UPDATES IN CIVIL PROCEDURE

Justice Magdangal M. de Leon

ACTIONS IN GENERAL

Basic rule in filing of action (Rule 2, Secs. 3-4)

1. For one cause of action (one delict or wrong), file only ONE ACTION or suit. Generally, NO
SPLITTING A SINGLE CAUSE OF ACTION. Reasons: a. to avoid multiplicity of suits; b. to minimize
expenses, inconvenience and harassment.

2. Remedy against splitting a single cause of action (two complaints separately filed for one action) -
defendant may file:

a. motion to dismiss on the ground of

(1) litis pendentia, if first complaint is still pending (Rule 16, Sec. 1 [e])

(2) res judicata, if first complaint is terminated by final judgment (Rule 16, Sec. 1 [f])

b. answer alleging either of above grounds as affirmative defense (Rule 16, Sec. 6)

If defendant fails to raise ground on time, he is deemed to have WAIVED them. Splitting must be
questioned in the trial court; cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

The requisites of litis pendentia are the following: (a) identity of parties, or at least such as
representing the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) identity of the two cases such that judgment in
one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other. ( Romullo vs.
Samahang Magkakapitbahay ng Bayanihan Compound Homeowners Association, Inc., G.R. No.
180687, October 6, 2010)

What are the requisites for joinder of causes of action? (Rule 2, Sec. 5)

1. Compliance with the rules on joinder of parties under Rule 3, Sec. 6.

2. A party cannot join in an ordinary action any of the special civil actions. – Reason: special civil
actions are governed by special rules.

3. Where the causes of action are between the SAME PARTIES but pertain to DIFFERENT VENUES OR
JURISDICTIONS, the joinder may be allowed in the RTC, provided ONE OF THE CAUSES OF ACTION falls
within the jurisdiction of the RTC and the venue lies therein.

Exception: Ejectment case may not be joined with an action within the jurisdiction of the RTC as the
same comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC.

However, if a party invokes the jurisdiction of the court, he cannot thereafter challenge the court’s
jurisdiction in the same case. He is barred by estoppel from doing so. (Hinog vs. Melicor, G.R. No.
140954, April 12, 2005)
N.B. As to joinder in the MTC, it must have jurisdiction over ALL THE CAUSES OF ACTION and must
have common venue.

4. Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money, jurisdiction is
determined by the AGGREGATE OR TOTAL AMOUNT claimed (totality rule).

N.B. The totality rule applies only to the MTC – totality of claims cannot exceed the jurisdictional
amount of the MTC.

There is no totality rule for the RTC because its jurisdictional amount is without limit. Exc. In tax cases
where the limit is below P1 million. Amounts of P1 million or more fall within the jurisdiction of the
CTA.

Lack of legal capacity to sue – plaintiff’s general disability to sue, such as on account of minority,
insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general disqualifications of a party.

Plaintiff’s lack of legal capacity to sue is a ground for motion to dismiss (Rule 16, Sec. 1[d]).

Ex. A foreign corporation doing business without a license lacks legal capacity to sue.

Lack of personality to sue– the fact that plaintiff is not the real party in interest.

Plaintiff’s lack of personality to sue is a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the fact that the
complaint, on its face, states no cause of action (Rule 16, Sec. 1 [g]) (Evangelista vs. Santiago, 457
SCRA 744 [2005])

A suit may only be instituted by the real party in interest. The original petition was instituted by Win,
which is a SEC-registered corporation. It filed a collection of sum of money suit which involved a
construction contract entered into by petitioner and Multi-Rich, a sole proprietorship. The counsel of
Win wanted to change the name of the plaintiff in the suit to Multi-Rich. The change cannot be
countenanced. The plaintiff in the collection suit is a corporation. The name cannot be changed to
that of a sole proprietorship. Again, a sole proprietorship is not vested with juridical personality to file
or defend an action. (Excellent Quality Apparel, Inc. vs. Win Multi Rich Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 175048,
February 10, 2009)

In a case involving constitutional issues, “standing” or locus standi means a personal interest in the
case such that the party has sustained or will sustained DIRECT INJURY as a result of the government
act that is being challenged.

To have legal standing, the petitioner must have DIRECT, PERSONAL and SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST to
protect. Here, petitioners, retired COA Chairmen and Commissioners, have not shown any direct and
personal interest in the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan. There is no indication that they have
sustained or are in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its implementation.
Clearly, they have no legal standing to file the instant suit (Domingo vs. Carague, 456 SCRA 450
[2005]).

Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable, and the other is
not even a necessary party because complete relief is available from either. (Cerezo vs. Tuazon, G.R.
No. 141538, March 23, 2004).
Procedure for dismissal if indispensable party is not impleaded

Anent the alleged non-joinder of indispensable parties, it is settled that the non-joinder of
indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-
party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party
or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. It is only when the
plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that the latter may
dismiss the complaint. In this case, no such order was issued by the trial court. (Limos vs. Spouses
Odones, G.R. No. 186979, August 11, 2010)

Whenever it appears to the court in the course of the proceeding that an indispensable party has not
been joined, it is the duty of the court to STOP THE TRIAL and to ORDER THE INCLUSION of such party.
The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actuations of the court NULL and VOID,
for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties, but even as to those present (Uy vs. CA,
494 SCRA 535 [July 11, 2006]).

Intervention (Rule 19, Sec. 1)

Under this Rule, intervention shall be allowed when a person has (1) a legal interest in the matter in
litigation; (2) or in the success of any of the parties; (3) or an interest against the parties; (4) or when
he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or disposition of property in the custody
of the court or an officer thereof. (Alfelor vs. Halasan, G.R. No. 165987, March 31, 2006).

Requirements: [a] legal interest in the matter in litigation; and [b] consideration must be given as to
whether the adjudication of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether the
intervenor's rights may be protected in a separate proceeding or not.

Legal interest must be of such DIRECT and IMMEDIATE character that the intervenor will either gain or
lose by direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. Such interest must be actual, direct and
material, and not simply contingent and expectant. (Perez vs. CA, G.R. No. 162580. January 27, 2006)

What is the effect of non-substitution of a deceased party?

Non-compliance with the rule on substitution would render the proceedings and judgment of the trial
court infirm because the court acquires NO JURISDICTION over the persons of the legal
representatives or of the heirs on whom the trial and the judgment would be binding.

Thus, proper substitution of heirs must be effected for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over their
persons and to obviate any future claim by any heir that he was not apprised of the litigation against
Bertuldo or that he did not authorize Atty. Petalcorin to represent him.

No formal substitution of the parties was effected within thirty days from date of death of Bertuldo,
as required by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Needless to stress, the purpose behind the rule
on substitution is the protection of the right of every party to due process. It is to ensure that the
deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed
legal representative of his estate. (Hinog vs. Melicor, 455 SCRA 460 [2005])

The Rules require the legal representatives of a dead litigant to be substituted as parties to a
litigation. This requirement is necessitated by due process. Thus, when the rights of the legal
representatives of a decedent are actually recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated
formal compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity of the promulgated decision. After all,
due process had thereby been satisfied.

When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished, the Rules of Court require a
substitution of the deceased. The procedure is specifically governed by Section 16 of Rule 3. (Dela
Cruz vs. Joaquin, G.R. No. 162788, July 28, 2005).

Failure of counsel to comply with his duty under Section 16 to inform the court of the death of his
client and no substitution of such party is effected, will not invalidate the proceedings and the
judgment thereon if the action survives the death of such party. Moreover, the decision rendered
shall bind his successor-in-interest. The instant action for unlawful detainer, like any action for
recovery of real property, is a real action and as such survives the death of Faustino Acosta. His heirs
have taken his place and now represent his interests in the instant petition. (Limbauan vs. Acosta,
G.R. No. 148606, June 30, 2008)

SELECTION OF COURT

Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his suit in the trial court,
statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions incapable
of pecuniary estimation. An action for specific performance, such as petitioner’s suit to enforce the
Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to this species of actions. (Herald Black Dacasin vs. Sharon
Del Mundo Dacasin, G.R. No. 168785, February 5, 2010)

The arbitration clause is a commitment on the part of the parties to submit to arbitration the disputes
covered since that clause is binding, and they are expected to abide by it in good faith. Clearly, the
RTC should not have taken cognizance of the collection suit. The presence of the arbitration clause
vested jurisdiction on the CIAC over all construction disputes between Petitioner and Multi-Rich. The
RTC does not have jurisdiction. (Excellent Quality Apparel, Inc. vs. Win Multi Rich Builders, Inc.,
represented by its president, Wilson G. Chua, G.R. No. 175048, February 10, 2009)

What is hierarchy of courts?

Pursuant to this doctrine, direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court will not be
entertained unless the appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals.

Rationale: (a) to prevent inordinate demands upon the SC’s time and attention which are better
devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and (b) to prevent further overcrowding of
the SC’s docket.

Thus, although the SC, CA and the RTC have CONCURRRENT jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give
the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.

The SC will NOT ENTERTAIN DIRECT RESORT to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts, and EXCEPTIONAL AND COMPELLING CIRCUMSTANCES, such as cases of national
interest and of serious implications, justify the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for
the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. (Hinog vs. Melicor, 455 SCRA 460 [2005])
VENUE

The venue of the action for the nullification of the foreclosure sale is properly laid with the Malolos
RTC although two of the properties together with the Bulacan properties are situated in Nueva
Ecija. The venue of real actions affecting properties found in different provinces is determined by the
SINGULARITY or PLURALITY of the transactions involving said parcels of land. Where said parcels are
the object of one and the same transaction, the venue is in the court of any of the provinces wherein a
parcel of land is situated (United Overseas Bank Phils. (formerly Westmont Bank) vs. Rosemoore
Mining & Development Corp.,G.R. Nos. 159669 & 163521, March 12, 2007).

Venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule, supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the
Revised Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words. They should be considered
merely as an agreement or additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. (Pacific
Consutants International Asia, Inc. vs. Schonfeld, G.R. No. 166920, February 19, 2007)

ACTIONABLE DOCUMENT

Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court is not applicable when the adverse party does not appear to be
a party to the instrument. (Municipality of Tiwi vs. Betito, G.R. No. 171873, July 9, 2010)

Rule 8, Section 8 specifically applies to actions or defenses founded upon a written instrument and
provides the manner of denying it. It is more controlling than Rule 6, Section 10 which merely
provides the effect of failure to file a Reply. Thus, where the defense in the Answer is based on an
actionable document, a Reply specifically denying it under oath must be made; otherwise, the
genuineness and due execution of the document will be deemed admitted. (Casent Realty
Development Corp. vs. Philbanking Corporation, G.R. No. 150731, September 14, 2007)

SUMMONS

Service of summons on resident defendant in an action in personam:

If he is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (1)
substituted service set forth in Section 8 of Rule 14; (2) personal service outside the country, with
leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or (4) any other manner the court
may deem sufficient. (Belen vs. Chavez, G.R. No. 175334, March 26, 2008)

Section 16 of Rule 14 regarding service of summons on residents temporarily out of the Philippines
uses the words “may” and “also.” Thus, extraterritorial service is not mandatory. Other methods of
service of summons allowed under the Rules may also be availed of by the serving officer on a
defendant-seaman. The normal method of service of summons on one temporarily absent is by
substituted service because personal service abroad and service by publication are not ordinary
means of summoning defendants. (Montefalcon vs. Vasquez, G.R. No.165016, June 17, 2008)

Substituted service on resident defendant temporarily out of the country. The Sheriff's Return stated
that private respondent was out of the country; Thus, the service of summons was made at her
residence with her husband, Alfredo P. Agudo, acknowledging receipt thereof. Alfredo was
presumably of suitable age and discretion, who was residing in that place and,therefore, was
competent to receive the summons on private respondent's behalf. The RTC had indeed acquired
jurisdiction over the person of private respondent when the latter's counsel entered his appearance
on private respondent's behalf, without qualification and without questioning the propriety of the
service of summons, and even filed two Motions for Extension of Time to File Answer. (Palma vs.
Galvez , G.R. No. 165273, March 10, 2010)

Pursuant to Sec. 14, Rule 14, summons by publication applies in any action. The rule does not
distinquish whether the action is in personam, in rem or quasi in rem. It authorizes summons by
publication whatever the action may be as long as the identity of the defendant is unknown or his
whereabouts are unknown. (Santos vs. PNOC Exploration Corporation, G.R. No. 170943, September
23, 2008)

For substituted service to be justified, the following circumstances must be clearly established: (a)
personal service of summons within a reasonable time was impossible; (b) efforts were exerted to
locate the party; and (c) the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion
residing at the party’s residence or upon a competent person in charge of the party’s office or place of
business. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.

However, we frown upon an overly strict application of the Rules. It is the spirit, rather than the
letter of the procedural rules, that governs. In his Return, Sheriff Potente declared that he was
refused entry by the security guard in Alabang Hills twice. The latter informed him that petitioner
prohibits him from allowing anybody to proceed to her residence whenever she is out. It was
impossible for the sheriff to effect personal or substituted service of summons upon
petitioner. Considering her strict instruction to the security guard, she must bear its
consequences. Thus, summons has been properly served upon petitioner and it has acquired
jurisdiction over her. ( Robinson vs. Miralles, G.R. No. 163584, December 12, 2006)

In case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating that the person who received the
summons in the defendant’s behalf was one with whom the defendant had a relation of confidence
ensuring that the latter would actually receive the summons. Here, petitioner failed to show that the
security guard who received the summons in respondent’s behalf shared such relation of confidence
that respondent would surely receive the summons. Hence, we are unable to accept petitioner’s
contention that service on the security guard constituted substantial compliance with the
requirements of substituted service. (Orion Security Corporation vs. Kalfam Enterprises, Inc., G.R. No.
163287, April 27, 2007)

General rule: filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance and the
consequent submission of one’s person to the jurisdiction of the court.

Exceptions:Pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction, which only leads
to a special appearance. (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the person of defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included; (2) in criminal
cases, motions to quash the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact that
failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person.
The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the
submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of
arrest. (Miranda vs. Tuliao, G.R. No. 158763, March 31, 2006)
Defendant’s filing of a motion for resetting of the hearing effectively cured the defect of the
substituted service of summons. Although the substituted service of summons on defendant is
patently defective as the sheriff’s return does not contain any statement with regard to the
impossibility of personal service, said defect was cured by his voluntary appearance. After plaintiff
moved for the execution of the trial court’s decision, defendant filed a motion for a re-setting of the
court’s hearing thereon. An appearance in whatever form without expressly objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the
person of the defendant or respondent. (Cezar vs. Ricafort-Bautista, G.R. No. 136415,. October 31,
2006)

Under Section 15, Rule 14, there are only four instances wherein a defendant who is a non-resident
and is not found in the Philippines may be served with summons by extraterritorial service : (1) when
the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of
which ia property, within the Philippines, in which the defendant claims a lien or an interest, actual or
contingent; (3) when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the
defendant from any interest in property located within the Philippines; and (4) when the defendant
non-resident’s property has been attached within the Philippines.

In these instances, service of summons may be effected by (a) personal service out of the country,
with leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave of court; or (c) any other manner the court may
deem sufficient. Extraterritorial service of summons applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in
rem and not when the action is in personam. The case for collection of sum of money and damages
filed by the respondent against the petitioner being an action in personam, then personal service of
summons upon the petitioner within the Philippines is essential for the RTC to validly acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. Having failed to do so, the RTC can never subject
petitioner to its jurisdiction.

The mere allegation made by the respondent that the petitioner had shares of stock within the
Philippines was not enough to convert the action from one in personam to one that was quasi in rem,
for petitioner’s purported personal property was never attached (Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. vs.
Dakila Trading Corporation, G.R. No. 172242, August 14, 2007).

Non-forum shopping certification signed by counsel and not by the principal party is a defective
certification

This is because it is the principal party who has actual knowledge whether he has initiated similar
action/s in other courts, agencies or tribunals (Go vs. Rico, G.R. No. 140682, April 25, 2006)

Not fatal defect when only one petitioner signed the certification of non-forum shopping

Such fact is not fatal to the petition because it satisifies the requirement that the petition be signed by
a principal party (Bases Conversion Development Authority vs. Uy, G.R. No. 144062, November 2,
2006)

Effect of forum shopping

1. If the forum shopping is NOT considered WILFUL and DELIBERATE, the subsequent cases shall be
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE on one of the two grounds mentioned above
2. If the forum shopping is WILFUL and DELIBERATE, both (or all, if there are more than two actions)
shall be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE (Ao-As vs. CA, 491 SCRA 353 [2006])

What are the requirements of forum shopping certificate for a corporation?

Only individuals vested with authority by a valid board resolution may sign the certificate of non-
forum shopping in behalf of a corporation. In addition, the Court has required that proof of said
authority must be attached. Failure to provide a certificate of non-forum shopping is sufficient ground
to dismiss the petition. Likewise, the petition is subject to dismissal if a certification was submitted
unaccompanied by proof of the signatory's authority. (Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Flight Attendants
and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP), G.R. No. 143088. January 24, 2006)

However, subsequent submission of Secretary’s Certificate is substantial compliance with the

requirement that a Board Resolution must authorize the officer executing the non-forum certification
on behalf of the corporation. (International Construction Inc. vs. Feb Leasing and Financing Corp., G.R.
No. 157195, April 22, 2005)

The lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by the submission thereof
after the filing of the petition. Section 5 of Rule 45 provides that the failure of the petitioner to submit
the required documents that should accompany the petition, including the certification against forum
shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. The same rule applies to certifications
against forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by
proof that said signatory is authorized to file a petition on behalf of the corporation. In certain
exceptional circumstances, however, the Court has allowed the belated filing of the certification.
(Mediserv, inc. vs. Court of Appeals (special former 13th division) and Landheights Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 161368, April 5, 2010)

Litis pendentia is not present between a petition for writ of possession and action for annulment of
foreclosure. The issuance of the writ of possession being a ministerial function, and summary in
nature, it cannot be said to be a judgment on the merits, but simply an incident in the transfer of title.
Hence, a separate case for annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale cannot be barred by litis
pendentia or res judicata. Thus, insofar as Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D and Civil Case No. 99-03169-D
pending before different branches of RTC Dagupan City are concerned, there is no litis pendentia. (Yu
vs. PCIB, G.R. No. 147902. March 17, 2006)

The pendency of a SEC case may be invoked as posing a prejudicial question to an RTC civil case. Since
the determination of the SEC as to which of the two factions is the de jure board of NUI is crucial to
the resolution of the case before the RTC, we find that the trial court should suspend its proceedings
until the SEC comes out with its findings. (Abacan, Jr., et. al. vs. Northwestern University, Inc., G.R. No.
140777, April 8, 2005)

What is judicial courtesy?

There are instances where even if there is no writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order issued by a higher court, it would be proper for a lower court or court of origin to suspend its
proceedings on the precept of judicial courtesy. As the Supreme Court explained in Eternal Gardens
Memorial Park v. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 421, 427-428 (1988):
Due respect for the Supreme Courtand practical and ethical considerations should have prompted the
appellate court to wait for the final determination of the petition before taking cognizance of the case
and trying to render moot exactly what was before this court x x x. This Court explained, however,
that the rule on “judicial courtesy” applies where “there is a STRONG PROBABILITY that the issues
before the higher court would be rendered MOOT AND MORIBUND as a result of the continuation of
the proceedings in the lower court or court of origin.” (Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 166859,
June 26, 2006)

Effect of amendment of Rule 65, Section 7 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, December 12, 2007 on the
principle of judicial courtesy . Judicial courtesy can no longer be used as an excuse by courts or
tribunals not to proceed with the principal case.

Section 7.Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. - The court in which the petition is filed may issue
orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. The
petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a
writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding
in the case.

The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10) days from the filing of a
petition for certiorari with a higher court or tribunal, absent a temporary restraining order or a
preliminary injunction, or upon its expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with the
principal case may be a ground for an administrative charge.

A compulsory counterclaim does not require a certificate of non-forum shopping because a

compulsory counterclaim is not an initiatory pleading.

The Rule distinctly provides that the required certification against forum shopping is intended to cover
an "initiatory pleading," meaning an "incipient application of a party asserting a claim for relief."
Respondent bank's Answer with Counterclaim is not a responsive pleading, filed merely to counter
petitioners' complaint that initiates the civil action. In other words, the rule requiring such
certification does not contemplate a defendant's/ respondent's claim for relief that is derived only
from, or is necessarily connected with, the main action or complaint. In fact, upon failure by the
plaintiff to comply with such requirement, Section 5, quoted above, directs the "dismissal of the case
without prejudice," not the dismissal of respondent's counterclaim. (Carpio vs. Rural Bank of Sto.
Tomas (Batangas), Inc., G.R. No. 153171. May 4, 2006)

What are the tests or criteria to determine compulsory or permissive nature of specific counterclaims?

1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim largely the same?

2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claim absent the compulsory counterclaim
rule?

3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as defendant’s
counterclaim?

4. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?
The evidence of the petitioner on its claim in its complaint, and that of the respondents on their
counterclaims are thus different. There is, likewise, no logical relation between the claim of the
petitioner and the counterclaim of the respondents. Hence, the counterclaim of the respondents is an
initiatory pleading, which requires the respondents to append thereto a certificate of non-forum
shopping. Their failure to do so results to the dismissal of their counterclaim without prejudice. (Korea
Exchange Bank vs. Hon. Gonzales, et. al., G.R. Nos. 142286-87, April 15, 2005)

The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which
if true would justify the relief demanded. The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the
material allegations. If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be
maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented by the
defendant. (Heirs of Tomas Dolleton vs. Fil – Estate Management, Inc., G.R. No. 170750, April 7, 2009)

When a motion to dismiss is premised on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action
(Rule 16, Section 1 (g)), the ruling thereon should be based only on the facts alleged in the
complaint. The court must resolve the issue on the strength of such allegations, assuming them to be
true. The test of sufficiency of a cause of action rests on whether, hypothetically admitting the facts
alleged in the complaint to be true, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same, in
accordance with the prayer in the complaint. However, there is no hypothetical admission of the
veracity of the allegations if:

1. the falsity of the allegations is subject to judicial notice;

2. such allegations are legally impossible;

3. the allegations refer to facts which are inadmissible in evidence;

4. by the record or document in the pleading, the allegations appear unfounded; or

5. there is evidence which has been presented to the court by stipulation of the parties or in the
course of the hearings related to the case. (Heirs of Loreto Maramag vs. Maramag, G.R. No. 181132,
2009 June 5, 2009)

A ground raised in a motion to dismiss may not be the subject of preliminary hearing as special and
affirmative defense in the answer, except when there are several defendants but only one filed a
motion to dismiss.

Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, the defendant may reiterate any of the grounds for
dismissal provided under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court as affirmative defenses but a preliminary
hearing may no longer be had thereon if a motion to dismiss had already been filed. This section,
however, does not recontemplate a situation, such as the one obtaining in this case, where there are
several defendants but only one filed a motion to dismiss. (Abrajano vs. Salas, Jr., G.R. No.
158895. February 16, 2006)

NOTICE OF DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINTunder Rule 17, Sec. 1

The trial court has no discretion or option to deny the motion, since dismissal by the plaintiff under
Section 1, Rule 17 is guaranteed as a matter of right to the plaintiffs. Even if the motion cites the most
ridiculous of grounds for dismissal, the trial court has no choice but to consider the complaint as
dismissed, since the plaintiff may opt for such dismissal as a matter of right, regardless of ground (O.B.
Jovenir Construction and Development Corp. vs. Macamir Realty and CA, G.R. No. 135803, March 28,
2006).

MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT DUE TO PLAINTIFF’S FAULT under Rule 17, Sec. 3.

Sec. 3, Rule 17 enumerates the instances where the complaint may be dismissed due to plaintiff’s
fault: (1) if he fails to appear on the date for the presentation of his evidence in chief; (2) if he fails to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time; or (3) if he fails to comply with the rules or
any order of the court. Once a case is dismissed for failure to prosecute, this has the effect of an
adjudication on the merits and is understood to be with prejudice to the filing of another action
unless otherwise provided in the order of dismissal. In other words, unless there be a qualification in
the order of dismissal that it is without prejudice, the dismissal should be regarded as an adjudication
on the merits and is with prejudice. (Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164797, February 13, 2006)

In situations contemplated in Section 3, Rule 17, where a complaint is dismissed for failure of the
plaintiff to comply with a lawful order of the court, such dismissal has the effect of an adjudication
upon the merits. A dismissal for failure to prosecute has the effect of an adjudication on the merits,
and operates as res judicata, particularly when the court did not direct that the dismissal was without
prejudice. (Court of Appeals vs. Alvarez, G.R. No. 142439, December 3, 2006)

Under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal of the complaint due to
the fault of plaintiff does not necessarily carry with it the dismissal of the counterclaim, compulsory or
otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the right of defendants to
prosecute the counterclaim. (Pinga vs. Santiago, G.R. No. 170354, June 30, 2006).

Pinga vs. Santiago which refers to instances covered by Section 3, Rule 17 on dismissal of the
complaint due to the fault of the plaintiff also applies where the dismissal of the complaint was upon
the instance of the petitioner who correctly argued lack of jurisdiction over its person.

Petitioner’s counterclaim against respondent is for damages and attorney’s fees arising from the
unfounded suit. While respondent’s complaint against petitioner is already dismissed, petitioner may
have very well already incurred damages and litigation expenses such as attorney’s fees since it was
forced to engage legal representation in the Philippines to protect its rights and to assert lack of
jurisdiction of the courts over its person by virtue of the improper service of summons upon it. Hence,
the cause of action of petitioner’s counterclaim is not eliminated by the mere dismissal of
respondent’s complaint. (Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. vs. Dakila Trading Corporation, G.R. No.
172242, August 14, 2007)

Remedy from order of dismissal for failure to prosecute – ordinary appeal.

An order of dismissal for failure to prosecute has the effect of an adjudication on the merits.
Petitioners’ counsel should have filed a notice of appeal with the appellate court within the
reglementary period. Instead of filing a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the proper
recourse was an ordinary appeal with the Court of Appeals under Rule 41. (Ko vs. PNB, 479 SCRA 298,
January 20, 2006)

Effect of declaration of default.

The mere fact that a defendant is declared in default does not automatically result in the grant of the
prayers of the plaintiff. To win, the latter must still present the same quantum of evidence that would
be required if the defendant were still present. A party that defaults is not deprived of its rights,
except the right to be heard and to present evidence to the trial court. If the evidence presented does
not support a judgment for the plaintiff, the complaint should be dismissed, even if the defendant
may not have been heard or allowed to present any countervailing evidence (Gajudo vs. Traders Royal
Bank, G.R. No. 151098, March 21, 2006).

A defendant party declared in default retains the right to appeal from the judgment by default on the
ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of the complaint, or that the decision
is contrary to law, even without need of the prior filing of a motion to set aside the order of default
(Martinez vs. Republic, G.R. No. 160895, October 30, 2006).

Procedure trial court must take when a defendant fails to file an answer.

Under Sec. 3 of Rule 9, the court "shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief
as his pleading may warrant," subject to the court’s discretion on whether to require the presentation
of evidence ex parte. The same provision also sets down guidelines on the nature and extent of the
relief that may be granted. In particular, the court’s judgment "shall not exceed the amount or be
different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages." (Gajudo vs. Traders Royal
Bank, supra)

DISCOVERY PROCEDURES

The importance of discovery procedures is well recognized by the Court. It approved A.M. No. 03-1-
09-SC on July 13, 2004 which provided for the guidelines to be observed by trial court judges and
clerks of court in the conduct of pre-trial and use of deposition-discovery measures. Under A.M. No.
03-1-09-SC, trial courts are directed to issue orders requiring parties to avail of interrogatories to
parties under Rule 25 and request for admission of adverse party under Rule 26 or at their discretion
make use of depositions under Rule 23 or other measures under Rule 27 and 28 within 5 days from
the filing of the answer. The parties are likewise required to submit, at least 3 days before the pre-
trial, pre-trial briefs, containing among others a manifestation of the parties of their having availed or
their intention to avail themselves of discovery procedures or referral to commissioners. (Hyatt
Industrial Manufacturing Corp. vs. Ley Construction and Development Corp., G.R. No. 147143, March
10, 2006)

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Rule 34, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, provides that a judgment on the pleadings is proper when an
answer fails to tender an issue or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's
pleading. The essential question is whether there are issues generated by the pleadings. A judgment
on the pleadings may be sought only by a claimant, who is the party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim or cross-claim; or to obtain a declaratory relief. (Meneses vs. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, G.R. No. 156304, October 23, 2006)

Judgment on the pleadings is improper when the answer to the complaint tenders several issues. A
motion for judgment on the pleadings admits the truth of all the material and relevant allegations of
the opposing party and the judgment must rest on those allegations taken together with such other
allegations as are admitted in the pleadings. It is proper when an answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading. However, when it appears
that not all the material allegations of the complaint were admitted in the answer for some of them
were either denied or disputed, and the defendant has set up certain special defenses which, if
proven, would have the effect of nullifying plaintiff's main cause of action, judgment on the pleadings
cannot be rendered. (Municipality of Tiwi vs. Betito, G.R. No. 171873, July 9, 2010)

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

For summary judgment to be proper, two (2) requisites must concur: (1) there must be no genuine
issue on any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (2) the moving party must be
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

When, on their face, the pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment is not proper. An issue
is genuine if it requires the PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE as distinguished from a sham, fictitious,
contrived or false claim. The trial court’s decision was merely denominated as summary judgment.
But in essence, it is actually equivalent to a judgment on the merits, making the rule on summary
judgment inapplicable in this case. (Ontimare vs. Elep, G.R. No. 159224, January 20, 2006).

When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue
or question as to the facts, and summary judgment is called for. The party who moves for summary
judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that
the issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for
trial. Trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only when there
is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are
disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial (Asian
Construction and Development Corp. vs. PCIB, G.R. No. 153827, April 25, 2006).

Under the Rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact which
call for the presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if on their face the pleadings appear to
raise issues, when the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genuine,
then summary judgment as prescribed by the Rules must ensue as a matter of law. The determinative
factor, therefore, in a motion for summary judgment, is the presence or absence of a genuine issue as
to any material fact. (Philippine Bank Of Communications vs. Spouses Go , G.R. No. 175514, February
14, 2011)

The trial court cannot motu proprio decide that summary judgment on an action is in order.Under the
applicable provisions of Rule 35, the defending party or the claimant, as the case may be, must invoke
the rule on summary judgment by filing a motion. The adverse party must be notified of the motion
for summary judgment and furnished with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions before
hearing is conducted. More importantly, a summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Pineda
vs. Guevara, G.R. No. 143188, February 14, 2007).

TRIAL

Lack of cause of action may be cured by evidence presented during the trial and amendments to
conform to the evidence.
Amendments of pleadings are allowed under Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in order that
the actual merits of a case may be determined in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner
without regard to technicalities, and that all other matters included in the case may be determined in
a single proceeding, thereby avoiding multiplicity of suits. Section 5 thereof applies to situations
wherein evidence not within the issues raised in the pleadings is presented by the parties during the
trial, and to conform to such evidence the pleadings are subsequently amended on motion of a party.
(Swagman Hotels & Travel, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 161135, April 8, 2005).

DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE

Since respondent failed to deny the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion and Confirmation
Statement under oath, then these are deemed admitted and must be considered by the court in
resolving the demurrer to evidence. We held in Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. v.
Sweet Lines, Inc. that “[w]hen the due execution and genuineness of an instrument are deemed
admitted because of the adverse party’s failure to make a specific verified denial thereof, the
instrument need not be presented formally in evidence for it may be considered an admitted fact.”
(Casent Realty Development Corp. vs. Philbanking Corporation, G.R. No. 150731, September 14,
2007)

Upon the dismissal of the demurrer in the appellate court, the defendant loses the right to present his
evidenceand the appellate court shall then proceed to render judgment on the merits on the basis of
plaintiff’s evidence. The rule, however, imposes the condition that if his demurrer is granted by the
trial court, and the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, the movant loses his right to present
evidence in his behalf and he shall have been deemed to have elected to stand on the insufficiency of
plaintiff’s case and evidence. In such event, the appellate court which reverses the order of dismissal
shall proceed to render judgment on the merits on the basis of plaintiff’s evidence (Republic vs.
Tuvera, G.R. No. 148246, February 16, 2007).

Distinction between motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action and motion to dismiss
based on lack of cause of action.

The first is raised in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16, Sec. 1 (g) before a responsive pleading is filed
and can be determined only from the allegations of the pleading and not from evidentiary matters.
The second is raised in a demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 after the plaintiff has rested his case and
can be resolved only on the basis of the evidence he has presented in support of his claim (The Manila
Banking Corp. vs. University of Baguio, Inc., G.R. No. 159189, February 21, 2007)

APPEAL AND REVIEW

The Supreme Court may review factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals

The petitioner admits that the issues on appeal are factual. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only
questions of law may be raised, for the simple reason that the Court is not a trier of facts. The findings
of the trial court as affirmed by the CA are conclusive on this Court, absent proof of any of the
recognized exceptional circumstances such as: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is
grave abuse of discretion;
(4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the finding of
absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the CA are
contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed
facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the CA are
beyond the issues of the case; and (11) the findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.
(Asian Construction & Dev’t. Corp. vs. Tulabut, G.R. No. 161904, April 26, 2005)

The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be exercised for
the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court – viz., on the basis
either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision. Even if
the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is
normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error
of law or fact – a mistake of judgment – appeal is the proper remedy. Vios vs. Pantangco, Jr., G.R. No.
163103, February 6, 2009)

Regional trial courts have jurisdiction over complaints for recovery of ownership or accion
reivindicatoria. Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules on Civil Procedure nonetheless allows the RTC to
decide the case brought on appeal from the MTC which, even without jurisdiction over the subject
matter, may decide the case on the merits. In the instant case, the MTC of Mambajao should have
dismissed the complaint outright for lack of jurisdiction but since it decided the case on its merits, the
RTC rendered a decision based on the findings of the MTC. (Provost vs. CA, G.R. No. 160406, June 26,
2006).

The RTC should have taken cognizance of the case. If the case is tried on the merits by the Municipal
Court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC on appeal may no longer dismiss the case
if it has original jurisdiction thereof. Moreover, the RTC shall no longer try the case on the merits, but
shall decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented in the lower court, without prejudice to
the admission of the amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice.
(Encarnacion vs. Amigo, G.R. No. 169793, September 15, 2006).

Inferior courts have jurisdiction to resolve questions of ownership whenever it is necessary to decide
the question of possession in an ejectment case.

The RTC erred when it agreed with the MTC’s decision to dismiss the case. At first glance, it appears
that based on the P13,300.00 assessed value of the subject property as declared by respondents, the
RTC would have no jurisdiction over the case. But the above-quoted provision refers to the original
jurisdiction of the RTC. Section 22 of BP 129 vests upon the RTC the exercise of appellate jurisdiction
over all cases decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Clearly then, the amount involved is
immaterial for purposes of the RTC’s appellate jurisdiction. All cases decided by the MTC are
generally appealable to the RTC irrespective of the amount involved (Serrano vs. Gutierrez, G.R. No.
162366, November 10, 2006).

Appeal from RTC decision rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction – petition for review
under Rule 42.
Since the unlawful detainer case was filed with the MTC and affirmed by the RTC, petitioners should
have filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals under Rule 42 and not a Notice of Appeal
with the RTC. However, we consider this to have been remedied by the timely filing of the Motion for
Reconsideration on the following day. Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court allows the withdrawal
of appeal at any time, as a matter of right, before the filing of the appellee’s brief. Applying this rule
contextually, the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration may be deemed as an effective withdrawal
of the defective Notice of Appeal. (Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. vs. Ong, G.R. No. 132197, August 16,
2005)

No petition for relief in the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court

While Rule 38 uses the phrase “any court,” it refers only to Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional Trial
Courts. The procedure in the CA and the Supreme Court are governed by separate provisions of the
Rules of Court. There is no provision in the Rules of Court making the petition for rellief applicable in
the CA or this Court. (Purcon vs. MRM Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 182718, September 26, 2008)

ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT

Section 1, Rule 47 of the 1987 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the remedy of annulment of
judgments or final orders/resolutions of a Regional Trial Court in civil actions can only be availed of
where "the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies
arenolongeravailablethroughnofaultofthepetitioner." A petition for annulment of judgment under
Rule 47 is a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his
part, has failed to avail of the ordinary or other appropriate remedies provided by law. Such action is
never resorted to as a substitute for a party’s own neglect in not promptly availing of the ordinary or
other appropriate remedies. (Republic of the Philippines vs. Spouses De Castro , G.R. No. 189724,
February 7, 2011)

Rule 47 applies only to annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and
resolutions in civil cases of Regional Trial Courts – it does not apply to criminal actions (People vs.
Bitanga, G.R. No. 159222, June 26 2007); final judgments or orders of quasi-judicial tribunals or
administrative bodies such as the National Labor Relations Commission, the Ombudsman, the Civil
Service Commission, the Office of the President, and the PARAD (Fraginal vs. Paranal, G.R. No.
150207, February 223, 2007).; or to nullification of decisions of the Court of Appeals (Grande vs.
University of the Philippines, G.R. No. 148456, September 15, 2006).

Although the RTC has the authority to annul final judgments, such authority pertains only to final
judgments rendered by inferior courts and quasi-judicial bodies of equal ranking with such inferior
courts. Given that DARAB decisions are appealable to the CA, the inevitable conclusion is that the
DARAB is a co-equal body with the RTC and its decisions are beyond the RTC’s control (Springfield
Development Corp. vs. Presiding Judge of RTC of Misamis Oriental, Branch 40, G.R. No. 142628,
February 6, 2007).

EXECUTION

Execution pending appeal applies to election cases. Despite the silence of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure as to the procedure of the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, there is no
reason to dispute the COMELEC’s authority to do so, considering that the suppletory application of the
Rules of Court is expressly authorized by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which
provides that absent any applicable provisions therein the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court
shall be applicable by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect. (Balajonda vs. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 166032, February 28, 2005).

When title has been consolidated in name of mortgagee, writ of possession is a matter of right.Once a
mortgaged estate is extrajudicially sold, and is not redeemed within the reglementary period, no
separate and independent action is necessary to obtain possession of the property. The purchaser at
the public auction has only to file a petition for issuance of a writ of possession pursuant to Section 33
of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. (DBP vs. Spouses Gatal, G.R. No. 138567, March 4, 2005).

Execution of money judgments under Rule 39, Sec. 9 – promissory note not allowed.

The law mandates that in the execution of a money judgment, the judgment debtor shall pay either in
cash, certified bank check payable to the judgment obligee, or any other form of payment acceptable
to the latter. Nowhere does the law mention promissory notes as a form of payment. The only
exception is when such form of payment is acceptable to the judgment debtor. But it was obviously
not acceptable to complainant, otherwise she would not have filed this case against respondent
sheriff. In fact, she objected to it because the promissory notes of the defendants did not satisfy the
money judgment in her favor. (Dagooc vs. Erlina, A.M. No. P-04-1857 (formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 02-1429-
P), March 16, 2005)

Venue of action for revival of judgment

If the action for revival of judgment affects title to or possession of real property, or interest therein,
then it is a real action that must be filed with the court of the place where the real property is located.
(Infante vs. Aran Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 156596, August 24, 2007)

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES

Improper issuance and service of writ of attachment

A distinction should be made between issuance and implementation of the writ of attachment. This is
necessary to determine when jurisdiction over the defendant should be acquired to validly implement
the writ.

The grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involves three stages: first, the court issues the
order granting the application; second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting
the writ; and third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first obtained, but once the implementation of the
writ commences, the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant (Mangila vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 125027, August 12, 2002, 387 SCRA 162).

Preference of levy on attachment duly registered over a prior unregistered sale

The settled rule is that levy on attachment, duly registered, takes preference over a prior unregistered
sale. The preference created by the levy on attachment is not diminished even by the subsequent
registration of the prior sale. This is so because an attachment is a proceeding in rem. It is against the
particular property, enforceable against the whole world. The attaching creditor acquires a specific
lien on the attached property which nothing can subsequently destroy except the very dissolution of
the attachment or levy itself.

The lien continues until the debt is paid, or sale is had under execution issued on the judgment, or
until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in some manner provided by
law. Thus, in the registry, the attachment in favor of respondents appeared in the nature of a real lien
when petitioner had his purchase recorded. The effect of the notation of said lien was to subject and
subordinate the right of petitioner, as purchaser, to the lien (Valdevieso vs. Damalerio, G.R. No.
133303, February 17, 2005, 451 SCRA 664, 670).

Judge's authority to issue a writ of preliminary injunction only within his/her territorial jurisdiction

As the presiding judge of RTC, Marawi City, he should have known that Makati City was way beyond
the boundaries of his territorial jurisdiction insofar as enforcing a writ of preliminary injunction is
concerned. Section 21 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, provides that the RTC shall exercise original
jurisdiction in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus
and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions (Gomos vs. Adiong, A.M.
No. RTJ-04-1863, October 22, 2004, 441 SCRA 162).

Original action for injunction outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals

What petitioner filed with the appellate court was an original action for preliminary injunction which
is a provisional and extraordinary remedy calculated to preserve or maintain the status quo of things
and is availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be heard. An
original action for injunction is outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, however.

Under B.P. 129, the appellate court’s jurisdiction to grant a writ of preliminary injunction is limited to
actions or proceedings pending before it (Section 2 of Rule 58) or in a petition for certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus (Section 7 of Rule 65). In the case at bar, petitioner’s complaint-in-
intervention in Civil Case No. 00-196 was pending before Branch 256 of the Muntinlupa RTC, not with
the appellate court. (Allgemeine-Bau-Chemie Phils., Inc., vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., Honorable
N. C. Perello, G.R. No. 159296 , February 10, 2006).

Injunction to restrain extrajudicial foreclosure involving several parcels located in different provinces

Separate injunction suits may be filed for breach of mortgage contract with injunction to restrain
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings of mortgaged properties located in different provinces without
violating the rule against forum shopping since injunction is enforceable only within the territorial
limits of the trial court, thus the mortgagor is left without remedy as to the properties located outside
the jurisdiction of the issuing court unless an application for injunction is made with another court
which has jurisdiction over the latter court (Benguet Management Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,
September 18, 2003, 411 SCRA 347).

CHANGE IN THE RULE

The last paragraph which was added to Section 5, Rule 58 states that a higher court (RTC, Court of
Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals) which issues a writ of preliminary injunction against a
lower court, board, officer or quasi-judicial agency must “decide the main case or petition within six
(6) months from the issuance of the writ.” (AM 07-7-12, effective December 27, 2007).
Purpose: in order not to unduly delay the main case lodged in the lower court.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

A petition for declaratory relief should be brought “in the appropriate regional trial court.” The
purpose of the petition is to ask the court to determine any question of construction or validity arising
from the sujbect matter thereof , and for the declaration of rights and duties thereunder. Hence, the
subject matter of such petition raises issues which are not capable of pecuniary estimation and must
be filed in the RTC (Sec. 19 [1], BP 129; Sec. 1, Rule 63). It would be error to file the petition the
petition with the Supreme Court which has no original jurisdiction to entertain a petition for
declaratory relief (Ortega vs. Quezon City Government, G.R. No. 161400, September 2, 2005).

However, where the action is for quieting of title which is a similar remedy under the second
paragraph of Sec. 1 of Rule 63, the jurisdiction will depend upon the assessed value of the property.

Re-filing of petition for certiorari should be done within the 60-day period.Where the dismissal by the
Court of Appeals of the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 69744 for non-submission of a non-
forum shopping certification was without prejudice and petitioner could have re-filed such petition,
such re-filing should still be done within the prescribed period under Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, or not later than sixty days from notice of the assailed Order of the
RTC. (Estrera vs. CA, G.R. No. 154235-36, August 16, 2006)

CHANGES IN THE RULE

Period to file petition for certiorari now inextendible. Last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 65: “No
extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reasons and in no case
exceeding fifteen (15) days” has been DELETED by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, effective December 27,
2007. Hence, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or
from the order denying a motion for reconsideration.

If the Court intended to retain the authority of the proper courts to grant extensions under Section 4
of Rule 65, the paragraph providing for such authority would have been preserved. The removal of the
said paragraph under the amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of Section 4, Rule 65 simply meant that
there can no longer be any extension of the 60-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari.
(Laguna Metts Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 185220, July 27, 2009)

A. M. No. 07-7-12 has also amended the second paragraph of Sec. 4:

If the petition relates to an act or omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, board, officer
or person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area
as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals whether or not the
same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or with the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise
provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of
Appeals.

In election cases involving an act or omission of a municipal or regional trial court, the petition shall
be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction
Following the hierarchy of courts, no certiorari against the RTC shall be filed with the Supreme Court.
This will help prevent the clogging of the Supreme Court’s dockets as litigants will be discouraged
from filing petitions directly with the Supreme Court.

Section 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. - The court in which the petition is filed may
issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ
of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent
from further proceeding in the case.

The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10) days from the filing of a
petition for certiorari with a higher court or tribunal, absent a temporary restraining order or a
preliminary injunction, or upon its expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with the
principal case may be a ground for an administrative charge

Unless there is a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction issued by a higher court, the
main or principal case should proceed despite the filing of a petition for certiorari questioning an act
or omission of a court or tribunal

Judicial courtesy, therefore, can no longer be used as an excuse by courts or tribunals not to proceed
with the principal case.

Section 8. Proceedings after comment is filed. - After the comment or other pleadings required by
the court are filed, or the time for the filing thereof has expired, the court may hear the case or
require the parties to submit memoranda. If, after such hearing or filing of memoranda or the
expiration of the period for filing, the court finds that the allegations of the petition are true, it shall
render judgment for such relief to which the petitioner is entitled.

However, the court may dismiss the petition if it finds the same patently without merit or prosecuted
manifestly for delay, or if the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
In such event, the court may award in favor of the respondent treble costs solidarily against the
petitioner and counsel, in addition to subjecting counsel to administrative sanctions under Rules 139
and 139-B of the Rules of Court.

The Court may impose motu proprio, based on rep ipsa loquitur, other disciplinary sanctions or
measures on erring lawyers for patently dilatory and unmeritorious petitions for certiorari.

Thewrit of prohibition does not lie against the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Since in issuing
the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the National Government Administration Committee was not
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function, which is the scope of a petition for prohibition
under Section 2, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the instant prohibition should be
dismissed outright. Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners’ remedy is an
ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court. (Holy Spirit Homeowners Association vs. Defensor, G.R. No. 163980, August 3,
2006).
A writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG is
unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a
duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of
motor vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section
4 “to grant preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to
operators of NGVs based on the results of the DOTC surveys” (Henares, Jr. vs. Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 158290, October 23, 2006).

Actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, which were formerly
cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission under PD 902-A, have been transferred to the
courts of general jurisdiction. But, this does not change the fact that Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure does not apply to quo warranto cases against persons who usurp an office in a private
corporation (Calleja vs. Panday, G.R. No. 168696. February 28, 2006).

EXPROPRIATION

Rep. Act No. 8974 mandates immediate payment of the initial just compensation prior to the issuance
of the writ of possession in favor of the government. RA 8974 requires that the government make a
direct payment to the property owner before the writ may issue. Such payment is based on the zonal
valuation of the BIR in the case of land, the value of the improvements or structures under the
replacement cost method, or if no such valuation is available and in cases of utmost urgency, the
proffered value of the property to be seized. It is the plain intent of RA 8974 to supersede the system
of deposit under Rule 67 with the scheme of “immediate payment” in cases involving national
government infrastructure projects (Republic vs. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 166249, December 19, 2005).

Section 9 of Rule 67 empowers the court to order payment to itself of the proceeds of the
expropriation whenever questions of ownership are yet to be settled. There is no reason why this rule
should not be applied even where the settlement of such questions is to be made by another tribunal,
i.e., the DARAB. (Philippine Veterans Bank vs. Bases Conversion Development Authority, G.R. No.
173085, January 19, 2011)

FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE

Awrit of possession is “a writ of execution employed to enforce a judgment to recover the possession
of land. It commands the sheriff to enter the land and give possession of it to the person entitled
under the judgment.”

A writ of possession may be issued under the following instances: (1) in land registration proceedings
under Section 17 of Act 496; (2) in a judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the
mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; (3) in an
extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act
No. 4118; and (4) in execution sales (last paragraph of Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court).

The present case falls under the third instance. Under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act
No. 4118, a writ of possession may be issued either (1) within the one-year redemption period, upon
the filing of a bond, or (2) after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a bond. (PNB vs.
Sanao Marketing Corporation, G.R. No. 153951, July 29, 2005
A writ of preliminary injunction is issued to prevent an extrajudicial foreclosure, only upon a clear
showing of a violation of the mortgagor’s unmistakable right. Unsubstantiated allegations of denial of
due process and prematurity of a loan are not sufficient to defeat the mortgagee’s unmistakable right
to an extrajudicial foreclosure. (Selegna Management and Development Corporation vs. UCPB, G.R.
No. 165662, May 31, 2006)

An action to invalidate the mortgage or the foreclosure sale is not a valid ground to oppose issuance
of writ of possession .

As a rule, any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal
ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of possession. Regardless of whether or not there is a
pending suit for annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure itself, the purchaser is entitled to a writ
of possession, without prejudice of course to the eventual outcome of said case. (Sps. Arquiza vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160479, June 8, 2005)

FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER

In forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental
value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property. The reason
for this is that the only issue raised in ejectment cases is that of rightful possession; hence, the
damages which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere
possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the
damages which he may have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material
possession. (Teraña vs. Hon. De Sagun, G.R. No. 152131, April 29, 2009;Dumo vs. Espinas, G.R. No.
141962, January 25, 2006)

The judgment rendered in an action for unlawful detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the
possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or
building. Such judgment would not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the
land or building. Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that when the defendant raises
the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue
of possession. (Roberts vs. Papio, G.R. No. 166714, February 9, 2007)

Accion publicianais one for the recovery of possession of the right to possess. It is also referred to as
an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or
from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. (Hilario, etc., et. al. vs. Salvador, et. al.,
G.R. No. 160384, April 29, 2005)

Does the RTC have jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of possession regardless of the value of the
property involved?

NO. The doctrine that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies with the regional
trial courts regardless of the value of the property — no longer holds true. As things now stand, a
distinction must be made between those properties the assessed value of which is below P20,000.00,
if outside Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if within (Quinagoran vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
155179. August 24, 2007)
Specifically, the regional trial court exercises exclusive original jurisdiction "in all civil actions which
involve possession of real property." However, if the assessed value of the real property involved
does not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila, and P20,000.00 outside of Metro Manila, the municipal
trial court exercises jurisdiction over actions to recover possession of real property (Atuel vs. Valdez,
June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 517, 528).

All cases involving title to or possession of real property with an assessed value of less than
P20,000.00 if outside Metro Manila, fall under the original jurisdiction of the municipal trial
court. (Aliabo v. Carampatan, G.R. No. 128922, March 16, 2001, 354 SCRA 548, 552).

A complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the
interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. This is because the nature
of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by
the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the law in
effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the
claims asserted therein. (Laresma v. Abellana, G.R. No. 140973, November 11, 2004, 442 SCRA 156;
Hilario v. Salvador, G.R. No. 160384, April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 815).

A complaint for reconveyance of a parcel of land which involves title to or interest in real property
should allege the assessed value of the land . The complaint specified only the market value or
estimated value which is P15,000.00. In the absence of an assessed value, or in lieu thereof, the
estimated value may be alleged.

Sec. 22 of BP 129 as amended by R.A. No. 7691 (where the assessed value of the real property does
not exceed P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 in Metro Manila) grants the MTC exclusive jurisdiction over
subject case.The nature of an action is determined not by what is stated in the caption of the
complaint but its allegations and the reliefs prayed for. Where the ultimate objective of the plaintiff is
to obtain title to real property, it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the
assessed value of the property subject thereof. (Barangay Piapi vs. Talip, 469 SCRA 409 [2005]).

The determining jurisdictional element for the accion reivindicatoria is, as RA 7691 discloses, the
assessed value of the property in question. For properties in the provinces, the RTC has jurisdiction if
the assessed value exceeds P20,000, and the MTC, if the value is P20,000 or below . An assessed value
can have reference only to the tax rolls in the municipality where the property is located, and is
contained in the tax declaration. It is the amount in the tax declaration that should be consulted and
no other kind of value, and as appearing in Exhibit B, this is P5,950. The case, therefore, falls within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Romblon which has jurisdiction over
the territory where the property is located, and not the court a quo. . (Hilario vs. Salvador, G.R. No.
160384. April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 815)

The actions envisaged in the aforequoted provisions (Secs. 19 and 33. BP 129, as amended by RA
7691) are accion publiciana and reivindicatoria. To determine which court has jurisdiction over the
action, the complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or
the interest thereon.The complaint does not contain any allegation of the assessed value of Lot 4-E
covered by TCT No. 47171. There is, thus, no showing on the face of the complaint that the RTC had
exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the respondent.
Moreover, as gleaned from the receipt of realty tax payments issued to the respondent, the assessed
value of the property in 1993 was P8,300.00. Patently then, the Municipal Trial Court of Aloguinsan,
Cebu, and not the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, had exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the
respondent. Hence, all the proceedings in the RTC, including its decision, are null and void (Laresma
vs. Abellana, G.R. No. 140973, November 11, 2004, 442 SCRA 156; Aliabo vs. Carampatan, G.R. No.
128922, March 16, 2001, 354 SCRA 548).; Ouano vs. PGTT Int'l. Investment Corporation, G.R. No.
134230, July 17, 2002, 384 SCRA 589) .

Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in
the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year (Canlas vs.
Tubil, G.R. No. 184285, September 25, 2009).

Mandatory allegations for the municipal trial court to acquire jurisdiction over forcible entry

First, the plaintiff must allege his prior physical possession of the property. Second, he must also
allege that he was deprived of his possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. If the
alleged dispossession did not occur by any of these means, the proper recourse is to file not an action
for forcible entry but a plenary action to recover possession with the Regional Trial Court (Benguet
Corporation vs. Cordillera Caraballo Mission, Inc., G.R. No.155343, September 2, 2005)..

What determines jurisdiction in unlawful detainer?

To vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary that the complaint
should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which
the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must
show enough on its face the court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony.

The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver
facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was
effected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or
an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court. (Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R No.
132424, May 4, 2006)

Possession by tolerance becomes unlawful from the time of demand to vacate.

Petitioner’s cause of action for unlawful detainer springs from respondents’ failure to vacate the
questioned premises upon his demand sometime in 1996. Within one (1) year therefrom, or on
November 6, 1996, petitioner filed the instant complaint.

Possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful when the possessor by
tolerance refuses to vacate upon demand made by the owner. (Santos vs. Sps. Ayon, G.R. No. 137013,
May 6, 2005)

Where the period of the lease has expired and several demands were sent to the lessee to vacate,
when should the one year period to file unlawful detainer be reckoned? From the date of the original
demand or from the date of the last demand?

From the date of the original demand if the subsequent demands are merely in the nature of
reminders or reiterations of the original demand.
Demand or notice to vacate is not a jurisdictional requirement when the action is based on the
expiration of the lease.. The law requires notice to be served only when the action is due to the
lessee’s failure to pay or the failure to comply with the conditions of the lease. The one-year period is
thus counted from the date of first dispossession. The allegation that the lease was on a month-to-
month basis is tantamount to saying that the lease expired every month. Since the lease already
expired mid-year in 1995, as communicated in petitioners’ letter dated July 1, 1995, it was at that time
that respondent’s occupancy became unlawful. (Racaza vs. Gozum, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 313)

As a general rule, an ejectment suit cannot be abated or suspended by the mere filing before the
regional trial court (RTC) of another action raising ownership of the property as an issue . As an
exception, however, unlawful detainer actions may be suspended even on appeal, on considerations
of equity, such as when the demolition of petitioners' house would result from the enforcement of
the municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judgment (Amagan vs. Marayag, G.R. No. 138377, February
28, 2000).

Even if RTC judgments in unlawful detainer cases are immediately executory, preliminary injunction
may still be granted. There need only be clear showing that there exists a right to be protected and
that the acts against which the writ is to be directed violate said right. In this case, we note that the
petition for review filed with the Court of Appeals raises substantial issues meriting serious
consideration. Chua’s putative right to continued possession of the premises stands to be violated if
the adverse judgment of the RTC were to be fully executed. Hence, the complete execution of the RTC
judgment could be held in abeyance, through a writ of preliminary injunction, until final resolution of
the main controversy (Benedicto vs. CA, G.R. No. 157604, October 19, 2005)

CONTEMPT

Respondent Judge’s blunder was compounded when she immediately cited complainant in contempt
of court and issued the bench warrant without requiring the latter to explain the reason for his non-
appearance and non-compliance with a standing order. Under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,
complainant’s alleged disobedience is an indirect contempt the punishment for which requires that a
respondent should be first asked to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.

Respondent also abused her contempt powers. If at all, complainant was guilty of indirect contempt
and not direct contempt. For not affording complainant the opportunity to explain why he
should not be cited in contempt, she blatantly disregarded Rule 71 of the Rules of Court (Tabujara
vs. Judge Asdala, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2126 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2896-RTJ], January 20, 2009 Jan 20,
En Banc)

Before one may be convicted of indirect contempt, there must be compliance with the following
requisites: (a) a charge in writing to be filed; (b) an opportunity for respondent to comment thereon
within such period as may be fixed by the court; and (c) an opportunity to be heard by himself or by
counsel . (Tokio Marine Malayan Insurance Company Inc. vs. Valdez, G.R. No. 150107, January 28,
2008).

Use of falsified and forged documents constitutes indirect contempt not direct contempt (Judge
Dolores Espanol vs. Atty. Benjamin Formoso, G.R. No. 150949, June 21, 2007).