

of devotion which are observed in the name of bhakti. He

condemns and ridicules those who have no knowledge of the

true nature of bhakti but are called bhaktas, and pride

themselves in it. Such people only distort the true nature

of bhakti, says Kabir

(ii) KabirTs Concept of God.

Belief in a personal God is sometimes attributed to

Kabir to prove his position as a bhakta in the light of

the existing definition of bhakti. But there is clear and

definite testimony in the verses of Kabir to his uncomprom­

ising belief in the impersonal nature of God*

Kabir's God is nirguna, impersonal and immanent.

1. thori bhagati bahut ahankara,

aise bhagata milain apara. KG>> p.115*

2. Kabiran bhakti bigariya, kankar patthar dhoy.

Kabir Saheb Ka Bijak, ed. by Hans Das Shastri and
Mahabir Prasad, Kabir Grantha Prakashan Samiti,
Harak, Zila Barabanki, (Uttar pradesh), 1950, p.114
(Sakhl 251)>(Abbrev. B i 1.)
 1
He always describes Him as nirguna,* and very often uses
p
abstract and impersonal terms in order to name Him. This

image of God is consistently upheld and supported by Kabir

through a monistic view of Reality which is fully in keeping

with the ideology of the Advaita Vedanta. In fact Kabir

very often uses the epithet Brahman to convey his idea of

God. He also makes it obvious that his belief and devotion

are directed towards the impersonal and the nirguna. He

states very clearly in one place, that his verses, which

are regarded by people as mere songs are in fact an

expression of his own ideas about the Brahman.^

Kabir of course had no scholastic interest in the

controversies so strongly current in theology and metaphysics

to determine the finality of the saguna or the nirguna

character of God and of the dual or the non-dual nature of

that Reality in relation to the phenomenal world. He

regarded these undertakings as futile and meaningless.

Nevertheless Kabir constantly pointed out and stressed the

1. teri nirguna katha kahi syoA kahiye, aisa kol viveki

KG, P *233*
2. Kabir freely uses the terms Brahman, Atman (as atam),
and tatva (as tat, tatu and tatt) for God.

3. sakal maAd maiA rami rahya, sahib kahiye soy. KG. p.52.
See also fcG. p.128 (pada 180); Bi,j p.30 (sabda7)*

4* tuma jini janauA git hai, yahu nij Brahma bichar

keval kahi samajhaiya atam sadhan sar re. KG. p.80.
truth of the nirguna nature of God in his own direct and

non-scholastic manner,
1
According to Kabir God has no form and no shape.

He defies every description and it is difficult even to give

2
Him an exact name. How then can He he described and

accepted as a person? How can He he identified with

•z
personalities such as Rama and Krish^ia^ and how can His

nature he fully grasped through philosophical expositions?^

It is impossible to define His exact nature through the

written word,^ and those who try to do so through the spoken

6
word get worn out by speaking endlessly about it. The

biasing glory of the Brahman can be known only through a

personal encounter."^

1. nati sarup baran nahiA jakai, ghati ghati rahyau samai.

* p.1 2 8 .

2, vako nam kah kahi lijai, vake baran na rupa. Bln, v*kS
(Sab da A 8 ) •

3* Bijak, p.15, Ramaini U5j P»l8, Ramaini nos. 5^-~5*

Bi.iak, p. 11, Ramaini 30.

5. sat samaftd ki masi karauft, lekhani sab banaray,

dharati sab kagad karaun, tau Hari gun likhya na jay.
K G , p.5U.

6, bolana kasauA boliye re bhai, bolat hi sab tattu nasal,

bolat bolat bacLh bikara, so boliye jo parai bichara.
BIj p ♦22 (Ramaini 70)
 99
h -f h J

But in spite of these unambiguous assertions by

Kabir of his belief in an impersonal God, scholars have very

often manipulated his verses to show the presence of the

concept of a personal God in them. However, the main

arguments put forward in support of such a stand always rest

on an initial acceptance of Kabir as a Vaishnava, The

Vaishnava bias for a personal deity is easily connected with

him and he is then described as a worshipper of Rama the

avatara of Vishnu, KabirTs frequent usage of the name of

Rama in his verses is mentioned and analysed to strengthen

these arguments. But a closer examination of Kabir as a

Vaishnava, and of the occurrence of the name Rama in his

poetry, does not justify these views. On the contrary, it

further substantiates Kabir1s impersonal image of God,

Kabir uses the name Rama for God only in a symbolic

sense. He uses it always as an epithet for the Ultimate

Reality, which is nameless and undefinable, K a birTs Rama

1
therefore is the same as the Atman and the Brahman, Kabir

very often uses the terms, Atman, Brahman, and Rama in close

conjunction with each other and the oneness of their meaning

1, kahai Kabir svad jab paya, bank nali ras khaya.

aftmrit jharai brahma parakasai, tab hi milai Ram raya,
KG, p.136.
 1
stands out very clearly in his verses. Kahir 1s Rama
2 ^
pervades all, and resides within man. He is the one whom

the four Vedas, the Smritis, and the Pur anas try to under­

stand, "but whose mystery is never solved.^- According to

Kahir, this Rama can he found within o n e Ts o-wn self.^ The

mystery of the name of Rama, he explains, requires serious

thinking and an act of intellectual discrimination.^

Thus Rama can he regarded as the object of Kahirrs

devotion only in the sense of the Nirguria Brahman and in

the sense of the Atman. Rama as a personal deity and an

incarnation of Vishnu has no significance for Kahir. There

1. atma Ram na chinhain santau, kyun rami lai Ram raya.

KG, p.125.
hrahm khojat janam gavayau, soi Ram ghat hhitari payau.
KG, p.172.
kya hvai tere nhai dhoih, atam Ram na chinhan soi,
KG, p.175.
2. ekamek rami rahya sahani main, to kahe hharamavau.
KG, p .92 *

3. soham hahsa ek saman, kaya ke guhn aftnahi aim. KG, p.93*

k * KG, p.92, Pada n o .49.

5o Ram nam hhaju Ram nam hhaju, cheti dekhu man mahih ho.
B1 ,i» p.76, (Kahara 5).

6. Ram nam sah ko kahai, kahihe hahut hichar. KG, p.48.

Ram kahan mahi hhedu hai tamahi ek hicharu. KG, p . 221.
Ram nanv tatsar hai, sah kahd upades. KG, p74.
Also see p.79* Pada 5.
 997
far? o

is no ambiguity about this in Kabir 1s verses. On the

contrary he makes it quite clear that his Rama is not the

1 2
same as the avatara of Vishnu, He did not marry Sita,

and he was not born in the house of Da^atha, and he did not

bring about the fall of Ravana.^ The Rama who did that was

a mortal like anyone else. How could he be the immutable

and eternal Reality which must remain free from birth and

death?^* Those who worship God as the unborn and the

unmanifest cannot worship Him in the form of a person, for

R
God is never born and can have no human parentage. Nor

does He act like a living mortal.

(iii) Kabir and jflana

As a bhakta, Kabir attaches the greatest importance

1. Dasarath sut tihuA lokahift jana, Ram nam ka maram hai ana.
Bi_i, p . 66 (Sabda 110).

2. Sirjanhar na byahl Sita, Bl.j, p. 31 (Sabda 8).

3. naA J'asarath ghari autari ava, naA LaAka ka rav saAtava.

KG, p .208•

U. das autar I sari maya, karat a kai 3in pnja.

kahahiA Kabir sunahu ho santo, upajai khapai so duja.
B y , p •31 (Sabda 8).
kahaAhi Kabir muva nahi soi, jake avagavan na hoi.
Bi (j, p.U5 (Sabda k5 )•

5* Kabir ko svami aiso thakur jakai mai na bapo re.

KG, p . 276.
 228

1 p
to jfiana. According to him jfiana is the highest state,

to attain which the devotee sets out in his spiritual

•5
quest-' and which alone can finally lead to spiritual

excellence.^" True enlightenment and awakening of the

spirit is not possible without $iana,^ for God must "be known

and worshipped through it.

6

Thus bhakti and jftana go together in Kabir1s thought.

In his scale of values, true hhakti cannot exist without

jfiana, and jfiana can have no meaning without "bhakti. The

true guru or spiritual preceptor is the hestower of hoth

jftana and bhakti and he who discovers the spiritual truth

1. gyan ratan ki kothari, chunbak dihhau tal.

parakhi age kholiye, kunji bachan rasal. BI j, p.115*
(sakhi 25k) •
raj binan kaisau rajaput
gyan bina :$pkat avadhut. KG, p.111.

2. kahai kabir sunahu re santau,

agam gyan pada mahin. KG, p.82.

3* KG> p. 81, pada 8-10.

JLu pahdit logah kau byavahar. gyanavaAta kau tattva bichar,
jakai jiy jaisi budhi hoi. kahi Kabir janaiga sol.
KG, p. 268 .

5* gyan hin chetai nahin suta. KG, p.198.

6. kari sanmukhi jab gyan bichari,

sanmukhi pariya agani mahjhari. KG, p. 203*
gyan na sumiryo nirgun sara,
bipathain birachi na fciya bicharan. KG, p.209«
 1
is "both a jfrani and a bhakta. The feeling of love or

•prema in Kahir is also an accordant accompaniment of

o
Brahma".jfiana, or the knowledge of the Brahman*

It must he made clear here that when Kahir speaks

of the supreme finality of jfiana, like Sankara,^ he also

implies hy it the knowledge hased on spiritual experience

and not the knowledge derived from hooks* The world can he

deluded hy the written word and the real essence of religion

can he lost in the increasing hulk of learned writings.*'*'

Ceaseless verbal expositions of religious themes can

destroy the real meaning and substance of religion and such

articulations can he a serious handicap to thought.*^ Kahir

therefore has very little respect for those who are well
the who
versed in/scriptures hut/do not really know the truth of

1* kahafthi Kahir sunahu ho sahto, jo yah pada arathavai.

sol pandit sol gyata, sol hhagat kahavai. BI j,, p.i-i-8
ISabaa 55)

2. prem pallta surati nali kari, gola gyan chalaya.

brahma agni le diya pallta, ekai chot dhahaya. KG, p.17$*
anahad bajai nljhar jharai, upajai brahma giyan.
abagati afttari pragatai, lagai prem dhiyan. KG, p.13*

3* Vide supra, p.

lw kagad likhi likhi jagat bhulanah, manahlh man na samanan.

KG, p.88*

5. bolanah ka kahiye re bhal, holat holat tat nasal.

KG, p. 96 .
 1
personal spiritual experience.' He ridicules the learned

pandit who repeatedly recites the Vedas hut is not aware

2
of the inner Reality that resides within his own self.

According to Kahir the man who knows the spiritual truth

through his own experience is truly a man of knowledge

%
even if he has no scholastic learning to his credit*

Sometimes extremely learned men struggle and aspire for

this knowledge and are yet unahle to grasp its reality.^

Although Kahir shows very little regard for

scholastic learning he attaches great importance to a

rational approach to religion and religious practices. He

strongly advocates the exercise of reason for ascertaining

religious truth and insists on a thoughtful quest for the

essential and the fundamental. Kahir upholds the intellect­

ual faculty of discrimination or viveka as the chief guide

in the spiritual quest. He not only recommends its

1* sumriti heda puran padhai sahh, anahhau hhav na darasai.

Bx,i, p.3U (Sabda 1U).

2* padhi padhi pandit heda hashannaih, hhitar huti hasat na

3aAnaino° K&, p. 90.

3o masi hinu dvat kalam hinu kagaj, hinu acchar sudhi hoi.
sudhi hinu sahaj gyan hinu gyata, kahhahiA Kahir jan sol.
B l n . p . 35 (Sabda , 16)

k* had had gyani munivar thake, pakari sakai nahin k o l .

Bin, p*59 (Sahda , 86).
exercise^" hut also pleads for its recognition and enjoins
o
that oheisance should he paid to it. The unawakened, he

says, are hound to get lost. Only those who have the power

of discrimination in them can remain safe.*^

Kabir !s reasoning takes him away from the religious

fixity of doctrine and practice to the truth of personal

spiritual experience, which he very often describes as

jfiana. This does not clash with his hhakti, which always

leaves full scope for individual reasoning. According to

Kahir the devout and the knowing man must always use the

touchstone of thought and reason in his quest for self-

realisation^ because the knowledge of the Brahman requires

serious contemplation. The real jftani is he who can think

R
for himself. Kahir addresses the human mind as the store­

house of intellect, and pleads with it that it should think

1. re re man budhivant bhaMara, ap ap hi karahu bichara.

KG, p. 199.

2» kar bahdagl bibek kl, hhesh dhare sah koy. Bid, p. 118
(Sakhi, 29U).

3. sansai sah jag khahdhiya, sahsai khandhai na koy.

saneai khahdhe so jana, sabda hiveki hoy. Bin, p.100
(Sakhi, 88).

!+• hastu kahin khojai kahiA, kyauA kari avai hath.

gyani soy sarahiye, parakh rakhai Bath. BIj, p.llU
(Sakhi Zk6)

3. kathata bakata surata sol, ap bichare so gyaAni hoi.

KG, p.90.
for itself and discriminate "between truth and falsehood,

and between the essential and the non-essential. In the

multitude of various hues and currents of thought and belief,

one must learn to know and recognize truth through o n e ’s own

p
intellect and reasoning. What can the scriptures yield if

one does not know how to draw their essence from them. No

path can be of any use if the traveller himself fails to

tread upon it with thought and care.^

Kabir*s recommendation of reason and discrimination

carries the force of personal conviction also, for he often

cites from his own experience in such contexts. He explains

that he did not go out anywhere to seek the truth, but

found it all by himself through his own reasoning and

contemplation. Truth then appeared on its own, he explains,

1. re re man budhiva&t bhaftdara, ap ap hi karahu bichara.

KG, p.199.

2. nana raftg taraAg hai, man makaraAd asujh*

kahanhi Kabir pukari kai, >akil kala le bttih. Blj, p.100
(Sakhi 9k).

3. bed kiteb dui j^ahd pasara, tehi ^aftde paru apu bichara.
Blj, p .i|l
T§abda 32).
i+. rah bichar1 kya karai, pathik na chalai bichari.
apan marag cntmdi kai, firai ujari ujari. Bi,j, p.109
(Sakhi 191).
 2 3 3

1
and freed him from all his doubts®

(iv) K ab i r Ts Monism®

According to Kabir there is only one Reality which

pervades the entire universe* Nothing is separate and

p
other than that, for it is that which is in all, and every

existing thing subsists in it, "Wherever I see" says Kabir,

"I find only that Reality, for it is that which abides in

everything*"^ This all pervading spirit and universal

Reality is the God of Kabir,

According to Kabir God lives in man like the pupil

in the eye.^ Only those who do not realize this truth and

do not accept the innate unity of things and the oneness of

1, karat bichar manahlA man upajl, naA kahIA gaya na ay a.

kahai kabir saAsa sab chut a, raAt rat an dhan paya,
KG, p.85*
bhal budhi kachu gyan nihara, ap ap hi kiya bichar5.
. apan main je rahyau samal, nedai dftri kathyau nahlA jal,
take chlnheA parachau pava, b&ai samajhi tasun man lava,
KG, p.200,

2, e sakal brahmanda tain puriya, aru duja mahi than jl,

main sab ghat antari peshiya, jab dekhya nainn samann jl*
KG, p.86,

3* jahan jahaA dekhoA tahaA tahaA sol, sab ghat raha samal.
Bjt
jj p.39 (RamainI 27)*

A* jyuA nainuA maiA put all, tyuA khalik ghat maAhiA®

°KG, p.73*
 2 3 4

man and G-od look for Him outside themselves*1 As the deer

wanders in the forest and continues to smell the grass in

search of the musk which rests within it, in the same

mistaken way the ignorant man looks around and wanders in

p
search of the God who resides within his own self. But

this is a futile search, for there is no Reality other than

the great Self. That which is bodiless abides in the body.^

The feeling of otherness in relation to God is due to the

lack of knowledge. This ignorance is caused by the evident

differences of form and appearance. All men are made of

the same clay, although they appear in different foirnis.-'

But they are essentially the same, for of whatever shape and

design be the ornaments, it is known that they are wrought

1. herat herat he sakhi, rahya Kabir hiray.

bund samani samad main, so kat heri jay.
herat herat he sakhi, rahya Kabir hiray.
samahd samana bund main, so kat herya jay. KG, p.15*

2. kasturi kuhdali basai, mrig dhftfujai ban mahhi.

aisain ghati ghati R a m hai,*duniya dekhai nahhin.
KG, p.72.
so saftin tan main basai, bhranmyau na jaftnaih tas.
kasturi ke mrig jyuh, pbiri |Uiri sunghai gfias. KG, p.73®

3* brahma khojat janam gavayau, soi Ram ghat bhitari payau.

0KG, p.172.

kc base apahdi pahd maih, ta gati lashai na koy. KG, p.15*

5. mati ek bhesh dhari nanan, sab rnaih brahma samanaft.

KG, p.150.
 235

out of the same goldo^

The true and steadfast aspirant therefore gets rid

o
of all sense of duality. He sees and recognizes the one­

ness of things. He gets coloured with the colour of the

great Self and becomes aware of the Self within. That in

which the individual exists and has his being, exists and

has its being in the individual. To know this is the

highest knowledge, and this knowledge can bring salvation.^-

Performance of religious acts is of no value without this

consciousness. According to Kabir, bhakti can have no

significance unless the bhakta is able to recognize the God

who resides in the Atman. When the bhakta knows and

recognizes this, there remains no distinction between God

6
and his devotee, for the bhakta then merges in the Bhagavan.

The self then merges in the great Self in the same manner

1 * gahana ek kanak te gahana, in mahh bhav na duja.

Blj, p .i-t-0(Sabda 30)

2 . Kabir sol surivah, man sun mahdai jhujh,

panch payada padi le, duri karai sab duj. KG, p. 6l.

3 9 apanen bichSri asabarl kijai sahaj kai paidai pav jab

dijai. KG, p. 86 .

PP. 124-5, pada no. 169.

5 * kya jap kya tap kya brat pujeu jakai ridai bhab hai duja.
KG, p.239.

6° pp.ll4"*5, see padas 136-8 ,

 2 3 6

1
as water merges into water when it is added to it,

Kabir describes his own experience of1 Brahma-jhana

in the same manner, "I could myself then see the self and

recognize It”, he explains "for having got introduced to

p
this Self, I could merge myself in my Self” , There

remains no sense of duality in this act of meeting for what

is outside is then known inside. This, he adds, is not

possible without contemplation of the Self* Nor is it

possible without constant effort and total dedication of

the empirical self towards this end in a spirit of devotion.

The knowledge of God as the great Self which abides within

man, comes neither easily nor frequently* This Self resides

within everyone, but it makes itself known only to the

fortunate few*^

The question of the incompatibility between Kabirfs

monistic beliefs and his bhakti need not arise in view of

1. jamaih ham soi ham hin main, nir mil eh jal ek huva.
KG, p.125.
2. apai main tab apa nirapya, apan paih apa sujhya*
apai kahat sunat puni apanan, apan paih apa bujhya*
apanaih parachai lag! tarl, apan pai ap samahnth.
kahai Kabir je ap bicharai, miti gaya avan jahnah*
KG, p ,80,

3. jo bahar so bhitar janya* bhaya bhed bhupati pahichanya.

KG, p . 267.
sab ghati mera sahiyah, shnih sej na koy,
bhag tinhauh ka he sakhi, jihi ghati paragat hoy* KG, p.45*
 2 3 7

the nature and implications of nirguna-bhakti0 As discussed

earlier, the sense of an axiological otherness between man

and God is irrelevant to nirguna bhakti. The consciousness

of duality necessary for a feeling of love and devotion can

exist within the individual himselfo In an act of devotion

the devotee can be conscious of a higher as well as a lower

self, both existing within him. In the act of nirguna bhakti,a

bhakta is required to surrender his empirical self to his

higher Self* The feelings of love, dedication and devotion

of one for the other in itself provide the scope for hhakti.

This aspect of the nirguna-bhakti, that it requires

a full awareness of the polarity of the higher Self and the

empirical self existing within one's own self, is made very

clear by Kabir* There is a mirror in the heart, he says,

2
but it is so difficult to look into it. You are you, and

are also the reflection that you see as your own. The man

of knowledge knows the oneness of the two as well as their

difference. But the one who is ignorant of this truth is

like the dog who, seeing its reflection in the mirror,

tires itself out barking at its own image thinking it to

1 • Vide Supra, pp jfffn

2* hiradayC bhitar arasl, mukh dekha nahih jay.
mukh to tabhln dekhi ho, dil ki duvidha jay. Bij, p.9U
(Sakhi 29)•
 1
be a reality other than itself.

God can "be very far from you and He can he very
2
near, says Kahir. Although He resides in all, He can remain

far off in the absence of true feelings of devotion. It

is only hy placing Him before your mind and contemplating

Him with jfiana or knowledge that you can see Him,^ The

one whom you search for and regard as the other, in the end

turns out to he you, and does not remain the other.

Kahir tells us at one place that he himself has given this

question very careful thought and feels sure that when the
6
self recognises the Self, it becomes immersed in the Self.

1. darapan kerl gufa men, sunaha paitha dhay.

dekhl pratima apani, bhunki bhunki mari jay. BI j, p»97
(Sakhi 59)

2* niyar thain duri duri thain niyara, Ram charit na

janiyain jiyara. KG, p . 201.

3. kathyau na jay niyarai aru duri, sakal atit rahya ghat

purl.
jahaA dekhauA tahaA Ram sam anaA, tumha bin thaur aur
nahIA annaA.
jadapi rahya sakal ghat purl, bhav bina abhi-antari duri.
KG, p. 202.

4* kari sanmuki jab gyann bicharI, sanamukhi pariya agani

manjharl. KG, p.203*

5. Kabir jako khojate payo sol thaur.

solfiiiri kai tu bhaya jakau fcahata aur. KG, p,217«

6. Kabir sochi bichariya, duja kol nanhi.

apa par jab chinhiyaA, tab ulati samana maAhi. KG, p.48.
 2 3 9

To use his own words: "Having called out to you as you for

so long, I myself have now turned into you and have lost all

sense of my selfhood# Wow that the consciousness of "you"

and "I" is no more in me,I find only you, no matter where

I look’*# As a nirguna bhakta Kahir shows a clear awareness

of the difference of the "Self’1 and the "not self", for he

says, "Mien rI f was, God was not, and now that God is, TI !
2
am not". Thus his bhakti does not require a constant

sense of dualism and otherness between the Deity and the

devotee•

(v) Kahir and Vaishnavism.

Because of the false identification of hhakti and

Vaishnavism, Kahir, on account of his hhakti, is generally

accepted as a Vaishnava# The antecedents of Kahirfs hhakti,

for the same reason, are sought in the Vaishnava tradition

of Ramanuja and an artificial relationship is thus

established between his thought and the Vaishnava theology#^

1. tuA tAA karata tuA hua mujh maiA rahl na huA#

jab apa par ka miti gaya jit dekhauA tit tuA# KG, p.218#

2o jab maiA tha tab hari nahIA, ah Hari haiA maiA nanhi#
KG, p #13.
ekahi te anaAt hhau, anaAt ek hvai ay#
parachai bhai jab ek te, anaAtau ek samay# BI j, p.103#
(Sakhi 12k)•

3* For an extreme example of the effort to establish a

compatibility between Kabir and the Vaishnava modes of
bhakti, see Munshl Ra m ^ Sharma, ibid*, ppl/+17~527 •
 240

Whenever Kabir is described as a Vaishnava,

0 ' the traditional
accounts of a teacher-disciple relationship between him and

Ramananda, and between Ramananda and Ramanuja are put forward

as evidence of his affiliations with the Ramanuja School.

At the same time, the constant occurrence of the name Rama

in his verses is taken as a direct testimony of his

Vaishpava faith.

These arguments however, cannot be accepted as

valid proofs of Kabir*s Vaishpava affiliations. It must

be stated here that Kabir himself has nowhere mentioned

Ramananda as his guru. But even if we accept the tradition

about his being the preceptor of Kabir, there are reasons

to believe that Ramananda belonged to a Vaishnava School

which had drifted away from the tradition of the 3ri

Sampradaya of Ramanuja and was more under the influence of

the northern movement of the Nath^pantha. The nature of

the Vaishnava School of Ramananda and its impact on Kabir,

which are reviewed at a later stage, show that the influence

of Ramananda on Kabir lies not in his Vaishnavism but can

be fixed in certain other contemporary influences, common

to both the Vaishnava School of Ramananda and the nirguna

1
bhakti of Kabir. Besides, it is definitely wrong to

Vide Infra, pp
describe Kabir as a Vaishnava merely on account of his

usage of the name Rama for God. As discussed earlier,

Kabir uses the name Rama only in a symbolic sense and not

in the sense of a personal incarnation of Vishnu.

Kabir believes neither in the worship of Vishnu nor

in that of Rama and Krishna. Nor does he show any respect

1
for the other for the Vaishnava
v
rituals. In fact his

total disregard of these strikes at the very roots of the

Vaishnava beliefs. Moreover, Kabir is not only opposed to

the worship of Vishnu and his avataras, but he condemns

every form of idol-worship, which as is commonly known, is

an integral part of the Vaishnava tradition. Lastly,

Kabir fs staunch belief in an impersonal G-od in itself

leaves no scope for the exaltation of personal deities

such as Vishpu, Rama, and Krishna, whose worship forms the

very basis of the Vaishnava religion.

The ten avataras or incarnations of Vishnu are

2
described by Kabir as nothing but maya or illusion. Belief

in them, according to him, is the result of ignorance which

is perpetuated on account of the lack of discrimination

1. mathe tilak hathi mala banan, logan Ram khilauna jaharw

KG, p . 271.

2. das autar I sari maya, karat a kai jin puja. BI j, p. 31

(Sabda 8)
for the entities which are horn and subject to destruction

can never he regarded as God. How can the personal

incarnations of Vishnu,
c r men who were horn and who died,* he
identified with God? Kahir therefore rejects the divinity

of each avatara in no uncertain terms, and explains that

the nirguna God must not he confused with Vishnu and his

incarnations. He cannot he the Rama who was horn of

Dasratha,' and who killed Havana.

« Nor can he he the Krishna
0 ♦
who killed KaAsa. He did not become incarnate to hring

about the death of Hiranyaka^ipu nor did he take the Vaman^h

form to test Bali. God could never assume a mortal frame

2
and is incapable of acting like a living man.

In fact Kahir!s complete disregard for the popular

deities Rama and Krishna brings out with greater emphasis

his uncompromising belief in a nirguna and impersonal God.

He not only rejects their divinity, hut does not even

hesitate to treat them on a par with the evil-doers, to

destroy whom, it is believed, Vishnu had become incarnate

in them. Kahir is able to speak of Rama and Havana, and

1 . Mathura marigau Krisna guvara, mari mari gaye daso

autara. Bij, p.18 (RamainI 5k) *
muye Krisna muye karatara, ek na muva jo sirajan hara.
kahanhin Kahir muva nahi soi, jake avagavan na hoi.
Bij, p.k5 (Sabda 45)*

2. See Bijak p.31 (Sabda 8 ); ibid., p .2k (Ramaini 75)*

 2 4 3

1
of Krishna and Kansa in one breath. They were all mortals,
2
he says, and pleads for the worship of the nirguna Rama

instead of these deified personalities,)

Although Kahir does not support the Vaishnava

beliefs as such, in some of his verses he speaks well of

the Vaishnavas. These verses, which of course are very few

in number, are always quoted as a proof of K a birTs Vaishna­

vism. But Kabir's appreciation of the Vaishnavas in all

these instances is of a relative nature. He invariably

praises them only in comparison with the corrupt ^aktas

and their evil practices. He does not exalt or advocate the

beliefs of the Vaishnavas, but shows only a greater regard

for them as compared with the £>aktas,^ Furthermore even

this appreciation of the Vaishnavas cannot be regarded as an

unqualified feature of Kabirfs views about them. He is

often very severe in his criticism of the Vaishnava rituals,

and shows an open contempt for the practising Vaishnavas

1 , Hiranakus Ravan gau KaftsS, Krisna gaye sur nar muni

bahsa. Bin, p<>15 (Ramaini 45) •
2, nirguna Ram nirguna Ram japahu re bhai
abigati ki gati lakhi na jal. KG, p.92«
ye tatu Ram japahu re pranl, BI,j, p. 36 (Sabda 19)

3 * baisnofi ki chhaparl bhall,

nan sashat ka bad gauru
sashat banbhan mati milai, baisanaun milai chandal.
KG, p.46.
 244

1
who otherwise fall short of the higher ethical standards.

In view of all this, it is surprising that scholars

like R.G-. Bhadarkar,

2
H.Go Raychaudhur i,
3
S. Radhakrishnan
h
5
and R 0Co Maoumdar^ should place Kahir in the Vaishnava

tradition without any reservations. Even the Hindi scholars,

in spite of their direct knowledge and familiarity with

the works of Kahir, continue to describe him as. a Vaishnava

¥ o

and struggle to prove his Vaishnava loyalties in order to

keep his position as a hhakta compatible with the standard

definition of hhakti.

(v i ) The Antecedents of Kah i r Ts Nirguna School

Kahir*s Nirguna School represents a particular

pattern of medieval devotionalism. It need not therefore

he approached necessarily from a Vaishnava angle to fit the

current definition of hhakti. A closer look at the Bhakti-

Movement shows that it was not confined to Vaishnavism alone.

The flowering of the Vaishnava-Vedanta and the Vaishnava

1 . baisanaun bhaya tau ka bhaya, bujha nahift hahek.

chhapa tilak banay kari, dagadhya lok anek. KG, p. 1+0.

2. RoG« Bhandarkar, ibid., p. 66-j-v

3. H,Co Raychauduri, ibid., p .2.

S « Radhakrishnan, ibid., Vol.II, p*670.

5. RoC. Majumdar, History and Culture of the Indian People.

ibid., Vol.VI, p .562, also in The Cultural Heritage of
India, Swami Ramakrishna Centenary Memorial, Vol.Ill,
n.d., p. 35 .
 245

poetry forms only one part of the medieval devotionalism.

It cannot cover and explain the whole of the Bhakti-Movement*

Certain other existing religio-philosophical traditions were

also asserting themselves with a fresh vigour at this time.

They too were stressing the importance of religions devotion

in accordance with their own "background of "beliefs and

practices. In so far as Kahir is concerned, forces other

than Vaishnavism contributed more than Vaishnavism itself

in shaping his school of nirguna hhakti,

Kahir was not a systematiser and was completely

non-sectarian in his outlook. The antecedents of his

thought and beliefs, therefore, cannot he traced hack to

any one system of philosophy or sectarian theology.

Influences proceeding from different sources, astika as

well as nastika, gave life and shape to Kahir’s religion,

Nevertheless Kahir cannot he regarded as merely an eclectic

thinker, for certain special characteristics of thought and

approach mark out his religious beliefs as a distinct

tradition in its own right. He repeated all such philosoph­

ical views which lent strength to his own ideology, and

openly condemned those which were not in keeping with it.

He emphasised the religious spirit hut had totally rejected

every religious form. The sources of K a hir’s inspiration

therefore can he determined only in the light of the

 246

predominant and characteristic features of his own stand­

point ,

As shown above, an essential spiritual monism and a

strictly impersonal view of God constitute the fundamentals

of the philosophical position of Kahir* A broad based

Advaita ideology can be found throughout his works, and by

whatever name he calls his God, he always conceives Him as

nirguna* As far as the methods of actual spiritual endeavour

or sadhna are concerned Kabir recognises the general

principles of yoga and advocates self-effort for the attain­

ment of spiritual ends. The highest values of religious

life upheld by Kabir lie clearly in the realm of mysticism,

for according to him, personal spiritual experience alone

must be regarded as the finality of the active religious

1
modeso In all these respects, Kabir is in line with the

astika traditions of the Hindus and lays strong emphasis on

certain essentials of the Hindu religion and philosophy.

At the same time, Kabir!s approach is also marked

with a freedom of thought and reasoning which makes him

unique as a religious thinker* Although both his philosophy

and faith are deeply rooted in the astika soil, his constant

and open attacks on all formal religious beliefs, doctrines,

1 . karm dharm kachhuvo nahin uhavan, na uhan mantra na puja.

Bijo (Sabda k3)
 2 4 7

1
and rituals, are reminiscent of those levied hy the

nastikas against the orthodox religion* Excepting the

essential truth and ultimacy of the Spirit, nothing escaped

the questioning and criticism of Kahir, and no religious

form, whether of ritual or doctrine was regarded as

infallible hy him. The vitality and freedom of individual

reasoning which we find in Kahir, carry with them a clear

echo of the nastika traditions.

K a h i r Ts religion strikes us as an expression of a

medieval astika tradition, which shows evidence of an inter­

mingling of the astika and nastika elements. A simplified

monistic philosophy, a reformed order of yoga^a rationalistic

and critical approach to religion^and an antipathy for

established religious form and ritual constitute the main

characteristics of this new astika tradition. It is astika

in nature in so far as it upholds the ultimacy of the Atman

and derives its inspiration from the monistic Vedanta and

yoga. At the same time the critical modes of reasoning and

the irreverential attitude which mark this tradition show

a clear impact of the nastika tradition.

There are reasons to believe that as a result of

their mutual interaction on each other, the differences

hijak pp. 8-9 (Ramaini 22), p.29 (sabdai-j-); p . 32 (sabdalO);

p .37~(sabda 22 ); p .^0 (sabda 30 ); p ^57 (sabda
 248

between the astika and n astika. tradition was becoming less

fundamental during the medieval period. Certain philosophi­

cal precepts and modes of religious discipline were now

finding equal acceptance amongst the astika a as well as the

nastikas„ A monistic view of Reality in the field of

Siddhanta and the practice of yoga in that of sadlyaa, were

1
common to both. Similarly a rejection of religious authority

and ritual, a complete disregard for scholasticism, and a

definite articulation of religious finalities in terms of

mysticism and personal spiritual experience, mark the

significant movements of both the astika and the nastika

2
groups. The expanding common grounds, of thought and

practice brought them nearer together and had resulted in

an interpenetration of thought and approach, miring this

period of confluence, if certain astika values were

assimilated by the nastikas, the critical and unorthodox

1. For examples of monistic thought in the medieval Buddhist

and Jaina literature, see Doha-Koda, edited by Rahula
Sankritayana, Bihar Rashtra Bhasha Parishad, Patna 1957,
p.85^ doha 1 and 2; p« 89 , doha 15 and 16; p.95* doha 32
and 3k I p*157, doha 1+9«
See also, Pahuda-Doha, of Muni Ramsimha, ed. by Hiralal
Jain, Karanja Sain Publications Society, Karanja (Berar)
1933, dohas 39, k O, 1+1, 122, 139, 17^.
2. See Doha-Kosa, ibid., p»93> doha 26 ; p.l6l, doha" 60;
p d 63, doha 63 and 67; p . 255, doha Ik and 25; p.259,
doha 26; p 028l, doha 11; p.291, doha 18,
See also Pahuda~Poha, ibid, d o h a s 8, 7, 19, 22, 2l+, 37,
59, 67, 69 , 7o, 97, 98, 109, 116, 126 , 135, 161-63, 180 ,
217.
approach of the nastikas also had a great impact on the

astikaSo

The new astika tradition which took shape as the

result of this intermingling, has a lot in common with the

later movement of nirguna hhakti. /V-/ It can explain the

combination in Kabir of the sincerity of his orthodox belief

in the ultimacy of spirit, which is astika in nature, and the

severity of his unorthodox criticism of existing religious

formalities which carries a nastika flavour, N-Philosophi­

cally, this new tradition was rooted in monistic thought,

and in the field of spiritual endeavour, it advocated

contemplation and yogic discipline. Resting on the

principles of the basic and innate truth of mysticism, it

emphasised the use of reason and freedom of thought in

religion. A movement was thus afoot long before its spirit

and message could take a more definite and popular form in

the nirguna bhaktas like Kabir.

There Is literary as well as sectarian evidence of

the existence of such an astika tradition in the medieval

period. Its sectarian manifestation can be seen in the

Natha-Pantha, one of the most popular and active ascetic

groups. The precepters of the Katha-Pantha preached a

monistic philosophy in a simple and popular form, laid

stress on yoga, and at the same time opposed the formal and
ritualistic patterns of* religion. The same characteristic

features are indicated m the Yoga-Va si sh th a , which is

neither a sectarian work nor a systematic exposition of any

particular philosophical doctrine, hut is a religious text

written in a popular style, advocating yoga and a nirguna

ideology* Although the Natha-Pantha was astika in its

beliefs, to the extent that the antecedents of the precepters

of the Natha-Pantha are inter-connected with that of the

Sahajayani Siddhas, they had a nastika background. Similarly,

■k*16 Yoga-Vasishtha is fully in keeping with the astika

traditions in so far as it enjoins a belief in a monistic

and nirguna view of reality and emphasises the importance

[
of jhana and yoga* But the Yoga -Vafeishta strongly

condemns many established beliefs and practices, a thing

with is associated more with the nastika tradition.

But although the Natha-Pantha reiterated the astika

beliefs related to Hinduism, its origins can be traced back

to the movements of the Buddhist siddhas, the beginnings of

which were first seen in the Vajrayana and the Sahajayana,^*

The names of Matseyendranath and of his disciple Gorakhnath,

1, Hajari Prasad Dvivedi, Nath a Sanrpradaya, Hindustani

Academy, Allahabad, 19507' p p *6bff,
Prabodha Ohandra Bagchi, Kaula 3nana Nirnaya, Calcutta,
193A, Introduction,
Dharma Vira Bharati, Siddha Sahitya, Kitab Mahal,
Allahabad, 1955* passim.
"both of whom are regarded as the most important of the

preceptors of the Natha-Pantha, are connected with the

tradition of the Sahajayani siddhas also* They represent

a stage of change in the Siddha tradition which ultimately

brought about the transformation of the Buddhist siddhas

into the Natha-Pantha* The predominance of the non-Buddhist

elements in Matsyendra and Gorakhnath shows that the

Buddhist siddhas had greatly assimilated the Brahmanic

2
influences* Separate from its allied Buddhist traditions

of the nastika fold, and free from the corrupting tantrik

influences, the Natha pantha served as a powerful ascetic

movement from the eleventh to the fifteenth century. The

intermingling of the astika and the nastika forces, and

the emergence of an astika tradition equipped with the

vitality of the critical and unorthodox attitude of the

nastikas, stands out very clearly in the growth of the

Natha-pantha.

Although the medieval nirguna saints cannot be

connected with the Natha-pantha in any narrow sectarian

sense, nevertheless this system seems to be the most

1. Dvivedi, ibid., pp.iH and £j-8ff.

2. S.B. Dasgupta, Obscure Religious Cults, Revised Ed.,

Calcutta, 1962, p p .226-29.
For Advaita influence in the Natha Pantha, see Dvivedi,
ibid., pp *69, 76*
preponderant of sectarian influences on the nirguna bhaktas

like Kablr. K a bir’s advocacy of yoga and his frequent

recourse to yogic terminology reiterates the Natha ideology.

His revolt against the formal and ritualistic religion, and

his incessant emphasis on the basic spirit and essentials

of religions is the same as that of the Natha teachers.

Many parallels can be found between Kablr and Gorakhnath.

Both Kablr and Gorakhnath take a monistic view of Reality.'1'

Both rely on the truth of personal experience and point out

2
the meaninglessness of scholastic knowledge in religion.

Both recommend the path of Self-knowledge and describe it

x
as Jfaana. Like Kabir, Gorakhnath also considers the formal

differences of religion as unimportant.^"

The Vaishnava influence on Kabxr which is recognised

because of his association with the Vaishnava guru Ramananda,

1. For comparison with Kabir, see Gorakh-Bani, edited by

Pitambara Butta Badathval, Hindi Sahitya Sammelan,
Prayag, i 960, p.25>*Bani 70; p.29,B83; p.6ii, B.191* P*71*
B 218; p,l88, B 22; p.l92,B p . 215* B32* The same in
Machhinder's teachings to Gorakh, ibido, p.188, B 22;
p.192 B 50.

2. Ibid., p . 3 , B 6 ; p . 5 , B 13; p . 21, B 59; P*42., B 119; p . 57*

B 167; P * 72, B 223; P. 77* B 2^8; p . 81, B 26U; p . 82, B 270;
p.170 , B k; p. 172 , b 11 ,

3. Ibid.. p . 6U, B 189; p . 65 , B 195;

For the position of the Natha-Pantha on JfXana, see
"Gyan-Tilak" and ,f‘ 2hana-I)vipa-Bodhan, ibid,,pp.207 ff
and 227 ff respectively.

4. Ibid., p. 25* B 68 and 69; p#33* B 96 ; p.175* B 9*

 is also interconnected with that of the Natha-Pantha. The

Vaishnava school of Benaras to which Ramananda Belonged was

very much influenced By the Natha-pantha. The works of Both

1
Ramananda and his guru Raghavananda Bear its stamp. The

connecting link Between KaBir and Ramananda therefore is

not Vaishnavism, But lies in the influence of the popular

northern movement of the Natha-pantha, an influence common

to Both KaBlr and the Vaishnava school of Ramananda* The

interconnection Between Vaishnavism and the Natha pantha, and

Between f
/ Vaishnavism and Kablr s nirguna school also Becomes clearer

when we examine the antecedents of the Vaishnava school to

which Ramananda Belonged.

Ramananda represents a distinct Vaishnava tradition

different from that of Ramanuja with whose &ri-sampradaya

he is so often connected on account of the traditions which

place him in the continuous line of teachers and disciples

connected with that school. However, it needs to Be

a
recognized more fully that/Vaishnava tradition was taking

shape in the north, which while still retaining its

Vaishnava affiliation, had drifted away from the Ramanuja

1. See Ram anand ki Hindi Rachnayeh, edited By PitamBara

Dutta Badathval, Nagari Prachar«ani SaBha, Kasi, 1955*
 254

1
school. This new Vaishnava
o
tradition did not attach

importance to caste distinctions in matters of religious

pursuits and had readily thrown open the higher paths of

spiritual endeavour to all, irrespective of their caste.

Different in its approach from the more common expressions

of Vaishnavism, it does not seem to regard the simple worship

of the personal deity Vishnu and the performance of the

characteristic Vaishnava rituals as self-sufficient in

themselves. On the contrary it laid great stress on yogic

discipline in the field of sadhana and on a strictly monistic

2
view of Ultimate Reality in the field of siddhanta. In

1. It is generally recognized that the Ramannuoa?s Sri

Vaishnava Sampradaya was later divided into two schools,
the northern school known as Vadagalai, and the southern
school known as the Tiftgalai. important ideological
differences can he found between these two schools, both
of which are traditionally connected with the 3rl
Sampradaya. Ramananda belonged to the northern school
of Raghavananda. It seems that these two had not only
drifted away from the southern tradition of the Alvars,
the immediate antecedent of the Sri sampradaya, but were
also greatly influenced by the popular but non-Vaishnava
movement of the north, that of the Natha Pantha.
For the differences between the Vadagali and the
Tihgalai branches of the £Sri Sampradaya^ and for those
between the school of Ramananda and Ramanuja^ see,
Pitambara Dutta Badathaval, ibid., pp.21-2.6.

2. These conclusions are based on the study of the Siddhanta

Panchmatra of Raghavananda, and that of Rama-Raksha,
Yoga-Chintamani and G-yana-Tilak of Ramananda. RamanandaTs
pada. in the ASi-G-rantha has also^been taken into account.
For these texts, see Ramananda Ki Hindi Rachnayen, ibid.,
■ 11 " 11 m ' ........... . .iHnnmnij ■ i iiV t i -i m 1— “*

and the/Adi-G-rantha.^
 some important respects therefore this Vaishnava tradition

had taken a very different position from that of Ramanuja.

Although a greater credit is given to Ramananda in this

connection, the beginnings of it can to some extent be

traced back to Ramananda's guru Raghavananda, the key figure

in this development.

Our knowledge of the life and thought of Raghavananda

1
is very meagre. Nabhadas places him in the tradition of
- - 2
Ramanuja, putting him as the fourth in line from him.

According to him, Raghavananda had gone to live at Kasi

where he tried to instil bhakti amongst all kinds of people

irrespective of their caste and asrama. Perhaps in the line

of Ramanuja's £>ri Sampradaya,Raghavananda was the first to

settle down at Kasi separately in his own right, and the first
to
/assume a different attitude on important questions like

the caste. In his chappaya on Raghavananda, Nabhadas makes

only a brief and passing reference to the immediate

successors of Ramanuja, such as Devacharya and Hariyananda,

and does not make any observations about them which might

suggest any noticeable change in the traditions of the

1. Pitambara Dutta Badathval, see nSwami Raghavananda aur

Siddhanta PanchmatraV in: Yoga^Pravaha» Kasi-Vidya-PItha,
Benares, 1 9 M $ 0

2. Bhakta-liala , fc&idw- Chappaya 30.

£>rl sampradaya. But he mentions Raghavananda as the one

who decided to stay at Kasi and who extended equality to all

castes in spiritual matters.

It must he remembered here however that Ramanuja

had thrown open only the lower path of prapatti or surrender

to the lower castes but had recommended the higher path of

bhakti for the high castes only. This fundamental difference

between Ramanuja and Raghavananda can be explained only on

grounds of the latter having moved to the north and having

come under the direct influence of the religious movement

of the north, that of the Natha-pantha which was unorthodox

in its approach in this respect but was a very active and

1
influential religious group. Ramananda, who is more well

known than his guru, Raghavananda, belonged to this Vaishnava

school of Ka^i. It is not surprising therefore that he

should have attracted such a large number of his celebrated

1. The traces of the Natha Pantha can be found in Bengal,

Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Sindh, Gujarat, Rajasthan and
Maharashtra. But there are reasons to believe that this
movement, in its origins, was essentially a northern
movement. The medieval religious thinking and movements
of north India show a greater influence of the Nathas
when compared with the southern counterparts. According
to Dr. Ghurye the south shows a much lesser impact of
the Natha Pantha.
G.S. Ghurye, Indian Sadhus, The Popular Book Depot,
Bombay 1953, P*155>
disciples from the lower castes

'idle Yoga-Vasishtha can he viewed as a significant

9

literary expression of an important aspect of medieval

religious life. As pointed out earlier, one vital current

of the period is found clearly marked with monistic beliefs,

reformed practice of yoga and a rational approach towards

formal aspects of religion. The evidence of it, is shown

above in the Natha-pantha. The same elements are found in

the Yoga-Vasishtha. Here also is seen an astika tradition

equipped with the vitality of the unorthodox approach of the

nastikas.

The Yoga-Vasishtha is not a sectarian work, nor is

it a systematic exposition of any particular philosophical

doctrine. It does not technically outline any system of

philosophy or metaphysics, nor is it meant for a limited

circle of the very learned. Nevertheless it is philosophical

in its approach and content, and is written more in the

nature of a popular religious text, meant for a much larger

audience. Certain essentials of the religio-philosophical

thought of the Hindus are conveyed here not in a scholastic

but a simple and straightforward manner, understandable

even by men of lesser learning. This aspect of the Yoga-

1. The most prominent of them are Kabir, Raidas, Dhana, and

Sehlu They are all mentioned by Nabhadas as the disciples
of Ramananda <, See Bhakta-Mala, Chhappaya 31»
Vasi.shtha can be taken as an indication of a popular

movement in favour of its teachings.

The ideology of the Yoga-Vasishtha is unorthodox in

some respects and cannot be confined to any particular

philosophical system or sect. At the same time it rests on

certain fundamentals of Hindu religious thought, particularly

those related to the classical Vedanta and Yoga. If the

Yoga-Vasishtha attacks the traditional formalities of

religion and states the importance of individual reasoning

against religious authority, it also stresses upon the

beliefs in the ultimacy of the Atman and the monistic nature

of Reality.

A similar approach characterises K a b i r 1s religious

position and many parallels can be found between the

passages of the Yoga-Vasishtha and the verses of Kabir.

Perhaps he was the product of the same forces which are in

evidence in the Yoga-Vasishth a . The following analysis of

the philosophy of the Yoga-Vasishtha brings out some points

of similarity between the two.

In general, like Kabir, the author of the Yoga-

Vasishtha upholds a monistic and nirguna ideology with the

help of a supporting philosophy of mysticism. The finality

of personal spiritual experience in religion is emphasised

by both, and both advocate the rejection of irrational

 25'9

authority and the use of individual reasoning in matters

pertaining to religions

A simplified and popularised form of monistic

philosophy forms the "basis of Kabirrs religious thought.

The same is the case with Yoga Vasi shth a , according to which

the being of the world is bound with the being of the spirit
1
and has no separate existence from it. There is nothing
2
which is not present in the Great Self, and the world

exists in the Brahman in the same way as the tree in the

3 II
seed, and as. the butter in the milk. The Yoga-Vasishtha

describes the Brahman as the unmanifest and without names5

in the same manner as Kabir. Even those who know it fail

to describe it. Therefore the use of different names to

6
describe the Ultimate Reality is unnecessary and meaningless.

From this position of the Yoga-Vasishtha Kabir had to take

only one step forward in order to say that the different

1. The Yogavasistha of Valffliiki, with the commentary,

Vasisthamaharamay^atatparyapraka^a, edited by Wdsudev
Laxman Sastri Pansikar, Kirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay 1937s
III.l4.75, also VI.Tdo lU.8."
2. Ibid., III.100*5*
3. Ibid., III.100.11.

2|. Ibid., Via.9.27; also ibid., Via.2,52; III.lU.73*

5* Ibid., VIbo 52.27.

6. Ibid., Via. 78.32-3U.

 2'3d

names used for God toy the Hindus and Muslims also could not

mean two different things*

The importance attached toy Yoga-Vasishtha to

personal spiritual experience is also the same as that found

in Kabir. According to the Yoga-Vasishtha the final proofs

lie only in direct apprehension, and the direct cognition

alone can serve as the ultimate source of knowledge.^ The

2
Self alone is the reality at the root of the universe, and

the nature of the Self cannot toe realized without its direct

experience. It is further explained in the Yoga-Vasishtha

that the Self can toe experienced only through intuition^

and that there is nothing greater than the divine experience

which is immanent in its nature and arises only when the ego

and the mind get completely dissolved. This reality

cannot toe described in words tout can only toe experienced

6
from within, God should not toe sought outside, for He

1. Ibid., II.19.16; III.U2.15; Vito 52.29.

2. Ibid., Via. 76.39.

3. Ibid., V.6U.53.

U. Ibid., V.73,15.

5. Ibid., V.6U.5I.

6. Ibid., V.6U.52.
resides within everyone and o n e ’s hody itself is His temple.

Those who leave this God residing within, and look for Him

outside themselves are like fools who leave the gem and run
1
after pieces of glass. A clear echo of the same ideas can

he found in Kablr. His way of explaining them also is

very often the same.

Similarly the role of the Self in religious and

spiritual endeavour as. laid down hy the Yoga*-Va si shtha is

upheld hy Kabir in the same spirit. The Self is the most

important. It is through the medium of the Self that

experience can make knowledge valid. But the self which

2
sees itself in its calm mind can he attained only through

o n e ’s own efforts and cannot he realized through external

agencies or methods. Scriptures cannot make one realize

the Self, if the individual attempt to interpret o n e ’s own

experience and intuition is missing.

In a scheme of ideas such as found in the Yoga-

Vasishth a , a greater stress is naturally laid on individual

reasoning and choice than on external authority and

injunctions. God can he found only through knowledge, and

1. Ibid.9 V.8*li-u

2. Ibid., Via. 1 1 8 .In

3. Ibid., VIb. 197.25,28,29.

 282

not through performances cf any hind. Living in a forest,

1
performing penance * going on pilgrimage, and Lathing in the
2
sacred rivers can he of no avail* Neither the scholarly

study of scriptures nor the worship of any particular god,

however powerful he may he, can he of any help without one 's

own personal effort. Even the god Vishriu cannot hestow

self knowledge on one who does not exercise his own thought.^"

According to the Yoga-Vasishth a , reason must serve as the

guiding light for the true aspirant. A rational man should

value the works of even an ordinary person if they are

conducive to the advancement of knowledge and are logical,

and should he ready to throw away even those of the great

sages if they fail in it. A reasonable statement, even that

of a child, should he accepted while an unreasonable one

should he discarded like straw, even if it came from the

creator himself. This freedom of thinking and expression

which is so predominant in the Yoga-Vasishtha hears an

extremely close resemblance with K a b x r fs general approach

1. Ibid., VIb. 199.30.

2. Ibid.* VIb. 197-16.

3* Ibid., V.M+.l; V O1 0 P 10, 13, 16, 17*

k. Ibid., V ,ii3.10.

3. Ibid., II.18.2,3*
and reasoning* The performance of ritualistic religious

acts is denounced hy Kabir in the same manner, and he lays

a similar emphasis on the importance of individual reasoning

for the understanding of religious truths, and of self­

effort for the attainment of spiritual ends*

On the testimony of the Yoga-Vasishth a , it can

perhaps be stated that at the time of the composition of

this popular religious text, the ideology of nirguna bhakti

had found wide acceptance amongst certain sections of the

Vaishnavas. In the evolutionary process of the penetration

of the philosophical influences in popular Vaishnavism, the

Yoga-Vasishtha represents a stage higher than that of a mere

identification of Vishnu with the nirguna brahman* In the

Yoga-Vasishtha, Rama, the avatara of Vishnu, asks for

instructions in Yoga from Vasishtha and listens to the

glories of the Nirguna Brahman from him. The personality of

Rama is thus reduced to a secondary position, and is that of

a recipient rather than of a giver of knowledge, a situation

very different from the one in the Bhagavad-G-ita, where it

is the personality of Krishna, again an avatara of Vishnu,

which occupies the central position in the narrative, and

serves as the transmitter of spiritual knowledge.

The personality of Rama in the Yoga-Vasishtha is

clearly superseded by the injunctions of jhana and yoga

 2 6 4

since the position of Rama in this work remains only that of

a listener. The constant use of the figure of Rama through-

out the narrative can only he explained in two ways. Either

his name was heing used to win Vaishnava sympathies and to

receive a Vaishnava hearing, or the nirguna ideology had

found such a complete acceptance amongst the Vaishnavas that

the personality of Rama could easily recede into the back­

ground in such a text. In either case the nirguna ideology

acquires a sanctity for the Vaishnavas in the Yoga-Vasi shtha

through the authority of the discourses between Rama and

Vasishtha. If Rama himself accepted the knowledge of

Vasishtha, why not the Vaishnavas who were his devotees?

Nirguna bhakti must have been fairly widespread

amongst certain Vaishnava groups of the north. Not only can

this conclusion be drawn on the basis of the narrative form

of the Yoga-Vasishtha, which is in the form of a discourse

between Rama and Vasishtha, but there are also certain

passages in it which indicate this more clearly and

definitely. The bhakti of Prahlada, as described in the

Yoga-Vasishtha, is a significant illustration of this.

Prahlada who is revered as one of the great Vishnu

bhaktas and who is represented as a devotee of Narayana,

and the account of whose Sagufea bhakti we find in the

Bhagavata-Purana , is represented in the Yoga-Vasishtha as a

nirguna bhakta who attains the real knowledge (ta11va- jflana)

of the oneness of Narayana and the Nirguna Brahman. As

Prahlada is worshipping the personal image of Vishnu in all

1
its glory and Beauty of form, the realisation comes that
2
Vishpu is the same as the Atman and that it is the reality

existing within himself, which has assumed the external form

of the deity for him as Vishnu.^

Again when Prahlada performs puja for Vishpu, makes

his offerings to him accompanied by rituals characteristic

of the Vaishnavas modes of worship^ praising the Lord Vishnu

in various ways, Vishnu himself appears before Prahlada to

explain the need for viveka and vichara, and enjoins upon

Prahlada to continue with his spiritual endeavours until he

can attain the state of Brahman. Having received this

injunction from the Bhagavan himself, Prahlada uses his

own thought power (vichara) and discrimination (viveka) to

6
understand Ultimate Reality. Thereafter he dwells upon the
supreme reality of the Self and its universal oneness. He

1. Ibid., V.31.375 32.1 .

2. Ibid., V.31.39.
3. Ihid.. V.32.2.

b. Ibid.. V.32. 8-16.

5. Ibid.. V.3U.3.
6. Ibid., V.3i4»8ff.

7. Ibid.. V .3i-l-.ll2-115.
realises that the ultimate Reality which is explained in

different ways through the doctrines of Vedanta* the systems

of logic, and the songs of the Puranas, is essentially the

1
same* At the end of this account of Prahlada,' Vasishtha
t
points out that whatever Prahlada had attained was attained
p
by him through his own efforts and not by any other course.

Vishpu is only that which is the Atman of all, and that which

is the Atman of all i& itself Vishnu? Atman alone had caused

Vishpu bhakti in Prahlada. Having realised that there was

no difference between himself as Atman and Vishnu, he

obtained Atman 3hana through his own power.^

If the above is accepted as an indication of the

possibility and prevalence of nirguna bhakti amongst certain

Vaishpava sects, it can serve as a clue for understanding the

viewpoint of the Vaishnava guru Ramananda. Ramananda is

always classed as a Vaishnava. But if there exists a

tradition proving him as a Vaishpava,there also exists a

clear evidence of a nirguna ideology in his verses. Some

of which hear a close resemblance with the Natha literature

1. Ibid.. V. 35 .2-10 .

2. Ibid.. V.43.4.

3. Ibid.. V.43.6.

4. Ibid.. V.43.7-8.
as well. The most prominent of the nirguna bhaktas of the

medieval period, who did not believe in Vishnu-worship, are

known to us as the disciples of Ramananda. There are only

two explanations possible in this connection. Either there

were two different Ramanandas who are wrongly referred to as

one, or the one traditional Ramananda was a strong protagon­

ist of a nirguna ideology in spite of his formal affiliations

with the Vaishnava sect. The traditional accounts of the

teacher-disciple relationship between the Vaishnava guru

Ramananda and Kabir can be accepted only in the light of the

second alternative.

In view of the lack of sufficient data, nothing

definite can be said about KablrTs personal associations

and his immediate sources of inspiration. Nor can we know,

with authenticity, the exact nature and extent of the

influence of any one sect on him. The above attempt there­

fore to ascertain the antecedents of K a bir?s Nirguna School

was not to connect him with a particular sect or thought

system, but was only to show the avenues in which we can

look for the sources of his inspiration. We were trying to

establish that Kabirfs thought and religion cannot be

explained in terms of Vaishnavism but can be understood only

against the background of a monistic and nirguna ideology.

 268

CONCLUSION

Certain firmly established views about "bhakti and

the Bhakti Movement have heen repudiated in the foregoing

chapters. It has heen shorn that "bhakti is neither a cult

nor a doctrine and that a fixed belief in a personal God,

an antagonism to the path of jhana, and the rejection of a

monistic view of Reality are not its necessary pre-requisites.

The validity of the identification of bhakti with

Vaishnavism has also been questioned. It has been pointed

out that the whole of the Bhakti Movement cannot be viewed

in Vaishnava terms, alone. We have suggested that the total

manifestation of medieval bhakti cannot be traced back to

Cojtnot
the inspiration of the Vaishnava acharyas, and that it^be

regarded as a reaction against Sankara's Advaita Vedanta.

There is clear evidence of bhakti in Sankara and many of the

medieval bhaktas of the nirguna school lend full support to

the essentials of monistic Vedanta and strongly advocate a

belief in an impersonal God. Taking this position about

bhakti and the Bhakti Movement^we have re-examined Kabir

and his antecedents to show the absence in him of those

beliefs which are generally attributed to him on account of

the current definition of bhakti.

Bhakti is not a religion. It does not fall in any

 2 6 9

of the categories "by which different religions and religious

doctrines are denominated and distinguished within the

totality of Hinduism, It does not stand for any dharrna,

mata, or siddhanta hut is a constituent of sadhana. It

suggests only a bhava or condition - in other words, only a

devotional attitude of mind and heart. Since it does not

pertain to any religious tenets but is indicative of only a

religious attitude, variations and distinctions can be

caused in its form and manner because of the difference of

sectarian beliefs and the disagreements in the doctrinal

approach to the question of the nature of God, In the total

complex of Hinduism, bhakti, in the sense of devotion, forms

a part of various religious traditions, and is not confined

to any one sect. Thus not only is it wrong to call it a

religion, but it is equally wrong to restrict it to the

Vaishnava
a
faith.

There is noincompatibility between bhakti and the

nirguna ideology of the Advaita Vedanta. In Hinduism, an

impersonal concept of God and a non-dualistic view of

Reality in no way exclude the possibilities of bhakti, On

the contrary they provide the necessary philosophical

framework for the recommended path of Self-realisation,

which forms an essential part of the Hindu view of religious

devotion.
 Bhakti is not antagonistic to ^hana either. In the

authoritative religious texts the two are always found as

accordant accompaniments to each other. In fact their

mutual interdependence is very often emphasised. The current

misconception that bhakti is opposed to Jnana is obviously

the result of a false interpretation of jhana. Whenever

bhakti and jhana are described as antagonistic to each

other, the latter is invariably understood as intellectual

and abstract knowledge. But in the Hindu literature,

whenever the term jnana is used in relation to spiritual

endeavour and is described as the highest value, it always

carries the meaning of Self-knowledge, derived from personal

spiritual experience.

The current theories which suggest that bhakti is a

religious conviction, that it is not possible without a

belief in a personal God, and that it is opposed to jhana

and the Advaita Vedanta, are of recent and artificial

formation. So is the equation of bhakti with Vaishnavism.

The beginnings of these theories which outline the principles

of the "bhakti religion", and which ultimately identify

bhakti with Vaishnavism can be traced back to certain western

o

scholars of the nineteenth century. The Hindu Scriptures

do not support these views. Even such texts as the Bhagavad-

Gita, the Bhag av a t a-Purana and the Bhakti-Sutras of Narada

and £>ahdilya do not bear them out, although these are always

cited to substantiate them. In none of these texts do we

find the suggestion that bhakti is possible only for a

personal God. Nor do we find any divergence between bhakti

and jhana^and between bhakti and the Vedanta. The Bhagavad-

Gita describes the jhani bhakta as the highest amongst the

devotees. Sahdilya refers to the Brahma-Kanda as the Bhakti-

Kand a 9 and the Bhagavata-Purana,, in spite of its strong

Vaishnava bias, gives full recognition to the bhakti for the

Nirguna.

The nucleus of the modern theories about bhakti can

be found in the writings of Albrecht Weber. The ideas

initiated by him were further developed by scholars like

Monier-Williams and George.A. Grierson. Weber had identified

bhakti with Krishna-worship. He was interested mainly in the

question of the influence of Christianity on this particular

religious tradition of India. Although the researches of

R.G. Bhandarkar finally resolved this question by proving

the pre-Christian existence of the cult of Krishna-wor ship,

its identification with bhakti had become a settled fact.

Even Bhandarkar could not question it in spite of his

awareness, though rather uncertain, that the spirit of the

upasana of the Upanishads was akin to that of bhakti.

However,* because of its initial identification with Krishna

. *
worship, bhakti, soon became in the academic circles an

equivalent for Vaishnavism. It was later discussed by

western scholars not in terms of Christian influence, but as

an expression of Hindu theism. They now saw in the worship

of Vishnu and of his avataras Rama and Krishna, the signs of

a "monotheistic religion’^ distinct and separate from the

religion of the Upanishads. They also suggested that the

theistic religion of bhakti was opposed to the ideology of

the classical Vedanta and the path of Jhana.

But most of these ideas propounded by the western

scholars in connection with bhakti seem to be the result of

their search for a Hindu parallel which could fit the

definition of a theistic religion according to their own

standards of Judgement. Their theories on bhakti rest on

two fundamental principles, the principle of a clear division

between religion and philosophy^ and the principle that theism

is possible only in the context of a belief in a personal

God. These principles however are easily understandable

against the western background. But they are not applicable

to Hinduism.

The principle of division between religion and

philosophy is clearly the result of the long period of

conflict between the two in Europe and their final separation.

Similarly^the ultimacy of a personal God in the academic

 27 3

definition of theism is determined hy the nature of a

Christian concept of God. Because of the incompatihility of

the Christian faith in the Biblical God and the impersonal

explanations of God offered hy modern philosophy, the personal

nature of God was hound to receive great emphasis in the

explanations ahout theism. But in the Hindu traditions,

religion and philosophy have always remained interconnected

and an impersonal view of God has never heen regarded as a

negation of theism.

The application of the ahove principles in the study

of Hinduism has resulted in many misconceptions. Not only

has it led to the formulation of certain fallacious theories

ahout hhakti, hut has also heen the cause of some wrong

postulations ahout the nature of Hindu theism and monotheism.

However, the recognition of the presence of religious

devotion and theism only in the worship of a personal deity,

and the rejection of all philosophical influences as non-

theistic and non-devotional^/ hastocaused serious misjudgements

ahout the Bhakti Movement and the nirguna hhaktas like Kah'ir.

The artificial definition of hhakti hased on these principles

makes it more difficult to evaluate them correctly.

The current view that the Bhakti Movement was a

reaction against the intellectual ism,,f of Sankara and that

its doctrinal hase was provided hy the Vaishnava acharyas,

 274

needs correction. It has led to a misrepresentation of

certain vital religious movements of the medieval period.

Some of them were obviously inspired hy the same values which

had inspired Sankara^and do not share the Vaishnava bias

which was the most predominant characteristic of the theology

expounded by the Vaishnava acharyas. Moreover, Sankara

himself lays great emphasis on bhakti. In fact there is no

disagreement between Sankara and the Vaishnava acharyas on

the question of the nature and importance of bhakti. Their

more serious disagreements arise from the inherent challenge

of Sankara’s nirguna ideology to the Vaishnava traditions of

worship which rest mainly on trie~ faith in the personal deity

Vishnu and his personal incarnations. Whereas the Vaishnava

acharyas can be rightly regarded as the fountainhead of the

neo-Vaishnava movement of the medieval period, there are no

valid grounds for connecting the whole of the Bhakti Movement

with their religious and doctrinal position.

When the total medieval religious upsurge is

described as the Bhakti Movement, certain common beliefs are

attributed to all the medieval bhaktas, irrespective of

their ideological differences. Their bhakti is commonly

understood as a simple faith in a personal God, different

from the beliefs upheld by the Vedantins, and as a path

opposed to that of jfiana. But an unbiased approach shows

clearly that some of the medieval bhaktas were staunch

supporters of the idea of an impersonal G-od and of the

essential teachings of the Vedanta, A monolithic view of

the Bhakti Movement, therefore, can he taken only if bhakti

is understood in its intrinsic and wider meaning. If however

bhakti is viewed in terms of specific doctrinal beliefs,

then the division between the nirguna and the saguna bhaktas
and their ideological differences must be recognized more

definitely, and they must be treated as entirely separate

groups. No efforts should then remain necessary to establish

the compatibility of the two, A correct understanding of the

nirguna bhaktas like Kabir is not possible without such an

approach,

K a b l r ’s position strikes us as the antithesis of the

current academic definition of bhakti. He rejects the idea

of a personal G-od and takes a completely monistic view of

Reality. He emphasises the importance of jfrana and advocates

that religious faith must always be accompanied by individual

reasoning. Furthermore, his ideology bears no particular

resemblance with that of the Vaishnava acharyas, and his

open attacks on the beliefs in the divinity of the avatar as

strikes at the very roots of the Vaishnava beliefs.

c
But

these aspects of his thought are not seen clearly because of

the preconceived notions about bhakti. Freedom from this

 2 7 6

fixed position is therefore necessary for a better under­

standing of his teachings and of the impact of his personality

on the medieval religion and thought„ Perhaps the more

fundamental aspects of the religious and philosophical

position of Kabir can be explained only after that* His

belief in the equality of man, his faith in the oneness of

all religions, his emphasis on reason, and his complete

disregard for ritual and tradition deserve a more serious

examination.
 27 ?

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Atm anand a , Swam i , Sri Sankarafs Teachings In his own

words, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan,„ 1960.

Baillie, J.B. "Hegel"//W e . Vol.VI, 1913.

Barth, Auguste, The Religions of India, Kegan Paul,

London 1906.

Barth, Auguste, Bulletin on the Religions of India,

Reprint, Indian Studies past and
present, Calcutta I 960 .

Berkeley, George, Essays, Principles, Dialogues with

selections from other writings,
ed. by Mary Whiton Calkins, Charles
Scribners & Sons, London 1929*

Berkeley, George, Principles of Human Knowledge in

Essays, Principles., Dialogues with
selections from other writings,
Charles Scribners & Son, London 1929 *

Bhandarkar, R.G ”The R&manujlya and the Bhagavata

or Panchratra Systems”, Berichte
des VII Internationaler Qrientalisten
Congresses Gehalten in Wien im Jahre
1886,1Wien 1889,

Bhandarkar, R.G Vaisnavism, Saivism and Minor

Religious Systems, Jo Truhner & Go.,
Strassburg 1913•
Bharadwaj, K.D The Philosophy of Ramanuja, Sir
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