First Study

Resolution March 18, 1954
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to
1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.
Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.
DIOKNO, J.:
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as
Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of
Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may
be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general
average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule
127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the different
bar examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which the
examination papers were graded, this court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates
who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in
1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this
court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to
R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than
those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate
Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to
70 per cent effective since 1946. The President requested the views of this court on the bill.
Complying with that request, seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written
comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not
override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the
provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court reiterated their unfavorable
views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his
signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full as follows:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-
FIVE.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred
twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of
seventy per cent in any bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to
the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one per cent in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in the nineteen
hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per cent in the nineteen hundred and
fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar
examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any subject, shall be
allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine
Bar: Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a
fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in any
bar examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to have
passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the
passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that
he may take.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to
the bar invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their examination
papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission.
There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without,
however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first
reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked
Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If
they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if
declared valid, should be applied equally to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or
not. A complete list of the petitioners, properly classified, affected by this decision, as well as a
more detailed account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended to this decision as
Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the effects of the law, the following statistical data
are set forth:
(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No.
972 total 1,168, classified as follows:
1946 (August) 206 121 18
1946 (November) 477 228 43
1947 749 340 0
1948 899 409 11
1949 1,218 532 164
1950 1,316 893 26
1951 2,068 879 196
1952 2,738 1,033 426
1953 2,555 968 284

TOTAL 12,230 5,421 1,168
Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586 have
filed either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere motions for
reconsideration.
(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said
Republic Act. These candidates had each taken from two to five different examinations, but
failed to obtain a passing average in any of them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades
in different subjects in previous examinations, with their latest marks, they would be sufficient to
reach the passing average as provided for by Republic Act No. 972.
(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of
which only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had
individually presented motions for reconsideration which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful
candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions, which are still pending
because they could be favorably affected by Republic Act No. 972, — although as has been
already stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legal
profession and the administration of justice, and because some doubts have been expressed as
to its validity, the court set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the sole
question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.
We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the
members of the bar who have amply argued, orally an in writing, on the various aspects in
which the question may be gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente
J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law,
and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz,
Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de
Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from the memoranda of
counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio
Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema themselves, has greatly helped
us in this task. The legal researchers of the court have exhausted almost all Philippine and
American jurisprudence on the matter. The question has been the object of intense deliberation
for a long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the preparation of the majority
opinion was assigned to a new member in order to place it as humanly as possible above all
suspicion of prejudice or partiality.
Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those
candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.
Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator
Pablo Angeles David stated:
The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous handicap
which students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome
such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students
who took up law soon after the liberation.
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now
it is claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because
they suffered from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law
graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as
was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of
legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem
evolved by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital
requisites for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To
the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To
approve officially of those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a
delicate mission is to create a serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an
insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated. There were abundant materials.
Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies were made available to the public during
those years and private enterprises had also published them in monthly magazines and annual
digests. The Official Gazette had been published continuously. Books and magazines published
abroad have entered without restriction since 1945. Many law books, some even with revised
and enlarged editions have been printed locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine
Reports began to be published since 1946, which continued to be supplemented by the addition
of new volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.
The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable
principles, but the resolution of the question would have been easier had an identical case of
similar background been picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any
precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been directly derived the
judicial system established here with its lofty ideals by the Congress of the United States, and
which we have preserved and attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous judicial history
of more than half a century? From the citations of those defending the law, we can not find a
case in which the validity of a similar law had been sustained, while those against its validity
cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240
NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of
Guariña (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the President which is expressed in his vote of
the original bill and which the postponement of the contested law respects.
This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been
promulgated, the judiciary immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not within our
power to offer a precedent to uphold the disputed law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that has been
cited to us as a favorable precedent of the law — that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of
Appeals of New York revoked the decision of the Supreme court of that State, denying the
petition of Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law under the provisions of a statute
concerning the school of law of Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was
declared by the Court of Appeals to be consistent with the Constitution of the state of New York.
It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:
They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either of them
for any elective office except that of the Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or the
people, shall be void. They shall not exercise any power of appointment to public office. Any
male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who possesses the
requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall be entitled to admission to practice in all the
courts of this State. (p. 93).
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:
Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them had previously
rested with the judges, and this was the principal appointing power which they possessed. The
convention was evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which this power had been exercised,
and with the restrictions which the judges had imposed upon admission to practice before them.
The prohibitory clause in the section quoted was aimed directly at this power, and the insertion
of the provision" expecting the admission of attorneys, in this particular section of the
Constitution, evidently arose from its connection with the object of this prohibitory clause. There
is nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a disposition to preserve any portion of
their power over this subject, unless the Supreme Court is right in the inference it draws from
the use of the word `admission' in the action referred to. It is urged that the admission spoken of
must be by the court; that to admit means to grant leave, and that the power of granting
necessarily implies the power of refusing, and of course the right of determining whether the
applicant possesses the requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.
These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act. (p. 93.)
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it provided that
the possession of a diploma of the school of law of Columbia College conferring the degree of
Bachelor of Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that the constitution required of
applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision does not however quote the text of the law,
which we cannot find in any public or accessible private library in the country.
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New York, the
Court of Appeals said of the object of the law:
The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College being an institution of
established reputation, and having a law department under the charge of able professors, the
students in which department were not only subjected to a formal examination by the law
committee of the institution, but to a certain definite period of study before being entitled to a
diploma of being graduates, the Legislature evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this
examination, together with the preliminary study required by the act, as fully equivalent as a test
of legal requirements, to the ordinary examination by the court; and as rendering the latter
examination, to which no definite period of preliminary study was essential, unnecessary and
burdensome.
The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of the applicant, and for
the mere purpose of substituting the examination by the law committee of the college for that of
the court. It could have had no other object, and hence no greater scope should be given to its
provisions. We cannot suppose that the Legislature designed entirely to dispense with the plain
and explicit requirements of the Constitution; and the act contains nothing whatever to indicate
an intention that the authorities of the college should inquire as to the age, citizenship, etc., of
the students before granting a diploma. The only rational interpretation of which the act admits
is, that it was intended to make the college diploma competent evidence as to the legal
attainments of the applicant, and nothing else. To this extent alone it operates as a modification
of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in connection with these statutes and with the
Constitution itself in order to determine the present condition of the law on the subject. (p.89)
xxx xxx xxx
The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission, that
has simply prescribed what shall be competent evidence in certain cases upon that question.
(p.93)
From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may be
clearly seen. Please note only the following distinctions:
(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who failed in
the bar examinations be admitted to the practice of law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court
its jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the
admission of any lawyer.
(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely different on
the matter of admission of the practice of law.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their
supervision have been disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute,
its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have been
demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid of
titles." Even considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter
supplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the practice of law,
to our judgment and proposition that the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement
of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging to Congress, is unacceptable.
The function requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts, whether
past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts are
governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And it
becomes more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the
petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be revoked or modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is
concededly judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter had been
undertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the validity of a
legislative enactment providing that Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts was
discussed. From the text of this decision we quote the following paragraphs:
This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the history of the
English speaking people so far as we have been able to ascertain. There has been much
uncertainty as to the extent of the power of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate
qualifications of attorney at law has been expressly committed to the courts, and the act of
admission has always been regarded as a judicial function. This act purports to constitute Mr.
Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion of legislative
power. (p. 444)
Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, art.
4.) In so far as the prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar are legislative in
character, the Legislature is acting within its constitutional authority when it sets up and
prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)
But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its judgment will serve the
purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to impose other and further
exactions and qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)
Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct, independent, and
coordinate branches of the government. Neither branch enjoys all the powers of sovereignty
which properly belongs to its department. Neither department should so act as to embarrass the
other in the discharge of its respective functions. That was the scheme and thought of the
people setting upon the form of government under which we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis.,
525; Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)
The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the
administration of justice is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By
committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty to the judicial department of our state
government, under 42a scheme which it was supposed rendered it immune from
embarrassment or interference by any other department of government, the courts cannot
escape responsibility fir the manner in which the powers of sovereignty thus committed to the
judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)
The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an attache
of the courts. The quality of justice dispense by the courts depends in no small degree upon the
integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach to the administration
of justice and bring the courts themselves into disrepute. (p.445)
Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars, at least
in the English speaking countries. (p. 445)
After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:
Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to the adoption
of our Constitution, the courts of England, concededly subordinate to Parliament since the
Revolution of 1688, had exercise the right of determining who should be admitted to the practice
of law, which, as was said in Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's New Cases 235,
"constitutes the most solid of all titles." If the courts and judicial power be regarded as an entity,
the power to determine who should be admitted to practice law is a constituent element of that
entity. It may be difficult to isolate that element and say with assurance that it is either a part of
the inherent power of the court, or an essential element of the judicial power exercised by the
court, but that it is a power belonging to the judicial entity and made of not only a sovereign
institution, but made of it a separate independent, and coordinate branch of the government.
They took this institution along with the power traditionally exercise to determine who should
constitute its attorney at law. There is no express provision in the Constitution which indicates
an intent that this traditional power of the judicial department should in any manner be subject to
legislative control. Perhaps the dominant thought of the framers of our constitution was to make
the three great departments of government separate and independent of one another. The idea
that the Legislature might embarrass the judicial department by prescribing inadequate
qualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent with the dominant purpose of making the
judicial independent of the legislative department, and such a purpose should not be inferred in
the absence of express constitutional provisions. While the legislature may legislate with respect
to the qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its general and unquestioned power
to protect the public interest. When it does legislate a fixing a standard of qualifications required
of attorneys at law in order that public interests may be protected, such qualifications do not
constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class from which the court must make its
selection. Such legislative qualifications do not constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond
which the court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications deemed necessary by the course of
the proper administration of judicial functions. There is no legislative power to compel courts to
admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit to exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at
law. (p. 450)
Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite likely true
that the legislature may exercise the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a
legislative functions. However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the power to admit
attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial function. In all of the states, except New Jersey (In
re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our investigation reveals, attorneys receive their
formal license to practice law by their admission as members of the bar of the court so
admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall.
333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan,
843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St.
Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.
The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts,
it having been so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to practice is
the judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer such
right upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an
attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter where the power to
determine the qualifications may reside. (p. 451)
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of
the Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:
It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that there be
members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral character. This
arises from the need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining authority over the
knavish, litigant. It is highly important, also that the public be protected from incompetent and
vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for doing mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C.L.,
in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851:
"Membership in the bar is a privilege burden with conditions." One is admitted to the bar "for
something more than private gain." He becomes an "officer of the court", and ,like the court
itself, an instrument or agency to advance the end of justice. His cooperation with the court is
due "whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld." Without such attorneys
at law the judicial department of government would be hampered in the performance of its
duties. That has been the history of attorneys under the common law, both in this country and
England. Admission to practice as an attorney at law is almost without exception conceded to
be a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in courts, as are other proceedings invoking
judicial action. Admission to the bar is accomplish and made open and notorious by a decision
of the court entered upon its records. The establishment by the Constitution of the judicial
department conferred authority necessary to the exercise of its powers as a coordinate
department of government. It is an inherent power of such a department of government
ultimately to determine the qualifications of those to be admitted to practice in its courts, for
assisting in its work, and to protect itself in this respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient
learning, and those not possessing good moral character. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly
and with finality in Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been well settled, by
the rules and practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine
who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and counselor, and for what cause
he ought to be removed." (p.727)
In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice the
legal profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:
In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath for
attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney's office as follows: "They
are officers of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their possessing
sufficient legal learning and fair private character. It has always been the general practice in this
country to obtain this evidence by an examination of the parties. In this court the fact of the
admission of such officers in the highest court of the states to which they, respectively, belong
for, three years preceding their application, is regarded as sufficient evidence of the possession
of the requisite legal learning, and the statement of counsel moving their admission sufficient
evidence that their private and professional character is fair. The order of admission is the
judgment of the court that the parties possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and
counselors, and are entitled to appear as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry the
parties become officers of the court, and are responsible to it for professional misconduct. They
hold their office during good behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained
and declared by the judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex
parte Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is
the exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in numerous cases. It was so held by the
court of appeals of New York in the matter of the application of Cooper for admission. Re
Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and Counselors", said that court, "are not only officers of the
court, but officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and
hence their appointment may, with propriety, be entrusted to the court, and the latter, in
performing his duty, may very justly considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate
judicial functions." (pp. 650-651).
We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:
Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the
exercise of a judicial function, and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this point.
Admission to practice have also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent powers of
the court. — Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.
Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent power of
the court. — A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on
Power of Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.
On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and
legislative departments of the government.
The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is that it is
the province of the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of
transactions occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary determines rights
and obligations with reference to transactions that are past or conditions that exist at the time of
the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a vital one and not subject to alteration or
change either by legislative action or by judicial decree.
The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other
departments of the government. — 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.
If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of them
construction of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by
settling aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of
offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry. —
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.
In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a
general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in
mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment
revoking those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates
concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for
justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive
department, that may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a
clear usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the law in question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the
rule promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no valid
argument. Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:
Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed
as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter
and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in
the Philippines. — Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal
responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. the primary power and
responsibility which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress
found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have nothing over
which to exercise the power granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules
promulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the
Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor permit
that Congress substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on
the matter. The Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar
or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of individuals to the practice of law.
Its power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according
to its judgment the need for a better service of the legal profession requires it. But this power
does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys
at law and supervise the practice of the legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the
admission to the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them
may and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful
consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each department requires. These powers
have existed together for centuries without diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitation
being found in that the legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on the admission
to the Bar respond to the demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high
virtues, culture, training and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of appeal,
amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power,
which has the inherent responsibility for a good and efficient administration of justice and the
supervision of the practice of the legal profession, should consider these reforms as the
minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these reforms the
lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting, suspending,
disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which, exercise within
their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in
attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and exacting
necessities of the administration of justice.
The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guariña took examination and
failed by a few points to obtain the general average. A recently enacted law provided that one
who had been appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of law without
a previous examination. The Government appointed Guariña and he discharged the duties of
Fiscal in a remote province. This tribunal refused to give his license without previous
examinations. The court said:
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks
admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds the
office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:
Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety, entitled
"An Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the
Philippine Islands," is hereby amended to read as follows:
1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the
sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing as members
of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this code; Provided, That any
person who, prior to the passage of this act, or at any time thereafter, shall have held, under the
authority of the United States, the position of justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of
First Instance, or judge or associate judge of the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine
Islands, or the position of Attorney General, Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General,
assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney General, prosecuting attorney for the City of
Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the
Moro Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in
the courts of the Philippine Islands without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme
Court and establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said court.
The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant took, and failed to
pass the prescribed examination. The report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907,
shows that he received an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of legal learning
upon which he was examined, thus falling four points short of the required percentage of 75. We
would be delinquent in the performance of our duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the face of
this affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant in the required qualifications of
learning in the law at the time when he presented his former application for admission to the
bar, we should grant him license to practice law in the courts of these Islands, without first
satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the examination on that occasion, he now
"possesses the necessary qualifications of learning and ability."
But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is entitled as
of right to be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination "upon motion before
the Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now holds the
office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in mind the object
which the legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting the above-cited amendment to the
earlier statute, and in view of the context generally and especially of the fact that the
amendment was inserted as a proviso in that section of the original Act which specifically
provides for the admission of certain candidates without examination. It is contented that this
mandatory construction is imperatively required in order to give effect to the apparent intention
of the legislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised.
And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States, articles 2,
16 and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:
Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and confirmed to it
by the Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case such as that under
consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word "may," as used in the above citation from Act
of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the power
conferred upon the commission is to that extent invalid and void, as transcending its rightful
limits and authority.
Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions
enumerated, and with particular emphasis in the case of Guariña, the Court held:
In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar under the provisions of
this statute have been considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such
appointments had been made as satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the applicant. But
in all of those cases we had reason to believe that the applicants had been practicing attorneys
prior to the date of their appointment.
In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was not and
never had been practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his
appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the
required qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to the bar.
In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion, we do not think that his
appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his possession of the
necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude therefore that this application for
license to practice in the courts of the Philippines, should be denied.
In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points short of
the necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also of the fact that since
that time he has held the responsible office of the governor of the Province of Sorsogon and
presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the performance of the duties of that office
that the Chief Executive, with the consent and approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to
retain him in the Government service by appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal, we think
we would be justified under the above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his case the
ordinary examination prescribed by general rule, provided he offers satisfactory evidence of his
proficiency in a special examination which will be given him by a committee of the court upon
his application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he desires so to do, to present himself at
any of the ordinary examinations prescribed by general rule. — (In re Guariña, pp. 48-49.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive
character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been found also to suffer
from the fatal defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a
classification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme Court, until
December 31 of that year, to grant license for the practice of law to those students who began
studying before November 4, 1897, and had studied for two years and presented a diploma
issued by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a law office and would pass an
examination, or to those who had studied for three years if they commenced their studies after
the aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared that this law was unconstitutional being,
among others, a class legislation. The Court said:
This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of diplomas
from law schools issued to the applicants. The act of the general assembly passed in 1899,
under which the application is made, is entitled "An act to amend section 1 of an act entitled "An
act to revise the law in relation to attorneys and counselors," approved March 28, 1884, in force
July 1, 1874." The amendment, so far as it appears in the enacting clause, consists in the
addition to the section of the following: "And every application for a license who shall comply
with the rules of the supreme court in regard to admission to the bar in force at the time such
applicant commend the study of law, either in a law or office or a law school or college, shall be
granted a license under this act notwithstanding any subsequent changes in said rules". — In
re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.
. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to December
31, 1899, this court shall grant a license of admittance to the bar to the holder of every diploma
regularly issued by any law school regularly organized under the laws of this state, whose
regular course of law studies is two years, and requiring an attendance by the student of at least
36 weeks in each of such years, and showing that the student began the study of law prior to
November 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual proofs of good moral character. The other
branch of the proviso is that any student who has studied law for two years in a law office, or
part of such time in a law office, "and part in the aforesaid law school," and whose course of
study began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory examination by
the examining board in the branches now required by the rules of this court. If the right to
admission exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso, which, it is claimed, confers substantial
rights and privileges upon the persons named therein, and establishes rules of legislative
creation for their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)
Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation, prohibited
by the constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to admit attorneys to
practice in the courts and take part in the administration of justice, and could prescribe the
character of evidence which should be received by the court as conclusive of the requisite
learning and ability of persons to practice law, it could only be done by a general law, persons or
classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The right to practice law is a privilege, and a license
for that purpose makes the holder an officer of the court, and confers upon him the right to
appear for litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees therefor, and creates certain
exemptions, such as from jury services and arrest on civil process while attending court. The
law conferring such privileges must be general in its operation. No doubt the legislature, in
framing an enactment for that purpose, may classify persons so long as the law establishing
classes in general, and has some reasonable relation to the end sought. There must be some
difference which furnishes a reasonable basis for different one, having no just relation to the
subject of the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs.
People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.
The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience, may furnish a
basis for classification (Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place where such
physician has resided and practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis, and is an arbitrary
discrimination, making an enactment based upon it void (State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18
Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes to say what shall serve as a test of fitness for the
profession of the law, and plainly, any classification must have some reference to learning,
character, or ability to engage in such practice. The proviso is limited, first, to a class of persons
who began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897. This class is subdivided into two classes
— First, those presenting diplomas issued by any law school of this state before December 31,
1899; and, second, those who studied law for the period of two years in a law office, or part of
the time in a law school and part in a law office, who are to be admitted upon examination in the
subjects specified in the present rules of this court, and as to this latter subdivision there seems
to be no limit of time for making application for admission. As to both classes, the conditions of
the rules are dispensed with, and as between the two different conditions and limits of time are
fixed. No course of study is prescribed for the law school, but a diploma granted upon the
completion of any sort of course its managers may prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can there be
anything with relation to the qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law resting upon the
mere date of November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not. Those
who began the study of law November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two years as
well as those who began on the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso need spend only two
years in study, while those who commenced the next day must spend three years, although
they would complete two years before the time limit. The one who commenced on the 3rd. If
possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted without examination before December 31, 1899, and
without any prescribed course of study, while as to the other the prescribed course must be
pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless. Such classification cannot rest upon any natural
reason, or bear any just relation to the subject sought, and none is suggested. The proviso is for
the sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined persons. (pp. 647-648.)
In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where the legislature
attempted by law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held with regards to
its aspect of being a class legislation:
But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the legislature has power to
prescribe ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon which courts must admit and license
those applying as attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the manner here
attempted. That power must be exercised through general laws which will apply to all alike and
accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of the Legislature to exact qualifications of
those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field in the case of Dent. vs. West
Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: "It is undoubtedly the right of
every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling, business or profession he may
choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, and
condition." This right may in many respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of our
republican institutions. Here all vocations are all open to every one on like conditions. All may
be pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring years of study and great learning for their
successful prosecution. The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the "estate" acquired in
them — that is, the right to continue their prosecution — is often of great value to the
possessors and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any more than their real or personal
property can be thus taken. It is fundamental under our system of government that all similarly
situated and possessing equal qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes
regulating the practice of medicine, requiring medications to establish the possession on the
part of the application of his proper qualifications before he may be licensed to practice, have
been challenged, and courts have seriously considered whether the exemption from such
examinations of those practicing in the state at the time of the enactment of the law rendered
such law unconstitutional because of infringement upon this general principle. State vs. Thomas
Call, 121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis.
172, 76 N.W. 345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.
This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to practice law and
to constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It is not
material that he had once established his right to practice law and that one time he possessed
the requisite learning and other qualifications to entitle him to that right. That fact in no matter
affect the power of the Legislature to select from the great body of the public an individual upon
whom it would confer its favors.
A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court to
admit to the practice of law without examination, all who had served in the military or naval
forces of the United States during the World War and received a honorable discharge therefrom
and who (were disabled therein or thereby within the purview of the Act of Congress approved
June 7th, 1924, known as "World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose disability is rated at least
ten per cent thereunder at the time of the passage of this Act." This Act was held
|unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly violated the quality clauses of the constitution of
that state. In re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N.W. 179.
A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-
153 as follows:
The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be valid
must rest upon material differences between the person included in it and those excluded and,
furthermore, must be based upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided
the constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and real differences, as
distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones. Therefore, any law that is made applicable to
one class of citizens only must be based on some substantial difference between the situation
of that class and other individuals to which it does not apply and must rest on some reason on
which it can be defended. In other words, there must be such a difference between the situation
and circumstances of all the members of the class and the situation and circumstances of all
other members of the state in relation to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as
presents a just and natural cause for the difference made in their liabilities and burdens and in
their rights and privileges. A law is not general because it operates on all within a clause unless
there is a substantial reason why it is made to operate on that class only, and not generally on
all. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject,
have obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5
per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5
per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as
members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general average of 75
per cent, which has been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature
indicated by the abovementioned authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and none
has been given, then the classification is fatally defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general
average indicated, were not included because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful
candidates of those years. This fact does not justify the unexplained classification of
unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the
exclusion of those who failed before said years under the same conditions justified. The fact that
this Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946 does not signify that no one concerned
may prove by some other means his right to an equal consideration.
To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it
is argued that it is curative, and that in such form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972
intend to cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal permitted
admission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain the general average of 75 per cent: in
1946 those who obtained only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or more;
in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per
cent, which was considered by the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the
Rules, by reason of circumstances deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the
passing averages during those years were all that could be objected to or criticized. Now, it is
desired to undo what had been done — cancel the license that was issued to those who did not
obtain the prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not propose to
do so. Concededly, it approves what has been done by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented
is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946
to 1952 as sufficient to qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of
judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to complete the cure of this infirmity, the
effectivity of the disputed law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955,
increasing each year the general average by one per cent, with the order that said candidates
be admitted to the Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof that what the
law attempts to amend and correct are not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the
Court, by means of simply taking its place. This is doing directly what the Tribunal should have
done during those years according to the judgment of Congress. In other words, the power
exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which continue in force. What was
done was to stop or suspend them. And this power is not included in what the Constitution has
granted to Congress, because it falls within the power to apply the rules. This power
corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty been confided.
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals.
The grave defect of this system is that it does not take into account that the laws and
jurisprudence are not stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his certificate, it may
happen that the existing laws and jurisprudence are already different, seriously affecting in this
manner his usefulness. The system that the said law prescribes was used in the first bar
examinations of this country, but was abandoned for this and other disadvantages. In this case,
however, the fatal defect is that the article is not expressed in the title will have temporary effect
only from 1946 to 1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite
time. This is contrary to Section 21 (1), article VI of the Constitution, which vitiates and annuls
article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its nullity
affect the entire law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the
legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second,
because they create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional
principles; and third, because their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic
principles. As has already been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal defects.
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is
unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the following reasons,
to wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations
of 1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was
exactly found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these
candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are at present already
prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary
to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional
responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of
these 810 candidates, without having examined their respective examination papers, and
although it is admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiable
reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and alter them. In attempting to do it directly
Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and
supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they
ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to
improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum
norms towards that end in the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers
to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily performance of judicial
functions and is essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and
inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may be
admitted and may continue in the practice of law according to existing rules.
4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is
contrary to facts which are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of
law students inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a
class legislation.
5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the
Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is
void.
6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the
examinations of 1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in
those years, shall continue in force.
RESOLUTION
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and
impassioned discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of
the debate among the members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious observations of two
of our beloved colleagues who since the beginning have announced their decision not to take
part in voting, we, the eight members of the Court who subscribed to this decision have voted
and resolved, and have decided for the Court, and under the authority of the same:
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946
to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without
force and effect.
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the
examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid
and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the
examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the
examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a
grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have
filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has become final, they shall be permitted
to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on the date or
dates that the chief Justice may set. So ordered.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
ANNEX I
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
A resume‚ of pertinent facts concerning the bar examinations of 1946 to 1953 inclusive follows:
August, 19461
Board of Examiners: Hon. Pedro Tuason, Chairman, Prof. Gerardo

Florendo, Atty. Bernardino Guerrero, Atty. Joaquin Ramirez, Atty.
Crispin Oben, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Jose
Perez Cardenas, and Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, members.
Number of candidates 206
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 12
73'S 6
72'S 6
Number of candidates who passed 85
Number of candidates who failed 121
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 18
Percentage of success (per cent) 41.62
Percentage of failure (per cent) 58.74
Passing grade (per cent) 72
November, 1946
Board of Examiners: The same as that of August, 1946, except Hon.

Jose Teodoro who was substituted by Atty. Honesto K. Bausan.

(72 per cent and above 73 per cent ---

Minutes of March 31, 1947)

(By resolution of the Court).
October, 1947
Board of Examiners: Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B.

Guevara, Atty. Antonio Araneta, Atty. Simon Cruz, Hon. Sixto de la
Costa, Atty. Celso B. Jamora, Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Federico Agrava,
Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Members.
70.55 per cent with 2 subject below 50 per 1

cent
69 per cent 40
68 per cent 2

(by resolution of the Court).
Note.--In passing the 2 whose grades were 68.95 per cent and 68.1 per
cent respectively, the Court found out that they were not benefited at all
by the bonus of 12 points given by the Examiner in Civil Law.
August, 1948
Board of Examiners: Hon. Marceliano R. Montemayor, Chairman Hon.

Luis P. Torres, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Sr., Atty.
Federico Agrava, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Hon. Jesus G. Barrera,
Hon. Rafael Amparo, Atty. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Members.
71's 29
70's 35
August, 1949
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Fernando

Jugo, Hon. Enrique Filamor, Atty. Salvador Araneta, Hon. Pastor M.
Endencia, Atty. Federico Agrava, Hon. Mariano H. de Joya, Hon. Felipe
Natividad, Atty. Emeterio Barcelon, Members.
Number of candidates 1,218

(74's)

August, 1950
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo,2 Chairman, Hon. Guillermo

B. Guevara, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Marcial P. Lichauco, Atty.
Carlos B. Hilado, Atty. J. Antonio Araneta, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor,
Hon. Francisco A. Delgado, Hon. Antonio Horrilleno, Members.
(The grade of 74 was raised to 75 per cent by recommendation and

authority
of the examiner in Remedial Law, Atty. Francisco Delgado).
August, 1951
Board of Examiners: Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor

M. Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Hon. Manuel Lim, Hon. Felipe
Natividad, Hon. Vicente Albert, Atty. Arturo Alafriz, Hon. Enrique V.
Filamor, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Members.

(74's)
Number of candidates who passed 1,189
August, 1952
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M.

Endencia, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Hon. Emilio
Peña, Atty. Emilio P. Virata, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad,
Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Members.

(74's)
Number of candidates who failed 1,033
August, 1953
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M.

Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr., Hon.
Emilio Peña, Atty. Jose S. de la Cruz, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe
Natividad, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Members.

(74's)
A list of petitioners for admission to the Bar under Republic Act No. 972, grouped by the years in
which they took the bar examinations, with annotations as to who had presented motions for
reconsideration which were denied (MRD), and who filed mere motions for reconsideration
without invoking said law, which are still pending, follows:
PETITIONER UNDER THE BAR FLUNKERS' LAW
Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.

Av.
MRD- 1. Agunod, Filemon L. 66 71 61 76 80 83 73 75 71.4
MRD- 2. Cunanan, Albino 76 72 74 75 70 70 65 72 71.45
MRD- 3. Mejia, Flaviano V. 64 64 65 68 83 74 68 80 69.85
1948
MRD- 4. Orlina, Soledad R. 71 68 66 75 63 75 70 88 69.9
MRD- 5. Vivero, Antonio Lu. 75 73 73 65 63 66 65 80 69.95
MRD- 6. Gatchalian, Salud 72 66 71 75 78 68 65 50 69.65
1949
7. Abaya, Jesus A. 69 79 75 75 71 89 55 75 70.8
MRD- 8. Advincula, David D. 76 80 62 86 81 72 60 65 70.5
9. Agraviador, Alfredo L. 63 85 70 77 80 81 65 80 71.8
10. Alacar, Pascual C. 61 63 83 79 71 85 65 80 72.05

11. Amog, Pedro M. 75 66 76 78 81 74 55 85 72.2
12. Apolinario, Miguel S. 75 84 78 78 70 70 60 75 71.95
13. Aquino, Maximo G. 82 77 71 77 76 77 60 75 73.15
14. Asinas, Candido D. 75 83 69 80 81 83 55 85 72.65
15. Baldivino, Jose B. 75 65 72 82 82 69 60 80 71.95
16. Balintona, Bernardo 75 80 64 78 74 67 65 70 70
17. Banawa, Angel L. 78 70 70 75 81 83 60 60 72.3
18. Bandala, Anacleto A. 66 80 66 71 93 72 55 70 69.6
19. Bandon, Alawadin L. 74 79 69 77 91 73 60 80 73.35
20. Baquero, Benjamin 76 79 64 77 85 72 65 75 72.5
21. Blanco, Jose 75 75 70 75 77 76 60 90 72.5
22. Buenaluz, Victoriano T. 75 71 72 78 67 82 60 75 70.85
23. Canda, Benjamin S. 75 72 75 82 76 77 65 75 73.55
24. Canon, Guillermo 77 86 67 88 75 69 70 85 73.9
25. Carlos, Estela S. 75 81 81 79 72 73 65 70 73.8
26. Cerezo, Gregorio O. 69 76 76 79 71 80 55 80 70.4
27. Clarin, Manuel L. 75 82 76 81 73 69 70 75 73.95
28. Claudo, Conrado O. 76 62 78 77 73 72 60 70 71.4
29. Condevillamar, Antonio 68 65 74 80 85 75 60 75 71.65

V.
MRD- Cornejo, Crisanto R. 72 75 69 82 83 79 65 80 73.4

30.
31. Corona, Olvido D. 68 76 73 81 81 72 60 75 71.15
32. Dizon, Marcial C. 76 86 69 83 75 74 65 80 73.1
33. Enriquez, Agustin P. 75 77 70 81 81 77 65 80 73.75

34. Espiritu, Irineo E. 80 88 69 75 76 77 65 75 73.8
35. Fernandez, Macario J. 63 82 76 75 81 84 65 75 72.95
36. Gallardo, Amando C. 78 79 67 77 76 75 60 65 70.95
37. Garcia, Freidrich M. 76 80 66 75 72 70 60 75 69.7
38. Garcia, Julian L. 64 77 68 82 89 77 65 75 72.15
39. Garcia, Leon Mo. 77 86 71 80 60 82 65 75 71.85
40. Garcia, Pedro V. 76 82 73 81 74 83 60 85 73.6
41. Garcia, Santiago C. 62 91 79 75 72 75 65 80 71.8
42. Genoves, Pedro 75 83 70 78 87 76 55 80 72.7
43. Gonzales, Amado P. 75 71 71 75 86 75 60 75 72.65
44. Guia, Odon R. de 77 76 66 81 74 76 60 75 70.9
45. Fernandez, Simeon 62 68 71 80 74 90 65 75 70.85
46. Jakosalem, Filoteo 82 83 73 82 61 87 65 70 73.6
47. Jesus, Felipe D. de 75 83 67 79 78 85 60 75 72.45
48. Jocom, Jacobo M. 77 77 74 77 74 64 55 85 70.65
49. Juares, Nicolas 77 84 56 76 73 82 60 85 70
50. Kalalang, Remigio 65 75 74 80 70 70 65 85 70.3
51. Layumas, Vicente L. 67 84 65 75 89 66 60 80 70.3
52. Leyson, Amancio F. 69 83 75 76 81 75 65 75 73.15
53. Libanan, Marcelino 71 83 61 77 80 81 65 85 71.75
54. Lim, Jose E. 77 77 72 76 72 64 65 70 71.15
55. Lim, Jose F. 70 75 62 83 80 71 65 80 70.4
56. Linao, Mariano M. 66 84 76 78 80 75 60 75 71.75
57. Lopez, Angelo P. 67 81 75 72 79 81 55 80 71

58. Lopez, Eliezar M. 77 75 60 75 77 85 60 75 70.7
59. Lopez, Nicanor S. 72 71 70 78 77 84 60 75 71.55
60. Manoleto, Proceso D. 72 70 65 78 81 90 60 80 71.95
61. Mancao, Alfredo P. 67 64 71 83 76 76 65 80 70.95
62. Manera, Mariano A. 75 78 75 75 68 79 60 65 71
63. Mercado, Arsenio N. 67 64 71 83 76 76 65 80 70.95
64. Miranda, Benjamin G. 76 81 67 82 74 77 65 80 72.55
65. Manad, Andres B. 77 75 68 82 69 72 65 75 71.15
1948
66. Orosco, Casimiro P. 72 84 69 81 70 82 65 75 71.9
67. Padua, Manuel C. 76 76 68 80 79 79 50 75 70.1
68. Palang, Basilio S. 71 75 82 71 55 87 55 75 69.6
69. Palma, Cuadrato 62 75 69 93 80 79 55 80 69.5
70. Pañganiban, Jose V. 67 83 61 81 91 74 60 75 70.6
71. Pareja, Felipe 66 71 75 81 67 74 60 70 68.75
72. Patalinjug, Eriberto 73 77 78 73 78 71 55 75 71.25
73. Paulin, Jose C. 66 69 71 77 83 82 65 75 72.1
74. Pido, Serafin C. 72 78 63 80 71 85 70 80 72.05
75. Pimentel, Luis P. 77 75 76 81 76 68 55 80 71.6
76. Plantilla, Rodrigo C. 72 78 68 89 79 81 65 85 73.55
77. Regalario, Benito B. 72 80 64 80 75 81 55 80 69.55
78. Robis, Casto P. 62 77 74 73 68 80 70 80 70.9
79. Rodil, Francisco C. 68 69 70 81 76 75 65 75 70.75
80. Rodriguez, Mariano I. 80 75 69 80 72 80 65 80 73.35

81. Romero, Crispulo P. 78 75 66 77 76 83 65 75 72.85
82. Saez, Porfirio D. 75 75 72 81 69 77 60 75 71
83. Saliguma, Crisogono 79 79 74 78 69 65 65 70 71.8

D.
84. Samano, Fortunato A. 75 84 72 77 70 82 60 75 71.9
85. Santos, Faustina C. 71 68 68 76 75 85 55 75 69.5
86. Santos, Josefina R. 68 69 76 71 77 82 65 75 72.3
87. Seludo, Ananias G. 75 80 69 79 77 82 65 75 73.25
88. Semilia, Rafael I. 68 85 55 83 89 79 65 80 71.25
89. Telan, Gaudencio 77 79 70 75 70 75 60 75 70.85
90. Tesorero, Leocadio T. 75 71 63 75 82 62 65 63 69.65
91. Torre, Valentin S. de la 85 81 71 76 69 65 55 70 70.4
92. Torres, Ariston L. 78 71 72 81 61 84 55 85 70.4
93. Veyra, Zosimo C. de 70 75 71 79 65 80 65 80 70.65
94. Viado, Jose 67 70 74 75 75 90 55 80 70.7
95. Villacarlos, Delfin A. 73 87 71 82 69 70 75 85 73.85
96. Villamil, Leonor S. 73 81 76 86 86 73 55 85 73.6
97. Zabala, Amando A. 76 70 67 75 76 76 60 75 70.6
1950
MRD- Cruz, Filomeno de la 70 71 78 81 76 72 64 96 73.4

98.
99. Española, Pablo S. 71 78 55 76 85 69 65 93 70.2
100. Foronda, Clarencio J. 60 78 68 79 84 88 62 93 71.9
101. Hechanova, Vicente 59 76 75 75 69 68 75 96 71.3
MRD- Peñalosa, Osias R. 80 78 61 76 61 77 66 85 70.2

102.
103. Sarmiento, Floro A. 65 86 63 82 89 72 60 72 70.15
MRD- Torre, Catalino P. 75 85 68 78 69 67 65 69 70.25

104.
105. Ungson, Fernando S. 61 87 75 70 57 85 83 82 72.8
1951
106. Abasolo, Romulo 77 70 64 65 76 70 76 64 71.7
107. Adeva, Daniel G. 75 59 74 65 69 51 78 67 70.4
108. Aguilar, Vicente Z. 73 63 68 75 70 69 75 75 71.25
109. Amodia, Juan T. 75 76 66 75 76 60 77 76 72.35
MRD- Añosa, Pablo S. 76 78 63 75 74 61 75 79 71.6

110.
111. Antiola, Anastacio R. 68 76 75 70 71 70 81 66 73.05
112. Aquino, S. Rey A. 70 71 71 60 74 62 76 77 71.1
113. Atienza, Manuel G. 71 78 68 80 86 51 82 75 73.85
114. Avanceña, Alfonso 71 71 65 75 70 72 78 80 71.8
MRD- Balacuit, Camilo N. 75 73 75 70 72 65 75 76 73.25

115.
116. Barinaga, Jeremias L. 68 69 73 70 74 50 80 79 71.2
MRD- Barrientos, Ambrosio 76 60 67 55 74 63 77 62 70.25

117. D.
MRD- Benitez, Tomas P. 67 75 75 60 73 72 75 78 72.2

118.
119. Biason, Sixto F. 73 82 67 65 66 72 77 68 71.25
MRD- Briñas, Isagani A. 71 69 74 70 76 52 79 72 71.95

120.
121. Buela, Arcadio P. 72 77 61 70 71 58 79 71 69.75
122. Cabilao, Leonardo S. 73 50 75 75 75 60 71 79 71.25

123. Cabrera, Ireneo M. 75 66 70 65 72 81 70 79 72.4
124. Cacacho, Emilio V.
125. Calilung, Soledad C. 64 73 73 80 73 57 75 59 69.65
MRD- Calimlim, Jose B. 64 73 73 80 73 57 75 59 69.65

126.
127. Calimlim, Pedro B. 66 82 69 60 69 52 83 75 70
128. Camello, Sotero H. 70 77 63 65 75 66 84 64 71.55
129. Campos, Juan A. 71 88 70 75 64 69 71 62 70.15
130. Castillo, Antonio del 78 78 70 60 79 67 69 76 72.65
MRD- Castillo, Dominador 75 61 72 75 74 71 67 66 71.1

131. Ad.
MRD- Castro, Jesus B. 72 86 72 75 65 75 76 71 72.85

132.
133. Casuga, Bienvenido B. 75 72 72 70 69 61 75 60 70.95
134. Cabangbang, Santiago 77 67 61 80 73 59 83 76 72.2

B.
135. Cruz, Federico S. 69 74 75 75 68 65 76 70 71.65
136. Dacanay, Eufemio P. 70 73 62 75 72 69 85 71 72.05
137. Deysolong, Felisberto 66 62 72 75 70 62 83 62 70.85
MRD- Dimaano, Jr., Jose N. 78 79 63 75 73 75 81 59 73.5

138.
139. Espinosa, Domingo L. 78 63 58 70 70 67 87 63 71.6
MRD- Farol, Evencia C. 80 78 66 75 81 72 62 73 72.25

140.
141. Felix, Conrado S. 71 71 75 65 70 58 75 69 70.75
142. Fernan, Pablo L. 67 88 66 85 73 68 78 75 72.35
143. Gandioco, Salvador G. 64 58 66 65 76 70 89 75 72.1

144. Gastardo, Crispin B. 70 69 68 75 78 66 86 72 73.9
145. Genson, Angelo B. 75 57 73 65 67 54 78 56 69.55
146. Guiani, Guinald M. 68 60 75 65 74 67 75 77 71.5
147. Guina, Graciano P. 66 69 67 60 78 52 83 61 69.6
MRD- Homeres, Praxedes P. 74 74 75 75 71 69 75 71 73.35

148.
149. Ibarra, Venancio M. 60 75 74 70 74 70 80 75 71.9
150. Imperial, Monico L. 72 78 75 75 72 56 82 77 73.7
MRD- Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M. 71 70 63 85 71 60 85 53 70.85

151.
152. Inandan, Fortunato C. 77 77 67 53 73 75 79 57 72.5
153. Jimenez, Florencio C. 75 70 70 75 72 61 75 78 72.05
154. Kintanar, Woodrow M. 70 83 72 65 76 73 75 69 72.95
155. Languido, Cesar V. 63 71 63 85 70 61 85 79 70.55
156. Lavilles, Cesar L. 61 89 75 55 73 63 75 78 70.55
157. Llenos, Francisco U. 64 70 65 60 72 65 92 75 71.75
158. Leon, Marcelo D. de 63 73 60 85 75 75 90 70 72.75
159. Llanto, Priscilla 72 68 60 65 76 67 84 68 71.35
160. Machachor, Oscar 68 59 78 70 67 57 75 75 70.15
MRD- Magsino, Encarnacion 77 66 70 70 76 71 75 61 72.75

161.
MRD- Maligaya, Demetrio M. 70 61 75 65 75 50 91 51 72.3

162.
163. Manio, Gregorio 67 67 69 80 71 67 75 75 70.65
164. Puzon, Eduardo S. 72 82 60 60 69 70 68 72 62.05
MRD- Marcial, Meynardo R. 66 75 74 70 75 67 81 75 73.15

165.
166. Martin, Benjamin S. 68 72 63 75 69 63 84 62 70.1
MRD- Monterroyo, Catalina 70 80 75 80 76 66 82 51 73.95

167. S.
MRD- Montero, Leodegario 73 67 66 80 81 65 81 75 73.75

168. C.
169. Monzon, Candido T. 70 72 74 75 67 70 77 69 72.05
170. Natividad, Alberto M. 73 79 68 65 73 69 75 79 72.2
MRD- Navallo, Capistrano C. 70 72 68 85 81 66 71 74 72.1

171.
172. Nisce, Camilo Z. 66 66 75 65 79 68 85 62 73.5
MRD- Ocampo, Antonio F. de 75 81 76 65 74 67 75 69 73.75

173.
174. Olaviar, Jose O. 72 70 69 55 66 70 77 75 70.5
MRD- Perez, Cesario Z. 75 76 66 80 72 63 82 69 72.95

175.
176. Pogado, Causin O. 70 66 65 70 75 64 75 70 69.95
177. Ramos-Balmori, 75 73 62 65 78 59 75 66 70.2

Manuela
178. Recinto, Ireneo I. 73 76 68 75 74 68 80 53 72.3
MRD- Redor, Francisco K. 62 77 73 75 69 64 76 69 70

179.
MRD- Regis, Deogracias A. 76 74 68 65 65 65 88 75 73.35

180.
181. Rigor, Estelita C. 67 78 61 80 71 77 79 65 70.9
MRD- Rimorin-Gordo, Estela 70 72 62 60 88 66 67 79 70.15

182.
183. Rosario, Prisco del 70 64 70 70 72 73 85 57 72.65
184. Rosario, Vicente D. del 75 91 65 75 68 68 79 62 72.2
185. Saavedra, Felipe 73 80 63 75 76 73 68 62 70.35

186. Salazar, Alfredo N. 66 72 73 75 67 68 77 69 70.85
187. Salem, Romulo R. 77 81 72 65 73 60 76 75 73
188. Foz, Julita A. 75 72 75 75 65 70 76 64 72.5
189. Santa Ana, Candido T. 77 69 65 75 81 75 70 75 73
190. Santos, Aquilino 72 66 69 65 68 70 81 71 71.7
191. Santos, Valeriano V. 76 72 75 75 68 62 76 79 73.1
192. Suico, Samuel 73 79 72 75 71 59 84 65 73.3
193. Suson, Teodorico 74 68 66 80 66 59 79 67 70.35
194. Tado, Florentino P. 64 76 67 65 76 72 76 53 69.7
195. Tapayan, Domingo A. 69 72 69 70 76 73 82 79 73.75
MRD- 67 60 71 75 79 67 84 60 72.7
Tiausas, Miguel V.
196.
197. Torres, Carlos P. 68 71 71 70 70 63 82 71 71.6
198. Tria, Hipolito 69 72 75 60 69 54 78 66 70.05
199. Velasco, Avelino A. 65 72 75 75 71 67 78 76 72.1
200. Villa, Francisco C. 65 80 73 75 68 79 65 75 70.2
201. Villagonzalo, Job R. 78 67 74 65 72 51 69 71 70.25
202. Villarama, Jr., Pedro 75 74 75 55 75 66 67 75 71.45
1952
203. Abacon, Pablo 75 72 78 81 78 72 64 55 72.7
MRP- Abad, Agapito 73 76 73 85 75 63 62 75 70.95

204.
MRP- Abella, Ludovico B. 70 81 76 81 70 66 77 58 72.7

205.
MRP- Abellera, Geronimo F. 75 79 79 87 76 51 63 70 71.7

206.
MRP- Abenojar, Agapito N. 71 72 78 84 70 75 69 70 72.9
207.
208. Alandy, Doroteo R. 64 83 93 91 68 59 60 60 71.2
209. Alano, Fabian T. 70 83 61 83 72 87 72 70 71.9
MRP- Alcantara, Pablo V. 71 79 80 81 73 70 72 62 73.65

210.
211. Arcangel, Agustin Ag. 75 85 71 73 76 65 68 65 71.85
212. Acosta, Dionisio N. 75 81 78 87 56 65 77 70 72.8
MRP- Abinguna, Agapito C. 66 85 80 84 75 58 76 75 73.65

213.
214. Adove, Nehemias C. 76 86 78 77 66 78 69 62 73.55
215. Adrias, Inocencio C. 75 83 61 88 76 67 79 75 73.4
216. Aglugub, Andres R. 75 83 73 88 72 62 72 62 72.65
217. Andrada, Mariano L. 76 85 66 87 63 77 75 77 73.
MRP- Almeda, Serafin V. 72 72 75 81 61 67 73 65 70.75

218.
219. Almonte-Peralta, 73 71 72 91 75 67 65 53 70.7

Felicidad
MRP- Amodia, Juan T. 75 79 68 85 62 64 75 78 71.4

220.
MRP- Antonio, Felino A. 71 76 81 83 79 52 72 70 73.3

221.
MRP- Antonio, Jose S. 75 92 90 68 65 64 68 60 73.75

222.
223. Añonuevo, Ramos B. 71 87 78 81 64 63 74 76 72.7
224. Aquino, S. Rey A. 67 77 57 78 69 70 69 80 67.7
225. Arteche, Filomeno D. 78 83 50 89 76 77 70 70 70.8
MRP- Arribas, Isaac M. 75 78 70 81 73 70 67 78 72.2

226.
MRP- Azucena, Ceferino D. 72 67 78 89 72 67 77 65 73.95
227.
228. Atienza, Ricardo 72 87 70 79 66 55 75 75 70.85
229. Balacuit, Camilo N. 75 78 89 75 70 54 66 75 73.3
MRP- Baclig, Cayetano S. 77 84 83 80 69 70 61 65 73

230.
231. Balcita, Oscar C. 75 77 79 90 64 60 67 50 70.65
232. Barilea, Dominador Z. 71 67 82 77 64 61 65 80 70.5
MRP- Banta, Jose Y. 75 80 77 81 75 63 71 75 73.95

233.
MRP- Barrientos, Ambrosio 76 70 67 80 67 65 70 81 70.7

234. D.
235. Batucan, Jose M. 66 76 78 88 62 76 67 78 71.2
236. Bautista, Atilano C. 70 82 84 85 58 61 71 62 71.25
237. Bautista, Celso J. 71 68 63 87 80 67 80 70 72.75
238. Belderon, Jose 76 81 76 92 70 66 67 62 72.65
MRP- Belo, Victor B. 76 77 64 73 75 71 76 76 72.85

239.
MRP- Bejec, Conceso D. 79 80 73 82 63 77 75 50 73.15

240.
MRP- Beltran, Gervasio M. 72 75 81 73 75 57 75 80 73.95

241.
MRP- Benaojan, Robustiano 74 84 77 84 75 63 68 62 72.85

242. O.
MRP- Beriña, Roger C. 70 80 79 79 68 72 64 78 71.85

243.
MRP- Bihis, Marcelo M. 75 86 65 92 64 64 84 75 73.45

244.
MRP- Binaoro, Vicente M. 73 69 78 83 73 59 70 82 72.75

245.
MRP- Bobila, Rosalio B. 76 86 76 83 68 59 71 78 73.05
246.
247. Buenafe, Avelina R. 78 80 75 75 70 55 72 80 72.75
248. Bueno, Anastacio F. 73 78 71 78 71 67 71 60 71.15
249. Borres, Maximino L. 67 85 62 91 72 63 76 80 70.9
MRP- Cabegin, Cesar V. 72 71 76 75 74 70 71 60 72.2

250.
MRP- Cabello, Melecio F. 72 78 78 89 58 70 67 71 70.5

251.
MRP- Cabrera, Irineo M. 79 88 53 91 71 85 75 76 73.3

252.
253. Cabreros, Paulino N. 71 79 83 84 60 62 71 50 70.85
254. Calayag, Florentino R. 69 79 66 88 69 75 68 76 70.6
MRP- Calzada, Cesar de la 76 72 80 67 62 71 66 62 70.85

255.
256. Canabal, Isabel 70 82 81 77 78 51 75 75 73.7
MRP- Cabugao, Pablo N. 76 87 69 80 58 64 78 75 71.8

257.
258. Calañgi, Mateo C. 73 93 71 87 70 66 69 62 71.8
259. Canda, Benjamin S. 72 71 77 90 62 75 66 82 71.95
260. Cantoria, Eulogio 71 80 71 89 70 55 72 75 71
261. Capacio, Jr., Conrado 67 78 71 90 65 75 72 60 70.65
262. Capitulo, Alejandro P. 75 70 53 87 78 63 76 91 71.2
MRP- Calupitan, Jr., Alfredo 75 93 81 76 64 75 68 56 73.15

263.
MRP- Caluya, Arsenio V. 75 86 70 87 77 52 77 82 73.9

264.
MRP- Campanilla, Mariano B. 80 75 78 77 73 71 63 76 73.65

265.
MRP- Campos, Juan A. 66 85 83 84 67 61 80 57 73.25
266.
267. Cardoso, Angelita G. 78 71 73 76 79 56 69 60 71.8
268. Cartagena, Herminio 71 72 65 89 64 73 80 70 71.65

R.
MRP- Castro, Daniel T. 65 75 77 76 85 60 75 69 73.15

269.
270. Cauntay, Gaudencio V. 70 78 72 73 77 69 64 80 71.2
271. Castro, Pedro L. de 70 68 69 87 76 75 72 70 73.35
272. Cerio, Juan A. 75 82 75 86 60 54 76 75 71.75
273. Colorado, Alfonso R. 68 75 80 74 77 66 67 80 72.6
274. Chavez, Doroteo M. 73 65 79 84 73 69 66 84 73.1
275. Chavez, Honorato A. 77 76 79 86 74 53 71 75 73.65
MRP- Cobangbang, Orlando 69 81 74 82 76 61 78 80 73.85

276. B.
277. Cortez, Armando R. 78 60 88 86 60 66 69 64 73.1
278. Crisostomo, Jesus L. 76 87 74 76 62 55 76 66 71.45
MRP- Cornejo, Crisanto R. 68 87 78 86 79 50 80 60 73.7

279.
MRP- Cruz, Raymundo 75 81 79 85 72 57 68 75 72.95

280.
MRP- Cunanan, Jose C. 78 92 63 83 76 72 68 65 72.4

281.
282. Cunanan, Salvador F. 70 82 64 92 67 75 73 76 71.45
283. Cimafranca, Agustin B. 71 76 76 80 70 71 75 71 73.35
284. Crisol, Getulio R. 70 91 78 85 68 55 71 50 70.8
MRP- Dusi, Felicisimo R. 76 82 69 82 66 62 80 71 72.85

285.
MRP- Datu, Alfredo J. 70 75 72 86 80 55 68 79 71.5
286.
287. Dacuma, Luis B. 71 67 87 83 71 50 65 70 71.25
MRP- Degamo, Pedro R. 73 80 82 74 80 67 67 57 73.65

288.
289. Delgado, Vicente N. 70 84 82 84 77 52 73 50 72.65
MRP- Diolazo, Ernesto A. 75 83 86 73 54 54 75 75 72.25

290.
291. Dionisio, Jr., Guillermo 73 84 64 89 71 78 75 66 72.8
MRP- Dichoso, Alberto M. 71 77 71 81 69 75 80 70 73.65

292.
MRP- Dipasupil, Claudio R. 70 76 82 73 79 70 72 56 73.9

293.
MRP- Delgado, Abner 75 84 63 67 64 60 70 72 68.35

294.
MRP- Domingo, Dominador 70 69 81 82 68 63 71 75 72.2

295. T.
296. Ducusin, Agapito B. 70 78 53 88 75 77 62 76 68.05
MRP- Duque, Antonio S. 75 77 78 86 76 72 64 75 73.9

297.
298. Duque, Castulo 75 80 73 83 66 67 65 66 70.65
299. Ebbah, Percival B. 70 80 85 76 66 63 76 75 73.95
300. Edisa, Sulpicio 65 77 75 89 75 62 75 65 72
301. Edradan, Rosa C. 70 75 84 84 71 59 69 86 73.4
MRP- Enage, Jacinto N. 66 70 88 93 72 67 65 75 73.2

302.
MRP- Encarnacion, Alfonso 75 86 73 81 63 77 69 75 72.65

303. B.
304. Encarnacion, Cesar 65 78 58 68 66 64 75 78 67.1

305. Estoista, Agustin A. 78 76 74 86 58 67 70 76 71.7
MRP- Fabros, Jose B. 66 75 80 82 80 71 67 70 73.05

306.
MRP- Fajardo, Balbino P. 77 69 82 83 65 60 75 75 73.9

307.
308. Fajardo, Genaro P. 70 79 77 79 79 50 73 75 72.5
309. Evangelista, Felicidad 75 75 72 87 63 63 77 70 72.15

P.
310. Familara, Raymundo Z. 68 75 87 83 64 65 68 65 71.85
311. Fariñas, Dionisio 70 78 89 66 65 75 70 50 72.75
312. Favila, Hilario B. 71 84 74 70 75 67 73 59 72.2
MRP- Feliciano, Alberto I. 71 69 70 85 69 81 72 70 72.25

313.
MRP- Fernando, Lope F. 73 77 86 79 70 76 64 50 73

314.
MRP- Flores, Dionisio S. 78 72 77 83 67 60 68 73 72.05

315.
MRP- Fortich, Benjamin B. 70 82 70 70 78 65 64 75 70.35

316.
MRP- Fuente, Jose S. de la 76 88 72 74 60 71 79 79 73.55

317.
318. Fohmantes, Nazario S. 72 79 71 77 68 61 76 60 70.9
MRP- Fuggan, Lorenzo B. 76 81 74 69 71 71 73 60 72.85

319.
320. Gabuya, Jesus S. 70 83 82 83 70 63 75 65 73.75
321. Galang, Victor N. 69 83 84 76 70 57 71 60 71.95
322. Gaerlan, Manuel L. 73 87 77 90 67 61 72 75 73.15
323. Galem, Nestor R. 72 79 86 78 60 61 75 70 73.05
324. Gallardo, Jose Pe B. 75 88 75 75 63 70 70 65 71.85

MRP- Gallos, Cirilo B. 70 78 84 91 80 51 65 70 72.85
325.
326. Galindo, Eulalio D. 70 89 87 65 78 71 62 62 73.4
327. Galman, Patrocinio G. 72 72 80 85 71 56 70 53 71.15
328. Gamalinda, Carlos S. 76 79 81 86 67 63 69 55 72.55
329. Gamboa, Antonio G. 71 67 70 72 76 60 75 68 70.95
330. Gannod, Jose A. 69 80 75 81 68 62 73 68 71.25
MRP- Garcia, Matias N. 67 78 74 90 79 59 76 65 72.8

331.
MRP- Ganete, Carmelo 75 87 77 82 74 57 68 81 73.3

332.
333. Gilbang, Gaudioso R. 75 67 80 82 67 57 64 70 70.5
334. Gofredo, Claro C. 68 78 72 86 78 52 70 76 70.9
335. Gomez, Jose S. 71 76 71 81 76 63 69 62 70.85
MRP- Gosiaoco, Lorenzo V. 68 93 85 78 64 69 70 54 72.35

336.
MRP- Gonzales, Rafael C. 77 75 71 89 55 70 70 60 70.05

337.
MRP- Gracia, Eulalia L. de 66 68 90 84 77 59 69 65 73.3

338.
339. Grageda, Jose M. A. 70 85 72 67 70 60 73 73 70.75
340. Guzman, Juan de 75 86 69 84 64 79 75 76 73.6
MRP- Guzman, Mateo de 76 79 79 73 72 69 68 80 73.9

341.
342. Guzman, Salvador B. 71 61 74 72 61 66 78 75 70.75
343. Guzman, Salvador T. 75 84 64 81 74 61 78 58 71.75

de
344. Habelito, Geronimo E. 71 76 71 87 73 60 67 55 69.65

345. Hedriana, Naterno G. 75 68 84 76 66 58 76 60 72.9
346. Hernandez, Quintin B. 67 75 72 81 72 72 66 76 70.6
1952
347. Homeres, Agustin R. 73 84 65 86 70 77 63 76 70.7
348. Ines, Leonilo F. 65 88 71 88 77 73 61 70 70.55
349. Jamer, Alipio S. 68 75 83 89 80 61 65 50 72
MRP- Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M. 75 65 68 85 76 70 83 54 73.8

350.
MRP- Jardinico, Jr., Emilio 73 86 72 78 82 67 67 64 72.8

351.
MRP- Jaen, Justiniano F. 76 75 78 84 71 66 70 77 73.85

352.
353. Jaring, Antonio S. 72 77 79 70 72 57 71 50 70.75
MRP- Javier, Aquilino M. 75 84 79 78 77 61 66 66 73.05

354.
355. Jomuad, Francisco 75 75 72 88 78 58 76 43 72.4
MRP- Jose, Nestor L. 78 61 64 73 68 76 64 80 69.7

356.
357. La Q, Jose M. 75 71 75 72 70 67 81 59 73.5
358. Leon, Brigido C. de 67 75 78 91 78 51 72 80 72.55
359. Leones, Constante B. 68 81 79 84 73 60 77 60 73
360. Liboro, Horacio T. 72 69 80 87 73 62 70 61 72.4
361. Llanera, Cesar L. 77 81 80 78 64 59 75 63 73
362. Lomontod, Jose P. 75 76 69 70 73 76 74 75 73.2
363. Luna, Lucito 70 75 69 83 59 53 74 75 68.4
MRP- Luz, Lauro L. 76 90 78 88 64 58 75 77 73.95

364.
MRP- Macasaet, Tomas S. 73 81 72 83 66 75 72 70 72.5
365.
366. Magbiray, Godofredo 80 67 84 76 70 62 65 68 73.05

V.
367. Majarais, Rodolfo P. 70 62 64 82 88 75 71 79 72.85
MRP- Makabenta, Eduardo 75 90 77 83 59 71 72 78 73.3

368.
MRP- Malapit, Justiniano S. 74 83 74 89 58 60 72 76 71.1

369.
370. Maloles, Iluminado M. 70 87 73 76 77 50 76 76 72.3
371. Maniquis, Daniel R. 75 80 73 91 69 71 65 70 72.1
372. Maraña, Arsenio 65 79 60 72 73 51 75 86 67.9
373. Marasigan, Napoleon 75 71 83 75 69 62 69 70 72.75
MRP- Marco, Jaime P. 75 67 74 76 64 75 75 57 71.9

374.
MRP- Martir, Osmundo P. 70 86 76 78 72 71 75 53 72.95

375.
MRP- Masancay, Amando E. 73 87 75 77 72 50 78 80 73.2

376.
MRP- Mati-ong, Ignacio T. 62 87 72 79 73 76 69 77 71.3

377.
378. Mara, Guillermo L. 70 78 78 89 75 67 66 65 72.35
MRP- Mercado, Felipe A. 73 77 82 82 78 52 69 85 73.9

379.
MRP- Miculob, Eugenio P. 70 82 73 86 77 52 79 65 72.8

380.
381. Mison, Rafael M. Jr., 79 78 73 75 71 68 69 53 71.95
MRP- Monponbanua, Antonio 79 79 68 88 64 78 69 83 73.1

382. D.
MRP- Montero, Leodegario 72 89 69 89 70 68 70 75 72.15
383. C.
384. Morada, Servillano S. 75 76 67 71 65 66 75 76 70.9
385. Mocorro, Generoso 78 84 78 84 60 73 68 70 73
MRP- Mosquera, Estanislao 75 78 75 85 72 55 77 66 73.15

386. L.
387. Motus, Rodentor P. 80 78 70 94 72 75 70 57 73.75
388. Macario, Pedro R. 70 67 74 86 78 63 72 66 72.15
MRP- Nadela, Geredion T. 72 64 64 81 73 50 75 75 69.15

389.
MRP- Nazareno, Romeo P. 67 70 71 76 76 79 75 57 72.05

390.
391. Nieto, Benedicto S. 69 79 77 77 72 62 76 76 72.9
MRP- Noguera, Raymundo 71 86 81 80 73 56 72 70 73.15

392.
MRP- Nodado, Domiciano R. 70 70 69 73 57 37 64 72 63.6

393.
394. Nono, Pacifico G. 67 77 78 67 75 59 71 76 71.35
MRP- Nuval, Manuel R. 78 72 67 90 72 68 78 67 73.65

395.
396. Ocampo, Augusto 75 90 77 72 69 55 65 67 60.7
397. Oliveros, Amado A. 72 75 68 72 84 50 75 79 71.9
398. Opiña, Jr., Pedro 76 77 74 67 73 66 68 70 71.85
MRP- Olaviar, Jose O. 70 62 85 81 74 50 68 79 71.8

399.
MRP- Olandesca, Per O. 70 91 76 87 72 66 70 79 73.45

400.
401. Orden, Apolonio J. 72 65 84 86 66 50 72 68 71.45
402. Ortiz, Melencio T. 71 75 78 81 66 67 70 78 72.1

MRP- Pablo, Fedelino S. 72 64 76 86 72 61 76 75 72.95
403.
404. Pacifico, Vicente V. 76 79 69 80 76 52 72 80 71.95
MRP- Paderna, Perfecto D. 75 69 72 75 78 58 75 70 72.6

405.
406. Padlan, Crispin M. 71 66 76 79 68 67 74 66 71.65
407. Padilla, Jose C. 70 65 67 82 78 75 78 75 73.3
408. Padilla, Jr., Estanislao 71 88 78 86 59 75 78 50 72.95

E.
MRP- Palma, Bartolome 67 81 80 82 71 75 69 75 73.25

409.
MRP- Papa, Angel A. 75 72 85 85 77 59 63 71 73.45

410.
MRP- Parayno, Mario V. 71 88 74 89 69 66 76 73 73.65

411.
412. Pariña, Santos L. 70 87 85 77 64 67 63 76 71.85
MRP- Pasion, Anastacio 63 80 68 81 82 79 76 58 72.55

413.
414. Pastrana, Rizal R. 69 76 71 76 68 63 77 83 71.65
MRP- Paulin, Jose O. 70 66 80 87 75 50 65 80 70.9

415.
MRP- Pelaez, Jr., Vicente C. 79 87 73 83 69 71 68 65 73.2

416.
417. Peña, Jesus 75 75 75 62 75 70 60 66 70.4
418. Perez, Toribio R. 71 64 81 92 69 58 67 70 71.25
419. Pestaño, Melquiades 77 81 74 87 59 68 76 75 73.2
MRP- Pido, Serafin C. 77 81 72 82 69 71 60 75 71.15

420.
421. Pinlac, Filemon 67 76 74 86 65 79 65 72 70.55

422. Poblete, Celso B. 72 79 82 76 66 64 74 50 72.15
MRP- Piza, Luz 68 70 75 87 74 67 64 75 70.8

423.
424. Puzon, Eduardo S. 72 80 81 69 72 53 67 70 71.05
425. Quetulio, Josefina D. 75 90 60 93 64 78 76 83 72.9
MRP- Quipanes, Melchor V. 69 88 79 82 65 62 71 66 71.55

426.
MRP- Quietson, Bayani R. 73 75 76 77 70 81 71 53 72.85

427.
428. Racho, Macario D. 68 75 81 82 78 53 66 54 70.55
429. Ramirez, Sabas P. 71 80 73 87 62 62 75 80 71.65
MRP- Raffiñan, Jose A. 80 83 79 79 62 72 68 65 73.25

430.
MRP- Ramos, Patricio S. 75 87 76 75 72 72 61 75 72.25

431.
MRP- Ramos-Balmori, 78 84 76 90 48 75 80 65 73.45

432. Manuela
MRP- Raro, Celso 75 81 76 67 75 77 55 77 71.4

433.
MRP- Rayos, Victor S. 75 86 79 91 71 67 67 70 73.9

434.
435. Revilla, Mariano S. 75 78 81 90 70 54 69 81 73.35
436. Reyes, Abdon L. 72 64 81 78 76 73 69 53 72.85
437. Reyes, Domingo B. 72 87 78 83 72 75 62 70 72.7
438. Reyes, Francisco M. 75 85 84 68 75 71 68 50 73.9
439. Reyes, Lozano M. 80 57 78 79 78 65 64 79 73.35
MRP- Reyes, Oscar R. 75 75 82 82 76 64 68 60 73.65

440.
441. Rigonan, Cesar V. 71 85 65 86 75 70 76 70 72.7

442. Rivera, Honorio 71 56 70 90 71 65 75 71 71.2
MRP- Rivero, Buenaventura 72 88 72 94 68 73 66 80 72.6

443. A.
MRP- Robles, Enrique 75 77 75 77 82 64 69 70 73.7

444.
445. Rodriguez, Orestes 76 75 76 63 69 77 65 78 72.25

Arellano
446. Roldan, Jose V. 67 80 79 83 73 71 75 70 73.9
447. Rosario, Adelaida R. 80 75 65 70 68 72 80 70 73.15

del
448. Rosario, Restituto F. 75 75 79 90 68 65 66 63 72.1

del
MRP- Sabelino, Conrado S. 71 81 69 75 77 71 75 70 72.95

449.
450. San Juan, Damaso 77 86 72 89 59 76 65 72 71.6
451. Sañiel, Felix L. 72 93 76 80 67 75 66 62 72.1
452. Samaniego, Jesus B. 75 80 76 72 60 67 68 70 70.6
MRP- Sandoval, Emmanuel 75 83 70 83 77 67 77 60 73.95

453. M.
MRP- Sanidad, Emmanuel Q. 71 75 81 90 62 64 76 68 72.95

454.
455. Santiago, Jr., Cristobal 75 76 84 93 63 65 59 70 71.8
456. Santillan, Juanito Ll. 76 89 83 83 63 58 65 52 71.25
MRP- Santos, Rodolfo C. 75 75 78 82 73 76 66 70 73.7

457.
MRP- Santos, Ruperto M. 67 54 69 76 63 64 71 60 66.75

458.
MRP- Santos, Aquilino C. 72 71 73 79 73 79 71 85 73.8

459.
MRP- Santos, Rufino A. 75 81 79 85 74 72 66 54 73.3
460.
461. Suanding, Bantas 75 67 67 92 79 59 76 76 73.1
MRP- Sulit, Feliz M. 76 79 76 78 72 75 68 67 73.5

462.
463. Songco, Felicisimo G. 70 68 82 84 60 69 76 65 73.35
464. Soriano, Aniceto S. 64 79 77 80 80 53 70 65 70.7
465. Suarez, Pablo D. 73 85 70 87 76 70 64 70 71.9
MRP- Sybico, Jesus L. 79 70 70 72 75 75 72 60 73.05

466.
467. Tabaque, Benjamin R. 69 68 77 79 74 68 72 60 71.85
MRP- Tan Kiang, Clarita 81 79 72 80 62 75 73 80 73.95

468.
MRP- Tando, Amado T. 71 82 78 83 71 61 71 60 72

469.
470. Tasico, Severo E. 71 69 75 89 70 75 67 63 71.65
471. Tiburcio, Ismael P. 73 82 72 93 76 57 68 54 71.15
MRP- Tiongson, Federico T. 70 70 76 84 77 75 75 50 73.45

472.
MRP- Tolentino, Jesus C. 75 89 63 84 85 73 73 50 73.4

473.
474. Torrijas, Alfredo A. 77 66 67 83 68 75 71 63 71.3
MRP- Tobias, Artemio M. 69 58 74 81 71 55 65 57 67.55

475.
MRP- Trillana, Jr., Apolonio 76 86 76 86 70 68 75 50 73.8

476.
MRP- Trinidad, Manuel O. 66 91 83 75 63 66 67 65 70.8

477.
478. Trinidad, Pedro O. 66 78 78 85 78 51 64 75 70.8

MRP- Udarbe, Flavio J. 80 82 77 82 67 56 68 75 72.6
479.
480. Umali, Osmundo C. 68 75 81 80 71 69 68 60 71.7
481. Umayam, Juanito C. 77 75 87 85 56 56 66 60 71
MRP- Usita, Gelacio U. 75 72 75 74 73 76 71 70 73.55

482.
483. Valino, Francisco M. 72 81 80 84 62 78 71 75 73.7
484. Varela, Dominador M. 67 75 81 86 72 57 81 70 73.85
485. Vega, Macairog L. de 78 62 79 87 70 70 71 65 73.8
MRP- Velasco, Emmanuel D. 71 80 74 85 60 66 76 76 71.85

486.
487. Velez, Maria E. 73 70 89 80 56 50 72 67 71.05
MRP- Venal, Artemio V. 78 91 58 67 76 55 75 73 73.65

488.
489. Venus, Conrado B. 69 81 74 85 62 66 72 77 77.05
MRP- Verzosa, Federico B. 75 79 72 88 76 68 74 59 73.7

490.
MRP- Villafuerte, Eduardo V. 75 83 70 76 64 64 75 65 71.2

491.
MRP- Villanueva, Cecilio C. 75 85 79 88 66 77 67 70 73.95

492.
493. Villar, Custodio R. 73 69 70 88 76 66 69 50 70.75
MRP- Villaseñor, Leonidas F. 80 85 67 77 62 75 76 73 73.15

494.
495. Viterbo, Jose H. 80 77 65 93 70 65 65 65 70.65
496. Yaranon, Pedro 70 77 76 85 72 50 75 75 71.85
MRP- Yasay, Mariano R. 75 75 72 76 63 77 70 60 71.1

497.
MRP- Ygay, Venancio M. 73 80 83 84 62 59 72 77 72.65
498.
499. Yulo, Jr., Teodoro 73 82 78 75 60 81 75 75 73.95
500. Zamora, Alberto 70 65 76 79 62 77 69 82 71.3
501. Rigonan, Felipe C. 70 79 69 89 76 62 71 64 71.2
A list of those who petitioned for the consolidation of their grades in subjects passed in previous
examinations, showing the years in which they took the examinations together with their grades
and averages, and those who had filed motions for reconsideration which were denied,
indicated by the initials MRD, follows:

Av.
1. Amao, Sulpicio M.
1946 68 67 76 76 73 73 49 50 66.5
1950 59 80 67 77 62 80 71 57 67.4
2. Baldo, Olegario Ga.
1951 65 76 58 55 59 63 75 72 64.9
1952 65 68 75 84 72 59 73 57 69.75
1953 57 74 68 68 76 52 71 76 66.7
3. Blanco, Jose B.
MRD-1949 75 75 70 75 77 76 60 90 72.15
1951 64 71 58 65 68 70 75 71 66.95
4. Condeno, Mateo
1950 71 80 62 75 75 81 55 92 69.3
1951 70 60 61 65 77 64 67 81 67.85
5. Ducusin, Agapito B.
MRD-1949 69 70 76 73 76 71 55 60 68.65
1950 60 71 55 67 67 75 56 89 68.1
6. Garcia, Manuel N.
MRD-1949 60 70 82 79 70 69 60 80 69.25
1950 57 65 51 69 54 85 56 84 60.3
7. Luna, Lucito A.
1946 63 53 69 76 75 76 57 69 66.55
1952 70 75 69 83 59 53 74 75 68.4
8. Maraña, Arsenio s.
1949 72 68 68 75 75 72 60 75 69.35
1952 65 79 60 72 73 51 75 86 67.9
9. Montano, Manuel M.
1951 61 60 58 60 70 63 75 64 64.8
1952 70 77 65 79 66 52 70 50 66.4
1953 78 64 66 68 81 50 71 78 70.65
10. Peña, Jesus S.
1950 25 75 45 75 45 52 46 71 46.2
1951 70 77 65 79 66 52 70 50 66.4
1952 75 75 75 62 75 70 60 66 70.4
11. Placido, Sr., Isidro
1950 68 78 70 75 69 70 58 69 67.75
1951 65 62 75 60 73 57 75 71 66.8
12. Rementizo, Filemon S.

1949 65 75 72 75 60 75 55 85 66.65
1951 68 57 48 60 91 66 55 75 64.05
1952 68 53 68 67 58 56 75 64 65.7
13. Amao, Sulpicio M.
1952 67 80 51 69 69 77 73 53 66.35
1953 65 67 78 74 75 62 69 80 70.9
14. Rodulfa, Juan T.
1951 67 60 70 65 68 56 75 66 67.75
1952 70 71 67 78 67 75 71 70 70.1
15. Sanchez, Juan J.
1948 39 69 82 75 76 72 55 50 63.5
MRD-1949 67 56 69 75 72 77 60 75 68
1951 70 59 55 60 68 57 78 67 65.8
16. Santos, Constantino
1952 62 76 54 82 72 77 66 65 66.65
1953 73 71 70 65 78 64 65 78 70.4
17. Santos, Salvador H.
1951 60 64 55 70 68 52 70 75 62.85
1952 75 64 70 81 76 55 61 75 69.1
1953 70 71 79 65 72 54 66 80 70
18. Sevilla, Macario C.
MRD-1948 50 64 76 66 66 69 60 52 63.1
MRD-1949 47 66 78 64 71 86 65 85 68
1950 35 65 40 75 63 57 27 49 45
MRD-1951 68 59 72 55 69 65 75 75 69.3
1953 70 73 74 70 81 56 69 71 71.05
Finally, with regards to the examinations of 1953, while some candidates--85 in all--presented
motions for reconsideration of their grades, others invoked the provisions of Republic Act No.
972. A list of those candidates separating those who filed mere motions for reconsideration (56)
from those who invoked the aforesaid Republic act, is as follows:
1953 PETITIONERS FOR RECONSIDERATION

Av.
1. Acenas, Calixto R. 73 70 68 62 82 51 67 77 73.45
2. Alcantara, Pedro N. 67 70 75 85 87 54 71 80 72.8
3. Alejandro, Exequiel 67 72 71 75 80 76 75 77 73.4
4. Andres, Gregorio M. 70 73 86 58 79 50 71 78 72.7
5. Arnaiz, Antonio E. 66 80 76 58 79 68 77 81 73.4
6. Asis, Floriano U. de 66 78 75 81 77 55 73 69 71.25
7. Bacaiso, Celestino M. 71 65 76 68 76 50 75 70 70.95
8. Bala, Florencio F. 64 82 47 70 82 58 75 82 67
9. Baldo, Olegario A. 57 74 68 68 76 52 71 76 66.7
10. Barrios, Benjamin O. 65 71 76 75 80 62 83 73 73.95
11. Buhay, Eduardo L. 73 76 71 91 76 61 74 78 73.35
12. Burgos, Dominador C. 72 80 89 61 66 37 69 68 70.05
13. Cariño, Eldo J. 79 81 60 75 74 74 76 74 73
14. Casar, Dimapuro 67 73 84 79 77 61 71 74 73.35
15. Castañeda, Gregorio 70 73 80 71 75 70 73 78 73.95
16. Estrellado, Benjamin R. 67 79 64 73 82 62 71 74 70.2

17. Fabunan, Edilberto C. 70 72 68 69 77 60 76 74 71.1
18. Feril, Domingo B. 75 71 84 65 70 60 65 70 71.6
19. Fernandez, Alejandro G. 65 75 87 80 81 63 61 80 72.8
20. Gapus, Rosita S. (Miss) 76 80 86 77 64 74 66 69 73.9
21. Garcia, Rafael B. 70 86 70 75 73 63 73 75 71.65
22. Gracia, Miguel L. de 73 68 75 59 80 51 72 71 71
23. Gungon, Armando G. 68 76 76 84 77 57 77 83 73.6
24. Gutierrez, Antonio S. 68 77 66 70 72 59 71 74 69.1
25. Ilejay, Abraham I. 77 70 76 77 81 62 70 68 73.7
26. Leon, Benjamin La. De 66 66 75 70 77 55 71 82 70.35
27. Lugtu, Felipe L. 62 70 78 65 78 56 69 81 69.9
28. Lukman, Abdul-Hamid 76 64 67 69 73 59 73 75 70.45
29. Maloles, Jr., Benjamin G. 77 76 68 68 71 51 75 78 70.85
30. Maloles, Julius G. 77 71 60 71 79 62 68 72 69.75
31. Mandi, Santiago P. 65 76 70 61 79 68 75 72 71.1
32. Margete, Rufino C. 70 76 66 75 85 73 71 75 72.75
33. Melocoton, Nestorio B. 70 81 73 78 83 52 72 75 72.35
34. Molina, Manuel C. 75 78 70 61 75 63 66 85 70.95
35. Muñoz, Mariano A. 75 80 86 67 74 57 68 76 73.75
36. Navarro, Buenaventura 80 75 65 75 83 55 73 79 73

M.
37. Nodado, Domiciano R. 60 67 67 50 70 50 56 75 61.7
38. Papas, Sisenando B. 65 62 71 61 70 56 66 67 66
39. Pagulayan-Sy, Fernando 63 75 71 62 83 67 70 72 70.4
40. Padula, Benjamin C. 70 77 54 62 74 78 75 68 69.05

41. Pasno, Enrique M. 78 72 66 54 71 58 72 78 69.85
42. Peña, Jr., Narciso 70 95 81 78 67 66 67 73 72.55
43. Peralta, Rodolfo P. 70 70 52 81 68 63 59 69 63.7
44. Pigar, Leopoldo R. 76 75 78 61 72 72 71 79 73.75
45. Publico, Paciano L. 68 69 76 76 70 59 74 67 70.6
46. Radaza, Leovigildo 75 78 76 61 77 50 71 86 72.2
47. Ramos, Bernardo M. 64 62 75 93 81 52 66 80 70.1
48. Rabaino, Andres D. 68 72 75 73 78 55 69 76 70.65
49. Ravanera, Oscar N. 70 77 80 71 82 62 69 78 73.6
50. Renovilla, Jose M. 65 75 80 68 79 52 62 78 69.5
51. Sabaot, Solomon B. 69 73 80 69 82 69 69 79 73.85
52. Sumaway, Ricardo S. 66 76 69 76 74 56 72 68 69.1
53. Torrefiel, Sofronio O. 70 77 74 75 73 50 68 72 69.55
54. Vera, Federico V. de 60 61 47 77 69 50 67 77 60.9
55. Viray, Venancio Bustos 65 67 67 52 73 64 71 65 67.15
56. Ylaya, Angela P. (Miss) 63 70 56 75 68 54 70 77 64.5

Av.
1. Ala, Narciso 70 71 73 59 73 74 81 77 73.5
2. Alcantara, Pedro N. 67 70 75 85 87 54 71 80 72.8
3. Arellano, Antonio L. 74 66 73 60 78 63 78 72 72.9
4. Buhay, Eduardo L. 73 76 71 91 76 61 74 78 73.35
5. Calautit, Celestino R. 71 78 84 75 75 61 68 72 73.2
6. Casuncad, Sulvio P. 61 73 82 69 81 68 71 84 73.05

7. Enriquez, Pelagio y 84 69 76 75 82 50 58 79 72.05
Concepcion
8. Estonina, Severino 80 74 64 89 81 56 68 82 72.4
9. Fernandez, Alejandro Q. 65 75 87 80 81 63 61 80 72.8
10. Fernandez, Luis N. 70 75 77 75 78 67 72 73 73.35
11. Figueroa, Alfredo A. 70 75 87 78 75 50 68 68 72.3
12. Formilleza, Pedro 65 75 89 68 83 51 70 75 73.25
13. Garcia, Manuel M. 69 68 83 83 73 62 62 70 71
14. Grospe, Vicente E. 68 75 78 66 79 61 69 82 71.6
15. Galema, Nestor R. (1952) 72 79 86 78 60 61 75 70 73.05
16. Jacobo, Rafael F. 76 76 75 74 76 50 72 76 72.3
17. Macalindong, Reinerio L. 67 77 79 79 74 72 68 77 72.75
18. Mangubat, Antonio M. 70 70 78 61 80 74 62 70 71.45
19. Montano, Manuel M. 78 64 66 68 81 50 71 78 70.65
20. Plomantes, Marcos 73 67 74 58 68 70 76 71 71.6
21. Ramos, Eugenio R. 70 80 76 67 72 69 72 79 72.6
22. Reyes, Juan R. 71 73 77 76 81 59 72 74 73.2
23. Reyes, Santiago R. 65 78 83 60 76 75 70 70 72.9
24. Rivera, Eulogio J. 65 67 78 74 75 62 69 80 70.9
25. Santos, Constantino P. 73 71 70 65 78 64 65 78 70.4
26. Santos, Salvador H. 70 71 79 65 72 54 66 80 70
27. Sevilla, Macario C. 70 73 74 70 81 56 69 71 71.05
28. Villavicencio, Jose A. 78 75 70 67 69 77 64 77 73.2
29. Viray, Ruperto G. 76 73 76 73 80 58 68 83 73.25
There are the unsuccessful candidates totaling 604 directly affected by this resolution. Adding
490 candidates who have not presented any petition, they reach a total of 1,094.
The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972
As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per cent the passing general
average in the bar examination of august and November of 1946; 69 per cent in 1947; 70 per
cent in 1948; 74 per cent in 1949; maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, but raising
to 75 per cent those who obtained 74 per cent since 1950. This caused the introduction in 1951,
in the Senate of the Philippines of Bill No. 12 which was intended to amend Sections 5, 9, 12,
14 and 16 of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, concerning the admission of attorneys-at-law to the
practice of the profession. The amendments embrace many interesting matters, but those
referring to sections 14 and 16 immediately concern us. The proposed amendment is as follows:
SEC. 14. Passing average. — In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed the
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 70 per cent without
falling below 50 per cent in any subject. In determining the average, the foregoing subjects shall
be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 20 per cent; Land Registration and Mortgages,
5 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law, 10 per cent; Political Law, 10 per cent;
International Law, 5 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises,
5 per cent; Social Legislation, 5 per cent; Taxation, 5 per cent. Unsuccessful candidates shall
not be required to take another examination in any subject in which they have obtained a rating
of 70 per cent or higher and such rating shall be taken into account in determining their general
average in any subsequent examinations: Provided, however, That if the candidate fails to get a
general average of 70 per cent in his third examination, he shall lose the benefit of having
already passed some subjects and shall be required to the examination in all the subjects.
SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful applicants. — Any applicant who has obtained a
general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without falling below 50 per cent in any
examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, or who has been otherwise found to be entitled
to admission to the bar, shall be allowed to take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the
corresponding oath of office. (Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No. 12).
With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to the matter before us being:
It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at bar examinations should be compelled to
repeat even those subjects which they have previously passed. This is not the case in any other
government examination. The Rules of Court have therefore been amended in this measure to
give a candidate due credit for any subject which he has previously passed with a rating of 75
per cent or higher."
Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May 3, 1951, the President requested
the comments of this Tribunal before acting on the same. The comment was signed by seven
Justices while three chose to refrain from making any and one took no part. With regards to the
matter that interests us, the Court said:
The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127. One part of this amendment provides that if a
bar candidate obtains 70 per cent or higher in any subject, although failing to pass the
examination, he need not be examined in said subject in his next examination. This is a sort of
passing the Bar Examination on the installment plan, one or two or three subjects at a time. The
trouble with this proposed system is that although it makes it easier and more convenient for the
candidate because he may in an examination prepare himself on only one or two subjects so as
to insure passing them, by the time that he has passed the last required subjects, which may be
several years away from the time that he reviewed and passed the firs subjects, he shall have
forgotten the principles and theories contained in those subjects and remembers only those of
the one or two subjects that he had last reviewed and passed. This is highly possible because
there is nothing in the law which requires a candidate to continue taking the Bar examinations
every year in succession. The only condition imposed is that a candidate, on this plan, must
pass the examination in no more that three installments; but there is no limitation as to the time
or number of years intervening between each examination taken. This would defeat the object
and the requirements of the law and the Court in admitting persons to the practice of law. When
a person is so admitted, it is to be presumed and presupposed that he possesses the
knowledge and proficiency in the law and the knowledge of all law subjects required in bar
examinations, so as presently to be able to practice the legal profession and adequately render
the legal service required by prospective clients. But this would not hold true of the candidates
who may have obtained a passing grade on any five subjects eight years ago, another three
subjects one year later, and the last two subjects the present year. We believe that the present
system of requiring a candidate to obtain a passing general average with no grade in any
subject below 50 per cent is more desirable and satisfactory. It requires one to be all around,
and prepared in all required legal subjects at the time of admission to the practice of law.
xxx xxx xxx
We now come to the last amendment, that of section 16 of Rule 127. This amendment provides
that any application who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without
failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946,
shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office. In other words, Bar
candidates who obtained not less than 70 per cent in any examination since the year 1946
without failing below 50 per cent in any subject, despite their non-admission to the Bar by the
Supreme Court because they failed to obtain a passing general average in any of those years,
will be admitted to the Bar. This provision is not only prospective but retroactive in its effects.
We have already stated in our comment on the next preceding amendment that we are not
exactly in favor of reducing the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent to
govern even in the future. As to the validity of making such reduction retroactive, we have
serious legal doubts. We should not lose sight of the fact that after every bar examinations, the
Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar those who
have obtained a passing general average grade, but also rejecting and denying the petitions for
reconsideration of those who have failed. The present amendment would have the effect of
repudiating, reversing and revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the
petitions of those who may have obtained an average of 70 per cent or more but less than the
general passing average fixed for that year. It is clear that this question involves legal
implications, and this phase of the amendment if finally enacted into law might have to go thru a
legal test. As one member of the Court remarked during the discussion, when a court renders a
decision or promulgate a resolution or order on the basis of and in accordance with a certain law
or rule then in force, the subsequent amendment or even repeal of said law or rule may not
affect the final decision, order, or resolution already promulgated, in the sense of revoking or
rendering it void and of no effect.
Another aspect of this question to be considered is the fact that members of the bar are officers
of the courts, including the Supreme Court. When a Bar candidate is admitted to the Bar, the
Supreme Court impliedly regards him as a person fit, competent and qualified to be its officer.
Conversely, when it refused and denied admission to the Bar to a candidate who in any year
since 1946 may have obtained a general average of 70 per cent but less than that required for
that year in order to pass, the Supreme Court equally and impliedly considered and declared
that he was not prepared, ready, competent and qualified to be its officer. The present
amendment giving retroactivity to the reduction of the passing general average runs counter to
all these acts and resolutions of the Supreme Court and practically and in effect says that a
candidate not accepted, and even rejected by the Court to be its officer because he was
unprepared, undeserving and unqualified, nevertheless and in spite of all, must be admitted and
allowed by this Court to serve as its officer. We repeat, that this is another important aspect of
the question to be carefully and seriously considered.
The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the following:
I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the bill, namely, to elevate the standard of the
legal profession and maintain it on a high level. This is not achieved, however, by admitting to
practice precisely a special class who have failed in the bar examination, Moreover, the bill
contains provisions to which I find serious fundamental objections.
Section 5 provides that any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all
subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th
day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribed the corresponding oath of office. This
provision constitutes class legislation, benefiting as it does specifically one group of persons,
namely, the unsuccessful candidates in the 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950 bar examinations.
The same provision undertakes to revoke or set aside final resolutions of the Supreme Court
made in accordance with the law then in force. It should be noted that after every bar
examination the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the
Bar those who have obtained a passing general average but also rejecting and denying the
petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The provision under consideration would
have the effect of revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the petitions of
those who may have failed to obtain the passing average fixed for that year. Said provision also
sets a bad precedent in that the Government would be morally obliged to grant a similar
privilege to those who have failed in the examinations for admission to other professions such
as medicine, engineering, architecture and certified public accountancy.
Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the Philippines, but it was not repassed
by 2/3 vote of each House as prescribed by section 20, article VI of the Constitution. Instead Bill
No. 371 was presented in the Senate. It reads as follows:
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP TO AND
INCLUDING 1953
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, any
bar candidate who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any bar examinations after July
4, 1946 up to the August 1951 Bar examinations; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72
per cent in the 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; 74 per cent in
1955 bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject,
shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the
Philippine Bar; Provided, however, That 75 per cent passing general average shall be restored
in all succeeding examinations; and Provided, finally, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact
one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole
number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any bar
examination after July 4, 1945 shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and
such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average that said
candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.
With the following explanatory note:
This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the President and to afford another
opportunity to those who feel themselves discriminated by the Supreme Court from 1946 to
1951 when those who would otherwise have passed the bar examination but were arbitrarily not
so considered by altering its previous decisions of the passing mark. The Supreme Court has
been altering the passing mark from 69 in 1947 to 74 in 1951. In order to cure the apparent
arbitrary fixing of passing grades and to give satisfaction to all parties concerned, it is proposed
in this bill a gradual increase in the general averages for passing the bar examinations as
follows; For 1946 to 1951 bar examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952 bar examination, 71 per cent;
for 1953 bar examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar examination, 73 percent; and for 1955 bar
examination, 74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the passing mark will be restored with the condition that
the candidate shall not obtain in any subject a grade of below 50 per cent. The reason for
relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade, is the tremendous handicap which students
during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the
insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up
law soon after the liberation. It is believed that by 1956 the preparation of our students as well
as the available reading materials will be under normal conditions, if not improved from those
years preceding the last world war.
In this will we eliminated altogether the idea of having our Supreme Court assumed the
supervision as well as the administration of the study of law which was objected to by the
President in the Bar Bill of 1951.
The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated among his objections that the bill would
admit to the practice of law "a special class who failed in the bar examination". He considered
the bill a class legislation. This contention, however, is not, in good conscience, correct because
Congress is merely supplementing what the Supreme Court have already established as
precedent by making as low as 69 per cent the passing mark of those who took the Bar
examination in 1947. These bar candidates for who this bill should be enacted, considered
themselves as having passed the bar examination on the strength of the established precedent
of our Supreme Court and were fully aware of the insurmountable difficulties and handicaps
which they were unavoidably placed. We believe that such precedent cannot or could not have
been altered, constitutionally, by the Supreme Court, without giving due consideration to the
rights already accrued or vested in the bar candidates who took the examination when the
precedent was not yet altered, or in effect, was still enforced and without being inconsistent with
the principles of their previous resolutions.
If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as a simple curative act or corrective statute
which Congress has the power to enact. The requirement of a "valid classification" as against
class legislation, is very expressed in the following American Jurisprudence:
A valid classification must include all who naturally belong to the class, all who possess a
common disability, attribute, or classification, and there must be a "natural" and substantial
differentiation between those included in the class and those it leaves untouched. When a class
is accepted by the Court as "natural" it cannot be again split and then have the dissevered
factions of the original unit designated with different rules established for each. (Fountain Park
Co. vs. Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).
Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with its tides brings new conditions which must
be cared for by new laws. Sometimes the new conditions affect the members of a class. If so,
the correcting statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes the condition affect only a few. If so,
the correcting statute may be as narrow as the mischief. The constitution does not prohibit
special laws inflexibly and always. It permits them when there are special evils with which the
general laws are incompetent to cope. The special public purpose will sustain the special form. .
. . The problem in the last analysis is one of legislative policy, with a wide margin of discretion
conceded to the lawmakers. Only in the case of plain abuse will there be revision by the court.
(In Williams vs. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 77 L. Ed. 1015, 53 Sup. Ct.
431). (1932)
This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute which always retroacts to the extent of the
care of correction only as in this case from 1946 when the Supreme Court first deviated from the
rule of 75 per cent in the Rules of Court.
For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is earnestly recommended.
(Sgd.) PABLO ANGELES DAVID

Senator
Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by Congress as above transcribed. The
President again asked the comments of this Court, which endorsed the following:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting Executive Secretary, Manila, with the
information that, with respect to Senate Bill No. 371, the members of the Court are taking the
same views they expressed on Senate Bill No. 12 passed by Congress in May, 1951, contained
in the first indorsement of the undersigned dated June 5, 1951, to the Assistant Executive
Secretary.
(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS
The President allowed the period within which the bill should be signed to pass without vetoing
it, by virtue of which it became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI, Constitution) numbered
972 (many times erroneously cited as No. 974).
It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election year, and that both the President and
the author of the Bill were candidates for re-election, together, however, they lost in the polls.
[G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.]
RENATO L. CAYETANO, Petitioner, v. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA,

COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE in his capacity as
Secretary of Budget and Management, Respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions While ostensibly only legal
issues are involved, the Court’s decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect
on the political aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1(1), Article IX-C:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners

who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates
for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years." (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section 1(1), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution
which similarly provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for al least ten years." (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law

as a legal qualification to an appointive office.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Black defines "practice of law" as:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court,
or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings,
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice
to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages
in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be an attorney, using a
letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with
opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered
by his associate." (Black’s Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.).
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust
Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the
practice of law when he:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations
or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies
and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining
or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the
law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law." (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102
S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173, 176-177)
stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions." (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of
any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing,
the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of
legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs.
Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of
legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as
concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of
sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which
rests upon all attorneys." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.], p. 665-
666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v.
Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers
(1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy,
counseling and public service.
"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what
he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active
practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this
he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute." (Barr D. Cardell, 155 NW
312).
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23).
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law." chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do
during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a
very brief statement?
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
"MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit.
Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section 1 is that ‘They must be Members of the
Philippine Bar’ — I am quoting from the provision — ‘who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.’"
"To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are
now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that
this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or
involve actual practice of law outside the COA. We have to interpret this to mean that as long as
the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their
respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as
members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
"This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and
we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available
whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar
engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.
"MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
"MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the
requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?"
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA although it is auditing, will
necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are
employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the provision
on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer
is yes.
"MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of
law.
"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
"MR. OPLE. Thank you."cralaw virtua1aw library
. . . (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman
and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public
accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with
the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a
fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law
Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois), 1986], p. 15]).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood,
means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services."
(Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are
called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some
firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In
either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are
younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneys called "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologies, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of
law is defined as "the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be
the practice of law. (State Bar Ass’n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A. 2d
863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A. 2d 623, 626 [1941]).
Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental
realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable. (Wolfram, op. cit.)
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar
role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little
time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case.
(Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer’s role
colors much of both the public image and the self-perception of the legal profession.
(Ibid.).chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality.
(Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander Sycip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated
on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still
uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the
courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen,
know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law
offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-
litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing
what [is] loosely describe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer
has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need
not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal
medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner will engage in a number of legal
tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions,
clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized
practice will usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within
a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as
advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an
administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively
rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the
work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client
counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find
that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source
of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in
very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features
of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some
lawyers’ work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in
which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these
roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging
trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate
law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members participating
in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging
trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate

understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the need
for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and
contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many
decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of
significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the
consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in
situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow
theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment.
Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the
policy-making process, wherein a model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is
developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the
trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and
formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a
cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the
law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional contexts and the
various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master’s or
doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level
of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of
other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of
an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every
necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de

campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of
the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that
a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will
vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm
out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for
certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-
house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a
corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research,
tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both
courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission),
and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the
business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining
policy and becoming involved in management. (Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not
understanding how one’s work actually fits into the work of the organization. This can be
frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate
lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the
business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer’s services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational

corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a
relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is
perceived by many as glamorous, this is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases,
however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their
"international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25, 1990,
p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the
lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to
spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is
one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No
longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the
Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern
management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1)
acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate
counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skills applicable to a corporate counsel’s
management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the
legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking
them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for
the corporate counsel’s total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel’s role. For that
matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic
repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to think
about a corporation’s strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being
reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-
national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with
each other — often with those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer’s participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly
changing. The modern corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stockholder — in some
cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through participation on
boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing
legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as
corporations organize for global operations. (Emphasis supplied).
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the
promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting
specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that
differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In Europe,
Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and
business Japan’s MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a
distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both
long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to
indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their
knowledge of the environment, coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements
within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team
performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the
managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to
anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability
and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new
managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An
understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to
simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the systems dynamics principles more
accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied).
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity
and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement
value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in
managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by
parties and mediators in all kinds of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide
coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these
techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the
point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three
pointed areas of consideration, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of
the general counsel’s responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive
lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for
such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and
made.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of
the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation’s
evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global,
interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate
the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel’s Office. The general counsel has
emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The
corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm’s strategic issues, including
structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied
interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by
decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make
one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system
shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer’s aim is not the understand all of
the law’s effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working
knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
"constitution" or make-up of the modern corporation. "Business Star, The Corporate Counsel,"
April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing
knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to
ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of
professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jar. 11, 1989, p.
4).chanrobles law library : red
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position
of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod
does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as

Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s

nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations
of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license
fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo).
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod
worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970),
Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which
involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries, negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in
1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment
bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former
Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod’s work involved
being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings
before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former
Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen’s Conference for Human Development, has worked
with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating,
lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban
land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide
Commission, a quasi-judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a
member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission,
Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions
with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative." (pp. 128-129 Rollo) (Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately
constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top
officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the
finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the
contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating
Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the
Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country’s Constitution; it lays down the law as far as
the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be
compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower’s
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13)
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside
from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries’ sovereignty. (Condensed
from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations,"
submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the
Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center
on August 26-31, 1973). (Emphasis supplied).
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely re negotiation policies,
demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in re
negotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist
or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract
agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted
and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of
adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine External
Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). (Emphasis
supplied).
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and
conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more
elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both
parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge
an obligation. For a complete debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in
the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements — an adherence to the rule of
law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: ‘They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are,
men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery.’ (See
Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the
Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law", particularly the
modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended
by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod s past work experiences as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court
said:chanrobles.com : virtual law library
"Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in

which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should
possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted
on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a
political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can
decide." (Emphasis supplied).
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171
SCRA 744) where it stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an
appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also
has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an
encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is
essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law." (Emphasis
supplied).
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4)
stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a
commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its
certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance
e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949;
Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod
as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article
IX of the Constitution which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without re appointment. Of those
first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years,
and the last Members for three years, without re appointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall
be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity."cralaw virtua1aw library
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla’s separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the
practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the
modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended
by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla’s definition would
require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practiced two or three times a week and
would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far
from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written
opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the
definition says that law practice." . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True
I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition
of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a
phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually
practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod
is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practicing law for over ten years.
This is different from the acts of persons practicing law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly
doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even
assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the
incumbent President?
We now proceed:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod’s
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required
by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged
power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only
where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the
Commission’s judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court’s
corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been
clearly shown.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
Additionally, consider the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme
Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer
is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed?
The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to
confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still
reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah
(who was Samson’s beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —
"No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins."cralaw virtua1aw library
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod
burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson’s eyes. This blinded the
man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with
anger, and fuming with righteous fury, Accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The
procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?"
The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH
RESOLUTION
PADILLA, J.:
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however
deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In
Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte
during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other
accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later
withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing
on each of the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months :and
one (1) day to four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.
On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted
by the Probation Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation.
On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's
oath based on the order of his discharge from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued
a resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now
be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those
seeking admission to the bar.
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15)
certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and
six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship
foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint
efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.
On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment
on petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:
a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son
was deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder
since the accused took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence,
taking advantage of superior strength and treachery.
b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one
of the accused who went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992,
literally on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and compassion. They also told him
that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his son's
involvement in the incident.
c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son.
However, as a loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his
law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome
manner of his death.
d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He
therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and
moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient
administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who
have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to
prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of
lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before us required weighing and reweighing of the reasons for
allowing or disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings
inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral fitness required for
admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:
. . . participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a
finding that the participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character. 1
In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the
question of whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character
referred to above.
Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert
Camaligan. The death of one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering
becomes even more pronounced and profound in cases where the death is due to causes other
than natural or accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third parties. The feeling then
becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause of death.
Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court- manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no
less than praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the
circumstances in this case, to find room for forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now
morally fit to be a lawyer.
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino
to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the
following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not
inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout
Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul
Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the
general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for
practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn
promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly
according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of
justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been
giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other
services to the more unfortunate members of society.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the
lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to
practice the legal profession.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 151258 December 1, 2014
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 154954
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM,
JR., JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO
GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES II,
ZOSIMO MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI, VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE GUERRERO,
JUDE FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN, PERCIVAL D. BRIGOLA,
PAUL ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS,
JOSEPH LLEDO, and RONAN DE GUZMAN, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 155101
FIDELITO DIZON, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080
GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ
SARUCA, JR., and ANSELMO ADRIANO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ:
We are asked to revisit our Decision in the case involving the death of Leonardo "Lenny" Villa
due to fraternity hazing. While there is nothing new in the arguments raised by the parties in
their respective Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration, we find a few remaining matters
needing to be clarified and resobed. Sorne oJ' these matters include the effect of our Decision
on the finality of the Court of Appeals judgments insofar as respondents Antonio Mariano
A!meda (Almeda), June] Anthony D. Arna (Arna), Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug), and Vincent
Tecson (Tecson) are concerned; the question of who are eligible to seek probation; and the
issue of the validity of the probation proceedings and the concomitant orders of a court that
allegedly had no jurisdiction over the case.
Before the Court are the respective Motions for Reconsideration or Clarification filed by
petitioners People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), and
Gerarda H. Villa (Villa); and by respondents Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson (collectively,
Tecson et al.) concerning the Decision of this Court dated 1 February 2012.1 The Court
modified the assailed judgments2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 15520 and
found respondents Fidelito Dizon (Dizon), Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The modification
had the effect of lowering the criminal liability of Dizon from the crime of homicide, while
aggravating the verdict against Tecson et al. from slight physical injuries. The CA Decision itself
had modified the Decision of the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 121 finding
all of the accused therein guilty of the crime of homicide.3
Also, we upheld another CA Decision4 in a separate but related case docketed as CA-G.R. S.P.
Nos. 89060 & 90153 and ruled that the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed the criminal case against Manuel Escalona II (Escalona), Marcus Joel Ramos
(Ramos), Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca), and Anselmo Adriano (Adriano) on the ground that their
right to speedy trial was violated. Reproduced below is the dispositive portion of our Decision:5
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgmentin G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito Dizon
guilty of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. The appealed Judgment in
G.R. No. 154954 – finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr.,
and Vincent Tecson guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries – is also MODIFIED and SET
ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato
Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison
term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused are ORDERED jointly and
severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of 50,000, and
moral damages in the amount of 1,000,000, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the
rate of 12% from the date of the finality of this Decision until satisfaction. Costs de oficio.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby AFFIRMED.
The appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the criminal case filed
against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed,
and the criminal case against Artemio Villareal deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to
include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members
during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
SO ORDERED.
To refresh our memories, we quote the factual antecedents surrounding the present case:6
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of
Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They
were Caesar "Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez III, Roberto
Francis "Bert" Navera, Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny" Villa
(neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila
Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufo’s
Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an
Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were
informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their
initiation rites were scheduled to last for three days. After their "briefing," they were brought to
the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults from
the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards the pelota
court of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them. The
neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites." These rites
included the "Indian Run," which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of
Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes; the "Bicol Express," which obliged the
neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while
the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the "Rounds," in which the neophytes were
held at the back of their pants by the "auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending
assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on
their arms or withknee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the "Auxies’ Privilege Round,"
in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes.
During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They
survived their first day of initiation.
On the morning of their second day – 9 February 1991 – the neophytes were made to present
comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the
Aquila Fraternity’s principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on
their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and
proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the
same manner of hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the
initiation for the day officially ended.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and
Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites,
Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal,
however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal,
then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny
received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground.
The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last
session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries
to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended, and the neophytes started
eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and
incoherent mumblings.1avvphi1 Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they
thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold,
some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a
sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the
hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans:
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)
4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)
13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
16. Antonio General (General)
17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
25. Adel Abas (Abas)
26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)
In Criminal Case No. C-38340
1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried. On the
other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held
in abeyance due to certain matters that had to be resolved first.
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91),
holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized with
reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. A few weeks after the trial
court rendered its judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the
remaining nine accused commenced anew.
On 10 January 2002, the CAin (CA-G.R. No. 15520) set aside the finding of conspiracy by the
trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of each of the
accused according to individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so
the following Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:
1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants– Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De
Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima,
Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.) – were acquitted,as their individual guilt was not
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants– Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio Mariano
Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) – were found guilty of the crime of slight
physical injuriesand sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They were also ordered to jointly
pay the heirs of the victim the sum of ₱30,000 as indemnity.
3. Two of the accused-appellants– Fidelito Dizonand Artemio Villareal– were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA sentenced them to an
indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17 years of reclusion temporal. They
were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of
₱50,000 and to pay the additional amount of ₱1,000,000 by way of moral damages.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge against
accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial. Meanwhile, on
different dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective Motions
to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. On 25 October 2006, the CA in
CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 90153 reversed the trial court’s Orders and dismissed the criminal
case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to
speedy trial.
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were individually brought
before this Court. (Citations omitted)
Motion for Partial Reconsideration
filed by Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa
Petitioner Villa filed the present Motion for Partial Reconsideration7 in connection with G.R.
Nos. 178057 & 178080 (Villa v. Escalona) asserting that the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion when it dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos,Saruca, and Adriano
(collectively, Escalona et al.) in its assailed Decision and Resolution.8 Villa reiterates her
previous arguments that the right to speedy trial of the accused was not violated, since they had
failed to assert that right within a reasonable period of time. She stresses that, unlike their co-
accused Reynaldo Concepcion, respondents Escalona et al.did not timely invoke their right to
speedy trial during the time that the original records and pieces of evidence were unavailable.
She again emphasizes that the prosecution cannot be faulted entirely for the lapse of 12 years
from the arraignment until the initial trial, as there were a number of incidents attributable to the
accused themselves that caused the delay of the proceedings. She then insists that we apply
the balancing test in determining whether the right to speedy trial of the accused was violated.
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG
The OSG, in its Motion for Reconsideration9 of G.R. Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) and 154954
(People v. Court of Appeals), agrees with the findings of this Court that accused Dizon and
Tecson et al. had neither the felonious intent to kill (animus interficendi) nor the felonious intent
to injure (animus iniuriandi) Lenny Villa. In fact, it concedes that the mode in which the accused
committed the crime was through fault (culpa). However, it contends that the penalty imposed
should have been equivalent to that for deceit (dolo) pursuant to Article 249 (Homicide) of the
Revised Penal Code. It argues that the nature and gravity of the imprudence or negligence
attributable to the accused was so gross that it shattered the fine distinction between dolo and
culpaby considering the act as one committed with malicious intent. It maintains that the
accused conducted the initiation rites in such a malevolent and merciless manner that it clearly
endangered the lives of the initiates and was thus equivalent to malice aforethought.
With respect to the 19 other accused, or Victorino et al., the OSG asserts that their acquittal
may also be reversed despite the rule on double jeopardy, as the CA also committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing its assailed Decision (CA-G.R. No. 15520). The OSG insists that
Victorino et al. should have been similarly convicted like their other co-accused Dizon, Almeda,
Ama, Bantug, and Tecson, since the former also participated in the hazing of Lenny Villa, and
their actions contributed to his death.
Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Tecson et al.
Respondents Tecson et al.,10 filed their respective motions pertaining to G.R. No. 154954
(People v. Court of Appeals). They essentially seek a clarification as to the effect of our
Decision insofar as their criminal liability and service of sentence are concerned. According to
respondents, they immediately applied for probation after the CA rendered its Decision (CAG.R.
No. 15520) lowering their criminal liability from the crime of homicide, which carries a non-
probationable sentence, to slight physical injuries, which carries a probationable sentence.
Tecson et al.contend that, as a result, they have already been discharged from their criminal
liability and the cases against them closed and terminated. This outcome was supposedly by
virtue of their Applications for Probation on various dates in January 200211 pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended, otherwise known as the Probation Law. They argue
that Branch 130 of Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) had already granted their
respective Applications for Probation on 11 October 200212 and, upon their completion of the
terms and conditions thereof, discharged them from probation and declared the criminal case
against them terminated on various dates in April 2003.13
To support their claims, respondents attached14 certified true copies of their respective
Applications for Probation and the RTC Orders granting these applications, discharging them
from probation, and declaring the criminal case against them terminated. Thus, they maintain
that the Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 had already lapsed into finality, insofar as they were
concerned, whenthey waived their right to appeal and applied for probation.
ISSUES
I. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for
violation of their right to speedy trial
II. Whether the penalty imposed on Tecson et al. should have corresponded to that for
intentional felonies
III. Whether the completion by Tecson et al. of the terms and conditions of their probation
discharged them from their criminal liability, and closed and terminated the cases against them
DISCUSSION
Findings on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of
Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa
As regards the first issue, we take note that the factual circumstances and legal assertions
raised by petitioner Villa in her Motion for Partial Reconsideration concerning G.R. Nos. 178057
& 178080 have already been thoroughly considered and passed uponin our deliberations, which
led to our Decision dated 1 February 2012. We emphasize that in light of the finding of violation
of the right of Escalona et al. to speedy trial, the CA’s dismissal of the criminal case against
them amounted to an acquittal,15 and that any appeal or reconsideration thereof would result in
a violation of their right against double jeopardy.16 Though we have recognized that the
acquittal of the accused may be challenged where there has been a grave abuse of
discretion,17 certiorari would lie if it is convincingly established that the CA’s Decision
dismissing the case was attended by a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction. It must be shown that the assailed judgment constitutes "a patent and
gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty imposed by law or toact in contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility; or a blatant abuse of authority
to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense
justice."18 Thus, grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because it
allegedly misappreciated the facts and the evidence.19
We have taken a second look at the court records, the CA Decision, and petitioner’s arguments
and found no basis to rule that the CA gravely abused its discretion in concluding that the right
to speedy trial of the accused was violated. Its findings were sufficiently supported by the
records of the case and grounded in law. Thus, we deny the motion of petitioner Villa with
finality.
Ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG
We likewise deny with finality the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG with respect to
G.R. Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) and 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals). Many of the
arguments raised therein are essentially a mere rehash of the earlier grounds alleged in its
original Petition for Certiorari.
Furthermore, we cannot subscribe to the OSG’s theory that even if the act complained of was
born of imprudence or negligence, malicious intent can still be appreciated on account of the
gravity of the actions of the accused. We emphasize that the finding of a felony committed by
means of culpa is legally inconsistent with that committed by means of dolo. Culpable felonies
involve those wrongs done as a result of an act performed without malice or criminal design.
The Revised Penal Code expresses thusly:
ARTICLE 365. Imprudence and Negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall
commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayorin its maximum period toprisión correccional in its medium period; if it
would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayorin its medium and
maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor
in its minimum period shall be imposed.
xxxx
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
person performing or failing to perform suchact, taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the
damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest. (Emphases
supplied)
On the other hand, intentional felonies concern those wrongs in which a deliberate malicious
intent to do an unlawful act is present. Below is our exhaustive discussion on the matter:20 Our
Revised Penal Code belongs tothe classical school of thought. x x x The identity of mens rea–
defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent – is the predominant
consideration. Thus, it is not enough to do what the law prohibits. In order for an intentional
felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be committed by means of doloor "malice."
The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence,
and intent. x x x x The element of intent – on which this Court shall focus – is described as the
state of mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act. It refers to the purpose of the
mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds.It does not refer to mere will, for the latter
pertains to the act, while intentconcerns the result of the act. While motive is the "moving power"
that impels one to action for a definite result, intent is the "purpose" of using a particular means
to produce the result. On the other hand, the term "felonious"means, inter alia, malicious,
villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose.With these elements taken together,
the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious
and malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional felony
requires the existence of dolus malus– that the act or omission be done "willfully," "maliciously,"
"with deliberate evil intent," and "with malice aforethought." The maxim is actus non facit reum,
nisi mens sit rea– a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act
complained of is innocent. As is required of the other elements of a felony, the existence of
malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
xxxx
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in
establishing the commission of the intentional felony of homicide. Being mala in se, the felony of
homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo immediately before or simultaneously with the
infliction of injuries. Intent to kill – or animus interficendi– cannot and should not be inferred,
unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent. Furthermore, the victim’s death
must not have been the product of accident, natural cause, or suicide. If death resulted from an
act executed without malice or criminal intent – but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or
negligence – the act must be qualified as reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting
in homicide.
xxxx
In order to be found guilty ofany of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised
Penal Code, the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act
that is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the
mental state of the wrongdoer – iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal
intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, incase of physical
injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious
intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or wellbeing of a person, so as to
incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable
doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries per semerely
satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. The commission of
the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are.
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances that the mere infliction of physical injuries,
absentmalicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional felony.x x
x.
xxxx
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused
fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also
punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof,
there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or
lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from which
an immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack
of precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it. In this case, the danger is
visible and consciously appreciated by the actor. In contrast, simple imprudence or negligence
comprises an act done without grave fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by
reason of a mere lack of foresight or skill. Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the
danger is not openly visible.
The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as follows:
Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee
harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If
so, the law imposes on the doer the duty to take precaution against the mischievous resultsof
the act. Failure to do so constitutes negligence.
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, the degree
of precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger involved. If, on
account of a certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to another person is great, the
individual who chooses to follow that particular course of conduct is bound to be very careful,
inorder to prevent or avoid damage or injury. In contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is
required. It is thus possible that there are countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may
be required of an individual, "from a transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort." The
duty of the person to employ more or less degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of
each particular case. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)
We thus reiterate that the law requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of
malicious intent or dolus malus before an accused can be adjudged liable for committing an
intentional felony.
Since the accused were found to have committed a felony by means of culpa, we cannot agree
with the argument of the OSG. It contends that the imposable penalty for intentional felony can
also be applied to the present case on the ground that the nature of the imprudence or
negligence of the accused was so gross that the felony already amounted to malice. The
Revised Penal Code has carefully delineated the imposable penalties as regards felonies
committed by means of culpaon the one hand and felonies committed by means of doloon the
other in the context of the distinctions it has drawn between them. The penalties provided in
Article 365 (Imprudence and Negligence) are mandatorily applied if the death of a person
occurs as a result of the imprudence or negligence of another. Alternatively, the penalties
outlined in Articles 246 to 261 (Destruction of Life) are automatically invoked if the death was a
result of the commission of a forbidden act accompanied by a malicious intent. These imposable
penalties are statutory, mandatory, and not subjectto the discretion of the court. We have
already resolved – and the OSG agrees – that the accused Dizon and Tecson et al. had neither
animus interficendi nor animus iniuriandi in inflicting physical pain on Lenny Villa. Hence, we
rule that the imposable penalty is what is applicable to the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide as defined and penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling on the Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration
filed by Tecson et al.
We clarify, however, the effect of our Decision in light of the motions of respondents Tecson et
al. vis-à-vis G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals).
The finality of a CA decision will not
bar the state from seeking the
annulment of the judgment via a
Rule 65 petition.
In their separate motions,21 respondents insist that the previous verdict of the CA finding them
guilty of slight physical injuries has already lapsed into finality as a result of their respective
availments of the probation program and their ultimate discharge therefrom. Hence, they argue
that they can no longer be convicted of the heavier offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide.22 Respondents allude to our Decision in Tan v. People23 to support their contention
that the CA judgment can no longer be reversed or annulled even by this Court.
The OSG counters24 that the CA judgment could not have attained finality, as the former had
timely filed with this Court a petition for certiorari. It argues that a Rule 65 petition is analogous
to an appeal, or a motion for new trial or reconsideration, in that a petition for certiorarialso
prevents the case from becoming final and executory until after the matter is ultimately resolved.
Indeed, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court speaks of the finality of a criminal judgment once the
accused applies for probation, viz:
SECTION 7. Modification of judgment. — A judgment of convictionmay, upon motion of the
accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except
where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes finalafter the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal, or whenthe sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or
when the accusedhas waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. (7a)
(Emphases supplied)
Coupled with Section 7 of Rule 11725 and Section 1 of Rule 122,26 it can be culled from the
foregoing provisions that only the accused may appeal the criminal aspect of a criminal case,
especially if the relief being sought is the correction or review of the judgment therein. This rule
was instituted in order to give life to the constitutional edict27 against putting a person twice in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. It is beyond contention that the accused would be
exposed to double jeopardy if the state appeals the criminal judgment in order to reverse an
acquittal or even to increase criminal liability. Thus, the accused’s waiver of the right to appeal –
as when applying for probation – makes the criminal judgment immediately final and executory.
Our explanation in People v. Nazareno is worth reiterating:28
Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred because the
government has already been afforded a complete opportunity to prove the criminal defendant’s
culpability; after failing to persuade the court to enter a final judgment of conviction, the
underlying reasons supporting the constitutional ban on multiple trials applies and becomes
compelling. The reason is not only the defendant’s already established innocence at the first
trial where he had been placed in peril of conviction, but also the same untoward and prejudicial
consequences of a second trial initiated by a government who has at its disposal all the powers
and resources of the State.
Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the government would then be allowed
another opportunity to persuade a second trier of the defendant’s guilt while strengthening any
weaknesses that had attended the first trial, all in a process where the government’s power and
resources are once again employed against the defendant’s individual means. That the second
opportunity comesvia an appeal does not make the effects any less prejudicial by the standards
of reason, justice and conscience. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)
It must be clarified, however, that the finality of judgment evinced in Section 7 of Rule 120 does
not confer blanket invincibility on criminal judgments. We have already explained in our Decision
that the rule on double jeopardy is not absolute, and that this rule is inapplicable to cases in
which the state assails the very jurisdiction of the court that issued the criminal judgment.29 The
reasoning behind the exception is articulated in Nazareno, from which we quote:30
In such instance, however, no review of facts and law on the merits, in the manner done in an
appeal, actually takes place; the focus of the review is on whether the judgment is per sevoid on
jurisdictional grounds, i.e., whether the verdict was rendered by a court that had no jurisdiction;
or where the court has appropriate jurisdiction, whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other words, the review is on the question of
whether there has been a validly rendered decision, not on the question of the decision’s error
or correctness. Under the exceptional nature of a Rule 65 petition, the burden — a very heavy
one — is on the shoulders of the party asking for the review to show the presence of a
whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or of a patent and
gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; or to an exercise of power in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. (Emphases supplied, citations
omitted) While this Court’s Decision in Tan may have created an impression of the
unassailability of a criminal judgment as soon as the accused applies for probation, we point out
that what the state filed therein was a mere motion for the modification of the penalty, and not a
Rule 65 petition. A petition for certiorari is a special civil action that is distinct and separate from
the main case. While in the main case, the core issue is whether the accused is innocent or
guilty of the crime charged, the crux of a Rule 65 petition is whether the court acted (a) without
or in excess of its jurisdiction; or (b) with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. Hence, strictly speaking, there is nomodification of judgment in a petition for
certiorari, whose resolution does not call for a re-evaluation of the merits of the case in order to
determine the ultimate criminal responsibility of the accused. In a Rule 65 petition, any resulting
annulment of a criminal judgment is but a consequence of the finding of lack of jurisdiction.
In view thereof, we find that the proper interpretation of Section 7 of Rule 120 must be that it is
inapplicable and irrelevant where the court’s jurisdiction is being assailed through a Rule 65
petition. Section 7 of Rule 120 bars the modification of a criminal judgment only if the appeal
brought before the court is in the nature of a regular appeal under Rule 41, or an appeal by
certiorari under Rule 45, and if that appeal would put the accused in double jeopardy. As it is,
we find no irregularity in the partial annulment of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 in spite
of its finality, as the judgment therein was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The orders of Caloocan City RTC
Branch 130 have no legal effect, as
they were issued without jurisdiction.
First, Tecson et al. filed their Applications for Probation with the wrong court. Part and parcel of
our criminal justice system is the authority or jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate and decide
the case before it. Jurisdiction refers to the power and capacity of the tribunal to hear, try, and
decide a particular case or matter before it.31 That power and capacity includes the
competence to pronounce a judgment, impose a punishment,32 and enforce or suspend33 the
execution of a sentencein accordance with law.
The OSG questions34 the entire proceedings involving the probation applications of Tecson et
al. before Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. Allegedly, the trial court did not have competence to
take cognizance of the applications, considering that it was not the court of origin of the criminal
case. The OSG points out that the trial court that originally rendered the Decision in Criminal
Case No. C-38340(91) was Branch 121 of the Caloocan City RTC.
The pertinent provision of the Probation Law is hereby quoted for reference:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after
it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant
within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the
defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem
best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant
has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction. x x x x (Emphases supplied)
It is obvious from the foregoing provision that the law requires that an application for probation
be filed withthe trial court that convicted and sentenced the defendant, meaning the court of
origin. Here, the trial court that originally convicted and sentenced Tecson et al.of the crime of
homicide was Branch 121 – not Branch 130 – of the Caloocan City RTC.35 Neither the judge of
Branch 130 in his Orders nor Tecson et al.in their pleadings have presented any explanation or
shown any special authority that would clarify why the Applications for Probation had not been
filed with or taken cognizance of by Caloocan City RTC Branch 121. While we take note that in
a previous case, the CA issued a Decision ordering the inhibition of Branch 121 Judge
Adoracion G. Angeles from hearing and deciding Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), the ruling
was made specifically applicable to the trial of petitioners therein, i.e. accused Concepcion,
Ampil, Adriano, and S. Fernandez.36
Tecson et al. thus committed a fatal error when they filed their probation applications with
Caloocan City RTC Branch 130, and not with Branch 121. We stress that applicants are not at
liberty to choose the forum in which they may seek probation, as the requirement under Section
4 of the Probation law is substantive and not merely procedural. Considering, therefore, that the
probation proceedings were premised on an unwarranted exercise of authority, we find that
Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 never acquired jurisdiction over the case.
Second, the records of the casewere still with the CA when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130
granted the probation applications. Jurisdiction over a case is lodged with the court in which the
criminal action has been properly instituted.37 If a party appeals the trial court’s judgment or
final order,38 jurisdiction is transferred to the appellate court. The execution of the decision is
thus stayed insofar as the appealing party is concerned.39 The court of origin then loses
jurisdiction over the entire case the moment the other party’s time to appeal has expired.40 Any
residual jurisdiction of the court of origin shall cease – including the authority to order execution
pending appeal – the moment the complete records of the case are transmitted to the appellate
court.41 Consequently, it is the appellate court that shall have the authority to wield the power to
hear, try, and decide the case before it, as well as to enforce its decisions and resolutions
appurtenant thereto. That power and authority shall remain with the appellate court until it finally
disposes of the case. Jurisdiction cannot be ousted by any subsequent event, even if the nature
of the incident would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first place.
According to Article 78 of the Revised Penal Code, "[n]o penalty shall be executed except by
virtue of a final judgment." A judgment of a court convicting or acquitting the accused of the
offense charged becomes final under any of the following conditions among others:42 after the
lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal; when the accused waives the right to appeal; upon
the grant of a withdrawal ofan appeal; when the sentence has already been partially or totally
satisfied or served; or when the accused applies for probation. When the decision attains
finality, the judgment or final order is entered in the book of entries of judgments.43 If the case
was previously appealed to the CA, a certified true copy of the judgment or final order must be
attached to the original record, which shall then be remanded to the clerk of the court from
which the appeal was taken.44 The court of origin then reacquires jurisdiction over the case for
appropriate action. It is during this time that the court of origin may settle the matter of the
execution of penalty or the suspension of the execution thereof,45 including the convicts’
applications for probation.46
A perusal of the case records reveals that the CA had not yet relinquished its jurisdiction over
the case when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 took cognizance of the Applications for
Probation of Tecson et al. It shows that the accused filed their respective applications47 while a
motion for reconsideration was still pending before the CA48 and the records were still with that
court.49 The CA settled the motion only upon issuing the Resolution dated 30 August 2002
denying it, or about seven months after Tecson et al. had filed their applications with the trial
court.50 In September 2002, or almost a month before the promulgation of the RTC Order dated
11 October 2002 granting the probation applications,51 the OSG had filed Manifestations of
Intent to File Petition for Certiorari with the CA52 and this Court.53 Ultimately, the OSG assailed
the CA judgments by filing before this Court a Petition for Certiorari on 25 November
2002.54 We noted the petition and then required respondents to file a comment
thereon.55 After their submission of further pleadings and motions, we eventually required all
parties to file their consolidated memoranda.56 The records of the case remained with the CA
until they were elevated to this Court in 2008.57
For the foregoing reasons, we find that RTC Branch 130 had no jurisdiction to act on the
probation applications of Tecson et al. It had neither the power nor the authority to suspend their
sentence, place them on probation, order their final discharge, and eventually declare the case
against them terminated. This glaring jurisdictional faux pasis a clear evidence of either gross
ignorance of the law oran underhanded one-upmanship on the part of RTC Branch 130 or
Tecson et al., or both – to which this Court cannot give a judicial imprimatur.
In any event, Tecson et al. were ineligible to seek probation at the time they applied for it.
Probation58 is a special privilege granted by the state to penitent qualified offenders who
immediately admit their liability and thus renounce their right to appeal. In view of their
acceptance of their fate and willingness to be reformed, the state affords them a chance to
avoid the stigma of an incarceration recordby making them undergo rehabilitation outside of
prison. Some of the major purposes of the law are to help offenders to eventually develop
themselves into law-abiding and self respecting individuals, as well as to assist them in their
reintegration with the community.
It must be reiterated that probation is not a right enjoyed by the accused. Rather, it is an act of
grace orclemency conferred by the state. In Francisco v. Court of Appeals,59 this Court
explained thus:
It is a special prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed by others
or by all. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court which is
to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit
of the accused. The Probation Law should not therefore be permitted to divest the state or its
government of any of the latter’s prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the intention of the
legislature to this end is clearly expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms of the
law who is not clearly within them. (Emphases supplied)
The OSG questions the validity of the grant of the probation applications of Tecson et al.60 It
points out that when they appealed to the CA their homicide conviction by the RTC, they
thereby made themselves ineligible to seek probation pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 968 (the Probation Law).
We refer again to the full text ofSection 4 of the Probation Law as follows:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after
it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant
within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the
defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem
best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant
has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only.
An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphases supplied)
Indeed, one of the legal prerequisites of probation is that the offender must not have appealed
the conviction.61 In the 2003 case Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals,62 this Court was faced with the
issue of whether a convict may still apply for probation even after the trial court has imposed a
non probationable verdict, provided that the CA later on lowers the original penalty to a
sentence within the probationable limit. In that case, the trial court sentenced the accused to a
maximum term of eight years of prisión mayor, which was beyond the coverage of the Probation
Law. They only became eligible for probation after the CA reduced the maximum term of the
penalty imposed to 1 year, 8 months and 21 days of prisión correccional.
In deciding the case, this Court invoked the reasoning in Francisco and ruled that the accused
was ineligiblefor probation, since they had filed an appeal with the CA. In Francisco, we
emphasized that Section 4 of the Probation Law offers no ambiguity and does not provide for
any distinction, qualification, or exception. What is clearis that all offenders who previously
appealed their cases, regardless of their reason for appealing, are disqualified by the law from
seeking probation. Accordingly, this Court enunciated in Lagrosathat the accused are
disallowed from availing themselves of the benefits of probation if they obtain a genuine
opportunity to apply for probation only on appeal as a result of the downgrading of their
sentence from non-probationable to probationable.
While Lagrosa was promulgated three months after Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 issued its
various Orders discharging Tecson et al. from probation, the ruling in Lagrosa, however, was a
mere reiteration of the reasoning of this Court since the 1989 case Llamado v. Court of
Appeals63 and Francisco. The Applications for Probation of Tecson et al., therefore, should not
have been granted by RTC Branch 130, as they had appealed their conviction to the CA. We
recall that respondents were originally found guilty of homicide and sentenced to suffer 14
years, 8 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Accordingly, even if the CA later
downgraded their conviction to slight physical injuries and sentenced them to 20 days of arresto
menor, which made the sentence fall within probationable limits for the first time, the RTC
should have nonetheless found them ineligible for probation at the time.
The actions of the trial court must thus be adjudged as an arbitrary and despotic use of
authority, so gross that it divested the court of its very power to dispense justice. As a
consequence, the RTC Orders granting the Applications for Probation of Tecson et al. and
thereafter discharging them from their criminal liability must be deemed to have been issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Whether for lack of jurisdiction orfor grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, we declare all orders, resolutions, and judgments of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130
in relation to the probation applications of Tecson et al. null and void for having been issued
without jurisdiction. We find our pronouncement in Galman v. Sandiganbayan64 applicable, viz:
A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. Through it, no
rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It
neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are
void. (Emphasis supplied)
The ultimate discharge of Tecson et
al. from probation did not totally
extinguish their criminal liability.
Accused Bantug asserts65 that, in any event, their criminal liability has already been
extinguished as a result of their discharge from probation and the eventual termination of the
criminal case against them by Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. To support his argument, he
cites the following provision of the Revised Penal Code:
ARTICLE 89. How Criminal Liability is Totally Extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties,
liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment.
2. By service of the sentence.
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
4. By absolute pardon.
5. By prescription of the crime.
6. By prescription of the penalty.
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in article 344 of this Code. (Emphasis
supplied)
As previously discussed, a void judgment cannot be the source of legal rights; legally speaking,
it is as if no judgment had been rendered at all. Considering our annulment of the Orders of
Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 in relation to the probation proceedings, respondents cannot
claim benefits that technically do not exist.
In any event, Tecson et al.cannot invoke Article89 of the Revised Penal Code, as we find it
inapplicable to this case. One of the hallmarks of the Probation Law is precisely to "suspend the
execution of the sentence,"66 and not to replace the original sentence with another, as we
pointed out in our discussion in Baclayon v. Mutia:67
An order placing defendant on "probation" is not a "sentence" but is rather in effect a
suspension of the imposition of sentence. It is not a final judgment but is rather an "interlocutory
judgment"in the nature of a conditional order placing the convicted defendant under the
supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a final judgment of discharge, if the
conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a final judgment of sentence if the
conditions are violated. (Emphases supplied)
Correspondingly, the criminal liability of Tecson et al.remains.
In light of our recent Decision in
Colinares v. People, Tecson et al.
may now reapply for probation.
Very recently, in Colinares v. People,68 we revisited our ruling in Franciscoand modified our
pronouncements insofar as the eligibility for probation of those who appeal their conviction is
concerned. Through a majority vote of 9-6, the Court En Bancin effect abandoned Lagrosaand
settled the following once and for all:69
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals "from the judgment of
conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens,
two judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated
homicide by the regional trial court,now set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide
by the Supreme Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion’s hard position, it will apply the probation
law on Arnel based on the trial court’s annulled judgment against him. He will not be entitled to
probation because of the severe penalty that such judgment imposed on him. More, the
Supreme Court’s judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also have
to bend over to the trial court’s judgment — even if this has been found in error. And, worse,
Arnel will now also be made to pay for the trial court’s erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of
his right to apply for probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw(the
horse errs, the carabao gets the whip). Where is justice there?
The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for probation
would dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court of Appealsthat the probation law
requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of
probation. But there is a huge difference between Franciscoand this case.
xxxx
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for
probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. Hewas not in a position to
say, "By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation." The stiff penalty that the trial
court imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek
probation under this Court’s greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in
Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have
the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.
xxxx
In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of
attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a
probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have found him guilty
of the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four months
maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of
his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such
philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions. As
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law must not be
regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the accused only where it clearly appears he comes
within its letter; to do so would be to disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation
Law should be applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its
beneficent purpose.
xxxx
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on Arnel the
correct penalty of two years and four months maximum, he would havehad the right to apply for
probation. No one could say with certainty that he would have availed himself of the right had
the RTC doneright by him. The idea may not even have crossed his mind precisely since the
penalty he got was not probationable.
The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness.1âwphi1 Is it fair to deny Arnel the right to
apply for probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him is, unlike the one
erroneously imposed by the trial court, subject to probation? (Emphases supplied)
In our Decision, we set aside the RTC and the CA judgments and found Tecson et al.ultimately
liable for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Pursuant to Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, the offense is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period (from 4
months and 1 day to 6 months) to prisión correccional in its medium period (from 2 years, 4
months, and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Considering that the new ruling in Colinares is
more favorable to Tecson et al., we rule that they are now eligible to apply for probation. Since
Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) was convicted of the same crime, we hereby clarify that Dizon is also
eligible for probation.
While we cannot recognize the validityof the Orders of RTC Branch 130, which granted the
Applications for Probation, we cannot disregard the fact that Tecson et al. have fulfilled the
terms and conditions of their previous probation program and have eventually been discharged
therefrom. Thus, should they reapply for probation, the trial court may, at its discretion, consider
their antecedent probation service in resolving whether to place them under probation at this
time and in determining the terms, conditions, and period thereof.
Final clarificatory matters
We now take this opportunity to correct an unintentional typographical error in the minimum
term of the penalty imposed on the accused Dizon and Tecson et al. While this issue was not
raised by any of the parties before us, this Court deems it proper to discuss the matter ex
proprio motuin the interest of justice. In the first paragraph of the dispositive portion of our
Decision dated 1 February 2012, the fourth sentence reads as follows:
They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1)
day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional,
as maximum.
As we had intended to impose on the accused the maximum term of the "penalty next lower"
than that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide, in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL),70 the phrase "and one
(1) day," which had been inadvertently added, must be removed. Consequently, in the first
paragraph of the dispositive portion, the fourth sentence should now read as follows:
They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional, as maximum.
In this instance, we further find it important to clarify the accessory penalties inherent to the
principal penalty imposed on Dizon and Tecson et al.
By operation of Articles 40 to 45 and 73 of the Revised Penal Code, a corresponding accessory
penalty automatically attaches every time a court lays down a principal penalty outlined in
Articles 25 and 27 thereof.71 The applicable accessory penalty is determined by using as
reference the principal penaltyimposed by the court before the prison sentence is computed in
accordance with the ISL.72 This determination is made in spite of the two classes ofpenalties
mentioned in an indeterminate sentence. It must be emphasized that the provisions on the
inclusion of accessory penalties specifically allude to the actual "penalty"73 imposed, not to the
"prison sentence"74 set by a court. We believe that the ISL did not intend to have the effect of
imposing on the convict two distinct sets of accessory penalties for the same offense.75 The
two penalties are only relevant insofar as setting the minimum imprisonment period is
concerned, after which the convict may apply for parole and eventually seek the shortening of
the prison term.76
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty for the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión
correccionalin its medium period. As this provision grants courts the discretion tolay down a
penalty without regard to the presence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the
imposable penaltymust also be within the aforementioned range.77 Hence, before applying the
ISL, we ultimately imposed on Dizon and Tecson et al. the actual (straight) penalty78 of four
years and two months of prisión correccional.79 Pursuant to Article 43 of the Revised Penal
Code, the penalty of prisión correccional automatically carries with it80 the following accessory
penalties: ARTICLE 43. Prisión Correccional— Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prisión
correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right tofollow a
profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if
the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the
disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the
same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
The duration of their suspension shall be the same as that of their principal penalty sans the
ISL; that is, for four years and two months81 or until they have served their sentence in
accordance with law. Their suspension takes effect immediately, once the judgment of
conviction becomes final.82
We further point out that if the length of their imprisonment exceeds 18 months, they shall
furthermore suffer a perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. Under Article 32
of the RevisedPenal Code, if this accessory penalty attaches, it shall forever deprive them of the
exercise of their right (a) to vote in any popular election for any public office; (b) to be elected to
that office; and (c) to hold any public office.83 Any public office that they may be holding
becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment.84 The aforementioned accessory penalties can
only be wiped out if expressly remitted in a pardon.85
Of course, the aforementioned accessory penalties are without prejudice to a grant of probation,
shouldthe trial court find them eligible therefor. As we explained in Baclayon,86 the grant of
probation suspends the execution of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as that of the
accessory penalties. We have reiterated this point in Moreno v. Commission on Elections:87
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation is not a
sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held that the
grant of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of
imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and from the
right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right
of suffrage. We thus deleted from the order granting probation the paragraph which required
that petitioner refrain from continuing with her teaching profession.
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from public
office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period imposed upon Moreno were
similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.
It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from
running for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put
on hold for the duration of the probation. x x x x. During the period of probation, the probationer
does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with
all the conditions prescribed in the probation order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of petitioner
Gerarda H. Villa in connection with G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 is hereby DENIED. The Motion
for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General concerning G.R. Nos. 155101 and
154954 is also DENIED.
The respective Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel
Anthony D. Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are likewise DENIED. In light of the
finding that Caloocan City Regional Trial Court Branch 130 acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the aforementioned Applications for Probation, we hereby
ANNUL the entire probation proceedings and SET ASIDE all orders, resolutions, or judgments
issued in connection thereto. We, however, CLARIFY that Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel
Anthony D. Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr., Vincent Tecson, and Fidelito Dizon are eligible to apply or
reapply for probation in view of our recent ruling in Colinares v. People of the
Philippines,88 without prejudice to their remaining civil liability, if any.
Furthermore, we issue a CORRECTION of the dispositive portion of our Decision dated 1
February 2012 and hereby delete the phrase "and one (1) day" located in the fourth sentence of
the first paragraph thereof. The sentence shall now read as follows: "They are hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisi6n correccional, as maximum."

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Resolution March 18, 1954

1946 (August) 206 121 18

1946 (November) 477 228 43

1947 749 340 0

1948 899 409 11

1949 1,218 532 164

1950 1,316 893 26

1951 2,068 879 196

1952 2,738 1,033 426

1953 2,555 968 284

Board of Examiners: Hon. Pedro Tuason, Chairman, Prof. Gerardo

Number of candidates 206

Number of candidates whose grades were raised 12

Number of candidates who passed 85

Number of candidates who failed 121

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 18

Percentage of success (per cent) 41.62

Percentage of failure (per cent) 58.74

Passing grade (per cent) 72

Board of Examiners: The same as that of August, 1946, except Hon.

Number of candidates 481

(72 per cent and above 73 per cent ---

Number of candidates who passed 249

Number of candidates who failed 228

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 43

Percentage of success (per cent) 52.20

Percentage of failure (per cent) 47.80

Passing grade (per cent) 72

Board of Examiners: Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B.

Number of candidates 749

Number of candidates whose grades were raised 43

70.55 per cent with 2 subject below 50 per 1

Number of candidates who passed 409

Number of candidates who failed 340

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 972

Percentage of success (per cent) 54.59

Percentage of failure (per cent) 45.41

Passing grade (per cent) 69

Board of Examiners: Hon. Marceliano R. Montemayor, Chairman Hon.

Number of candidates 899

Number of candidates whose grades were raised 64

Number of candidates who passed 490

Number of candidates who failed 409

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 11

Percentage of success (per cent) 62.40

Percentage of failure (per cent) 37.60

Passing grade (per cent) 70

(by resolution of the Court).

Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Fernando

Number of candidates 1,218

Number of candidates whose grades were raised 55

Number of candidates who passed 686

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 164

Percentage of success (per cent) 56.28

Percentage of failure (per cent) 43.72

Passing grade (per cent) 74

(by resolution of the Court).