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Eric Cade Jury Demand
Eric Cade Jury Demand
1. This is a Title Dispute for Possession of Land, and the Maryland Constitution
requires Trial by Jury on written demand by any party. See MD Real Prop Code §
8-602 (2017) Demand for jury trial:
(a) Separate written pleading required; time of filing. -- A jury demand must be
made by a separate written pleading. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this
section, a jury demand under this subsection shall be filed with the court as
provided in item (1) or (2) of this subsection or the right to trial by jury is waived:
(from another section) (g) Subject to § 8-118.1 of this article, a party to a wrongful
detainer action brought in the District Court under this section may demand a
trial by jury in accordance with Title 8, Subtitle 6 of this article.
2. All Material Facts are Denied, and after a diligent investigation, it is impossible
to form a more responsive answer. The complaint fails to set forth a cause of
action or state a claim for which relief could be granted.
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3. The action for Unlawful Detainer or Wrongful Detainer may not be used as a
means to raise a claim for Title or to obtain possession of land for the first time.
Empire v. Hardy, 386 Md. 628, 873 A.2nd 1187 (2005)
4. The undersigned denies and rebuts the instant “Landlord”claim by stating that
immediate possession of this Property was obtained by adverse entry under their
own title over 30 years ago. There is a longstanding 3 year bar to bring the
action for Unlawful Detainer, “Forcible Detainer”, etc..
5. This form of action has been illegally and systematically converted into a “title
eviction claim” state-wide, and contrary to the longstanding precedent at Empire
v. Hardy, 386 Md. 628, 873 A.2nd 1187 (2005). The statutory restriction on the
powers of the District Courts in Maryland absolutely prohibits the use of “FED”
action to obtain possession for the first time, or to dispute or raise Title claims.
6. See MD Cts. & Jud. Pro. Code § 4-402 (2013): “(a) Except as provided in §§ 4-401 and
4-404 of this subtitle, the District Court does not have equity jurisdiction. (b)
Except as provided in § 4-401 of this subtitle, the District Court does not have
jurisdiction to decide the ownership of real property or of an interest in real
property.” The question of ‘paramount title’ and ‘state of the title’, requires an
abstract of title claims and complex adjudication in the Circuit Courts.
7. “After the foreclosure sale [purchaser] had an equitable interest in the land
commensurate with that conveyed by the mortgage deed, and he was entitled to the
legal title upon the final ratification of the sale by the court and the payment of the
purchase money…” Union Trust v. Briggs, 153 Md. [50] 55-56, 137 A. [509] 512
(1927). It would require examination of the underlying mortgage deed to even
begin making those determinations, all of which are barred in the “general”
District Courts and cannot be alleged or verified with the “forcible detainer”
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action, especially under the minimal boilerplate form provided, and in the
limited resource and capacity of a “no record” small claims court. The plaintiff
does not claim “forcible detainer”, it claims Title and this is disputed.
MEMORANDUM
Every case in Forcible Entry or Detainer is that of a Landlord seeking to evict his
Tenant, whether it was tenant by permission or not, or by unlawful holding over. The
moment there is a complete lack of connection or privity amongst the parties, the action
must fail as a matter of law. The plaintiff “N.T. HOLDINGS LLC” did not once “lose”
possession, nor does it stand in privity to that possession, which could not have been
therefore “lost” by any means. Viz- Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws:
“There are several stages or degrees requisite to prove a complete title to lands
and tenements: 1st. The lowest and most imperfect degree of title consists in the mere
naked possession or actual occupation of the estate, without any apparent right or any
shadow or pretence of right to hold or continue such possession. And at all events
without such actual possession no title can be completely good. 2d. The next step to a
good and perfect title is the right of possession, which may reside in one man while the
actual possession is not in himself, but in another. 3d. The mere right of property, the
proprietatis, without either the possession, or the right of possession, the mere right is in
him, the jus merum, and the estate of the owner is in such cases said to be totally
divested, and put to a right.”
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then only is the title completely legal.” Pannill v. Coles, 81 Va. (6 Hans.) 380, 383-84
(1886) (emphasis added) (quoting 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries 195); see also 2
Henry St. George Tucker, Commentaries on the Laws of Virginia 178-80 (3d ed. 1846); 2
John B. Minor, Institutes of Common and Statute Law 511-15 (3d ed. 1882).”
See also Seitz v. Federal National Mortgage Ass’n, 909 F. Supp. 2d 490, 499 (E.D. Va.
2012) (“Thus, generally speaking, in an unlawful detainer action, the court is largely
confined to a determination within Blackstone’s first and second ‘degrees’ of title.”) See
In re Cherokee Corp., 222 B.R. 281, 286 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998) (“The issue of proper title is
separate and independent of a determination of lawful possession” and is “irrelevant to
a claim of unlawful detainer.”) The State of Virginia Supreme Court now agrees with
the principles of this petition, and it is time for other States to reach the same
conclusion. See BRIAN D. PARRISH, ET AL. v. FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE
ASSOCIATION Record No. 150454 Opinion by VIRGINIA COURT OF APPEALS
JUSTICE WILLIAM C. MIMS June 16, 2016.
http://www.courts.state.va.us/opinions/opnscvwp/1150454.pdf
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the ‘Federal Protecting Tenants in Foreclosure’ act. "N.T. Holdings LLC" does not plead
or even disclose “landlord” (ex rel "tenant in possession") and may not impose the
landlord relationship without first granting possession, even if it was involuntary. As
an example, many States require that the standard ”FED” complaint will clearly bear
this essential statement in the caption part: YOU ARE BEING SUED BY YOUR
LANDLORD, PAY CLOSE ATTENTION. The respondents entered under their own
title 27 years ago, holding continuously since, and cannot be trespassing in their own
possession. “Forcible Detainer” is barred as a matter of law ‘3 years’ after entry under
any circumstance without raising a possessory covenant or the attournment of defendant
to plaintiff in the action. Take some wisdom from an old case when people understood
what words meant:
“A party who is in possession of lands under claim of title, makes it his as
against the world except as to the true owner, and it remains his as against all persons
entering without his consent, unless he abandons the land; and he may recover the
possession of the land by a writ of unlawful entry and detainer, even of the true owner,
who has entered upon the same without the occupant's consent and without his
abandonment of such land.” Mitchell v. Carder, 21 W. Va. 277. Take more recent wisdom
from the State of Georgia, at Johnson v. Freedman, 197 S.E. 2d 400, 128 Ga. App. 480
(1993):
"The major issue is tenancy v el non ["or not"]. Jordan v. Jordan, 103 Ga. 482 (30 S.E.
265). However, t enancy is not established by the mere showing of ownership in one
person and possession in another."..."The classical test was whether the alleged tenant
had ever a ttourned to a person, i.e., by some act had recognized that person's status as
his landlord. B
ullard v. Hudson, 125 Ga. 393 (54 S.E. 132). In this case, there is undisputed
evidence that the defendants did not attorn to plaintiff, just the opposite, in fact." [as
here] … "However, they are foreclosed from this defense b
y a statement in the deed to
secure debt which provides that upon a default and a sale under power, the
grantor (and, of course, his heirs, successors, assigns, etc.) s hall become a tenant
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holding over who may be summarily dispossessed." Jo hnson v. Freedman, 197 S.E. 2d
400, 128 Ga. App. 480 (1993)
The “FED” court in Maryland (whether in “District” or even in “Circuit”) cannot
hear about title jus merum, limited by statutory law to Blackstone’s 1st and 2nd orders of
property adjudication (Seitz, supra). This is the fundamental definition of Forcible
Detainer: "property title shall not be questioned nor raised" among landlord-tenant
complaints, or actions to evict squatters, unwanted guests and other holdovers. S
tellar
Investment Trust cannot suddenly find themselves deprived of possession by purchasing
a “title”, while the petitioners have lived in this house for 15 years and they hold a deed
in fee simple from the last grantor, noting the exhibit.
What has happened here as in everywhere is the “glass half empty/half full”
syndrome: because half a glass of water was purchased in a “trustee sale deed”, it is
suddenly expected that someone else will magically “deliver” the other half; but all they
bought was a bargain for half a glass of water to begin with. A bad bargain unless they
mean to establish a new “securitization trust”, and collateralize the value of the real
estate as it was under “U.S. Bank N.A.” In the common law action to “try title” the
matter will be settled by judicially determining the equity of petitioners redemption or
“right of first refusal” to their own home, while Plaintiff is still only an intermediate
“nonpossessory” financial interest represented jus merum in the 3rd order of
Blackstones’ hierarchy of property relations, a question barred entirely to the powers of
“eviction” jurisdiction without a written possessory covenant or the attournment to a
landlord. It is barred in any case under strict application of the right form, which
specifically requires a plain statement of “landlord” and “why possession is demanded”
at RP 8, a cause of action which is specifically denied at para. 4 & 5, standard preprinted
RP 14-132 form. Trial by Jury for the Possession of Land is hereby demanded.
date: