ARTICLE III SECTION 1: DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 3.
3. W/N the properties confiscated from Dimaano’s house are illegally seized and
REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN, GR 104768, 21 JULY 2003
- Aquino issued EO No. 1 creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) tasked to recover ill-gotten wealth of Marcos and his associates. It is given
the power to..
• conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out
the purposes of this order
• promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purpose of this order.
- An AFP Anti-Graft Board was created to investigate reports of unexplained wealth
and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether active service or retired.
FACTS:
1. Major General Ramas was the Commanding Gen. of the PH Army until 1986
2. Elizabeth Dimaano was a confidential agent of the Military Security Unit,
Philippine Army, assigned as a clerk-typist at the office of Ramas
3. The AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of
respondent Ramas and found that:
a. He owns a house and lot in La Vista (700,000 value) and Cebu
b. Military and communications equipment and money (P2.8M and 50k USD)
were found in the premises of Dimaano and were confiscated.
c. Items could not have been in Dimaano’s possession if not given for her use by
Ramas as Commanding General.
d. She is his mistress w/ no visible means of income (a secretary) and is
supported by him so it’s impossible for her to claim that she owns the money.
There was an intention to cover the existence of these money.
e. CONCLUSION: The Board finds a prima facie case against Ramas for ill-gotten
and unexplained wealth in the amount of P2.9M and 50k USD in violation of
RA3019 “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act” and RA1379 “The Act for the
Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property.”
4. AUGUST 1987: the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under RA No. 1379
against Ramas (and Dimaano in the amended complaint)
a. Alleged that Ramas acquired funds, assets and properties manifestly out of
proportion to his salary and his other income from legitimately acquired
property by taking undue advantage of his public office and/or using his
power, authority and influence as such officer of the AFP and as a subordinate
and close associate of the deposed President Marcos.”
b. Prayed for, among others, the forfeiture of respondents’ properties, funds and
equipment in favor of the State.
5. Ramas’ contended that he only owned a house in QC, valued at P700,000, which
was not out of proportion to his income, and denied ownership of any mansion in
Cebu and other items confiscated from the house of Dimaano.
6. Dimaano claimed ownership of the monies, communications equipment, jewelry
and land titles taken from her house.
7. 1989: PCGG then filed a motion for leave to again amend the complaint in order
“to charge the delinquent properties with being subject to forfeiture as having been
unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano alone..”
8. Sandiganbayan:
a. Proceeded with petitioner’s presentation of evidence on the ground that the
motion for leave to amend complaint did not state when the amended
complaint would be filed.
b. the amended complaint was on its face vague and not related to the existing
complaint.
c. held that due to the time that the case had been pending in court, petitioner
should proceed to present its evidence.
9. PCGG:
a. manifested its inability to proceed to trial because of the absence of other
witnesses or lack of further evidence to present
b. reiterated its motion to amend the complaint to conform to the evidence
already presented or to change the averments to show that Dimaano alone
unlawfully acquired the monies or properties subject of the forfeiture.
10. Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic v.
Migrino, —the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute
military officers by reason of mere position held without a showing that they are
“subordinates” of former President Marcos.
11. 1991, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the case and ordered the confiscated items
are ordered returned to Elizabeth Dimaano.
a. The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the rulings of the
SC in Cruz,Jr and Migrino cases which involve the same issues.
b. No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases
was conducted against Ramas and Dimaano.
c. The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima facie case
against him.
d. There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.
12. SB denied PCGG's MR
ISSUES:
1. W/N the PCCG has jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a forfeiture
petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA 1379. —
NO
2. W/N the SB erred in dismissing the case before completion of the presentation of
petitioner’s evidence. — NO
ART3SEC1
therefore inadmissible in evidence. — YES
a. Whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective takeover of
power by the revolutionary government following the cessation of resistance by loyalist
forces up to 24 March 1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Provisional
Constitution); —NO
b. whether the protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (“Covenant”) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(“Declaration”) remained in effect during the interregnum —YES
RULING:
1. NO. PCGG has no such jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a
forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth
a. Sec 3, EO1: The PCGG tasked the AFP Board to make the necessary
recommendations to appropriate government agencies on the action to be taken
based on its findings
b. Sec 2, EO1: The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the
unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel who fall under either
of the two categories mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. These are:
i. AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the
administration of former President Marcos by being the latter’s immediate
family, relative, subordinate or close associate, taking undue advantage of
their public office or using their powers, influence x x x; or
ii. AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided the
President assigns their cases to the PCGG.
c. SC: The PCGG does not claim that the President assigned Ramas’ case to them.
Therefore, Ramas’ case should fall under the first category of AFP personnel
before the PCGG could exercise its jurisdiction over him.
i. PCGG: argues that Ramas was undoubtedly a subordinate of Marcos
because his position as the Commanding General of the Philippine Army
enabled him to receive orders directly from his commander-in-chief,
undeniably making him Marcos’ subordinate.
d. SC: We hold that Ramas was not a “subordinate” of former President
Marcos in the sense contemplated under EO No. 1 and its amendments.
i. Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a
“subordinate” as this term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a
showing that he enjoyed close association with Marcos.
- “SUBORDINATE”: refers to one who enjoys a close association
with former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the
immediate family member, relative, and close associate in EO
No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or
nominee in EO No. 2.
ii. SC: There must be a prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully
accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with
former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife in the same manner that business
associates, dummies, agents or nominees of former President Marcos were
close to him.
- Ramas’ position alone does not suffice to make him a
“subordinate” of Marcos for purposes of EO No. 1.
e. PCGG also argues that unlike in Migrino, they in this case conducted the
investigation pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A in relation to RA1379.
i. SC: Although the PCGG sought to investigate and prosecute private
respondents under EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, the result yielded a finding of
violation of Republic Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 without any relation to EO
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
- EO No. 1 created the PCGG for a specific and limited purpose,
and necessarily its powers must be construed to address such
specific and limited purpose.
- The reso. and complaint of the AFP Board merely enumerated the
properties Ramas allegedly owned and suggested that these were
disproportionate to his income without showing that Ramas
amassed them bec. of his close association w/ Marcos.
- The AFP Board resolution admits that it does not contain a finding
that Ramas accumulated his wealth because of his close
association but..
f. SC: Petitioner forgets that it is precisely a prima facie showing that the ill-
gotten wealth was accumulated by a “subordinate” of former President
Marcos that vests jurisdiction on PCGG.
g. EO1 in relation to EO 14 says that other violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act not otherwise falling under the categories(AFP closely
related to marcos), require a previous authority of the President for the
respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute. Otherwise, jurisdiction over
such cases is vested in the Ombudsman and other duly authorized
investigating agencies such as the provincial and city prosecutors, their
assistants, the Chief State Prosecutor and his assistants and the state
prosecutors.
i. The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should
investigate and prosecute forfeiture petitions not falling under EO
No. 1 and its amendments.
ii. Ombudsman Act: The preliminary investigation of unexplained wealth
amassed on or before 25 February 1986 falls under the jurisdiction of the
Omb, while the authority to file the corresponding forfeiture petition
rests with the Solicitor General.
iii. The PCGG still pursued this case despite the absence of a prima facie
finding that Ramas was a “subordinate” of former President Marcos
1
 h. Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. The PCGG cannot
exercise investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to it. Unless
given additional assignment by the President, PCGG’s task is only to recover
the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies.
i. The petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the PCGG to
conduct the preliminary investigation.
2. NO. SB did not err in dismissing the case before completion of the presentation
of petitioner’s evidence. Petitioner has only itself to blame for non-completion of
the presentation of its evidence.
a. This case has been pending for 4 years before the Sandiganbayan dismissed
it.
b. Petitioner filed its Amended Complaint in Aug. 1987 and only began to
present its evidence on April 1989. (almost two years to prepare evidence)
c. Despite this, they still delayed the presentation of the rest of its evidence by
filing numerous motions for postponements and extensions.
d. The Sandiganbayan, however, refused to defer the presentation of petitioner’s
evidence since petitioner did not state when it would file the amended
complaint so it set the continuation of the presentation of evidence giving
petitioner ample time to prepare its evidence. Still, petitioner manifested its
inability to present its evidence.
e. The pronouncements of the Court in Migrino and Cruz prompted the
Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case since the PCGG has no jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute the case against private respondents.
f. This alone would have been sufficient legal basis for the Sandiganbayan to
dismiss the forfeiture case against private respondents.
3. YES. The seizure was illegal.
a. In March 3 1986, the Constabulary served at Dimaano’s residence a search
warrant captioned “Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition.”
b. The raiding team seized the items detailed together with other items not
included in the search warrant— cash, jewelry, and land titles.
c. Petitioner: wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team
conducted the search and seizure “on March 3, 1986 or five days after the
successful EDSA revolution.”
i. argues that a revolutionary government was operative at that time by
virtue of Proc. No. 1 announcing that Pres. Aquino and VP Laurel were
taking power.
ii. asserts that the revolutionary government effectively withheld the
operation of the 1973 Consti. which guaranteed private respondents’
exclusionary right.
iii. argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search
applies only beginning Feb 2 1987(ratification of 1987 Constitution)
iv. contends that all rights under the Bill of Rights had already reverted to
its embryonic stage? at the time of the search. Therefore, the
government may confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano
and use the same in evidence against her since at that time of their
seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any constitutional right.
d. SC: Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.
i. The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986.
ii. March 25 1986, Proc. No 3: the EDSA Revolution was “done in defiance of
the provisions of the 1973 Constitution.”
iii. The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary
government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except
treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de jure
government in the Philippines, assumed under international law.
4. We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative
during the interregnum. However, we rule that the protection accorded to
individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect during
the interregnum.
a. During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary
government were the supreme law because no constitution limited the extent
and scope of such directives and orders.
i. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful
revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the directives and
orders of the revolutionary government.
ii. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any
exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a
constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum.
iii. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of
the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the
interregnum.
- However, upon the adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the
sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as
contrary to the Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.
- The framers of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987
Constitution were fully aware that the sequestration orders would
clash with the Bill of Rights. Thus, the framers of both
constitutions had to include specific language recognizing the
validity of the sequestration orders.
• by expressly stating it in the consti: Section 26, Article XVIII
of the 1987 Constitution. The framers of the Constitution
were fully aware that absent Section 26, sequestration orders
would not stand the test of due process under the Bill of
Rights.
ART3SEC1
iv. Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained in
force during the interregnum, absent a constitutional provision
excepting sequestration orders from such Bill of Rights, would clearly
render all sequestration orders void during the interregnum.
b. Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to
enjoy, under the ICCPR and UDHR, almost the same rights found in the
Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.
i. The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure
government, assumed responsibility for the State’s good faith
compliance with the ICCPR to which the Philippines is a signatory.
- Art. 2(1) requires each signatory State “to respect and to ensure to
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the present Covenant
- Under Art. 17(1): “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or
unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence.”
ii. The UDHR, to which the Philippines is also a signatory,
- Art. 17(2): no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.
iii. Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally
binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted
the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of
international law and binding on the State.
- Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated under
international law to observe the rights of individuals under the
Declaration.
iv. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not
escape responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with its treaty
obligations under international law.
v. It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25
March 1986 that the directives and orders of the revolutionary
government became subject to a higher municipal law that, if
contravened, rendered such directives and orders void.
- The Provisional Constitution adopted verbatim the Bill of Rights
of the 1973 Constitution and served as a self-limitation by the
government to avoid abuses of the absolute powers entrusted to it
vi. During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed,
directives and orders issued by government officers were valid so long
as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the
revolutionary government.
vii. The directives and orders should not have also violated the Covenant
or the Declaration.
viii. IN THIS CASE
- The revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the
warrant since the revolutionary government did not repudiate it.
The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application, specified
the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid
with respect to the items specifically described in the warrant.
- BUT!! the raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized
items not included in the warrant
c. The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are
contraband per se, and they are not, they must be returned to the person from
whom the raiding seized them.
* Revolution — “the complete overthrow of the established government in any country
or state by those who were previously subject to it” ; or “an inherent right of a people
to cast out their rulers, change their policy or effect radical reforms in their system of
government or institutions by force or a general uprising when the legal and
constitutional methods of making such change have proved inadequate or are so
obstructed as to be unavailable.”
* Interregnum — period of a new govt being established.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORG V. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING
MILLS CO., INC., 51 SCRA 189, 5 JUNE 1973
FACTS:
1. Complainant Philippine Blooming Mills, Company, Inc. (The Company) is a
corporation existing and operating under and by virtue of the laws of the
Philippines
2. Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate
labor organization, and the respondents herein are either officers of
respondent PBMEO or members thereof.
3. Company learned of the projected mass demonstration at Malacañang in
protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police Department
a. to be participated by the first shift (6:00 AM — 2:00 PM workers
b. as well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00
AM to 5:00 PM in the morning of March 4, 1969
4. A meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M.
at the Company's canteen
a. the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected mass
2
 demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969.
b. PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as the spokesman of the union
panel, confirmed the planned demonstration
i. He stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled
because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting.
ii. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do
with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute
with Management;
5. The Management informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable
right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution.
a. They emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter should
not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company.
b. The Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, warned the PBMEO representatives
that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without
previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the
officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail
to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be
dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and,
therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike;
6. Another meeting was convoked.
a. Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while
all workers may join the Malacañang demonstration, the workers for the
first and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from joining the
demonstration and should report for work in order not to violate the
provisions of the CBA
b. All those who will not follow this warning of the Company shall be
dismissed.
7. the trial court found that "the projected demonstration did in fact occur and
in the process paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the complainant
company"
a. Upon these facts the Prosecution Division of the Court of Industrial
Relations filed with said court a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice against
PBMEO
b. “the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization is
found guilty of bargaining in bad faith […] respondents […] who are
directly responsible for perpetrating this unfair labor practice act, are hereby
considered to have lost their status as employees of the Philippine Blooming
Mills, Inc”
8. It is not controverted that it was only on September 29, 1969, or seven (7)
days after they were notified of the court's decision, that petitioners filed
their motion for reconsideration with the industrial court.
a. In other words, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was filed two (2)
days after the lapse of the five (5) day period provided for the filing thereof
in the rules of the Court of Industrial Relations,
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Industrial Relations acted correctly and within the
law in rendering and issuing its order dismissing PBMEO motion for reconsideration
against the Company’s order of their dismissal
HELD: YES.
1. Set against and tested by foregoing principles governing a democratic
society, the demonstration held petitioners was purely and completely an
exercise of their freedom expression in general and of their right of
assembly and petition for redress of grievances.
a. They exercise their civil and political rights for their mutual aid
protection from what they believe were police excesses.
b. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent
firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its members from the
harassment of local police officers.
2. The primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly
and of petition for redress of grievances — over property rights has been
sustained.
a. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The
debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized
in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The
wounds fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying
day, even as he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is
like rubbing salt on bruised tissues. ☺ ☺ ☺
3. Respondent company: no need for all its employees to participate in the
demonstration
a. Court: Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression.
i. If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the
circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished.
ART3SEC1
ii. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the
purpose of the rally.
4. The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice.
a. The refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its
employees and workers to join the mass demonstration constituted an
unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom of
assembly and freedom petition for redress of grievances.
b. The respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in
Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act.
5. the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with the
demonstration and consequently being absent from work, constitutes a
denial of social justice
a. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution: promotion of social justice
b. Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution: State protection to labor
6. Having violated these basic human rights of the laborers, the Court of
Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it
issued in the instant case are a nullity.
a. There is no time limit to the exercise of the freedoms.
7. On the issue of LATE motion for reconsideration:
a. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial
Relations over basic human rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not
only incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional government
that the Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and
regulations, but also does violence to natural reason and logic.
b. The dominance and superiority of the constitutional right over the
aforesaid Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule of necessity
should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION: Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention,
but a complete lack of sympathetic understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim
that they are being subjected to indignities by the local police, It was more expedient for
the firm to conserve its income or profits than to assist its employees in their fight for
their freedoms and security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers. This is
sheer opportunism.
OPINIONS:
BARREDO, J., dissenting:
1. Agreed on the constitutional issue BUT
a. LATE motion for reconsideration: case has already become final and
executory.
2. The judgment of the industrial court sought to be reviewed in the present
case has already become final and executory, nay, not without the fault of the
petitioners, hence, no matter how erroneous from the constitutional
viewpoint it may be, it is already beyond recall, I vote to dismiss this case,
without pronouncement as to costs.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

1. No person may be deprived of such basic rights without due process –
which is but “responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the
dictates of justice. […] Correctly it has been identified as freedom from
arbitrariness.
2. Respondent court's order finding petitioner union guilty on respondent's
complaint of bargaining in bad faith and unfair labor practice for having so
carried out the mass demonstration, notwithstanding that it concededly was
not a declaration of strike nor directed in any manner against respondent
employer, and ordering the dismissal of the union office manifestly
constituted grave abuse of discretion in fact and in law.
3. Neither could there be, in law, a willful violation of the collective bargaining
agreement's "no-strike" clause as would warrant the union leaders' dismissal
a. the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a strike, there
being no industrial dispute between the protagonists, but merely
the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work" to enable the
workers to exercise their constitutional rights of free expression,
peaceable assembly and petition for redress of grievance against
alleged police excesses.
TUPAS V. CA, 193 SCRA 597, 1991
FACTS:
1. Petitioners received a copy of the decision of the RTC (Pasay) on April 3,
1989, and that the motion for reconsideration thereof was filed on time (April
17/14 days after)
2. The order of May 3, 1989, denying the motion was received by the
petitioners' counsel on May 9.
3
 3. Instead of filing the petition for review with the CA within the remainder of
the 15-day reglementary period (May 10) the petitioner did so only on May
23.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners were denied due process NO
RULING:
1. For having themselves forfeited the right to appeal, the petitioners cannot
now plaintively claim that they have been denied due process.
2. The petitioners' counsel did not file the petition for review within the
remaining period, which he should have known was only one day.
a. Neither did he move for an extension that would have been
granted as a matter of course.
3. PETITIONER: They should not be prejudiced by the mistakes of their
counsel because they are laymen and not familiar with the intricacies of the
law is not acceptable.
a. COURT: The petitioners have not shown that their counsel was
exceptionally inept or motivated by bad faith or excusably
misled by the facts.
i. There is no reason why the court should not apply
the rule that clients should be bound by the acts of
their counsel.
4. PETITIONER: their counsel's failure to appeal on time should be regarded as
excusable neglect or honest error
a. COURT: He is a prestigious member of the bar and his conduct
at the trial demonstrated his experience and skill as a trial
lawyer.
5. The petitioners waited to move for reconsideration until the last hour and
filed the petition for review only when it was already too late.
a. Under these circumstances, equity cannot be extended to them
to soften the rigor of the law they have not chosen to observe.
6. Equity is available only in the absence of law and not as its replacement
*** If a motion for reconsideration is filed with and denied by a regional trial court, the
movant has only the remaining period within which to file a petition for review.  state, and who does not appear, the relief must be confined to the res,
BANCO ESPAÑOL, 37 PHIL 921
FACTS:
1. In 1908, El Banco EspañoI-Filipino" instituted an action to foreclose a mortgage upon
property in Manila instituted in 1906 by the defendant, Engracio Limquingco as
security for a debt. (218k + 8% interest/yr)
a. After the execution of this instrument by the mortgagor, Palanca returned to
China and died there in 1910, without again returning to Ph.
2. Engracio was a nonresident at the time of the institution of the action so the plaintiff
in the foreclosure proceeding gave notice to the defendant by publication in a
newspaper pursuant to Sec 399 of Code of Civ. Pro.
a. The court also directed the clerk of the court to deposit in the post office (via
mail) in a stamped envelope a copy of the summons and complaint directed to
the defendant at his last place of residence, in Amoy, China.
i. There is now showing whether the clerk complied but only an affidavit
dated 1908 signed by Bernado Garcia, an employee of the attorneys for
the bank, showing that he had deposited in the Manila post-office a
registered letter, addressed to Palanca, at Manila, containing such
required documents.
3. A decision was then made in favor of the Bank, to which its decision stated that
publication had been properly made in a periodical, but nothing was said about
notice having been given by mail.
4. The property was then sold at an auction in 1908.
5. 7 years after the sale’s confirmation, a motion was made in this cause by Vicente
Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant to set aside the order
of default and the judgment rendered,
a. claiming they were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction
over the defendant or over the subject of the action
ISSUES:
1. W/N the court acquired the necessary jurisdiction to enable it to proceed with the
foreclosure of the mortgage — YES
2. W/N those proceedings were conducted in such manner as to constitute due
process of law. — YES
RULING:
2. YES. The possible failure of the clerk to send the notice to the defendant by mail
did not destroy the jurisdiction of the court.
a. Jurisdiction refers to:
i. the authority of the court to entertain a particular action or to administer a
particular relief, or the power of the court over the parties, or
- (this is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his
submission to its authority, or by the coercive legal process exerted over the
person.)
ii. over the property which is the subject to the litigation.
- may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process,
where it is brought into the actual custody of the law, etc.
iii. Jurisdiction over the res v. in rem
- RES: found in the proceeding to register the title of land under our
system for the registration of land????? not sure
- REM: property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation
upon which the proceedings are based.
- To foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem
ART3SEC1
• an individual the defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to
subject his interest to the obligation/lien burdening the property.
• against persons but proceed upon seizure
iv. In this case, the property itself is in fact the sole thing which is impleaded
and is the responsible object which is the subject of the exercise of judicial
power.
b. It follows that the jurisdiction of the court in such case is based exclusively
on the power which, under the law, it possesses over the property.
i. The jurisdiction of the court over the property is based upon the following
conditions and considerations, namely:
- (1) that the property is located within the district;
- (2) that the purpose of the litigation is to subject the property by sale to
an obligation fixed upon it by the mortgage; and
- (3) that the court at a proper stage of the proceedings takes the property
into its custody, if necessary, and exposes it to sale for the purpose of
satisfying the mortgage debt.
ii. Propositions relative to the foreclosure proceeding against the property of a
nonresident mortgagor who fails to come in and submit himself personally
to the jurisdiction of the court:
- (1) That the jurisdiction of the court is derived from the power which it
possesses over the property;
- (2) that jurisdiction over the person is not acquired and is nonessential;
- (3) that the relief granted by the court must be limited to such as can be
enforced against the property itself.
iii. Personal judgment upon constructive or substituted service (like mailing
notice/publication) against a nonresident who does not appear is wholly
invalid unless where the nonresident defendant has expressly or impliedly
consented to the mode of service.
- IN THIS CASE, in proceedings in rem or quasi in rem to foreclose a
mortgage against a nonresident who is not served personally within the
and the court cannot lawfully render a personal judgment against
him.
iv. Petitioner’s contention: this judgment is void because the court entered a
personal judgment against the absent debtor for the full amount of the
indebtedness secured by the mortgage.
- SC: NO! The judgement is not in the language of a personal judgement
but rather merely as a compliance with the requirement that the
amount due shall be ascertained and that the defendant shall be
required to pay it as prescribed in section 256 of the Code of Civil
c. Jurisdiction is not acquired by publicaction and notice in this case.
Jurisdiction rests upon a basis much more secure than would be supplied
by any form of notice that could be given to a resident of a f foreign
country.
4. YES. The failure of the clerk to mail the notice, if in fact he did so fail, is not such
an irregularity as amounts to a denial of due process of law;
a. Requirements of due process:
i. (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear
and determine the matter before it;
ii. (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the
defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding;
iii. (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and
iv. (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
b. In a foreclosure case some notification of the proceedings to the nonresident
owner, prescribing the time within which appearance must be made is
essential.
i. Notification (of whatever service) is merely a means provided by law
whereby the owner may be admonished that his property is the subject of
judicial proceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to take such steps as
he sees fit to protect it.
c. It will be observed that this mode of notification (mailing) does not
involve any absolute assurance that the absent owner shall thereby receive
actual notice.
i. Actual notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is not, under the law,
to be considered absolutely necessary.
- Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in
person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions,
to have the knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its
condemnation/sale.
- "It is the duty of the owner of real estate, who is a nonresident, to take
measures that in some way he shall be represented when his property is
called into requisition..”
ii. Irregularity, if proved, would not avoid the judgment in this case.
- Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and this is the only
form of notice which the law unconditionally requires.
d. The jurisdiction being once established, all that due process of law thereafter
requires is an opportunity for the defendant to be heard; and as publication
was duly made in the newspaper, it would seem highly unreasonable to hold
that the failure to mail the notice was fatal.
ii. Furthermore any motion to vacate the judgment on the ground of the
irregularity in question must fail unless it shows that the defendant was
prejudiced by that irregularity.
iii. Lapse of time is also a circumstance deeply affecting this aspect of the case.
iv. The party has the burden of showing diligence
4
 - The rational bounds of human credulity to suppose that a man who
had placed a mortgage upon property worth nearly P300,000 and had
then gone away from the scene of his life activities to end his days in
China, should have long remained in ignorance of the fact that the
mortgage had been foreclosed and the property sold.
- It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of things that he should
have acquired information as to what was transpiring in his affairs at
Manila.
iv. There is a presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary
habits of life
- The presumption is clear and strong that this notice reached the
defendant, there being no proof that it was ever returned by the postal
officials as undelivered.
- And if it was delivered in Manila, instead of being forwarded to Amoy,
China, there is a probability that the recipient was a person sufficiently
interested in his affairs to send it or communicate its contents to him.
- Conclusion: the defendant voluntarily abandoned all thought of saving
his property from the obligation which he had placed upon it
v. There is also legal presumption that the clerk perf formed his duty as the
ministerial officer of the court, which. presumption is not overcome by any
other facts appearing in the cause.
- presumption: "that official duty has been regularly performed;”
- the presumption maintains notwithstanding the absence from the
record of the proper proof of that fact.
i. The motion in the present case does not conform to the requirements of
either of these provisions in sections 113 and 513 of civ pro for the proper
remedy so the action of the CFI in dismissing the motion was proper.
MALCOM, Dissent:
1. due process of law is that no man shall be condemned in his person or property
without notice and an opportunity of being heard in his defense
2. Protection of the parties demands a strict and an exact compliance with this
constitutional provision in our organic law and of the statutory provisions in
amplification.
RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TV COVERAGE (AMPATUAN CASE)
ANG TIBAY V. CIR, 69 PHIL 635
FACTS
1. Toribio Teodoro was the manager and proprietor of Ang Tibay, a leather company
which supplies to the Philippine Army
a. He claims that there was a shortage of leather soles, thus, he
temporarily laid off members of the National Labor Union Inc.
2. NLU questioned the validity of the lay-off effected by Teodoro before the Court of
Industrial Relations
a. The CIR rendered a decision in favor of Teodoro
3. NLU then went to the SC, which ruled in favor of the labor union with the
following conclusions:
a. A work contract, either individual or collective, without a fixed term of
duration, or that which is not a specific one, ends (1) at the discretion
of any of the parties, or (2) each time the deadline fixed for the
payment of wages according to custom in the locality, or (3) when the
work is finished
b. Workers of a manufacturing company who entered into a contract,
either individually or collectively, who have been forced to cease their
work because they declared a forced stoppage in the factory, leave as
employees or workers of said manufacturing company
c. An employer or a company that entered into a CBA with its workers
without a fixed time duration and without being determined for work,
and refuses to reinstate its workers who ceased because of a forced
unemployment, is not guilty of unfair practice
i. However, its refusal to reinstate is because the workers belong to a certain
work organism, since they already left their employees through the
termination of the contract under unemployment
4. The Solicitor General, on behalf of the CIR, filed an MR in order to reconsider the
SC’s conclusions
5. On the other hand, the NLU prayed for the vacation of the judgement rendered by
the SC, and also prayed that the case be remanded to the CIR for a new trial
6. The NLU contends that:
a. Teodoro’s claim for the laying-off of NLU members is false and
unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of
Accounts of native leather dealers
b. Teodoro only set up a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture
of the bond despite the breach of his contract with the Philippine Army
c. Ang Tibay’s National Worker’s Brotherhood is a union dominated by
Teodoro, and such union’s existence and functions are illegal
d. The majority rule and elective representation in the exercise of
laborer’s rights to collective bargaining are essential and indispensable
e. Civil Code should not be applied in interpreting modern labor
legislation of American origin where industrial peace has always been
the rule
f. Teodoro is guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against
NLU
g. The exhibits attached to the petition are so inaccessible that Teodoro
and NWB could not have obtained them even if they exercised due
diligence
ART3SEC1
h. Said exhibits have a far-reaching importance and effect that there must
be a modification and reversal of the appealed decision
ISSUE: WON the NLU is entitled to a new trial before the CIR
RULING: Yes, the NLU is entitled to a new trial before the CIR
1. The CIR is a special court created by Commonwealth Act No. 103
a. It is more administrative, rather than part of the integrated judicial
system of the nation – it is not a mere receptive organ of the
government
b. The function of the CIR is more active, affirmative and dynamic
i. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, and
acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked, and deciding
only cases that are presented by the parties litigant
c. It exercises its judicial or quasi-judicial functions in disputes between
employers and employees, but its functions are far more
comprehensive and expensive
d. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines over to settle any dispute
affecting employers and employees, and to regulate relations between
them
e. When ordered by the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate
and study all industries established in a designated locality in order to
determine the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting a minimum
wage and the like
f. There is a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a
departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental
powers
2. Goseco v. CIR, et al.:
a. The CIR is not compelled by technical rules of procedure
b. The Commonwealth Act requires the CIR to act according to justice
and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms
c. In light of legislative policy, appeals to this court are especially
regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the CIR itself to carry
into the effect the avowed legislative purpose
d. However, the fact that the CIR may be free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements, does not mean that it can entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process
in administrative trials and investigations
3. There are primary rights which must be respected:
a. The right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party to present
his own case and submit evidence (“The liberty and property of the
citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair
play”)
b. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented by the party
c. “While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide
right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, that of
having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly
attached” ! Sorry, hindi ko ‘to gets huhu I copy-pasted this na lang
huhu
i. Law is both a grant a limitation upon power
d. The evidence must be substantial
i. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept
as adequate to support a conclusion
ii. The purpose of this is to free administrative boards from the
force of technical rules so that the mere admission of
incompetent evidence would not invalidate the
administrative order
iii. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute
substantial evidence.
e. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected
f. The CIR or any of its judges must act on his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision
g. The CIR should render its decision in such a manner that the parties
can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision
rendered
i. This duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon
it
4. In the case at bar, the record is barren and does not satisfy factual basis that would
lead to a conclusion of law
5. However, this does not prohibit a new trial prayed for by NLU
a. The SC ruled that the interest of justice would be better served if NLU
is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred
to in its motion and such other evidence
6. The legislation which created the CIR and under which it acts is new
a. The motion for a new trial should be granted
b. The entire record of the case shall be remanded to the CIR, with
instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be
relevant
SHU V. DEE, 723 SCRA 512
FACTS:
1. Rule 45 petition filed by Ray Shu seeking the reversal of the 2008 CA decision and
its 2008 resolution annulling the resolution of the Secretary of Justice finding
probable cause for falsification against the respondents.
5
2. Shu, the president of the 3A Apparel Corporation, filed a complaint before the NBI
charging the respondents who were of falsification of two deeds of real estate
mortgage submitted to Metrobank.
a. Petitioner claims that respondents, Metrobank employees signed the deeds,
so Metrobank foreclosed the two properties securing the 3A Apparel
Corporation’s loan.
3. NBI filed a complaint charging respondents for forgery and falsification based on
the documents report stating that the signatures of the petitioner which appear on
the questioned deeds
4. Respondents contended that they were denied their right to due process during the
NBI investigation because the agency never required them and Metrobank to
submit the standard sample signatures of the petitioner for comparison as the
report only covered the sample signatures unilaterally submitted by the petitioner
a. An examination of the signatures of the petitioner which appear in several
documents in Metrobank’s possession revealed that his signatures in the
questioned deeds are genuine
b. The examination of the documents was conducted without the original
copies of the questioned deeds of real estate mortgage.
5. CITY PROSECUTOR: found no probable cause against the respondents and
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit
a. report is not conclusive evidence that the respondents committed the crime
charged.
b. found that the similarities in the sample signatures submitted by the
respondents and the signatures on the two deeds are so strikingly similar
c. petitioner’s ‘credit line’ with Metrobank is sufficient consideration for the
execution of the questioned deeds
6. Petitioner then appealed to the DOJ SECRETARY who reversed the city
prosecutor’s finding
a. the city prosecutor failed to consider the evidentiary value of the findings of
the NBI questioned documents experts.
b. This NBI finding is entitled to full faith and credit in the absence of proof of
irregularity in the performance of the experts’ duties.
7. CA ruling annulled the DOJ reso., claiming that the respondents were denied their
right to due process in the proceedings before the NBI and the DOJ.
a. In the NBI proceedings, the respondents were not furnished a copy of the
complaint and were not required to file their answer or to present
countervailing evidence.
i. All the evidence at the NBI level were solely provided by the petitioner
b. In the DOJ proceedings, the respondents were not furnished with the
petition for review that the petitioner filed and were not required to file their
answer nor to comment.
c. CA affirmed the findings of the city prosecutor who he had the opportunity
to examine the documents submitted by the parties, including the
respondents’ evidence which the NBI did not consider.
8. Hence, the petition
e. PETITIONER: CA sweepingly relied on the respondents’ allegation that they
had been denied due process in the proceedings before the DOJ despite their
active participation in the proceedings through the filing of a motion for
reconsideration
f. RESPONDENT: reiterated their argument that they were prevented from
participating in the proceedings before the NBI and the Secretary of Justice,
resulting in the denial of their right to due process and that it’s all one-sided.
ISSUE: W/N the respondents were denied due process
RULING: No, The respondents were not denied their right to due process
1. The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard.
a. What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but its absolute
absence and lack of opportunity to be heard.
b. Sufficient compliance with the requirements of due process exists when a
party is given a chance to be heard through his motion for reconsideration.
c. In the present case, we do not find it disputed that the respondents filed
with the Secretary of Justice a motion for reconsideration of her resolution.
i. Therefore, any initial defect in due process, if any, was
cured by the remedy the respondents availed of.
d. On respondents contentions against the NBI
i. The functions of this agency are merely investigatory and informational
in nature and has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is incapable
of granting any relief to any party.
- It cannot even determine probable cause.
ii. The NBI is an investigative agency whose findings are merely
recommendatory.
- no denial of the respondents’ due process right could have taken
place; the NBI’s findings were still subject to the prosecutor’s and
the Secretary of Justice’s actions for purposes of finding the
existence of probable cause.
iii. Their report is inconclusive and does not prevent the respondents from
securing a separate documents examination by handwriting experts
based on their own evidence.
iv. The report’s significance is that, taken together with the other pieces
of evidence submitted by the parties during the preliminary
investigation, these evidence could be sufficient for purposes of
finding probable cause — the action that the Secretary of Justice
undertook in the present case.
ART3SEC1
Other rulings
2. The Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion
a. Probable cause pertains to facts and circumstances sufficient to support a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the accused is
probably guilty thereof.
b. only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the respondent are
required, not absolute certainty.
c. The Secretary of Justice made a holistic review of the parties’ submitted
pieces of evidence in ruling that “the expert evidence, the disclaimer of the
petitioner that he did not sign any promissory note, the lack of proof of
receipt of the proceeds of the loan, all tend to prove that he did not execute
the subject deeds, etc.
3. The findings of the city prosecutor are not proper in a preliminary investigation but
should be threshed out in a full-blown trial
a. The city prosecutor already delved into the merits of the respondents’
defense, contrary to the well-settled rule that the validity and merits of a
party’s defense and accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and
evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary
investigation level
4. The Secretary of Justice has the power to review the findings of the city prosecutor
a. The CA erred in ruling that the city prosecutor’s findings should be given
more weight than the findings of the Secretary of Justice.
b. The determination of probable cause is essentially an executive function,
lodged in the first place on the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary
investigation.
The prosecutor’s ruling is reviewable by the Secretary who, as the final determinative
authority on the matter, has the power to reverse, modify or affirm the prosecutor’s
determination.
GMA V. COMELEC, 734 SCRA 88
Case: petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of
COMELEC Resolution 9615 limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and
political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of 120 minutes and 180
minutes, respectively.
- They contend that such restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time violates
freedom of the press, impairs the people’s right to suffrage as well as their right to
information relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the
forthcoming elections.
FACTS:
1. During the 2007 and 2010 elections, COMELEC issued Resolutions
implementing and interpreting Sec. 6 of RA 9006 (airtime limitations), to mean
that a candidate is entitled to the aforestated number of minutes “per station.”
a. For the 2013 elections, however, COMELEC promulgated  Resolution
9615 changing the interpretation of said candidates' and political
parties' airtime limitation for political campaigns or advertisements
from a “per station” basis, to a “total aggregate” basis.
2. Petitioners ABS-CBN, ABC Development Corp. (ABC), GMA, Manila
Broadcasting Company (MBC), Newsounds Broadcasting Network (NBN),
Radio Mindanao Network (RMN) and Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng
Pilipinas (KBP) sent letters to COMELEC questioning the provisions of its
Resolutions.
3. They assail the following provisions:
a. Section 7 (d): provides a penalty of suspension or revocation of an
offender's franchise or permit, imposes criminal liability against
broadcasting entities and their officers in the event they sell airtime in
excess of the size, duration, or frequency authorized in the new rules;
i. PETITIONERS: unlawfully criminalizing acts not prohibited and penalized
as criminal offenses 
b. Section 9 (a): provides for an “aggregate total” airtime and also
required prior COMELEC approval for candidates' television and radio
guestings and appearances;
i. PETITIONERS: it is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection
clause.
1. It is vague and infringes on the constitutionally protected freedom
of speech, of the press and of expression, and on the right of
people to be informed on matters of public concern.
2. It is a cruel and oppressive regulation as it imposes an
unreasonable and almost impossible burden on broadcast mass
media of monitoring a candidate's or political party's aggregate
airtime.
c. Section 14: provides for a candidate's “right to reply.”
i. PETITIONERS: an improper exercise of the COMELEC's regulatory powers;
for constituting prior restraint and infringing petitioners' freedom of
expression, speech and the press; and for being violative of the equal
protection guarantee.
d. Section 1 (4): defines the term “political advertisement” or “election
propaganda” (ABS)
e. Section 35: states that any violation of said Rules shall constitute an
election offense. (GMA)
4. GMA further contends that the resolution was promulgated without public
consultations, which violates petitioners’ right to due process.
a. It contended that it is entitled to a TRO since the implementation of the
Resolutions will cause irreparable damage to it by disrupting its
mandate to provide television and radio services to the public.
5. ABC also contends that the definition of “political advertisement” and
“election propaganda” suffers from overbreadth.
6. RESPONDENTS:
6
 a. Petitioners do not have locus standi. i. There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken among the
i. the constitutional rights and freedoms they enumerate are not personal to citizens across the country.
them. ii. For a national candidate to really reach out to as many of the
ii. They belong to candidates, political parties and the Filipino electorate in electorates as possible, it might also be necessary that he conveys
general, as the limitations are imposed on candidates, not on media outlets.  his message through his advertisements in dialects that the people
b. The remedies of  certiorari  and prohibition are not available to may more readily understand and relate to.
petitioners. 4. Section 9 (a) of Resolution 9615 is violative of the people’s right to suffrage.
i. The writ of  certiorari  is only available against the COMELEC's adjudicatory a. Candidates and political parties need adequate breathing space –
or quasi-judicial powers. including the means to disseminate their ideas.
ii. The writ of prohibition only lies against the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial b. This could not be reasonably addressed by the very restrictive
or ministerial functions. manner by which COMELEC implemented the time limits in
c. The per candidate rule or total aggregate airtime limit would truly give regard to political advertisements in the broadcast media.
life to the constitutional objective to equalize access to media during 5. Resolution No. 9615 needs prior hearing before adoption.
elections. a.  there is a need for adequate and effective means by which they
i. It is a more effective way of levelling the playing field may be adopted, disseminated and implemented.
between candidates/parties with enormous resources i. In this regard, it is not enough that they be published
and those without much. – or explained – after they have been adopted.
d. Provisions are not vague. b. When an administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for
i. The Resolutions have given clear and adequate the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the
mechanisms to protect broadcast stations from implementation of the law but substantially adds to or increases
potential liability arising from a violation of airtime the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord
limits. at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and
e. No prior restraint in the provisions requiring notice to the COMELEC for thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance  is given
appearances of candidates in bona fide news broadcasts.  the force and effect of law.
f. The nationwide aggregate total airtime does not violate the equal protection 6. Resolution No. 9615 does not impose an unreasonable burden on the
clause. broadcast industry.
i. It does not make any substantial distinctions between national and a. the Reporting Requirement for the COMELEC’s monitoring is
regional and/or local broadcast stations. reasonable
ii. Even without the aggregate total airtime rule, candidates and b. Such a requirement is a reasonable means adopted by the
parties are likely to be more inclined to advertise in national COMELEC to ensure that parties and candidates are afforded
broadcast stations. equal opportunities to promote their respective candidacies.
g. Radio and television broadcasting companies do not own the airwaves and 7. The right to reply provision is reasonable.
frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals.
i. They are merely given the temporary privilege to use the same. GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG V. OLALIA, GR 153675, 19 APRIL 2007
h. there is no impairment of the people's right to information on matters of FACTS
public concern. 1. On 30 January 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and then British Crown
i. the COMELEC is not withholding access to any public record. Colony of HK signed an agreement
i. The right to reply provision cannot be considered a prior restraint on the a. The agreement is for the surrender of accused and convicted persons
freedoms of expression, speech and the press. 2. On 1 July 1997, HK reverted to the People’s Republic of China
i. Media entities are free to report any news event, even if it should a. It became the HK Special Administrative Region
turn out to be unfavourable to a candidate. 3. Juan Antonio Muñoz was charged before the HK Court, and warrants of arrest
ISSUES: were issued against him
PROCEDURAL 4. The DOJ then received from the HK DOJ a request for the provisional arrest of
1. WON the petitioners have locus standi Muñoz, and the DOJ forwarded the request to the NBI
2. WON petitions for certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies available a. An application for Muñoz’s provisional arrest was then filed with the
SUBSTANTIVE Manila RTC
1. WON Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution 9615 is unconstitutional YES b. Muñoz was then arrested and detained by NBI agents
5. Muñoz filed with the CA a petition, questioning the validity of his arrest
RULING: a. The CA then declared the order of arrest to be void
PROCEDURAL 6. Because of this, the DOJ filed with the SC a petition to reverse the CA decision
1. PROPER REMEDY a. The SC then sustained the validity of Muñoz’s arrest, and such
a. The Court has in the past seen fit to step in and resolve petitions despite decision became final and executory
their being the subject of an improper remedy, in view of the public 7. Meanwhile, HK SAR filed with the Manila RTC a petition for Muñoz’s extradition
importance of the issues raised therein. a. In the same case, Muñoz filed a petition for bail
2. LOCUS STANDI 8. The petition for bail was denied, ruling that there is no Philippine law which
a. The owners may have the right to assert a constitutional right of their grants bail in extradition cases, and that Muñoz is considered as a “flight risk”
clients. a. Muñoz filed an MR, and this was granted by Judge Felixberto Olalia
b. Establishments which publish and broadcast have the standing to assert the 9. The petition for bail was granted subject to conditions:
constitutional freedom of speech of candidates and of the right to a. Bail is set at 750 thousand pesos in cash
information of the public, not to speak of their own freedom of the press. i. Muñoz shall appear and answer the issues raised in the
SUBSTANTIVE proceedings and will, at all times, hold himself amenable to
1. COMELEC is duty bound to come up with reasonable basis for changing the orders and processes of the SC
interpretation and implementation of the airtime limits ii. If Muñoz fails in this regard, the cash bond will be forfeited
a. COMELEC is not free to change the rules especially if it has consistently in favor of the government
interpreted a legal provision in a particular manner in the past. A change in b. Muñoz must surrender his valid passport to the SC
rules the same must be properly explained with sufficient basis. c. The DOJ is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own
b. It did not fully explain or justify the change in computing the airtime motion for hold departure order before the SC
allowed candidates and political parties, except to make reference to the d. Muñoz is required to report to government prosecutors handling his
need to “level the playing field.” case at any time and day of the week
2. The COMELEC went beyond the authority granted it by the law in adopting i. The government prosecutors may also require that all of
“aggregate” basis in the determination of allowable airtime. Muñoz’s real and personal assets be filed with the SC
a. RA 9006 does not justify a conclusion that the maximum allowable airtime ii. If Muñoz flees from his undertaking, such assets will be
should be based on the totality of possible broadcast in all television or forfeited in favor of the government
radio stations.  10. In line of this, the HK SAR filed a motion to vacate the order (the granted petition
b. Congress intended to provide a more expansive and liberal means by for bail), but it was denied by Judge Olalia
which the candidates and other stake holders in the electoral exercise may 11. The HK SAR then filed a petition for certiorari before the SC, claiming that:
be given a chance to fully explain and expound on their platforms of a. The Manila RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
governance, and for the electorate to be given a chance to know better the lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting Muñoz to bail
personalities behind the candidates. b. There is nothing in the Constitution, or statutory law, which provides
3. Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution 9615 on airtime limits also goes against that a potential extraditee has the right to bail
the constitutional guaranty of freedom of expression, of speech and of the i. The right is limited solely to criminal proceedings
press. 12. On the other hand, Judge Olalia maintains that:
a. The “aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it a. The right to bail under the BoR extends to a prospective extraditee
unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties b. Extradition is a harsh process which results in the prolonged
to reach out and communicate with the people. deptivation of one’s property
b. It unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time limits on
broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not only composed ISSUE: WON Judge Olalia acted with grave abuse of discretion as there is no provision
of so many islands. in the Constitution, or statutory law, which provides the right to bail to a potential
extraditee (WON the constitutional provision on bail applies to an extradition case)

7
ART3SEC1
 15. It is true that the Philippine extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail
RULING: No, Judge Olalia did not act with grave abuse of discretion (Yes, the to an extradite
constitutional provision on bail applies to an extradition case) a. However, there is no provision in the Constitution prohibiting an
1. Article 3, Section 13 provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired: extraditee from filing a motion for bail, as this is a right to due process
2. In the Philippines, jurisprudence on extradition is only in its infancy, however, the 16. Former Chief Justice Reynato Puno proposed that a new standard which he
SC already had an occasion to resolve whether the question of a prospective termed “clear and convincing evidence”  should be used in granting bail in
extradite may be granted bail extradition cases
3. Government of USA v. Hon. Guillermo Purganan and Mark Jimenez: a. This standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt
a. The constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition but higher than preponderance of evidence
proceedings – it is available only in criminal proceedings b. The potential extraditee must prove by clear and convincing evidence
b. Thus, the constitutional provision on bail applies only when a person that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and
has been arrested or detained for violating Philippine criminal laws processes of the extradition court
c. It does not apply to extradition proceedings because extradition courts
do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal GOV’T. OF HONGKONG SPECIAL ADMIN. REGION VS. MUÑOZ
4. De la Camara v. Enage:
a. The constitutional right to bail is based on the presumption of RCBC V. BDO
innocence in favor of every accused who should not lose his freedom
as he would be entitled to acquittal, unless he is guilty beyond FACTS:
reasonable doubt
b. The constitutional provision on bail will not apply to an extradition
case because the presumption of innocence is not at issue
1. RCBC entered into a Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) with Equitable-PCI
5. The Constitution states that the right to bail shall not be impaired, even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended
a. Therefore, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail
Bank, Inc. (EPCIB now BDO), George L. Go and the individual shareholders
(Article 3, Section 13) merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal
of Bankard, Inc. (Bankard) for the sale to RCBC of 226,460,000 shares of
proceedings for the offenses of rebellion and invasion
Bankard, constituting 67% of the latter’s capital stock.
b. The right to bail is not available in extradition proceedings that are not
criminal in nature 2. In May 2003, RCBC informed EPCIB and the other selling shareholders of an
6. However, the SC cited trends in international law: overpayment of the subject shares
a. The growing importance of the individual person in public
international law who has attained global recognition a. there was an overstatement of valuation of accounts amounting
b. The higher value now being given to human rights in the international to P478 million
sphere
c. The duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in 3. No settlement was reached, RCBC commenced arbitration proceedings with
fulfilling their treaty obligations the International Chamber of Commerce-International Court of Arbitration
d. The duty of the SC to balance the rights of the individual under our (ICC-ICA) in accordance with Section 10 of the SPA.
fundamental law and the law on extradition
a. “such matter shall then be finally settled by arbitration under the
7. The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth
Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International
of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights
Chamber of Commerce “
8. Also, after World War II, both international organizations and states recognized
the importance to human rights, thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights b. Substantive aspects of the dispute shall be settled by applying
was adopted the laws of the Philippines.
a. The right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every
person were proclaimed 4. RCBC charged Bankard with deviating from and contravening generally
b. The principles contained in the UDHR are now recognized as accepted accounting principles and practices.
customarily binding upon the members of the international
community a. RCBC sought its rescission, actual damages, legal interest on the
c. These principles are part of the law of the land purchase price until actual restitution, moral damages and
9. The Philippines has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of litigation and attorney’s fees, with alternative prayer for award
every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested of damages in the amount plus legal interest.
can participate in the proceedings before a court
5. Respondents denied RCBC’s allegations contending that RCBC’s claim is one
a. Philippine authorities are obliged to make available to every person
for overpayment or price reduction is already time-barred.
under detention remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to
liberty, and this includes the right to be admitted to bail a. The remedy of rescission is unavailable.
10. Because of various international treaties that recognize and protect human rights,
particularly the right to life and liberty, there must be a reexamination of the SC’s b. RCBC failed to file its claim within a reasonable time.
ruling in the Purganan case
a. The exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty [ARBITRATION PROCESS – Payment of Advances]
is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings.
6. ICC-ICA informed the parties that they are required to pay US$350,000 as
i. Those in administrative proceedings, such as deportation
advance on costs pursuant to Article 30 (3) of the ICC Rules of Arbitration (ICC
and quarantine, have likewise been detained
Rules).
b. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail
to criminal proceedings only a. RCBC paid its share
i. The SC has admitted to bail persons who are not involved
in criminal proceedings b. Respondents filed an Application for Separate Advances but was
ii. Bail has been allowed in Philippine jurisdiction to persons denied.
in detention while administrative proceedings are pending
11. Extradition is not a criminal proceeding 7. The ICC-ICA invited anew the Respondents to pay its share in the advance on
a. It is sui generis, tracing its existence to treaty obligations costs.
b. It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential
a. Respondents refused to pay their share in the advance cost fixed by the
extraditee – it is merely administrative in character
ICC-ICA.
c. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a
crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the b. the ICC-ICA invited RCBC to pay the said amount in substitution of
purpose of trial or punishment Respondents.
12. An extradition proceeding, while administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal
process since a potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged c. RCBC replied that it was not willing to shoulder the share of
restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the Respondents
proceedings
13. Extradition is characterized by the following: 8. The ICC-ICA instructed the Arbitration Tribunal to suspend its work
a. It entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extradite
a. granted the parties a final time-limit of 15 days to pay the balance of
b. The means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also “the
the advance on costs
machinery of criminal law”
14. In the case at bar, Muñoz had been detained for over 2 years without having been b. failing which the claims shall be considered withdrawn
convicted of any crime
a. This extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his 9. On December 15, 2005, the ICC-ICA notified the parties of its decision to increase
fundamental right to liberty the advances on costs.
b. It was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the
extradition court to grant him bail a. BDO refused to pay the increment, insisting that RCBC should bear the
cost of prosecuting its own claim and that compelling the Respondents

8
ART3SEC1
 to fund such prosecution is inequitable. Respondents reiterated that it
was willing to pay the advance on costs for their counterclaim.
10. RCBC wrote the ICC-ICA stating that the latter should compel the
Respondents to pay as otherwise RCBC will be prejudiced and the inaction
of the ICC-ICA and the Arbitration Tribunal will detract from the
effectiveness of arbitration as a means of settling disputes.
a. Chairman Ian Barker of the ICC: The Tribunal has no power under
the ICC Rules to order the Respondents to pay the advance on costs
sought by the ICC or to give the Claimant any relief against the
Respondents’ refusal to pay.
b. RCBC paid the additional US$100,000 under the second assessment to
avert suspension of the Arbitration Tribunal’s proceedings.
11. The Arbitration Tribunal rendered a Partial Award (First Partial Award):
a. RCBC’s claim not time-barred
b. Assets of Bankard were overstated
12. ICC-ICA increased the advance on costs from US$450,000 to US$580,000.
a. Respondents declined to pay; RCBC substituted again.
b. RCBC reiterated its plea that Respondents be declared as in default and
the counterclaims deemed as withdrawn.
c. Chairman Barker: Contrary to the Complainant’s view, the Tribunal
has no jurisdiction to declare that the Respondents have no right to
participate in the proceedings concerning the claim.
13. RCBC applied for a partial award against Respondents’ failure to pay their
share in the advance on costs.
14. Granted: The Tribunal interprets the Claimant’s latest letter as an
application by the Claimant to the Tribunal for the issue of a partial award
against the Respondents in respect of their failure to pay their share of the
ICC’s requests for advance on costs. 
 RTC-MAKATI CITY BRANCH 148, THE DEPUTIZED SHERIFFS AND
a. Hence, BDO’s certiorari
15. Chairman Barker advised the parties:
a. The Tribunal notes that neither party has referred to an article by
Mat[t]hew Secomb on this very subject which appears in the ICC
Bulletin Vol. 14 No.1 (Spring 2003).
i. “To assist both sides and to ensure that the Tribunal does not
consider material on which the parties have not been given an
opportunity to address, I attach a copy of this article, which
also contains reference to other scholarly works on the
subject.”
b. Mr. Secomb’s article, “Awards and Orders Dealing With the Advance on
Costs in ICC Arbitration: Theoretical Questions and Practical Problems
specifically dealt with the situation when one of the parties to
international commercial arbitration refuses to pay its share on the
advance on costs.
c. By furnishing the parties with a copy of this article, Chairman Barker
practically armed RCBC with supporting legal arguments under the
“contractual approach” discussed by Secomb. True enough, RCBC in
its Application for Reimbursement of Advance Costs Paid utilized said
approach as it singularly focused on Article 30(3) of the ICC Rules and
fiercely argued that BDO was contractually bound to share in the
advance costs fixed by the ICC.
16. Respondents directly filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45, docketed as G.R. No. 182248
a. BDO: Aside from violating their right to due process and to be heard
by an impartial tribunal, Respondents also argued that in issuing the
award for advance cost, the Arbitration Tribunal decided an issue
beyond the terms of the TOR.
17. RCBC refuted Respondents’ allegation of partiality on the part of Chairman
Barker
a. the Arbitration Tribunal is vested with jurisdiction and authority to render
an award with respect to said reimbursement of advance cost paid by the
non-defaulting party.
18. BDO: RCBC’s application for reimbursement of advance cost has no basis under
the ICC Rules.
ART3SEC1
a. Partial award not the remedy.
b. Correct remedy: Such party’s reimbursement for payments of the defaulting
party’s share depends on the final arbitral award where the party liable for
costs would be determined. This is the only remedy provided by the ICC
Rules.
19. The Arbitration Tribunal rendered the Second Partial Award,
a. BDO required to pay RCBC.
20. BDO filed a Motion to Vacate Second Partial Award.
a. the award is void ab initio having been rendered by the arbitrators who
exceeded their power or acted without it
b. the award was procured by undue means or issued with evident partiality
or attended by misbehavior on the part of the Tribunal which resulted in a
material prejudice to the rights of the Respondents.
21. Tribunal issued the Final Award ordering BDO to pay the claimant damages,
fees and expenses.
a. BDO filed to Vacate Final Award
b. RCBC filed with the Makati City RTC, Branch 148 (SP Proc. Case No.
M-6046) a Motion to Confirm Final Award.
22. RCBC: BDO’s filing of its petition with another court is a blatant violation of the
Special ADR Rules and is merely a subterfuge to commit forum-shopping.
23. RTC denied BDO’s application for TRO against the execution proceedings
ISSUES:
1. whether there is legal ground to vacate the Second Partial Award
2. whether BDO is entitled to injunctive relief in connection with the execution
proceedings
3. CONSTI 2: WHETHER OR NOT BDO’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW WAS GROSSLY VIOLATED BY THE
RESPONDENT RCBC CAPITAL, DUE TO THE DENIAL OF THEIR PRAYER
FOR STAY ORDER AND/OR TRO
HELD: BOTH PETITIONS WERE DENIED. RCBC’s petition to execute Second
Partial Award denied because of evident partiality. BDO’s petition for injunctive
relief denied.
[Judicial Review on arbitration]
1. It must be stated that a review brought to this Court under the Special ADR
Rules is not a matter of right. Rule 19.36 of said Rules specified the
conditions for the exercise of this Court’s discretionary review of the CA’s
decision.
a. A review by the Supreme Court is not a matter of right, but of
sound judicial discretion, which will be granted only for serious
and compelling reasons resulting in grave prejudice to the
aggrieved party.
2. the award of an arbitrator cannot be set aside for mere errors of judgment
either as to the law or as to the facts. Courts are without power to amend or
overrule merely because of disagreement with matters of law or facts
determined by the arbitrators.
1. There must be a clear showing that the award suffers from any of the
infirmities or grounds for vacating an arbitral award under Section 24 of
Republic Act No. 876.
2. The Court, however, must clarify that the merits of the parties’ arguments
as to the propriety of the issuance of the Second Partial Award are not in
issue here.
a. It is the finding of evident partiality which constitutes legal
ground for vacating the Second Partial Award and not the
Arbitration Tribunal’s application of the ICC Rules adopting
the “contractual approach” tackled in Secomb’s article.
b. For this reason, the law authorizes vacating an arbitral award
when there is evident partiality in the arbitrators.
[The Court examine the merits of the petition before us solely on the statutory ground
raised for vacating the Second Partial Award: evident partiality pursuant to Arbitration
Law]
3. To determine the meaning of “evident partiality,” we begin with the terms
themselves. The common meaning of “partiality” is “the inclination to favor
one side.
4. Evident partiality in its common definition thus implies “the existence of signs
and indications that must lead to an identification or inference” of partiality.
5. BDO: Chairman Barker acted with evident partiality in making such award.
9
 6. It is the finding of evident partiality which constitutes legal ground for vacating
the Second Partial Award and not the Arbitration Tribunal’s application of the
ICC Rules adopting the “contractual approach” tackled in Secomb’s article.
a. Chairman Barker’s act of furnishing the parties with copies of
Matthew Secomb’s article, considering the attendant
circumstances, is indicative of partiality such that a reasonable
man would have to conclude that he was favoring the Claimant,
RCBC.
b. an arbitrator’s conduct should be beyond reproach and
suspicion. His acts should be free from the appearances of
impropriety.
c. Even before the issuance of the Second Partial Award for the
reimbursement of advance costs paid by RCBC, Chairman Barker
exhibited strong inclination to grant such relief to RCBC,
notwithstanding his categorical ruling that the Arbitration
Tribunal “has no power under the ICC Rules to order the
Respondents to pay the advance”.
7. NEVERTHELESS, BDO cannot be issued injunctive relief
8. The RTC held that BDO failed to substantiate these allegations. On appeal, the
CA likewise found that the Arbitration Tribunal did not go beyond the
submission of the parties
9. BDO’s application for a stay order and/or TRO/preliminary injunction is
denied for non-compliance with Rule 19.25 of the Special ADR Rules.
a. BDO failed to show the existence of a clear right to be protected
and that the acts sought to be enjoined violated any right.
Neither was BDO able to demonstrate that the injury to be
suffered by it is irreparable or not susceptible to mathematical
computation.
b. since BOO had already paid P637,941,185.55 m manager's check,
albeit under protest, and which payment was accepted by RCBC
as full and complete satisfaction of the writ of execution, there is
no more act to be enjoined.
SUMMARY:
1. Arbitration in favor of RCBC
2. Arbitration not subject to judicial review; but because of the presence of an issue
on evident partiality; merits of the petition were examined.
a. Evident partiality as shown by:
b. Chairman Barker’s act of furnishing the parties with copies of
Matthew Secomb’s article, considering the attendant
circumstances, is indicative of partiality such that a reasonable
man would have to conclude that he was favoring the Claimant,
RCBC.
3. BDO prayed for TRO against the execution of the second award.
4. BDO still subsequently paid advance costs; therefore, TRO/injunction becomes
moot and academic
5. Assuming arguendo that BDO did not pay, SC still cannot issue TRO because
BDO failed to show the existence of a clear right to be protected and that the acts
sought to be enjoined violated any right.
6. TRO cannot be issued. But second partial award vacated because of evident
partiality
ADMU V. CAPULONG, 222 SCRA 644
FACTS:
1. Respondents in the case at bar, having been previously enrolled in the University,
seek re-admission, have been found guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo
Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities
causing the death of a neophyte.
2. 1991: Aquila Legis held its initiation rites, in which case Lennie Villa died of serious
physical injuries and Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized.
3. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student
Investigating Committee tasked to investigate and submit a report within 72 hours
on the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa and required
respondent students to submit their written statements within 24 hours from
receipt. (in which the students failed to reply)
a. After receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several
witnesses, found a prima facie case against respondent students for violation of
Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue.
b. The Disciplinary board informed them that they had violated Rule 3
4. The students were then directed by the Board to appear before a hearing on
February 28, 1991 to clarify their answers with regard to the charges
5. They were also informed that:
ART3SEC1
a. The proceedings will be summary in nature in accordance with the rules laid
down in the case of Guzman vs. National University;
b. Petitioners have no right to cross-examine the affiants- neophytes;
c. Hazing which is not defined in the School catalogue shall be defined in
accordance with the proposed bill of Sen. Jose Lina;
d. The Board will take into consideration the degree of participation of the
petitioners in the alleged hazing incident in imposing the penalty;
e. The Decision of the Board shall be appealable to the President of the
University, i.e. Respondent Joaquin Bernas S.J.
6. In view of the lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of
dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University
Administration.
7. Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, as President of the ADMU, accepted the factual findings of
the Board, thus: “that as auxies they exercised the ‘auxie’s privilege;’ that even
assuming that they did not lay hands on the neophytes,” respondent students are
still guilty (conspiracy; act of one, act of all).
8. The imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students
9. Respondents filed with the RTC a petition for prohibition and cert:
a. alleging that they were currently enrolled as students for the second semester
of schoolyear 1990-91.
b. They would be prevented from taking their examinations.
c. The petition principally centered on the lack of due process in their dismissal.
10. TRO was granted.
11. Consequently, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board to investigate the charges
of hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza.
a. Respondent students reacted immediately by filing a Petition for, among
others, TRO to include the aforesaid members of the Special Board, as
additional respondents to the original petition.
b. Petitioners moved to strike out the Supplemental Petition arguing that the
creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the original petition
which alleged lack of due process in the conduct of investigations by the
Disciplinary Board against respondent students
12. Respondent Judge ordered petitioners to reinstate respondent students, to conduct
special examinations in lieu of the final examinations which allegedly the students
were not allowed to take, and enjoined them to maintain the status quo with regard
to the cases of Abas and Mendoza pending final determination of the issues of the
instant case.
13. The board imposed the penalty of dismissal Abas and Mendoza.
14. Judge issued a TRO against ADMU.
ISSUES (in relation to Academic Freedom) whether or not respondent students have
been afforded procedural due process prior to their dismissal from petitioner
university. —YES
RULING: Petition granted and reversed the order of respondent judge ordering
readmission of respondent students.
1. There was no indication that resp’s right to due process has been violated.
a. the school actually respected the students’ rights in accordance to
jurisprudence via multiple investigative proceedings before the expulsion.
b. According to the Guzman case, the minimum standards to be satisfied in
the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions are:
1. the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of
any accusation against them;
2. that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with
the assistance of counsel, if desired;
3. they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
4. they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf;
5. the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee
or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the
case
c. In this case:
1. Dean DC notified and required respondent students on February 11,
1991 to submit within twenty-four-hours their written statement on the
incident
• the ones who failed to do so were even granted extensions
2. The requisite assistance of counsel was met when, from the very start of
the investigations
3. The nature and cause of the accusation were mentioned in the notices
4. The notices clearly show that respondent students were given ample
opportunity to adduce evidence in their behalf and to answer the
charges leveled against them.
5. February 14, 1992 order clearly states that it was reached only after
receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several
witnesses and they were also summoned to answer clarificatory
questions
d. Disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to
cross examination
e. An administrative proceeding conducted to investigate students’
participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the attributes of a
judicial proceeding.
f. The charge filed before the Joint Administration-Faculty-Student
Investigating Committee and the Disciplinary Board is not a criminal case
requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt but is merely administrative in
character.
10
 i. As such, it is not subject to the rigorous requirements of criminal due 4. Letran’s rule prohibiting its high school students from joining fraternities to
process, particularly with respect to the specification of the charge be a reasonable regulation.
involved. a. Letran’s penalty for violation of the rule is clearly stated in its
g. (minor) On contention of procedural infirmity: It is accepted that an exception enrollment contracts and in the Students Handbooks it
to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question distributes at the start of every school year.
of law. (due process b. The right to establish disciplinary rules is consistent with the
2. Ruling on the immediate reinstatement of the students who have been investigated mandate in the Constitution for schools to teach discipline;
and found by the Disciplinary Board to have violated petitioner university’s c. Schools have the duty to develop discipline in students.
disciplinary rules and standards will seriously impair petitioner university’s d. The Court has always recognized the right of schools to impose
academic freedom which has been enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and the present disciplinary sanctions on students who violate disciplinary rules.
1987 Constitutions. i. The penalty for violations includes dismissal or
a. admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a school, exclusion from re-enrollment.
the same being a privilege on the part of the student rather than a right. 5. The petitioners were notified of both rule and penalty through Kim’s
enrollment contract for school year 2001 to 2002.
a. Notably, the penalty provided for fraternity membership is
PETITION GRANTED. “summary dismissal.”
b. No reason, therefore, exist to justify the trial court’s position that
* NOTE: ACADEMIC FREEDOM: respondent Letran cannot lawfully dismiss violating students
1. who may teach; 6. Disciplinary proceedings may be summary.
2. what may be taught; a. the insistence that a “formal inquiry” on the accusation against
3. how it shall be taught; and Kim should have been conducted lacks legal basis.
4. who may be admitted to study. 7. The respondents had given them ample opportunity to assist their son in his
disciplinary case.
a. the records show that the respondents gave them two notices.
Drama lang: “Certainly, they do not deserve to claim such a venerable institution as the Ateneo b. both parents failed to attend the January 8, 2002 conference while
de Manila University as their own a minute longer, for they may foreseeably cast a malevolent Mr. Go did not bother to go to the January 15, 2002 conference.
influence on the students currently enrolled, as well as those who come after them.” 8. Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings
but failed to do so, he cannot [thereafter] complain of deprivation of due
GO V. COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN, 683 SCRA 358 process.
FACTS: 9. administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in the
1. Mr. Isleta, the Head of Letran’s Auxiliary Services Department, received strict judicial sense.
information that certain fraternities were recruiting new members among a. What matters for due process purpose is notice of what is to be
Letran’s high school students. explained, not the form in which the notice is given.
a. The school started an investigation and conducted a series of b. The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard.
medical examinations.
2. The school physician reported that 6 students bore injuries. The Assistant CUDIA VS. SUPT. OF PMA
Prefect for Discipline conferred with the students and asked for their
explanations in writing. LAO GI V. CA, 180 SCRA 756
a. 4 students admitted that they were neophytes of the Tau Gamma FACTS:
Fraternity and were present in a hazing rite. 1. 1953: DOJ rendered Opinion no. 191 finding Filomeno Chia, Jr. alias Sia Pieng Hui
b. They also identified the senior members of the fraternity present to be a Filipino citizen as it appears that his father Filomeno Chia, Sr. is a Filipino
at their hazing. These included Kim Go. citizen born in Pampanga.
3. Letran’s security officer (Rosarda) prepared an incident report that the Tau
2. 1980: the Minister of Justice rendered Opinion No. 147 cancelling Opinion No. 191
Gamma Fraternity had violated its covenant with Letran by recruiting
and setting aside the citizenship of Filomeno Chia, Sr. on the ground that it was
members from its high school department.
founded on fraud and misrepresentation.
4. Rosarda informed Kim’s mother that the students identified her son as a
fraternity member. Kim responded through a written statement and denied 3. 1981: a charge for deportation was filed with the Commission on Immigration and
that he was a fraternity member. Deportation (CID) against Lao Gi alias Filomeno Chia, Sr., his wife and children.
a. Rosarda requested Kim’s parents (by notice) to attend a a. An amended charge was filed alleging that said respondents refused to
conference to address the issue of Kim’s fraternity membership. register as aliens having been required to do so and continued to refuse to
However, they did not attend the conference. register as such.
5. The Father Prefect for Discipline recommended the fraternity members’ 4. PET CONTENTIONS:
dismissal from the hs department rolls. This sanction was stated in a letter to a. the CID has no authority to reopen a matter long settled under Opinion No.
Kim’s parents. 191, series of 1958
a. However, this recommendation was rejected to allow the 4th year b. that Petitioners are not subject to immediate deportation.
students to graduate from Letran. c. The order for the arrest of petitioners in case of failure to register as aliens
6. Rosarda conveyed to Kim’s parents, in their conference, the decision to was premature since there was no competent determination yet that their
suspend Kim. citizenship was indeed procured by fraud.
a. Mrs. Go submitted a request for the deferment of Kim’s 5. The CID special prosecutor also filed an opposition on the ground that the
suspension. citizenship may be threshed out as the occasion may demand and that due process
7. The respondents proposed that the students and their parents sign a pro- was accorded to respondents.
forma agreement to signify their conformity with their suspension.
6. Motion to dismiss and MR were denied.
a. Kim’s parents refused to sign.
b. They also refused to accept the respondents’ finding that Kim 7. SC en banc aso dismissed.
was a fraternity member. 8. so much procedural denial and extension…
c. They insisted that due process had not been observed. 9. 1982: CID directed respondents to register as aliens within two (2) days from
8. Kim’s parents filed a complaint for damages claiming that the respondents notice thereof.
had unlawfully dismissed Kim. 10. RTC - CA - SC: seek to set aside the decision of the CA and 1982 order
9. the petitioners insist that the question be resolved under the guidelines for
administrative due process. They argue that the respondents violated due ISSUE:
process 1. w/n petitioners were denied due process upon ordering immediate deportation
a. by not conducting a formal inquiry into the charge against Kim and to register as aliens — YES
b. by not giving them any written notice of the charge;
c. by not providing them with the opportunity to cross-examine the
neophytes who had positively identified Kim as a senior member RULING:
of their fraternity. 1. CID has the authority and jurisdiction to hear and determine the deportation case
8. The petitioners also fault the respondents for not showing them the against petitioners and in the process determine also the question of citizenship
neophytes’ written statements, which they claim to be unverified, unsworn, raised by the petitioners.
and hearsay. a. Section 37(a) (1) of the Immigration Act — before any alien may be deported
ISSUE: WON the petitioners were denied due process NO upon a warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration, there should be a prior
(RTC ruled that they were denied due process/CA reversed this decision) determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the
RULING: ground as charged against the alien.
1. Petitioners were not denied due process as the petitioners had been given i. IN THIS CASE: In this case it appears that petitioners are charged with
ample opportunity to be heard in Kim’s disciplinary case. having entered the Philippines by means of false and misleading
2. There was no bad faith, malice, fraud, nor any improper and willful motive statements or without inspection or admission by the immigration
or conduct on the part of the respondents to justify the award of damages. authorities at a designated port of entry.
3. the disciplinary sanction the respondents imposed on Kim was actually a b. After appropriate charges are filed in the CID the specific grounds of which
suspension and not a “dismissal” as the petitioners insist in their complaint. he should be duly informed of, a hearing should be conducted, and it is

11
ART3SEC1
 only after such a hearing by the CID that the alien may be ordered
deported.
i. While it is not disputed that it is also within the power and authority of
the Commissioner to require an alien to so register, such a requirement
must be predicated on a positive finding that the person who is so
required is ACTUALLY an alien
ii. In this case, there should be a previous determination by the CID that
they are aliens before the petitioners may be directed and required to
register as aliens.
2. The power to deport an alien is an act of the State as a police measure against
undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is found to be injurious to the
public good and domestic tranquility of the people
3. Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal
action, however, considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative
proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional right
of such person to due process should not be denied
a. The provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly on
criminal procedure are applicable to deportation proceedings.
b. Section 37(c) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 as amended, it is
provided: ”No alien shall be deported without being informed of the
specific grounds for deportation nor without being given a hearing under
rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration.”
4. Hence, the charge against must specify the acts or omissions complained of which
must be stated in ordinary language to enable a person of common understanding
to know on what ground he is intended to be deported
a. Before any charge, a preliminary investigation must be conducted to
determine if there is a sufficient cause for deportation.
b. The issuance of warrants of arrest & arrests without warrant should be in
accordance likewise with Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
5. Also, the Court sees no reason why a private prosecutor should be allowed to
participate in a deportation case.
a. The possibility of oppression, harrassment and persecution cannot be
discounted. The deportation of an alien is the sole concern of the State. This is
the reason why there are special prosecutors and fiscals tasked to prosecute
such cases.
* respondent Commission on Immigration and Deportation is hereby directed to
continue hearing the deportation case against petitioners and thereafter, based on the
evidence before it, to resolve the issue of citizenship of petitioners,
MISON V. GALLEGAS
MACEDA V. ERB, 199 SCRA 454
FACTS:
1. Upon the outbreak of the Persian Gulf conflict, private respondents oil
companies filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) their respective
applications on oil price increases.
2. The ERB issued an order granting a provisional increase of P1.42 per liter.
3. Petitioner Maceda filed a petition for Prohibition seeking to nullify the
provisional increase.
4. SC dismissed the petition on December 18, 1990, reaffirming ERB's authority
to grant provisional increase even without prior hearing,
a. pursuant to Sec. 8 of E.O. No. 172, it does not preclude the Board
from ordering, ex-parte, a provisional increase, as it did here,
subject to its final disposition of whether or not: (1) to make it
permanent; (2) to reduce or increase it further; or (3) to deny the
application.
5. Section 8 does not negate Section 3.
a. Section 8: an authority to increase provisionally, without need of a
hearing, subject to the final outcome of the proceeding.
b. Section 3: Section 3(e) outlines the jurisdiction of the Board and
the grounds for which it may decree a price adjustment, subject
to the requirements of notice and hearing.
6. The Board, of course, is not prevented from conducting a hearing on the
grant of provisional authority-which is of course, the better procedure —
however, it cannot be stigmatized later if it failed to conduct one.
7. ERB set the continuation of the hearing to October 24, 1990. This was
postponed to November 5, 1990, on written notice of petitioner Maceda.
a. On November 5, 1990, the three oil companies filed their
respective motions for leave to file or admit amended/
supplemental applications to further increase the prices of
petroleum products.
ART3SEC1
8. Maceda: this order of proof deprived him of his right to finish his cross-
examination of Petron's witnesses and denied him his right to cross-examine
each of the witnesses of Caltex and Shell. He points out that this relaxed
procedure resulted in the denial of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not Maceda was denied of due process.
HELD: NO
1. The order of testimony both with respect to the examination of the particular
witness and to the general course of the trial is within the discretion of the
court and the exercise of this discretion in permitting to be introduced out of
the order prescribed by the rules is not improper.
2. Section 2, Rule I of the Rules of Practice and Procedure Governing Hearings
Before the ERB
a. the Board may, in any particular matter, except itself from these rules
and apply such suitable procedure as shall promote the objectives of the
Order.
3. MACEDA: there is no substantial evidence on record to support the
provisional relief.
4. Evidences:
a. certified copies of bins of lading issued by crude oil suppliers to
the private respondents
b. reports of the Bankers Association of the Philippines on the peso-
dollar exchange rate at the BAP oil pit
c. OPSF status reports of the Office of Energy Affairs.
5. Our lawmakers may see the wisdom of allowing presidential review of the
decisions of the ERB since, despite its being a quasi-judicial body, it is still
"an administrative body under the Office of the President whose decisions
should be appealed to the President under the established principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies," especially on a matter as
transcendental as oil price increases which affect the lives of almost an
Filipinos.
OPINIONS:
PARAS, J., dissenting:
the ERB has absolutely no power to tax which is solely the prerogative of Congress.
SC: "the Board Order authorizing the proceeds generated by the increase to be deposited
to the OPSF is not an act of taxation but is authorized by Presidential Decree No. 1956, as
amended by Executive Order No. 137.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The acts of the ERB ostensibly sparked by "presidential requests" clearly demonstrate
that the evidence did not, in the first place, justify the price increases it had ordered on
5 and 6 December 1990
SARMIENTO, J., separate opinion:
I agree with Justice Padilla insofar as he refers to the "present scheme of allowing
provisional price increase" as a "scheme [to defraud] the people." I would like to go
further. As I indicated the ERB does no more than to punch calculators for the
Government-which decides oil price increases.
CORONA V. UHPAP, 283 SCRA 31
FACTS
1. The Philippine Ports Authority, pursuant to its power of control, regulation and
supervision of pilots and the pilotage profession, issued an AO
a. The AO embodied the rules and regulations governing pilotage
services, the conduct of pilots, and pilotage fees in Philippine ports
b. These rules require that aspiring pilots must be holders of pilot
licenses, and they must train as probationary pilots
i. It is only after they have achieved satisfactory
performance that they are given permanent and regular
appointments to exercise harbor pilotage until the age of
70, unless sooner removed because of mental or physical
unfitness
12
2. Furthermore, harbor pilots are required to organize themselves into associations,
which would make available equipment that PPA would require for effective
pilotage services
a. In fact, every new pilot appointed by the PPA automatically becomes a
member of a pilot association, and he is required to pay a
proportionate equivalent equity or capital before allowed to assume
duties
3. PPA General Manager Rogelio Dayan issued AO 04-92, in which the purpose was
to instill discipline and afford better protection to port users through the
improvement of pilotage services
a. The AO was implemented by providing that all existing regular
appointments which have been previously issued either by the Bureau
of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only
b. All appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall
be only for a term of one year from the AO’s date of effectivity, subject
to yearly renewal or cancellation by the PPA after an evaluation
4. United Harbor Pilots Association and Manila Pilots Association, through Captain
Alberto Compas, questioned the AO before the DOTC
a. However, they were informed by then DOTC Secretary Jesus Garcia
that the action of reviewing, recalling or annulling PPA’s
administrative issuances lies exclusively with PPA’s Board of Directors
5. UHPAP and MPA reiterated their request to suspend the AO 04-92, but Garcia
maintained his stance, thus, Compas appealed to the OP
6. The OP then issued an order directing the PPA to hold in abeyance the
implementation of the AO
a. The PPA then countered, saying that it exercises administrative control
and supervision over harbor pilots
b. It also intended to restore order in ports and improve quality of port
services
7. The OP, through then ES for Legal Affairs Renato Corona, dismissed the petition of
UHPAP and MPA
8. Corona stated that:
a. AO 04-92 applied to all harbor pilots and was not the act of the PPA
General Manager, but of the PPA
i. Thus, it merely implemented PD 857 (the PD that revised
the charter of the PPA), mandating it to control, regulate and
supervise pilotage and conduct of pilots in any port district
9. In relation to the constitutionality of AO 04-92, Corona opined that:
a. The exercise of one’s profession falls within the constitutional
guarantee against wrongful deprivation of, or interference with,
property rights without due process
b. AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful interference with, or a
wrongful deprivation of, the property rights of those affected
c. The issuance of the AO aims to improve pilotage services by limiting
the appointment to harbor pilot positions to one year, subject to
renewal or cancellation after an evaluation
d. AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor
pilots of their profession in PPA’s jurisdictional area
10. Regarding the alleged absence of ample prior consultation before the issuance of
the AO, Corona cited Section 26 of PD 857
a. The section merely requires the PPA to consult with relevant
government agencies
i. Since the PPA Board of Directors is composed of secretaries
of the DOTC, DPWH, DOF, DENR, as well as the Director-
General of NEDA and MARINA, as well as a private sector
representative who was appointed by the President to the
Board, the AO then sufficiently complied
11. UHPAP and MPA then filed a petition before the Manila RTC, and a judgement
was rendered in their favor on the ground that:
a. The Bureau of Customs, the precursor of the PPA, recognized pilotage
as a profession and, therefore, it is a property right
b. Any withdrawal or alteration of such property right must be strictly
made in accordance with the constitutional mandate of due process of
law
i. This was apparently not followed by the PPA when it did
not conduct public hearings prior to the issuance of the AO
ii. UHPAP and MPA allegedly learned about it only after its
publication in the newspapers
12. Corona, Garcia and Dayan then elevated the case to the SC
ISSUE: WON the PPA, in issuing AO 04-92, limiting the term of appointment of harbor
pilots to one-year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation, violated UHPAP’s and
MPA’s right to exercise their profession and their right to due process of law
RULING: Yes, PPA violated UHPAP’s and MPA’s right to exercise their profession
and their right to due process of law
1. Section 1 of the BoR is the due process clause of the Constitution
2. In order to fall under the provision, two conditions must concur:
a. There is a deprivation
b. Such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process
3. In due process, there is a distinction between matters of procedure and substance
a. Procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the
law is enforced
b. Substantive due process requires that the law itself, not merely the
procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable,
and just
4. Lumiqued v. Hon. Exevea:
a. As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in
due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law,
ART3SEC1
b. This opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process
c. This constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted
an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of
5. In the case at bar, UHPAP and MPA questioned AO 04-92 no less than four times
before the matter was finally elevated to the SC
a. However, their arguments failed to persuade
b. UHPAP and MPA emphasize that the Philippine Coast Guard, which
issues the licenses of pilots after administering the pilots’
examinations, was not consulted
i. However, the facts show that the MARINA, which
took over the licensing function of the PCG, was duly
represented in the PPA’s Board of Directors
ii. Thus, Corona, et al. correctly argued that, there being
no matters of naval defense involved in the AO’s
issuance, the Philippine Coast Guard need not be
consulted
6. Also, the fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way does not
make the AO invalid
a. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements
of procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative
body exercises its quasi-judicial function
b. In the performance of its executive or legislative functions, an
administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice
and hearing
7. UHPAP and MPA claim that the right to the exercise of harbor pilotage by pilots
has become vested and can only be withdrawn or shortened by observing the
constitutional mandate of due process of law
a. Their argument has thus shifted from the procedural to one of
substance
b. It is here where AO 04-92 fails to meet the condition set by the organic
law
8. Pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right
9. Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced only by duly licensed
individuals
a. Licensure is the granting of license especially to practice a profession
b. It is also the system of granting licenses in accordance with established
standards
c. A license is a right or permission granted by some competent authority
to carry on a business or do an act which, without such license, would
be illegal
10. Before harbor pilots can earn a license to practice their profession, they have to
pass five examinations, each followed by actual training and practice
11. The pilot’s license is granted in the form of an appointment, which allows him to
engage in pilotage until they retire at the age of 70
a. This is a vested right
12. Under the terms of the AO:
a. All existing regular appointments which have been previously issued
by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31
December 1992 only
b. All appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall
be only for a term of one year from the AO’s date of effectivity, subject
to renewal or cancellation after an evaluation
13. In the case at bar, AO 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their
profession before their compulsory retirement
a. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of security knowing that after
passing five examinations and undergoing years of OJT, they would
have a license which they could use until their retirement
b. Under the AO, they have to contend with an annual cancellation of
their license which can be temporary or permanent, depending on the
outcome of their performance evaluation
14. The pilots are suddenly confronted with one-year terms which expire at the end of
that period
15. Renewal of their license is now dependent on a rigid evaluation of performance
which is conducted only after the license has already been cancelled
16. It is this pre-evaluation cancellation which primarily makes the AO unreasonable
and constitutionally infirm
OTHER RULING
1. UHPAP and MPA are correct in pointing out that AO 04-92 is an unnecessary
enactment because it is already covered by another AO which is still operational
2. The claim that PPA General Manager Dayan was responsible for the issuance of
the questioned AO may have some factual basis or bearing
a. However, in the absence of proof, Dayan should be presumed to have
acted in accordance with law and the best of professional motives
b. His actions are certainly always subject to scrutiny by higher
administrative authorities
SALAW V. NLRC, 202 SCRA 7
FACTS:
1. Espero Santos Salaw, was employed by the private respondents as a credit
investigator-appraiser.
a. His duties included inspecting, investigating, appraising, and
identifying the company's foreclosed assets; giving valuation to
its real properties, and verifying the genuineness and
encumbrances of the titles of properties mortgaged to the
respondents.
2. The Criminal Investigation Service extracted from the petitioner — without
the assistance of counsel — a Sworn Statement3  which made it appear that
13
 the petitioner, in cahoots with a co-employee, Reynaldo Madrigal, sold 20 ii. It leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
sewing machines and electric generators and divided the proceeds between carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary
the two of them. flexing of the Government muscle
3. The petitioner was requested by Tuazon, the bank manager, to appear before b. However, the act must be utterly vague on its face, meaning, it
the bank's Personnel Discipline and Investigation Committee. cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by construction
4. When Salaw signified his readiness to appear before the PDIC, Tuazon sent i. Coates v. City of Cincinnati:
him a letter stating that Salaw is requested to appear without a counsel. 1. The subject ordinance imposed no
5. Petitioner was terminated for alleged serious misconduct or willful standard at all “because one may never
disobedience and fraud or willful breach of trust. know in advance what annoys some
6. Petitioner filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal against people but does not annoy others”
respondent Bank. 2. A “perfectly vague” act is that whose
ISSUE: WON the petitioner was illegally dismissed YES obscurity is evident on its face
RULING: a. It is to be distinguished from
1. The petitioner was terminated without the benefit of due process of law. His legislation couched in
dismissal was illegal. imprecise language
2. Respondents' initial act in convening their PDIC to investigate complainant b. A legislation couched in
would have complied with the demands of due process had complainant imprecise language
been given the opportunity to present his own defense and confront the nonetheless specifies a
witnesses, if any, and examine the evidence against him. standard, though defectively
a. Salaw was denied that constitutional right when his subsequent phrased, thus, it may be
request to refute the allegations against him was granted and a “saved” by proper
hearing was set "without counsel or representative.” construction
b. Section 5 of the Rule XIV, Book V of the IRR of the Labor Code c. It is also distinguished from statutes that are apparently
requires that "the employer shall afford the worker ample ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the i. Such statutes may not be challenged whenever
assistance of his representative, if he so desires." directed against such activities
3. the right to counsel, a very basic requirement of substantive due process, has ii. Parker v. Levy:
to be observed. 1. The defendant was not allowed to invoke
a. Rights to counsel and to due process of law are two of the void for vagueness doctrine on the
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution to person premise that accepted military
under investigation, be the proceeding administrate civil, or interpretation and practice had provided
criminal. enough standards, and consequently, a
** The rudimentary requirements of due process — notice and hearing — must also be fair notice that his conduct was
observed before an employee may be dismissed.  impermissible
** The requirement of notice is intended inform the employee concerned of the iii. Gonzales v. COMELEC:
employer's intent dismiss him and the reason for the proposed dismissal; 1. The subject law had included an “enumeration of the acts
** The requirement of hearing affords the employ the opportunity to answer his deemed included in the terms ‘election campaign’ or
employer's charges against him and accordingly to defend himself therefrom before ‘partisan political activity’ that would supply the
dismissal effected. standards
2. The SC also applied the balancing-of-interests test, saying
PEOPLE V. NAZARIO, 165 SCRA 136 that the early nomination of candidates stands
consistently with and does not offend the Constitution
FACTS d. In the US, the balancing test is closely related to the “less restrictive
1. Eusebio Nazario is charged of the crime of Violation of Municipal Ordinance in an alternative doctrine”
information filed by the provincial Fiscal i. Under this doctrine, the court searches for alternatives available to the
2. From the evidence, the prosecution wanted to show the court that Nazario, as government outside of statutory limits, or for “less drastic means” open
lessee or operator of a fishpond in Pagbilao, refused, and still refuses, to pay the to the State, that would render the statute unnecessary
municipal taxes for 1964, 1965 and 1966 3. The SC ruled that the ordinances at bar are not tainted with the vice of vagueness
3. On the other hand, Nazario, through his evidence, wanted to show that: a. As the actual operator of the fishponds, Nazario comes within the term
a. The taxes sought to be collected have already lapsed “manager:
b. There is no law empowering municipalities to pass ordinances b. He was the one who financed the construction of the fishponds, introduced
taxing fishpond operators fish fries into the fishponds, and had employed laborers to maintain them
c. Nazario is not covered by said municipal ordinances c. Although it appears that it is the National Government which owns them,
d. Nazario should not be taxed as fishpond operator because there is the Government never shared in the profits generated, thus, he shoulders
no fishpond yet being operated by him, considering that it was the burden of tax
still under construction during the period covered by the taxes i. The ordinances are in the character of revenue measures designed to
sought to be collected assist Pagbilao
e. The ordinance in question is ultra vires as it is outside of the ii. Therefore, it cannot be the Government on whom liability should attach
power of the municipal council of Pagbilao, Quezon, to enact iii. The Government is immune from taxes, and since it is not the
f. The ordinance in question is ambiguous and uncertain Government that had been making money from the venture
4. There is no question from the evidence presented that Nazario is a lessee of a d. Nazario, as the actual operator of the fishponds, and as the recipient of
parcel of forest land for fishpond purposes, under an agreement entered into by profits, cannot say that he did not have a fair notice of such a liability for
the him and the government municipal taxes to make such ordinances vague
a. There is also no question from the evidence presented that the 4. The said ordinances are also not vague as to dates of payment
land leased by Nazario was actually converted and used as a a. NAZARIO: The imposition of tax has to depend upon an uncertain date yet
fishpond to be determined (three years after the “approval of the fishpond” by the
b. Therefore, Nazario is indeed an operator of a fishpond Bureau of Fisheries) and upon an uncertain event (if the fishpond started
5. The Court of First Instance of Quezon returned a verdict of guilty operating before 1964)
b. SC: This argument has no merit as there is no ambiguity in the ordinance –
ISSUE: WON the ordinances in which Nazario was convicted for violating are vague the dates of payment have been definitely established
i. The fact that Nazario is allegedly uncertain about the reckoning dates
RULING: No, the ordinances are not vague presents a mere problem in computation, but it does not make the
1. NAZARIO: The ordinances speak of “owner or manager,” and said ordinances are ordinances vague
vague insofar as they consider the date of payment 5. The SC ruled that the ordinances set forth enough standards that clarify imagined
a. Ordinance No. 4 provides that parties shall commence payment ambiguities
“after the lapse of three years starting from the date said fishpond a. While such standards are not immediately apparent, they are visible from
is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries” the intent of the ordinances
b. Ordinance No. 12 states that liability for the tax accrues
“beginning and taking effect from the year 1964 if the fishpond OTHER RULINGS
started operating before the year 1964” 1. WON the said ordinances can be said to be ex post facto measures NO
2. SC: As statute or act is vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of a. Municipal Ordinance No. 4 was passed on May 14, 1955, thus, it cannot be
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its said that the amendment under Ordinance No. 12 is being made to apply
application retroactively to the year 1964 since the reckoning period is 1955, which is
a. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two ways: the date of enactment
i. It violates due process for failure to accord persons, b. Municipal Ordinances Nos. 12 and 15 are in the nature of curative measures
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the intended to facilitate and enhance the collection of revenues
conduct to avoid c. The non-payment of the tax had also been made punishable since 1955, and
it cannot be said that Municipal Ordinance No. 12 imposes a retroactive
penalty

14
ART3SEC1
 i. It operates to grant amnesty to operators who had been delinquent
between 1955 and 1964, therefore, it does not even mete out a penalty
d. The tax in question is not a tax on property, and fishponds are not
forest lands
i. “Forest” is a large tract of land covered with a natural growth of trees
and underbush; a large wood
e. They are privilege taxes on the business of fishpond maintenance
i. They are not charged against sales, but rather, on occupation
ii. They are what have been classified as fixed annual taxes, and this is
obvious from the ordinances themselves
ESTRADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN, GR 148560, 19 NOVEMBER 2001
FACTS:
1. Joseph Ejercito Estrada to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and
Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),as amended by RA 7659, wishes to impress
upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that
thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm.
a. it suffers from vagueness;
b. it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions; and
c. it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable
under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear
violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due
process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
2. Petitioner, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory
definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and
Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4.
a. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law
unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and
deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due
process.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7080 as amended by RA 7659 is constitutionally infirm
HELD: NO
1. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are
used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them;
a. there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the
legislature to define each and every word in an enactment.
b. it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a
statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification (Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary )
i. Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process
of combining. To combine is to bring into such close relationship as
to obscure individual characters.
ii. Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one
after another in spatial and temporal succession.
c. Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be
understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the
legislative deliberations on the bill
2. The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental
purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."
a. The Plunder law is not “too broad”. Overbreadth doctrine does not
apply to penal statutes.
3. "[O]n its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong
medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort” and is generally
disfavored.
a. it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so
tenaciously claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more
imagined than real.
ART3SEC1
[on the issue of proof beyond reasonable doubt]
4. Petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder
Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder
when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing
unlawful scheme or conspiracy
5. “Reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm
of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt
of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.
6. Looking at the deliberations of the House, the legislature did not in any
manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder.
The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of
doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute the crime.
7. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a
number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would
constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00.
a. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the
Information to have been committed by the accused in
furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth.
8. As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder
is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent.
a. The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in
the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder
Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder
since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by
his criminal intent.
FEEDER V. CA, 197 SCRA 842
FACTS
1. The M/T "ULU WAI" foreign vessel of Honduran registry is owned and operated
by Feeder International Shipping Lines of Singapore
2. The vessel left Singapore on 6 May 1986
a. It carried metric tons of gas oil and fuel oil consigned to Far East
Synergy Corporation of Zamboanga
3. On 14 May 1986, the vessel anchored at Guiuanon Island in Iloilo without
notifying the Iloilo customs authorities
a. The Iloilo authorities only knew through information of the civilian
informer in the area
b. Because of this, Acting District Collector of Iloilo sent a Customs
team to verify the report
4. The Customs team found out that the vessel did not have on board the required
ship and shipping documents
a. The vessel only had a clearance from the port authorities of
Singapore clearing the vessel for Zamboanga
b. Because of this, the vessel and its cargo were held, and a warrant of
seizure and detention was issued
5. Feeder then filed a motion to dismiss and quash the warrants, but this was denied
by the District Collector
a. In the forfeiture proceedings, the parties agreed on a stipulation of
facts
6. The District Collector then rendered a decision, stating that ULU WAI was guilty
of violating provisions of the Tariffs and Customs Code
a. This was affirmed by the Commissioner of Customs and the CTA
7. Feeder then filed a petition before the SC of the decision of the CTA, and the SC
referred the case to the CA on the basis of Development Bank of the Philippines vs.
Court of Appeals, et al.
a. In said case, it was held that final judgments or decrees of the CTA
are within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CA
b. The CA affirmed the CTA’s decision, and a subsequent MR filed by
Feeder was also denied
8. Feeder then interposed a petition before the SC, contending that:
a. The CA erred in ruling based on circumstantial evidence that an
illegal importation had been committed
b. Feeder was deprived of property without due process of law in that
its right to be presumed innocent was not recognized and the
decision was not supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt
c. The sworn statements of Romeo Deposa (the captain of ULU WAI)
and Antonio Torres (the representative of the owner of ULU WAI),
were taken without assistance of counsel, violating their
constitutional right
ISSUE: WON there was an illegal importation committed, or at least an attempt thereof,
which would justify a forfeiture of the subject vessel and its cargo
15
RULING: Yes, there was an illegal importation committed which would justify a
forfeiture of the subject vessel and its cargo
1. Section 1202 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides that importation begins
when the carrying vessel or aircraft enters the jurisdiction of the Philippines with
intention to unload therein
a. It is clear from the provision of the law that mere intent to unload is
sufficient to commence an importation
i. “Intent,” being a state of mind, can rarely be directly
proven, thus, it must ordinarily be inferred from the facts
ii. This can only be proved by unguarded, expressions,
conduct and circumstances generally
2. ULU WAI entered the jurisdiction of the Philippines, and the issue is whether or
not there was an intention to unload
3. The facts and circumstances shown by the evidence convince the SC that there was
intent to unload, thus, there is illegal importation:
a. Considering that the vessel came from Singapore, the route to
Zamboanga was shorter, and Iloilo lies further north
i. Thus, it is not logical for the sailing vessel to travel a longer
distance to get the necessary repairs
b. When the vessel anchored at Guiuanon Island, it did not notify the
Iloilo port or Customs authorities of its arrival
c. At the time of boarding by the customs personnel, the required ship
and shipping documents were not on board, except the clearance from
Singaporean port officials clearing the vessel for Zamboanga
d. Torres also stated that he did not know the buyer of the oil, which is
impossible if he had the Local Purchase Order
i. Torres also swore that his knowledge came from the vessel’s
owner, without mentioning the shipping documents which
indicate such data
ii. He also said that he did not know the consignee of the oil
which would have been patent from the documents
e. Deposa enumerated the documents he allegedly gave to Torres, but did
not mention as among them the Local Purchase Order of Pogun
Construction SDN (the buyer of the oil) and the Bill of Lading
4. The findings of fact of the CA are in consonance with the findings of both the
District Collector and the Commissioner of Customs, as affirmed by the CTA
a. Therefore, the SC follows the elementary principle that findings of fact
of the CA, and of the administrative and quasi-judicial bodies for that
matter, are entitled to great weight and are conclusive and binding
upon the SC, absent a showing of a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction
5. The fact that the testimonies of Deposa and Torres were given without the
assistance of counsel may not be considered an outright violation of their
constitutional right to be assisted by counsel
a. Nera v. The Auditor General:
i. The right to the assistance of counsel is not indispensable to
the requirement of due process, unless required by the
Constitution or a law
ii. An exception is made only during the custodial
investigation of a person suspected of a crime, who may not
waive his right to counsel except under certain conditions
iii. These guarantees are embodied in the Constitution because
of the odds to defend his liberty against the State
6. However, in other proceedings, the need for the assistance of counsel is not as
urgent, nor is it essential to the proceeding’s validity
b. There is nothing in the Constitution that says a party in a non-criminal
proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel
c. If he is not represented by counsel, he would still be bound by the
proceeding
d. The assistance of lawyers, although desirable, is not indispensable
e. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all,
except only with a lawyer at his side
7. If ever there was any doubt as to the veracity of the sworn statements of Deposa
and Torres, they should have been presented during any appropriate stage of the
proceedings
f. This was not done by Feeder, thus, there is the presumption that
official duty was regularly performed
g. Also, Feeder does not deny that Torres himself is a lawyer
8. Feeder also simply contends that the sworn statements were taken without the
assistance of counsel, but there was failure to allege or prove that the statements
were taken under anomalous circumstances
h. There is no reason to doubt the veracity of the sworn statements
OTHER RULINGS
1. Seizure and forfeiture proceedings under tariff and customs laws are not criminal
in nature
a. They do not result in the conviction of the offender nor in the
imposition of the
b. Seizure proceedings are purely civil and administrative in character
c. Their main purpose is to enforce the administrative fines or forfeiture
incident to unlawful importation of goods or their deliberate
possession
d. The penalty in seizure cases is distinct and separate from the criminal
liability that might be imposed against the indicted importer or
possessor
e. People v. CIF of Rizal, et al.:
i. The decision of the Collector of Customs, as in other
seizure proceedings, concerns the  “res” rather than
“persona”
ART3SEC1
ii. The subject merchandise in the case at bar violated
the revenue law of the country, and as such, have
been prevented from being assimilated in lawful
commerce
iii. The importer or possessor is treated differently, and
the fact that he is administratively liable is not
consequentially related to criminal liability (and this
goes both ways: probable guilt cannot be negated
simply he was not administratively charged)
f. Considering that proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally
imported are not criminal in nature, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
not required
g. In this case, the degree of proof required is substantial evidence
i. Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion
2. Feeder, which is a corporate entity, has no personality to invoke the right to be
presumed innocent
a. This right is available only to an individual who is an accused in a
criminal case
CB V. CA, 220 SCRA 536
FACTS:
1. This petition seeks review of the 1986 CA decision which affirmed the twin orders
of the RTC denying herein petitioners' motion to dismiss a Civil Case and directing
petitioner Ramon V. Tiaoqui to restore the private management of Triumph Savings
Bank (TSB) to its elected board of directors and officers, subject to Central Bank
comptrollership.
2. The Monetary Board (MB) issued Resolution No. 596 ordering the closure of TSB,
forbidding it from doing business in the Philippines, placing it under receivership,
and appointing Ramon V. Tiaoqui as receiver.
a. Based on examination reports submitted by the Supervision and Examination
Sector (SES) of the Central Bank (CB) "that the financial condition of TSB is
one of insolvency and its continuance in business would involve probable
loss to its depositors and creditors”
3. TSB filed a civil complaint with the RTC against CB and Tiaoqui to annul the MB
Resolution
a. challenging in the process the constitutionality of Sec. 29 of R.A. 269,
otherwise known as 'The Central Bank Act,” insofar as it authorizes the CB
to take over a banking institution even if it is not charged with violation of
any law or regulation, much less found guilty
4. PETITIONER’s MOTION TO DISMISS: TSB’s motion to dismiss did not allege
ultimate facts showing that the action was plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith,
which are the only grounds for the annulment of MB resolutions placing a bank
under conservatorship, and that TSB was without legal capacity to sue except
through its receiver
5. The RTC in separate orders denied petitioners' motion to dismiss and ordered
receiver Tiaoqui to restore the management of TSB to its elected board of directors
and officers, subject to CB comptrollership.
6. CA uphled RTC ruling.
a. Affirmed that an insolvent bank that had been summarily closed by the
Monetary Board should be restored to its private management supposedly
because such summary closure was "arbitrary and in bad faith" and a denial
of "due process”;
b. held that the "charge of lack of due process" for "want of prior hearing" in a
complaint to annul a Monetary Board receivership resolution under Sec. 29 of
R.A, 265 "may be taken as .. . allegations of arbitrariness and bad faith"; and
ISSUE: W/N a Monetary Board resolution placing a private bank under receivership be
annulled on the ground of lack of prior notice and hearing?
(otherwise stated: is absence of prior notice and hearing constitutive of acts of
arbitrariness and bad faith)
RULING: NO. Sec. 29 of R.A. 265 does not require a previous hearing before the
Monetary Board can implement its resolution closing a bank, since its action is
subject to judicial scrutiny as provided by law.
1. Sec. 29 of R.A. 265, the CB, through the MB, is vested with exclusive authority to
assess, evaluate and determine the condition of any bank, and finding such
condition to be one of insolvency, or that its continuance in business would involve
probable loss to its depositors or creditors, forbid the bank or non-bank financial
institution to do business in the Philippines; and shall designate an official of the
CB or other competent person as receiver to immediately take charge of its assets
and liabilities.
2. Contrary to the notion of private respondent, Sec. 29 does not contemplate prior
notice and hearing before a bank may be directed to stop operations and placed
under receivership.
a. When par. 4 provides for the filing of a case within 10 days after the receiver
takes charge of the assets of the bank, the assailed actions should precede the
filing of the case.
b. The legislature could not have intended to authorize "no prior notice and
hearing" in the closure of the bank and at the same time allow a suit to annul
it on the basis the absence of hearing.
3. In Rural Bank of Lucena, the SC held that a previous hearing is not required in Sec.
29 nor does the constitutional requirement of due process demand that the
correctness of the MB’s resolution to stop operation and proceed to liquidation be
first adjudged before making the resolution effective. It is enough that a subsequent
judicial review be provided.
16
4. BUT Sec. 29 does not altogether divest an institution placed under receivership of
the opportunity to be heard and present evidence on arbitrariness and bad faith
because within ten (10) days from the date the receiver takes charge of the assets of
the bank, resort to judicial review may be had by filing an appropriate pleading
with the court.
a. Respondent TSB did in fact avail of this remedy by filing a complaint with
the RTC of Quezon City on the 8th day .
5. POLICE POWER: This "close now and hear later" scheme is grounded on
practical and legal considerations to prevent unwarranted dissipation of the
bank's assets and as a valid exercise of police power to protect the depositors,
creditors, stockholders and the general public.
a. In this case, "x x x due process does not necessarily require a prior hearing; a
hearing or an opportunity to be heard may be subsequent to the closure.
i. if there was prior hearing = hysteria and panic
b. The banking business is properly subject to reasonable regulation under
the police power of the state because of its relation to the fiscal affairs of
the people and the revenues of the state
i. public interest because they receive funds from the general public in
the form of deposits.
c. Banks are under the obligation to treat with meticulous care and utmost
fidelity the accounts of those who have reposed their trust and confidence in
them
d. It is then the Government's responsibility to see to it that the financial
interests of those who deal with the banks and banking institutions, as
depositors or otherwise, are protected.
e. That task is delegated to the Central Bank which, pursuant to its Charter:
R.A. 265, is authorized to administer the monetary, banking and credit
system of the Philippines
i. Sec. 20, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution also provides for the CB
ii. Under its charter, the CB is further authorized to take the necessary
steps against any banking institution if its continued operation
would cause prejudice to its depositors, creditors and the general
public as well. This power has been expressly recognized by this
Court.
6. The procedure prescribed in Sec. 29 is truly designed to protect the interest of all
concerned, i.e., the depositors, creditors and stockholders, the bank itself, and the
general public, and the summary closure pales in comparison to the protection
afforded public interest.
7. At any rate, the bank is given full opportunity to prove arbitrariness and bad faith in
placing the bank under receivership, in which event, the resolution may be
properly nullified and the receivership lifted as the trial court may determine.
a. BUT what is being raised as arbitrary by private respondent is the denial of
prior notice and hearing by the MB
IN SUM:
- appeal to procedural due process cannot just outweigh the evil sought to be
prevented (discussion on public interest); hence, Sec. 29 of R.A. 265 is a sound
legislation promulgated in accordance with the Constitution in the exercise of
police power of the state.
- Consequently, the absence of notice and hearing is not a valid ground to annul a
Monetary Board resolution placing a bank under receivership.
- CASE REMANDED TO RTC for arbitrariness.
PEREZ V. MADRONA, 668 SCRA 696
FACTS
1. Spouses Fortunito Madrona and Yolanda Pante are registered owners of a
residential property located in Greenheights Subdivision, Phase II, Marikina
a. The property is covered by a TCT in the Registry of Deeds of Marikina
2. In 1989, Madrona and Pante built their house and enclosed it with a concrete fence
and steel gate
3. In 1999, they received a letter from the Chief of the Marikina Demolition Office,
Jaime Perez
a. The letter was concerned with the house that the spouses built on the
property, stating that it was in violation of certain laws in Marikina:
i. National Building Code of the Philippines
ii. Anti-Squatting Law
iii. Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992
iv. Encroachment of Rivers, Esteros, Drainage Channels, and
Other Waterways
v. Illegally Occupied/Constructed Improvements within the
Road Right-of-Way
b. The letter also stated that they had seven days to demolish the house,
otherwise, they would be sanctioned
4. As a response, Madrona sent Perez a letter, stating that Perez’s letter:
a. Contained an accusation libelous in nature as it is condemning him and
his property without due process
b. Has no basis and authority since there is no court order authorizing
him to demolish their structure
c. Cited legal bases which do not expressly give Perez the authority to
demolish
d. Contained a false accusation since their fence did not extend to the
sidewalk
5. The spouses then received a letter from Perez, requesting them to provide him a
copy of the relocation survey on the property
a. However, they did not oblige because it was as if Perez was fishing
evidence from them
ART3SEC1
6. On 28 February 2001, Perez sent another letter with the same contents as the first
letter, but this time giving the spouses 10 days from receipt thereof to remove the
structure allegedly protruding to the sidewalk
a. This prompted the spouses to file a complaint before the Marikina RTC
7. In their complaint, the spouses alleged that:
a. Perez’s letters made it appear that their fence was encroaching on the
sidewalk and directed them to remove it, otherwise, he would take the
corresponding action
b. Perez’s threat of action would be damaging and adverse to them, and
the threat is real, earnest and imminent
c. The removal of their fence, which would include the main gate, would
certainly expose the premises and its occupants to intruders or third
persons
d. Perez has no legal authority to demolish structures in private
properties and the laws he cited in his letters do not give him any
authority
e. The spouses enjoy the legal presumption of rightful possession
f. If Perez accuses them of erroneous possession, he should so prove only
through the courts
g. Their fence is beside the sidewalk and the land on which it stands has
never been the subject of acquisition
h. Perez’s intended act of demolition has no factual or legal basis since
there is no existing infrastructure project
i. Perez’s letter and his intended act of demolition are malicious,
unfounded, meant only to harass the spouses, thus, he is accountable
both in his personal and official capacity
8. The RTC then issued a TRO against Perez
9. Perez then filed a motion for extension to file answer, but his counsel failed to file
within the requested period, thus, Perez was declared in default
a. Perez filed a motion to lift the order of default, and according to
Perez’s new counsel, an answer was not filed because of the former
counsel’s workload as lone lawyer in the City Legal Office
b. The motion to lift the order was denied because the motion failed to
include a notice of hearing, and the alleged cause of delay is
inexcusable, especially because the delay consisted of over 103 days
c. Perez filed an MR, but it was also denied
10. Perez then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA assailing the default order
a. The RTC then suspended the proceedings of the injunction case until
such time when the petition for certiorari has been disposed with
finality
11. The CA then dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit
a. Perez moved for reconsideration, but it was denied
12. The RTC then dismissed the injunction complaint without prejudice
a. It held that spouses have not instituted any action before the court
showing that they are still interested in further prosecuting the case
i. Also, in accordance with the Rules of Court, the Court is
compelled to dismiss the complaint because of the spouses’
failure to prosecute their complaint for an unreasonable
length of time
b. However, upon the spouses’ motion, the dismissal order was set aside
and the complaint was reinstated
13. The RTC, in agreement with the spouses, ruled that it was the court which
suspended the proceedings in the injunction case
a. When the RTC issued the dismissal order, there was no entry of
judgment yet from the CA, thus, it cannot be said that the petition was
already disposed of with finality
14. The RTC then decided in favor of the spouses
a. The RTC held that the spouses, being lawful owners of the subject
property, are entitled to the peaceful and open possession of every inch
of their property
b. Perez’s threat to demolish the concrete fence around their property is
tantamount to a violation of their rights as property owners who are
entitled to protection under the Constitution and laws 
c. There is also no showing that the spouses’ fence is a nuisance and
presents an immediate danger to the community’s welfare, nor did the
fence has encroached on the sidewalk
15. Perez appealed the decision to the CA, but the CA affirmed such
ISSUE: WON the requisites for the issuance of a writ of injunction are present (WON
Perez is entitled or has the right to carry out the threatened demolition of the spouses’
perimeter fence and steel gate)
RULING: Yes, the requisites for the issuance of a writ of injunction are present (No,
Perez is not entitled or does not have the right to carry out the threatened demolition
of the spouses’ perimeter fence and steel gate)
1. For injunction to issue, there are two requisites:
a. There must be a right to be protected
b. The acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of
said right
2. In the case at bar, the two requisites are clearly present:
a. There is a right to be protected: the spouses’ right over their concrete
fence which cannot be removed without due process
b. The act: the summary demolition of the concrete fence, against which
the injunction is directed, would violate said right
3. If Perez indeed found the spouses to have encroached on the sidewalk, his remedy
is not to demolish it summarily, but to go to court and prove the spouses’
violations in the construction of the concrete fence
a. Unless a thing is a nuisance per se, it may not be abated summarily
without judicial intervention
17
4. Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc., cognizance of Glorious Suns appeal since:
a. There is a need for judicial intervention when the thing is a nuisance
per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and
a. it amounted to an administrative review of the final judgment of
property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of
the courts;

necessity
b. If it be a nuisance per accidens, it may be proven in a hearing
conducted for that purpose
c. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement b. Glorious Sun had long ago abandoned its right to appeal the
without judicial intervention 1984 Decision of the GTEB.
5. Pampanga Bus Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Tarlac:
a. In the abatement of nuisances the provisions of the Civil Code
5. PETITIONER: the Office of the President committed grave abuse of
(Articles 694-707) must be observed and followed
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in finding that there was a
6. In the case at bar, the spouses’ fence is not a nuisance per se
violation of Glorious Sun's right to procedural due process. (GTEB decision
a. By its nature, it is not injurious to the health or comfort of the
should be upheld)
community
b. It was built primarily to secure the property of the spouses and
prevent intruders from entering it ISSUE: Whether or not the Malacañang decision suffers from grave abuse of discretion
c. Also, the sidewalk still exists
d. Not being a nuisance per se, but at most a nuisance per accidens, its
HELD: NO
summary abatement without judicial intervention is unwarranted
OTHER RULINGS
1. WON the RTC erred in reinstating the complaint of the spouses NO 1. The decision penned by Deputy Executive Secretary Magdangal B. Elma and
a. There was no admission of negligence by the spouses, either express the resolution penned by Acting Deputy Executive Secretary Mariano
or implied Sarmiento II are not tainted in the slightest by any grave abuse of discretion.
b. Both the RTC and the CA found it correctly that the spouses did not
lose interest in prosecuting their case nor was their counsel negligent
a. They outline in detail why the private respondent was denied
in handling it
due process when its export quotas were cancelled by GTEB. The
c. There was no basis for the dismissal order
findings are supported by the records.
d. The reinstatement of the spouses’ complaint was justified
2. WON Perez is liable to pay attorney’s fees, as well as moral damages and
exemplary damages YES 2. Court’s action in 1984 did not resolve anything. In fact when we heard the
a. As the spouses were forced to file a case against Perez to enjoin the parties during oral arguments, GTEB was unable to present any showing of
impending demolition of their property, the award of attorney’s fees and misdeclaration of imports.
costs of suit is justified
b. Clearly, the spouses wanted to settle the problem on their alleged
3. The resolution dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 67180 was based solely on
encroachment without resorting to court processes when they replied by
this notice of withdrawal by the private respondent. The dismissal of the
letter after receiving Perez’s first notice
petition in G.R. No. 67180 was clearly based on a technical matter rather
c. Perez, however, required them to submit the relocation plan as if he wants
than on the merits of the petition.
the spouses to prove that they are not encroaching on the sidewalk, even if
it was he who made the accusation of violation in the first place
d. When he did not get the proof he was requiring from the spouses, he again 4. The GTEB in the 1984 hearings failed to disclose to Glorious Sun vital
sent a notice with a threat of summary demolition evidence used by GTEB in arriving at its conclusion that Glorious Sun was
e. This gave the spouses no other choice but to file an injunction complaint to guilty of dollar-salting.
protect their rights
f. The spouses are entitled to moral damages because they suffered anxiety
5. The petitioner cannot use as an excuse the subsequent disclosure of the
and sleepless nights since they were worried what would happen to their
evidence used by the GTEB to Glorious Sun in 1987 to justify the 1984 GTEB
children who were left by themselves in their Marikina residence while they
resolution.
were in Ormoc City
g. The spouses are also entitled to exemplary damages to serve as an example
to other public officials that they should be more circumspect in the a. The glaring fact is that Glorious Sun was denied due process
performance of their duties when the GTEB failed to disclose evidence used by it in
rendering a resolution against Glorious Sun.
AMERICAN INTER-FASHION V. OP, 197 SCRA 409
related to, several cases pending before the Sandiganbayan which pertain to funds, properties and
6. The documents disclosed to Glorious Sun by GTEB in 1987 enhanced the
assets alleged to have been illegally acquired or misappropriated by the members of the Marcos
charge that Glorious Sun was denied due process. These were not disclosed
family and their business associates or cronies.
in 1086 for being privileges, they were unmarked as exhibits.

FACTS:
7. There is no legal impediment to re- examining the same conclusions which
1. respondent Glorious Sun was ruled by GARMENTS & TEXTILE EXPORT are borne by the records of the instant case since we are now confronted with
BOARD (GTEB) guilty of misdeclaration of imported raw materials the issue as to the correctness of the 1984 GTEB decision.
resulting in dollar salting abroad and, therefore, its export quotas should be
cancelled. 8. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded respect and finality, and
generally should not be disturbed by the courts. This general rule, however,
a. Its quotas were given to two newly-formed corporations—De Soleil Apparel is not without exceptions:
Manufacturing Corporation (De Soleil and the American Inter-Fashion
Corporation (AIFC). a. Such factual findings may be disregarded only if they "are not
supported by evidence; where the findings are initiated by fraud,
i. These two corporations were joint ventures of the Hongkong imposition or collussion; where the procedures which lead to the factual
investors and majority stockholders of Glorious Sun on one hand findings are irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when
and, allegedly, a member of the family and a crony of President grave abuse of discretion arbitrarines or capriciousness is
Marcos on the other. manifest." (Mapa v. Arroyo)

2. President set aside the GTEB decision and remanded the case for genuine
hearings where due process would be accorded to both parties. BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO V. CAMACHO, 562 SCRA 511 + MR, 585 SCRA
FACTS:
1. RA 8240 (amending several provisions of the NIRC) took effect on January 1,
a. The petitioner now alleges that the GTEB decision is res judicata 1997.
and that Glorious Sun was given every opportunity to be heard a.  In the same year, Congress passed RA 8424 (The Tax Reform Act
by the Board. of 1997) re-codifying the NIRC.
2. Par (c) of Sec. 145 provides for 4 tiers of tax rates based on the  net retail
3. HOWEVER, Glorious Sun has never been sequestered. The records also price per pack of cigarettes. 
show that American Inter-Fashion's sequestration has been lifted and a. To determine the applicable tax rates of existing cigarette brands,
apparently only De Soliel remains sequestered. a survey of the net retail prices per pack of cigarettes was
conducted.

4. PETITIONER: respondent office of the president committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction petition in having taken

18
ART3SEC1
 i. The results of this survey were embodied in  Annex
D  of the NIRC as the duly registered, existing or
active brands of cigarettes.
b. As such, new brands of cigarettes shall be taxed according to
their current net retail price while existing or old brands shall be
taxed based on their net retail price.
3. BIR issued RR 1-97 which classified the existing brands of cigarettes as those
duly registered or active brands prior to Jan 1, 1997.
a.   New brands shall be initially assessed at their suggested retail
price until such time that the appropriate survey to determine
their current net retail price is conducted.
4. In 2001, British American Tobacco introduced into the market Lucky Strike
Filter, Lucky Strike Lights and Lucky Strike Menthol Lights cigarettes, with a
suggested retail price of P9.90 per pack.
a. The Lucky Strike brands were initially assessed the excise tax at
P8.96 per pack.
5. Several BIR RRs and RMOs were then issued.
a.   Revenue Regulations No. 9-2003: provided a periodic review
every two years or earlier of the current net retail price of new
brands and variants thereof for the purpose of establishing and
updating their tax classification
b. Revenue Memorandum Order No. 6-2003: prescribed the
guidelines and procedures in establishing current net retail prices
of new brands of cigarettes and alcohol products.
c. Revenue Regulations No. 22-2003: implemented implement the
revised tax classification of certain new brands introduced in the
market based on the survey of their current net retail price.  unduly favor locally produced ones.
6. petitioner filed before the RTC a petition for injunction with prayer for the
issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
a. They contended that the Section 145 of the NIRC, the RRs and
RMOs that were issued discriminate against new brands of
cigarettes, in violation of the equal protection and uniformity
provisions of the Constitution.
7. While the petition was pending, RA 9334 took effect on January 1, 2005. It
a. increased the excise tax rates provided in par (c) of Section 145;
b. mandated that new brands of cigarettes shall initially be classified
according to their suggested net retail price, until such time that their
correct tax bracket is finally determined under a specified period and,
after which, their classification  shall remain in force until revised by
Congress;
c. retained Annex D as tax base of those surveyed as of October 1, 1996.
Said classification shall remain in force until revised by Congress; and
d. provided a legislative freeze on brands of cigarettes introduced between
the period  January 2, 1997  to  December 31, 2003, such that said
cigarettes  shall remain in the classification under which the BIR has
determined them to belong until revised by Congress.
8. RA 9334 renders petitioners liable for taxes in the total sum of P22,775,000.00.
9. Petitioner filed a Motion to Admit Attached Supplement and a Supplement
to the petition for review, assailing the constitutionality of RA 9334 insofar as
it retained Annex D.
ISSUE:
1. WON the  classification freeze provision  violates the equal protection and
uniformity of taxation clauses of the Constitution. NO
2. WON the RRs and RMOs are invalid insofar as they empower the BIR to
reclassify or update the classification of new brands of cigarettes based on
their current net retail prices every two years or earlier. YES
3. WON RA 8240, as amended by RA 9334, and its implementing rules and
regulations violate the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of
1947 NO
RULING:
FIRST ISSUE:
1. A legislative classification that is reasonable does not offend the
constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the laws.  the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices.
a. The classification is considered valid and reasonable provided
that:
i. it rests on substantial distinctions;
ii. it is germane to the purpose of the law;
iii. it applies, all things being equal, to both present and
future conditions
iv. it applies equally to all those belonging to the same
class.
2. The first, third and fourth requisites are satisfied.
a.   The  classification freeze provision  was inserted in the law for
reasons of practicality and expediency.  presented before the trial court is insufficient to
b. Since a new brand was not yet in existence at the time of the
passage of RA 8240, then Congress needed a uniform mechanism
to fix the tax bracket of a new brand.
3. 2 requisite:
nd
a. The  classification freeze provision  was in the main the result of
Congress’ earnest efforts to improve the efficiency and effectivity
of the tax administration over sin products while trying to
balance the same with other state interests.  declared unconstitutional for being regressive in character
i. This addressed Congress’ administrative concerns
regarding delegating too much authority to the DOF
and BIR as this will open the tax system to potential
areas for abuse and corruption.  4.
ii. Congress may have reasonably conceived that a tax
system which would give the least amount of
ART3SEC1
discretion to the tax implementers would address the
problems of tax avoidance and tax evasion.
b. Congress sought to, among others, simplify the whole tax system
for sin products to remove these potential areas of abuse and
corruption from both the side of the taxpayer and the
government.
i.   Without doubt, the  classification freeze provision  was
an integral part of this overall plan. 
c. Aside from the major concern regarding the elimination of
potential areas for abuse and corruption from the tax
administration of sin products, the legislative deliberations also
show that the classification freeze provision  was intended to
generate buoyant and stable revenues for government. 
i. With the frozen tax classifications, the revenue inflow
would remain stable and the government would be
able to predict with a greater degree of certainty the
amount of taxes that a cigarette manufacturer would
pay given the trend in its sales volume over time. 
4. Whether Congress acted improvidently in derogating, to a limited extent, the
states interest in promoting fair competition among the players in the
industry, while pursuing other state interests necessarily go into the wisdom
of the assailed law which the court cannot inquire into, much less overrule. 
THIRD ISSUE
1. The  classification freeze provision  uniformly applies to all newly introduced
brands in the market, whether imported or locally manufactured.
a. It does not purport to single out imported cigarettes in order to
 
BRITISH TOBACCO V NIRC MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
FACTS:
1. In its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner insists that the assailed
provisions
a. violate the equal protection and uniformity of taxation clauses of
the Constitution
b. contravene Section 19 Article XII of the Constitution on unfair
competition
c. infringe the constitutional provisions on regressive and
inequitable taxation. 
2. Petitioner argues that assuming the assailed provisions are constitutional, it
is entitled to a downward reclassification of Lucky Strike from the premium-
priced to the high-priced tax bracket.
RULING:
1. The assailed law does not violate the equal protection and uniformity of
taxation clauses.
a. the rational basis test was properly applied to gauge the
constitutionality of the assailed law in the face of an equal
protection challenge. 
b. Under the rational basis test, it is sufficient that the legislative
classification is rationally related to achieving some legitimate
State interest.
c. A tax is uniform when it operates with the same force and effect
in every place where the subject of it is found.
i. It does not signify an intrinsic but simply a
geographical uniformity.
ii. A levy of tax is not unconstitutional because it is not
intrinsically equal and uniform in its operation.
iii. The uniformity rule does not prohibit classification
for purposes of taxation.
d. Petitioners’s real disagreement lies with the legitimate State
interests. 
i. Equal protection is not a license for courts to judge
ii.   Petitioners’ remedy is with Congress and not this
Court.
2. The assailed provisions do not violate the constitutional prohibition on
unfair competition.
a. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately
brought to the attention of the lower court will not be ordinarily
considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal.
i. Even if the court were to relax this rule, the evidence
establish the alleged violation of the constitutional
proscription against unfair competition.
3. The assailed law does not transgress the constitutional provisions on
regressive and inequitable taxation.
a. The tax does not take into account the person’s ability to pay.
b. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the assailed law may be
because the Constitution does not prohibit the imposition of
indirect taxes but merely provides that Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation.
Petitioner is not entitled to a downward reclassification of Lucky Strike.
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 a. Petitioner acknowledged that the initial tax classification of Lucky Strike i. it rests on substantial distinctions;
may be modified depending on the outcome of the survey which will ii. it is germane to the purpose of the law;
determine the actual current net retail price of Lucky Strike in the market. iii. it applies, all things being equal, to both present and future
b. There was no upward reclassification of Lucky Strike because it was taxed conditions
based on its suggested gross retail price from the time of its introduction in iv. it applies equally to all those belonging to the same class.
the market in 2001 until the BIR market survey in 2003.  7. The first, third and fourth requisites are satisfied.
c. The failure of the BIR to conduct the market survey within the three-month a.   The  classification freeze provision  was inserted in the law for reasons of
period under the revenue regulations then in force can in no way make the practicality and expediency. 
initial tax classification of Lucky Strike based on its suggested gross retail b. Since a new brand was not yet in existence at the time of the passage of
price permanent. RA 8240, then Congress needed a uniform mechanism to fix the tax
d. The issue of timeliness of the market survey was never raised before the bracket of a new brand.
trial court because petitioners theory of the case was wholly anchored on 8. 2 requisite:
nd

the alleged unconstitutionality of the classification freeze provision.  a. The  classification freeze provision  was in the main the result of
i. As a consequence, no documentary evidence as to the actual Congress’ earnest efforts to improve the efficiency and effectivity of
net retail price of Lucky Strike in 2001 was presented before the the tax administration over sin products while trying to balance the
trial court. same with other state interests. 
ii. The rule is that a party is bound by the theory he adopts and by i. This addressed Congress’ administrative concerns regarding
the cause of action he stands on.  delegating too much authority to the DOF and BIR as this
1. He cannot be permitted after having lost thereon to will open the tax system to potential areas for abuse and
repudiate his theory and cause of action, and thereafter, corruption. 
adopt another and seek to re-litigate the matter anew ii. Congress may have reasonably conceived that a tax system
either in the same forum or on appeal. which would give the least amount of discretion to the tax
BRITISH TOBACCO V NIRC implementers would address the problems of tax avoidance
FACTS: and tax evasion.
10. RA 8240 (amending several provisions of the NIRC) took effect on January 1, 1997. b. Congress sought to, among others, simplify the whole tax system for sin
a.   In the same year, Congress passed RA 8424 (The Tax Reform Act of 1997) re- products to remove these potential areas of abuse and corruption from
codifying the NIRC. both the side of the taxpayer and the government.
11. Par (c) of Sec. 145 provides for 4 tiers of tax rates based on the net retail price per pack of i.  Without doubt, the classification freeze provision was an integral
cigarettes.  part of this overall plan. 
a. To determine the applicable tax rates of existing cigarette brands, a survey of the net c. Aside from the major concern regarding the elimination of potential areas
retail prices per pack of cigarettes was conducted. for abuse and corruption from the tax administration of sin products, the
i. The results of this survey were embodied in Annex D of the NIRC as legislative deliberations also show that the classification freeze provision  was
the duly registered, existing or active brands of cigarettes. intended to generate buoyant and stable revenues for government. 
b. As such, new brands of cigarettes shall be taxed according to their current net retail i. With the frozen tax classifications, the revenue inflow would
price while existing or old brands shall be taxed based on their net retail price. remain stable and the government would be able to predict
12. BIR issued  RR 1-97  which classified the existing brands of cigarettes as those duly with a greater degree of certainty the amount of taxes that a
registered or active brands prior to Jan 1, 1997. cigarette manufacturer would pay given the trend in its sales
a.  New brands shall be initially assessed at their suggested retail price until such time that volume over time. 
the appropriate survey to determine their current net retail price is conducted. 9. Whether Congress acted improvidently in derogating, to a limited extent, the states
13. In 2001, British American Tobacco introduced into the market Lucky Strike Filter, Lucky interest in promoting fair competition among the players in the industry, while pursuing
Strike Lights and Lucky Strike Menthol Lights cigarettes, with a suggested retail price of other state interests necessarily go into the wisdom of the assailed law which the court
P9.90 per pack. cannot inquire into, much less overrule. 
a. The Lucky Strike brands were initially assessed the excise tax at P8.96 per pack. THIRD ISSUE
14. Several BIR RRs and RMOs were then issued. 2. The  classification freeze provision  uniformly applies to all newly introduced brands in the
a.   Revenue Regulations No. 9-2003: provided a periodic review every two years or market, whether imported or locally manufactured.
earlier of the current net retail price of new brands and variants thereof for the a. It does not purport to single out imported cigarettes in order to unduly
purpose of establishing and updating their tax classification favor locally produced ones. 
b. Revenue Memorandum Order No. 6-2003: prescribed the guidelines and
procedures in establishing current net retail prices of new brands of cigarettes and
alcohol products.
c. Revenue Regulations No. 22-2003: implemented implement the revised tax
classification of certain new brands introduced in the market based on the survey of
their current net retail price. 
15. petitioner filed before the RTC a petition for injunction with prayer for the issuance of
a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
a. They contended that the Section 145 of the NIRC, the RRs and RMOs
that were issued discriminate against new brands of cigarettes, in violation
of the equal protection and uniformity provisions of the Constitution.
16. While the petition was pending, RA 9334 took effect on January 1, 2005. It
a. increased the excise tax rates provided in par (c) of Section 145;
b. mandated that new brands of cigarettes shall initially be classified according to their
suggested net retail price, until such time that their correct tax bracket is finally
determined under a specified period and, after which, their classification shall remain in
force until revised by Congress;
c. retained Annex D as tax base of those surveyed as of October 1, 1996. Said
classification shall remain in force until revised by Congress; and
d. provided a legislative freeze on brands of cigarettes introduced between the
period January 2, 1997 to December 31, 2003, such that said cigarettes shall remain
in the classification under which the BIR has determined them to belong until revised by
Congress.
17. RA 9334 renders petitioners liable for taxes in the total sum of P22,775,000.00.
18. Petitioner filed a Motion to Admit Attached Supplement  and a Supplement to the
petition for review, assailing the constitutionality of RA 9334 insofar as it retained
Annex D.
ISSUE:
4. WON the  classification freeze provision  violates the equal protection and uniformity of
taxation clauses of the Constitution. NO
5. WON the RRs and RMOs are invalid insofar as they empower the BIR to reclassify or
update the classification of new brands of cigarettes based on their current net retail
prices every two years or earlier. YES
6. WON RA 8240, as amended by RA 9334, and its implementing rules and regulations
violate the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947 NO
RULING:
FIRST ISSUE:
5. Since the case is not a case which involves suspect classification nor impinges on
fundamental/constitutional rights, the rational test basis is applicable.
6. A legislative classification that is reasonable does not offend the constitutional guaranty
of the equal protection of the laws. 
a. The classification is considered valid and reasonable provided that:

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