FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 131638-39. March 26, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LORETA MEDENILLA y DORIA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

This is an appeal from a joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 262, promulgated on
November 26, 1997, in Criminal Case Nos. 3618-D and 3619-D finding accused-appellant Loreto Medenilla
y Doria guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 15 and 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. 1cräläwvirtualibräry

Accused-appellant was charged in Criminal Case No. 3618-D for violating Section 15, 2 Article III of R.A.
No. 6425. The information reads as follows:

That on or about the 16th day of April, 1996 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess
any regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to
another 5.08 grams of white crystalline substance positive to the test for methampetamine hydrochloride
(shabu) which is regulated drug, in violation of the above cited law.3cräläwvirtualibräry

Accused-appellant was also charged in Criminal Case No. 3619-D for violating Section 16, 4 Article III of
R.A. No. 6425 with an information which reads as follows:

That on or about the 16th day of April, 1996 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess
any regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and/or
(sic) under his custody and control four (4) transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline substance
with a total weight of 200.45 grams, which were found positive to the test for methampetamine
hydrochloride (shabu) which is regulated drug, in violation of the above cited law.5cräläwvirtualibräry

Arraigned on June 25, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. 6 Joint trial ensued
thereafter.

The prosecutions version, as gathered from the testimonies of SPO2 Bonifacio Cabral, SPO1 Neowille De
Castro and P/Sr. Insp. Julita T. De Villa, is as follows:

On April 14, 1996, a confidential informant arrived at the office of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) in
camp Crame and reported to SPO2 Bonifacio Cabral that there is a certain person engaged in illegal drug
pushing activities in Caloocan, Malabon and Mandaluyong. SPO2 Cabral reported the matter to his
superior, Police Senior Inspector Manzanas. 7 Accordingly, Sr. Insp. Manzanas directed SPO2 Cabral to
confirm the veracity of the report. Thus, SPO2 Cabral requested the confidential informant to contact the
suspected drug pusher to introduce him as a possible buyer. 8cräläwvirtualibräry

On April 15, 1996, the informant returned to the NARCOM office and told SPO2 Cabral that he had
arranged a meeting with the suspected drug pusher. The two then proceeded to the pre-arranged meeting
place at a Seven Eleven Store along Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong City. At around 5:30 p.m., accused-
appellant arrived on board a Toyota Corolla. 9 Without alighting from his car, accused-appellant spoke
with the informant. 10 The informant introduced SPO2 Cabral to accused-appellant as a prospective buyer
of shabu. Accused-appellant inquired how many grams of shabu he wanted to buy and SPO2 Cabral replied
that he needed five (5) grams. The suspect then offered the shabu at the price of One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00) per gram to which SPO2 Cabral agreed. 11 Accused-appellant told SPO2 Cabral to return the
following day. They agreed that the pick up point would be at the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB)
Building also along Boni Avenue. Upon their return to Camp Crame, SPO2 Cabral and the informant
reported the results of their meeting to Sr. Insp. Manzanas. Based on their information, a buy-bust
operation was planned. SPO2 Cabral was designated to act as the poseur-buyer with SPO2 de Castro as
his back-up. Sr. Insp. Manzanas was assigned to stay in the car and await the signal to be given by SPO2
Cabral, through his pager, before apprehending accused-appellant.

At around 3:30 in the early morning of April 16, 1996, the buy-bust team proceeded to the agreed meeting
place at the UCPB Building in Boni Avenue. 12 Upon reaching the area, SPO2 Cabral alighted from the car
while the other operatives positioned themselves in strategic areas. 13 After thirty (30) minutes, accused-
appellant arrived. 14 after talking for a short time with SPO2 Cabral, accused-appellant asked the former
if he had the money. 15 SPO2 Cabral showed the bundle of money 16 and accused-appellant told him to
wait. When he returned, SPO2 Cabral gave him the money and, in exchange, accused-appellant handed a
pack containing a white crystalline substance. 17 As planned, SPO2 Cabral turned on his pager which
prompted the backup operatives to close in and apprehend accused-appellant. 18 SPO2 Cabral asked
accused-appellant if he could search the latters car. Accused-appellant acceded to the request and, as a
result, SPO2 Cabral found a brown clutch bag at the drivers seat of the car. Inside the clutch bag, they
found therein four plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance which they suspected
was shabu. 19cräläwvirtualibräry

Accused-appellant was brought to Camp Crame for booking. SPO2 Cabral and SPO1 de Castro then
submitted the substance they confiscated to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. 20 They thereafter
brought accused-appellant to the PNP General Hospital for a medical and physical
examination. 21cräläwvirtualibräry

The laboratory report on the white crystalline substance showed that the same tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu 22 and that the contents of the substance sold weighed 5.08
grams while those taken from the bag had a total weight of 200.45 grams. The report reads:

PHYSICAL SCIENCES REPORT NO. D-448-96

CASE: Alleged Viol of RA 6425 SUSPECT/S: LORETO MEDENILLA

TIME AND DATE RECEIVED: 2145H 16 April 1996

REQUESTING PARTY/UNIT: C, SOU-HQS-PNPNARCOM

Camp Crame, Quezon City

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:

Exh A One (1) brown MARUDINI CLUTCH BAG containing the following specimens:
1. One (1) heat sealed transparent plastic bag marked as Exh A-1 with 5.08 grams of white crystalline
substance:

2. Four (4) transparent plastic bags marked as Exhs. A-2 through A-5 each with white crystalline substance
and having a total weight of 200.45 grams. xxx

PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:

To determine the presence of prohibited and/or regulated drug. xxx

FINDINGS:

Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimens gave positive result to the tests for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug. xxx

CONCLUSION:

Exhs. A-1, A-2 through A-5 contain methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug.

REMARKS:

TIME AND DATE COMPLETED: 0740H 17 April 199623cräläwvirtualibräry

For his defense, accused-appellant presented a different version of the events leading to his arrest.

On or about April 12, 1996, accused-appellant rented a car, a Toyota Corolla, from a certain Jess Hipolito.
It was to be used by his brother for a trip to Pangasinan. 24 On April 15, 1996, his brother turned over the
car to accused-appellant with the instruction to return the car to Jess Hipolito. 25 However, before
returning the car, accused-appellant decided to use the same for a night out with his friends. Accused-
appellant, along with four (4) of his friends, namely, Joy, Tess, Willy and Jong-jong, went to Bakahan in
Quezon City for dinner and, thereafter, transferred to Music Box Lounge located in front of the said
restaurant,. After having some drinks, accused-appellant decided to return the car to Jess Hipolito and
just take a taxicab with his friends in going back to their place in Caloocan City. 26 They all proceeded to
the condominium unit of Jess Hipolito located along Boni Avenue in Mandaluyong City. 27 they reached
the place at around 2:30 a.m. 28 Accused-appellant told the guard of the condominium building that he
wanted to see Jess Hipolito to retun the car he rented. The guard instructed him to park the car in front
of UCPB. After doing so, accused-appellant, together with Jong-jong and Joy went up to the unit of Jess
Hipolito while their two companions, Willy and Tess, stayed in the lobby. 29 While inside the unit of Jess
Hipolito, accused-appellant was introduced to Alvin. 30 Accused-appellant told Jess Hipolito that he
wanted to return the car. However, Jess Hipolito requested accused-appellant to drive Alvin, using the
rented car, to quezon City since the latter was carrying a large amount of money. 31 Accused-appellant
acceded to the request of Jess Hipolito. They then all went down and, along with Willy and Tess who were
then at the lobby, boarded the vehicle. 32 However, when accused-appellant was about to back out the
vehicle, a white car blocked the rear portion of the car. 33 The passengers of the white car then stepped
out of their vehicle and approached them. One of the passengers of the white car, SPO1 de Castro, asked
accused-appellant to roll down his window and, after doing so, SPO2 Cabral introduced himself and his
companions as police officers. 34 Accused-appellant then asked: Bakit po, sir? 35 In response, one of the
police officers said: May titingnan lang muna kami, baba muna kayo. 36 after alighting from the vehicle,
accused-appellant and his companions were frisked. 37 Thereafter, SPO2 Cabral noticed a brown clutch
bag being held by Alvin and confiscated the same. SPO2 Cabral then asked accused-appellant if he can
search the car. The latter agreed. SPO2 Cabral searched the car for about 15 minutes but found
nothing. 38 SPO2 Cabral then opened the brown clutch bag he confiscated from Alvin and found plastic
sachets containing a white crystalline substance. The police officers then instructed accused-appellant
and his companions to board their vehicle. They were all brought to Camp Crame. 39 When they reached
the said camp, they were instructed to alight from the vehicle one by one. The first one to step out of the
vehicle and go inside the office was Alvin. After 20 minutes, the two women, Tess and Joy, were brought
inside the office and, after 30 minutes, accused-appellant, along with the two remaining passengers, Willy
and Jong-jong, followed. 40

When they were all inside the NARCOM office, their personal circumstances were taken down. Thereafter,
Jong-jong, Willy and accused-appellant were separated from the group and placed inside the detention
cell. Alvin and the two women were left behind in the office and were later on released. 41 After a few
hours, Jong-jong and Willy were brought out of the detention cell while accused-appellant, who was then
sleeping, was left in confinement. Jong-jong and Willy were brought into the office and were made to sign
a document on a yellow pad, prepared by the police officers. The police officers then cautioned the two
that they will be implicated in the case if they interfered. They were then released and accompanied out
to Camp Crame by a police officer. 42 Accused-appellant was the only one who remained in detention and
was, subsequently, solely charged for the illegal sale and possession of shabu.

While in detention, accused-appellant learned that the vehicle he borrowed from Jess Hipolito was owned
by a certain Evita Ebora, who was also detained in the Mandaluyong City Jail for a drug-related
offense. 43cräläwvirtualibräry

On November 17, 1997, the trial cour found accused-appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive portion
of the trial courts decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accuse LORETO MEDENILLA y DORIA GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Sections 15 and 16, in relation to Section 20, of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Said accused is hereby sentenced to: (a)
with respect to Criminal Case No. 3618-D, suffer an indeterminate sentence of a minimum of one (1) year,
eight (8) months and twenty (20) days, to a maximum of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional; (b) with respect to Criminal Case No. 3619-D, suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and
pay a fine in the amount of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00); (c) suffer all the accessories penalties
consequent thereto; and (d) pay the costs.

The shabu involved in this action is hereby confiscated in favor of the government and ordered to be
forwarded to the Dangerous Drugs Board to be disposed of in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.44cräläwvirtualibräry

Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant raises the following issues:

I. Was the accused arrested illegally?

II. Was there in fact any buy-bust operation?

III. Was the accused accorded his right to due process?45cräläwvirtualibräry

Being interrelated, we shall discuss the first and second issues jointly.

The defense insist that there was no prior agreement between accused-appellant and SPO2 Cabral for the
sale of 5 grams of shabu on April 16, 1996 and that no buy bust operation actually took place. The
prosecutions claim that there was a buy-bust operation is, according to the defense, belied by the
testimonies of accused-appellant and Wilfredo de Jesus that when the incident took place, accused-
appellant was not alone but was accompanied by five (5) other persons. 46 thus, the defense argues that
since there was no buy-bust operation, the arrest of accused-appellant was illegal since the arresting
officers were not properly armed with a warrant of arrest.

Accused-appellants argument deserves scant consideration. The prosecution through the testimonies of
SPO2 Cabral and SPO1 de Castro adequately established the fact that there was a legally conducted buy-
bust operation. Their testimonies clearly showed that their confidential informant reported the drug
operations of accused-appellant; that a meeting took place between accused-appellant and SPO2 Cabral
where they agreed on the sale of 5 grams of shabu; that the NARCOM operatives planned a buy-bust
operation; that the said operation was indeed conducted; and that the same resulted in the arrest of
accused-appellant and the confiscation of 5 plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance. In this
regard, the testimonies of the police officers were given full credence by the trial court, to wit:

The prosecution witnesses gave a detailed account of the circumstances surrounding the apprehension
of accused Medenilla from the time Cabral was introduced to accused Medenilla up to the buy-bust
operation, which culminated in the arrest of accused-Medenilla. This Court can find no inconsistency in
their testimonies and, as such, gives full faith and credit thereto. In addition, it is to be noted that no
evidence exists to show that the law enforcers failed to perform their duty regularly. Neither was any
evidence presented to show that there was improper motive on the part of said witnesses to falsely
implicate accused Medenilla. On the contrary, it was established that they did not know accused
Medenilla prior to the buy bust operation. xxx47cräläwvirtualibräry

The trial courts determination of the credibility of the police officers deserves the highest respect by this
court, considering that the trial court had the direct opportunity to observe their deportment and manner
of testifying. 48 Furthermore, in the absence of any proof of any intent on the part of the police authorities
to falsely impute such a serious crime against accused-appellant, the testimonies of SPO2 Cabral and SPO1
de Castro on the buy-bust operation are deserving of belief due to the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty accorded to law enforcers. 49 Clearly, accused-appellants mere denial and
concoction of another arrest scenario cannot overcome the positive testimonies of the police officers.

Even the supposed corroborative testimony of Wilfredo de Jesus is not credible since the said witness
appeared to have been making a mockery of the proceedings before the lower court as noted by the trial
judge, to wit:

COURT:

You better refrain from smiling, I have been warning you. You keep on laughing.
Atty. Arias:

Your Honor, because he laughs.(interrupted)

COURT:

No, he is laughing.

xxx

COURT:

And keep on laughing.

Atty. Arias:

He is smiling your Honor.

COURT:

No, he is not smiling, you can ask him. I do not understand why this guy is keep (sic) on laughing.

Atty. Arias:

Binabalaan ka na bata. Huwag kang tatawa, huwag kang ngingiti kundi magsalita ka ng maayos at tiyak at
tahasan.50cräläwvirtualibräry

The testimonies of accused-appellant and Wilfredo de Jesus are not convincing since they are replete with
numerous inconsistencies and improbabilities. First, accused-appellant testified that the Bakahan
restaurant and the Music Box lounge they went to on the evening of April 15, 1996 are located in Quezon
City. 51 However, Wilfredo de Jesus claimed that the said establishments are located in
Mandaluyong. 52 The divergence of their assertions on the location of these establishments goes into the
credibility of their claim that they were together with other people and had a night out on the evening of
April 15, 1996. Second, accused-appellant claimed that at the time the police officers approached the car
prior to the arrest, one of the officers requested them to alight from the vehicle. 53 On the other hand,
Wilfredo de Jesus testified that when the police officers approached them, they were forcibly pulled out
of their vehicle. 54 Their inconsistency on this matter renders questionable the veracity of the claim of
Wilfredo de Jesus that he was present during the arrest of accused-appellant by the NARCOM
operatives. Third, their claim that they were at the parking lot of UCPB in Boni Avenue at around 3:00
oclock in the morning of April 16, 1996 to return the rented vehicle to Jess Hipolito is hard to believe.
Human experience dictates that one does not return a rented vehicle to its owner in the early hours of
the morning. Business transactions, such as returning a rented car, would ordinarily be transacted during
regular hours of work or, perhaps, even earlier but definitely not during the hours of dawn. Fourth, both
accused-appellant and Wilfredo de Jesus claimed the improbable scenario that, after they were accosted
by the police officers, they were all brought to camp Crame by riding the same vehicle they rented. If this
is believed, then two unlikely situations are made to appear. Either all the six original passengers boarded
the vehicle along with a seventh passenger, one of the NARCOM operatives who will ensure that they will
proceed to the camp, or only the six original passengers boarded the car to go to Camp Crame and they
were just escorted by the police officers who all rode another vehicle. The first situation is implausible
since a bantam car, like a Toyota Corolla, can only accommodate five, at most six, fully grown adults but,
definitely, not seven. On the other hand, the second situation is contrary to human experience since it
will not be in accord with good police operating procedure to allow a group of suspects arrested for a
drug-related offense to board a vehicle by themselves and drive the same to the police headquarters.

Furthermore, if there were indeed five other passengers on board the vehicle aside from accused-
appellant, why were they not charged or, at least, booked in the records of the NARCOM? No proof, not
even an allegation, was presented by the defense to reasonably explain why charges were not lodged
against these alleged other passengers. The most that accused-appellant did was to claim in his appeal
brief that the reason why the other suspects were not charged was because the police officers feared that
bad luck might befall them if all were charged. Thus, he argues:

xxx Due to the belief of karma, the Narcom operatives instead of filing case or cases against all the other
occupants of the car together with the accused, the Narcom operatives filed only one case and that is
against the accused and in open court denied the presence of the other companions of the
accused.55cräläwvirtualibräry

Clearly, such type of reasoning and justification shows that accused-appellant is already grasping at straws
in order that he may be acquitted, through whatever allegation, legal or otherwise, of the crimes he is
charged with.

We now come to the third issue raised by accused-appellant that he was denied due process. In this
regard, accused-appellant claims that he was deprived of such constitutional right on the following
grounds:

a) the denial of the court a quo of the motion of the accused through his counsel to have the
questioned shabu quantitatively examined; and

b) the bias attitude of the presiding judge of the lower court.56cräläwvirtualibräry

Accused-appellant admits the veracity of the quantitative test conducted by the PNP Crime Laboratory on
the 5 plastic containers of the white crystalline substance which resulted in the issuance of Physical
Sciences Report No. D-448-96. 57 This was stipulated upon by accused-appellant when the forensic chemist
of the PNP Crime Laboratory, P/Sr. Insp. Julita T. de Villa, was presented as a witness, to wit:

Prosec. Paz:

The testimony of the witness is formally offered to prove in both cases, Crim. Cases No. 3618-D and 3619-
D, that in Crim. Case 36180D that the white crystalline substance which was sold by the accused Loreto
Medenilla to the police operatives was examined by the witness and found positive to the test
of shabu and weighs 5.08 grams and in Crim. Case No. 3619-D to prove that accused Loreto Medenilla y
Doria that the four (4) transparent plastic bags found in the possession of the accused with a total weight
of 200.45 grams was found positive to the test of shabu as examined by the witness, your Honor.

May we know from counsel for the accused if he is willing to enter into a stipulation?
COURT:

Atty. Arias, are you willing to enter into stipulation?

Atty. Arias:

I will admit that the witness is an expert, second, I admit that there was an examination conducted by her
and that the result of her examination was reduced into writing.

COURT:

And it was found positive that the specimen submitted to the crime lab was shabu.

Atty. Arias:

Yes, your Honor, according to the examination and I will also state for the record that the witness does
not know where the specimen came from, how the specimen came into being.

xxx

Prosec. Paz:

May we request counsel for the accused to admit the authenticity and veracity of this document prepared
by witness after examining the specimen and the findings as stated in the initial laboratory report.

Atty. Arias:

As we have stated earlier, your Honor, that the result of her examination was reduced into writing, this is
the result of the examination, so be it, your Honor.

xxx

Prosec. Paz:

May we also request that the counsel will admit the weights of the specimens as found by the forensic
chemist.

Atty. Arias:

Everything is written in the document.58cräläwvirtualibräry

However, despite this admission, accused-appellant filed a motion to require the forensic chemist to
conduct a quantitative as well as a qualitative analysis on the subject menthamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu to determine its purity. 59 The trial court, after the prosecution filed its Comment/Opposition 60 to
the motion, issued an Order, dated March 17, 1997, denying the motion, to wit:
This resolves the motion filed by the accused through his counsel praying that the forensic chemist be
required to conduct a qualitative and quantitative analysis on the subject methamphetamine
hydrochloride.

Records will show (TSN dated October 23, 1996) that the defense counsel, with the express conformity of
the accused, had agreed to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts concerning the nature, quality
and quantity of the specimens submitted for chemical analysis. The results of said analysis indicated that
said specimens were positive to the test for shabu, and they weighed 5.08 and 200.45 grams, respectively.
These results were explicitly admitted by both the accused and his counsel. The only matter that was not
admitted was the alleged source of the stuff, it being denied that it was found in and taken from the
possession of the accused. The defense counsel who was given the opportunity to cross-examine raised
the forensic chemist when she was presented, never raised the issue or even suggested that what was
examined could not have been pure shabu, and that if such was the case, it was necessary to determine
which part is shabu and which was otherwise. It appears that this idea is merely an after-thought. To the
mind of the Court, the attempt to have the specimens examine at this stage of the action, when the
prosecution had already terminated the presentation of its evidence and is, in fact, about to make a
written formal offer of exhibits, can have no other purpose than to repudiate the findings of the forensic
chemist, which had already been previously admitted. This cannot be permitted bythe Court as it detracts
from the full respect that must be accorded to judicial admissions that have been freely and intelligently
made. As correctly observed by the prosecution, said judicial admissions are conclusive and binding upon
the accused. The judicial admission that the stuff submitted for analysis, weighing 5.08 and 200.45 grams,
respectively, are indeed shabu forecloses any further challenge as to its alleged purity. To speculate at
this stage of the action that the stuff is not pure shabu is to virtually repudiate the findings of the forensic
chemist, previously admitted without any qualification that the stuff analysed were indeed such illegal
drug. This can no longer be permitted by the Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant motion is DENIED for lack of merit. 61cräläwvirtualibräry

In the instant appeal, accused-appellant insists that he should have been allowed by the trial court to have
the shabu subjected to a quantitative test by the PNP Crime Laboratory. He argues that such a test is
crucial in view of the nature of the penalties for the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended, which are graduated depending on the amount of regulated or prohibited drugs involved in a
case. Accused-appellant claims that a quantitative test will definitely show that the shabu involved herein
is not pure and, as such, is less than 200 grams contrary to the assertion of the prosecution that it is 200.45
grams. He anchors this argument on the contention that shabu is never 100% pure but, at most, is only
85% unadulterated. 62cräläwvirtualibräry

We find that the trial court committed no reversible error in denying the motion. When the defense
stipulated with the prosecution that the results of the laboratory examination, as reflected in Physical
Sciences Report No. D-448-96, were true and correct, the accused-appellant, in effect, admitted that the
substance examine was indeed methamphetamine hydrochloride having a weight of 5.08 grams, for
Criminal Case No. 3618-D, and 200.45 grams, for Criminal Case No. 3619-D. Accused-appellant made no
qualifications on the veracity of the PNP Crime Laboratorys finding on the total weight of the examined
shabu. In fact, no cross-examination was conducted by accused-appellants counsel on the witness, P/Sr.
Insp. Julita de Villa, regarding this matter. Thus, when the defense tried to renege on the previous
stipulation by filing a motion requesting for a quantitative test on the shabu involved herein, the trial
court was correct in denying the same.
Furthermore, in the case of People vs. Barita, 63 we held that there is no need to examine the entirety of
the submitted specimen since the sample testing is representative of the whole specimen, we held:

We are not persuaded by the claim of accused-appellants that in order for them to be convicted of selling
2,800 grams of marijuana, the whole specimen must be tested considering that Republic Act 7659 impose
a penalty dependent on the amount or the quantity of drugs seized or taken. This court has ruled that a
sample taken from one of the packages is logically presumed to be representative of the entire contents
of the package unless proven otherwise by accused-appellant.64cräläwvirtualibräry

This ruling was reiterated in People vs. Zheng Bai Hui, 65 thus:

To recall, appellants sold the NARCOM operatives a substance weighing 992.3 grams. This amount is more
than the minimum of 200 grams required by the law to warrant the imposition of either reclusion
perpetua or, if there be aggravating, circumstances, the death penalty. Appellants however foist the
probability that the substance sold could contain additives or adulterants, and not just methamphetamine
hydrochloride. Thus, the actual weight of pure shabu could be less than 992.3 grams, thereby possibly
reducing the imposable penalty.

The contention has no merit. We rejected a similar argument in People vs. Tang Wai Lan:

Accused-appellant then argues that the tests were not done for the entire amount of drugs allegedly
found inside the bags. It is suggested that since the law, Republic Act No. 7659, imposes a penalty
dependent on the amount or quantity of drugs seized or taken, then laboratory test should be undertaken
for the entire amount or quantity of drugs seized in order to determine the proper penalty to be imposed.

The argument is quaint and even borders on being ridiculous. In the present case, even assuming that the
confirmatory tests were conducted on samples taken from only one (1) of the plastic packages, accused-
appellants arguments must still fail.

It will be recalled that each of the plastic packages weighed 1.1 kilograms, an amount more than sufficient
to justify imposing the penalty under Sec. 14 of Rep. Act No. 6425 as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659. A
sample taken from one (1) of he packages is logically presumed to be representative of the entire contents
of the package unless proven otherwise by accused-appellant. Therefore, a positive result for the
presence of drugs is indicative that there is 1.1 kilogram of drugs in the plastic package from which the
sample was taken. If it is then proved, beyond reasonable doubt, xxx that accused appellant transported
into the Philippines the plastic packages from which samples were taken for tests, and found positive as
prohibited drugs, then conviction for importing shabu is definitely in order.

Thus, if the prosecution proves that the sample is positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, it can be
presumed that the entire substance is shabu. The burden of evidence shifts to the accused who must
prove otherwise. Appellants in this case have not presented any evidence to overcome the presumption.

It is clear, therefore, that when accused-appellant stipulated that the weight of the examined specimens
for Criminal Case Nos. 3618-D and 3619-D totaled 5.08 and 200.45 grams, respectively, he in effect
admitted that the said amounts of shabu are pure and unadulterated. Moreover, accused-appellant made
no reservations as to his admission on the veracity of the results as reflected in Physical Sciences Report
No. D-448-96. His only concern, at that time, was to make it clear that the forensic scientist who examined
the confiscated substance was not aware of where the specimen came from. 66 This was in accord with
the theory of the defense that it was not accused-appellant but a companion, Alvin, who was in possession
of the confiscated substance. Thus, due to the absence of any reservation on the total weight of
the shabu examined, accused-appellant can no longer be heard to go back on his previous admission by
requesting a quantitative test of the same.

Nevertheless, accused-appellant argues that a quantitative test should be allowed in view of an alleged
circular issued by this Court sometime in 1996 directing the PNP Crime Laboratory to conduct a qualitative
and a quantitative examination on all illegal drugs submitted to the said office in relation to a
case. 67cräläwvirtualibräry

This argument of accused-appellant is totally bereft of any legal basis. This Court never issued any such
circular requiring the PNP Crime Laboratory to conduct quantitative and qualitative tests on substances
which they examine. It is clear that this argument was resorted to by counsel for the defense in order to
mislead the trial court and this court into acquitting his client. This contemptuous conduct of counsel for
the defense will be dealt with appropriately.

Accused-appellant also claims that the biased attitude of the trial judge deprived him of due process. In
this regard, he cites in his appeal brief a single instance when the judge allegedly revealed his bias, to wit:

COURT:

Mark it.

Q What happened after the accused handed to you one pack of crystalline substance?

A Immediately, I switched on our voyager pager which prompted my backup to subdue the suspect and
introduce ourselves as Anti Narcotics police, sir.

COURT:

By the way, did you not give the money to the accused when he handed to you the alleged substance?

A I gave it to him, your honor.

COURT:

So the money was already in the possession of the accused when you received the shabu from him.

A Yes, your Honor.68cräläwvirtualibräry

We fail to see how this single noted instance of questioning can justify a claim that the trial judge was
biased. We have exhaustively examined the transcript of stenographic notes and determined that the trial
judge was more than equitable in presiding over the hearings of this case. Moreover, a judge is not
prohibited from propounding clarificatory questions on a witness if the purpose of which is to arrive at a
proper and just determination of the case. Thus, in Zheng Bai Hui, we said:
In any case, a severe examination by a trial judge of some of the witness for the defense in an effort to
develop the truth and to get at the real facts affords no justification for a charge that he has assisted the
prosecution with an evident desire to secure a conviction, or that he had intimidated the witnesses for
the defense. The trial judge must be accorded a reasonable leeway in putting such questions to witnesses
as may be essential to elicit relevant facts to make the record speak the truth. Trial judges in this
jurisdiction are judges of both the law and the facts, and they would be negligent in the performance of
their duties if they permitted a miscarriage of justice as a result of a failure to propound a proper question
to a witness which might develop some material bearing upon the outcome. In the exercise of sound
discretion, he may put such question to the witness as will enable him to formulate a sound opinion as to
the ability or the willingness of the witness to tell the truth. A judge may examine or cross-examine a
witness. He may propound clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the
truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to
support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against him if the
clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths which tend to destroy the theory of
one party. 69cräläwvirtualibräry

The sale of less than 200 grams of methampethamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, is punishable with
a penalty ranging from prision correccional to reclusion temporal, depending on the quantity. 70 Thus, if
the regulated drug weighs less than 66.67 grams, then the penalty is prision correctional, if 66.67 grams
or more but less than 133.33 grams then the penalty is prision mayor, and if 133.33 grams or more but
less than 200 grams then the penalty is reclusion temporal. In Criminal Case No. 3618-D, the amount of
shabu involved weighs 5.08 grams, as such the appropriate penalty is prision correccional. There being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period or from 2
years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum penalty shall be within the range of prision correccional medium and the minimum penalty shall
be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed or, in this case, arresto mayor. It is,
therefore, clear from the foregoing that the trial committed an error in imposing an indeterminate
sentence of 1 year, 8 months and 20 days, as minimum, to 4 years and 2 months, as maximum, of prision
correccional. Accordingly, this must be modified.

On the other hand, the possession of 200 grams or more of shabu carries with it the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million
Pesos (P10,000,000.00). Since no aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the offense, the
trial court, in Criminal Case No. 3619-D, was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua with a
fine of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00).

WHEREFORE , the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS.
Accused-appellant Loreto Medenilla y Doria is hereby found GUILTY of violating Sections 15 and 16 of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and hereby sentenced: (a) in Criminal Case
No. 3618-D, to suffer an indeterminate sentence of 6 months of arresto mayor to 4 years and 2 months
of prision correccional; and (b) in Criminal Case No. 3619-D, to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
to pay a fine of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00).

Counsel for the defense, Atty. Marcelino Arias, is hereby ordered to explain within ten (10) days why he
should not be cited in contempt for citing an inexistent circular in his pleadings.

SO ORDERED.
People v. Medenilla [GR 131638-39, 26 March 2001] First Division, Kapunan (J) : 4 concur

Facts: On 16 April 1996, Loreto Medenilla y Doria was caught for illegal possession and unlawfully selling
5.08g of shabu (Criminal Case 3618-D), was in unlawful possession of 4 transparent plastic bags of shabu
weighing 200.45g (Criminal Case 3619-D) in Mandaluyong City. Versions of facts leading to the arrest are
conflicting; the prosecution alleging buy-bust operations, while defense claim illegal arrest, search and
seizure. Arraigned on 25 June 1996, Medenilla pleaded not guilty. The judge therein, for the purpose of
clarification, propounded a question upon a witness during the trial. On 26 November 1997, the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig (Branch 262) found Medenilla, in Criminal Cases 3618-D and 3619-D, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Sections 15 and 16 of RA 6425, as amended (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972).

Issue: Whether judges are allowed to asked clarificatory questions.

Held: A single noted instance of questioning cannot justify a claim that the trial judge was biased. The
Court have exhaustively examined the transcript of stenographic notes and determined that the trial judge
was more than equitable in presiding over the hearings of this case. Moreover, a judge is not prohibited
from propounding clarificatory questions on a witness if the purpose of which is to arrive at a proper and
just determination of the case. “The trial judge must be accorded a reasonable leeway in putting such
questions to witnesses as may be essential to elicit relevant facts to make the record speak the truth. It
cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory
 [G.R. No. 40243. March 11, 1992.]

CELESTINO TATEL, Petitioner, v. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC, SALVADOR A.

SYLLABUS

1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS; DEFINED. — It is a settled principle of law that

municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-
government and as such are endowed with police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry
out the declared objects of their creation. Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under
the Administrative Code.

2. ID.; ID.; MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE; REQUISITES FOR VALIDITY. — For an ordinance to be valid, it must
not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact but must also be passed according
to the procedure prescribed by law, and must be in consonance with certain well established and basic
principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that a municipal ordinance (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial
or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with
public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable. Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952, meets these criteria.

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW; NOT VIOLATED IN CASE AT
BAR. — As to the assignment of error, that warehouses similarly situated as that of petitioner were not
prosecuted, suffice it to say that the mere fact that the municipal authorities of Virac have not
proceeded against other warehouses in the municipality allegedly violating Ordinance No. 13 is no
reason to claim that the ordinance is discriminatory. A distinction must be made between the law itself
and the manner in which said law is implemented by the agencies in charge with its administration and
enforcement. There is no valid reason for the petitioner to complain, in the absence of proof that the
other bodegas mentioned by him are operating in violation of the ordinance and that complaints have
been lodged against the bodegas concerned without the municipal authorities doing anything about it.
The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the ordinance have not been
substantiated. Its purpose is well within the objectives of sound government. No undue restraint is
placed upon the petitioner or for anybody to engage in trade but merely a prohibition from storing
inflammable products in the warehouses because of the danger of fire to the lives and properties of the
people residing in the vicinity. As far as public policy is concerned, there can be no better policy than
what has been conceived by the municipal government.

4. REMEDIAL LAW; COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE; HAS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION FOR CIVIL SUIT FOR
ABATEMENT OF NUISANCE. — As to petitioner’s contention of want of jurisdiction by the lower court we
find no merit in the same. The case is a simple civil suit for abatement of a nuisance, the original
jurisdiction of which falls under the then Court of First Instance.
 DECISION
NOCON, J.:

This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction with the Court of First Instance of
Catanduanes. filed by appellant, Celestino Tatel, a businessman engaged in the import and export of
abaca and other products against the Municipal Council of Virac, Catanduanes and its municipal officials
enjoining them from enforcing Resolution No. 29 1 of the Council, declaring the warehouse of petitioner
in barrio Sta. Elena of the said municipality a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines and directing the petitioner to remove and transfer said warehouse to a
more suitable place within two (2) months from receipt of the said resolution.cralawnad

It appears from the records that on the basis of complaints received from the residents of barrio Sta.
Elena on March 18, 1966 against the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine
inside the warehouse of petitioner which affected the peace and tranquility of the neighborhood due to
the smoke, obnoxious odor and dust emitted by the machine, a committee was appointed by the
municipal council of Virac to investigate the matter. The committee noted the crowded nature of the
neighborhood with narrow roads and the surroundings residential houses, so much so that an accidental
fire within the warehouse of petitioner occasioned by a continuance of the activity inside the warehouse
and the storing of inflammable materials created a danger to the lives and properties of the people
within the neighborhood.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

Resultantly, Resolution No. 29 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac on April 22, 1966 declaring
the warehouse owned and operated by petitioner a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of
the New Civil Code. 2

His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Municipal Council of Virac, petitioner
instituted the present petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction.

Respondent municipal officials contend that petitioner’s warehouse was constructed in violation of
Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses
either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said
block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire.

On the other hand, petitioner contends that said ordinance is unconstitutional, contrary to the due
process and equal protection clause of the Constitution and null and void for not having been passed in
accordance with law.

The issue then boils down on whether petitioner’s warehouse is a nuisance within the meaning of
Article 694 of the Civil Code and whether Ordinance No. 13, S. 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is
unconstitutional and void.

In a decision dated September 18, 1969, the court a quo ruled as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. The warehouse in question was legally constructed under a valid permit issued by the municipality of
Virac in accordance with existing regulations and may not be destroyed or removed from its present
location;
2. Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, is a legitimate and valid exercise of police power by the Municipal
Council of Virac is not (sic) unconstitutional and void as claimed by the petitioner;

3. The storage by the petitioner of abaca and copra in the warehouse is not only in violation of the
provisions of the ordinance but poses a grave danger to the safety of the lives and properties of the
residents of the neighborhood due to accidental fire and constitutes a public nuisance under the
provisions of Article 694 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and may be abated;

4. Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby directed to remove from the said warehouse all abaca and copra
and other inflammable articles stored therein which are prohibited under the provisions of Ordinance
No. 13, within a period of two (2) months from the time this decision becomes final and that henceforth,
the petitioner is enjoined from storing such prohibited articles in the warehouse. With costs against
petitioner."

Seeking appellate review, petitioner raised as errors of the court a quo:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. In holding that Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, of the Municipality of Virac, Catanduanes, is a
legitimate and valid exercise of police power of the Municipal Council, and therefore, constitutional;

2. In giving the ordinance a meaning other than and different from what it provided by declaring that
petitioner violated the same by using the warehouse for storage of abaca and copra when what is
prohibited and penalized by the ordinance is the construction of warehouses.

3. In refusing to take judicial notice of the fact that in the municipality, there are numerous
establishments similarly situated as appellant’s warehouses but which are not prosecuted.

We find no merit in the Petition.

Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its
police power. It is a settled principal of law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the
promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with police powers in
order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. 3 Its authority
emanates from the general welfare clause under the Administrative Code, which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The municipal council shall enact such ordinance and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as
may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and
such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity,
improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein." 4

For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to
enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, and must be in
consonance with certain well established and basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles
require that a municipal ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statue (2) must not
be unfair or oppressive (3) must no be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate
trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable 5
Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952, meets these criteria.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
As to the petitioner’s second assignment of error, the trial court did not give the ordinance in question a
meaning other than what it says. Ordinance No. 13 passed by the Municipal Council of Virac on
December 29, 1952, 6 reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"AN ORDINANCE STRICTLY PROHIBITING THE CONSTRUCTION OF WAREHOUSE IN ANY FORM NEAR A
BLOCK OF HOUSES EITHER IN POBLACION OR BARRIO WITH NECESSARY DISTANCE TO AVOID GREAT
LOSSES OF PROPERTY AND LIVES BY FIRE ACCIDENT."

Section 1 provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is strictly prohibited to construct warehouses in any form to any person, persons, entity, corporation
or merchants, wherein to keep or store copra, hemp, gasoline, petroleum, alcohol, crude oil, oil of
turpentine and the like products or materials if not within the distance of 200 meters from a block of
houses either in the poblacion or barrios to avoid great losses of properties inclusive lives by fire
accident."cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 2 provides: 7
"Owners of warehouses in any form, are hereby given advice to remove their said warehouses this
ordinance by the Municipal Council, provided however, that if those warehouses now in existence
should no longer be utilized as such warehouse for the above-described products in Section 1 of this
ordinance after a lapse of time given for the removal of the said warehouses now in existence, same
warehouse shall be exempted from the spirit of the provision of section 1 of this ordinance, provided
further, that these warehouses now in existence, shall in the future be converted into non-inflammable
products and materials warehouses."cralaw virtua1aw library

In spite of its fractured syntax, basically, what is regulated by the ordinance is the construction of
warehouses wherein inflammable materials are stored where such warehouses are located at a distance
of 200 meters from a block of houses and not the construction per se of a warehouse. The purpose is to
avoid the loss of life and property in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of government.

This was also the observation of the trial court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A casual glance of the ordinance at once reveals a manifest disregard of the elemental rules of syntax.
Experience, however, will show that this is not uncommon in law making bodies in small towns where
local authorities and in particular the persons charged with the drafting and preparation of municipal
resolutions and ordinances lack sufficient education and training and are not well grounded even on the
basic and fundamental elements of the English language commonly used throughout the country in such
matters. Nevertheless, if one scrutinizes the terms of the ordinance, it is clear that what is prohibited is
the construction of warehouses by any person, entity or corporation wherein copra, hemp, gasoline and
other inflammable products mentioned in Section 1 may be stored unless at a distance of not less than
200 meters from a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios in order to avoid loss of property
and life due to fire. Under Section 2, existing warehouses for the storage of the prohibited articles were
given one year after the approval of the ordinance within which to remove them but were allowed to
remain in operation if they had ceased to store such prohibited articles.

The ambiguity therefore is more apparent than real and springs from simple error in grammatical
construction but otherwise, the meaning and intent is clear that what is prohibited is the construction or
maintenance of warehouses for the storage of inflammable articles at a distance within 200 meters from
a block of houses either in the poblacion or in the barrios. And the purpose of the ordinance is to avoid
loss of life and property in case of accidental fire which is one of the primordial and basic obligation of
any government." 8

Clearly, the lower court did NOT add meaning other than or different from what provided in the
ordinance in question. It merely stated the purpose of the ordinance and what it intends to prohibit to
accomplish its purpose.

As to the third, assignment of error, that warehouses similarly situated as that of petitioner were not
prosecuted, suffice it to say that the mere fact that the municipal authorities of Virac have not
proceeded against other warehouses in the municipality allegedly violating Ordinance No. 13 is no
reason to claim that the ordinance is discriminatory. A distinction must be made between the law itself
and the manner in which said law is implemented by the agencies in charge with its administration and
enforcement. There is no valid reason for the petitioner to complain, in the absence of proof that the
other bodegas mentioned by him are operation in violation of the ordinance and that complaints have
been lodged against the bodegas concerned without the municipal authorities doing anything about it.

The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the ordinance have not been
substantiated. Its purpose is well within the objectives of sound government. No undue restraint is
placed upon the petitioner or for anybody to engage in trade but merely a prohibition from storing
inflammable products in the warehouse because of the danger of fire to the lives and properties of the
people residing in the vicinity. As far as public policy is concerned, there can be no better policy than
what has been conceived by the municipal government.

As to petitioner’s contention of want of jurisdiction by the lower court we find no merit, in the same.
The case is a simple civil suit for abatement of a nuisance, the original jurisdiction of which falls under
the then Court of First Instance.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.