CASE DIGEST 1-4

1. BLANDINA GAMBOA HILADO, petitioner, vs. JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID, VICENTE J. FRANCISCO,
JACOB ASSAD and SELIM JACOB ASSAD, respondents.

FACTS:

*Blandina Gamboa Hilado brought an action against Selim Jacob Assad to annul the sale of several houses and
lot executed during the Japanese occupation by Mrs. Hilado's now deceased husband.

* Attorneys Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita filed an answer on behalf of the defendant; and on June 15,
Attorneys Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo registered their appearance as counsel for the plaintiff, they filed
an amended complaint by including Jacob Assad as party defendant.

*Attorney Francisco entered his appearance as attorney of record for the defendant in substitution for Attorney
Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita who had withdrawn from the case.

*Attorney Dizon, in the name of his firm, wrote Attorney Francisco urging him to discontinue representing the
defendants on the ground that their client had consulted with him about her case, on which occasion, it was
alleged, "she turned over the papers" to Attorney Francisco, and the latter sent her a written opinion. Not
receiving any answer to this suggestion, Attorney Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo on June 3, 1946, filed a
formal motion with the court, wherein the case was and is pending, to disqualify Attorney Francisco.

In his answer to plaintiff's attorneys' complaint, Attorney Francisco alleged that about May, 1945, a real
estate broker came to his office in connection with the legal separation of a woman who had been
deserted by her husband, and also told him (Francisco) that there was a pending suit brought by Mrs.
Hilado against a certain Syrian to annul the sale of a real estate which the deceased Serafin Hilado had
made to the Syrian during the Japanese occupation; that this woman asked him if he was willing to
accept the case if the Syrian should give it to him; that he told the woman that the sales of real
property during the Japanese regime were valid even though it was paid for in Japanese military notes;
that this being his opinion, he told his visitor he would have no objection to defending the Syrian;

That one month afterwards, Mrs. Hilado came to see him about a suit she had instituted against a
certain Syrian to annul the conveyance of a real estate which her husband had made; that according to
her the case was in the hands of Attorneys Delgado and Dizon, but she wanted to take it away from
them; that as he had known the plaintiff's deceased husband he did not hesitate to tell her frankly that
hers was a lost case for the same reason he had told the broker; that Mrs. Hilado retorted that the
basis of her action was not that the money paid her husband was Japanese military notes, but that the
premises were her private and exclusive property; that she requested him to read the complaint to be
convinced that this was the theory of her suit; that he then asked Mrs. Hilado if there was a Torrens
title to the property and she answered yes, in the name of her husband; that he told Mrs. Hilado that if
the property was registered in her husband's favor, her case would not prosper either;

That some days afterward, upon arrival at his law office on Estrada street, he was informed by Attorney
Federico Agrava, his assistant, that Mrs. Hilado had dropped in looking for him and that when he,
Agrava, learned that Mrs. Hilado's visit concerned legal matters he attended to her and requested her
to leave the "expediente" which she was carrying, and she did; that he told Attorney Agrava that the
firm should not handle Mrs. Hilado's case and he should return the papers, calling Agrava's attention to
what he (Francisco) already had said to Mrs. Hilado;
 That several days later, the stenographer in his law office, Teofilo Ragodon, showed him a letter which
had been dictated in English by Mr. Agrava, returning the "expedients" to Mrs. Hilado; that Ragodon
told him (Attorney Francisco) upon Attorney Agrava's request that Agrava thought it more proper to
explain to Mrs. Hilado the reasons why her case was rejected; that he forthwith signed the letter
without reading it and without keeping it for a minute in his possession; that he never saw Mrs. Hilado
since their last meeting until she talked to him at the Manila Hotel about a proposed extrajudicial
settlement of the case;

That in January, 1946, Assad was in his office to request him to handle his case stating that his
American lawyer had gone to the States and left the case in the hands of other attorneys; that he
accepted the retainer and on January 28, 1946, entered his appearance.

Attorney Francisco filed an affidavit of stenographer Ragodon in corroboration of his answer.

*The judge trying the case, Honorable Jose Gutierrez David, later promoted to the Court of Appeals, dismissed
the complaint. His Honor believed that no information other than that already alleged in plaintiff's complaint in
the main cause was conveyed to Attorney Francisco, and concluded that the intercourse between the plaintiff
and the respondent did not attain the point of creating the relation of attorney and client.

ISSUE:

WON attorney and client relationship relation was established.

HELD:

*Relation of attorney and client between Attorney Francisco and Mrs. Hilado ensued.

*To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney
professionally on any previous occasion. . . . It is not necessary that any retainer should have been paid,
promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the
case about which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any
kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or
assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional
employment must be regarded as established. .

*An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or counselor-when he
is listening to his client's preliminary statement of his case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as
when he is drawing his client's pleadings, or advocating his client's cause in open court

*Formality is not an essential element of the employment of an attorney. The contract may be express or
implied and it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of the attorney is sought and received, in matters
pertinent to his profession. An acceptance of the relation is implied on the part of the attorney from his acting
in behalf of his client in pursuance of a request by the latter.

Section 26 (e), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court provides that "an attorney cannot, without the consent
of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given
thereon in the course of professional employment;" and section 19 (e) of Rule 127 imposes upon an
attorney the duty "to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the
secrets of his client." There is no law or provision in the Rules of Court prohibiting attorneys in express
terms from acting on behalf of both parties to a controversy whose interests are opposed to each other,
but such prohibition is necessarily implied in the injunctions above quoted.
*Where it appeared that an attorney, representing one party in litigation, had formerly represented the
adverse party with respect to the same matter involved in the litigation, the court need not inquire as to how
much knowledge the attorney acquired from his former during that relationship, before refusing to permit the
attorney to represent the adverse party.

*There is in legal practice what called "retaining fee," the purpose of which stems from the realization that the
attorney is disabled from acting as counsel for the other side after he has given professional advice to the
opposite party, even if he should decline to perform the contemplated services on behalf of the latter. It is to
prevent undue hardship on the attorney resulting from the rigid observance of the rule that a separate and
independent fee for consultation and advice was conceived and authorized.

*The defense that Attorney Agrava wrote the letter Exhibit A and that Attorney Francisco did not take the
trouble of reading it, would not take the case out of the interdiction. If this letter was written under the
circumstances explained by Attorney Francisco and he was unaware of its contents, the fact remains that his
firm did give Mrs. Hilado a formal professional advice from which, as heretofore demonstrated, emerged the
relation of attorney and client. This letter binds and estop him in the same manner and to the same degree as
if he personally had written it. An information obtained from a client by a member or assistant of a law firm is
information imparted to the firm.

*The fact that petitioner did not object until after four months had passed from the date Attorney Francisco
first appeared for the defendants does not operate as a waiver of her right to ask for his disqualification.

We conclude therefore that the motion for disqualification should be allowed.

2. ROSA F. MERCADO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, respondent.

FACTS:

*Rosa F. Mercado filed the instant administrative complaint against Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, seeking his
disbarment from the practice of law. The complainant alleged that respondent maliciously instituted a criminal
case for falsification of public document against her, a former client, based on confidential information gained
from their attorney-client relationship.

*Complainant is a Senior Education Program Specialist of the Standards Development Division, Office of
Programs and Standards while respondent is a Deputy Executive Director IV of the Commission on Higher
Education (CHED).

*Complainant's husband filed Civil Case for annulment of their marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City. This annulment case had been dismissed by the trial court, and the dismissal became final and
executory on July 15, 1992.

*In August 1992, Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, counsel of complainant, died. On February 7, 1994, respondent
entered his appearance before the trial court as collaborating counsel for complainant.

*On March 16, 1994, respondent filed his Notice of Substitution of Counsel, informing the RTC of Pasig City
that he has been appointed as counsel for the complainant, in substitution of Atty. de Leon.

*Respondent filed a criminal action against complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City, for
violation of Articles 171 and 172 (falsification of public document) of the Revised Penal Code.

*Respondent alleged that complainant made false entries in the Certificates of Live Birth of her children,
Angelica and Katelyn Anne. Complainant allegedly indicated in said Certificates of Live Birth that she is married
to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez, and that their marriage was solemnized on April 11, 1979, when in truth,
she is legally married to Ruben G. Mercado and their marriage took place on April 11, 1978.

*Complainant denied the accusations of respondent against her. Complainant Mercado alleged that said
criminal complaint for falsification of public document disclosed confidential facts and information relating to
the civil case for annulment, then handled by respondent Vitriolo as her counsel. This prompted complainant
Mercado to bring this action against respondent. She claims that, in filing the criminal case for falsification,
respondent is guilty of breaching their privileged and confidential lawyer-client relationship, and should be
disbarred.

*Respondent maintains that his filing of the criminal complaint for falsification of public documents against
complainant does not violate the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client because the
bases of the falsification case are two certificates of live birth which are public documents and in no way
connected with the confidence taken during the engagement of respondent as counsel. According to
respondent, the complainant confided to him as then counsel only matters of facts relating to the annulment
case. Nothing was said about the alleged falsification of the entries in the birth certificates of her two
daughters. The birth certificates are filed in the Records Division of CHED and are accessible to anyone.

*The Court referred the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.

*The IBP found the respondent guilty of violating the rule on privileged communication between attorney and
client, and recommending his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.

ISSUE:

WON respondent violated the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client when he filed a
criminal case for falsification of public document against his former client.

HELD:

*In engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes on him special powers of trust and confidence.
Their relationship is strictly personal and highly confidential and fiduciary. The relation is of such delicate,
exacting and confidential nature that is required by necessity and public interest. Only by such confidentiality
and protection will a person be encouraged to repose his confidence in an attorney. The hypothesis is that
abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice.
Thus, the preservation and protection of that relation will encourage a client to entrust his legal problems to
an attorney, which is of paramount importance to the administration of justice. One rule adopted to serve this
purpose is the attorney-client privilege: an attorney is to keep inviolate his client's secrets or confidence and
not to abuse them. Thus, the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's secrets and confidence outlasts the
termination of the attorney-client relationship, and continues even after the client's death. It is the glory of the
legal profession that its fidelity to its client can be depended on, and that a man may safely go to a lawyer and
converse with him upon his rights or supposed rights in any litigation with absolute assurance that the lawyer's
tongue is tied from ever disclosing it. With full disclosure of the facts of the case by the client to his attorney,
adequate legal representation will result in the ascertainment and enforcement of rights or the prosecution or
defense of the client's cause.
 The factors are as follows:

(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by

reason of this relationship that the client made the communication.

-Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on privileged
communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter declines
the employment. The reason for this is to make the prospective client free to discuss whatever he
wishes with the lawyer without fear that what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or used against him,
and for the lawyer to be equally free to obtain information from the prospective client.

On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective) client to a lawyer for some purpose other
than on account of the (prospective) attorney-client relation is not privileged.

(2) The client made the communication in confidence.

The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The client must
intend the communication to be confidential.

A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between

attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the
information to no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of the
information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given.

(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.

The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere information, but for
the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations. The communication
must have been transmitted by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice.

If the client seeks an accounting service, or business or personal assistance, and not legal advice, the
privilege does not attach to a communication disclosed for such purpose.

*The evidence on record fails to substantiate complainant's allegations. Complainant did not even specify the
alleged communication in confidence disclosed by respondent. All her claims were couched in general terms
and lacked specificity. She contends that respondent violated the rule on privileged communication when he
instituted a criminal action against her for falsification of public documents because the criminal complaint
disclosed facts relating to the civil case for annulment then handled by respondent. She did not, however, spell
out these facts which will determine the merit of her complaint.

*Such confidential information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged communication
between attorney and client. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege.
3. MA. LUISA HADJULA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROCELES F. MADIANDA, respondent.

FACTS:

*AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT was filed with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant charged Atty.
Roceles F. Madianda with violation of Article 2092 of the Revised Penal Code and Canon Nos. 15.02 and 21.02
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

*Complainant alleged that she and respondent used to be friends as they both worked at the Bureau of Fire
Protection (BFP) whereat respondent was the Chief Legal Officer while she was the Chief Nurse of the Medical,
Dental and Nursing Services. Complainant claimed that, sometime in 1998, she approached respondent for
some legal advice. Complainant further alleged that, in the course of their conversation which was supposed to
be kept confidential, she disclosed personal secrets and produced copies of a marriage contract, a birth
certificate and a baptismal certificate, only to be informed later by the respondent that she (respondent) would
refer the matter to a lawyer friend. It was malicious, so complainant states, of respondent to have refused
handling her case only after she had already heard her secrets.

*Complainant averred that her friendship with respondent soured after her filing, of criminal and disciplinary
actions against the latter. What precipitated the filing was when respondent, then a member of the BFP
promotion board, demanded a cellular phone in exchange for the complainant's promotion.

*According to complainant, respondent, in retaliation to the filing of the aforesaid actions, filed a COUNTER
COMPLAINT with the Ombudsman charging her (complainant) with violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act
No. 3019,4 falsification of public documents and immorality, the last two charges being based on the
disclosures complainant earlier made to respondent. And also on the basis of the same disclosures,
complainant further stated, a disciplinary case was also instituted against her before the Professional
Regulation Commission.

*Complainant seeks the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent for the latter's act of disclosing personal
secrets and confidential information she revealed in the course of seeking respondent's legal advice.

*Respondent denied giving legal advice to the complainant and dismissed any suggestion about the existence
of a lawyer-client relationship between them. Respondent also stated the observation that the supposed
confidential data and sensitive documents adverted to are in fact matters of common knowledge in the BFP.

*IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution which ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner stating that the information related by complainant to the respondent is
"protected under the attorney-client privilege communication." Prescinding from this postulate, the
Investigating Commissioner found the respondent to have violated legal ethics when she "[revealed]
information given to her during a legal consultation," thus respondent Atty. Roceles Madianda be reprimanded
for revealing the secrets of the complainant.

ISSUE:

WON lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two.

HELD:

Yes. As it were, complainant went to respondent, a lawyer who incidentally was also then a friend, to bare
what she considered personal secrets and sensitive documents for the purpose of obtaining legal advice and
assistance. The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a
veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Such relationship imposes upon the lawyer
certain restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the profession. Among the burdens of the relationship is that
which enjoins the lawyer, respondent in this instance, to keep inviolate confidential information acquired or
revealed during legal consultations. The fact that one is, at the end of the day, not inclined to handle the
client's case is hardly of consequence. Of little moment, too, is the fact that no formal professional
engagement follows the consultation. Nor will it make any difference that no contract whatsoever was
executed by the parties to memorialize the relationship.

In Burbe v. Magulta;

-A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked respondent
for legal advise regarding the former's business. To constitute professional employment, it is not
essential that the client employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion.

It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that the
attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought.

It a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to
obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the
consultation, then the professional employments is established.

*Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship between the
lawyer and the complainant or the non-payment of the former's fees.

*The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is actually to protect the client from possible breach of confidence
as a result of a consultation with a lawyer.

*The seriousness of the respondent's offense notwithstanding, the Court feels that there is room for
compassion, absent compelling evidence that the respondent acted with ill-will. Without meaning to condone
the error of respondent's ways, what at bottom is before the Court is two former friends becoming bitter
enemies and filing charges and counter-charges against each other using whatever convenient tools and data
were readily available. Unfortunately, the personal information respondent gathered from her conversation
with complainant became handy in her quest to even the score. At the end of the day, it appears clear to us
that respondent was actuated by the urge to retaliate without perhaps realizing that, in the process of giving
vent to a negative sentiment, she was violating the rule on confidentiality.

4. SHIRLEY LORIA TOLEDO and ROSIE LORIA DAJAC, complainants, vs. JUDGE ALFREDO E.
KALLOS, respondent.

FACTS:

*A verified complaint, written in the vernacular of siblings Shirley Loria Toledo and Rosie Loria Dajac was filed
against respondent Judge Alfredo E. Kallos, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City,
Branch 10, for violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Article
1491 (5) of the Civil Code.

*Prior to his appointment as a judge in March 1995,1 Judge Kallos was complainants’ counsel of record in Civil
Case No. 4879 filed with the RTC of Legazpi City involving the recovery of hereditary shares with damages. On
25 March 1979, a judgment was rendered ordering the defendants to, among other things, turn over to herein
complainants, the plaintiffs therein, the possession and ownership of the 4,514 square lot in Albay Cadastre."
On appeal, the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and became final and executory,
*Several years thereafter, the respondent filed in the same action, Civil Case No. 4879, before the RTC of
Legazpi, Branch 4, an Omnibus Motion praying, inter alia, for the issuance an order constituting in his favor an
attorney’s lien to the extent of one-third over the lot awarded in favor of the complainants representing his
attorney’s fee. He based his motion on a written contingency agreement on attorney’s fees for professional
services rendered whereby he is entitled to one-third share of what would be awarded to the complainants. He
claimed that this agreement had already been implemented when "one of the three (3) lots levied upon by the
sheriff to answer for the award of damages was given to (him) as his one-third share while the other two lots
went to the plaintiffs as their two-third. However, he misplaced a copy of said written agreement.

*The complainants filed the subject verified complaint. Complainants pray for three things. First, they pray for
an order directing the respondent to stop demanding his "1/3 share attorney’s fees." They assert that the
respondent has no basis for his claim because he failed to show in court proof of the alleged written
contingency fee agreement. They also belie respondent’s insistence in his Omnibus Motion that the said
agreement had already been implemented when, on execution, one of three lots levied upon by the sheriff
was given to him as his 1/3 share. They emphasize that all the lots levied by the sheriff were given to them.
However, the respondent "forced" them to sign a Deed of Absolute Sale on 16 January 1990 involving a parcel
of land valued in the document at ₱10,000, but actually worth more than ₱500,000, in payment of his
attorney’s fees. While they did not want to sign the document because respondent appeared in their case only
during execution, they were constrained to do so for fear that something adverse might happen to their case,
as the respondent so warned them. The latter told them that they would not have won the case were it not for
his services.

*The complainants thus seek, as their second prayer, the recovery of the property involved in said Deed of
Absolute Sale. They argue that pursuant to Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited from
buying their client’s properties when the same are still the object of litigation. To prove that the respondent
was still their counsel when the sale took place, the complainants attached to their complaint the Motion to
Terminate Services dated 23 June 1994, which was based on respondent’s being remiss in his duties and
responsibilities as their lawyer, and the Order of the court dated 29 June 1994, approving the termination.

*Third, the complainants pray for the removal of the respondent from his position as RTC judge for his alleged
abusive conduct unbecoming a judge.

*The respondent denies the allegations against him and asserts that he is only claiming what is due him. He
vehemently denies that he appeared in the case only during the execution stage. He insists that he was never
remiss in the performance of his duties and responsibilities as complainants’ counsel.

*The respondent further alleges that the existence of the agreement on attorney’s fees was admitted by
complainant Shirley Loria Toledo as evidenced by the order issued by the court on 01 March 2002, which
states that Ms. Toledo came to the court informally informing it that she had a copy of the contract on
attorney’s fees.

*As regards the Deed of Absolute Sale, respondent admits that he was still complainants’ lawyer when the lot
was transferred in his name. The lot was given to him by the complainants and their mother, pursuant to their
written contingency agreement, as his 1/3 share in the three parcels of land levied upon by the sheriff to settle
the accrued rentals awarded in the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the decision. He did not pay
for it. The figure appearing on the document was written only to facilitate the transaction. He never compelled
the complainants and their mother to sell to him the parcel of land. Neither did he tell them that nothing would
happen to their case without him.

*Finally, the respondent asserts that his claim for attorney’s fees is still being litigated in Civil Case No. 4879.
Thus, the instant complaint is premature.
*The complainants insist that there is no basis for respondent’s claim for attorney’s fees for the following
reasons: (1) the respondent failed to present the agreement on attorney’s fees; (2) attorney’s fees were not
awarded by the RTC or the Court of Appeals; and (3) Civil Case No. 4879 is in its execution stage.

ISSUE:

WON respondent is entitled to the property as attorney’s fees.

HELD:

*It is fundamental that a claim for attorney’s fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the
services of a lawyer had been rendered or in a separate action. The respondent chose to file his claim for
attorney’s fees in the same case in which he served as counsel for the complainants. As mentioned, this is a
proper remedy under our jurisdiction and is preferred to an independent action as it avoids multiplicity of suits.
Besides, the right to recover attorney’s fees is but an incident of the case in which the services of counsel have
been rendered. Moreover, the court trying the case is to a certain degree already familiar with the nature and
extent of the lawyer’s services and is in a better position to decide the question of fees.

*Undisputably, respondent’s claim for attorney’s fees is under litigation. Since respondent’s claim for attorney’s
fees in the main case has not yet become final, the objection of prematurity obtains, as a contrary holding may
be preemptive of a final judicial determination of factual and evidentiary matters inherent in the claim. Clearly,
the reliefs asked by the complainants are judicial in nature. And, if only for an orderly administration of justice,
the proceedings in Civil Case No. 4879 should be allowed to continue and take its course, and the claim of the
respondent judicially settled first.

*The act of demanding attorney’s fees for services rendered is not a ground for an administrative sanction. As
long as a lawyer honestly and in good faith serves and represents the interest of the client, he should have a
reasonable compensation for his service.

*Lawyers are thus as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice on the part of their clients as the
clients are against abuses on the part of counsel. The duty of the court is not only to see that lawyers act in a
proper and lawful manner, but also to see that lawyers are paid their just and lawful fees.

K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. v. De Vera ,14 citing Albano v. Coloma:

-While, indeed, the practice of law is not a business venture, a lawyer, nevertheless, is entitled to be
duly compensated for professional services rendered. So, also, he must be protected against clients
who wrongly refuse to give him his just due.

*The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a professional relationship that
justifies the collection of attorney’s fees for professional services rendered. Documentary formalism is not an
essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the
relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter
pertinent to his profession. Hence, with or without a contingency agreement between the complainants and
the respondent, the trial court must determine the propriety of respondent’s claim for attorney’s fees and the
reasonable amount thereof.

The instant administrative complaint is DISMISSED for being premature and for lack of merit.