1. G.R. Nos.

L-66075-76 July 5, 1990

EULOGIO AGUSTIN, HEIRS OF BALDOMERO LANGCAY, ARTURO BALISI & JUAN LANGCAY, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MARIA MELAD, TIMOTEO MELAD, PABLO BINAYUG & GERONIMA
UBINA, respondents.

Antonio N. Laggui for petitioners.

Pedro R. Perez, Jr. for private respondents.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

The Cagayan River separates the towns of Solana on the west and Tuguegarao on the east in the province of Cagayan. According to
the unrebutted testimony of Romeo Rigor, Geodetic Engineer of the Bureau of Lands, in 1919 the lands east of the river were covered
by the Tuguegarao Cadastre. In 1925, Original Certificate of Title No. 5472 was issued for land east of the Cagayan River owned by
defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin (Exh. 2-Agustin).

As the years went by, the Cagayan River moved gradually eastward, depositing silt on the western bank. The shifting of the river and
the siltation continued until 1968.

In 1950, all lands west of the river were included in the Solana Cadastre. Among these occupying lands covered by the Solana
Cadastre were plaintiffs-private respondents, namely, Pablo Binayug, who has been in possession of Lots 3349, 7876, 7877, 7878,
7879, 7875, 7881, 7882, 7883, 7884, 7885, 7891 and 7892, and Maria Melad, who owns Lot 3351 (Exh. 3-Binayug; Exh. B-Melad).
Pablo Binayug began his possession in 1947. An area of eight (8) hectares was planted to tobacco and corn while 12 hectares were
overgrown with talahib (Exh. C-1 Binayug.) Binayug's Homestead Application No. W-79055 over this land was approved in 1959
(Exh. B-Binayug). Binayug's possession was recognized in the decision in Civil Case No. 101 (Exh. F-Binayug). On the other hand, as
a result of Civil Case No. 343-T, Macario Melad, the predecessor-in-interest of Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad, was issued Original
Certificate of Title No. P-5026 for Lot 3351 of Cad. 293 on June 1, 1956.

Through the years, the Cagayan River eroded lands of the Tuguegarao Cadastre on its eastern bank among which was defendant-
petitioner Eulogio Agustin's Lot 8457 (Exh. E-Melad), depositing the alluvium as accretion on the land possessed by Pablo Binayug
on the western bank.

However, in 1968, after a big flood, the Cagayan River changed its course, returned to its 1919 bed, and, in the process, cut across the
lands of Maria Melad, Timoteo Melad, and the spouses Pablo Binayug and Geronima Ubina whose lands were transferred on the
eastern, or Tuguegarao, side of the river. To cultivate those lots they had to cross the river.

In April, 1969, while the private respondents and their tenants were planting corn on their lots located on the eastern side of the
Cagayan River, the petitioners, accompanied by the mayor and some policemen of Tuguegarao, claimed the same lands as their own
and drove away the private respondents from the premises.

On April 21, 1970, private respondents Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad filed a complaint (Civil Case No. 343-T) to recover Lot No.
3351 with an area of 5 hectares and its 6.6-hectare accretion. On April 24, 1970, private respondent Pablo Binayug filed a separate
complaint (Civil Case No. 344-T) to recover his lots and their accretions.

On June 16, 1975, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby made:

In Civil Case No. 343-T, commanding Eulogio Agustin, Gregorio Tuliao, Jacinto Buquel and Octavio Bancud, or
anybody acting as their representative[s] or agents to vacate Lot No. 3351 of Solana Cadastre together with its
accretion consisting of portions of Lots 9463, 9462 and 9461 of Tuguegarao Cadastre and for these defendants to
restore ownership in favor of Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad who are the only interested heirs of Macario Melad.

In Civil Case No. 344-T, commanding defendants Justo Adduru, Andres Pastor, Teofilo Tagacay, Vicente Camilan,
Nicanor Mora, Baldomero Cagurangan, Domingo Quilang, Cesar Cabalza, Elias Macababbad, Titong Macababbad,
Arturo Balisi, Jose Allabun, Eulogio Agustin, Banong Aquino, Junior Cambri and Juan Langoay, or any of their
agents or representatives to vacate the Lots 3349, 7876, 7877, 7878, 7879, 7875, 7881, 7882, 7883, 7884, 7885,
7891 and 7892, together with its accretion and to restore possession to plaintiffs Pablo Binayug and Geronima
Ubina. Without pronouncement as to damages which were not properly proven and to costs.

SO ORDERED. (As amended by the order dated August 15, 1975.) (pp. 24-25, Rollo.)

Only defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin appealed in Civil Case No. 343-T, while in Civil Case No. 344-T, only defendants-
petitioners Eulogio Agustin, Baldomero Cagurangan (substituted by his heir), Arturo Balisi and Juan Langcay appealed. But upon
motion of plaintiffs-private respondents, the trial court ordered the execution pending appeal of the judgment in Civil Case No. 344-T
against Cagurangan, Balisi and Langcay on the ground that their appeal was dilatory as they had not presented evidence at the trial
(Order dated August 15, 1975).
On November 29, 1983, the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered a decision affirming in toto the judgment of the trial court, with
costs against the defendants-appellants.

In their petition for review of that decision, the petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred:

1. in declaring that the land in question had become part of private respondents' estate as a result of accretion;

2. in declaring that the accretion to private respondents' estate which used to pertain to petitioners' estate cannot
preclude the private respondents from being the owners thereof; and

3. in declaring that the ownership of private respondents over the accretion is not affected by the sudden and abrupt
change in the course of the Cagayan River when it reverted to its old bed

The petition is unmeritorious and must be denied.

The finding of the Court of Appeals that there had been accretions to the lots of the private respondents who did not lose the
ownership of such accretions even after they were separated from the principal lots by the sudden change of course of the river, is a
finding of fact which is conclusive on this Court. That finding is supported by Art. 457 of the New Civil Code which provides:

Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive
from the effects of the current of the waters. (366)

Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2)
that it resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of a
river (Republic vs. CA, 132 SCRA 514).

All these requisites of accretion are present in this case for, as the trial court found:

. . . Cagayan River did move year by year from 1919 to 1968 or for a period of 49 years. Within this period, the
alluvium (sic) deposited on the other side has become greater in area than the original lands of the plaintiffs in both
cases. Still the addition in every year is imperceptible in nature, one could not discern it but can be measured after
the lapse of a certain time. The testimonial evidence in these cases that said Cagayan River moved eastward year by
year is overwhelming as against the denial of defendant Eulogio Agustin alone. Cesar Caronan, one time mayor of
Solana, Cagayan, said so. Arturo Taguian said so. Timoteo Melad said so. Francisco Ubina said so. Geodetic
Engineer Rigor impliedly said so when he testified that when Solana Cadastre was executed in 1950 it overlapped
portions of Tuguegarao Cadastre executed in 1919. This could not have happened if that part of Tuguegarao
Cadastre was not eroded by the overflow of the Cagayan River. These testimonies cannot be destroyed by the
denials of Vicente Cauilan, Marcelo Agustin and Eulogio Agustin alone . . . . (p. 27, Rollo.)

The appellate court confirmed that the accretion on the western bank of the Cagayan River had been going on from 1919 up to 1968 or
for a period of 49 years. It was gradual and imperceptible. Only when Lot No. 3351, with an original area of 5 hectares described in
the free patent that was issued to Macario Melad in June 1956, was resurveyed in 1968 did it become known that 6.6 hectares had
been added to it. Lot No. 3351, covered by a homestead patent issued in June, 1950 to Pablo Binayug, grew from its original area of
18 hectares, by an additional 50 hectares through alluvium as the Cagayan River gradually moved to the east. These accretions belong
to riparian owners upon whose lands the alluvial deposits were made (Roxas vs. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Director of Lands vs. Rizal, 87
Phil. 806). The reason for this principle is because, if lands bordering on streams are exposed to floods and other damage due to the
destructive force of the waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject to encumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is only just
that such risks or dangers as may prejudice the owners thereof should in some way be compensated by the right of accretion (Cortes
vs. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567).i•t•c-aüsl

The private respondents' ownership of the accretion to their lands was not lost upon the sudden and abrupt change of the course of the
Cagayan River in 1968 or 1969 when it reverted to its old 1919 bed, and separated or transferred said accretions to the other side (or
eastern bank) of the river. Articles 459 and 463 of the New Civil Code apply to this situation.

Art. 459. Whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates from an estate on its bank a known portion of
land and transfers it to another estate, the owner of the land to which the segregated portion belonged retains the
ownership of it, provided that he removes the same within two years.

Art. 463. Whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving a piece of land or part thereof isolated,
the owner of the land retains his ownership. He also retains it if a portion of land is separated from the estate by the
current. (Emphasis supplied).

In the case at bar, the sudden change of course of the Cagayan River as a result of a strong typhoon in 1968 caused a portion
of the lands of the private respondents to be "separated from the estate by the current." The private respondents have retained
the ownership of the portion that was transferred by avulsion to the other side of the river.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is
hereby affirmed. Costs against the petitioners.
 2. G.R. No. 73465 September 7, 1989

LEONIDA CUREG, ROMEO, PEPITO, HERNANDO, MANUEL, ANTONIO AND ELPIDIO (ALL SURNAMED
CARNIYAN) petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, (4TH CIVIL CASES DIVISION), DOMINGO APOSTOL, SOLEDAD
GERARDO, ROSA GERARDO, NIEVES GERARDO, FLORDELIZA GERARDO, AND LILIA MAQUINAD, respondent.

Josefin De Alban Law Office for petitioners.

Silvestre Br. Bello for private respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks the reversal of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of
Appeals) dated October 15,1985 in AC-G.R. CV No. 03852 entitled "Domingo Apostol, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Leonida Cureg,
et al., Defendants-Appellants", which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Isabela, Branch XXII declaring private
respondent Domingo Apostol the absolute owner of a parcel of land, situated in Barangay Casibarag-Cajel, Cabagan, Isabela, more
particularly described as follows:

... containing an area of 5.5000 hectares, and bounded, on the north, by Cagayan River; on the east, by Domingo
Guingab; on the south, by Antonio Carniyan; and on the west, by Sabina Mola, with an assessed value of P3,520.
(par. 9 of complaint, p. 4, Record; Emphasis supplied)

On November 5, 1982, private respondents Domingo Apostol, Soledad Gerardo, Rosa Gerardo, Nieves Gerardo, Flordeliza Gerardo
and Lilia Maquinad, filed a complaint for quieting of title and damages with preliminary injunction against herein petitioners Leonida,
Romeo, Pepito, Hernando, Manuel, Antonio and Elpidio, all surnamed Carniyan with the Regional Trial Court of Isabela and docketed
as Civil Case No. Br. 111-373. A temporary restraining order was issued by the trial court on November 12, 1982.

The complaint alleged that private respondents, except Domingo Apostol, are the legal and/or the forced heirs of the late Domingo
Gerardo, who died in February 1944, the latter being the only issue of the late Francisco Gerardo, who died before the outbreak of the
second world war; that since time immemorial and/or before July 26, 1894, the late Francisco Gerardo, together with his predecessors-
in-interest have been in actual, open, peaceful and continuous possession, under a bona fide claim of ownership and adverse to all
other claimants, of a parcel of land (referred to as their "motherland"), situated in Casibarag-Cajel, Cabagan, Isabela, more particularly
described as follows:

... containing an area of 2.5000 hectares, more or less, and bounded on the North, by Cagayan River;on the East, by
Domingo Guingab (formerly Rosa Cureg); on the south by Antonio Carniyan; and on the West by Sabina Mola, ...
(p. 2, Record)

that said land was declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 08-3023 in the name of Francisco Gerardo, which cancels
Tax Declaration No. C-9669, also in the name of Francisco Gerardo; that upon the death of Francisco Gerardo, the ownership and
possession of the "motherland" was succeeded by his only issue, Domingo Gerardo who, together with three (3) legal or forced heirs,
namely Soledad Gerardo, one of private respondents herein, Primo Gerardo and Salud Gerardo, both deceased, have also been in
actual, open, peaceful and continuous possession of the same; that Primo Gerardo is survived by herein respondents, Rosa, Nieves and
Flordeliza, all surnamed Gerardo and Salud Gerardo is survived by respondent Lilia Maquinad; that in 1979, respondents Soledad
Gerardo, Rosa Gerardo, Nieves Gerardo, Flordeliza Gerardo and Lilia Maquinad verbally sold the "motherland" to co-respondent
Domingo Apostol; that on September 10, 1982, the verbal sale and conveyance was reduced into writing by the vendors who executed
an "Extra-Judicial Partition with Voluntary Reconveyance (Exhibit "Q", p. 206, Rollo); that about the time of the execution of the
Extra-Judicial Partition, their "motherland" already showed/manifested signs of accretion of about three (3) hectares on the north
caused by the northward movement of the Cagayan River; that Domingo Apostol declared the motherland and its accretion for tax
purposes under Tax Declaration No. 08-13281 on September 15, 1982.

The complaint also stated that sometime about the last week of September and/or the first week of October 1982, when private
respondents were about to cultivate their "motherland" together with its accretion, they were prevented and threatened by defendants
(petitioners herein) from continuing to do so. Named defendants in said case are herein petitioners Leonida Cureg and Romeo, Pepito,
Hernando, Manuel, Antonio and Elpidio, all surnamed Carniyan, surviving spouse and children, respectively, of Antonio Carniyan.
Further, the complaint stated that Antonio Carniyan was the owner of a piece of land situated in Casibarag-Cajel, Cabagan, Isabela
and more particularly described as follows:

... containing an area of 2,790 sq. m., more or less bounded on the north by Domingo Gerardo; on the East, by
Domingo Guingab; on the south, by Pelagio Camayo; and on the west by Marcos Cureg, declared for taxation
purposes under Tax Declaration No. 13131, with an assessed value of P70.00. (P. 5, Record)

that deceased Antonio Carniyan revised on November 28, 1968 his Tax Declaration No. 13131 dated July 24, 1961 to conform with
the correct area and boundaries of his Original Certificate of Title No. P-19093 issued on November 25, 1968; that the area under the
new Tax Declaration No.15663 was increased from 2,790 square meters to 4,584 square meters and the boundary on the north became
Cagayan River, purposely eliminating completely the original boundary on the north which is Domingo Gerardo.

Petitioners' answer alleged that the "motherland" claimed by private respondents is non-existent; that Antonio Carniyan, petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest, was the owner of a piece of land bounded on the north by Cagayan River and not by the land of Francisco
Gerardo as claimed by private respondents; that the "subject land" is an accretion to their registered land and that petitioners have been
in possession and cultivation of the "accretion" for many years now.
The application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was denied on July 28,1983 (pp. 244-250, Rollo) on the ground
that the defendants were in actual possession of the land in litigation prior to September 1982. In a decision rendered on July 6, 1984,
the trial court held that respondent Domingo Apostol, thru his predecessors-in-interest had already acquired an imperfect title to the
subject land and accordingly, rendered judgment: 1. declaring Domingo Apostol its absolute owner; 2. ordering the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction against herein petitioners; 3. ordering that the writ be made permanent; and 4. ordering herein petitioners to
pay private respondents a reasonable attorney's fee of P5,000.00, litigation expenses of P1,500.00 and costs (pp. 143-145, Rollo).

On July 17, 1984, petitioners appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the trial court on
October 15, 1985. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied on January 8, 1986. Hence, this petition for review on the
following assigned errors:

A. It erred in ruling that the subject land or "accretion" (which is bounded on the north by the Cagayan River)
belongs to the private respondents and not to the petitioners when the petitioners "Original Certificate of " Title No.
19093 states clearly that the petitioners' land is bounded on its north by the Cagayan River.

B. It erred in construing the tax declarations against the interest of the herein petitioners who are only the heirs of
the late Antonio Carniyan since the late Francisco (supposed predecessor of the respondents) could not have
executed the recently acquired tax declarations (Exhibits "A" to "A-2") as he died long before World War II and
since the late Antonio Carniyan could no longer stand up to explain his side.

C. Contrary to the evidence and the finding of the Regional Trial Court, it wrongly ruled that petitioners have never
been in possession of the land (p. 7 of Annex "A", ibid.).

D. It erred in awarding the accretion of 3.5 hectares to the private respondents who incredibly claimed that the
accretion occurred only in 1982 and is a "gift from the Lord. (pp. 24-25, Rollo)

This petition is impressed with merit.

The object of the controversy in this case is the alleged "motherland" of private respondents together with the accretion of about 3.5
hectares, the totality of which is referred to in this decision as the "subject land."

In this case, petitioners claimed to be riparian owners who are entitled to the "subject land" which is an accretion to the registered land
while private respondents claimed to be entitled to the 3.5 hectares accretion attached to their "motherland."

It should be noted that the herein private respondents' claim of ownership of their alleged two and a half (2 & ½) hectare "motherland"
is anchored mainly on four (4) tax declarations (Exhibits "A", "A-1", "A-2" and "B", pp. 191, 192, 193, 194, Rollo). This Court has
repeatedly held that the declaration of ownership for purposes of assessment on the payment of the tax is not sufficient evidence to
prove ownership. (Evangelista v. Tabayuyong, 7 Phil. 607; Elumbaring v. Elumbaring, 12 Phil. 384; cited in Camo v. Riosa Bayco, 29
Phil. 437, 444). For their part, petitioners relied on the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of their Original Certificate of Title No.
P-19093, dated November 25, 1968 (Exhibit "3", p. 189, Rollo) issued in the name of Antonio Carniyan (petitioners' predecessor-in-
interest) pursuant to Free Patent No. 399431 dated May 21, 1968, clearly showing that the boundary of petitioners' land on the north is
Cagayan River and not the "motherland" claimed by respondents. The said registered land was bought by the late Antonio Carniyan
from his father-in-law, Marcos Cureg, on October 5, 1956, as evidenced by an Absolute Deed of Sale (Exhibit "8", p. 195, Rollo)
which states that the land is bounded on the north by Cagayan River.

In the case of Ferrer-Lopez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50420, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 393,401-402, We ruled that as against an
array of proofs consisting of tax declarations and/or tax receipts which are not conclusive evidence of ownership nor proof of the area
covered therein, an original certificate of title indicates true and legal ownership by the registered owners over the disputed premises.
Petitioners' OCT No.P-19093 should be accorded greater weight as against the tax declarations (Exhibit "A', dated 1979; Exhibit "A-1
" undated and Exhibit "A2" dated 1967, pp. 191, 192, 193, Rollo) offered by private respondents in support of their claim, which
declarations are all in the name of private respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Francisco Gerardo, and appear to have been subscribed
by him after the last war, when it was established during the trial that Francisco Gerardo died long before the outbreak of the last war.

Anent Tax Declaration No. 13131, in the name of Antonio Carniyan (Exhibit "C", p. 203, Rollo), which the appellate court considered
as an admission by him that his land is bounded on the north by the land of Domingo Gerardo and that he (Carniyan) is now estopped
from claiming otherwise, We hold that said tax declaration, being of an earlier date cannot defeat an original certificate of title which
is of a later date. Since petitioner's original certificate of title clearly stated that subject land is bounded on the north by the Cagayan
River, private respondents" claim over their "motherland," allegedly existing between petitioners" land and the Cagayan River, is
deemed barred and nullified with the issuance of the original certificate of title.

It is an elemental rule that a decree of registration bars all claims and rights which arose or may have existed prior to the decree of
registration (Ferrer-Lopez v. CA, supra., p. 404). By the issuance of the decree, the land is bound and title thereto quieted, subject only
to exceptions stated in Section 39, Act 496 (now Sec. 44 of PD No. 1529). Moreover, the tax declarations of the late Antonio Camiyan
subsequent to the issuance of OCT P-19093 (Exhibit "D", p. 204, Rollo) already states that its northern boundary is Cagayan River. In
effect, he has repudiated any previous acknowledgment by him, granting that he caused the accomplishment of the tax declarations in
his name before the issuance of OCT No. P- 19093, of the existence of Francisco Gerardo's land.

Finally, the trial court concluded that petitioners have never been in possession of the "subject land" but the evidence on record proves
otherwise. First, the trial court on page 11 of its Decision (p. 121, Rollo), stated the reason for denying private respondents' petition for
the issuance of a preliminary injunction, that is, "... the defendants (petitioners herein) were in actual possession of the land in
litigation prior to September, 1982" (p. 121, Rollo). Second, witness for private respondents, Esteban Guingab, boundary owner on the
east of the land in question and whose own land is bounded on the north of Cagayan River, on cross-examination, revealed that when
his property was only more than one (1) hectare in 1958, (now more than 4 hectares) his boundary on the west is the land of Antonio
Carniyan (T.S.N., 5 May 1983, pp. 19-20). Third, witness Rogelio C. Albano, a geodetic engineer, on direct examination stated that in
1974, the late Antonio Carniyan requested him to survey the land covered by his title and the accretion attached to it, but he did not
pursue the same because he learned from the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Lands that the same accretion is the subject of an
application for homestead patent of one Democrata Aguila, (T.S.N., May 18, 1984, pp. 12-13) contrary to the statement of the trial
court and the appellate court that Albano "made three attempts to survey the land but he did not continue to survey because persons
other than defendants were in possession of the land," which statement appears only to be a conclusion (p. 7, Rollo). Fourth, We note
Exhibit "20" (p. 273, Rollo) for petitioners which is an order by the Director of Lands dated August 14,1980 in connection with the
Homestead Application of Democrata Aguila of an accretion situated in Catabayungan, Cabagan, Isabela. Aguila's application was
disapproved because in an investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands of the area applied for which is an accretion, the same was
found to be occupied and cultivated by, among others, Antonio Carniyan, who claimed it as an accretion to his land. It is worthy to
note that none of the private respondents nor their predecessors-in-interest appeared as one of those found occupying and cultivating
said accretion.

On the other hand, the allegation of private respondents that they were in possession of the "motherland" through their predecessors-
in-interest had not been proved by substantial evidence. The assailed decision of the respondent court, which affirmed the decision of
the trial court, stated that since the "motherland" exists, it is also presumed that private respondents were in possession of the "subject
land" through their predecessors- in-interest since prior to July 26, 1894. The trial court relied on the testimony of Soledad Gerardo,
one of the private respondents in this case, an interested and biased witness, regarding their possession of the "motherland." From her
testimony on pedigree, the trial court presumed that the source of the property, the late Francisco Gerardo, was in possession of the
same since prior to July 26, 1894 (pp. 137-140, Rollo).

The foregoing considerations indubitably show that the alleged "motherland" claimed by private respondents is nonexistent. The
"subject land" is an alluvial deposit left by the northward movement of the Cagayan River and pursuant to Article 457 of the New
Civil Code:

To the owners of land adjoining the banks of river belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters.

However, it should be noted that the area covered by OCT No. P-19093 is only four thousand five hundred eighty four (4,584) square
meters. The accretion attached to said land is approximately five and a half (5.5) hectares. The increase in the area of petitioners'land,
being an accretion left by the change of course or the northward movement of the Cagayan River does not automatically become
registered land just because the lot which receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. (See Grande v. Court of Appeals, L-
17652, June 30, 1962). As such, it must also be placed under the operation of the Torrens System. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is
hereby GRANTED. The decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING
Civil Case No. Br. III-373 for quieting of title and damages.
G.R. No. 77294 December 12, 1988
3. ANGELICA VIAJAR and CELSO VIAJAR, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, LEONOR P. LADRIDO, LOURDES LADRIDO IGNACIO, EUGENIO P. LADRIDO and L P.
LADRIDO, defendants-appellees.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.
Miraflores Law Offices for respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 29, 1986, in CA-G.R. CV No.
69942 entitled, "ANGELICA VIAJAR, et. al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus LEONOR LADRIDO, et. al., Defendants-
Appellees," affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Iloilo dated December 10, 1981.

The antecedent facts in the instant case are as follows: The spouses Ricardo Y. Ladrido and Leonor P. Ladrido were the owners of Lot
No. 7511 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan situated in barangay Cawayan, Pototan, Iloilo. This lot contained an area of 154,267
square meters and was registered in the names of the spouses under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21940 of the Register of Deeds
of Iloilo.

Spouses Rosendo H. Te and Ana Te were also the registered owners of a parcel of land described in their title as Lot No. 7340 of the
Cadastral Survey of Pototan.

On September 6, 1973, Rosendo H. Te, with the conformity of Ana Te, sold this lot to Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar for
P5,000. A Torrens title was later issued in the names of Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar.

Later, Angelica F. Viajar had Lot No. 7340 relocated and found out that the property was in the possession of Ricardo Y. Ladrido.
Consequently, she demanded its return but Ladrido refused.

On February 15, 1974, Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar instituted a civil action for recovery of possession and damages against
Ricardo Y. Ladrido. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 9660 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. Summoned to plead,
defendant Ladrido filed his answer with a counterclaim. Plaintiffs filed their reply to the answer.

Subsequently, the complaint was amended to implead Rosendo H. Te as another defendant. Plaintiffs sought the annulment of the
deed of sale and the restitution of the purchase price with interest in the event the possession of defendant Ladrido is sustained.
Defendant Te filed his answer to the amended complaint and he counter claimed for damages. Plaintiffs answered the counterclaim.

During the pendency of the case, plaintiff Celso F. Viajar sold his rights over Lot No. 7340 to his mother and co-plaintiff, Angelica F.
Viajar. For this reason, plaintiff Angelica F. Viajar now appears to be the sole registered owner of this lot.

On May 25, 1978, defendant Ladrido died. He was substituted in the civil action by his wife, Leonor P. Ladrido, and children, namely:
Lourdes Ladrido-Ignacio, Eugenio P. Ladrido and Manuel P. Ladrido, as parties defendants.

The facts admitted by the parties during the pre-trial show that the piece of real property which used to be Lot No. 7340 of the
Cadastral Survey of Pototan was located in barangay Guibuanogan Pototan, Iloilo; that it consisted of 20,089 square meters; that at the
time of the cadastral survey in 1926, Lot No. 7511 and Lot No. 7340 were separated by the Suague River; that the area of 11,819
square meters of what was Lot No. 7340 has been in the possession of the defendants; that the area of 14,036 square meters, which
was formerly the river bed of the Suague River per cadastral survey of 1926, has also been in the possession of the defendants; and
that the plaintiffs have never been in actual physical possession of Lot No. 7340.

After trial on the merits, a second amended complaint which included damages was admitted.

The plaintiffs raised the following issues to be resolved:

1. Whether the change in the course of the Suague River was sudden as claimed by the plaintiffs
or gradual as contended by the defendants;

2. Assuming arguendo it was gradual, whether or not the plaintiffs are still entitled to Lot "B'
appearing in Exhibit "4" and to one-half (½) of Lot "A," also indicated in Exhibit "4;" and

3. Damages (pp. 12-13, Rollo).

On December 10, 1981, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs:

1. Dismissing the complaint of plaintiffs Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar with costs against
them;

2. Declaring defendants Leonor P. Ladrido, Lourdes Ladrido-Ignacio, Eugenio P. Ladrido and

Manuel P. Ladrido as owner of the parcel of land indicated as Lots A and B in the sketch plan
 (Exhs. 'C' as well as '4,' '4-B' and '4-C') situated in barangays Cawayan and Guibuanogan Pototan,
Iloilo, and containing an area of 25,855 square meters, more or less; and

3. Pronouncing that as owners of the land described in the preceding paragraph, the defendants are
entitled to the possession thereof.

Defendants' claim for moral damages and attorney's fees are dismissed.

SO ORDERED (p. 36, Rollo).

Not satisfied with the decision, the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals and assigned the following errors:

I.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO LOT B
APPEARING IN EXHIBIT "4" AND TO ONE-HALF (½) OF LOT A IN THE SAID EXHIBIT "4."

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFFS (p. 42, Rollo).

As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the court a quo. Plaintiffs (the petitioners herein) now come to Us
claiming that the Court of Appeals palpably erred in affirming the decision of the trial court on the ground that the change in the
course of the Suague River was gradual and not sudden.

In the decision appealed from, the Court of Appeals held:

This appeal is not impressed with merit.

Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides that:

Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.

The presumption is that the change in the course of the river was gradual and caused by accretion and erosion
(Martinez Canas vs. Tuason, 5 Phil. 668; Payatas Estate Improvement Co. vs. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55; C.H. Hodges vs.
Garcia, 109 Phil. 133). In the case at bar, the lower court correctly found that the evidence introduced by the
plaintiff to show that the change in the course of the Suague River was sudden or that it occurred through avulsion is
not clear and convincing.

Contrariwise, the lower court found that:

... the defendants have sufficiently established that for many years after 1926 a gradual accretion on the eastern side
of Lot No. 7511 took place by action of the current of the Suague River so that in 1979 an alluvial deposit of 29,912
square meters (2.9912 hectares), more or less, had been added to Lot No. 7511. (Exhs. '1' as well as Exhs. 'C' and
'4'). Apropos it should be observed that the accretion consisted of Lot A with an area of 14,036 square meters; Lot B,
11,819 square meters; and Lot C, 4,057 square meters. (Exhs. '4-B,' '4-C' and '4-D'). Only Lot C is not involved in
this litigation. (See Pre-trial Order, supra)

The established facts indicate that the eastern boundary of Lot No. 7511 was the Suague River based on the
cadastral plan. For a period of more than 40 years (before 1940 to 1980) the Suague River overflowed its banks
yearly and the property of the defendant gradually received deposits of soil from the effects of the current of the
river. The consequent increase in the area of Lot No. 7511 due to alluvion or accretion was possessed by the
defendants whose tenants plowed and planted the same with coin and tobacco.

The quondam river bed had been filled by accretion through the years. The land is already plain and there is no
indication on the ground of any abandoned river bed. The river bed is definitely no longer discernible now.

What used to be the old river bed (Lot A) is in level with Lot No. 7511. So are the two other areas to the East. (Lots
B and C) Lots A, B and C are still being cultivated.

Under the law, accretion which the banks or rivers may gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters becomes the property of the owners of the lands adjoining the banks. (Art. 366, Old Civil Code; Art. 457,
New Civil Code which took effect on August 30, 1950 [Lara v. Del Rosario, 94 Phil. 778]. Therefore, the accretion
to Lot No. 7511 which consists of Lots A and B (see Exhs. 'C' and '4') belongs to the defendants (pp. 34-35, Record
on Appeal).

We find no cogent reason to disturb the foregoing finding and conclusion of the lower court.
 The second assignment of error is a mere offshoot of the first assignment of error and does not warrant further
discussion (pp. 4244, Rollo).

The petition is without merit.

The petitioners contend that the first issue raised during the trial of the case on the merits in the Court of First Instance, that is,
"whether the change in the course of the Suague River was sudden as claimed by the plaintiffs or gradual as contended by the
defendants," was abandoned and never raised by them in their appeal to the Court of Appeals. Hence, the Court of Appeals, in holding
that the appeal is without merit, because of the change of the Suague River was gradual and not sudden, disposed of the appeal on an
issue that was never raised and, accordingly, its decision is void. In support of its contention, petitioners cite the following authorities:

It is a well-known principle in procedure that courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not
in issue (Lim Toco vs. Go Fay, 80 Phil. 166).

A judgment going outside the issues and purporting to adjudicate something upon which the parties were not heard,
is not merely irregular, but extra-judicial and invalid ( Salvante vs. Cruz, 88 Phil. 236-244; Lazo vs. Republic Surety
& Insurance Co., Inc., 31 SCRA 329, 334).

The pivotal issue in the petitioners' appeal was whether the change in the course of the Suague River was gradual or sudden because
the trial court below resolved the same in its decision thus subjecting the same to review by respondent appellate court. By simply
abandoning this issue, the petitioners cannot hope that the affirmance of the decision wherein this issue was resolved makes the
decision of the Court of Appeals void. In effect, the petitioners are expounding a new procedural theory that to render a questioned
decision void, all that has to be done is to simply abandon on appeal the pivotal issue as resolved by the lower court and when its
decision is affirmed on appeal, attack the decision of the appellate court as void on the principle that a court of justice has no
jurisdiction or power to decide the question not in issue. This is not correct. Even the authorities cited by the petitioners, more
specifically the Salvante and Lazo cases, supra, do not support their contention. They were heard in the trial court and they cannot
complain that the proceeding below was irregular and hence, invalid.

The trial court found that the change in the course of the Suague River was gradual and this finding was affirmed by the respondent
Court of Appeals. We do not find any valid reason to disturb this finding of fact.

Article 457 of the New Civil Code (reproduced from Article 366 of the Old), the law applied by the courts a quoprovides:

Art. 457. To the owners of the lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive
from the effects of the current of the waters.

Petitioners contend that this article must be read together with Sections 45 an 46 of Act No. 496 which provides:

SEC. 45. 1 The obtaining of a decree of registration and the entry of a certificate of title shall be regarded as an
agreement running with the land, and binding upon the applicant and all successors in title that the land shall be and
always remain registered land, and subject to the provisions of this Act and all Acts amendatory thereof.

SEC. 46. 2 No title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription
or adverse possession.

As a result, petitioners contend, Article 457 of the New Civil Code must be construed to limit the accretion mentioned therein as
accretion of unregistered land to the riparian owner, and should not extend to registered land. Thus, the lot in question having
remained the registered land of the petitioners, then the private respondents cannot acquire title there in derogation to that of the
petitioners, by accretion, for that will defeat the indefeasibility of a Torrens Title.

The rule that registration under the Torrens System does not protect the riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his
registered land through gradual changes in the course of an adjoining stream is well settled. In Payatas Estate Improvement Co. vs.
Tuason, 53 Phil. 55, We ruled:

The controversy in the present cases seems to be due to the erroneous conception that Art. 366 of the Civil Code
does not apply to Torrens registered land. That article provides that "any accretions which the banks of rivers may
gradually receive from the effects of the current belong to the owners of the estates bordering thereon." Accretions
of that character are natural incidents to land bordering on running streams and are not affected by the registration
laws. It follows that registration does not protect the riparian owner against diminution of the area of his land
through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream.

In C.N. Hodges vs. Garcia, 109 Phil. 133, We also ruled:

It clearly appearing that the land in question has become part of defendant's estate as a result of accretion, it follows
that said land now belongs to him. The fact that the accretion to his land used to pertain to plaintiffs estate, which is
covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title, cannot preclude him (defendant) from being the owner thereof.
Registration does not protect the riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his land through gradual
changes in the course of the adjoining stream. Accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the
effect of the current become the property of the owners of the banks (Art. 366 of the Old Civil Code; Art. 457 of the
New). Such accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on running streams and the provisions of the Civil
Code in that respect are not affected by the Registration Act.
We find no valid reason to review and abandon the aforecited rulings.

As the private respondents are the owners of the premises in question, no damages are recoverable from them.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
4. 4. G.R. No. 98045 June 26, 1996

DESAMPARADO VDA. DE NAZARENO and LETICIA NAZARENO TAPIA, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, MR. & MRS. JOSE SALASALAN, MR. & MRS. LEO RABAYA, AVELINO LABIS, HON.
ROBERTO G. HILARIO, ROLLEO I. IGNACIO, ALBERTO M. GILLERA and HON. ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR., in
their official and/or private capacities, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:p

Petitioners Desamparado Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia Nazareno Tapia challenge the decision of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the dismissal of petitioners' complaint by the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 22. The
complaint was for annulment of the verification, report and recommendation, decision and order of the Bureau of Lands
regarding a parcel of public land.

The only issue involved in this petition is whether or not petitioners exhausted administrative remedies before having
recourse to the courts.

The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land situated in Telegrapo, Puntod, Cagayan de Oro City. Said land was
formed as a result of sawdust dumped into the dried-up Balacanas Creek and along the banks of the Cagayan river.

Sometime in 1979, private respondents Jose Salasalan and Leo Rabaya leased the subject lots on which their houses
stood from one Antonio Nazareno, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. In the latter part of 1982, private respondents
allegedly stopped paying rentals. As a result, Antonio Nazareno and petitioners filed a case for ejectment with the
Municipal Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 4. A decision was rendered against private respondents, which
decision was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 20.

The case was remanded to the municipal trial court for execution of judgment after the same became final and executory.
Private respondents filed a case for annulment of judgment before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch
24 which dismissed the same. Antonio Nazareno and petitioners again moved for execution of judgment but private
respondents filed another case for certiorari with prayer for restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the
Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 25 which was likewise dismissed. The decision of the lower court was
finally enforced with the private respondents being ejected from portions of the subject lots they occupied..

Before he died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of the survey plan designated as Plan
Csd-106-00571 with a view to perfecting his title over the accretion area being claimed by him. Before the approved
survey plan could be released to the applicant, however, it was protested by private respondents before the Bureau of
Lands.

In compliance with the order of respondent District Land Officer Alberto M. Gillera, respondent Land Investigator Avelino
G. Labis conducted an investigation and rendered a report to the Regional Director recommending that Survey Plan No.
MSI-10-06-000571-D (equivalent to Lot No. 36302, Cad. 237) in the name of Antonio Nazareno, be cancelled and that
private respondents be directed to file appropriate public land applications.

Based on said report, respondent Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands Roberto Hilario rendered a decision ordering
the amendment of the survey plan in the name of Antonio Nazareno by segregating therefrom the areas occupied by the
private respondents who, if qualified, may file public land applications covering their respective portions.

Antonio Nazareno filed a motion for reconsideration with respondent Rolleo Ignacio, Undersecretary of the Department of
Natural Resources and Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Lands who denied the motion. Respondent Director of Lands
Abelardo Palad then ordered him to vacate the portions adjudicated to private respondents and remove whatever
improvements they have introduced thereon. He also ordered that private respondents be placed in possession thereof.

Upon the denial of the late Antonio Nazareno's motion for reconsideration, petitioners Desamparado Vda. de Nazareno
and Leticia Tapia Nazareno, filed a case before the RTC, Branch 22 for annulment of the following: order of investigation
by respondent Gillera, report and recommendation by respondent Labis, decision by respondent Hilario, order by
respondent Ignacio affirming the decision of respondent Hilario and order of execution by respondent Palad. The RTC
dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies which resulted in the finality of the administrative
decision of the Bureau of Lands.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC dismissing the complaint. Applying Section 4 of C.A.
No. 141, as amended, it contended that the approval of the survey plan belongs exclusively to the Director of Lands.
Hence, factual findings made by the Metropolitan Trial Court respecting the subject land cannot be held to be controlling
as the preparation and approval of said survey plans belong to the Director of Lands and the same shall be conclusive
when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural resources. 1

Furthermore, the appellate court contended that the motion for reconsideration filed by Antonio Nazareno cannot be
considered as an appeal to the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as mandated by C.A. No.
141 inasmuch as the same had been acted upon by respondent Undersecretary Ignacio in his capacity as Officer-in-
charge of the Bureau of Lands and not as Undersecretary acting for the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
For the failure of Antonio Nazareno to appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the present case
does not fall within the exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. It also held that there was no
showing of oppressiveness in the manner in which the orders were issued and executed..

Hence, this petition.

Petitioners assign the following errors:

I. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IN A WHIMSICAL, ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS

MANNER AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE
PREVAILING FACTS AND THE LAW ON THE MATTER;

II. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IN A WHIMSICAL, ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS

MANNER AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT DISMISSING THE ORIGINAL CASE
WHICH FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE EXECUTION ORDER OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT
ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR., DIRECTOR OF LANDS, MANILA, PRACTICALLY CHANGED THE
DECISION OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT ROBERTO HILARIO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF
LANDS, REGION 10, THUS MAKING THE CASE PROPER SUBJECT FOR ANNULMENT WELL
WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURT.

The resolution of the above issues, however, hinges on the question of whether or not the subject land is public land.
Petitioners claim that the subject land is private land being an accretion to his titled property, applying Article 457 of the
Civil Code which provides:

To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive
from the effects of the current of the waters.

In the case of Meneses v. CA, 2 this Court held that accretion, as a mode of acquiring property under Art. 457 of the Civil
Code, requires the concurrence of these requisites : (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where accretion
takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast). These are called the rules on alluvion which if present in a
case, give to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received from the
effects of the current of waters.

For petitioners to insist on the application of these rules on alluvion to their case, the above-mentioned requisites must be
present. However, they admit that the accretion was formed by the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials on
portions of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River bounding their land. 3 It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the
accumulation of such boulders, soil and other filling materials was gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the action of
the waters or the current of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River. In Hilario v. City of Manila, 4 this Court held that
the word "current" indicates the participation of the body of water in the ebb and flow of waters due to high and low tide.
Petitioners' submission not having met the first and second requirements of the rules on alluvion, they cannot claim the
rights of a riparian owner.

In any case, this court agrees with private respondents that petitioners are estopped from denying the public character of
the subject land, as well as the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands when the late Antonio Nazareno filed his Miscellaneous
Sales Application MSA (G-6) 571. 5 The mere filing of said Application constituted an admission that the land being
applied for was public land, having been the subject of Survey Plan No. MSi-10-06-000571-D (Equivalent to Lot No.
36302, Cad-237) which was conducted as a consequence of Antonio Nazareno's Miscellaneous Sales Application
wherein said land was described as an orchard. Said description by Antonio Nazareno was, however, controverted by
respondent Labis in his investigation report to respondent Hilario based on the findings of his ocular inspection that said
land actually covers a dry portion of Balacanas Creek and a swampy portion of Cagayan River. The investigation report
also states that, except for the swampy portion which is fully planted to nipa palms, the whole area is fully occupied by a
part of a big concrete bodega of petitioners and several residential houses made of light materials, including those of
private respondents which were erected by themselves sometime in the early part of 1978. 6

Furthermore, the Bureau of Lands classified the subject land as an accretion area which was formed by deposits of
sawdust in the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan river, in accordance with the ocular inspection conducted by the
Bureau of Lands. 7 This Court has often enough held that findings of administrative agencies which have acquired
expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but even
finality. 8 Again, when said factual findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the same are conclusive on the parties
and not reviewable by this Court. 9

It is this Court's irresistible conclusion, therefore, that the accretion was man-made or artificial. In Republic v. CA, 10this
Court ruled that the requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable.
This excludes from Art. 457 of the Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention. Putting it differently, alluvion
must be the exclusive work of nature. Thus, in Tiongco v. Director of Lands, et al., 11 where the land was not formed solely
by the natural effect of the water current of the river bordering said land but is also the consequence of the direct and
deliberate intervention of man, it was deemed a man-made accretion and, as such, part of the public domain.

In the case at bar, the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley Lumber Co.
consequent to its sawmill
operations. 12 Even if this Court were to take into consideration petitioners' submission that the accretion site was the
result of the late Antonio Nazareno's labor consisting in the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials into the
Balacanas Creek and Cagayan River bounding his land, 13 the same would still be part of the public domain.

Having determined that the subject land is public land, a fortiori, the Bureau of Lands, as well as the Office of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have jurisdiction over the same in accordance with the Public Land Law.
Accordingly, the court a quo dismissed petitioners' complaint for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies which ruling
the Court of Appeals affirmed.

However, this Court agrees with petitioners that administrative remedies have been exhausted. Petitioners could not have
intended to appeal to respondent Ignacio as an Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau of Lands. The decision being appealed
from was the decision of respondent Hilario who was the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands. Said decision was
made "for and by authority of the Director of Lands". 14 It would be incongruous to appeal the decision of the Regional
Director of the Bureau of Lands acting for the Director of the Bureau of Lands to an Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau of
Lands.

In any case, respondent Rolleo Ignacio's official designation was "Undersecretary of the Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resources." He was only an "Officer-In-Charge" of the Bureau of Lands. When he acted on the late Antonio
Nazareno's motion for reconsideration by affirming or adopting respondent Hilario's decision, he was acting on said
motion as an Undersecretary on behalf of the Secretary of the Department. In the case of Hamoy v. Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, 15 this Court held that the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources may
modify, adopt, or set aside the orders or decisions of the Director of Lands with respect to questions involving public lands
under the administration and control of the Bureau of Lands and the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. He
cannot, therefore, be said to have acted beyond the bounds of his jurisdiction under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 16

As borne out by the administrative findings, the controverted land is public land, being an artificial accretion of sawdust.
As such, the Director of Lands has jurisdiction, authority and control over the same, as mandated under Sections 3 and 4
of the Public Land Law (C.A. No. 141) which states, thus:

Sec. 3. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be the exclusive officer charged with
carrying out the provisions of this Act through the Director of Lands who shall act under his immediate
control.

Sec. 4. Subject to said control, the Director of Lands shall have direct executive control of the survey,
classification, lease, sale or any other form of concession or disposition and management of the lands of
the public domain, and his decisions as to questions of fact shall be conclusive when approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

In connection with the second issue, petitioners ascribe whim, arbitrariness or capriciousness in the execution order of
public respondent Abelardo G. Palad, the Director of Lands. This Court finds otherwise since said decision was based on
the conclusive finding that the subject land was public land. Thus, this Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the
Director of Lands acted within his rights when he issued the assailed execution order, as mandated by the aforecited
provisions.

Petitioners' allegation that respondent Palad's execution order directing them to vacate the subject land practically
changed respondent Hilario's decision is baseless. It is incorrect for petitioners to assume that respondent Palad awarded
portions of the subject land to private respondents Salasalans and Rabayas as they had not yet been issued patents or
titles over the subject land. The execution order merely directed the segregation of petitioners' titled lot from the subject
land which was actually being occupied by private respondents before they were ejected from it. Based on the finding that
private respondents were actually in possession or were actually occupying the subject land instead of petitioners,
respondent Palad, being the Director of Lands and in the exercise of his administrative discretion, directed petitioners to
vacate the subject land on the ground that private respondents have a preferential right, being the occupants thereof.

While private respondents may not have filed their application over the land occupied by them, they nevertheless filed
their protest or opposition to petitioners' Miscellaneous Sales Application, the same being preparatory to the filing of an
application as they were in fact directed to do so. In any case, respondent Palad's execution order merely implements
respondent Hilario's order. It should be noted that petitioners' own application still has to be given due course. 17

As Director of Lands, respondent Palad is authorized to exercise executive control over any form of concession,
disposition and management of the lands of the public domain. 18 He may issue decisions and orders as he may see fit
under the circumstances as long as they are based on the findings of fact.

In the case of Calibo v. Ballesteros, 19 this Court held that where, in the disposition of public lands, the Director of Lands
bases his decision on the evidence thus presented, he clearly acts within his jurisdiction, and if he errs in appraising the
evidence, the error is one of judgment, but not an act of grave abuse of discretion annullable by certiorari. Thus, except
for the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, this Court finds no reversible error nor grave abuse of
discretion in the decision of the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
5. [G.R. No. 68166. February 12, 1997]

HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO, Petitioner, v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND HEIRS OF SINFOROSO
PASCUAL, Respondents.

DECISION

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

Unique is the legal question visited upon the claim of an applicant in a Land Registration case by oppositors thereto, the Government
and a Government lessee, involving as it does ownership of land formed by alluvium.

The applicant owns the property immediately adjoining the land sought to be registered. His registered property is bounded on the east
by the Talisay River, on the west by the Bulacan River, and on the north by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River and the Bulacan River
flow down towards the Manila Bay and act as boundaries of the applicant's registered land on the east and on the west.

The land sought to be registered was formed at the northern tip of the applicant's land. Applicant's registered property is bounded on
the north by the Manila Bay.

The issue: May the land sought to be registered be deemed an accretion in the sense that it naturally accrues in favor of the riparian
owner or should the land be considered as foreshore land?

Before us is a petition for review of: (1) the decision1 and (2) two subsequent resolutions2 of the Intermediate Appellate Court3 (now
the Court of Appeals) in Land Registration Case No. N-84,4 the application over which was filed by private respondents' predecessor-
in-interest, Sinforoso Pascual, now deceased, before the Court of First Instance 5 (now the Regional Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan.

There is no dispute as to the following facts:

On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual, now deceased, filed an application for foreshore lease covering a tract of foreshore land in
Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having an area of approximately seventeen (17) hectares. This application was denied on January 15, 1953.
So was his motion for reconsideration.

Subsequently, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, also now deceased, Emiliano Navarro, filed a fishpond application with the Bureau
of Fisheries covering twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore land also in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Initially, such application was
denied by the Director of Fisheries on the ground that the property formed part of the public domain. Upon motion for reconsideration,
the Director of Fisheries, on May 27, 1988, gave due course to his application but only to the extent of seven (7) hectares of the
property as may be certified by the Bureau of Forestry as suitable for fishpond purposes.

The Municipal Council of Balanga, Bataan, had opposed Emiliano Navarro's application. Aggrieved by the decision of the Director of
Fisheries, it appealed to the Secretary of Natural Resources who, however, affirmed the grant. The then Executive Secretary, acting in
behalf of the President of the Philippines, similarly affirmed the grant.

On the other hand, sometime in the early part of 1960, Sinforoso Pascual filed an application to register and confirm his title to a
parcel of land, situated in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, described in Plan Psu-175181 and said to have an area of 146,611 square meters.
Pascual claimed that this land is an accretion to his property, situated in Barrio Puerto Rivas, Balanga, Bataan, and covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 6830. It is bounded on the eastern side by the Talisay River, on the western side by the Bulacan River,
and on the northern side by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River as well as the Bulacan River flow downstream and meet at the Manila
Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on Pascual's property resulting in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion as
the riparian owner.

On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the Assistant Solicitor General, filed an opposition thereto stating that
neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the subject property, the same being a portion of the public
domain and, therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the Philippines. The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal, similarly
opposed Pascual's application for the same reason as that advanced by the Director of Lands. Later on, however, the Director of Lands
withdrew his opposition. The Director of Forestry become the sole oppositor.

On June 2, 1960, the court a quo issued an order of general default excepting the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry.

Upon motion of Emiliano Navarro, however, the order of general default was lifted and, on February 13, 1961, Navarro thereupon
filed an opposition to Pascual's application. Navarro claimed that the land sought to be registered has always been part of the public
domain, it being a part of the foreshore of Manila Bay; that he was a lessee and in possession of a part of the subject property by virtue
of a fishpond permit issued by the Bureau of Fisheries and confirmed by the Office of the President; and that he had already converted
the area covered by the lease into a fishpond.

During the pendency of the land registration case, that is, on November 6, 1960, Sinforoso Pascual filed a complaint for ejectment
against Emiliano Navarro, one Marcelo Lopez and their privies, alleged by Pascual to have unlawfully claimed and possessed, through
stealth, force and strategy, a portion of the subject property covered by Plan Psu-175181. The defendants in the case were alleged to
have built a provisional dike thereon: thus they have thereby deprived Pascual of the premises sought to be registered. This,
notwithstanding repeated demands for defendants to vacate the property.
The case was decided adversely against Pascual. Thus, Pascual appealed to the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Balanga, Bataan, the appeal having been docketed as Civil Case No. 2873. Because of the similarity of the parties and the subject
matter, the appealed case for ejectment was consolidated with the land registration case and was jointly tried by the court a quo.

During the pendency of the trial of the consolidated cases, Emiliano Navarro died on November 1, 1961 and was substituted by his
heirs, the herein petitioners.

Subsequently, on August 26, 1962, Pascual died and was substituted by his heirs, the herein private respondents.

On November 10, 1975, the court a quo rendered judgment finding the subject property to be foreshore land and, being a part of the
public domain, it cannot be the subject of land registration proceedings.

The decision's dispositive portion reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:

(1) Dismissing plaintiff [private respondent] Sinforoso Pascual's complaint for ejectment in Civil Case No. 2873;

(2) Denying the application of Sinforoso Pascual for land registration over the land in question; and

(3) Directing said Sinforoso Pascual, through his heirs, as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2873 and as applicant in Land Registration Case
No. N-84 to pay costs in both instances."6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The heirs of Pascual appealed and, before the respondent appellate court, assigned the following errors:

"1. The lower court erred in not finding the land in question as an accretion by the action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers to the land
admittedly owned by applicants-appellants [private respondents].

2. The lower court erred in holding that the land in question is foreshore land.

3. The lower court erred in not ordering the registration of the and is controversy in favor of applicants-appellants [private
respondents].

4. The lower court erred in not finding that the applicants-appellants [private respondents] are entitled to eject the oppositor-appellee
[petitioners]."7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On appeal, the respondent court reversed the findings of the court a quo and granted the petition for registration of the subject property
but excluding therefrom fifty (50) meters from corner 2 towards corner 1; and fifty meters (50) meters from corner 5 towards corner 6
of the Psu-175181.

The respondent appellate court explained the reversal in this wise:

"The paramount issue to be resolved in this appeal as set forth by the parties in their respective briefs is whether or not the land sought
to be registered is accretion or foreshore land, or, whether or not said land was formed by the action of the two rivers of Talisay and
Bulacan or by the action of the Manila Bay. If formed by the action of the Talisay and Bulacan rivers, the subject land is accretion but
if formed by the action of the Manila Bay then it is foreshore land.

xxx

It is undisputed that applicants-appellants [private respondents] owned the land immediately adjoining the land sought to be registered.
Their property which is covered by OCT No. 6830 is bounded on the east by the Talisay River, on the west by the Bulacan River, and
on the north by the Manila Bay. The Talisay and Bulacan rivers come from inland flowing downstream towards the Manila Bay. In
other words, between the Talisay River and the Bulacan River is the property of applicants with both rivers acting as the boundary to
said land and the flow of both rivers meeting and emptying into the Manila Bay. The subject land was formed at the tip or apex of
appellants' [private respondents'] land adding thereto the land now sought to be registered.

This makes this case quite unique because while it is undisputed that the subject land is immediately attached to appellants' [private
respondents'] land and forms the tip thereof, at the same time, said land immediately faces the Manila Bay which is part of the sea. We
can understand therefore the confusion this case might have caused the lower court, faced as it was with the uneasy problem of
deciding whether or not the subject land was formed by the action of the two rivers or by the action of the sea. Since the subject land is
found at the shore of the Manila Bay facing appellants' [private respondents'] land, it would be quite easy to conclude that it is
foreshore and therefore part of the patrimonial property of the State as the lower court did in fact rule x x x.

xxx

It is however undisputed that appellants' [private respondents'] land lies between these two rivers and it is precisely appellants' [private
respondents'] land which acts as a barricade preventing these two rivers to meet. Thus, since the flow of the two rivers is downwards
to the Manila Bay the sediments of sand and silt are deposited at their mouths.
It is, therefore, difficult to see how the Manila Bay could have been the cause of the deposit thereat for in the natural course of things,
the waves of the sea eat the land on the shore, as they suge [sic] inland. It would not therefore add anything to the land but instead
subtract from it due to the action of the waves and the wind. It is then more logical to believe that the two rivers flowing towards the
bay emptied their cargo of sand, silt and clay at their mouths, thus causing appellants' [private respondents'] land to accumulate
therein.

However, our distinguished colleage [sic], Mr. Justice Serrano, do [sic] not seem to accept this theory and stated that the subject land
arose only when x x x Pascual planted 'palapat' and 'bakawan' trees thereat to serve as a boundary or strainer. But we do not see how
this act of planting trees by Pascual would explain how the land mass came into being. Much less will it prove that the same came
from the sea. Following Mr. Justice Serrano's argument that it were the few trees that acted as strainers or blocks, then the land that
grew would have stopped at the place where the said trees were planted. But this is not so because the land mass went far beyond the
boundary, or where the trees were planted.

On the other hand, the picture-exhibits of appellants' [private respondents'] clearly show that the land that accumulated beyond the so-
called boundary, as well as the entire area being applied for is dry land, above sea level, and bearing innumerable trees x x x. The
existence of vegetation on the land could only confirm that the soil thereat came from inland rather than from the sea, for what could
the sea bring to the shore but sand, pebbles, stones, rocks and corrals? On the other hand, the two rivers would be bringing soil on
their downward flow which they brought along from the eroded mountains, the lands along their path, and dumped them all on the
northern portion of appellants' [private respondents'] land.

In view of the foregoing, we have to deviate from the lower court's finding. While it is true that the subject land is found at the shore
of the Manila Bay fronting appellants' [private respondents'] land, said land is not foreshore but an accretion from the action of the
Talisay and Bulacan rivers. In fact, this is exactly what the Bureau of Lands found out, as shown in the following report of the Acting
Provincial Officer, Jesus M. Orozco, to wit:

'Upon ocular inspection of the land subject of this registration made on June 11, 1960, it was found out that the said land is x x x
sandwitched [sic] by two big rivers x x x These two rivers bring down considerable amount of soil and sediments during floods every
year thus raising the soil of the land adjoining the private property of the applicant [private respondents]. About four-fifth [sic] of the
area applied for is now dry land whereon are planted palapat trees thickly growing thereon. It is the natural action of these two rivers
that has caused the formation of said land x x x subject of this registration case. It has been formed, therefore, by accretion. And
having been formed by accretion, the said land may be considered the private property of the riparian owner who is the applicant
herein [private respondents'] x x x.

In view of the above, the opposition hereto filed by the government should be withdrawn, except for the portion recommended by the
land investigator in his report dated May 2, 1960, to be excluded and considered foreshore. x x x'

Because of this report, no less than the Solicitor General representing the Bureau of Lands withdrew his opposition dated March 25,
1960, and limited 'the same to the northern portion of the land applied for, compromising a strip 50 meters wide along the Manila Bay,
which should be declared public land as part of the foreshore' x x x. 8

Pursuant to the aforecited decision, the respondent appellate court ordered the issuance of the corresponding decree of registration in
the name of private respondents and the reversion to private respondents of the possession of the portion of the subject property
included in Navarro's fishpond permit.

On December 20, 1978, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforecited decision. The Director of Forestry also moved
for the reconsideration of the same decision. Both motions were opposed by private respondents on January 27, 1979.

On November 21, 1980, respondent appellate court promulgated a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the
Director of Forestry. It, however, modified its decision, to read, viz:

"(3). Ordering private oppositors Heirs of Emiliano Navarro to vacate that portion included in their fishpond permit covered by Plan
Psu-175181 and hand over possession of said portion to applicants-appellants, if the said portion is not within the strip of land fifty
(50) meters wide along Manila Bay on the northern portion of the land subject of the registration proceedings and which area is more
particularly referred to as fifty (50) meters from corner 2 towards corner 1; and fifty (50) meters from corner 5 towards corner 6 of
Plan Psu-175181. x x x9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On December 15, 1980, we granted the Solicitor General, acting as counsel for the Director of Forestry, an extension of time within
which to file in this court, a petition for review of the decision dated November 29, 1978 of the respondent appellate court and of the
aforecited resolution dated November 21, 1980.

Thereafter, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Director of Forestry, filed a petition for review entitled, "The Director of Forestry vs.
the Court of Appeals."10 We, however, denied the same in a minute resolution dated July 20, 1981, such petition having been
prematurely filed at a time when the Court of Appeals was yet to resolve petitioners' pending motion to set aside the resolution dated
November 21, 1980.

On October 9, 1981, respondent appellate court denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the decision dated November 29,
1978.

On October 17, 1981, respondent appellate court made an entry of judgment stating that the decision dated November 29, 1978 had
become final and executory as against herein petitioners as oppositors in L.R.C. Case No. N-84 and Civil Case No. 2873 of the Court
of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan.
On October 26, 1981, a second motion for reconsideration of the decision dated November 29, 1978 was filed by petitioners' new
counsel.

On March 26, 1982, respondent appellate court issued a resolution granting petitioners' request for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration.

On July 13, 1984, after hearing, respondent appellate court denied petitioners' second motion for reconsideration on the ground that
the same was filed out of time, citing Rule 52, Section 1 of the Rules of Court which provides that a motion for reconsideration shall
be made ex-parte and filed within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the final order or judgment.

Hence this petition where the respondent appellate court is imputed to have palpably erred in appreciating the facts of the case and to
have gravely misapplied statutory and case law relating to accretion, specifically, Article 457 of the Civil Code.

We find merit in the petition.

The disputed property was brought forth by both the withdrawal of the waters of Manila Bay and the accretion formed on the exposed
foreshore land by the action of the sea which brought soil and sand sediments in turn trapped by the palapat and bakawan trees planted
thereon by petitioner Sulpicio Pascual in 1948.

Anchoring their claim of ownership on Article 457 of the Civil Code, private respondents vigorously argue that the disputed 14-
hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers which run their course on the eastern and
western boundaries, respectively, of private respondents' own tract of land.

Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457, requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the
accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3)
that the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river. 11 Accretion is the process whereby the soil is
deposited, while alluvium is the soil deposited on the estate fronting the river bank; 12 the owner of such estate is called the riparian
owner. Riparian owners are, strictly speaking, distinct from littoral owners, the latter being owners of lands bordering the shore of the
sea or lake or other tidal waters.13 The alluvium, by mandate of Article 457 of the Civil Code, is automatically owned by the riparian
owner from the moment the soil deposit can be seen14 but is not automatically registered property, hence, subject to acquisition
through prescription by third persons.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Private respondents' claim of ownership over the disputed property under the principle of accretion, is misplaced.

First, the title of private respondents' own tract of land reveals its northeastern boundary to be Manila Bay. Private respondents' land,
therefore, used to adjoin, border or front the Manila Bay and not any of the two rivers whose torrential action, private respondents
insist, is to account for the accretion on their land. In fact, one of the private respondents, Sulpicio Pascual, testified in open court that
the waves of Manila Bay used to hit the disputed land being part of the bay's foreshore but, after he had planted palapat and bakawan
trees thereon in 1948, the land began to rise. 16

Moreover, there is no dispute as to the location of: (a) the disputed land; (b) private respondents' own tract of land; (c) the Manila Bay;
and, (d) the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers. Private respondents' own land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers; in front of their
land on the northern side lies now the disputed land where before 1948, there lay the Manila Bay. If the accretion were to be attributed
to the action of either or both of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium should have been deposited on either or both of the
eastern and western boundaries of private respondents' own tract of land, not on the northern portion thereof which is adjacent to the
Manila Bay. Clearly lacking, thus, is the third requisite of accretion, which is, that the alluvium is deposited on the portion of
claimant's land which is adjacent to the river bank.

Second, there is no dispute as to the fact that private respondents' own tract of land adjoins the Manila Bay. Manila Bay is obviously
not a river, and jurisprudence is already settled as to what kind of body of water the Manila Bay is. It is to be remembered that we held
that:

"Appellant next contends that x x x Manila Bay cannot be considered as a sea. We find said contention untenable. A bay is part of the
sea, being a mere indentation of the same:

'Bay. An opening into the land where the water is shut in on all sides except at the entrance; an inlet of the sea; an arm of the sea,
distinct from a river, a bending or curbing of the shore of the sea or of a lake.' 7 C.J. 1013-1014."17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which
adjoined private respindents' own tract of land on the northern side. As such, the applicable law is not Article 457 of the Civil Code
but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.

The process by which the disputed land was formed, is not difficult to discern from the facts of the case. As the trial court correctly
observed:

"A perusal of the survey plan x x x of the land subject matter of these cases shows that on the eastern side, the property is bounded by
Talisay River, on the western side by Bulacan River, on the southern side by Lot 1436 and on the northern side by Manila Bay. It is
not correct to state that the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers meet a certain portion because the two rivers both flow towards Manila Bay.
The Talisay River is straight while the Bulacan River is a little bit meandering and there is no portion where the two rivers meet before
they end up at Manila Bay. The land which is adjacent to the property belonging to Pascual cannot be considered an accretion [caused
by the action of the two rivers].
Applicant Pascual x x x has not presented proofs to convince the Court that the land he has applied for registration is the result of the
settling down on his registered land of soil, earth or other deposits so as to be rightfully be considered as an accretion [caused by the
action of the two rivers]. Said Art. 457 finds no applicability where the accretion must have been caused by action of the
bay."18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The conclusion formed by the trial court on the basis of the foregoing observation is that the disputed land is part of the foreshore of
Manila Bay and therefore, part of the public domain. The respondent appellate court, however, perceived the fact that petitioners' own
land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, to be basis to conclude that the disputed land must be an accretion formed by the
action of the two rivers because private respondents' own land acted as a barricade preventing the two rivers to meet and that the
current of the two rivers carried sediments of sand and silt downwards to the Manila Bay which accumulated somehow to a 14-hectare
land. These conclusions, however, are fatally incongruous in the light of the one undisputed critical fact: the accretion was deposited,
not on either the eastern or western portion of private respondents' land where a river each runs, but on the northern portion of
petitioners' land which adjoins the Manila Bay. Worse, such conclusions are further eroded of their practical logic and consonance
with natural experience in the light of Sulpicio Pascual's admission as to having planted palapat and bakawan trees on the northern
boundary of their own land. In amplification of this, plainly more reasonable and valid are Justice Mariano Serrano's observations in
his dissenting opinion when he stated that:

"As appellants' (titled) land x x x acts as a barricade that prevents the two rivers to meet, and considering the wide expanse of the
boundary between said land and the Manila Bay, measuring some 593.00 meters x x x it is believed rather farfetched for the land in
question to have been formed through 'sediments of sand and salt [sic]... deposited at their [rivers'] mouths.' Moreover, if 'since the
flow of the two rivers is downwards to the Manila Bay the sediments of sand and silt are deposited at their mouths,' why then would
the alleged cargo of sand, silt and clay accumulate at the northern portion of appellants' titled land facing Manila Bay instead of
merely at the mouths and banks of these two rivers? That being the case, the accretion formed at said portion of appellants' titled
[land] was not caused by the current of the two rivers but by the action of the sea (Manila Bay) into which the rivers empty.

The conclusion x x x is not supported by any reference to the evidence which, on the contrary, shows that the disputed land was
formed by the action of the sea. Thus, no less than Sulpicio Pascual, one of the heirs of the original applicant, testified on cross-
examination that the land in dispute was part of the shore and it was only in 1948 that he noticed that the land was beginning to get
higher after he had planted trees thereon in 1948. x x x

x x x it is established that before 1948 sea water from the Manila Bay at high tide could reach as far as the dike of appellants' fishpond
within their titled property, which dike now separates this titled property from the land in question. Even in 1948 when appellants had
already planted palapat and bakawan trees in the land involved, inasmuch as these trees were yet small, the waves of the sea could still
reach the dike. This must be so because in x x x the survey plan of the titled property approved in 1918, said titled land was bounded
on the north by Manila Bay. So Manila Bay was adjacent to it on the north. It was only after the planting of the aforesaid trees in 1948
that the land in question began to rise or to get higher in elevation.

The trees planted by appellants in 1948 became a sort of strainer of the sea water and at the same time a kind of block to the strained
sediments from being carried back to the sea by the very waves that brought them to the former shore at the end of the dike, which
must have caused the shoreline to recede and dry up eventually raising the former shore leading to the formation of the land in
question."19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In other words, the combined and interactive effect of the planting of palapat and bakawan trees, the withdrawal of the waters of
Manila Bay eventually resulting in the drying up of its former foreshore, and the regular torrential action of the waters of Manila Bay,
is the formation of the disputed land on the northern boundary of private respondents' own tract of land.

The disputed property is an accretion on a sea bank, Manila Bay being an inlet or an arm of the sea; as such, the disputed property is,
under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, part of the public domain.

At the outset, there is a need to distinguish between Manila Bay and Laguna de Bay.

While we held in the case of Ignacio v. Director of Lands and Valeriano 20 that Manila Bay is considered a sea for purposes of
determining which law on accretion is to be applied in multifarious situations, we have ruled differently insofar as accretions on lands
adjoining the Laguna de Bay are concerned.

In the cases of Government of the P.I v. Colegio de San Jose,21 Republic v. Court of Appeals,22 Republic v. Alagad23, and Meneses v.
Court of Appeals,24 we categorically ruled that Laguna de Bay is a lake the accretion on which, by the mandate of Article 84 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, belongs to the owner of the land contiguous thereto.

The instant controversy, however, brings a situation calling for the application of Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, the
disputed land being an accretion on the foreshore of Manila Bay which is, for all legal purposes, considered a sea.

Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 provides as follows:

"Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When
they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of
special industries, or for the coast-guard service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates
adjacent thereto and as increment thereof."

In the light of the aforecited vintage but still valid law, unequivocal is the public nature of the disputed land in this controversy, the
same being an accretion on a sea bank which, for all legal purposes, the foreshore of Manila Bay is. As part of the public domain, the
herein disputed land is intended for public uses, and "so long as the land in litigation belongs to the national domain and is reserved
for public uses, it is not capable of being appropriated by any private person, except through express authorization granted in due form
by a competent authority."25 Only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have the right and the power to make the
declaration that the lands so gained by action of the sea is no longer necessary for purposes of public utility or for the cause of
establishment of special industries or for coast guard services. 26 Petitioners utterly fail to show that either the executive or legislative
department has already declared the disputed land as qualified, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, to be the
property of private respondents as owners of the estates adjacent thereto.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED.

The decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in CA G.R. No. 59044-R dated November 29, 1978 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution dated November 21, 1980 and March 28, 1982, respectively, promulgated by the
Intermediate Appellate Court are likewise REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The decision of the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), Branch 1, Balanga, Bataan, is hereby ORDERED
REINSTATED.
6. G.R. No. 160453 November 12, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS III, and ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

By law, accretion - the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the effects of the current of the water- belongs to the owner of
the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms. The drying up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed
belongs to the State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a law vests the ownership in some other person.

Antecedents

Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on
March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque City. The property,
which had an area of 1,045 square meters, more or less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City, and was bounded in
the Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the Parañaque River, in
the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan.1

On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of the
latter’s co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the property had been formed through accretion and had been in their joint open,
notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for more than 30 years. 2

The City of Parañaque (the City) opposed the application for land registration, stating that it needed the property for its flood control
program; that the property was within the legal easement of 20 meters from the river bank; and that assuming that the property was not
covered by the legal easement, title to the property could not be registered in favor of the applicants for the reason that the property
was an orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion. 3

Ruling of the RTC

On May 10, 2000,4 the RTC granted the application for land registration, disposing:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the applicants, ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS, III and ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., both
Filipinos and of legal age, as the TRUE and ABSOLUTE OWNERS of the land being applied for which is situated in the Barangay of
San Dionisio, City of Parañaque with an area of one thousand forty five (1045) square meters more or less and covered by Subdivision
Plan Csd-00-000343, being a portion of Lot 4998, Cad. 299, Case 4, Parañaque Cadastre, LRC Rec. No. and orders the registration of
Lot 4998-B in their names with the following technical description, to wit:

xxxx

Once this Decision became (sic) final and executory, let the corresponding Order for the Issuance of the Decree be issued.

SO ORDERED.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed.

Ruling of the CA

In its appeal, the Republic ascribed the following errors to the RTC, 5 to wit:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED IS AN ACCRETION TO
THE ADJOINING PROPERTY OWNED BY APPELLEES DESPITE THE ADMISSION OF APPELLEE ARCADIO C. SANTOS
JR. THAT THE SAID PROPERTY WAS NOT FORMED AS A RESULT OF THE GRADUAL FILLING UP OF SOIL THROUGH
THE CURRENT OF THE RIVER.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION DESPITE APPELLEE’S
FAILURE TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND
IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.

III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLEES HAD SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THEIR CONTINUOUS,
OPEN, PUBLIC AND ADVERSE OCCUPATION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR A PERIOD OF MORE THAN THIRTY
(30) YEARS.

On May 27, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC. 6

The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on October 20, 2003. 7

Issues

Hence, this appeal, in which the Republic urges that:8

RESPONDENTS’ CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS AN ACCRETION TO THEIR ADJOINING LAND THAT
WOULD ENTITLE THEM TO REGISTER IT UNDER ARTICLE 457 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IS CONTRADICTED BY
THEIR OWN EVIDENCE.

II

ASSUMING THAT THE LAND SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED WAS "PREVIOUSLY A PART OF THE PARAÑAQUE RIVER
WHICH BECAME AN ORCHARD AFTER IT DRIED UP," THE REGISTRATION OF SAID PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF
RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE ALTERNATIVELY JUSTIFIED UNDER ARTICLE 461 OF THE CIVIL CODE.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT THE FAILURE OF RESPONDENTS
TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE
AND DISPOSABLE IS FATAL TO THEIR APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION.

IV

THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE CONTINUOUSLY, OPENLY, PUBLICLY AND
ADVERSELY OCCUPIED THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY
WELL-NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE.

To be resolved are whether or not Article 457 of the Civil Code was applicable herein; and whether or not respondents could claim the
property by virtue of acquisitive prescription pursuant to Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration
Decree).

Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

I.

The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457 of the Civil Code to respondents’ benefit

Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the currents of the waters."

In ruling for respondents, the RTC pronounced as follows:

On the basis of the evidence presented by the applicants, the Court finds that Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III and Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., are
the owners of the land subject of this application which was previously a part of the Parañaque River which became an orchard after it
dried up and further considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property is owned by applicant, Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., after it was
obtained by him through inheritance from his mother, Concepcion Cruz, now deceased. Conformably with Art. 457 of the New Civil
Code, it is provided that:

"Article 457. To the owners of the lands adjoining the bank of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters." 9

The CA upheld the RTC’s pronouncement, holding:

It could not be denied that "to the owners of the lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive
from the effects of the current of the waters" (Article 457 New Civil Code) as in this case, Arcadio Ivan Santos III and Arcadio Santos,
Jr., are the owners of the land which was previously part of the Parañaque River which became an orchard after it dried up and
considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property is owned by the applicant which was obtained by the latter from his mother
(Decision, p. 3; p. 38 Rollo).10
The Republic submits, however, that the application by both lower courts of Article 457 of the Civil Code was erroneous in the face of
the fact that respondents’ evidence did not establish accretion, but instead the drying up of the Parañaque River.

The Republic’s submission is correct.

Respondents as the applicants for land registration carried the burden of proof to establish the merits of their application by a
preponderance of evidence, by which is meant such evidence that is of greater weight, or more convincing than that offered in
opposition to it.11 They would be held entitled to claim the property as their own and apply for its registration under the Torrens
system only if they established that, indeed, the property was an accretion to their land.

Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. 12 The deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must
be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the
banks of rivers.13

Accordingly, respondents should establish the concurrence of the elements of accretion to warrant the grant of their application for
land registration.

However, respondents did not discharge their burden of proof. They did not show that the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil
through the effects of the current of the river had formed Lot 4998-B. Instead, their evidence revealed that the property was the dried-
up river bed of the Parañaque River, leading both the RTC and the CA to themselves hold that Lot 4998-B was "the land which was
previously part of the Parañaque River xxx (and) became an orchard after it dried up."

Still, respondents argue that considering that Lot 4998-B did not yet exist when the original title of Lot 4 was issued in their mother’s
name in 1920, and that Lot 4998-B came about only thereafter as the land formed between Lot 4 and the Parañaque River, the
unavoidable conclusion should then be that soil and sediments had meanwhile been deposited near Lot 4 by the current of the
Parañaque River, resulting in the formation of Lot 4998-B.

The argument is legally and factually groundless. For one, respondents thereby ignore that the effects of the current of the river are not
the only cause of the formation of land along a river bank. There are several other causes, including the drying up of the river bed. The
drying up of the river bed was, in fact, the uniform conclusion of both lower courts herein. In other words, respondents did not
establish at all that the increment of land had formed from the gradual and imperceptible deposit of soil by the effects of the current.
Also, it seems to be highly improbable that the large volume of soil that ultimately comprised the dry land with an area of 1,045
square meters had been deposited in a gradual and imperceptible manner by the current of the river in the span of about 20 to 30 years
– the span of time intervening between 1920, when Lot 4 was registered in the name of their deceased parent (at which time Lot 4998-
B was not yet in existence) and the early 1950s (which respondents’ witness Rufino Allanigue alleged to be the time when he knew
them to have occupied Lot 4988-B). The only plausible explanation for the substantial increment was that Lot 4988-B was the dried-
up bed of the Parañaque River. Confirming this explanation was Arcadio, Jr.’s own testimony to the effect that the property was
previously a part of the Parañaque River that had dried up and become an orchard.

We observe in this connection that even Arcadio, Jr.’s own Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44687 confirmed the uniform conclusion
of the RTC and the CA that Lot 4998-B had been formed by the drying up of the Parañaque River. Transfer Certificate of Title No.
44687 recited that Lot 4 of the consolidated subdivision plan Pcs-13-002563, the lot therein described, was bounded "on the SW along
line 5-1 by Dried River Bed."14

That boundary line of "SW along line 5-1" corresponded with the location of Lot 4998-B, which was described as "bounded by Lot
4079 Cad. 299, (Lot 1, Psu-10676), in the name of respondent Arcadio Santos, Jr. (Now Lot 4, Psd-13-002563) in the Northeast."15

The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion that became respondents’ property pursuant to
Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was definitely not an accretion. The process of drying up of a river to form dry land involved
the recession of the water level from the river banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which was the gradual and
imperceptible deposition of soil on the river banks through the effects of the current. In accretion, the water level did not recede and
was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian owners had no legal right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B.
Considering that the clear and categorical language of Article 457 of the Civil Code has confined the provision only to accretion, we
should apply the provision as its clear and categorical language tells us to. Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where the language of the law
is clear and categorical, there is no room for interpretation; there is only room for application.16 The first and fundamental duty of
courts is then to apply the law. 17

The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership. Article 502 of the Civil Code expressly
declares that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of the State. 18 It follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B,
continue to belong to the

State as its property of public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that the dried-up river beds should belong to some
other person.19

II

Acquisitive prescription was

not applicable in favor of respondents

The RTC favored respondents’ application for land registration covering Lot 4998-B also because they had taken possession of the
property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than 30 years based on their predecessor-in-interest being the
adjoining owner of the parcel of land along the river bank. It rendered the following ratiocination, viz: 20

In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicants became the owners thereof, they took possession of the same property
continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty (30) years because their predecessors-in-interest are the adjoining
owners of the subject parcel of land along the river bank. Furthermore, the fact that applicants paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed per
subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land Management Services and the fact that Engr. Chito
B. Cainglet, OIC–Chief, Surveys Division Land Registration Authority, made a Report that the subject property is not a portion of the
Parañaque River and that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000, thus, the Court opts to grant the application.

Finally, in the light of the evidence adduced by the applicants in this case and in view of the foregoing reports of the Department of
Agrarian Reforms, Land Registration Authority and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Court finds and so
holds that the applicants have satisfied all the requirements of law which are essential to a government grant and is, therefore, entitled
to the issuance of a certificate of title in their favor. So also, oppositor failed to prove that the applicants are not entitled thereto, not
having presented any witness.

In fine, the application is GRANTED.

As already mentioned, the CA affirmed the RTC.

Both lower courts erred.

The relevant legal provision is Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), which pertinently states:

Section 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper [Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.

xxxx

Under Section 14(1), then, applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following, namely: (a) that the land forms part
of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12,
1945.21

The Republic assails the findings by the lower courts that respondents "took possession of the same property continuously, openly,
publicly and adversely for more than thirty (30) years." 22

Although it is well settled that the findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are accorded the highest
degree of respect, and generally will not be disturbed on appeal, with such findings being binding and conclusive on the Court,23 the
Court has consistently recognized exceptions to this rule, including the following, to wit: (a) when the findings are grounded entirely
on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
(f) when in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and
reply briefs are not disputed by respondent; and (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.24

Here, the findings of the RTC were obviously grounded on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; and that the inference made by the
RTC and the CA was manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible. Hence, the Court should now review the findings.

In finding that respondents had been in continuous, open, public and adverse possession of the land for more than 30 years, the RTC
declared:

In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicant became the owners thereof, they took possession of the same property
continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty years because their predecessor in interest are the adjoining owners
of the subject parcel of land along the river banks. Furthermore, the fact that the applicant paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed per
subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land Management Services and the fact that Engr. Chito
B. Cainglet, OIC – Chief, Surveys Division Land Registration Authority, made a Report that the subject property is not a portion of
the Parañaque River and that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000, thus, the Court opts to grant the application.

The RTC apparently reckoned respondents’ period of supposed possession to be "more than thirty years" from the fact that "their
predecessors in interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land." Yet, its decision nowhere indicated what acts
respondents had performed showing their possession of the property "continuously, openly, publicly and adversely" in that length of
time. The decision mentioned only that they had paid realty taxes and had caused the survey of the property to be made. That, to us,
was not enough to justify the foregoing findings, because, firstly, the payment of realty taxes did not conclusively prove the payor’s
ownership of the land the taxes were paid for,25 the tax declarations and payments being mere indicia of a claim of ownership;26 and,
secondly, the causing of surveys of the property involved was not itself an of continuous, open, public and adverse possession.

The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of soil does not need to make an express act of
possession, and that no acts of possession are necessary in that instance because it is the law itself that pronounces the alluvium to
belong to the riparian owner from the time that the deposit created by the current of the water becomes manifest27 has no applicability
herein. This is simply because Lot 4998-B was not formed through accretion. Hence, the ownership of the land adjacent to the river
bank by respondents’ predecessor-in-interest did not translate to possession of Lot 4998-B that would ripen to acquisitive prescription
in relation to Lot 4998-B.

On the other hand, the claim of thirty years of continuous, open, public and adverse possession of Lot 4998-B was not even validated
or preponderantly established. The admission of respondents themselves that they declared the property for taxation purposes only in
1997 and paid realty taxes only from 1999 28 signified that their alleged possession would at most be for only nine years as of the filing
of their application for land registration on March 7, 1997.

Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed Lot 4998-B for more than thirty years in the character they
claimed, they did not thereby acquire the land by prescription or by other means without any competent proof that the land was
already declared as alienable and disposable by the Government. Absent that declaration, the land still belonged to the State as part of
its public dominion.

Article 419 of the Civil Code distinguishes property as being either of public dominion or of private ownership. Article 420 of the
Civil Code lists the properties considered as part of public dominion, namely: (a) those intended for public use, such as roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; and (b) those
which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth. As earlier mentioned, Article 502 of the Civil Code declares that rivers and their natural beds are of public dominion.

Whether the dried-up river bed may be susceptible to acquisitive prescription or not was a question that the Court resolved in favor of
the State in Celestial v. Cachopero,29 a case involving the registration of land found to be part of a dried-up portion of the natural bed
of a creek. There the Court held:

As for petitioner’s claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a dried-up bed of the Salunayan Creek, based on (1) her
alleged long term adverse possession and that of her predecessor-in-interest, Marcelina Basadre, even prior to October 22, 1966, when
she purchased the adjoining property from the latter, and (2) the right of accession under Art. 370 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889
and/or Article 461 of the Civil Code, the same must fail.

Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive
prescription, the adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in the confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to
alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. It is only after the Government has declared the land to be alienable and
disposable agricultural land that the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an
imperfect title.

A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea. As such,
under Articles 420(1) and 502(1) of the Civil Code, the Salunayan Creek, including its natural bed, is property of the public domain
which is not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. And, absent any declaration by the government, that a
portion of the creek has dried-up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable character.

xxxx

Had the disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up after the present Civil Code took effect, the subject land would clearly not
belong to petitioner or her predecessor-in-interest since under the aforementioned provision of Article 461, "river beds which are
abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners of the land occupied by the new
course," and the owners of the adjoining lots have the right to acquire them only after paying their value.

And both Article 370 of the Old Code and Article 461 of the present Civil Code are applicable only when "river beds are abandoned
through the natural change in the course of the waters." It is uncontroverted, however, that, as found by both the Bureau of Lands and
the DENR Regional Executive Director, the subject land became dry as a result of the construction an irrigation canal by the National
Irrigation Administration. Thus, in Ronquillo v. Court of Appeals, this Court held:

The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for interpretation. Article 370 applies only if there is a natural change in the
course of the waters. The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial accretions nor to accretions to lands that adjoin
canals or esteros or artificial drainage systems. Considering our earlier finding that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was
actually caused by the active intervention of man, it follows that Article 370 does not apply to the case at bar and, hence, the Del
Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners.

The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part of the land of the public domain which cannot be
subject to acquisition by private ownership. xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where there has been a change in the course of a river, not where the river simply
dries up. In the instant Petition, it is not even alleged that the Salunayan Creek changed its course. In such a situation, commentators
are of the opinion that the dry river bed remains property of public dominion. (Bold emphases supplied)
Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong
to the State.30 No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the Government. It is
indispensable, therefore, that there is a showing of a title from the State. 31Occupation of public land in the concept of owner, no matter
how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.32

Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which declares river beds that are abandoned through the natural
change in the course of the waters as ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land occupied by the new course, and which gives to
the owners of the adjoining lots the right to acquire only the abandoned river beds not ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land
affected by the natural change of course of the waters only after paying their value), all river beds remain property of public dominion
and cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription unless previously declared by the Government to be alienable and disposable.
Considering that Lot 4998-B was not shown to be already declared to be alienable and disposable, respondents could not be deemed to
have acquired the property through prescription.

Nonetheless, respondents insist that the property was already classified as alienable and disposable by the Government. They cite as
proof of the classification as alienable and disposable the following notation found on the survey plan, to wit: 33

NOTE

ALL CORNERS NOT OTHERWISE DESCRIBED ARE OLD BL CYL. CONC. MONS 15 X 60CM

All corners marked PS are cyl. conc. mons 15 x 60 cm

Surveyed in accordance with Survey Authority NO. 007604-48 of the Regional Executive Director issued by the CENR-OFFICER
dated Dec. 2, 1996.

This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25 classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Dev’t. on Jan. 3,
1968.

Lot 4998-A = Lot 5883} Cad 299

Lot 4998-B = Lot 5884} Paranaque Cadastre.

Was the notation on the survey plan to the effect that Lot 4998-B was "inside" the map "classified as alienable/disposable by the
Bureau of Forest Development on 03 Jan. 1968" sufficient proof of the property’s nature as alienable and disposable public land?

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a
positive act of the Government, such as a presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative action, investigation reports of the
Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act or statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

As to the proofs that are admissible to establish the alienability and disposability of public land, we said in Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap 34 that:

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome
this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or
disposable.There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government
such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed
to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the
Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were
subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the
Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of
land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof." (Emphasis supplied)

In Menguito v. Republic,35 which we reiterated in Republic v. Sarmiento,36 we specifically resolved the issue of whether the notation
on the survey plan was sufficient evidence to establish the alienability and disposability of public land, to wit:

To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the
printed words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No.
2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).

This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna,
and other natural resources are owned by the State. x x x."

For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be
registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by
the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by
the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.

In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer’s notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey was inside
alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the
land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said
surveyor’s assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable. (Emphasis
supplied)

In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,37 we dealt with the sufficiency of the certification by the Provincial Environmental Officer
(PENRO) or Community Environmental Officer (CENRO) to the effect that a piece of public land was alienable and disposable in the
following manner, viz:

x x x it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration
must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by
the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by
the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove
that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by
themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

Only Torres, respondent’s Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by respondent.1âwphi1 The government
officials who issued the certifications were not presented before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court should not
have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued
and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable.

xxxx

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable
and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the
facts stated therein. Such government certifications may fall under the class of documents contemplated in the second sentence of
Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but they do not
constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. (Emphasis supplied)

These rulings of the Court indicate that the notation on the survey plan of Lot 4998-B, Cad-00-000343 to the effect that the "survey is
inside a map classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Dev’t" did not prove that Lot 4998-B was already classified as
alienable and disposable. Accordingly, respondents could not validly assert acquisitive prescription of Lot 4988-B.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on May 27, 2003;
DISMISSES the application for registration of Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. and Arcadio Ivan S. Santos III respecting Lot 4998-B with a
total area of 1,045 square meters, more or less, situated in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City, Metro Manila; and DECLARES
Lot 4998-B as exclusively belonging to the State for being part of the dried--up bed of the Parat1aque River.

Respondents shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
7. G.R. No. 219811
REX DACLISON, Petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO BAYTION, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review 1 are the February 5, 2015 Decision2 and the August 3, 2015 Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 99627, which affirmed in toto the April 27, 2012 Decision 4 rendered by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 224, Quezon City (RTC) in Civil Case No. Q-09-66145, a case for forcible entry.

The Antecedents

On January 27, 2009, respondent Eduardo Baytion (Baytion) filed a Complaint5 for Forcible Entry and Damages with Prayer for
Issuance of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 43, Quezon City (MeTC) against petitioner
Rex Daclison (Daclison), which was docketed as Civil Case No. 39225.

In the complaint, Baytion alleged that he was a co-owner of a parcel of land consisting of 1,500 square meters, covered by Transfer
Certificate Title (TCT) No. 221507. The said property was inherited by him and his siblings from their parents and, as agreed upon,
was being administered by him. As administrator, he leased portions of the property to third persons.

Erected on the said property was a one-storey building which was divided into seven units or stalls. One of the stalls was leased to a
certain Leonida Dela Cruz (Leonida) who used it for her business of selling rocks, pebbles and similar construction materials.

When the lease of Nida expired sometime in May 2008, Daclison and other persons acting under her took possession of the portion
leased and occupied by Leonida without the prior knowledge and consent of Baytion. Since then, Daclison had been occupying the
contested portion and using it for his business of selling marble and other finishing materials without paying anything to Baytion.

Upon learning of Daclison’s unauthorized entry into the subject portion of the property, sometime in June 2008, Baytion demanded
that he vacate it. Despite oral and written demands to vacate, Daclison refused to do so. This prompted Baytion to file the complaint
for forcible entry and damages.

Daclison, in his answer, averred that sometime in 1978, Baytion leased the subject portion to Antonio dela Cruz (Antonio) where the
latter started a business; that ten or fifteen years later, a stone walling, called a riprap, was erected at the creek lying beside Baytion’s
property, leaving a deep down-sloping area; that Antonio negotiated with a certain engineer so he could be in possession of the said
down-slope; that Antonio had the down-slope filled up until it was leveled with the leased portion; that Antonio paid for the right to
possess the same; that in 2000, Antonio’s business was taken over by Leonida, who suffered a stroke in December 2007; that after her
death, the business was taken over by Ernanie Dela Cruz (Ernanie); that in February 2008, he (Daclison) entered into a business
venture with Ernanie in the same leased property and he took over the management of the business; that he received a letter from
Baytion addressed to Ernanie requesting the latter to vacate the subject premises; that Baytion and Ernanie came to an agreement that
the latter would continue the lease of the property; that he issued a check in the amount of ₱100,000.00 as payment for the rental
arrears; that two weeks thereafter, Baytion returned the check and demanded that Ernanie vacate the property; that Baytion promised
that he would no longer bother them if they would just transfer to the filled-up and plane-leveled property; that on account of the said
promise, he and Ernanie vacated the leased area and transferred their business to the filled-up portion; that despite the fact that they
already vacated the leased portion of the property, Baytion still filed a complaint with the barangay claiming that the filled-up portion
was part of his property; that the executive officer of the barangay who conducted the investigation made a report indicating that
a mojon was placed by him (Daclison) which showed the boundary of Baytion’s property; that Baytion acknowledged the said report
and agreed to put an end to the controversy; and that despite Baytion’s agreement to put an end to the dispute, he still sent a demand
letter to vacate.6

On August 25, 2009, the MeTC dismissed the case on the ground that Baytion failed to include his siblings or his co-owners, as
plaintiffs in the case. The dismissal, however, was without prejudice.

Baytion appealed the case to the RTC, which ruled that the MeTC lacked jurisdiction to decide the case because the allegations in the
complaint failed to constitute a case of forcible entry. Pursuant to Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, however, the RTC did not
dismiss the case and, instead, exercised its original jurisdiction over the same.

The RTC then decided that Baytion had a better right of possession over the property. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering:

1) The defendant and other persons claiming under him to vacate and to turn over the possession of the subject property to
the plaintiff; and,

2) The defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of ₱20,000.00/monthly for the use of the premises commencing from May 2008
until the subject premises is vacated.

SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved, Daclison filed an appeal with the CA.

The CA tackled two issues, namely: a) whether the RTC committed a reversible error when it exercised original jurisdiction of the
case and decided the same on its merits pursuant to Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court; and, b) who, between Baytion and
Daclison, had a better right to possess the subject property.

The CA ruled that the MeTC had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case in a summary proceeding for forcible entry because
Baytion failed to allege that he was in prior physical possession of the property and that he was deprived of his possession under
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court. It was of the view that the present action for forcible entry had actually ripened into
one for recovery of the right to possess or accion publiciana, which was an action in an ordinary civil proceeding in the Regional Trial
Court. The action was aimed at determining who among the parties had a better right of possession of realty independent of the issue
of ownership or title. It was an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the
unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.8 Thus, it agreed with the RTC when the latter correctly assumed jurisdiction over the
case following the mandate of Section 8, Rule 40 of the Revised Rules of Court.9

As to the issue of possession, the CA concluded that Baytion, as co-owner of the subject property, had a better right to possess. It
wrote:

Xxx, it is clear that Antonio, Leonida and Ernanie were all lessees of the subject property and its improvements owned by the plaintiff.
Ernanie, who is a sub-lessee of the subject property, again sub-leased the same to appellant, without authority or consent from
appellee. Thus, since appellant have been possessing the subject property in his capacity as a mere sub-lessee, he cannot own the
subject property and its improvements through open, continuous and adverse possession of the property. It follows then that appellee
has the right to repossess the subject property.10

On February 5, 2015, the CA rendered the assailed decision, disposing in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the Decision 27 April 2012 rendered by Branch 224
of the RTC of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-09-66145 is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.11

Daclison filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in the assailed resolution.

Hence, the present petition for review raising the following

ISSUES

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE INSTANT CASE IS AN ACCION
PUBLICIANA, MORE SIGNIFICANTLY [WITH] RESPECT TO THE LAND OUTSIDE TCT NO. 221507; THAT,
EFFECTIVELY, THE RESPONDENT HAS PRIOR POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY OUTSIDE TCT NO. 221507.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED UNDER THE LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
PETITIONER WAS A LESSEE OF THE SECOND PROPERTY

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED UNDER THE LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT THE SECOND
PROPERTY OR LAND WAS AN UMPROVEMENT ON THE PROPERTY OF THE RESPONDENT.

IV.

THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED UNDER THE LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
RESPONDENT HAS LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE.

V.

THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED UNDER THE LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
PETITIONER SHOULD PAY THE [RESPONDENT] THE AMOUNT OF ₱20,000 MONTHLY FOR THE USE OF THE
PREMISES.12

Daclison insists that what is really in dispute in the present controversy is the filled-up portion between the riprap constructed by the
government and the property of Baytion and, 13 therefore, outside of the land co-owned by Baytion. Accordingly, the RTC and the CA
should have dismissed the case because the leased property was already surrendered to its owner, thereby, mooting the complaint.14

Daclison insists that Antonio, from whom he derived his right over the contested portion, made an open, continuous and adverse
possession and use of the property when the latter extended his place of business to the filled-up portion.15 He claims that the filled-up
portion is not an improvement on the leased property as found by the RTC and the court a quo. It is a property separate and distinct
from the leased property.16

The Respondent’s Position

Baytion basically posits that although the disputed portion is outside the description of the property covered by TCT No. 221507, it
forms an integral part of the latter because it is an accretion, construction, or improvement on the property and, under the law, any
accretion or anything built thereon belongs to him and his co-owners.17

The Court’s Ruling

At the outset, it was clear that the disputed property was the filled-up portion between the riprap constructed by the government and
the property covered by TCT No. 221507. According to Daclison, the property covered by TCT No. 221507 had already been
surrendered to Baytion which the latter never disputed. As such, the Court is now confronted with the question as to who between the
parties has a better right over this contested portion between the land co-owned by Baytion and the constructed riprap.

Baytion does not have a better

right over the contested portion

The RTC and the CA erred in holding that Baytion has a better right to possess the contested portion.

Baytion’s contention that he owns that portion by reason of accretion is misplaced. Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides:

To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belongs the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current
of the waters.

In other words, the following requisites must concur in order for an accretion to be considered, namely:

(1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible;

(2) that it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and,

(3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.18

In the case at bench, this contested portion cannot be considered an accretion. To begin with, the land came about not by reason of a
gradual and imperceptible deposit.1âwphi1 The deposits were artificial and man-made and not the exclusive result of the current from
the creek adjacent to his property. Baytion failed to prove the attendance of the indispensable requirement that the deposit was due to
the effect of the current of the river or creek. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature and not a result of human intervention.19

Furthermore, the disputed property cannot also be considered an improvement or accession. Article 445 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 445. Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of another and the improvements or repairs made thereon, belong to the
owner of the land, subject to the provisions of the following articles.

[Emphases supplied]

It must be noted that Article 445 uses the adverb "thereon" which is simply defined as "on the thing that has been mentioned."20 In
other words, the supposed improvement must be made, constructed or introduced within or on the property and not outside so as to
qualify as an improvement contemplated 'by law. Otherwise, it would just be very convenient for land owners to expand or widen their
properties in the guise of improvements.

In view of all the foregoing, it is the opinion of this Court that Baytion, not being the owner of the contested portion, does not have a
better right to possess the same.1âwphi1 In fact, in his initiatory pleading, he never claimed to have been in prior possession of this
piece of property. His claim of ownership is without basis. As earlier pointed out, the portion is neither an accretion nor an accession.
That being said, it is safe to conclude that he does not have any cause of action to eject Daclison.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 5, 2015 Decision and the August 3, 2015 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 99627 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint for possession is hereby
ordered DISMISSED.
8. G.R. No. 182908 August 6, 2014

HEIRS OF FRANCISCO I. NARVASA, SR., and HEIRS OF PETRA IMBORNAL and PEDRO FERRER, represented by
their Attorney-in-Fact, MRS. REMEDIOS B. NARVASA-REGACHO, Petitioners,
vs.
EMILIANA, VICTORIANO, FELIPE, MA TEO, RAYMUNDO, MARIA, and EDUARDO, all surnamed
IMBORNAL,Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated November 28, 2006 and the Resolution3dated May 7, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 57618 which reversed and set aside the Decision4 dated August 20, 1996 of the
Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44 (RTC) in Civil Case No. D-6978, declared (a) the descendants of Ciriaco Abrio 5 as
the exclusive owners of the Motherland covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1462, 6 (b) the descendants of respondent
Victoriano Imbornal (respondent Victoriano) as the exclusive owners of the first accretion (First Accretion) covered by OCT No. P-
318,7 and (c) the descendants of Pablo Imbornal (Pablo) as the exclusive owners of the second accretion (Second Accretion) covered
by OCT No. 21481,8 and dismissed the complaint and counterclaim in all other respects for lack of merit.

The Facts

Basilia Imbornal+ (Basilia) had four (4) children, namely, Alejandra, Balbina, Catalina, and Pablo.Francisco I. Narvasa,
Sr.9 (Francisco) and Pedro Ferrer (Pedro) were the children10 of Alejandra, while petitioner Petra Imbornal (Petra) was the daughter of
Balbina.11 Petitionersare the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco, Pedro, and Petra (Francisco, et al.). On the other hand,
respondentsEmiliana, Victoriano, Felipe, Mateo, Raymundo, Maria, and Eduardo, all surnamed Imbornal, are the descendants of
Pablo.12

During her lifetime, Basilia owned a parcel of land situated at Sabangan, Barangay Nibaliw West, San Fabian, Pangasinan with an
area of 4,144 square meters (sq. m.), more or less (Sabangan property), which she conveyed to her three (3) daughters Balbina,
Alejandra, and Catalina (Imbornal sisters) sometime in 1920. 13

Meanwhile, Catalina’s husband, Ciriaco Abrio (Ciriaco), applied for and was granted a homestead patent over a 31,367-sq. m. riparian
land (Motherland) adjacent to the Cayanga River in San Fabian, Pangasinan. 14 He was eventually awarded Homestead Patent No.
2499115 therefor, and, on December 5, 1933, OCT No. 1462 was issued in his name. Later, or on May 10, 1973, OCT No. 1462 was
cancelled, and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 10149516 was issued in the name of Ciriaco’s heirs, namely: Margarita Mejia;
Rodrigo Abrio, marriedto Rosita Corpuz; Antonio Abrio, married to Crisenta Corpuz; Remedios Abrio, married to Leopoldo Corpuz;
Pepito Abrio; Dominador Abrio; Francisca Abrio; Violeta Abrio; and Perla Abrio (Heirs of Ciriaco).

Ciriaco and his heirs had since occupied the northern portionof the Motherland, while respondents occupied the southern portion. 17

Sometime in 1949, the First Accretion, approximately 59,772 sq. m. in area, adjoined the southern portion of the Motherland. On
August 15, 1952, OCT No. P-318 was issued in thename of respondent Victoriano, married to Esperanza Narvarte, covering the First
Accretion.18 Decades later, or in 1971, the Second Accretion, which had an area of 32,307 sq. m., more or less, abutted the First
Accretion on its southern portion.19 On November 10, 1978, OCT No. 21481 was issued in the names of all the respondents covering
the Second Accretion.

Claiming rights over the entire Motherland, Francisco, et al., as the children of Alejandra and Balbina, filed on February 27,1984 an
Amended Complaint20 for reconveyance, partition,and/or damages against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. D-6978. They
anchored their claim on the allegation that Ciriaco, with the help of his wifeCatalina, urged Balbina and Alejandra to sell the Sabangan
property, and that Ciriaco used the proceeds therefrom to fund his then-pending homestead patent application over the Motherland. In
return, Ciriaco agreed that once his homestead patent is approved, he will be deemed to be holding the Motherland – which now
included both accretions – in trust for the Imbornal sisters.21

Likewise, Francisco, et al.alleged that through deceit, fraud, falsehood, and misrepresentation, respondent Victoriano, with respect to
the First Accretion, and the respondents collectively, with regard to the Second Accretion, had illegally registered the said accretions
in their names, notwithstanding the fact that they werenot the riparian owners (as they did not own the Motherland to which the
accretions merely formed adjacent to). In this relation, Francisco, et al. explained that they did not assert their inheritance claims over
the Motherland and the two (2) accretions because they respected respondents’ rights, until they discovered in 1983 that respondents
have repudiated their (Francisco, et al.’s) shares thereon. 22 Thus, bewailing that respondents have refused them their rights not only
with respect to the Motherland, but also to the subsequent accretions, Francisco, et al. prayed for the reconveyance ofsaid properties,
or, in the alternative, the payment of their value, as well as the award of moral damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00, actual damages
in the amount of ₱150,000.00, including attorney’s fees and other costs. 23

In their Amended Answer dated March 5, 1984, 24 respondents contended that: (a) the Amended Complaint statedno cause of action
against them, having failed to clearly and precisely describe the disputed properties and specify the transgressions they have allegedly
committed; (b) the action was barred by prescription; and (c) that the properties sought to be reconveyed and partitioned are not the
properties of their predecessors-ininterest but, instead, are covered by Torrens certificates of titles, free from any encumbrance, and
declared for taxation purposes in their names. In this regard, respondents prayed that the Amended Complaint be dismissed and that
Francisco, et al.be held liable for the payment of moral damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit in their favor.
During trial, it was established from the testimonies of the parties that the Motherland was eventually sold bythe Heirs of Ciriaco to a
certain Gregorio de Vera (de Vera), and thatsaid heirs and deVera were not impleaded as parties in this case. 25

The RTC Ruling

On August 20, 1996, the RTC rendered a Decision26 in favor of Francisco, et al. and thereby directed respondents to: (a) reconvey to
Francisco, et al. their respective portions in the Motherland and in the accretions thereon, or their pecuniary equivalent; and (b) pay
actual damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00, moral damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00, and attorney’s fees in the sum of
₱10,000.00, as well as costs of suit.

The RTC found that the factual circumstances surrounding the present case showed that an implied trust existed between Ciriaco and
the Imbornal sisters with respect to the Motherland.27 It gave probative weight to Francisco, et al.’s allegation that the Sabangan
property, inherited by the Imbornal sisters from their mother, Basilia, was sold in order to help Ciriaco raise funds for his then-pending
homesteadpatent application. In exchange therefor, Ciriaco agreed that he shall hold the Motherland in trust for them once his
homestead patent application had been approved. As Ciriaco was only able to acquire the Motherland subject of the homestead patent
through the proceeds realized from the sale of the Sabangan property, the Imbornal sisters and, consequently, Francisco, et al. (as the
children of Alejandra and Balbina) are entitled to their proportionate shares over the Motherland, notwithstanding the undisputed
possession of respondents over its southern portion since 1926. 28

With respect to the accretions thatformed adjacent to the Motherland, the RTC ruled that the owner of the Motherland is likewise the
owner of the said accretions. Considering that the Imbornal sisters have become proportionate owners of the Motherland by virtue of
the implied trust created between them and Ciriaco, they (Imbornal sisters) and their heirs are also entitled to the ownership of said
accretions despite the fact that respondents were able to register them in their names.

Dissatisfied with the RTC’s ruling, respondents elevated the matter on appeal to the CA.

The CA Ruling

On November 28, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision29 reversing and setting aside the RTC Decision and entering a new one declaring:
(a) the descendants of Ciriaco as the exclusive owners of the Motherland; (b) the descendants of respondent Victoriano asthe exclusive
owners of the First Accretion; and (c) the descendants of Pablo (i.e., respondents collectively) as the exclusive owners of the Second
Accretion.

With respect to the Motherland, the CA found that Ciriaco alone was awarded a homestead patent, which later became the basis for
the issuance of a Torrens certificate of title in his name; as such, saidcertificate of title cannot be attacked collaterally through an
action for reconveyance filed by his wife’s (Catalina’s) relatives (i.e., Francisco, et al.being the children of Alejandra and Balbina,
who, in turn, are the sisters of Catalina). The CA further observed that the homestead patent was not aninheritance of Catalina;
instead, it was awarded by the government to Ciriaco after having fully satisfied the stringent requirements set forth under
Commonwealth Act No. 141,30 as amended,31and his title thereto had already become indefeasible. 32 Consequently, since the entire
Motherland was titled in Ciriaco’s name, his descendants should be regarded as the absolute owners thereof.

On the other hand, with regard to the disputed accretions, the CA ruled that respondents – i.e., respondent Victoriano with respect to
the First Accretion, and all the respondents withrespect to the Second Accretion – need not be the owners of the Motherland in order
to acquire them by acquisitive prescription. Considering that accretions are not automatically registered in the name of the
riparianowner and are, therefore, subject to acquisitive prescription by third persons, any occupant may apply for their registration. In
this case, the CA found that respondents have acquired title to the subject accretions by prescription, 33 considering that they have been
in continuous possession and enjoyment of the First Accretion in the concept of an owner since 1949 (when the First Accretion was
formed), which resulted in the issuance of a certificate of title in the name of respondent Victoriano covering the same. Accordingly,
they have also become the riparian owners of the Second Accretion, and given thatthey have caused the issuance of OCT No. 21481 in
their names over the said Accretion, they have also become the absolute ownersthereof. Since Francisco, et al. took no action to
protect their purported interests over the disputed accretions, the respondents’ titles over the same had already become indefeasible, to
the exclusion of Francisco, et al.34

At odds with the CA’s disposition, Francisco et al. filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however,denied by the CA in a
Resolution35 dated May 7, 2008, hence, this petition taken by the latter’s heirs as their successors-in-interest.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not the CA erred in declaring that: (a) the descendants of Ciriaco are the exclusive
owners of the Motherland; (b) the descendants of respondent Victoriano are the exclusive owners of the First Accretion; and (c) the
descendants of Pablo (respondents collectively) are the exclusive owners of the Second Accretion on the basis of the following
grounds: (a) prescription of the reconveyance action, which was duly raised as anaffirmative defense in the Amended Answer, and (b)
the existence of an implied trust between the Imbornal sisters and Ciriaco.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

A. Procedural Matter: Issue of Prescription.

At the outset, the Court finds that the causes of action pertaining to the Motherland and the First Accretion are barred by prescription.
An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and legal
owner.36 Thus, reconveyance is a remedy granted only tothe owner of the property alleged to be erroneously titled in another’s name. 37

As the records would show, the Amended Complaint filed by petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest, Francisco, et al. is for the
reconveyance of their purported shares or portions in the following properties: (a) the Motherland, originally covered by OCT No.
1462 in the name of Ciriaco; (b) the First Accretion, originally covered by OCT No. P-318 in the name of respondent Victoriano; and
(c) the Second Accretion, covered by OCT No. 21481 in the name of all respondents. To recount, Francisco, et al. asserted co-
ownership over the Motherland, alleging that Ciriaco agreed to hold the same in trustfor their predecessors-in-interest Alejandra and
Balbina upon issuance of the title in his name. Likewise, they alleged that respondents acquired the First and Second Accretions by
means of fraudand deceit.

When property is registered in another’s name, an implied or constructive trust is created by law in favor of the true owner. 38 Article
1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee ofan implied
trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten (10)
years, reckoned from the date of registration of the deed or the date ofissuance of the certificate of title over the property, 39 if the
plaintiff is not in possession. However, if the plaintiff is in possession of the property, the action is imprescriptible. As held in the case
of Lasquite v. Victory Hills, Inc.:40

An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in 10 years. The reference point of the 10-yearprescriptive period is
the date of registration of the deed or the issuance of the title. The prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to
reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. However, if the plaintiff, as the realowner of the
property also remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property does not run
against him. In such a case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an
action that is imprescriptible.41 (Emphases supplied)

Based on the foregoing, Francisco, et al. had then a period of ten (10) years from the registration of the respective titles covering the
disputed properties within which to file their action for reconveyance, taking into account the fact that they were never in possessionof
the said properties. Hence, with respect tothe Motherland covered by OCT No. 1462 issued on December 5, 1933 in the name of
Ciriaco, an action for reconveyance therefor should have been filed until December 5, 1943; with respect to the First Accretion
covered by OCT No. P-318 issued on August 15, 1952in the name of respondent Victoriano, an action of the same nature should have
been filed untilAugust 15, 1962; and, finally, with respect to the Second Accretion covered by OCT No. 21481 issued on November
10, 1978in the name of the respondents, a suit for reconveyance therefor should have been filed until November 10, 1988.

A judicious perusal of the records, however, will show that the Amended Complaint 42 covering all three (3) disputed properties was
filed only on February 27, 1984. As such, it was filed way beyond the 10-year reglementary period within which to seek the
reconveyance of two (2) of these properties, namely, the Motherland and the First Accretion, with only the reconveyance action with
respect to the Second Accretion having been seasonably filed. Thus, considering thatrespondents raised prescription as a defense in
their Amended Answer,43 the Amended Complaint with respect to the Motherland and the First Accretion ought to have
beendismissed based on the said ground, with only the cause of action pertaining to the Second Accretion surviving. As will be,
however, discussed below, the entirety of the Amended Complaint, including the aforesaid surviving cause of action, would falter on
its substantive merits since the existence of the implied trust asserted in this case had not been established. In effect, the said complaint
is completely dismissible.

B. Substantive Matter: Existence of an Implied Trust.

The main thrust of Francisco, et al.’s Amended Complaint is that an implied trust had arisen between the Imbornal sisters, on the one
hand, and Ciriaco, on the other, with respect to the Motherland. This implied trust is anchored on their allegation that the proceeds
from the sale of the Sabangan property – an inheritance of their predecessors, the Imbornal sisters – were used for the then-pending
homestead application filed by Ciriaco over the Motherland. As such, Francisco, et al. claim that they are, effectively, coowners of the
Motherland together with Ciriaco’s heirs.

An implied trust arises, not from any presumed intention of the parties, but by operation of law in order to satisfy the demands of
justice and equity and to protect against unfair dealing or downright fraud. 44 To reiterate, Article 1456 of the Civil Code states that
"[i]f property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust
for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes."

The burden of proving the existence ofa trust is on the party asserting its existence, and such proof must be clear and satisfactorily
show the existence of the trust and its elements.45 While implied trusts may be proven by oral evidence, the evidence must be
trustworthy and received by the courts with extreme caution, and should not be made to rest on loose, equivocal or indefinite
declarations. Trustworthy evidence is required because oral evidence can easily be fabricated. 46

In this case, it cannot be said, merely on the basis of the oral evidence offered by Francisco, et al., that the Motherland had been either
mistakenly or fraudulently registered in favor of Ciriaco. Accordingly, it cannot be said either that he was merely a trustee of an
implied trust holding the Motherland for the benefit of the Imbornal sisters or their heirs.

As the CA had aptly pointed out,47 a homestead patent award requires proof that the applicant meets the stringent conditions48 set forth
under Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, which includes actual possession, cultivation, and improvement of the homestead. It
must be presumed, therefore, that Ciriaco underwent the rigid process and duly satisfied the strict conditions necessary for the grant of
his homestead patent application. As such, it is highly implausible thatthe Motherland had been acquired and registered by mistake or
through fraudas would create an implied trust between the Imbornal sisters and Ciriaco, especially considering the dearth of evidence
showing that the Imbornal sisters entered into the possession of the Motherland, or a portion thereof, orasserted any right over the
same at any point during their lifetime. Hence, when OCT No. 1462 covering the Motherland was issued in his name pursuant to
Homestead Patent No. 24991 on December 15, 1933, Ciriaco’s titleto the Motherland had become indefeasible. It bears to stress that
the proceedings for land registration that led to the issuance of Homestead Patent No. 24991 and eventually, OCT No. 1462 in
Ciriaco’s name are presumptively regular and proper, 49 which presumption has not been overcome by the evidence presented by
Francisco, et al.

In this light, the Court cannot fully accept and accord evidentiary value to the oral testimony offered by Francisco, et al. on the alleged
verbal agreement between their predecessors, the Imbornal sisters, and Ciriaco with respect to the Motherland. Weighed against the
presumed regularity of the award of the homestead patent to Ciriaco and the lack of evidence showing that the same was acquired and
registered by mistake or through fraud, the oral evidence of Francisco, et al.would not effectively establish their claims of ownership.
It has been held that oral testimony as to a certain fact, depending as it does exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as
written or documentary evidence,50 especially since the purported agreement transpired decades ago, or in the 1920s. Hence, with
respect to the Motherland, the CA did not err in holding that Ciriaco and his heirs are the owners thereof, without prejudice to the
rights of any subsequent purchasers for value of the said property.

Consequently, as Francisco, et al.failed to prove their ownership rights over the Motherland, their cause of action with respect to the
First Accretion and, necessarily, the Second Accretion, must likewise fail. A further exposition is apropos.

Article 457 of the Civil Code states the rule on accretion as follows: "[t]o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters." Relative thereto, in Cantoja v. Lim, 51 the Court,
citing paragraph 32 of the Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 dated April 30, 1936, in relation to Article 4 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of 1866, as well as related jurisprudence on the matter, elucidated on the preferential right of the riparian owner over the land
formed by accretions, viz.:

Being the owner of the land adjoining the foreshore area, respondent is the riparian or littoralowner who has preferential right to lease
the foreshore area as provided under paragraph 32 of the Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, dated 30 April 1936, which reads:

32. Preference of Riparian Owner. – The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands, marshylands or lands covered with water
bordering upon shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to apply for such lands adjoining his property as
may not be needed for the public service, subject to the laws and regulations governing lands of this nature, provided that he applies
therefor within sixty (60) days from the date he receives a communication from the Director of Lands advising him of his preferential
right.

The Court explained in Santulan v. The Executive Secretary[170 Phil. 567; 80 SCRA 548 (1977)] the reason for such grant of
preferential right to the riparian or littoral owner, thus:

Now, then, is there any justification for giving to the littoral owner the preferential right to lease the foreshore land abutting on his
land?

That rule in paragraph 32 is in consonance with Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 which provides that, while lands
added to the shore by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea form part of the public domain, such lands,
"when they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the established
[sic] of special industries, or for the coast guard service, "shall be declared by the Government "to be the property of the owners of the
estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof."

In other words, article 4 recognizes the preferential right of the littoral owner (riparian according to paragraph 32) to the foreshore
land formed by accretionsor alluvial deposits due to the action of the sea.1âwphi1

The reason for that preferential right is the same as the justification for giving accretions to the riparianowner, which is that accretion
compensates the riparian owner for the diminutions which his land suffers by reason of the destructive force of the waters. So, in the
case of littoral lands, he who loses by the encroachments of the sea should gain by its recession. 52

Accordingly, therefore, alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek or a river do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial
property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is
that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be
subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons. 53

In this case, Francisco, et al. and, now, their heirs, i.e., herein petitioners,. are not the riparian owners of the Motherland to which the
First Accretion had .attached, hence, they cannot assert ownership over the First Accretion. Consequently, as the Second Accretion
had merely attached to the First Accretion, they also have no right over the Second Accretion. Neither were they able to show that they
acquired these properties through prescription as it was ·not established that they were in possession of any of them. Therefore,
whether through accretion or, independently, through prescription, the discernible conclusion is that Francisco et al. and/or petitioners'
claim of title over the First and Second Accretions had not been substantiated, and, as a result, said properties cannot be reconveyed in
their favor. This is especially so since on the other end of the fray lie respondents armed with a certificate of title in their names
covering the First and Second Accretions coupled with their possession thereof, both of which give rise to the superior credibility of
their own claim. Hence, petitioners' action for reconveyan.ce with respect to both accretions must altogether fail.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 28, 2006 and the Resolution dated May 7, 2008 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57618 are hereby AFFIRMED, and a new judgment is entered DISMISSING the Amended Complaint
dated February 27, 1984 filed in said case.