RISOS-VIDAL v COMELEC

G.R. No. 206666|January 21, 2015

Leonardo-De Castro, J.
FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
 Sept. 12, 2007: Sandiganbayan convicted Estrada for the crime of plunder, and he was sentenced to
suffer:
 The penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
 The accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual
absolute disqualification
 Oct. 25, 2007: Pres. Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former Pres. Estrada
 A day later, Estrada received and accepted the pardon
 Oct. 2, 2012: Estrada filed a COC for the position of Mayor of the City of Manila
 Jan. 24, 2013: Risos-Vidal filed a petition for disqualification against Estrada before the COMELEC,
arguing that he is disqualified because of his conviction for plunder by the Sandiganbayan pursuant
to Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC) in relation to Sec. 12 of the Omnibus Election Code
 Sec. 40 Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective
local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for
an offense punishable by one year or more of imprisonment, within two years after
serving sentence
 Sec. 12 Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane
or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection,
rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a
candidate and to hold any public office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted
amnesty
 April 1, 2013: COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition for disqualification
 In 2010, COMELEC already ruled that Estrada’s right to seek public office was effectively
restored by the pardon
 Risos-Vidal failed to present sufficient proof to reverse COMELEC’s earlier ruling
 Since this Commission has already spoken on the issue, it will no longer engage in
disquisitions of a settled matter lest indulged in wastage of government resources
 April 30, 2013: After COMELEC denied her subsequent motion for reconsideration, Risos-Vidal filed a
petition for certiorari
 Prayed that the Court annul and set aside the Resolutions of the COMELEC, which dismissed
her petition for disqualification
 Alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC
 May 13, 2013: While the case was pending, the local board of canvassers proclaimed Estrada as the
duly-elected Mayor of the City of Manila
 June 7, 2013: Alfredo Lim, one of the other candidates for Mayor, moved for leave to intervene in
this case  SC granted his motion
 Averred that Estrada is disqualified to run and hold public office as the pardon granted to him
failed to EXPRESSLY remit his perpetual disqualification
 In light of his supposed disqualification:
 Votes for Estrada in the May 2013 elections should be declared stray
 Lim should be declared the rightful winning candidate for the position

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ISSUES/HELD/RATIO:
1. W/N COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that Estrada is qualified to vote and
be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by Arroyo
HELD: NO.
 Estrada was granted an ABSOLUTE pardon that fully-restored all his civil and political rights,
which includes the right to seek public elective office
 Wording of the pardon extended to Estrada is COMPLETE, UNAMBIGUOUS, and
UNQUALIFIED
 Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the third preambular clause of the pardon DOES NOT
operate to make the pardon conditional
 3rd whereas clause in preamble: “whereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly
committed to no longer seek any elective position or office"
 From a detailed review pardon itself, nothing therein gives an iota of intimation
that the third Whereas Clause is actually a limitation, proviso, stipulation or
condition on the grant of the pardon
 Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they
are not part of the operative language of the statute
 Therefore, the third preambular clause does not have any legal or binding effect
on the absolute nature of the pardon extended by Arroyo to Estrada
 Art. 36 and Art. 41 of the RPC DOES NOT abridge or diminish the exclusive power and
prerogative of the President to pardon persons convicted of violating penal statutes
 Instead, the provisions must be construed to HARMONIZE the power of Congress to
define crimes and prescribe penalties, and the power of the President to grant
executive clemency
 Provisions merely provide that the pardon of the principal penalty does not carry with it
the remission of the accessory penalties, unless the President expressly includes said
accessory penalties in the pardon
 ART. 36. Pardon; its effects.– A pardon shall not work the restoration of the
right to hold publicoffice, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be
expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.
 ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory
penalties.– The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall
carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the period of the
sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification
which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal
penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon
 In the presidential pardon that Arroyo issued, BOTH the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua
and the accessory penalties are included
 Included in the text of the pardon is the phrase “is hereby restored to his civil and
political rights”  complies with the requirement of EXPRESS restoration
 Exceptions to the grant of pardon CANNOT be presumed from the omission of
the word “full” to qualify political rights
 The President’s pardoning power CANNOT be limited by legislative action
 President’s power to grant pardons is provided by Art. VII Sec. 19, and Sec. 5 Article IX-C.
According to these articles, president may NOT extend pardon in:
 Impeachment cases, cases that have not yet resulted in final conviction, cases
involving election laws, rules, and regulations

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  Framers of the Constitution strongly rejected a proposal to carve out an exemption
from the pardoning power
 Congress CANNOT dictate as to how the President may exercise her power of executive
clemency according to the principle of separation of powers

RULING OF THE COURT:

Petition and petition-intervention are DISMISSED.
Court found it unnecessary to separately discuss Lim's petition-in- intervention, which substantially
presented the same arguments as Risos-Vidal's petition.

DISSENTING OPINION (LEONEN, J.)

 The 2010 disqualification cases filed against Estrada in connection with his 2010 bid for the
presidency do not bar the present case on account of res judicata
 The 2010 cases were anchored on the constitutional prohibition against a President’s
reelection, as provided by Article VII, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution
 The present case is anchored on Estrada’s conviction for plunder which carried with it
the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification
 Articles 40 to 43 of the Revised Penal Code provide that even though pardoned as to the
principal penalty, the accessory penalties attached to it shall still be suffered by the offender
“unless expressly remitted in the pardon”
 From the plain text of the dispositive portion of the pardon extended by former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (PGMA) to Estrada, it can be readily seen that there is NO categorical
statement actually saying that Estrada’s rights to vote and be voted for elective public office are
restored, or that the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification is remitted:
 “IN VIEW HEREOF and pursuant to the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution, I hereby
grant executive clemency to JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, convicted by the Sandiganbayan of
Plunder and imposed a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is hereby restored to his civil and political
rights. The forfeitures imposed by the Sandiganbayan remain in force and in full, including all writs
and processes issued by the Sandiganbayan in pursuance hereof, except for the bank accounts he
owned before his tenure as President. Upon acceptance of this pardon by JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA, this pardon shall take effect.”
 Estrada capitalizes on the broad conception of civil and political rights as including in its scope
the rights of suffrage and the right to hold public office
 That is precisely the handicap in his theory: It is broad; it fails to account for
requirements relating to specific rights
 It is revealing that former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo chose to deviate from
many historical examples, aware of the significance of excluding the qualifier “FULL,”
she chose to grant pardon to Estrada under entirely generic and indistinct terms.
 Jurisprudence and other official acts of this court are replete with instances in which reference
to preambular clauses was resorted to in interpreting instruments other than statutes and
official acts of the President
 The third preambular clause of the pardon operates to make the pardon conditional
 Estrada was and remains to be disqualified
 Reading the pardon as a whole, and an illumination through the preambular clauses will
lead to this conclusion
 There is neither an express restoration of Estrada’s rights to vote and be voted for
elective public office nor a remission of his perpetual absolute disqualification