Legal Ethics Case Doctrines

Legal Ethics Case Doctrines | ABACALZO.RATON.
SOTELO
ADVINCULA VS ATTY. MACABATA

A.C. No. 7204 March 7, 2007
Chico-Nazario
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Immorality; Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry
from what it used to be, but this permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public
faith, are burdened with a high degree of social responsibility and, hence, must handle their
personal affairs with greater caution.—Simple as the facts of the case may be, the manner by which
we deal with respondent’s actuations shall have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal
practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it
used to be.
Same; Same; Same; The exalted positions of lawyers as officers of the court demand no less
than the highest degree of morality.—It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to
the highest standards of morality. The legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers
are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of
malpractice. Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the
Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and
honored fraternity. They may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct,
even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Good moral character is defined as what a person
really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of
him, or the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known.—In Bar
Matter No. 1154, 431 SCRA 146 (2004), good moral character was defined as what a person really is, as
distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, or the estimate in
which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term
but one which corresponds to objective reality. It should be noted that the requirement of good moral
character has four ostensible purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image
of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves.
Same; Same; Same; It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to
what is “grossly immoral conduct” or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which
render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar—the rule implies that what
appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct
that warrants disbarment.— In Zaguirre v. Castillo, 398 SCRA 658 (2003), we reiterated the definition
of immoral conduct, as such conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to
the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Furthermore, for such conduct to
warrant disciplinary action, the same must not simply be immoral, but grossly immoral. It must be so
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.
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Legal Ethics Case Doctrines | ABACALZO.RATON.SOTELO
Same; Same; Same; While the act of respondent in turning the head of complainant towards
him and kissing her on the lips are distasteful, such act, even if considered offensive and
undesirable, cannot be considered grossly immoral.—Immorality has not been confined to sexual
matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency,
depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to
opinions of respectable members of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order
and public welfare. Guided by the definitions above, we perceived acts of kissing or beso-beso on the
cheeks as mere gestures of friendship and camaraderie, forms of greetings, casual and customary.
Same; Same; Same; While it is discretionary upon the Supreme Court to impose a particular
sanction that it may deem proper against an erring lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary and
despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, but should ever be controlled by the
imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the bar and to exact from
the lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the court, to his client, to his brethren in the
profession and to the public.—
Same; Same; Same; Only those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit
disbarment or suspension, while those acts which neither affect nor erode the moral character
of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of such nature and to such
extent as to clearly show the lawyer’s unfitness to continue in the practice of law; Censure or
reprimand is usually meted out for an isolated act of misconduct of a lesser nature.—The power
to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases of
misconduct which seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and
member of the Bar. The dubious character of the act charged as well as the motivation which induced
the lawyer to commit it must be clearly demonstrated before suspension or disbarment is meted out.
The mitigating or aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of the offense should also be
considered. Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an isolated act of misconduct of a lesser
nature. It is also imposed for some minor infraction of the lawyer’s duty to the court or the client.
______________________________
BALAOING VS JUDGE CALDERON

A.M. No. RTJ-90-580
BALAOING VS HON. MALIWANAG
A.M. No. R-676-RTJ
APRIL 27, 1993
PER CURIAM
Legal Ethics; Code of Professional Responsibility; Complainant Balaoing’s wanton disregard of

the Supreme Court’s stern warning not to file baseless and frivolous complaints and his
adamant refusal to abide Canon 11, Rule 11.03 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility have shown his unfitness to hold the license to practice law. —These acts of
complainant Balaoing run counter to the explicit mandate of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to
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wit: CANON 11—A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO
JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS, xxx xxx xxx Rule 11.03—A
lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04—A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no
materiality to the case. We have painstakingly reviewed the records of these cases and find the present
administrative complaints of Atty. Balaoing against Judge Calderon, Jr. and his OIC Leonor Maniago, and
against Judge Maliwanag, just as frivolous and baseless as the previous ones. Like before, his present
complaints are based on his personal interpretation-of the law and not on material allegations of fact,
substantiated by solid evidence. This We cannot countenance. The Philippines abounds in lawyers. But
as Justice Malcolm puts it, “the Philippines do not need so-called lawyers who x x x have no ethical
standards, and who are a disgrace to a great and noble profession. x x x (F)or what is needed in the
Philippines is not a greater quantity, but a finer quality, of professional men and women, x x x who have
a sincere understanding of the high requirements of the legal profession x x x.” Complainant Balaoing
has utterly failed to live up to the duties and responsibilities of a member of the legal profession.
The administrative complaints are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Complainant Eduardo R. Balaoing
is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
____________________________
CAYETANO VS MONSOD
GR No. 100113 September 3, 1991
Paras, J.
Practice of law” defined.—Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. “To engage in the practice of
law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to
give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill.” (111 ALR 23) Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term “practice
of law”, particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal
construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor—verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement—that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
PADILLA, J., Dissenting: Definition of “Practice of Law".—What constitutes practice of law? As

commonly understood, “practice” refers to the actual performance or application of knowledge as
distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or
customary action. To “practice” law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an
employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily. Therefore, a doctor of
medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be
in the “practice of medicine.” A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to
practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business
executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a
corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
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GUTIERREZ, JR., J., Dissenting: Definition of “Practice of Law".—The Constitution uses the phrase
“engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.” The deliberate choice of words shows that the
practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental,
seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be “engaged” in an activity for ten years requires committed
participation in something which is the result of one’s decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and
involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the
ten-year period.
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CO KIM CHAM VS VALDEZ TAN KEH & JUDGE DIZON

No. L- 5 November 16, 1945
Feria, J.
POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW; VALIDITY OF ACTS OF "DE FACTO" GOVERNMENT.—It is a legal
truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and
judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid.
ID.; ID.; VALIDITY OF JUDICIAL ACTS AND PROCEEDINGS OF PHILIPPINE EXECUTIVE COMMISSION AND
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AFTER REOCCUPATION OF THE PHILIPPINES.—The governments of the
Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military
occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of
the courts of justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid,
and, by virtue of the well-known principle of postliminy (postliminium) in international law, remained
good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces
under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur.
JURISDICTION OF COURTS OF COMMONWEALTH TO CONTINUE PROCEEDINGS IN ACTIONS PENDING IN

COURTS DURING JAPANESE MILITARY OCCUPATION.—Although in theory the authority of the local civil
and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes
place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but
continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined,
unless absolutely prevented, to respect. XXXXX. If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the
Islands prior to the Japanese military occupation had been continued during the Japanese military
administration, the Philippine Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic of the Philippines, it
stands to reason the same courts, which become reestablished and conceived of as having been in
continued existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of
postliminy (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 516), may continue the proceedings in cases then pending
in said courts, without necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said
proceedings.
MANDAMUS; REFUSAL OF COURT TO Go INTO MERITS OF CASE UPON ERROR OF LAW OR OF

PRACTICE.—If a court has erroneously decided some question of law or of practice, presented as a
preliminary objection, and upon such erroneous construction has refused to go into the merits of the
case, mandamus will lie to compel it to proceed.
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Facts: Petition "for mandamus in which petitioner prays that the respondent judge of the lower court be
ordered to continue the proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of said court, which were initiated under the
regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation
of these Islands. The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings in
said case on the ground that the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas
MacArthur had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the
courts of the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines
established during the Japanese military occupation, and that, the lower courts have no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of
the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority.
____________________________________
DE VERA VS PINEDA
GR No. 96333 September 2, 1992
Padilla, J.
Attorneys; Disbarment proceedings, Nature of.—At this juncture, it may well be re-stated that
“proceedings for the disbarment of members of the bar are not in any sense a civil action where there is
a plaintiff and the respondent is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and
afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public
welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his
conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court
to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.” (Tajan vs. Hon. Vicente
Cusi, Jr., G.R. No. L-28899, 30 May 1974, 57 SCRA 154).
____________________________________
DEL ROSARIO VS MILLADO

A.C. No. 724 January 31, 1969
Concepcion, C.J.
Legal ethics; Attorney and client; Purchase by lawyer of interest in litigation prohibited; Case at
bar.—The provisions of the Civil Code and of the Canons of Legal Ethics prohibit the purchase by
lawyers of any interest in the subject matter of the litigation in which they participated by reason of
their profession. The records in the present proceeding show that respondent's alleged interest in said
lots was acquired before he intervened as counsel for Mrs. Pascual in the ejectment cases against her
and that said interest is not necessarily inconsistent with that of his aforementioned client, aside from
the fact that he had made no substantial misrepresentation in the pleadings filed by him in said cases.
This fact and the absence of said conflict are made more manifest by the circumstance that the charges
under consideration have been preferred, not by Mrs. Pascual, but by her opponent in one of the
'ejectment cases above mentioned. The complaint herein being devoid of merit, the same is dismissed.
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Facts: Complaint for disbarment against respondent counsel for malpractice on the ground of violation
of Article 1491 of the Civil Code and Canon 10 of the Canon of Legal Ethics by acquiring an interest in the
land involved in a litigation in which he had taken part by reason of his profession.
In his answer, respondent alleged that his interest in the said land had been acquired before he
intervened in said proceedings as counsel for one of the parties; that his client was aware of his interest
and that there is no conflict between the same and that of his client.
______________________________________
E.CONRAD AND GEESLIN VS ATTY. NAVARRO

A.C. No. 2033
ATTY. ORTIGAS AND ATTY. RODRIGUEZ VS ATTY. NAVARRO
A.C. No. 2148
May 9, 1990
PER CURIAM
Attorneys; Disbarment; The purpose of disbarment is not meant as a punishment to deprive an

attorney of a means of livelihood but is rather to protect the courts and the public from the
misconduct of the officers of the court; Its objective. — To ensure the proper administration of
justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and
trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. Its objectives are to compel the
lawyer to deal fairly and honestly with his client and to remove from the profession a person whose
misconduct has proven him unfit for the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an
attorney.
Same; Same; Same; In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant
and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.—As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal
presumption that he is innocent of the charges until the contrary is proved, and that, as an officer of the
court, he has performed his duty in accordance with his oath.
______________________________
HERMOSA VS MENDOZA
A.M. No. P-2432 February 20, 1982
Guerrero, J.
Courts; Telling a representative of complainant in a criminal case, who was talking to another
court personnel that his uncle is no longer interested: “magdedemanda-demanda kayo, tapos
hindi kayo pupunta” is improper and out of turn. Court employees should treat a citizen with
dignity and civility on official matters. Respondent is admonished. — Indeed, respondent Amparo
Mendoza deserves admonition, to be more tactful and prudent in her actuations. Common and ordinary
ethics alone will dictate the impropriety of butting in on other people’s conversations. More so, if the
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person concerned is a public officer, who as such, is required to exhibit civility and courtesy in her
dealings with the public.
Same; Same.—Indeed, respondent failed short of respecting and treating a citizen with dignity who has
an official business to transact in her office. Complainant has the right to be attended civilly and
accordingly advised. It must be emphasized that courts are established to serve the public, especially
litigants. All court officers and employees, of which respondent is one, have the duty to comfort
themselves in such a manner as to merit the respect and trust of the people.
____________________________
LICUANAN VS ATTY. MELO

A.C. No. 2361 February 9, 1989
PER CURIAM
Legal Ethics; Lawyers; Canons of Professional Ethics; Respondent’s failure to account and remit
the money he received on behalf of his client for over a year is glaringly a breach of the lawyer’s
oath to which he swore observance.—
Same; Same; Same; Malpractice; Respondent’s unprofessional actuations deserve the severest
punishment.—Indeed, by his professional misconduct, respondent has breached the trust reposed in
him by his client. He has shown himself unfit for the confidence and trust which should characterize an
attorney-client relationship and the practice of law. By reason thereof complainant was compelled to
file a groundless suit against her tenant for non-payment of rentals thereby exposing her to jeopardy by
becoming a defendant in a damage suit filed by said tenant against her. By force of circumstances,
complainant was further compelled to engage the services of another counsel in order to recover the
amount rightfully due her but which respondent had unjustifiedly withheld from her. Respondent has
violated his oath not to delay any man for money or malice, besmirched the name of an honorable
profession and has proven himself unworthy of the trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the
Court.
Respondent Disbarred.
___________________________
PAFLU VS BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY

No. L-23959 November 29, 1971
Reyes, JBL., J.
Legal ethics; Attorney’s fees; Division of fees with non-lawyers not allowed.—–An agreement
providing for the division of attorney’s fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share
in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot be
justified. An award by a court of attorney’s fees is no less immoral in the absence of a contract.
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Same; Same; Court of Industrial Relations; Allowance of non-lawyers to appear in the Court of
Industrial Relations does not entitle them to fees. —–The permission for a non-member of the bar to
represent or appear or defend in the Court of Industrial Relations on behalf of a party-litigant does not
by itself entitle the representative to compensation for such representation. The award for attorney’s
fees provided by law imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the
recovery of attorney’s fees.
Same; Only lawyers may represent litigants in courts.—– Public policy demands that legal work in
the representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications
and who are sworn to observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, as well as being subject to
judicial disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients and the public.
_____________________________
PEOPLE VS CASTRO AND JOHN DOE

No. 31105 November 23, 1929
Johns, J.
WHEN CONVICTION WILL BE SUSTAINED.—Where it appears that there was a substitution and
falsification of the original compositions of the defendant in the Bar Examination, and that Exhibits A-1,
A-2 and A-3 are not genuine, and that they are in the handwriting of the defendant, and that the
falsification was committed in his original compositions and for his sole use and benefit, and that after
reviewing his examination papers, he filed a motion in which he alleged that certain mistakes had been
made in his grades, and it appears that the falsification could not have been made without his
knowledge, consent and approval, the conviction of the defendant for the falsification will be sustained.
Facts: Defendants were charged with falsification of public documents committed as follows: that
defendant Castro, one of the candidates to the Bar Examination held in 1926 and his co-defendant John
Doe, employee of Supreme Court and custodian of the documents connected with the said examination,
took from the said archive the following official documents kept therein: compositions in Mercantile
Law, Remedial Law and Legal Ethics, written, prepared and submitted by Castro during the said
examination; and once in possession, defendants concealed and destroyed it; and for the purpose of
being admitted to the Bar, defendant Castro wrote and prepared other compositions and substituted it
to those taken away; and on the covers of the new compositions, defendants falsified the writing and
signatures of the correctors and placed the new compositions in the archives of the Court, thereby
succeeded in changing the relative merit of the compositions of Castro in the subjects mentioned.
An examination of the exhibits which are admittedly the original compositions of the defendant and of
the exhibits which the defendant claimed to be his, are conclusive evidence that all of them are in his
own handwriting.
____________________________
PEREZ VS CA, CATINDIG

GR No. 162580 January 27, 2006
Ynares-Santiago, J.
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Actions; Intervention; Requirements for Intervention; What Constitutes Legal Interest .—The
requirements for intervention are: [a] legal interest in the matter in litigation; and [b] consideration
must be given as to whether the adjudication of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or
whether the intervenor’s rights may be protected in a separate proceeding or not. Legal interest, which
entitles a person to intervene, must be in the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate
character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct legal operation and effect of the
judgment. Such interest must be actual, direct and material, and not simply contingent and expectant.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioner never acquired the legal interest as a wife upon which her
motion for intervention is based.—Petitioner’s claim that she is the wife of Tristan even if their
marriage was celebrated abroad lacks merit. Since petitioner’s motion for leave to file intervention was
bereft of the indispensable requirement of legal interest, the issuance by the trial court of the order
granting the same and admitting the complaint-in-intervention was attended with grave abuse of
discretion. Consequently, the Court of Appeals correctly set aside and declared as null and void the said
order.
_____________________________________
RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED RESTORING INTEGRITY:

A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND
MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT.
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC. June 7, 2011.
Leonardo-De Castro, J.:
Attorneys; Contempt; The same incident of contumacious speech and/or behavior directed
against the Court on the part of a lawyer may be punishable either as contempt or an ethical
violation, or both in the discretion of the Court.
Same; Same; A charge of indirect contempt, if proven in due proceedings, carry with it penal
sanctions such as imprisonment or a fine or both
Same; Same; In Salcedo v. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724 (1935), for the same act of filing in court a
pleading with intemperate and offensive statements, the concerned lawyer was found guilty of
contempt and liable administratively. — For this reason, two separate penalties were imposed upon
him, a fine (for the contempt charge) and reprimand (for his failure to observe his lawyerly duty to give
due respect to the Court).
Same; Same; The lesson is that, when the Court initiates contempt proceedings and/or
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers for intemperate and discourteous language and
behavior directed at the courts, the evil sought to be prevented is the same—the degradation of
the courts and the loss of trust in the administration of justice.— For this reason, it is not unusual
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for the Court to cite authorities on bar discipline (involving the duty to give due respect to the courts) in
contempt cases against lawyers and vice versa.
Same; Same; When the Court chooses to institute an administrative case against a respondent
lawyer, the mere citation or discussion in the orders or decision in the administrative case of
jurisprudence involving contempt proceedings does not transform the action from a disciplinary
proceeding to one for contempt. — Respondents’ contrary position in their motion for
reconsideration is bereft of any rational merit. Had this Court opted to cite respondents for contempt of
court, which is punishable by imprisonment or fine, this Court would have initiated contempt
proceedings in accordance with the Rules of Court. Clearly, the Court did not opt to do so. We cannot
see why respondents would stubbornly cling to the notion that they were being cited for indirect
contempt under the Show Cause Resolution when there is no basis for such belief other than their own
apparent misreading of the same.
_____________________________
SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD ET. AL.

VS HON. CLORIBEL, ETC. ET. AL.
No. L-27072 January 9, 1970
Sanchez, J.
Legal ethics; Attorneys; Legal duties of attorneys; Duty of an attorney to the courts.—Section
20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out the duty of an attorney to the
courts—observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. The first
canon of legal ethics pronounces that “it is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance.” That same canon makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers
to support the courts against unjust criticism and clamor. The attorney’s oath solemnly binds him to a
conduct that should be with all good fidelity to the courts. The duty of an attorney to the courts “can
only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is
bound to uphold.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Duty not to promote distrust in the administration of justice .—A
lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, “like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the
ends of justice.” His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity,
“not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.” Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to
preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice “is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the
attainment of the liberties of the people.” Thus, it has been said of a lawyer that “as an officer, of the
court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and
regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Disrespectful language in pleadings; Case at bar.—The language of
attorney in his motion for reconsideration referring to the Supreme Court as a “civilized, democratic
tribunal,” but by innuendo would suggest that it is not; in his motion to inhibit, categorizing the Court’s
decision as “false, erroneous and illegal” and accusing two justices for being interested in the decision of
the case without any basis in fact; asking the other members of the Court to inhibit themselves for
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favors or benefits received from any of the petitioners including the President—constitute disrespectful
language to the Court. It undermines and degrades the administration of justice.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; That language is necessary for the defense of client is no
justification,—It ill behooves an attorney to justify his disrespectful language with the statement that it
was necessary for the defense of his client. A client’s cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line
between liberty and license. Lawyers must always keep in perspective the thought that “since lawyers
are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as
many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their clients’ success is wholly subordinate;
and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.”
Same; Same; Same; Duty to abstain from offensive personality against a party or witness. —It
has been said that “a lawyer’s language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession.” It is the lawyer’s duty as a member of the Bar “to abstain from an offensive personality and
to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the
justice of the cause with which he is charged.” In this case, it was necessary for attorney to accuse
petitioners of having made “false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice
the courts against MacArthur”; to describe a proposition of petitioners as “corrupt on its face,” laying
bare “the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners”; and to charge petitioners with
opportunistically changing their claims and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to
pleading in the same case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Defense that Solicitor General or his assistants may not be
considered offended parties in the case.—It is not a defense to say that the Solicitor General or his
assistants may not be considered offended parties in a contempt case. The Supreme Court may motu
proprio start proceedings of this Nature. For, inherent in courts is the power “to control, in furtherance
of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a
case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto.” [Sec. 5(d), Rule 185, Rules of Court]
Same; Same; Sane; Duty not to mislead the judge; Use of distorted quotation.—Canon 22 of the
Canons of Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer to characterize his conduct with candor and fairness, and
specifically states that “it is not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote.” In this case,
deliberately misquoted Section 1, Rule 51 by intentionally omitting the qualification which should not
have been done.
Same; Same; Same; Duty to counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to
be just.—A lawyer has control of the proceedings. Whatever steps his client takes be within his
knowledge and responsibility. Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics should remind a lawyer that “a
lawyer should be within his knowledge and responsibility.” Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics
should remind a lawyer that “a lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients
from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with reference to their
conduct towards courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in such wrong
doing the lawyer should terminate their relation.”
_______________________
ULEP VS THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
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BM No. 553 June 17, 1993

Regalado, J.
Attorneys; Words and Phrases; Meaning of “Practice of Law.”— Practice of law means any activity,
in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal
knowledge or skill. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal
advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are
secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court.
Same; Same; Same.—When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in
the practice of law. One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the
business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. Giving
advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect
thereto constitutes a practice of law. One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a
statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law.
Same; The practice of giving out legal information constitutes practice of law.—What is palpably
clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention
that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing
information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity
of this Court that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy
thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called
paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her
on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided-for by said law. That is what its
advertisements represent and for which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity
falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of “practice of law.” Such a conclusion will not be
altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as
the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal research,
giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth.
Same; Same; The services offered by respondent cannot be performed by paralegals here as
distinguished from the United States.—Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As
admitted by respondent, there are schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in
paralegal education, while there are none in the Philippines. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not
duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to
render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or
regulations granting permission therefor.
Same; Lawyers may not advertise their services or expertise.—Anent the issue on the validity of the
questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making
known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or
statement of facts. Prior to the adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of
Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for
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professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his

photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or
concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the
lawyer’s position, and all other like self-laudation.
Same; Exceptions.—Not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the
profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to
which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are
expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions.
Same; Same.—The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner
consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative
data.
___________________________________
G.R. No. 173022, January 23, 2006 [Formerly G.R. No. 144588]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. DARIUS RODRIGO y FAJARDO (acquitted), FELICIANO
FAJARDO, JR., and REY PLATA, Appellants.
The power to prosecute includes the initial discretion to determine who should be utilized by the
government as a state witness. The prosecution has gathered the evidence against the accused and is in
a better position to decide the testimonial evidence needed by the State to press its prosecution to a
successful conclusion. Under our Rules, however, it is the courts that will finally determine whether the
requirements have been satisfied to justify the discharge of an accused to become a witness for the
government.
It is a jurisprudential rule that the testimony of a self-confessed accomplice or co-conspirator imputing

the blame to or implicating his co-accused cannot, by itself and without corroboration, be regarded as
proof with a moral certainty that the latter committed or participated in the commission of the crime.
The testimony must be substantially corroborated in its material points by unimpeachable testimony
and strong circumstances and must be to such an extent that its trustworthiness becomes manifest. The
testimony of dela Cruz was substantially corroborated by no less than the victim himself, Oliver, as well
as Pedro.
As noted by the trial court, there may have been inconsistencies in the narration of dela Cruz. These,
however, were minor details and simply could be attributed to the frailty of human memory. It cannot
be expected that her testimony would be entirely flawless. Inconsistencies as to minor details and
collateral matters do not affect the credibility of the witnesses nor the veracity or weight of their
testimonies. Such minor inconsistencies may even serve to strengthen their credibility as they negate
any suspicion that the testimonies have been rehearsed. Moreover, the testimony of dela Cruz coincides
with that of Oliver and Pedro relating to the principal occurrence and the positive identification of
appellants.
_________________________________
A.C. No.7054, November 11, 2014

CONRADO N. QUE, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.
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Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right granted to everyone who demands it, but rather, a special privilege granted and
continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral
character. The same reasoning applies to reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. When exercising its
inherent power to grant reinstatement, the Court should see to it that only those who establish their
present moral fitness and knowledge of the law will be readmitted to the Bar. Thus, though the doors to
the practice of law are never permanently closed on a disbarred attorney, the Court owes a duty to the
legal profession as well as to the general public to ensure that if the doors are opened, it is done so only
as a matter of justice.
We are not fully convinced that the passage of more than four (4) years is sufficient to enable the
respondent to reflect and to realize his professional transgressions. We emphasize that this is the
second time that the respondent was accused and was found guilty of gross misconduct. Considering
the respondent’s earlier disbarment case (and subsequent reduction of the penalty imposed as an act of
clemency), and another disbarment case against him still pending review by the Court, we are not fully
and convincingly satisfied that the respondent has already reformed. The period of five (5) years is
likewise not considerably long considering the nature and perversity of the respondent’s misdeeds. We
believe that it is still early for the Court to consider the respondent’s reinstatement.
Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the respondent's sincerity in acknowledging his guilt. While he
expressly stated in his appeal that he had taken full responsibility of his misdemeanor, his previous
inclination to pass the blame to other individuals, to invoke self-denial, and to make alibis for his
wrongdoings, contradicted his assertion. The respondent also failed to submit proof satisfactorily
showing his contrition. He failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he is again worthy of
membership in the legal profession. We thus entertain serious doubts that the respondent had
completely reformed.
__________________________
A.C. No. 2797, October 4, 2002

ROSAURA P. CORDON, complainant, vs. JESUS BALICANTA, respondent.
The relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature. Balicanta cannot hide
behind the corporation’s separate juridical personality because he blatantly used the corporate veil to
perpetrate his fraudulent acts. In this case, it is clear that Balicanta behaved in a way that merits more
than a mere suspension.
____________________________
A.C. No. 5299, August 19, 2003 ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief,
Public Information Office, Complainant, vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Respondent.
The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money is the
primary consideration.
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Rule 2.03 A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01 A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Rule 138, Sec 27 of the Rules of Court states: Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court, grounds therefore.— A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
The following elements distinguish legal profession from business:
1. A duty of public service

2. A relation as an “officer of the court” to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity,
integrity and reliability
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to
current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with
their clients.
________________________________
A.C. No. 10676, September 8, 2015

ATTY. ROY B. ECRAELA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. IAN RAYMOND A. PANGALANGAN, Respondent.
The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess and continue to possess the legal
qualifications for the profession. Good moral character is not only required for admission to the Bar, but
must also be retained in order to maintain one's good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity.
The IBP-CBD Report sufficiently showed by preponderant evidence the grounds by which respondent
has been found committing gross immorality in the conduct of his personal affairs. This Court has, in
numerous occasions, revoked the licenses of lawyers who were proven to have not only failed to retain
good moral character in their professional and personal lives, but have also made a mockery of the
institution of marriage by maintaining illicit affairs. In Guevarra v. Eala, respondent Atty. Eala was
disbarred because he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law, by having an
extramarital affair with the wife of the complainant. In doing so, he betrayed his unfitness to be a
lawyer.
In the present case, complainant alleged that respondent carried on several adulterous and illicit
relations with both married and unmarried women between the years 1990 to 2007, including
complainant's own wife. Through documentary evidences in the form of email messages, as well as the
corroborating testimonies of the witnesses presented, complainant was able to establish respondent's
illicit relations with DDD and CCC by preponderant evidence.
____________________________________
A.C. No. 7136, August 1, 2007

JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, respondent.
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Lawyer’s oath stated that a lawyer should support the Constitution and obey the laws, meaning he shall
not make use of deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, or be
convicted in any crime involving moral turpitude. In the case at bar Atty. Eala was accused of
concubinage under ART. 334 of the Revised Penal Code, “ Any husband who shall keep a mistress in a
conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who
is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium period. Section 2 of ART. XV states that “Marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the state. Respondent’s grossly
immoral conduct runs afoul of the constitution and the laws, that he as a lawyer has sworn to uphold.
Hence the court declared Atty. Jose Emmanul M. Eala DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation
of his oath of office, and violation of canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
____________________________________________
G.R. No. L-16745, December 17, 1966
AURORA CAMARA VDA. DE ZUBIRI, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WENCESLAO ZUBIRI alias BEN, ET AL.,
defendants. WENCESLAO ZUBIRI alias BEN, defendant-appellant
The active participation of a lawyer in one party's affairs relating to a pending case in which the said
lawyer is the counsel for the opposing party is brazenly unethical to say the least. The Canons of Legal
Ethics very explicitly declare that "it is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests" (No. 6), and
command that:
"A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented
by counsel; much less should he undertaken to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but
should deal only with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything
that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and he should not undertake to advise him
as to the law." (No. 9).
_______________________________
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO,
HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR, FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ.
GREGORIO R. CASTILLO. ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES. JR., ANDRES G. GATMAITAN, JUSTINO
H. CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R.
CENIZA, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE V. PESIGAN, petitioners.
In the case of Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation, the SC said:
The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between
attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no practice
should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of deception. Said
attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the names of the deceased partners from their firm name.
The court also made the difference from the law firms and business corporations:
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A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association for a
particular purpose. … It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or business or
of holding property.” Thus, it has been stated that “the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name
in law practice is improper.
We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute the
same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice does not mean that
Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom. Petition suffers legal and
ethical impediment.
______________________________________
A.C. No. 9608, November 27, 2012

MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON, Respondent.
Any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer, be it in the lawyer’s public or private activities, which tends
to show said lawyer deficient in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to
warrant suspension or disbarment. Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members
of the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency.
Respondent has violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by complainant, then a 13-year-old
minor, who for a time was under respondent’s care. Whether the sexual encounter between the
respondent and complainant was or was not with the latter’s consent is of no moment. Respondent
clearly committed a disgraceful, grossly immoral and highly reprehensible act. Such conduct is a
transgression of the standards of morality required of the legal profession and should be disciplined
accordingly. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly states that a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among others, any deceit,
grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required to take before admission to the
practice of law. It bears to stress that membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.
The fact that complainant filed an Affidavit of Desistance during the pendency of this case is of no
moment. A case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a
complainant as in a civil case, but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its
undesirable members in order to protect the public and the courts. A disbarment case is not an
investigation into the acts of respondent but on his conduct as an officer of the court and his fitness to
continue as a member of the Bar. Illicit sexual relations have been previously punished with disbarment,
indefinite or definite suspension, depending on the circumstances.
The Court is mindful of the dictum that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and
only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Thus, where a lesser penalty, such as temporary
suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed. However, in the
present case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar as it appears
to be the most appropriate penalty.
___________________________________________
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A.C. No. 5804, July 1, 2003

BENEDICTO HORNILLA and ATTY. FEDERICO D. RICAFORT, complainants, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO S.
SALUNAT, respondent
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or
claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument
will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been
bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will
require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which
he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first
client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is
whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance thereof.
__________________________________
B.M. No. 810 January 27, 1998

IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH BY ARTHUR M. CUEVAS, JR
Petitioner is allowed to take the LAWYER’S OATH and sign the ROLL OF ATTORNEYS. The Court shares
the sentiment of Atty. Camaligan, father of hazing victim Raul Camaligan, and condoles with the
untimely death of a son who is expected to become a lawyer and succeed his father. In his comment
submitted to the Court, Atty. Camaligan submits petitioner’s plea to be admitted to the membership to
the Philippine Bar, to the sound and judicious discretion of the Court. The deliberate participation of
Cuevas in the senseless beating of a helpless neophyte which resulted to his death indicates that
petitioner does not possess the moral fitness required for admission to the Bar. However, petitioner was
discharged from probation without any infraction thereafter of the conditions of the probation and the
various certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and civic-oriented character prove that he has
taken decisive steps to purge himself of his deficiency in moral character and atone for the unfortunate
death of Camaligan. The Court then decides to give petitioner a chance in the same manner that it
allowed AL ARGOSINO, petitioner’s co-accused to take the lawyer’s oath.
_____________________________________
AC 5713 June 10, 2003

DOMINADOR P. BURBE VS. ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA
The failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees deposited by
complainant, and his attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client, which caused complainant
additional damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part, unbecoming a
member of the law profession. The subsequent reimbursement by the respondent of part of the money
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deposited by complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his misappropriation of
said funds.
____________________________________
A.C. No. 3248. September 18, 1992

DOMINGO R. MARCELO, Petitioner, v. ATTY. ADRIANO S. JAVIER, SR., Respondent.
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and
confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his
duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public. The bar should maintain a high standard of
legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the
legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.
To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in
any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession.
An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney
and counsellor which include the statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. These statutory grounds are so broad as to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his
professional or private capacity. It is a settled rule that the enumeration of the statutory grounds for
disciplinary action is not exclusive and a lawyer may be disciplined on grounds other than those
specifically provided in the law.
_____________________________________
A.M. No. 2756 June 5, 1986

PRUDENTIAL BANK, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSE P. CASTRO and ATTY. BENJAMIN M. GRECIA,
respondents.
Complaint contained several allegations which imputed partiality of the judge in favour of Atty Grecia in
the case of Macro Textile Mills Corporation, Plaintiff, vs. Prudential Bank & Trust Co., Aka The Prudential
Bank and Benjamin Baens del Rosario, Notary Public for Quezon City, Defendants, to wit:
1. The respondent judge failed to act on the Motion for the collection of the proper filing fees.
2. The summary judgment was rendered by Respondent Judge on November 16, 1984 despite
the allegation of fraud and deceit in the Complaint, thereby resulting in the avoidance of
trial and the presentation of witnesses
3. The respondent judge failed to rule on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
complainant.
4. Respondent Judge considered the Summary Judgment final and ordered the issuance of a
Writ of Execution notwithstanding the timely notice of appeal filed by Complainant Bank.
Respondents' foregoing actuations reveal an "unholy alliance" between them and a clear indication of
partiality for the party represented by the other to the detriment of the objective dispensation of
justice. Writs of Attachment and Execution were issued and implemented with lightning speed; the case
itself was railroaded to a swift conclusion through a summary judgment; astronomical sums were
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awarded as damages and attorney's fees; and topping it all, the right to appeal was foreclosed by clever
maneuvers.
Respondent Grecia has been proven to be lacking in fidelity to his oath of office essential to his
continuance as an attorney-at-law. The affirmance on April 23, 1986 by the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R.
CV No. 05611* of the Summary Judgment rendered by Respondent Judge in the Macro Case, for which
reason, Respondent Grecia had moved to dismiss this case against him on May 8, 1986 is not a ground
for the dismissal of this Disbarment Case, the said Decision not having attained finality besides the fact
that the issue herein is the fitness of Respondent Grecia to continue in the practice of law.
____________________________________
G.R. No. 86100-03 January 23, 1990

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ARTURO ALAFRIZ and ASSOCIATES, respondents.
A petition for recovery of attorney's fees, either as a separate civil suit or as an incident in the main
action, has to be prosecuted and the allegations therein established as any other money claim. The
persons who are entitled to or who must pay attorney's fees have the right to be heard upon the
question of their propriety or amount. Hence, the obvious necessity of a hearing is beyond cavil.
Besides, in fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of
quantum meruit, the elements to be considered are generally (1) the importance of the subject matter
in controversy, (2) the extent of the services rendered, and (3) the professional standing of the lawyer.
These are aside from the several other considerations laid down by this Court in a number of decisions
as pointed out by respondent court. A determination of all these factors would indispensably require
nothing less than a full-blown trial where private respondent can adduce evidence to establish its right
to lawful attorney's fees and for petitioner to oppose or refute the same.
______________________________________
Yu vs Palana AC 7747 July 14, 2008
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A high sense of morality, honesty, and
fair dealing is expected and required of a member of the bar. Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that “a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.” The nature of the office of a lawyer requires that s/he shall be of good moral character. This
qualification is not only a condition precedent to the admission to the legal profession, but its continued
possession is essential to maintain one’s good standing in the profession. Indeed, the strength of the
legal profession lies in the dignity and integrity of its members.
In the instant case, respondent’s unjustified withholding of petitioners’ money years after it became due
and demandable demonstrates his lack of integrity and fairness, and this is further highlighted by his
lack of regard for the charges brought against him. Instead of meeting the charges head on, respondent
did not bother to file an answer nor did he participate in the proceedings to offer a valid explanation for
his conduct.
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The Court has emphatically stated that when the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not
enough that s/he denies the charges against him; s/he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence
against him/her. S/he must show proof that s/he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity
which at all times is expected of him/her.
________________________________
Emiliano Court Townhouses vs Atty Dioneda
Generally, a valid written agreement fixing attorney’s fees is conclusive as between the parties. And
when both parties are deemed to have impliedly repudiated the contract and placed themselves in the
position as though there was no express stipulation as to the attorney’s fees, the lawyer’s compensation
shall be determined on the basis of quantum meruit. Here, the Supreme Court considered the demand
of ETCHA for the refund of the entire amount received as attorney’s fees and the counter – proposal of
respondent to deduct reasonable fees for the efforts exerted by him as implied repudiation of the
contract by both parties.
However, to deserve compensation based on quantum meruit the lawyer must prove by substantial
evidence that he is entitled to a reasonable fee for his efforts in pursuing his client’s case with the court
taking into account certain factors in fixing the amount of his fees. It is noteworthy to point out
respondent’s failure to attend any hearing of his disbarment case before the IBP without presenting any
reason. Respondent’s lamentable attitude towards his client’s case is clearly evident from his apparent
disinterest in his own case for disbarment. Therefore, for having missed the opportunities to present
evidence in his favor without any satisfactory explanation as to his non-appearance, he should be
denied compensation based on quantum meruit due to the lack of any factual basis to determine the
value of his work as complainant’s counsel.
AVIDA LAND CORPORATION (FORMERLY LAGUNA PROPERTIES HOLDINGS, INC.), Complainant, vs.
ATTY. AL C. ARGOSINO, Respondent
What is patent from the acts of respondent — as herein narrated and evident from the records – is that
he has made a mockery of judicial processes, disobeyed judicial orders, and ultimately caused unjust
delays in the administration of justice. These acts are in direct contravention of Rules 10.3 and 12.04 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provide:
Rule 10.03 – A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends
of justice.
Rule 12.04 – A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of judgment or misuse court
processes.
Further, respondent violated the Lawyer’s Oath by disobeying the legal orders of a duly constituted
authority, and disregarding his sworn duty to “delay no man for money or malice.”
__________________________
A.C. No. 6183, March 23, 2004 EDISON G. CHENG, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALEXANDER M. AGRAVANTE,
respondent.
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The issue is whether or not the Atty. Agravante is guilty of violating Rules 10.01 and 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The court held in affirmative. Respondent was suspended from practice of
law for one (1) year and is fined the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). Respondent’s filing of
the Memorandum of Appeal four (4) days after the deadline proves that his efforts fell short of the
diligence required of a lawyer. His failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed period constitutes
negligence and malpractice proscribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provide that a
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
Rule 10.01 —A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
The belated filing of the Memorandum of Appeal cannot in any way mitigate respondent’s liability; on
the contrary, it shows ignorance on his part. As a lawyer, he ought to know that his Memorandum of
Appeal, having been filed beyond the reglementary period, would surely be struck down for late filing.
_____________________________
A.C. No. 4269, October 11, 2016 DOLORES NATANAUAN, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ROBERTO P.
TOLENTINO, Respondent.
There was no denial of due process and opportunity to be heard.
Atty. Tolentino, like any respondent in a disbarment or administrative proceeding, is entitled to due
process. The most basic tenet of due process is the right to be heard, hence, denial of due process
means the total lack of opportunity to be heard or to have one's day in court. As a rule, no denial of due
process takes place where a party has been given an opportunity to be heard and to present his case.
Rule 138, Section 30 of the Revised Rules of Court also provides:
Sec. 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. - No attorney shall be removed or
suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice
to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself
or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may
proceed to determine the matter ex-parte.
Contrary to his claims, Atty. Tolentino was not denied due process or deprived of an opportunity to be
heard. The records show that his then counsel Atty. Fuentes filed a Comment on his behalf. He also filed
a Motion for Reconsideration of the May 13, 2011 Resolution of the IBP Board, and a Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration. His participation through pleadings and motions cured whatever defect
that may have attended the issuance of notices regarding the proceedings held before the IBP.
In Vivo v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, We held that any defect in the observance of
due process is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration and that denial of due process cannot
22 | P a g e
be successfully invoked by a party who was afforded the opportunity to be heard. We likewise
reiterated that defects in procedural due process may be cured when the party has been afforded the
opportunity to appeal or to reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
__________________________________
A.M. No. 1625 February 12, 1990 ANGEL L. BAUTISTA, complainant, vs. ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES,
respondent
The issue is whether or not respondent committed serious misconduct involving a champertous
contract. The court held that in affirmative. The respondent was suspended from practice of law for six
(6) months.
The Court finds that the agreement between the respondent and the Fortunados contrary to Canon 42
of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer may not properly agree with a client to
pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04, Code of Professional Responsibility].
Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to
reimbursement. The agreement between respondent and the Fortunados, however, does not provide
for reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an
attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the client’s rights is champertous. Such
agreements are against public policy especially where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry
on the action at his own expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute
[citation omitted]. The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between the
lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur administrative sanctions.
_________________________________
Adm. Case No. 6708 August 25, 2005 (CBD Case No. 01-874) FELICITAS S. QUIAMBAO, Complainant, vs.
ATTY. NESTOR A. BAMBA, Respondent.
In the case at bar, the Supreme Court held that Atty. Bamba’s theory is incorrect that since the
ejectment case and the replevin case are unrelated cases with different issues, parties, and subject
matters, the prohibition is inapplicable. His representation of opposing clients in both cases, though
unrelated, obviously constitutes conflict of interest or, at the least, invites suspicion of double-dealing.
While the respondent may assert that the complainant expressly consented to his continued
representation in the ejectment case, the respondent failed to show that he fully disclosed the facts to
both his clients and he failed to present any written consent of the complainant and AIB as required
under Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
It must be noted that Republic Act No. 5487, otherwise known as the Private Security Agency Law,
prohibits a person from organizing or having an interest in more than one security agency. Thus, in
organizing SESSI, the Atty. Bamba violated Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which mandates lawyers to promote respect for the law and refrain from counseling or abetting
activities aimed at defiance of the law. Atty. Bamba is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of ONE (1) YEAR.
________________________
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AC No. 99-634, June 10, 2002 DOMINADOR P. BURBE, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA,
respondent
In the case at bar, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP
as follows: “It is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law Office was for
the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainant’s deposit of the filing fees for the Regwill
complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of respondent was created and that was to file the
Regwill complaint within the time frame contemplated by his client. The failure of respondent to fulfill
this obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees deposited by complainant, and his attempts to cover
up this misuse of funds of the client, which caused complainant additional damage and prejudice,
constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part, unbecoming a member of the law profession. The
subsequent reimbursement by the respondent of part of the money deposited by complainant for filing
fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his misappropriation of said funds.”
__________________________________
B.M. No. 1222, April 24, 2009 RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS ATTY. DANILO DE GUZMAN, Petitioner
In the case at bar, it is of no question that petitioners act in copying the examination questions from
Atty. Balgos computer without the latter’s knowledge and consent, and which questions later turned out
to be the bar examinations questions in Mercantile Law in the 2003 Bar Examinations, is not at all
commendable. While we do believe that petitioner sincerely did not intend to cause the damage that his
action ensued, still, he must be sanctioned for unduly compromising the integrity of the bar
examinations as well as of this Court.
The court is convinced, however, that petitioner has since reformed and has sincerely reflected on his
transgressions. Thus, in view of the circumstances and likewise for humanitarian considerations, the
penalty of disbarment may now be commuted to suspension. Considering the fact, however, that
petitioner had already been disbarred for more than five (5) years, the same may be considered as
proper service of said commuted penalty and thus, may now be allowed to resume practice of law.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommended that the instant Petition for
Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated 10 November 2008 of petitioner DANILO G. DE GUZMAN be
GRANTED. Petitioners disbarment is now commuted to suspension, which suspension is considered as
served in view of the petitioners five (5) year disbarment. Hence, petitioner may now be allowed to
resume practice of law.
The recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant is well-taken in part. We deem petitioner
worthy of clemency to the extent of commuting his penalty to seven (7) years suspension from the
practice of law, inclusive of the five (5) years he has already served his disbarment.
Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders.[2] While the Court is
ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the
penalty imposed has already served its purpose.
____________________________
24 | P a g e
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995 IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF
SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.
In the case of Re: Petition of Al Argosino to Take the Lawyers Oath (Bar Matter 712), which may be
applied in the instant case, the Court said:
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take
the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following
admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyers oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not
inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout
Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts, to atone for the death of Raul
Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general
tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
________________________________________
G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014 FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA Petitioner, vs. CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA
LOURDES P. A. SERENO, THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., Respondents.
The Court’s Power of Supervision over the JBC Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
provides for the creation of the JBC. The Court was given supervisory authority over it. Section 8
reads: 8.A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector. [Emphasis supplied] As a meaningful guidepost, jurisprudence provides the definition and scope
of supervision. It is the power of oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate officers perform
their duties. It ensures that the laws and the rules governing the conduct of a government entity are
observed and complied with. Supervising officials see to it that rules are followed, but they
themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace
them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform
to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no
discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.
____________________________________
A.C. No. L-1117, March 20, 1944 THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant, vs. ESTANISLAO
R. BAYOT, respondent.
The issue is whether or not the respondent violated the ethics of his profession by having published an
advertisement of his service.
25 | P a g e
Yes. It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the
ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127
expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for
an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and
not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of
mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he
defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple
of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be
forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)
NOTES:
In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for the
period of one month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the public by writing circular
letters. That case, however, was more serious than this because there the solicitations were repeatedly
made and were more elaborate and insistent.
______________________________
A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015 DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ, Complainant, vs. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG and
ATTY. KAREN E. BAYDO, Respondents
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or suspended from
the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral conduct.
“A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.” Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable
members of the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal
act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency. The Court makes
these distinctions, as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral,
not simply immoral, conduct.
Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly immoral conduct.
While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty. Baydo, in itself,
cannot be considered a grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms part of the pattern showing his
propensity towards immoral conduct. Lest it be misunderstood, the Court’s finding of gross immoral
conduct is hinged not on Atty. Catindig’s desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his contracting of a subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of his previous marriage to Gomez.
Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one definitely manifests a
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws. By his own admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of
26 | P a g e
marriage, taking advantage of his legal skills in the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree
of morality required of him as a member of the bar, which thus warrant the penalty of disbarment.
The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the
lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to
prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings
is preponderance of evidence.
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Legal Ethics Case Doctrines | ABACALZO.RATON.

ADVINCULA VS ATTY. MACABATA

BALAOING VS JUDGE CALDERON

Legal Ethics; Code of Professional Responsibility; Complainant Balaoing’s wanton disregard of

PADILLA, J., Dissenting: Definition of “Practice of Law".—What constitutes practice of law? As

CO KIM CHAM VS VALDEZ TAN KEH & JUDGE DIZON

JURISDICTION OF COURTS OF COMMONWEALTH TO CONTINUE PROCEEDINGS IN ACTIONS PENDING IN

MANDAMUS; REFUSAL OF COURT TO Go INTO MERITS OF CASE UPON ERROR OF LAW OR OF

DEL ROSARIO VS MILLADO

E.CONRAD AND GEESLIN VS ATTY. NAVARRO

Attorneys; Disbarment; The purpose of disbarment is not meant as a punishment to deprive an

LICUANAN VS ATTY. MELO

PAFLU VS BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY

PEOPLE VS CASTRO AND JOHN DOE

PEREZ VS CA, CATINDIG

RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED RESTORING INTEGRITY:

SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD ET. AL.

ULEP VS THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.

BM No. 553 June 17, 1993

professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his

It is a jurisprudential rule that the testimony of a self-confessed accomplice or co-conspirator imputing

A.C. No.7054, November 11, 2014

A.C. No. 2797, October 4, 2002

The following elements distinguish legal profession from business:

1. A duty of public service

A.C. No. 10676, September 8, 2015

A.C. No. 7136, August 1, 2007

G.R. No. L-16745, December 17, 1966

A.C. No. 9608, November 27, 2012

A.C. No. 5804, July 1, 2003

B.M. No. 810 January 27, 1998

AC 5713 June 10, 2003

A.C. No. 3248. September 18, 1992

A.M. No. 2756 June 5, 1986

G.R. No. 86100-03 January 23, 1990

Yu vs Palana AC 7747 July 14, 2008

Emiliano Court Townhouses vs Atty Dioneda

There was no denial of due process and opportunity to be heard.

Rule 138, Section 30 of the Revised Rules of Court also provides:

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