Cases CHR

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994
BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO

OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN DOES, respondents.
The City Attorney for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
VITUG, J.:
The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights ("CHR") is again placed into
focus in this petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. The
petitioners ask us to prohibit public respondent CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case
No. 90-1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."
The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the
petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management
Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being
the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the
respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the
questioned premises of North EDSA.1Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private
respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give way to the
"People's Park".2 On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint
(Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR
Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of
Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along
North EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580.3 On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued
an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA
pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said
petitioners to appear before the CHR.4
On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July 1990, as well as
CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990 the petitioners carried out the
demolition of private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia,5 the CHR, in its resolution of 1
August 1990, ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of
the private respondents to purchase light housing materials and food under the Commission's supervision
and again directed the petitioners to "desist from further demolition, with the warning that violation of said
order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest."6
A motion to dismiss,7 dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The motion also averred,
among other things, that:
1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the (petitioners) of the Inter-
Agency Memorandum of Agreement whereby Metro-Manila Mayors agreed on a
moratorium in the demolition of the dwellings of poor dwellers in Metro-Manila;
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3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the moratorium referred to therein
refers to moratorium in the demolition of the structures of poor dwellers;
4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but independent business
entrepreneurs even this Honorable Office admitted in its resolution of 1 August 1990 that
the complainants are indeed, vendors;
5. that the complainants (were) occupying government land, particularly the sidewalk of
EDSA corner North Avenue, Quezon City; . . . and
6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive discretion and
authority whether or not a certain business establishment (should) be allowed to operate
within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, to revoke or cancel a permit, if already issued, upon
grounds clearly specified by law and ordinance. 8
During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement, arguing that the motion
to dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be resolved. The petitioners likewise manifested that
they would bring the case to the courts.
On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners, stating that the
Commission's authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of
civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and political
rights, (but) their privilege to engage in business."9
On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for resolution, along with the
contempt charge that had meantime been filed by the private respondents, albeit vigorously objected to
by petitioners (on the ground that the motion to dismiss was still then unresolved). 10
In an Order,11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the
demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine
of P500.00 on each of them.
On 1 March 1991,12 the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and supplemental
motion to dismiss, in this wise:
Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional mandate had
jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the squatters-vendors who complained of the gross
violations of their human and constitutional rights. The motion to dismiss should be and is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.13
The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to create only a paper
tiger limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial
body with the power to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all
persons within the Philippines . . . ." It added:
The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to development, to life and to
dignity. All these brazenly and violently ignored and trampled upon by respondents with
little regard at the same time for the basic rights of women and children, and their health,
safety and welfare. Their actions have psychologically scarred and traumatized the
children, who were witness and exposed to such a violent demonstration of Man's
inhumanity to man.
In an Order,14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this recourse.
The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution15 of 25 June 1991; it was subsequently reinstated,
however, in our resolution16 of 18 June 1991, in which we also issued a temporary restraining order,
directing the CHR to "CEASE and DESIST from further hearing CHR No. 90-1580."17
The petitioners pose the following:
Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:
a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents whose stalls
were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;
b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and
c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition.
In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General was excused from filing his comment
for public respondent CHR. The latter thus filed its own comment,18 through Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of
its Commissioners. The Court also resolved to dispense with the comment of private respondent Roque
Fermo, who had since failed to comply with the resolution, dated 18 July 1991, requiring such comment.
The petition has merit.
The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987

Constitution.19 It was formally constituted by then President Corazon Aquino via Executive Order No.
163,20 issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her legislative power at the time. It succeeded, but so
superseded as well, the Presidential Committee on Human Rights.21
The powers and functions22 of the Commission are defined by the 1987 Constitution, thus: to —
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for
violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons
within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive
measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been
violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance
respect for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to
provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations
on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the
truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the
performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the intention
of the members of the Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial body.23 This view,
however, has not heretofore been shared by this Court. In Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights, 24 the
Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed that it is "only
the first of the enumerated powers and functions that bears any resemblance to adjudication or
adjudgment," but that resemblance can in no way be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The
Court explained:
. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental law to be
another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over
the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is
that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards
claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not
adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively,
finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by
law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other kernel of this
controversy and, its is, to determine the extent of CHR's investigative power.
It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term that any attempt to define it,
albeit not a few have tried, could at best be described as inconclusive. Let us observe. In a symposium on
human rights in the Philippines, sponsored by the University of the Philippines in 1977, one of the
questions that has been propounded is "(w)hat do you understand by "human rights?" The participants,
representing different sectors of the society, have given the following varied answers:
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity. They are
the same in all parts of the world, whether the Philippines or England, Kenya or the
Soviet Union, the United States or Japan, Kenya or Indonesia . . . .
Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property; freedom of
speech, of the press, of religion, academic freedom, and the rights of the accused to due
process of law; political rights, such as the right to elect public officials, to be elected to
public office, and to form political associations and engage in politics; and social rights,
such as the right to an education, employment, and social services.25
Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact
of his humanity. . . . Because they are inherent, human rights are not granted by the
State but can only be recognized and protected by it.26
(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights defined
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.27
Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of
his natural birth, right, innate and inalienable.28
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically, the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
suggests that the scope of human rights can be understood to include those that relate to an individual's
social, economic, cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the term to the
universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is generally considered to be
his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life.
Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our 1986 Constitutional
Commission in adopting the specific provisions on human rights and in creating an independent
commission to safeguard these rights? It may of value to look back at the country's experience under the
martial law regime which may have, in fact, impelled the inclusions of those provisions in our fundamental
law. Many voices have been heard. Among those voices, aptly represented perhaps of the sentiments
expressed by others, comes from Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a respected jurist and an advocate of civil
liberties, who, in his paper, entitled "Present State of Human Rights in the Philippines," 29 observes:
But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their Bill of Rights most
of the human rights expressed in the International Covenant, these rights became
unavailable upon the proclamation of Martial Law on 21 September 1972. Arbitrary action
then became the rule. Individuals by the thousands became subject to arrest upon
suspicion, and were detained and held for indefinite periods, sometimes for years,
without charges, until ordered released by the Commander-in-Chief or this
representative. The right to petition for the redress of grievances became useless, since
group actions were forbidden. So were strikes. Press and other mass media were
subjected to censorship and short term licensing. Martial law brought with it the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and judges lost independence and security of
tenure, except members of the Supreme Court. They were required to submit letters of
resignation and were dismissed upon the acceptance thereof. Torture to extort
confessions were practiced as declared by international bodies like Amnesty International
and the International Commission of Jurists.
Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we can see the following
discussions during its 26 August 1986 deliberations:
MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made clear in view of the
importance of human rights and also because civil and political rights have been
determined by many international covenants and human rights legislations in the
Philippines, as well as the Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights and subsequent
legislation. Otherwise, if we cover such a wide territory in area, we might diffuse its
impact and the precise nature of its task, hence, its effectivity would also be curtailed.
So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks so that the commission can be
most effective.
MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and political rights are very
broad. The Article on the Bill of Rights covers civil and political rights. Every single right of
an individual involves his civil right or his political right. So, where do we draw the line?
MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights have been made clear in the
language of human rights advocates, as well as in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights which addresses a number of articles on the right to life, the right against torture,
the right to fair and public hearing, and so on. These are very specific rights that are
considered enshrined in many international documents and legal instruments as
constituting civil and political rights, and these are precisely what we want to defend here.
MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and political rights as defined in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights distinguished this right against torture.
MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights that we have?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will encompass social and economic rights,
and there are other violations of rights of citizens which can be addressed to the proper
courts and authorities.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to define its functions, and,
therefore, in doing that the commission will be authorized to take under its wings cases
which perhaps heretofore or at this moment are under the jurisdiction of the ordinary
investigative and prosecutorial agencies of the government. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier that we would like to define the
specific parameters which cover civil and political rights as covered by the international
standards governing the behavior of governments regarding the particular political and
civil rights of citizens, especially of political detainees or prisoners. This particular aspect
we have experienced during martial law which we would now like to safeguard.
MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I had. Therefore, what we are really
trying to say is, perhaps, at the proper time we could specify all those rights stated in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and defined as human rights. Those are the rights
that we envision here?
MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our
Constitution. They are integral parts of that.
MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all the rights under the Bill of
Rights covered by human rights?
MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and political rights.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of human rights, I would like
to state that in the past regime, everytime we invoke the violation of human rights, the
Marcos regime came out with the defense that, as a matter of fact, they had defended the
rights of people to decent living, food, decent housing and a life consistent with human
dignity.
So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to political rights. Is that the
sense of the committee, so as not to confuse the issue?
MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.
MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to repeated points raised by the
previous speaker.
There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights could act
effectively: 1) protection of rights of political detainees; 2) treatment of prisoners and the
prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public trials; 4) cases of disappearances; 5) salvagings
and hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed against the religious.
xxx xxx xxx
The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.
I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner Garcia that we should, in
order to make the proposed Commission more effective, delimit as much as possible,
without prejudice to future expansion. The coverage of the concept and jurisdictional area
of the term "human rights". I was actually disturbed this morning when the reference was
made without qualification to the rights embodied in the universal Declaration of Human
Rights, although later on, this was qualified to refer to civil and political rights contained
therein.
If I remember correctly, Madam President, Commissioner Garcia, after mentioning the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, mentioned or linked the concept of
human right with other human rights specified in other convention which I do not
remember. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the Declaration of Torture of 1985?
MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner mentioned another.
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the International Convention on Civil
and Political Rights of which we are signatory.
MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that, although I have a copy of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights here, I do not have a copy of the other covenant mentioned.
It is quite possible that there are rights specified in that other convention which may not
be specified here. I was wondering whether it would be wise to link our concept of human
rights to general terms like "convention," rather than specify the rights contained in the
convention.
As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned, the Committee, before
the period of amendments, could specify to us which of these articles in the Declaration
will fall within the concept of civil and political rights, not for the purpose of including these
in the proposed constitutional article, but to give the sense of the Commission as to what
human rights would be included, without prejudice to expansion later on, if the need
arises. For example, there was no definite reply to the question of Commissioner
Regalado as to whether the right to marry would be considered a civil or a social right. It
is not a civil right?
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the various specific civil and political
rights that we felt must be envisioned initially by this provision — freedom from political
detention and arrest prevention of torture, right to fair and public trials, as well as crimes
involving disappearance, salvagings, hamlettings and collective violations. So, it is limited
to politically related crimes precisely to protect the civil and political rights of a specific
group of individuals, and therefore, we are not opening it up to all of the definite areas.
MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record, the Gentlemen is no longer
linking his concept or the concept of the Committee on Human Rights with the so-called
civil or political rights as contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I
was referring to an international instrument.
MR. GUINGONA. I know.
MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to each and every specific article
therein, but only to those that pertain to the civil and politically related, as we understand
it in this Commission on Human Rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even clear as to the distinction between
civil and social rights.
MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the International Covenant and
Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights. The second covenant contains all the different rights-the rights of labor to
organize, the right to education, housing, shelter, et cetera.
MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of the committee to
those that the Gentlemen has specified.
MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
xxx xxx xxx

SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the victims of human rights, I cannot
stress more on how much we need a Commission on Human Rights. . . .
. . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They cannot pay and very few lawyers
will accept clients who do not pay. And so, they are the ones more abused and
oppressed. Another reason is, the cases involved are very delicate — torture, salvaging,
picking up without any warrant of arrest, massacre — and the persons who are allegedly
guilty are people in power like politicians, men in the military and big shots. Therefore,
this Human Rights Commission must be independent.
I would like very much to emphasize how much we need this commission, especially for
the little Filipino, the little individual who needs this kind of help and cannot get it. And I
think we should concentrate only on civil and political violations because if we open this
to land, housing and health, we will have no place to go again and we will not receive any
response. . . .30 (emphasis supplied)
The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision
empowering the Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party,
all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights" (Sec. 1).
The term "civil rights,"31 has been defined as referring —
(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider sense, to
all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or administration of the
government. They include the rights of property, marriage, equal protection of the laws,
freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights appertaining to a
person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. Such term may also refer, in
its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.
Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious persecution,
unreasonable searches and seizures, and imprisonment for debt. 32
Political rights,33 on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the
right of petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of
government.34
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the
delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe
cases of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1)
protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair
and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes
committed against the religious." While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any preclusive
effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has
set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive
delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead,
that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the
authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation."35
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-
sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which
is planned to be developed into a "People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of
Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent
danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which
is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact,
extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances
obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the
stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the compartment of "human
rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution.
On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and
rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court."
Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold
any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the
procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however,
should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of
procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt
could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold
relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work.
The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is
not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not possess.
In Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights,36 the Court, speaking through
Madame Justice Carolina Griño-Aquino, explained:
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and
legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need
protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a
restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the intention, the Constitution would
have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law". It is
never derived by implication.
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution
refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction) which
the CHR may seek from proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations.
Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of
preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is
pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme
Court. . . . A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a
pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interests of a
party thereto, and for no other purpose." (footnotes omitted).
The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and
recommendations to any appropriate agency of government.37
The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way of financial aid to the
vendors affected by the demolition is not an appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not only is there lack
of locus standi on the part of the petitioners to question the disbursement but, more importantly, the
matter lies with the appropriate administrative agencies concerned to initially consider.
The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners has become moot
and academic since the case before it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has already been fully heard, and that
the matter is merely awaiting final resolution. It is true that prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain
the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already
accomplished. 38 Here, however, said Commission admittedly has yet to promulgate its resolution in CHR
Case No. 90-1580. The instant petition has been intended, among other things, to also prevent CHR from
precisely doing that.39
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission on Human Rights is
hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580 and from implementing the
P500.00 fine for contempt. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued by this Court is made
permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason
and Puno, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I reiterate my separate opinion in "Carino, et al. vs. The Commission on Human rights, et al.," G.R. No.
96681, 2 December 1991, 204 SCRA 483 in relation to the resolution of 29 January 1991 and my
dissenting opinion in "Export Processing Zone Authority vs. The Commission on Human Rights,
et al.," G.R. No. 101476, 14 April 1992, 208 SCRA 125. I am of the considered view that the CHR can
issue a cease and desist order to maintain a status quo pending its investigation of a case involving an
alleged human rights violation; that such cease and desist order maybe necessary in situations involving
a threatened violation of human rights, which the CHR intents to investigate.
In the case at bench, I would consider the threatened demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderias as well as the temporary shanties owned by the private respondents as posing prima
facie a case of human rights violation because it involves an impairment of the civil rights of said private
respondents, under the definition of civil rights cited by the majority opinion (pp. 20-21) and which the
CHR has unquestioned authority to investigate (Section 18, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution).
Human rights demand more than lip service and extend beyond impressive displays of placards at street
corners. Positive action and results are what count. Certainly, the cause of human rights is not enhanced
when the very constitutional agency tasked to protect and vindicate human rights is transformed by us,
from the start, into a tiger without dentures but with maimed legs to boot. I submit the CHR should be
given a wide latitude to look into and investigate situations which may (or may not ultimately) involve
human rights violations.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further
proceedings.
# Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I reiterate my separate opinion in "Carino, et al. vs. The Commission on Human rights, et al.," G.R. No.
96681, 2 December 1991, 204 SCRA 483 in relation to the resolution of 29 January 1991 and my
dissenting opinion in "Export Processing Zone Authority vs. The Commission on Human Rights,
et al.," G.R. No. 101476, 14 April 1992, 208 SCRA 125. I am of the considered view that the CHR can
issue a cease and desist order to maintain a status quo pending its investigation of a case involving an
alleged human rights violation; that such cease and desist order maybe necessary in situations involving
a threatened violation of human rights, which the CHR intents to investigate.
In the case at bench, I would consider the threatened demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderias as well as the temporary shanties owned by the private respondents as posing prima
facie a case of human rights violation because it involves an impairment of the civil rights of said private
respondents, under the definition of civil rights cited by the majority opinion (pp. 20-21) and which the
CHR has unquestioned authority to investigate (Section 18, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution).
Human rights demand more than lip service and extend beyond impressive displays of placards at street
corners. Positive action and results are what count. Certainly, the cause of human rights is not enhanced
when the very constitutional agency tasked to protect and vindicate human rights is transformed by us,
from the start, into a tiger without dentures but with maimed legs to boot. I submit the CHR should be
given a wide latitude to look into and investigate situations which may (or may not ultimately) involve
human rights violations.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further
proceedings.
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor
children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD
DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health,
HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON.
MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204934
ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its
President, Maria Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro, Jose S.
Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. &
Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho & Traquilina
Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and on behalf
of their minor children, Therese Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel F
emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses
Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves and on behalf of their minor children,
Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor & Mildred C.
Castor for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil
C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho
for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin
Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine V. Racho for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho,
Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for
themselves and on behalf of their minor child Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her
minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R.
Laws, Joseph R . Laws & Katrina R. Laws, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and
Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development,
HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ARSENIO M.
BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and NEDA Director-General, THE PHILIPPINE
COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its Chairperson, Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE
PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, represented by its President Eduardo Banzon,
THE LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Alfonso Umali,
THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Oscar Rodriguez, and
THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Donato
Marcos,Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204957
TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S. AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204988
SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as
President and in his personal capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr.
Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of the school board and in his personal capacity,
ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G.
NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP,Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health;
HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205003
EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE
PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR
GENERAL, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205043
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, DILG SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205138
PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its National

President, Atty. Ricardo M . Ribo, and in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B.
Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan,
Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno and
Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN, Secretary,
Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General,
National Economic and Development Authority, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO, Director-General, Food
and Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation,
and THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on Women, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205478
REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND
JOSEPHINE MILLADO-LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life, and ANTHONY
PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G. MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE
NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively known as Filipinos For
Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of
Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA.
ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205491

SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for
themselves, their Posterity, and the rest of Filipino posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205720
PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as Executive Director,

and in her personal capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A.
CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA, CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY,
WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 206355
MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA BORROMEO-
GARCIA, STELLAACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207111
JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN
Q. VERDEJO, ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary,
MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207172
COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO AND
FRANCESCA ISABELLE BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR.
and DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N. RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207563
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the
Department of Health, and HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management,Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court
has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest
possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his
beliefs , and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the
common good."1
To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a developed country,
leaving our people beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment. While governmental
policies have been geared towards the revitalization of the economy, the bludgeoning dearth in social
services remains to be a problem that concerns not only the poor, but every member of society. The
government continues to tread on a trying path to the realization of its very purpose, that is, the general
welfare of the Filipino people and the development of the country as a whole. The legislative branch, as
the main facet of a representative government, endeavors to enact laws and policies that aim to remedy
looming societal woes, while the executive is closed set to fully implement these measures and bring
concrete and substantial solutions within the reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the judicial
branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental body that merely casts its watchful eyes on
clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when called into action,
the Judiciary then willingly embarks on its solemn duty to interpret legislation vis-a-vis the most vital and
enduring principle that holds Philippine society together - the supremacy of the Philippine Constitution.
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control,
abortion and contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects
and their perceived consequences freely circulate in various media. From television debates 2 to sticker
campaigns,3 from rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the
clergy4 - the clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and
progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold
support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21,
2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of
society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down
constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the
Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-
intervention, to wit:
(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely
Ann C. Imbong, in their personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of
their minor children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned
educational institution (Jmbong);
(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc.,
through its president, Atty. Maria Concepcion S. Noche7 and several others8 in their personal
capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations unborn (ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano
S. Avila, in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City,
Inc.,11 Rosevale Foundation, Inc.,12 a domestic, privately-owned educational institution, and
several others,13 in their capacities as citizens (Serve Life);
(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);
(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace
Apostolate of the Philippines,16 in their capacities as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);
(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians
Inc.,18 and several others19 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (PAX);
(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others,21 in their capacities as
citizens and taxpayers (Echavez);
(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad
and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet
unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity as a member of the Bar (Tatad);
(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation Inc.24 and
several others,25 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its associates who
are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);
(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa,
Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their capacities as
citizens, taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF);
(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several others,29 in
their capacities as citizens (Juat) ;
(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and
several others,31in their capacities as citizens (CFC);
(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Tillah); and
(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen and a
taxpayer (Alcantara); and
(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited

political party.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law
on the following GROUNDS:
• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding
its declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the
purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in
violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of
the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.35
• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products.
The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives which are
hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and other health problems. 36
• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law
violates the constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for
the procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that
are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring
religious freedom.37
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution,
imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who
seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct
information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and
convictions.38
In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-
IRR),39 provides that skilled health professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited to,
Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical officers, medical specialists, rural health physicians,
hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are specifically charged with the
duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors. 40
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools
should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs. 41
While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that
the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to
justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech. 42
• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the
petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be
accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of
pro bona services for indigent women, under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and
other forms of punishment.43
The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner
would effectively be forced to render reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth
accreditation would mean that the majority of the public would no longer be able to avail of the
practitioners services.44
• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law
discriminates against the poor as it makes them the primary target of the government program
that promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting reproductive
health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that would effectively
reduce the number of the poor.45
• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. In
imposing the penalty of imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does
not define the type of conduct to be treated as "violation" of the RH Law.46
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by
removing from them (the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health
facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer."47 It ignores the management prerogative
inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their own discretion and
judgment.
• The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of
family planning methods is plainly to curtail his right to expound only his own preferred way of
family planning. The petitioners note that although exemption is granted to institutions owned and
operated by religious groups, they are still forced to refer their patients to another healthcare
facility willing to perform the service or procedure.48
• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is
contended that the RH Law providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon
their constitutional right to raise their children in accordance with their beliefs. 49
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health
procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of
spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-being of their family. In the same
breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of
parental authority to determine whether their child should use contraceptives. 50
• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The
petitioners question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a
product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL). 51
• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of
the Constitution.52
• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53
• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for
reproductive health measures at the local government level and the ARMM, infringes upon the
powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government Code and R.A . No.
9054.54
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-intervention in
defense of the constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which
commented on the petitions in behalf of the respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,56 former
officials of the Department of Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G.
Romualdez,57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for Reproductive Health (C4RH),58 Ana Theresa "Risa"
Hontiveros,59 and Atty. Joan De Venecia60 also filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention in
conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted
leave to intervene.61
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the
dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and,
therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to
question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the
Court has no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo
Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of
one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.62
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to determine
and/or identify the pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which these issues were to
be discussed in the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the
cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered extended until further
orders of the Court.63
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60) days
and, at the same time posed several questions for their clarification on some contentions of the parties. 64
The Status Quo Ante
(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws
Prior to the RH Law
Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation and distribution
of contraceptive drugs and devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729
entitled "An Act to Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and
Devices." Although contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed, they could not be sold, dispensed or
distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner." 65
In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to "dispensing of
abortifacients or anti-conceptional substances and devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided
that "no drug or chemical product or device capable of provoking abortion or preventing conception as
classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be delivered or sold to any person without a proper
prescription by a duly licensed physician."
On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population, which recognized
that the population problem should be considered as the principal element for long-term economic
development, enacted measures that promoted male vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate population
growth.67 Among these measures included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August 16, 1971, entitled "An Act
Establishing a National Policy on Population, Creating the Commission on Population and for Other
Purposes. " The law envisioned that "family planning will be made part of a broad educational program;
safe and effective means will be provided to couples desiring to space or limit family size; mortality and
morbidity rates will be further reduced."
To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential Decree.
(P.D.) No. 79,68 dated December 8, 1972, which, among others, made "family planning a part of a broad
educational program," provided "family planning services as a part of over-all health care," and made
"available all acceptable methods of contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino citizens desirous of
spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods evolved from being a
component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly,
reproductive health.69 Under that policy, the country gave priority to one's right to freely choose the
method of family planning to be adopted, in conformity with its adherence to the commitments made in
the International Conference on Population and Development.70 Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country
enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna Carta for Women, " which, among others, mandated the State to
provide for comprehensive health services and programs for women, including family planning and sex
education.71
The RH Law
Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an
uncontrollable pace. From a paltry number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the
country reached over 76 million in the year 2000 and over 92 million in 2010.72 The executive and the
legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH Law was
enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and information to the full
range of modem family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples' right
to reproductive health be achieved. To make it more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health
providers to provide information on the full range of modem family planning methods, supplies and
services, and for schools to provide reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law
criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.
Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws
on contraception, women's health and population control.
Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in
particular, argues that the government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH
Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect
and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo ante - the situation prior to the passage of the RH
Law - must be maintained."73 It explains:
x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided under
Republic Act No. 5921 and Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are
prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by a physician. What the Petitioners find
deplorable and repugnant under the RH Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the entire
bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay officials in the remotest areas of the
country - is made to play in the implementation of the contraception program to the fullest extent possible
using taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder and provider of all forms of family planning
methods and the implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of, and universal
access to, a full range of family planning methods, devices and supplies. 74
ISSUES
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and
refined them to the following principal issues:
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
1] Power of Judicial Review
2] Actual Case or Controversy

3] Facial Challenge
4] Locus Standi
5] Declaratory Relief
6] One Subject/One Title Rule
II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
1] Right to Life
2] Right to Health
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
4] The Family
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6] Due Process
7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM
DISCUSSION
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the Court to
resolve some procedural impediments.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.
The Power of Judicial Review
In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to the
legislative and political wisdom of Congress and respect the compromises made in the crafting of the RH
Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian democratic process"75 and "characterized by an inordinate
amount of transparency."76 The OSG posits that the authority of the Court to review social legislation like
the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests the discretion to implement the
constitutional policies and positive norms with the political departments, in particular, with Congress. 77 It
further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council,78 the
remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the
acts of the legislature.79
Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the
assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government has yet to
distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged
"on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure.80
In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the
Legislature, it is often sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due respect
to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the
separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government, which obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. 81
Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines;82 (b) the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines; 83 and (c) the
judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.84 The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of powers
among the three branches of government.85
In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which
imposes upon the courts proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the
other branches of government, in striking down the acts of the Executive or the Legislature as
unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and caution. 86
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability, the
great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. 87 In order
to address this, the Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal
branch done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the
line of separation - but only at a very limited and specific point - to determine whether the acts of the
executive and the legislative branches are null because they were undertaken with grave abuse of
discretion.88 Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the
RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results. 89 The
Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and principles
embodied in the Constitution.
In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the
Constitution makes no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it
in the form of social legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to the earlier point. The
Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive branches, since its
duty is not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in consonance
with their respective authorities and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review,
the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the
actions under review.90 This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly
provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government. [Emphases supplied]
As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify,
when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on applied in Macalintal v.
COMELEC,92 Aldaba v. COMELEC,93 Magallona v. Ermita,94 and countless others. In Tanada, the Court
wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the
petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary
to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate)
remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the
application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it
becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied]
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is
essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers
among the three great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the
boundaries of authority and control between them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only,
medium of participation - or instrument of intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing operation.95
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule
on just any and every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power
of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case. 96
Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any actual case or
controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented.97 They claim that the questions raised by
the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged with violating
any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely
affected by its operation.98 In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law is premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion.99 The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly
interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete,
touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings
must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the
other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought
to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in
nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of
facts.100
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. 101 A question
is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has
then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the
challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of the act complained of102
In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines, 103 where the
constitutionality of an unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)
was put in question, it was argued that the Court has no authority to pass upon the issues raised as there
was yet no concrete act performed that could possibly violate the petitioners' and the intervenors' rights.
Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the law or act in question being not yet effective does
not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a
singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for
judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect
and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject
petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the
Judiciary to settle the dispute.104
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical
providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof,
particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of
retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that
the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure. 105
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge,
is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all
other rights in the First Amendment.106 These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the
right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.107 After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful
assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they are modes which
one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained,
albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly
penal statues,108 it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also
those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. 109 The underlying reason for this
modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is
mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.110 Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with
its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional
human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been
violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions
and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the
simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive
branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of
the Filipino people.
Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends
that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be
enforced and applied against them,111 and the government has yet to distribute reproductive health
devices that are abortive.112
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status
as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. 113 It
requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.114
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the
constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from
challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not
before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.115
Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure,
hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when
the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest."116
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,117 the Court held that in cases of paramount
importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed
and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of
judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases,118 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to
question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an indirect and general
interest shared in common with the public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-applied
challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus s tandi requirement. It has
accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest
affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked.
The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one
occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens,
taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured
by the operation of a law or any other government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR: 119
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical
defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised
herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the
youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the
well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to
facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
(Emphasis supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench
and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically
affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression
and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and
reproductive health have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court
entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance warranting immediate
court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn
which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the
Constitution are being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child is
at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.
Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over
which the Court has no original jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for
injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65,
over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for
injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.121
One Subject-One Title
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ),
Article VI of the Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for
reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional
standards of due process by concealing its true intent - to act as a population control measure.123
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control
measure,124 and that the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both
interrelated as they are inseparable.125
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a
population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's
population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes
pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos,
especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the full range of modem family
planning products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or modem, however, are clearly
geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the
country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large
portion of the law, however, covers the dissemination of information and provisions on access to
medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care
services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the
entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law.126 Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to
contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses its very foundation. 127 As earlier explained, "the
other positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-natal
services, prevention and management of reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already
provided for in the Magna Carta for Women."128
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr.
v. The Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of
the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the
minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to
include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested
are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover,
this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so as not to
cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health"
and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the
population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons
including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human
development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and
information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that
the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as
to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or
different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or
scope of the act."129
Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears
to the attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the
Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the
contents of the assailed legislation.
II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1-The Right to Life

Position of the Petitioners
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn child under
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to
abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion.130
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law
considers contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb
as an abortifacient; thus, sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after fertilization and prior to
implantation, contrary to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized
ovum which already has life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives,
intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning
products and supplies, medical research shows that contraceptives use results in abortion as they
operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has life.131
As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that the
State sanction of contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man. 132
Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) to certify that the product or supply is not to be used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation
effectively confirms that abortifacients are not prohibited. Also considering that the FDA is not the agency
that will actually supervise or administer the use of these products and supplies to prospective patients,
there is no way it can truthfully make a certification that it shall not be used for abortifacient purposes.133
Position of the Respondents
For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was
simply the prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since
the said law emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive health care services, methods, devices
products and supplies shall be made accessible to the public.134
According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are not
abortifacients by enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due consideration to various
studies and consultations with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other experts in the medical
field, it is asserted that the Court afford deference and respect to such a determination and pass
judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on determined as an abortive. 135
For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life is not
violated considering that various studies of the WHO show that life begins from the implantation of the
fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is constitutional since the law specifically
provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized ovum are allowed. 136
The Court's Position
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life. 137
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore,
not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any
authority or the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not of
recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale,
Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing
rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent fertilization, 138 to the promotion of male
vasectomy and tubal ligation,139 and the ratification of numerous international agreements, the country
has long recognized the need to promote population control through the use of contraceptives in order to
achieve long-term economic development. Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and
other family planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one
centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.140
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health and the
overall promotion of the family's well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The
Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of
Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national population program
has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion" and the "principle of non-
coercion."141 As will be discussed later, these principles are not merely grounded on administrative policy,
but rather, originates from the constitutional protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and
guarantee religious freedom.
When Life Begins*
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a scientific
and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During
the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that the individual members of the Court could express
their own views on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section
12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as
a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the
unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for
civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable because
before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is
mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen because,
amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception is
reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of
when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the
female ovum by the male sperm.142 On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that
conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the uterus. 143
Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in their plain
and ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council: 144
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear,
plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much
as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use.
What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the
power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they
say. Verba legis non est recedendum - from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because
the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in whose
consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as
described and defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant, formation of a
viable zygote; the fertilization that results in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its
parents.145
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the female
ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of survival and maturation under normal
conditions.146
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing
Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano, 147 it was written:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she
could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life
of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn
already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
[Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the
State "has respect for human life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest
in preserving and promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was referred to, or cited, as a
baby or a child.149
Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the
term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly
refers to the moment of "fertilization." The records reflect the following:
Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:
"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of
conception."
When is the moment of conception?
xxx
Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm that
there is human life. x x x.150
xxx
As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life, it was
explained:
Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that needs to be
answered is: Is the fertilized ovum alive? Biologically categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive.
First of all, like all living organisms, it takes in nutrients which it processes by itself. It begins doing this
upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it multiplies itself at
a geometric rate in the continuous process of cell division. All these processes are vital signs of life.
Therefore, there is no question that biologically the fertilized ovum has life.
The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the moment of
conception, the nuclei of the ovum and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes from the
ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the sperm to form a total of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome
count of 46 is found only - and I repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.
Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized ovum is
both alive and human, then, as night follows day, it must be human life. Its nature is human. 151
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the moment of
fertilization" was not because of doubt when human life begins, but rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us here before with the
scientific phrase "fertilized ovum" may be beyond the comprehension of some people; we want to use the
simpler phrase "from the moment of conception."152
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the Constitution, it was
discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a Constitution,
without specifying "from the moment of conception."
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the Commissioner's own
admission, he would leave it to Congress to define when life begins. So, Congress can define life to begin
from six months after fertilization; and that would really be very, very, dangerous. It is now determined by
science that life begins from the moment of conception. There can be no doubt about it. So we should not
give any doubt to Congress, too.153
Upon further inquiry, it was asked:
Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is one of the
questions I was going to raise during the period of interpellations but it has been expressed already. The
provision, as proposed right now states:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of
conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the sperm?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.
Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain
contraceptives that we know today are abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of the so-called
contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has already occurred, the next
process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take root. What happens with some
contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the fertilized ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we
take the provision as it is proposed, these so called contraceptives should be banned.
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called abortifacient and,
therefore, would be unconstitutional and should be banned under this provision.
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not these
certain contraceptives are abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now proposed,
they are already considered abortifacient.154
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that
the State shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest
opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It is
also apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting
measures that would allow it determine when life begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives
for being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a
constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized that the determination of whether a contraceptive
device is an abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on based on
established evidence.155
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an
abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male
sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed
non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.
As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I would
like not only to protect the life of the unborn, but also the lives of the millions of people in the world by
fighting for a nuclear-free world. I would just like to be assured of the legal and pragmatic implications of
the term "protection of the life of the unborn from the moment of conception." I raised some of these
implications this afternoon when I interjected in the interpellation of Commissioner Regalado. I would like
to ask that question again for a categorical answer.
I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of conception" we
are also actually saying "no," not "maybe," to certain contraceptives which are already being encouraged
at this point in time. Is that the sense of the committee or does it disagree with me?
Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is no unborn
yet. That is yet unshaped.
Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives, such as the
intra-uterine device which actually stops the egg which has already been fertilized from taking route to the
uterus. So if we say "from the moment of conception," what really occurs is that some of these
contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.
Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.
Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156
The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by petitioners
during the oral arguments. There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not
classified as abortifacients.157
Atty. Noche:
Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.
Justice Bersamin:
There is no life.
Atty. Noche:
So, there is no life to be protected.
Justice Bersamin:
To be protected.
Atty. Noche:
Under Section 12, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
So you have no objection to condoms?
Atty. Noche:
Not under Section 12, Article II.
Justice Bersamin:
Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?
Atty. Noche:
Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing here
Section 12, Article II, Your Honor, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
Alright.
Atty. Noche:
And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor. 158
Medical Meaning
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and
Allied Health Dictionary defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant
a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable zygote."159
It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the
embryo develops."160
The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics), 161 used by medical schools in the
Philippines, also concludes that human life (human person) begins at the moment of fertilization with the
union of the egg and the sperm resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic
composition that dictates all developmental stages that ensue.
Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development begins after the
union of male and female gametes or germ cells during a process known as fertilization (conception).
Fertilization is a sequence of events that begins with the contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a
secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the sperm and
ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to form a new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote,
is a large diploid cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of a human being."162
The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same position. They wrote: "Although life is
a continuous process, fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new,
genetically distinct human organism is thereby formed.... The combination of 23 chromosomes present in
each pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the diploid number is restored and the
embryonic genome is formed. The embryo now exists as a genetic unity."
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on the Reproductive
Health Bill (Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:
CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA maintains its strong
position that fertilization is sacred because it is at this stage that conception, and thus human life, begins.
Human lives are sacred from the moment of conception, and that destroying those new lives is never licit,
no matter what the purported good outcome would be. In terms of biology and human embryology, a
human being begins immediately at fertilization and after that, there is no point along the continuous line
of human embryogenesis where only a "potential" human being can be posited. Any philosophical, legal,
or political conclusion cannot escape this objective scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a
new human being commences at a scientifically well defined "moment of conception." This conclusion is
objective, consistent with the factual evidence, and independent of any specific ethical, moral, political, or
religious view of human life or of human embryos.164
Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from

Fertilization
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more
importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a
zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-
defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life
begins at implantation.165 According to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive
stages in the reproductive process. They are not identical and synonymous."166 Citing a letter of the
WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the
commencement of conception and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be medically
detected."167
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not
pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an
inanimate object - it is a living human being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes. 168 Implantation has
been conceptualized only for convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it would
constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution.
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.
If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or device that
would prevent the implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be provocative and further
aggravate religious-based divisiveness.
It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the
unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It
was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers was captured in
the record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Commissioner Bernardo Villegas,
the principal proponent of the protection of the unborn from conception, explained:
The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by Congress or any
pro-abortion decision passed by the Supreme Court.169
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion.
While the Court has opted not to make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the
RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization. As pointed out
by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect to the
fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to the uterus for implantation. 170
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code,
which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:
1] xx x.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as
follows:
xxx.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services and
supplies that contribute to reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive health-related
problems. It also includes sexual health, the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal
relations. The elements of reproductive health care include the following:
xxx.
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;
xxx.
2] xx x.
Section 4. x x x.
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and
responsibly whether or not to have children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to make
other decisions concerning reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the
information and means to do so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual health and reproductive
health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do not include abortion, and access to
abortifacients.
3] xx x.
SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law, presidential decree or
issuance, executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or is
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act including Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise known as the
Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.
The RH Law and Abortifacients
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear,
Section 4(a) of the RH Law defines an abortifacient as:
Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb
upon determination of the FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of fertilization.
By using the word " or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation, but also
those that induce abortion and those that induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb.
Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device that either:
(a) Induces abortion; or
(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, upon
determination of the FDA.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the
Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounden duty to
protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that
induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the
killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted
in the mother's womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life
only begins only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not declare either that protection
will only be given upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one,
there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must be
protected the moment it becomes existent - all the way until it reaches and implants in the mother's
womb. After all, if life is only recognized and afforded protection from the moment the fertilized ovum
implants - there is nothing to prevent any drug or device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior
to implantation.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH
Law does not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at fertilization, not at
implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall , its viability is sustained but that
instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started earlier. And as defined by the RH
Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or
prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, is an abortifacient.
Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any product or
supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and
supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" as empty as it is
absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not all be used as an
abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every instance when the contraceptive product or
supply will be used.171
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient
contraceptives, however, the Court finds that the proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend to the
legislative intent and mean that "any product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a
certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it cannot
be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the proviso under the second paragraph
of the same section that provides:
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means emergency
contraceptive pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other forms
or equivalent.
Abortifacients under the RH-IRR
At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office
when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as follows:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb
upon determination of the FDA.
Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:
Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb upon determination of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]
Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family planning
method, device, or health product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not
primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's womb
in doses of its approved indication as determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient"
only those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb. 172
This cannot be done.
In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they pointed
out, with the insertion of the word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR173 must be struck
down for being ultra vires.
Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra
vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is
danger that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives
which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a
contraceptive will only be considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion or, as
pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum.
For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of contraceptives which
are actually abortifacients because of their fail-safe mechanism.174
Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these contraceptives cannot
act as abortive. With this, together with the definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law
and its declared policy against abortion, the undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in
the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those contraceptives that do not have the primary action of
causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, but also those that do not have the secondary
action of acting the same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that laws
should be construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its implementing
rules must be consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word " primarily" in Section
3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of
the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the primary effect of being an abortive would
effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of
the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution." 175
To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the constitutional
protection of life must be upheld.
2-The Right to Health
The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the inclusion of
hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and supplies in the
National Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of essential medicines and
supplies of all national hospitals.176Citing various studies on the matter, the petitioners posit that the risk
of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly increased in women who use oral contraceptives as
compared to women who never use them. They point out that the risk is decreased when the use of
contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is contended that the use of combined oral contraceptive pills is
associated with a threefold increased risk of venous thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of
ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial infarction. 177 Given the definition of
"reproductive health" and "sexual health" under Sections 4(p) 178 and (w)179 of the RH Law, the petitioners
assert that the assailed legislation only seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable and satisfying sex
lives.180
The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it being a
mere statement of the administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits
that medical authorities refute the claim that contraceptive pose a danger to the health of women. 181
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is
replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the
Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of the
people, viz:
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development
which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people
at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled,
women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and
undertake appropriate health, manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's health
needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-
development, and self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous
products.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions
clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory. There
is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions.182 In Manila Prince Hotel v.
GSIS,183 it was stated:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would
have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that –
... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or
whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking
body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing
statute. (Emphases supplied)
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question
contraception and contraceptives per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921
and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they are dispensed
by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician - be maintained.185
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A.
No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still
in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that the
effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale,
distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the prescription of a
licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public
that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public. As aptly explained by respondent
Lagman:
D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription
108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed and
used without prescription.
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of
Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines and for Other Purposes"
are not repealed by the RH Law and the provisions of said Acts are not inconsistent with the RH Law.
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices are
particularly governed by RA No. 4729 which provides in full:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise
distribute whether for or without consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale,
dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:
"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used exclusively for
the purpose of preventing fertilization of the female ovum: and
"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced into the
female reproductive system for the primary purpose of preventing conception.
"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be punished with
a fine of not more than five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six months or more than
one year or both in the discretion of the Court.
"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
"Approved: June 18, 1966"
111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:
"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug
of whatever nature and kind or device shall be compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be
made available to the consuming public except through a prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy,
duly established in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other relevant statutes, the
pretension of the petitioners that the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives,
whether harmful or not, is completely unwarranted and baseless.186 [Emphases in the Original.
Underlining supplied.]
In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:
The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which provides:
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure, distribute
to LGUs and monitor the usage of family planning supplies for the whole country. The DOH shall
coordinate with all appropriate local government bodies to plan and implement this procurement and
distribution program. The supply and budget allotments shall be based on, among others, the current
levels and projections of the following:
(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.
Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program consistent
with the overall provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of
R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a
duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these
contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The
distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be indiscriminately done. The public health must
be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and
burden are assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held
accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use. 187
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA
pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are
declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines available to
the public are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on
the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives must first be
measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the case presents
itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives
and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their
inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as
operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not
Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine
device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the requirements for
the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-
uterine devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products
and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a
determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning
products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives
are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific examination.
3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech
Position of the Petitioners:
1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the
constitutional proscription, there are those who, because of their religious education and background,
sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of these are medical
practitioners who essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of contraceptives but also the
willing participation and cooperation in all things dealing with contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX explained
that "contraception is gravely opposed to marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of the transmission of
life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of the spouses; it harms true love and denies the sovereign rule of
God in the transmission of Human life."188
The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the expenditure
of their taxes on contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom since contraceptives
contravene their religious beliefs.189
2. On Religious Accommodation and

The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious sentiments by
making provisions for a conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated
because the law also imposes upon the conscientious objector the duty to refer the patient seeking
reproductive health services to another medical practitioner who would be able to provide for the patient's
needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring the conscientious objector to cooperate with the very
thing he refuses to do without violating his/her religious beliefs. 190
They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the recognition is
unduly limited, because although it allows a conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer
a patient seeking reproductive health services and information - no escape is afforded the conscientious
objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a patient seeking reproductive health procedures. They
claim that the right of other individuals to conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in public health
facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public officers involved in the implementation of the law referred to in
Section 23(b ); and c) teachers in public schools referred to in Section 14 of the RH Law, are also not
recognize.191
Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the requirement to refer
the matter to another health care service provider is still considered a compulsion on those objecting
healthcare service providers. They add that compelling them to do the act against their will violates the
Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of the law are too secular that they tend to
disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of contraceptives with abortive effects, mandatory
sex education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive health services to indigents encroach upon the religious
freedom of those upon whom they are required.192
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the person seeking
reproductive health care services to another provider infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces the
objector to become an unwilling participant in the commission of a serious sin under Catholic teachings.
While the right to act on one's belief may be regulated by the State, the acts prohibited by the RH Law are
passive acts which produce neither harm nor injury to the public.193
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify regulation of
religious freedom because it mentions no emergency, risk or threat that endangers state interests. It does
not explain how the rights of the people (to equality, non-discrimination of rights, sustainable human
development, health, education, information, choice and to make decisions according to religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of responsible parenthood) are being threatened or
are not being met as to justify the impairment of religious freedom. 194
Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend
family planning and responsible parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of compliance. They
claim that the provision forces individuals to participate in the implementation of the RH Law even if it
contravenes their religious beliefs.195 As the assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of fine and/or
imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions, the petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing
them to provide, support and facilitate access and information to contraception against their beliefs must
be struck down as it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The Respondents' Positions
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a specific mode or
type of contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any religion or
belief.196 They point out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the public interest by providing accessible,
effective and quality reproductive health services to ensure maternal and child health, in line with the
State's duty to bring to reality the social justice health guarantees of the Constitution, 197 and that what the
law only prohibits are those acts or practices, which deprive others of their right to reproductive
health.198 They assert that the assailed law only seeks to guarantee informed choice, which is an
assurance that no one will be compelled to violate his religion against his free will. 199
The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed, the petitioners
are effectively going against the constitutional right to religious freedom, the same right they invoked to
assail the constitutionality of the RH Law.200 In other words, by seeking the declaration that the RH Law is
unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that the Court recognize only the Catholic Church's sanctioned
natural family planning methods and impose this on the entire citizenry.201
With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom, it being a carefully balanced compromise between the interests of the
religious objector, on one hand, who is allowed to keep silent but is required to refer -and that of the
citizen who needs access to information and who has the right to expect that the health care professional
in front of her will act professionally. For the respondents, the concession given by the State under
Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient accommodation to the right to freely exercise one's religion without
unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others.202
Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited in
duration, location and impact.203
Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the respondents claim that it is a
reasonable regulation providing an opportunity for would-be couples to have access to information
regarding parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is argued that those who
object to any information received on account of their attendance in the required seminars are not
compelled to accept information given to them. They are completely free to reject any information they do
not agree with and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without intervention of the
State.204
For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family planning is the only
method acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the
matter, they highlight the changing stand of the Catholic Church on contraception throughout the years
and note the general acceptance of the benefits of contraceptives by its followers in planning their
families.
The Church and The State
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of
diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our government,
in law and in practice, has allowed these various religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a
single society together. It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards all - the religious people
of different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a
deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for guidance and enlightenment in
crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present Constitution reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane
society, and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common
good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of
independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality,
and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their spirituality innate in our nature
and consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the
preamble, it means that the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills
into the mind the purest principles of morality.205 Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of religion to
society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain benevolent and accommodating provisions
towards religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of religious officers in government
institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not encroach into
the affairs of the church, and vice-versa. The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus,
enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect.1âwphi1 Generally, the
State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or
dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the
church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot
demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the
Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to a
temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious
organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect the State
from the pursuit of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article III,
Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:
Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.
Section 29.
xxx.
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for
the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion,
or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any
religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious
groups."206 Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources for
the support or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience.207 Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly
interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and faith.208 Explaining the concept of religious
freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union209 wrote:
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the
modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the
practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the
free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the
religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience,
to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes
he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. Any legislation whose
effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously
between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect.
(Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates conduct by
enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's
secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless the state can
accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563,
81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes. They
have a single goal-to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the
free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious
beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief
with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to
deny government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and
practices.210
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of religious
freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The
first part is absolute. As explained in Gerona v. Secretary of Education:211
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So
is the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most
anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical
when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief and
the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. 212
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed
only with proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief is translated into
external acts that affect the public welfare."213
Legislative Acts and the
Free Exercise Clause
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine
of benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor,
(Escritor)214 where it was stated "that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or
permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution." 215 In the same case,
it was further explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions,
accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of religion, but
to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. "The purpose of
accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's
religion."216 "What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality
of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its 'burdensome effect,' whether by the
legislature or the courts."217
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is
proper.218Underlying the compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental
right and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict scrutiny. 219 In Escritor, it was written:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the first case
on the Free Exercise Clause, American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and present
danger" test but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in subsequent cases on
religious liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced that the test of permissibility of religious freedom is
whether it violates the established institutions of society and law. The Victoriano case mentioned the
"immediate and grave danger" test as well as the doctrine that a law of general applicability may burden
religious exercise provided the law is the least restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law. The
case also used, albeit inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano , German went
back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate danger" test and overruled
the Gerona test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and present danger"
test in the maiden case of A merican Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which employed the
"clear and present danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test involved, in one form or another,
religious speech as this test is often used in cases on freedom of expression. On the other hand, the
Gerona and German cases set the rule that religious freedom will not prevail over established institutions
of society and law. Gerona, however, which was the authority cited by German has been overruled by
Ebralinag which employed the "grave and immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only case that
employed the "compelling state interest" test, but as explained previously, the use of the test was
inappropriate to the facts of the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo
where the "clear and present danger" and "grave and immediate danger" tests were appropriate as
speech has easily discernible or immediate effects. The Gerona and German doctrine, aside from having
been overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality approach, thus not appropriate in this
jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case involves purely conduct arising from religious belief.
The "compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human
conduct has different effects on the state's interests: some effects may be immediate and short-term while
others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a
substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the
state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a
preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the
words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a
higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited government is premised upon an
acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order
to build a just and humane society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest
abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests
which balances a right with just a colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a
compelling interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires
the state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter
religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In determining which shall prevail
between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The "compelling
state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time affording protection
to the paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e.
refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest" test, by upholding the paramount
interests of the state, seeks to protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be preserved.
[Emphases in the original. Underlining supplied.]
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of
contraceptives or one's participation in the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from
a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For the
Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law,
custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province
of the civil courts."220 The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever
pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be understood only in this realm where it
has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters,
as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the
guarantee of religious freedom.
At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs and
convictions. It is replete with assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets of his religion
or defy his religious convictions against his free will. Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious
freedom are the following:
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality
and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health
which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and
make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and
the demands of responsible parenthood. [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family which
in turn is the foundation of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:
(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands
of responsible parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family
planning, including effective natural and modern methods which have been proven medically safe, legal,
non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research
standards such as those registered and approved by the FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified
through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That the
State shall also provide funding support to promote modern natural methods of family planning, especially
the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and their religious convictions.
[Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number of
children they desire with due consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources
available and affordable to them and in accordance with existing laws, public morals and their religious
convictions. [Section 3CDJ
5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in
accordance with their religious convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's
obligations under various human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's organizations,

civil society, faith-based organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure that
reproductive health and population and development policies, plans, and programs will address the
priority needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]
7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and
aspirations of the family and children. It is likewise a shared responsibility between parents to determine
and achieve the desired number of children, spacing and timing of their children according to their own
family life aspirations, taking into account psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and
economic concerns consistent with their religious convictions. [Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some
medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with
the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.
The Establishment Clause
and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it
also limits what religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the
government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the
government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a
particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its
population control program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is
contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular
objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his
taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between Church and State
demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are
God's.221
The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly respects diverse
religious beliefs in line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with
respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said provisions commonly mandate that a hospital or a
medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to
another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical
beliefs.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or
practice, the compelling state interest test in line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent
Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case, the conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom
would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in
demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an important secular objective.
Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than
strict scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has
been burdened. As in Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious
objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to the law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs,
while the other entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an
illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose religious beliefs are incongruent with what
the RH Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief
and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient
seeking information on modem reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his
conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As
Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis of the free exercise
clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. 222
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise
because it makes pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally
repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may
not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it
being an externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent. With
the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection that should be afforded to
individuals in communicating their beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being silent. The
Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter
what is not in his mind.223 While the RH Law seeks to provide freedom of choice through informed
consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits any degree of
compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion.224
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the
interest of the State, on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive health products,
services, procedures and methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number and spacing of
the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers,
whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be
exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to
his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the
constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the case of
Doogan and Wood v. NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board,225 that the midwives claiming to be
conscientious objectors under the provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967, could not be required to
delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor ward who were involved in abortions. 226 The Inner
House stated "that if 'participation' were defined according to whether the person was taking part 'directly'
or ' indirectly' this would actually mean more complexity and uncertainty." 227
While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same - they could
not be forced to assist abortions if it would be against their conscience or will.
Institutional Health Providers
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated
by a religious group and health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law
penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under Section 7 and
Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for being violative of the freedom of
religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24, considering that in the
dissemination of information regarding programs and services and in the performance of reproductive
health procedures, the religious freedom of health care service providers should be respected.
In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary228 it was
stressed:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court
has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest
possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his
beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the
common good."10
The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure compliance.
Without set consequences for either an active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless and
ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an effective implementation of a law is a
constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a
healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or who declines to
perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear
inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:
Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of
hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically
charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be
considered as conscientious objectors.
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection clause
should be equally protective of the religious belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible
distinction why they should not be considered exempt from the mandates of the law. The protection
accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical practitioners without
distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic
in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even if one
acquires employment in the government.
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of human
values. The mind must be free to think what it wills, whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give
expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or through the media and, thus, seek other candid views in
occasions or gatherings or in more permanent aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then are freedom
of religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and petition, and freedom of association. 229
The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH Law itself but
also because it is violative of the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman,
if there is any conflict between the RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law must prevail.
Justice Mendoza:
I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52, you mentioned RH
Law is replete with provisions in upholding the freedom of religion and respecting religious convictions.
Earlier, you affirmed this with qualifications. Now, you have read, I presumed you have read the IRR-
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Bill?
Congressman Lagman:
Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not thoroughly dissected the
nuances of the provisions.
Justice Mendoza:
I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR it says:
" .... skilled health professionals such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals,
head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged
with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as
conscientious objectors." Do you agree with this?
Congressman Lagman:
I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.
Justice Mendoza:
In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can be conscientious
objectors, skilled health professionals cannot be considered conscientious objectors. Do you agree with
this? Is this not against the constitutional right to the religious belief?
Congressman Lagman:
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must prevail.230
Compelling State Interest
The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense of the subject
provisions, were able to: 1] demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain conscientious
objectors in their choice of services to render; and 2] discharge the burden of proof that the obligatory
character of the law is the least intrusive means to achieve the objectives of the law.
Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was
curiously silent in the establishment of a more compelling state interest that would rationalize the curbing
of a conscientious objector's right not to adhere to an action contrary to his religious convictions. During
the oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence and evasion. The Transcripts of the
Stenographic Notes disclose the following:
Justice De Castro:
Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Yes, Justice.
Justice De Castro:
... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling State interest in
imposing this duty to refer to a conscientious objector which refuses to do so because of his religious
belief?
Ahh, Your Honor, ..
Justice De Castro:
What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?
In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State interest, this is an
ordinary health legislation involving professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a pure free exercise
matter. This is a regulation by the State of the relationship between medical doctors and their patients.231
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise clause of the
conscientious objectors, however few in number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger
to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the
government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally
unacceptable.232
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act or not
to act according to what one believes. And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against
one's belief or is prevented from acting according to one's belief.233
Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the
perceived scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, number and spacing
of the birth of their children refers to a future event that is contingent on whether or not the mother
decides to adopt or use the information, product, method or supply given to her or whether she even
decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon those who object to
contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on reproductive
health matters.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the conscientious
objector's religious freedom, the respondents have failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override a person's fundamental right to religious
freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented any government effort exerted to show that the
means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means. 234 Other than the
assertion that the act of referring would only be momentary, considering that the act of referral by a
conscientious objector is the very action being contested as violative of religious freedom, it behooves the
respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State to achieve its objective
without violating the rights of the conscientious objector. The health concerns of women may still be
addressed by other practitioners who may perform reproductive health-related procedures with open
willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance
deserves the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional freedoms.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the right to
health is protected. Considering other legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the
Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise
known as "The Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of women in relation to health services
and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on comprehensive health services and programs
for women, in fact, reads:
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at all times,
provide for a comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and programs
covering all stages of a woman's life cycle and which addresses the major causes of women's mortality
and morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for comprehensive health services, due respect shall be
accorded to women's religious convictions, the rights of the spouses to found a family in accordance with
their religious convictions, and the demands of responsible parenthood, and the right of women to
protection from hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and substances.
Access to the following services shall be ensured:
(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy and infant
health and nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;
(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health services
without prejudice to the primary right and duty of parents to educate their children;
(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including sexually

transmitted diseases, HIV, and AIDS;
(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and cervical
cancers, and other gynecological conditions and disorders;
(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related complications;
(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children victims and
survivors shall be provided with comprehensive health services that include psychosocial,
therapeutic, medical, and legal interventions and assistance towards healing, recovery,
and empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant to ethical
norms and medical standards;
(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and
(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of women and
girls. In addition, healthy lifestyle activities are encouraged and promoted through
programs and projects as strategies in the prevention of diseases.
(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women in all sectors with
appropriate, timely, complete, and accurate information and education on all the above-stated aspects of
women's health in government education and training programs, with due regard to the following:
(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth and the
development of moral character and the right of children to be brought up in an
atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the enrichment and strengthening of character;
(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility
awareness.
As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling state interest was
"Fifteen maternal deaths per day, hundreds of thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives changed, x x
x."235 He, however, failed to substantiate this point by concrete facts and figures from reputable sources.
The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the Filipino maternal
mortality rate dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although there was still no RH Law at that
time. Despite such revelation, the proponents still insist that such number of maternal deaths constitute a
compelling state interest.
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs for Filipino
women, they could not be solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious
beliefs in exchange for blind conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law. While
generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care procedures if
doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that
require the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the mother
should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial
of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger. Thus, during the oral
arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC, manifested: "the forced referral clause that we are objecting on
grounds of violation of freedom of religion does not contemplate an emergency."237
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged
always to try to save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one should not be
deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the House of
Representatives of the principle of double-effect wherein intentional harm on the life of either the mother
of the child is never justified to bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict situation between the life of the
child and the life of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. However, he
can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it is medically impossible to save both, provided
that no direct harm is intended to the other. If the above principles are observed, the loss of the child's life
or the mother's life is not intentional and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of
abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted against the child because both their lives are equally
valuable.238
Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the child
may be resorted to even if is against the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted
above, whatever burden imposed upon a medical practitioner in this case would have been more than
justified considering the life he would be able to save.
Family Planning Seminars
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license,
the Court finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A cursory
reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of the petitioners is not at all violated.
All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning
breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to be
included in the seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those who
receive any information during their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept the
information given to them, are completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable, and retain
the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.
4-The Family and the Right to Privacy
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the
Constitution by intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters
animosity in the family rather than promote its solidarity and total development.240
The Court cannot but agree.
The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social
institution. In fact, one article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the family.
ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of
responsible parenthood;
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development;
The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and implementation of policies
and programs that affect them.
In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains provisions
which tend to wreck the family as a solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from
participating in the decision making process regarding their common future progeny. It likewise deprives
the parents of their authority over their minor daughter simply because she is already a parent or had
suffered a miscarriage.
The Family and Spousal Consent
Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...
(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of legal age
on the ground of lack of consent or authorization of the following persons in the following instances:
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement, the decision of
the one undergoing the procedures shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]
The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by
their very nature, should require mutual consent and decision between the husband and the wife as they
affect issues intimately related to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses
that the State shall defend the "right of the spouses to found a family." One person cannot found a family.
The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the same Section 3, their right "to participate in the
planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them " is equally recognized.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority
to the spouse who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the
decision would drive a wedge between the husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and
endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the population. This would be a marked
departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution.241
Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the
couple, not just one of them. Any decision they would reach would affect their future as a family because
the size of the family or the number of their children significantly matters. The decision whether or not to
undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they
chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices the State,
which has not shown any compelling interest, the State should see to it that they chart their destiny
together as one family.
As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the
"Magna Carta for Women," provides that women shall have equal rights in all matters relating to marriage
and family relations, including the joint decision on the number and spacing of their children. Indeed,
responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law states, is a shared responsibility between parents.
Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not be allowed to betray the constitutional mandate to protect
and strengthen the family by giving to only one spouse the absolute authority to decide whether to
undergo reproductive health procedure.242
The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and such
state intervention would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In our
jurisdiction, the right to privacy was first recognized in Marje v. Mutuc, 243 where the Court, speaking
through Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection."244 Marje adopted the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,245 where
Justice William O. Douglas wrote:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties, older than our
school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to
the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for
as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.
Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal
offense on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married
persons. Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed by couples. Justice Douglas in
Grisworld wrote that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of
privacy."246
At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.
The Family and Parental Consent
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be
undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – x x x.
No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or artificial:
Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to modern methods of family planning without written
consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the minor is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage.
There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a parent or has
had a miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the decision making process of the minor with regard to
family planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off just because
there is a need to tame population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her
own parents. The State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to providing her
needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not
promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the
family as an inviolable social institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and primary right
and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character
shall receive the support of the Government."247 In this regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:
The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It imports the
assertion that the right of parents is superior to that of the State.248 [Emphases supplied]
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their minor-
child or the right of the spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose of
marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of one's
privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and strongly-held Filipino tradition
of maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition that the State affords couples entering into
the special contract of marriage to as one unit in forming the foundation of the family and society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and
custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a
compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their parental authority.
First Exception: Access to Information
Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second paragraph of
Section 7 or with respect to the consenting spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made.
There must be a differentiation between access to information about family planning services, on one
hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and modern family planning methods
themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is concerned, the Court finds no constitutional
objection to the acquisition of information by the minor referred to under the exception in the second
paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of her own body and that of her unborn
child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the State to protect both the life of the
mother as that of the unborn child. Considering that information to enable a person to make informed
decisions is essential in the protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to such information with
respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of
their parental control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise parental guidance and
control over their minor child and assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information
received.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that
require the performance of emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already
suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It
should be emphasized that no person should be denied the appropriate medical care urgently needed to
preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii)249 should be struck down. By effectively
limiting the requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents
their right of parental authority in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for
the two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an abused child as provided in the first sentence
of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority.
To deny them of this right would be an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the
family.
5 - Academic Freedom
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching of
Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine and/or
imprisonment violates the principle of academic freedom . According to the petitioners, these provisions
effectively force educational institutions to teach reproductive health education even if they believe that
the same is not suitable to be taught to their students.250 Citing various studies conducted in the United
States and statistical data gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that the prevalence of
contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-wedlock births; divorce and breakdown of families; the
acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of society; and promotion
of promiscuity among the youth.251
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature
because the Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-
appropriate reproductive health education. One can only speculate on the content, manner and medium
of instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious
beliefs of the petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this
particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right and
duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987
Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to
become productive members of society. Notably, it places more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children by recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right of
parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State.252
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral development of
the youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing the youth and their
important role in nation building.253 Considering that Section 14 provides not only for the age-appropriate-
reproductive health education, but also for values formation; the development of knowledge and skills in
self-protection against discrimination; sexual abuse and violence against women and children and other
forms of gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and emotional changes in
adolescents; women's rights and children's rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and
development; and responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section
4(t) of the RH Law itself provides for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and
physical and emotional changes among adolescents - the Court finds that the legal mandate provided
under the assailed provision supplements, rather than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in
the moral development of their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education program
shall be developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations, school officials and other
interest groups, it could very well be said that it will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.
By imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention that Section 14 violates
Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit.254
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their participation in the
reproductive health education program provided under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the
same violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before
it.
6 - Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process
clause of the Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service
provider" among those who may be held punishable but does not define who is a "private health care
service provider." They argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only makes reference to a
"private health care institution."
The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals operated by
religious groups from rendering reproductive health service and modern family planning methods. It is
unclear, however, if these institutions are also exempt from giving reproductive health information under
Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect
information, but at the same time fails to define "incorrect information."
The arguments fail to persuade.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to
the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the
parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.255 Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not only
be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It
is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part
of it must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment.256
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service provider,"
reference must be made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health service provider,"
viz:
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly licensed
and accredited and devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion,
disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury,
disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing care; (2) public health care
professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3) public health worker engaged in the
delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay health worker who has undergone training programs
under any accredited government and NGO and who voluntarily renders primarily health care services in
the community after having been accredited to function as such by the local health board in accordance
with the guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .
Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private
health care service provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that they are
used synonymously.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to render
reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, includes exemption from being
obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health procedures. Clearly,
subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being obligated
to render reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, necessarily includes
exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health
procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the providing of information
and the rendering of medical procedures.
The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care service
providers who intentionally withhold, restrict and provide incorrect information regarding reproductive
health programs and services. For ready reference, the assailed provision is hereby quoted as follows:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally provide
incorrect information regarding programs and services on reproductive health including the right to
informed choice and access to a full range of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective family
planning methods;
From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with
established rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty, morality or propriety;
and failing to coincide with the truth. 257 On the other hand, the word "knowingly" means with awareness
or deliberateness that is intentional.258 Used together in relation to Section 23(a)(l), they connote a sense
of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and
services on reproductive health. Public health and safety demand that health care service providers give
their honest and correct medical information in accordance with what is acceptable in medical practice.
While health care service providers are not barred from expressing their own personal opinions regarding
the programs and services on reproductive health, their right must be tempered with the need to provide
public health and safety. The public deserves no less.
7-Egual Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution as
it discriminates against the poor because it makes them the primary target of the government program
that promotes contraceptive use . They argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the
poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor. Their
bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in the
guiding principles259 and definition of terms260 of the law.
They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health
education program imposed by the RH Law renders it unconstitutional.
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to expound on the concept of
equal protection. Thus:
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is
embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in
the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair
play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against
any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged
on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted
partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires
public bodies and inst itutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of
the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution
through the state's duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the concept of equal justice under the
law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on
differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its
inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive departments,
and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or
whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to
be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not
make for a valid classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons
who naturally belong to the class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the
class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that
the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should
possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is
achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual
belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable
from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him."
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude
addition to the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may
thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that
should otherwise fall into a certain classification. [Emphases supplied; citations excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program is
not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the
Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by
providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development of the people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development
which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people
at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled,
women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are
suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention
that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the use
of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the
"promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the advancement of
reproductive health."
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not
impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise that the
assailed law seeks to charge couples with the duty to have children only if they would raise them in a truly
humane way, a deeper look into its provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply provide
priority to the poor in the implementation of government programs to promote basic reproductive health
care.
With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health
education program under Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children of those who
are less fortunate attend public educational institutions does not amount to substantial distinction
sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial distinction rests between public
educational institutions and private educational institutions, particularly because there is a need to
recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious
instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.
8-Involuntary Servitude
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional
prohibition against involuntary servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring
private and non-government health care service providers to render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono
reproductive health services, actually amounts to involuntary servitude because it requires medical
practitioners to perform acts against their will.262
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be
considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have the
discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the
imposition is within the powers of the government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with
PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken.
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is
both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with
conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the power of
Congress263 to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of professions or trades which affect the public
welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or control such
professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right altogether. 264
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force,
threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion.265 A reading of the assailed
provision, however, reveals that it only encourages private and non- government reproductive healthcare
service providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is
imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare
service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service they wish to provide, when,
where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat
is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was
made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an
unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a
perceived legitimate state interest.
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that
conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions
do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.
9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA
The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine
whether or not a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL). 266
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also the
competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is the only government entity
empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that health
services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily understood
as "health products."
In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the
Office of the Secretary and shall have the following functions, powers and duties:
"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and regulations issued
pursuant to the same;
"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;
"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of this Act;
"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products
standards, and to recommend standards of identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of
container;
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the
issuance of appropriate authorization and spot-check for compliance with regulations regarding
operation of manufacturers, importers, exporters, distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and
other establishments and facilities of health products, as determined by the FDA;
"x x x
"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance of
appropriate authorizations to ensure safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailers,
consumers, and non-consumer users of health products to report to the FDA any incident that
reasonably indicates that said product has caused or contributed to the death, serious illness or
serious injury to a consumer, a patient, or any person;
"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for health products,
whether or not registered with the FDA Provided, That for registered health products, the cease
and desist order is valid for thirty (30) days and may be extended for sixty ( 60) days only after
due process has been observed;
"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product found to
have caused death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be
imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to require all concerned to
implement the risk management plan which is a requirement for the issuance of the appropriate
authorization;
x x x.
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the
agency to carry out the mandates of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole agency that ensures
the safety of food and medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary
powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary implication, the mandate
by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting only food and medicines that are
safe includes "service" and "methods." From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress
intended that the public be given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-
abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards.
The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice,267 as
follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has
ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many
of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence,
let alone the interest and the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say specific
solutions.
10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the
powers devolved to local government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Said
Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and
facilities, as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the
powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also
discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them
pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and
discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to
efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and
responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them from the national agencies on the
aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c)
of the same provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded
projects, facilities, programs and services.268 Thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure
projects and other facilities, programs and services funded by the National Government under the
annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those
wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this Section, except in
those cases where the local government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing
agency for such projects, facilities, programs and services. [Emphases supplied]
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is
particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding
has been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the
program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU. 269 A complete
relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and services
cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it.270
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health
care facilities,271 the hiring of skilled health professionals,272 or the training of barangay health
workers,273 it will be the national government that will provide for the funding of its implementation. Local
autonomy is not absolute. The national government still has the say when it comes to national priority
programs which the local government is called upon to implement like the RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these
services. There is nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as making the availability of
these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to an
undue encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.
The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally applied to
the ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11
of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of
the operation of the RH Law in the autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for the guidance of
the regional government. These provisions relied upon by the petitioners simply delineate the powers that
may be exercised by the regional government, which can, in no manner, be characterized as an
abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the general welfare. After all,
despite the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as
they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship between the national and the
regional governments.274 Except for the express and implied limitations imposed on it by the Constitution,
Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which
extends to all matters of general concern or common interest.275
11 - Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law,276 suffice it to say that the Court does
not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the
Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law, the Court
is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it is
not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on
inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school
are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or present.277 Unless,
a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law. In
Republic v. Sandiganbayan,278 the very case cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not
duty-bound to examine every law or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural
law. Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights
inherent to man where no law is applicable.279
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow
abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program of the government
by providing information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to the public,
especially to the poor.
Facts and Fallacies
and the Wisdom of the Law
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to
medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services,
methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of
society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional
safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher than
the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed
to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity
and pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may
continue to reign as we exist alongside each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that what it seeks
to address is the problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause
of these perennial issues is not the large population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if
population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the country's wealth remains in the hands
of the very few.
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The European and
Asian countries, which embarked on such a program generations ago , are now burdened with ageing
populations. The number of their young workers is dwindling with adverse effects on their economy.
These young workers represent a significant human capital which could have helped them invigorate,
innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to reverse their programs, but they are
still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.
And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas Filipino Workers.
This is because we have an ample supply of young able-bodied workers. What would happen if the
country would be weighed down by an ageing population and the fewer younger generation would not be
able to support them? This would be the situation when our total fertility rate would go down below the
replacement level of two (2) children per woman.280
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive
measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it.
Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the law is
as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying what the law should be or what is the
correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of
the law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the business of this
Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise from the application of a particular law. It is for
the legislature to enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary in the premises. But as always,
with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate function of interpreting
the law, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The
Court's function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying what
the law is, as enacted by the lawmaking body.281
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of the prior
existing contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the Court
decrees the RH Law as entirely unconstitutional, there will still be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the
Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the reproductive health for women or The Magna Carta of Women
(R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the assailed legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-
abortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any family planning method should be maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354
as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private
health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a
religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow
minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family
planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to
disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of
his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a
married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act
No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the
requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a
patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently
accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health
programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health
program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro
bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing
PhilHealth accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in
defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for
contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July
16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein
declared as constitutional.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners,
vs.
ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The individual's desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society is an equally powerful
desire. Thus each individual is continually engaged in a personal adjustment process in which he
balances the desire for privacy with the desire for disclosure and communication of himself to others, in
light of the environmental conditions and social norms set by the society in which he lives.
- Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)
The Case
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section
19 of A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC,1 otherwise known as the "Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data." Petitioners
herein assail the July 27, 2012 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City (RTC) in SP.
Proc. No. 19251-CEB, which dismissed their habeas data petition.
The Facts
Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were, during the period
material, graduating high school students at St. Theresa's College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in
January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and
Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments.
These pictures were then uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her Facebook 3 profile.
Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher at STC’s high school
department, learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting
themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they knew
who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes Taboada
(Chloe), among others.
Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal Facebook accounts
and showed her photos of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard
liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing
articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of their black brassieres. What is more, Escudero’s
students claimed that there were times when access to or the availability of the identified students’ photos
was not confined to the girls’ Facebook friends,4but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.5
Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her student’s Facebook page, showed
the photosto Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action. Thereafter,
following an investigation, STC found the identified students to have deported themselves in a manner
proscribed by the school’s Student Handbook, to wit:
1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;
2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;
3. Smoking and drinking alcoholicbeverages in public places;
4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;
5. Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity; contains sexually suggestive
messages, language or symbols; and 6. Posing and uploading pictures on the Internet that entail
ample body exposure.
On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures in question, reported, as
required, to the office of Sr. Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe (Sr. Purisima), STC’s high school principal and
ICM6 Directress. They claimed that during the meeting, they were castigated and verbally abused by the
STC officials present in the conference, including Assistant Principal Mussolini S. Yap (Yap), Roswinda
Jumiller, and Tigol. What is more, Sr. Purisima informed their parents the following day that, as part of
their penalty, they are barred from joining the commencement exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012.
A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed a
Petition for Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Cebu City against STC, et al., docketed as Civil
Case No. CEB-38594.7In it, Tan prayed that defendants therein be enjoined from implementing the
sanction that precluded Angela from joining the commencement exercises.
On March 25, 2012,petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother of Julia, joined the fray as an
intervenor. On March 28, 2012, defendants inCivil Case No. CEB-38594 filed their memorandum,
containing printed copies of the photographs in issue as annexes. That same day, the RTC issued a
temporary restraining order (TRO) allowing the students to attend the graduation ceremony, to which STC
filed a motion for reconsideration.
Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned students from participating in
the graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of the commencement exercises, its adverted motion for
reconsideration on the issuance ofthe TRO remained unresolved.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data, docketed
as SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB8 on the basis of the following considerations:
1. The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were taken for posterity before
they changed into their swimsuits on the occasion of a birthday beach party;
2. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at "Friends Only." They,
thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.
3. Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or ought to have known of laws
that safeguard the right to privacy. Corollarily, respondents knew or ought to have known that the
girls, whose privacy has been invaded, are the victims in this case, and not the offenders. Worse,
after viewing the photos, the minors were called "immoral" and were punished outright;
4. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without
their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and
by subsequently showing them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of petitioners’
children were intruded upon;
5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and
digital images happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory; and
6. All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly broadcasted by respondents
through their memorandum submitted to the RTC in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594.
To petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing constitutes an invasion of their children’s privacy and,
thus, prayed that: (a) a writ of habeas databe issued; (b) respondents be ordered to surrender
and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the subjectdata before or at the
preliminary hearing; and (c) after trial, judgment be rendered declaring all information, data, and
digital images accessed, saved or stored, reproduced, spread and used, to have been illegally
obtained inviolation of the children’s right to privacy.
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC, through an Order dated July 5, 2012,
issued the writ of habeas data. Through the same Order, herein respondents were directed to file their
verified written return, together with the supporting affidavits, within five (5) working days from service of
the writ.
In time, respondents complied with the RTC’s directive and filed their verified written return, laying down
the following grounds for the denial of the petition, viz: (a) petitioners are not the proper parties to file the
petition; (b) petitioners are engaging in forum shopping; (c) the instant case is not one where a writ of
habeas data may issue;and (d) there can be no violation of their right to privacy as there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy on Facebook.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for habeas data. The dispositive
portion of the Decision pertinently states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.9
To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the
minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data. Moreover,
the court a quoheld that the photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who
may view them, lost their privacy in some way. Besides, the RTC noted, STC gathered the photographs
through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the implementation of the school’s policies and rules
on discipline.
Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court pursuant to Section 19 of the Rule
on Habeas Data.10
The Issues
The main issue to be threshed out inthis case is whether or not a writ of habeas datashould be issued
given the factual milieu. Crucial in resolving the controversy, however, is the pivotal point of whether or
not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security
of the minors involved in this case.
Our Ruling
We find no merit in the petition.
Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding
the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.11 It is an independent and summary
remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an
individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks
to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. 12
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to informational
privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas dataas "a procedure
designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age." 13 The writ, however, will not
issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a person.Availment of
the writ requires the existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to
life, liberty or security on the other.14 Thus, the existence of a person’s right to informational privacy and a
showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life,
liberty or security of the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be extended. 15
Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational privacy, a habeas
datapetition will not prosper. Viewed from the perspective of the case at bar,this requisite begs this
question: given the nature of an online social network (OSN)––(1) that it facilitates and promotes real-time
interaction among millions, if not billions, of users, sans the spatial barriers, 16 bridging the gap created by
physical space; and (2) that any information uploaded in OSNs leavesan indelible trace in the provider’s
databases, which are outside the control of the end-users––is there a right to informational privacy in
OSN activities of its users? Before addressing this point, We must first resolve the procedural issues in
this case.
a. The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances
Contrary to respondents’ submission, the Writ of Habeas Datawas not enacted solely for the purpose of
complementing the Writ of Amparoin cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data. However, in
cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by:
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children and
parents; or
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil
degreeof consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
(emphasis supplied)
Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to cases of extralegal killings
or enforced disappearances, the above underscored portion of Section 2, reflecting a variance of habeas
data situations, would not have been made.
Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information
age."17 As such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
only. In fact, the annotations to the Rule preparedby the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court,
after explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data complements the Writ of Amparo, pointed out that:
The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s right to
privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies against the violation of such
right can include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or
files in possession or in control of respondents.18 (emphasis Ours) Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Datamay also be availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
b. Meaning of "engaged" in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
Respondents’ contention that the habeas data writ may not issue against STC, it not being an entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home
and correspondence of the aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is, nonetheless, erroneous.
To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only
against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the businessof gathering, storing, and collecting of data.
As provided under Section 1 of the Rule:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis
Ours)
The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea that habeas data
is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private individuals or entities
engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her
correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or entity need not be in the business of
collecting or storing data.
To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To "engage" means "to do
or take part in something."19 It does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a
business. What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or
information about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element
of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other
reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to said
person or entity.
To agree with respondents’ above argument, would mean unduly limiting the reach of the writ to a very
small group, i.e., private persons and entities whose business is data gathering and storage, and in the
process decreasing the effectiveness of the writ asan instrument designed to protect a right which is
easily violated in view of rapid advancements in the information and communications technology––a right
which a great majority of the users of technology themselves are not capable of protecting.
Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now proceed to the core of the controversy.
The right to informational privacy on Facebook
a. The Right to Informational Privacy
The concept of privacyhas, through time, greatly evolved, with technological advancements having an
influential part therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno’s
speech, The Common Right to Privacy,20 where he explained the three strands of the right to privacy, viz:
(1) locational or situational privacy;21(2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy.22 Of the three,
what is relevant to the case at bar is the right to informational privacy––usually defined as the right of
individuals to control information about themselves.23
With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data sharing nowadays, not to
mention each system’s inherent vulnerability to attacks and intrusions, there is more reason that every
individual’s right to control said flow of information should be protected and that each individual should
have at least a reasonable expectation of privacy in cyberspace. Several commentators regarding privacy
and social networking sites, however, all agree that given the millions of OSN users, "[i]n this [Social
Networking] environment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable expectations, but rather in some
theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking."24
It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to provide for judicial remedies that would
allow a summary hearing of the unlawful use of data or information and to remedy possible violations of
the right to privacy.25 In the same vein, the South African High Court, in its Decision in the landmark case,
H v. W,26promulgated on January30, 2013, recognized that "[t]he law has to take into account the
changing realities not only technologically but also socially or else it will lose credibility in the eyes of the
people. x x x It is imperative that the courts respond appropriately to changing times, acting cautiously
and with wisdom." Consistent with this, the Court, by developing what may be viewed as the Philippine
model of the writ of habeas data, in effect, recognized that, generally speaking, having an expectation of
informational privacy is not necessarily incompatible with engaging in cyberspace activities, including
those that occur in OSNs.
The question now though is up to whatextent is the right to privacy protected in OSNs? Bear in mind that
informational privacy involves personal information. At the same time, the very purpose of OSNs is
socializing––sharing a myriad of information,27 some of which would have otherwise remained personal.
b. Facebook’s Privacy Tools: a response to the clamor for privacy in OSN activities
Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact and to stay connected to
other members of the same or different social media platform through the sharing of statuses, photos,
videos, among others, depending on the services provided by the site. It is akin to having a room filled
with millions of personal bulletin boards or "walls," the contents of which are under the control of each and
every user. In his or her bulletin board, a user/owner can post anything––from text, to pictures, to music
and videos––access to which would depend on whether he or she allows one, some or all of the other
users to see his or her posts. Since gaining popularity, the OSN phenomenon has paved the way to the
creation of various social networking sites, includingthe one involved in the case at bar,
www.facebook.com (Facebook), which, according to its developers, people use "to stay connected with
friends and family, to discover what’s going on in the world, and to share and express what matters to
them."28
Facebook connections are established through the process of "friending" another user. By sending a
"friend request," the user invites another to connect their accounts so that they can view any and all
"Public" and "Friends Only" posts of the other.Once the request is accepted, the link is established and
both users are permitted to view the other user’s "Public" or "Friends Only" posts, among others.
"Friending," therefore, allows the user to form or maintain one-to-one relationships with other users,
whereby the user gives his or her "Facebook friend" access to his or her profile and shares certain
information to the latter.29
To address concerns about privacy,30 but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with
different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile 31 as well as information
uploaded by the user. In H v. W,32 the South Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users to
"customize their privacy settings," but did so with this caveat: "Facebook states in its policies that,
although it makes every effort to protect a user’s information, these privacy settings are not foolproof." 33
For instance, a Facebook user canregulate the visibility and accessibility of digital images(photos), posted
on his or her personal bulletin or "wall," except for the user’sprofile picture and ID, by selecting his or her
desired privacy setting:
(a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;
(b) Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook
user; and
(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up barriers to broaden or
limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content, statuses, and photos, among others, from another
user’s point of view. In other words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the availability of
their Facebook activities reflect their choice as to "when and to what extent to disclose facts about
[themselves] – and to put others in the position of receiving such confidences."34 Ideally, the selected
setting will be based on one’s desire to interact with others, coupled with the opposing need to withhold
certain information as well as to regulate the spreading of his or her personal information. Needless to
say, as the privacy setting becomes more limiting, fewer Facebook users can view that user’s particular
post.
STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy
Without these privacy settings, respondents’ contention that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy
in Facebook would, in context, be correct. However, such is not the case. It is through the availability of
said privacy tools that many OSN users are said to have a subjective expectation that only those to
whomthey grant access to their profile will view the information they post or upload thereto. 35
This, however, does not mean thatany Facebook user automatically has a protected expectation of
privacy inall of his or her Facebook activities.
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary that said
user, in this case the children of petitioners,manifest the intention to keepcertain posts private, through
the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility.36 And this intention can
materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools. In other words, utilization of
these privacy tools is the manifestation,in cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to
informational privacy.37
Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny access to his or her
post orprofile detail should not be denied the informational privacy right which necessarily accompanies
said choice.38Otherwise, using these privacy tools would be a feckless exercise, such that if, for instance,
a user uploads a photo or any personal information to his or her Facebook page and sets its privacy level
at "Only Me" or a custom list so that only the user or a chosen few can view it, said photo would still be
deemed public by the courts as if the user never chose to limit the photo’s visibility and accessibility. Such
position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of their function but it would also disregard the
very intention of the user to keep said photo or information within the confines of his or her private space.
We must now determine the extent that the images in question were visible to other Facebook users and
whether the disclosure was confidential in nature. In other words, did the minors limit the disclosure of the
photos such that the images were kept within their zones of privacy? This determination is necessary in
resolving the issue of whether the minors carved out a zone of privacy when the photos were uploaded to
Facebook so that the images will be protected against unauthorized access and disclosure.
Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their children’s privacy right being violated, insist that
Escudero intruded upon their children’s Facebook accounts, downloaded copies ofthe pictures and
showed said photos to Tigol. To them, this was a breach of the minors’ privacy since their Facebook
accounts, allegedly, were under "very private" or "Only Friends" setting safeguarded with a
password.39 Ultimately, they posit that their children’s disclosure was only limited since their profiles were
not open to public viewing. Therefore, according to them, people who are not their Facebook friends,
including respondents, are barred from accessing said post without their knowledge and consent.
Aspetitioner’s children testified, it was Angelawho uploaded the subjectphotos which were only viewable
by the five of them,40 although who these five are do not appear on the records.
Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit41 that "my students showed me some pictures of girls
cladin brassieres. This student [sic] of mine informed me that these are senior high school [students] of
STC, who are their friends in [F]acebook. x x x They then said [that] there are still many other photos
posted on the Facebook accounts of these girls. At the computer lab, these students then logged into
their Facebook account [sic], and accessed from there the various photographs x x x. They even told me
that there had been times when these photos were ‘public’ i.e., not confined to their friends in Facebook."
In this regard, We cannot give muchweight to the minors’ testimonies for one key reason: failure to
question the students’ act of showing the photos to Tigol disproves their allegation that the photos were
viewable only by the five of them. Without any evidence to corroborate their statement that the images
were visible only to the five of them, and without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the other
students were able to view the photos, their statements are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant
consideration.42
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her students, who are
the minors’ Facebook "friends," showed her the photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only
goes to show that no special means to be able to viewthe allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by
Escudero’s students,43 and that it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality,
viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is"Public," it can be surmised that the photographs
in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively
limited the disclosure of the photograph. If suchwere the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached
to the right to informational privacy. The ensuing pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez44 is most
instructive:
[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy
rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances suchas here, where the Defendant did not
employ protective measures or devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or the
photograph itself.45
Also, United States v. Maxwell46 held that "[t]he more open the method of transmission is, the less privacy
one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large inthe chat room or e-mail that is
forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy."
That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not necessarily bolster the petitioners’ contention. In
this regard, the cyber community is agreed that the digital images under this setting still remain to be
outside the confines of the zones of privacy in view of the following:
(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the tools to
interact and share in any conceivable way;"47
(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total strangers; 48
(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and
(4) A user’s Facebook friend can "share"49 the former’s post, or "tag"50 others who are not
Facebook friends with the former, despite its being visible only tohis or her own Facebook friends.
It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to "Friends" is no
assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of
the content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook
friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the
former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the
person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at
"Friends."
To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B are not Facebook friends. If
C, A’s Facebook friend, tags B in A’s post, which is set at "Friends," the initial audience of 100 (A’s own
Facebook friends) is dramatically increased to 300 (A’s 100 friends plus B’s 200 friends or the public,
depending upon B’s privacy setting). As a result, the audience who can view the post is effectively
expanded––and to a very large extent.
This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of Facebook’s proclivity towards user
interaction and socialization rather than seclusion or privacy, as it encourages broadcasting of individual
user posts. In fact, it has been said that OSNs have facilitated their users’ self-tribute, thereby resulting
into the "democratization of fame."51Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or even a post, with visibility set
at "Friends Only" cannot easily, more so automatically, be said to be "very private," contrary to petitioners’
argument.
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’ Facebook
friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was the
minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what
were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily
given to them by persons who had legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with
the friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the minors nor their parents imputed any
violation of privacy against the students who showed the images to Escudero.
Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents reproduced and broadcasted
the photographs. In fact, what petitioners attributed to respondents as an act of offensive disclosure was
no more than the actuality that respondents appended said photographs in their memorandum submitted
to the trial court in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594.52 These are not tantamount to a violation
of the minor’s informational privacy rights, contrary to petitioners’ assertion.
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more precise, the photos of minor
students scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the reputation
of the minors enrolled in a conservative institution. However, the records are bereft of any evidence, other
than bare assertions that they utilized Facebook’s privacy settings to make the photos visible only to them
or to a select few. Without proof that they placed the photographs subject of this case within the ambit of
their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an expectation of privacy with
respect to the photographs in question.
Had it been proved that the access tothe pictures posted were limited to the original uploader, through the
"Me Only" privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been screened to limit access to a select few,
through the "Custom" setting, the result may have been different, for in such instances, the intention to
limit access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s
friends en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.
On Cyber Responsibility
It has been said that "the best filter is the one between your children’s ears." 53 This means that self-
regulation on the part of OSN users and internet consumers ingeneral is the best means of avoiding
privacy rights violations.54 As a cyberspace communitymember, one has to be proactive in protecting his
or her own privacy.55 It is in this regard that many OSN users, especially minors, fail.Responsible social
networking or observance of the "netiquettes"56 on the part of teenagers has been the concern of many
due to the widespreadnotion that teenagers can sometimes go too far since they generally lack the
people skills or general wisdom to conduct themselves sensibly in a public forum. 57
Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons on good cyber citizenship in its
curriculum to educate its students on proper online conduct may be mosttimely. Too, it is not only STC
but a number of schools and organizations have already deemed it important to include digital literacy
and good cyber citizenshipin their respective programs and curricula in view of the risks that the children
are exposed to every time they participate in online activities. 58 Furthermore, considering the complexity
of the cyber world and its pervasiveness,as well as the dangers that these children are wittingly or
unwittingly exposed to in view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the participation of the
parents in disciplining and educating their children about being a good digital citizen is encouraged by
these institutions and organizations. In fact, it is believed that "to limit such risks, there’s no substitute for
parental involvement and supervision."59
As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its students to beresponsible in
their dealings and activities in cyberspace, particularly in OSNs, whenit enforced the disciplinary actions
specified in the Student Handbook, absenta showing that, in the process, it violated the students’ rights.
OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to whenever they engage
incyberspace activities.1âwphi1 Accordingly, they should be cautious enough to control their privacy and
to exercise sound discretion regarding how much information about themselves they are willing to give
up. Internet consumers ought to be aware that, by entering or uploading any kind of data or information
online, they are automatically and inevitably making it permanently available online, the perpetuation of
which is outside the ambit of their control. Furthermore, and more importantly, information, otherwise
private, voluntarily surrendered by them can be opened, read, or copied by third parties who may or may
not be allowed access to such.
It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings and activities
and must not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding relief from the
courts, as here, requires that claimants themselves take utmost care in safeguarding a right which they
allege to have been violated. These are indispensable. We cannot afford protection to persons if they
themselves did nothing to place the matter within the confines of their private zone. OSN users must be
mindful enough to learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if they desire to keep the information private,
and to keep track of changes in the available privacy settings, such as those of Facebook, especially
because Facebook is notorious for changing these settings and the site's layout often.
In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors' privacy rights, We find no cogent
reason to disturb the findings and case disposition of the court a quo.
In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other assigned errors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated July 27, 2012 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB is hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice
AT T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology
which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility"
and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a
cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the
unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro
Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein,
now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents.
Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-
stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action
geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the
Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala,
was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners.1 The complaint2 was instituted as a
taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines,
taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the
country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally
concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring
them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf
to —
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a
land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in
which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a
genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous
Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence
reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be
utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for
agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this
balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as
(a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well
as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of
salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of
Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity,
with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum —
approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the
country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural
communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers
and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction
in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire
country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the
floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of
forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated
for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and
(k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and
catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the
"greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are
so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial
notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as
documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of
rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million
hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth
rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and
about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license
agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million
hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as
Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25
hectares per hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the
Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not
earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable
damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to
generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the
environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt,
experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs —
especially plaintiff minors and their successors — who may never see, use, benefit from
and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural

resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and
are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On
March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging
permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing
serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative
of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is
desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous
cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the
public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part,
states that it is the policy of the State —
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can
thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations
of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of

dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is

contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to —
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make
full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14,
Article XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural law
— and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant
action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint
based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue
raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive
branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1)
the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action
presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In
the said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action against
him and that it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the
granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the
fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge
gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only
represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. 8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the
respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains
sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the
Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of
generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and
self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative
obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in
granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available
involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners
maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit
that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be
revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific
legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing
in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which
supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such
allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that
the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be
properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the
petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill
that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the
State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time —
usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled
unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the
agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs
indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due
process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil
Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue
with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject
matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the
Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally
impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are
numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all
the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are
present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves,
for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue
in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as
hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and
harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to
the present as well as future generations. 10Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the
next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put
a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time,
the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the
petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the
issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and
rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but
agree with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of
all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right
they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to
prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the
Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified
data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein
defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with
political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by
this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the
three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our
jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber
license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise
would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient
definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is
replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint
itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of
the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the
civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly
stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments
and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for
they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the
fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself,
thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to
preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would
be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to
inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing
the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and
Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all
forms of pollution — air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment

necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same
and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of
environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the
country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well
as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and
utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10
June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources,
specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed
areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as
may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the
welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following
statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the
sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection
and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the different
segments of the population to the development and the use of the country's natural
resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It is also
the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value system including social and
environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and conservation
of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987,15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino
people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land,
waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with the
necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the
quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration, development and
utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the
present as well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into
account social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development
and conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting
and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically
speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's
being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be
primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization,
and conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the
bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes
already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6
June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment
Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain
and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with
each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of
Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity
and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian
of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the
said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as
clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No.
192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or
protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which
they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful
ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and
its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the
defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to
state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the
facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity
of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only
issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a
valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court
laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon
a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a
correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or
recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in
disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory
affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to
be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they
may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as
the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees
thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation
or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue.
What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and
expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no
longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that
protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section
1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a
distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving
the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority
represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what
was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the
government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court,
the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the
legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave
abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according
to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and
decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before
us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from revolving it under the
expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the
political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts
clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our
jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber
license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise
would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping
pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in
his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost
infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber
license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said
licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of
public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every
timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend,
modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of
privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a
contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution.
In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license
is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or
privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is

not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the
person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a
vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People
vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by
which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a
privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products
therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief
Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within
the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree
No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27,
1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not
involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber
licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that
a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be
stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose,
such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose
of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and
enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute.
The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the
promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the
police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general
welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life
Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are
normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall
be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are
absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the
detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally
fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common
interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with
respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing
or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed
in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of
right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged
Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The
petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the
questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to
my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal
principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the
protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the natural
resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what
the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and,
maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their
suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a
plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of
"class" here involved — membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country
whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action
petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The
Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental
protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or
entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may
be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part
of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is
not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental
legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that
"the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been
"constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it
cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very
difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a
balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic
appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from
factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers,
inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of
organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after
strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and
other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of
ground water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements
pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV,
Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be
formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II,
Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other
hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and "environment
quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified
the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a
specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code
identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the formulation and
implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and sub-headings
mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate
action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the
constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of
Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The
implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and
far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right — a
right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution —
that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners
so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind,
the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well
exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the
existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an
effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a
specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons.
One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in
operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in
other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation
is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial
power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis
supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the
right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully
submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At
least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have no
claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no
specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments
— the legislative and executive departments — must be given a real and effective opportunity to
fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts
should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession
agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the
proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded
is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms and
conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those
companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the
specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between
petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent
administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies
demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest
cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's
decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.
# Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to
my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal
principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the
protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the natural
resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what
the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and,
maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their
suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a
plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of
"class" here involved — membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country
whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action
petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The
Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental
protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or
entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may
be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part
of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is
not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental
legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that
"the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been
"constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it
cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very
difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a
balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic
appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from
factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers,
inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of
organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after
strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and
other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of
ground water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements
pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV,
Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be
formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II,
Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other
hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and "environment
quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified
the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a
specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code
identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the formulation and
implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and sub-headings
mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate
action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the
constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of
Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The
implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and
far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right — a
right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution —
that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners
so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind,
the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well
exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the
existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an
effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a
specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons.
One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in
operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in
other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation
is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial
power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis
supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the
right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully
submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At
least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have no
claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no
specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments
— the legislative and executive departments — must be given a real and effective opportunity to
fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts
should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession
agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the
proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded
is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms and
conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those
companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the
specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between
petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent
administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies
demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest
cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's
decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.
G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967
HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his
capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO
D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G.
REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal
Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City
Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro,
Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for
respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 — hereinafter referred to as
Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges2 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges —
issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein 4 and/or the
corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-
named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take
possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,

portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or
intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications
adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code)
and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and
the Rules of Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books
and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the
warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed
against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents,
papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed
of in accordance with law — on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original
action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of
the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their
agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in
the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered
quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the
respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3,
Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated
under the search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and
have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by
petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against
herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. However,
by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers,
documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are concerned; but,
the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the
residences of petitioners herein.7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question
may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the
aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of
the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said
corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein
petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said
corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality
of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,9 and that the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of
the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to
above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to the corporation did
not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized and
thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they were the rights of
the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the
lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have been invaded. Certainly,
such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of defendants whose property
had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could they claim
for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with
reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows,
therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful
search and seizure does not extend to the personal defendants but
embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs.
United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the
aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by
this Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence
against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled,
namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the
authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative,
whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners
herein.1äwphï1.ñët
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and
that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this connection, the
Constitution 13provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were
issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a
"violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof
with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges
who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the
applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would
be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the
aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the
privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace
officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted — to
outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen
political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal
means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants,
that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by providing in
its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court
added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,

portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss
statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations,
whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the
things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the
elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if
the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things
thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we
are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said
position was in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free
merely "because the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence
unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages against the searching officer, against
the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of
an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such
other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the
exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been
unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional
privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may have been
protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the
seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be
secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are
concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their
officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have
resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same Federal
Court. 20After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of privacy
free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are led by it to
close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in
flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very
same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation
of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same
sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as
without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would
be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable
human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so
ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish
means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was
applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have
seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the
exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that
proposition. The right to when conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was not
susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment
had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore,
in extending the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable
searches — state or federal — it was logically and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion
doctrine — an essential part of the right to privacy — be also insisted upon as an essential
ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new
constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege,
namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the
unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and
enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule
to "is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available
way — by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of
constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that the
right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that
the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional
in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because it is
enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured by its Due
Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who,
in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded
on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees
him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the
courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a
search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime
by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not
comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent
evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no
justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its
issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing
expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or
make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under
consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the party
in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not
have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually — but, understandably — finds itself
in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral
effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party
for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962,
petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey
Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be
included among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S.
Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records,
papers and other effects seized in the offices of the corporations above referred to include personal
belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive possession and control, for the
exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of
the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the
aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been
Advanced, not in their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be
readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution sought to
be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to
said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or
allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for
reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in support
of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon
by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any
rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter open
for determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned;
that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution
of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ
of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects
thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for
are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned
residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should
be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as
regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other
premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:
From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and from the import of the
deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:
1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this case are general
warrants and are therefore proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of section 1 of Article III
(Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;
2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search warrants were
consequently illegal;
3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1, should be, and is
declared, abandoned;
4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners are expressly declared
null and void the searches and seizures therein made are expressly declared illegal; and the writ
of preliminary injunction heretofore issued against the use of the documents, papers and effect
seized in the said residences is made permanent; and
5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily demonstrated that they
have legal standing to move for the suppression of the documents, papers and effects seized in
the places other than the three residences adverted to above, the opinion written by the Chief
Justice refrains from expressly declaring as null and void the such warrants served at such other
places and as illegal the searches and seizures made therein, and leaves "the matter open for
determination in appropriate cases in the future."
It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately preceding paragraph
(numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.
I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the nullity of the search
warrants served at places other than the three residences, and the illegibility of the searches and seizures
conducted under the authority thereof. In my view even the exacerbating passions and prejudices
inordinately generated by the environmental political and moral developments of this case should not
deter this Court from forthrightly laying down the law not only for this case but as well for future cases and
future generations. All the search warrants, without exception, in this case are admittedly general, blanket
and roving warrants and are therefore admittedly and indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the
searches and seizures made were therefore unlawful. That the petitioners, let us assume in gratia
argumente, have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of the papers, things and effects seized
from places other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in any manner affect, alter or otherwise
modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures
made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing the said warrants are void and
remain void, and the searches and seizures were illegal and remain illegal. No inference can be drawn
from the words of the Constitution that "legal standing" or the lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or
validity of a search warrant or of the lawfulness or illegality of a search or seizure.
On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings submitted to this Court
the petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and return of the documents,
papers and effects that were seized from places other than their family residences.
Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction and interpretation
of the said constitutional provision, our courts have invariably regarded as doctrinal the pronouncement
made on the Fourth Amendment by federal courts, especially the Federal Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit Courts of Appeals.
The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of documents,
papers and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be summarized as follows;
(a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b) ownership and/or control or
possession — actual or constructive — of premises searched gives "standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved
person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn application for search warrant are "primarily"
directed solely and exclusively against the "aggrieved person," gives "standing."
An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three, all were
directed against the petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named personally,
followed by the designation, "the President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. The
three warrants excepted named three corporate defendants. But the "office/house/warehouse/premises"
mentioned in the said three warrants were also the same "office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to
be owned by or under the control of the petitioners in all the other search warrants directed against the
petitioners and/or "the President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. (see pages 5-24
of Petitioners' Reply of April 2, 1962). The searches and seizures were to be made, and were actually
made, in the "office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of the petitioners.
Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."
Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and suppress,
and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure regardless of their
location at the time of seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (narcotics stored in the
apartment of a friend of the defendant); Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d. 650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961),
(personal and corporate papers of corporation of which the defendant was president), United States vs.
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in an apartment not belonging to the defendant); Pielow vs.
United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1925) (books seized from the defendant's sister but belonging to
the defendant); Cf. Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683 (10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk
neither owned by nor in exclusive possession of the defendant).
In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 1966), it was held that under
the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures, a person places himself or his
property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his
automobile:
Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature and scope of
Fourth Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a man relies
upon when he places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his
home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile. There he is protected from unwarranted
governmental intrusion. And when he puts some thing in his filing cabinet, in his desk drawer, or
in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be secure from an unreasonable search or an
unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth Amendment could not tolerate the warrantless
search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the purloining of the petitioner's private papers in Gouled, or
the surreptitious electronic surveilance in Silverman. Countless other cases which have come to
this Court over the years have involved a myriad of differing factual contexts in which the
protections of the Fourth Amendment have been appropriately invoked. No doubt, the future will
bring countless others. By nothing we say here do we either foresee or foreclose factual
situations to which the Fourth Amendment may be applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct. 408
(December 12, 1966). See also U.S. vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93 (November 13, 1951).
(Emphasis supplied).
Control of premises searched gives "standing."
Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized, the petitioners
have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or leasehold interest in
many of the premises searched. These proprietary and leasehold interests have been sufficiently set forth
in their motion for reconsideration and need not be recounted here, except to emphasize that the
petitioners paid rent, directly or indirectly, for practically all the premises searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen
Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises 2008, Dewey Boulevard; 1436 Colorado Street);
maintained personal offices within the corporate offices (IBMC, USTC); had made improvements or
furnished such offices; or had paid for the filing cabinets in which the papers were stored (Room 204,
Army & Navy Club); and individually, or through their respective spouses, owned the controlling stock of
the corporations involved. The petitioners' proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the premises searched
therefore independently gives them standing to move for the return and suppression of the books, papers
and affects seized therefrom.
In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature and extent of the
interest in the searched premises necessary to maintain a motion to suppress. After reviewing what it
considered to be the unduly technical standard of the then prevailing circuit court decisions, the Supreme
Court said (362 U.S. 266):
We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We are persuaded,
however, that it is unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions,
developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of private property law which,
more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is
largely historical. Even in the area from which they derive, due consideration has led to the
discarding of those distinctions in the homeland of the common law. See Occupiers' Liability Act,
1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying out Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305.
Distinctions such as those between "lessee", "licensee," "invitee," "guest," often only of gossamer
strength, ought not be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to constitutional
safeguards. See also Chapman vs. United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).
It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises searched must own the
property seized in order to have standing in a motion to return and suppress. In Alioto vs. United States,
216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a Bookkeeper for several corporations from whose apartment the corporate
records were seized successfully moved for their return. In United States vs. Antonelli, Fireworks Co., 53
F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the corporation's president successfully moved for the return and
suppression is to him of both personal and corporate documents seized from his home during the course
of an illegal search:
The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, "either his own or the
corporation's was entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Under the
circumstances in the case at bar, the search and seizure were unreasonable and unlawful. The
motion for the return of seized article and the suppression of the evidence so obtained should be
granted. (Emphasis supplied).
Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the place searched or the articles
seize had the necessary standing to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule. But in MacDonald vs.
Unite States, 335 U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson joined by Justice Felix Frankfurter, advanced
the view that "even a guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree he is under against criminal intrusion."
This view finally became the official view of the U.S. Supreme Court and was articulated in United States
vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years later, in 1960, in Jones vs. Unite States, 362 U.S. 257, 267,
the U.S. Supreme Court went a step further. Jones was a mere guest in the apartment unlawfully
searched but the Court nonetheless declared that the exclusionary rule protected him as well. The
concept of "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" was enlarged to include "anyone
legitimately on premise where the search occurs."
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held
that the defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president of a corporation had standing in a mail fraud
prosecution against him to demand the return and suppression of corporate property. Henzel vs. United
States, 296 F 2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra. The court conclude that the defendant had standing on
two independent grounds: First —he had a sufficient interest in the property seized, and second — he
had an adequate interest in the premises searched (just like in the case at bar). A postal inspector had
unlawfully searched the corporation' premises and had seized most of the corporation's book and records.
Looking to Jones, the court observed:
Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as a "person aggrieved by an
unlawful search and seizure." It tells us that appellant should not have been precluded from
objecting to the Postal Inspector's search and seizure of the corporation's books and records
merely because the appellant did not show ownership or possession of the books and records or
a substantial possessory interest in the invade premises . . . (Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d
at 651). .
Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683, (10th Cir. 1962). In Villano,
police officers seized two notebooks from a desk in the defendant's place of employment; the defendant
did not claim ownership of either; he asserted that several employees (including himself) used the
notebooks. The Court held that the employee had a protected interest and that there also was an invasion
of privacy. Both Henzel and Villano considered also the fact that the search and seizure were "directed at"
the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 682; Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d at
683.
In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage and went to Puerto Rico,
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to move to quash as unreasonable
search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution a grand jury subpoena duces
tecum directed to the custodian of his files. The Government contended that the petitioner had no
standing because the books and papers were physically in the possession of the custodian, and because
the subpoena was directed against the custodian. The court rejected the contention, holding that
Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal rights in the books
and papers as not to enable the question of unreasonable search and seizure to be escaped
through the mere procedural device of compelling a third-party naked possessor to produce and
deliver them. Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956).
Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed against said person
gives "standing."
The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191 (1965,
U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had stored with an attorney certain files and papers, which attorney,
by the name of Dunn, was not, at the time of the seizing of the records, Birrell's attorney. * Dunn, in turn,
had stored most of the records at his home in the country and on a farm which, according to Dunn's
affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and management." The papers turned out to be private,
personal and business papers together with corporate books and records of certain unnamed
corporations in which Birrell did not even claim ownership. (All of these type records were seized in the
case at bar). Nevertheless, the search in Birrell was held invalid by the court which held that even though
Birrell did not own the premises where the records were stored, he had "standing" to move for the return
ofall the papers and properties seized. The court, relying on Jones vs. U.S., supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli
Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d 631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; and Schwimmer vs. U.S.,
supra, pointed out that
It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were directed solely and
exclusively against Birrell. The only person suggested in the papers as having violated the law
was Birrell. The first search warrant described the records as having been used "in committing a
violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341, by the use of the mails by one Lowell M.
Birrell, . . ." The second search warrant was captioned: "United States of America vs. Lowell M.
Birrell. (p. 198)
Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to move to suppress.
Such was the rule even before Jones. (p. 199)
If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records stored with Dunn, it
matters not whether he had any interest in the premises searched. See also Jeffers v. United
States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 432 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed.
459 (1951).
The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the United States did not appeal
from this decision. The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of the present petitioners;
as in Birrell, many personal and corporate papers were seized from premises not petitioners' family
residences; as in Birrell, the searches were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED SOLETY AND EXCLUSIVELY"
against the petitioners. Still both types of documents were suppressed in Birrell because of the illegal
search. In the case at bar, the petitioners connection with the premises raided is much closer than
in Birrell.
Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless whether
these were directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the documents were
personal papers of the petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate papers) were held by them in
a personal capacity or under their personal control.
Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to the petitioners
all personal and private papers and effects seized, no matter where these were seized, whether from their
residences or corporate offices or any other place or places. The uncontradicted sworn statements of the
petitioners in their, various pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show that amongst the things
seized from the corporate offices and other places were personal and private papers and effects
belonging to the petitioners.
If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where the objects of the
unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be: (a) personal or private papers of
the petitioners were they were unlawfully seized, be it their family residences offices, warehouses and/or
premises owned and/or possessed (actually or constructively) by them as shown in all the search and in
the sworn applications filed in securing the void search warrants and (b) purely corporate papers
belonging to corporations. Under such categorization or grouping, the determination of which unlawfully
seized papers, documents and things are personal/private of the petitioners or purely corporate
papers will have to be left to the lower courts which issued the void search warrants in ultimately effecting
the suppression and/or return of the said documents.
And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners likewise have clear legal
standing to move for the suppression of purely corporate papers as "President and/or General Manager"
of the corporations involved as specifically mentioned in the void search warrants.
Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my disquisition were criminal
prosecutions, the great clauses of the constitutional proscription on illegal searches and seizures do not
withhold the mantle of their protection from cases not criminal in origin or nature.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 81561. January 18, 1991.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANDRE MARTI, Accused-

Appellant.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Reynaldo B . Tatoy and Abelardo E . Rogacion for Accused-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; GUARANTEE AGAINST UNREASONABLE

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; PRONOUNCEMENT OF UNITED STATES FEDERAL SUPREME
COURT AND STATE APPELLATE COURTS, DOCTRINAL IN THIS JURISDICTION. — Our
present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure
had its origin in the 1935 Charter which was in turn derived almost verbatim from the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As such, the Court may turn to the
pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts
which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY; EXCLUSIONARY RULE ON EVIDENCE

OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE GUARANTEE AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES. — In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and
has struck down the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional
safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. (Bache & Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz,
37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos, 144
SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1987]; See also Salazar v. Hon.
Achacoso, Et Al., GR No. 81510, March 14, 1990).
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; LIBERTIES MAY BE INVOKED ONLY AGAINST

THE STATE, NOT UPON PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS. — In the absence of governmental
interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the
State. As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]: "1. This
‘constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the immunity of
one’s person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, included in which
is his residence, his papers, and other possessions . . . That the Bill of Rights embodied in
the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals finds support
in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. The constitutional proscription against
unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be
invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise
of power is imposed.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; GUARANTEE AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE; CASE AT
BAR. — The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government
without the latter transgressing appellant’s rights against unreasonable search and seizure,
the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the
prosecution of the offense charged. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers,
a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality.
However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the
intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot
be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum,
the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MERE PRESENCE OF NBI AGENTS TO OBSERVE AND LOOK AT WHICH
IS IN PLAIN SIGHT IS NOT A SEARCH. — The mere presence of the NBI agents did not
convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure
proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is
not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in
aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the contraband
articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the
search that is prohibited by the constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927];
Ker v. State of California 374 US 23, 10 L. Ed. 2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d
122 [1968]).
6. ID.; CONSTITUTION; DOES NOT GOVERN RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS. —

The constitution, in laying down the principles of the government and fundamental liberties
of the people, does not govern relationships between individuals.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY; EVIDENCE PROCURED BY INDIVIDUALS

EFFECTED THROUGH PRIVATE SEIZURE, ADMISSIBLE. — Similarly, the admissibility of the
evidence procured by an individual effected through private seizure equally applies, in pari
passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental as it is, of appellant’s constitutional rights
to privacy and communication.
8. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY; SELF-SERVING DENIALS, DESERVE NO WEIGHT IN LAW. —

Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative self-serving
evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight
than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v.
Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989]; People v. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237 [1989]).
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITE FOR EVIDENCE TO BE BELIEVED. — Evidence, to be believed,

must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself
such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under
the circumstances.
10. ID.; ID.; BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS; THINGS WHICH A PERSON
POSSESSES ARE PRESUMED OWNED BY HIM; CASE AT BAR. — As records further show,
appellant did not even bother to ask Michael’s full name, his complete address or passport
number. Furthermore, if indeed, the German national was the owner of the merchandise,
appellant should have so indicated in the contract of shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records,
p. 40). On the contrary, appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof
giving more weight to the presumption that things which a person possesses, or exercises
acts of ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is
therefore estopped to claim otherwise.
DECISION
BIDIN, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision ** rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila
(Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 21
(b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e)(i), Article 1 of Republic
Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as

follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his common-law
wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the
Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift-wrapped
packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them.
The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich,
Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein
his name, passport number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the
consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland" (Decision, p.
6)
"Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages.
Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books, cigars,
and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant’s representation, Anita
Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the packages. The four (4) packages were then
placed inside a brown corrugated box one by two feet in size (1’ x 2’). Styro-foam was
placed at the bottom and on top of the packages before the box was sealed with masking
tape, thus making the box ready for shipment (Decision, p. 8).chanrobles law library : red
"Before delivery of appellant’s box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr.
Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating
procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant’s box, a
peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiosity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles
allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he
pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He made
an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents
thereof (tsn, pp. 29-30, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
"Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a
laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp.
5-6, October 6, 1987).
"He brought the letter and a sample of appellant’s shipment to the Narcotics Section of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o’clock in the afternoon of that date,
i.e., August 14, 1987. He was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job Reyes
informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes
and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes’ office et Ermita, Manila
(tsn, p. 30, October 6, 1987).
"Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant’s packages were placed and, in the
presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out the
cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have
been contained inside the cellophane wrappers (tsn, p. 38, October 6, 1987; Emphasis
supplied).
"The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He
discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The
package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that
dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6,
1987).
"The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof,
after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects (tsn, pp. 2-3, October 7,
1987).
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant’s stated
address in his passport being the Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested
assistance from the latter’s Chief Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming
his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted
shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI
submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory examination. It
turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic
chemist. (Appellee’s Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132-134).
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.
In this appeal, Accused/appellant assigns the following errors, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY SEARCHED AND
SEIZED OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS.
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT
THAT HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER CUSTODIAL PROCEEDINGS
WERE NOT OBSERVED.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE
APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION." (Appellant’s Brief,
p. 1; Rollo, p. 55)
1. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in
violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of
communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues that the same
should be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).
Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
"Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law.
"(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding."cralaw virtua1aw library
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure had its origin in the 1935 Charter which, worded as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Sec. 1 [3],
Article III).
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment *** to the United States
Constitution. As such, the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States
Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this
jurisdiction.
Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio by the US Federal Supreme
Court (367 US 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 1081 [1961]), this Court, in Stonehill v. Diokno
(20 SCRA 383 [1967]), declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a
defective search and seizure warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier adopted
in Moncado v. People’s Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948]) wherein the admissibility of evidence was
not affected by the illegality of its seizure. The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2], Art. IV)
constitutionalized the Stonehill ruling and is carried over up to the present with the advent
of the 1987 Constitution.
In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck
down the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard
against unreasonable searches and seizures. (Bache & Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA
823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1
[1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1987]; See also Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, Et Al.,
GR No. 81510, March 14, 1990).
It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained
were invariably procured by the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or
other authorized government agencies.chanrobles law library : red
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought
to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a
private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State authorities. Under
the circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated? Stated otherwise, may an act of a
private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant’s constitutional rights, be invoked
against the State?
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties

guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. This ‘constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the
immunity of one’s person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government,
included in which is his residence, his papers, and other possessions . . .
". . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the access except under the
circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is
his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon
to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life . . ." (Cf.
Schermerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966] and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616
[1886]; Emphasis supplied).
In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the Court there
in construing the right against unreasonable searches and seizures declared
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures, and as
shown in previous cases, its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and history
clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority,
and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies; as against
such authority it was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to secure the citizen in the right
of unmolested occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his property, subject to the
right of seizure by process duly served."cralaw virtua1aw library
The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661 [1968]) where a parking
attendant who searched the automobile to ascertain the owner thereof found marijuana
instead, without the knowledge and participation of police authorities, was declared
admissible in prosecution for illegal possession of narcotics.
And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d 121), it was held that the search
and seizure clauses are restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon private
individuals, (citing People v. Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d 621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892 (1966); State
v. Brown, Mo., 391 S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v. Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957).
Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517 (1967). The Court there
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The search of which appellant complains, however, was made by a private citizen — the
owner of a motel in which appellant stayed overnight and in which he left behind a travel
case containing the evidence**** complained of. The search was made on the motel
owner’s own initiative. Because of it, he became suspicious, called the local police, informed
them of the bag’s contents, and made it available to the authorities.
"The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not require exclusion of evidence
obtained through a search by a private citizen. Rather, the amendment only proscribes
governmental action."cralaw virtua1aw library
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without
the latter transgressing appellant’s rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the
Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the
prosecution of the offense charged.chanrobles law library
Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal search
and seizure of the evidence later on used in prosecuting the case which resulted in his
conviction.
The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be clarified in two days. In both

instances, the argument stands to fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI
agents conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of
the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency,
who made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a
standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before
delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts (TSN, October 6 & 7,
1987, pp. 15-18; pp. 7-8; Original Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168).
It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took
samples of the same to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of business.
Thereafter, he opened the parcels containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the
care and custody thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and
seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of accused/appellant.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search
effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution.
Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed
that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search
(Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the contraband articles are identified without a
trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the
constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v. State of California 374 US
23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122 [1968]).
In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise held that where the
property was taken into custody of the police at the specific request of the manager and
where the search was initially made by the owner there is no unreasonable search and
seizure within the constitutional meaning of the term.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts
of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
True, the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must always be subject to
protection. But protection against whom? Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech in
the Bill of Rights answers the query which he himself posed, as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of
constitutional democracy. Protection against whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of
Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the
relation between individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. What the
Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to
any power holder." (Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner Bernas; Record of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis supplied)
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a
restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement
of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against
arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first
secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the
behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private
purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right
against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to
bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935 Constitution has been
modified by the present phraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as
inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against
illegal search and seizure, it matters not whether the evidence was procured by police
authorities or private individuals (Appellant’s Brief, p. 8, Rollo, p. 62).
The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles of
the government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships
between individuals. Moreover, it must be emphasized that the modifications introduced in
the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the issuance of either a search warrant
or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of the judge in the issuance thereof (See
Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No. 13 [October 1, 1985] and Circular
No. 12 [June 30, 1987]. The modifications introduced deviate in no manner as to whom the
restriction or inhibition against unreasonable search and seizure is directed against. The
restraint stayed with the State and did not shift to anyone else.
Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked
against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority.
To agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights
should also be construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal complications
and an absurd interpretation of the constitution.
Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected through

private seizure equally applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental as
it is, of appellant’s constitutional rights to privacy and communication.
2. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the lower court erred in
convicting him despite the undisputed fact that his rights under the constitution while under
custodial investigation were not observed.
Again, the contention is without merit, We have carefully examined the records of the case
and found nothing to indicate, as an "undisputed fact", that appellant was not informed of
his constitutional rights or that he gave statements without the assistance of counsel. The
law enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional rights. It is
presumed that they have regularly performed their duties (Sec. 5(m), Rule 131) and their
testimonies should be given full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary.
What is clear from the records, on the other hand, is that appellant refused to give any
written statement while under investigation as testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI,
Thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Fiscal Formoso:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job Reyes. What about the accused here, did
you investigate the accused together with the girl?
"WITNESS:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with the girl but the accused availed of his
constitutional right not to give any written statement, sir." (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 62;
Original Records, p. 240)
The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution was not contradicted by the defense
on cross-examination. As borne out by the records, neither was there any proof by the
defense that appellant gave uncounselled confession while being investigated. What is
more, we have examined the assailed judgment of the trial court and nowhere is there any
reference made to the testimony of appellant while under custodial investigation which was
utilized in the finding of conviction. Appellant’s second assignment of error is therefore
misplaced.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
3. Coming now to appellant’s third assignment of error, appellant would like us to believe
that he was not the owner of the packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather a
certain Michael, a German national, whom appellant met in a pub along Ermita, Manila: that
in the course of their 30-minute conversation, Michael requested him to ship the packages
and gave him P2,000.00 for the cost of the shipment since the German national was about
to leave the country the next day (October 15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10).
Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant’s disclaimer as incredulous,
self-serving and contrary to human experience. It can easily be fabricated. An acquaintance
with a complete stranger struck in half an hour could not have pushed a man to entrust the
shipment of four (4) parcels and shell out P2,000.00 for the purpose and for appellant to
readily accede to comply with the undertaking without first ascertaining its contents. As
stated by the trial court," (a) person would not simply entrust contraband and of
considerable value at that as the marijuana flowering tops, and the cash amount of
P2,000.00 to a complete stranger like the Accused. The Accused, on the other hand, would
not simply accept such undertaking to take custody of the packages and ship the same from
a complete stranger on his mere say-so" (Decision, p. 19, Rollo, p. 91). As to why he readily
agreed to do the errand, appellant failed to explain. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, are negative self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and
cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989]; People v. Sariol,
174 SCRA 237 [1989]).
Appellant’s bare denial is even made more suspect considering that, as per records of the
Interpol, he was previously convicted of possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in the
Federal Republic of Germany on January 1, 1982 and that the consignee of the frustrated
shipment, Walter Fierz, also a Swiss national, was likewise convicted for drug abuse and is
just about an hour’s drive from appellant’s residence in Zurich, Switzerland (TSN, October
8, 1987, p. 66; Original Records, p. 244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93).
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it
must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968], citing
Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130; see also People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 [1989];
People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327 [1983]); Castañares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567 [1979]). As
records further show, appellant did not even bother to ask Michael’s full name, his complete
address or passport number. Furthermore, if indeed, the German national was the owner of
the merchandise, appellant should have so indicated in the contract of shipment (Exh. "B",
Original Records, p. 40). On the contrary, appellant signed the contract as the owner and
shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption that things which a person
possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At
this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise.cralawnad
Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial court in rendering the assailed
judgment.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr . and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
A.M. No. P-02-1651 June 22, 2006

(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 00-1021-P)
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, Complainant,

vs.
SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
While man is finite, he seeks and subscribes to the Infinite. Respondent Soledad Escritor once again
stands before the Court invoking her religious freedom and her Jehovah God in a bid to save her family –
united without the benefit of legal marriage - and livelihood. The State, on the other hand, seeks to wield
its power to regulate her behavior and protect its interest in marriage and family and the integrity of the
courts where respondent is an employee. How the Court will tilt the scales of justice in the case at bar will
decide not only the fate of respondent Escritor but of other believers coming to Court bearing grievances
on their free exercise of religion. This case comes to us from our remand to the Office of the Court
Administrator on August 4, 2003.1
I. THE PAST PROCEEDINGS
In a sworn-letter complaint dated July 27, 2000, complainant Alejandro Estrada requested Judge Jose F.
Caoibes, Jr., presiding judge of Branch 253, Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, for an investigation of
respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in said court, for living with a man not her husband, and
having borne a child within this live-in arrangement. Estrada believes that Escritor is committing an
immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed
therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.2 Consequently, respondent was charged with
committing "disgraceful and immoral conduct" under Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Sec. 46(b)(5) of the
Revised Administrative Code. 3
Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her
husband having died in 1998.4 She admitted that she started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the
benefit of marriage more than twenty years ago when her husband was still alive but living with another
woman. She also admitted that she and Quilapio have a son.5 But as a member of the religious sect
known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, respondent asserted
that their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs and has the approval of her
congregation.6 In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991, a "Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness."7
For Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Declaration allows members of the congregation who have been
abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations. The Declaration thus makes the resulting
union moral and binding within the congregation all over the world except in countries where divorce is
allowed. As laid out by the tenets of their faith, the Jehovah’s congregation requires that at the time the
declarations are executed, the couple cannot secure the civil authorities’ approval of the marital
relationship because of legal impediments. Only couples who have been baptized and in good standing
may execute the Declaration, which requires the approval of the elders of the congregation. As a matter
of practice, the marital status of the declarants and their respective spouses’ commission of adultery are
investigated before the declarations are executed.8 Escritor and Quilapio’s declarations were executed in
the usual and approved form prescribed by the Jehovah’s Witnesses,9 approved by elders of the
congregation where the declarations were executed,10 and recorded in the Watch Tower Central Office.11
Moreover, the Jehovah’s congregation believes that once all legal impediments for the couple are lifted,
the validity of the declarations ceases, and the couple should legalize their union. In Escritor’s case,
although she was widowed in 1998, thereby lifting the legal impediment to marry on her part, her mate
was still not capacitated to remarry. Thus, their declarations remained valid. 12 In sum, therefore, insofar
as the congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement between
Escritor and Quilapio and they remain members in good standing in the congregation.
By invoking the religious beliefs, practices and moral standards of her congregation, in asserting that her
conjugal arrangement does not constitute disgraceful and immoral conduct for which she should be held
administratively liable,13 the Court had to determine the contours of religious freedom under Article III,
Section 5 of the Constitution, which provides, viz:
Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.
A. Ruling
In our decision dated August 4, 2003, after a long and arduous scrutiny into the origins and development
of the religion clauses in the United States (U.S.) and the Philippines, we held that in resolving claims
involving religious freedom (1) benevolent neutrality or accommodation, whether mandatory or
permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the religion clauses in our Constitution; and (2)
in deciding respondent’s plea of exemption based on the Free Exercise Clause (from the law with which
she is administratively charged), it is the compelling state interest test, the strictest test, which must be
applied.14
Notwithstanding the above rulings, the Court could not, at that time, rule definitively on the ultimate issue
of whether respondent was to be held administratively liable for there was need to give the State the
opportunity to adduce evidence that it has a more "compelling interest" to defeat the claim of the
respondent to religious freedom. Thus, in the decision dated August 4, 2003, we remanded the complaint
to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), and ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to
intervene in the case so it can:
(a) examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent’s claimed religious belief and practice;
(b) present evidence on the state’s "compelling interest" to override respondent’s religious belief
and practice; and
(c) show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to
respondent’s religious freedom. 15
It bears stressing, therefore, that the residual issues of the case pertained NOT TO WHAT APPROACH
THIS COURT SHOULD TAKE IN CONSTRUING THE RELIGION CLAUSES, NOR TO THE PROPER
TEST APPLICABLE IN DETERMINING CLAIMS OF EXEMPTION BASED ON FREEDOM OF
RELIGION. These issues have already been ruled upon prior to the remand, and constitute "the law of
the case" insofar as they resolved the issues of which framework and test are to be applied in this case,
and no motion for its reconsideration having been filed.16 The only task that the Court is left to do is to
determine whether the evidence adduced by the State proves its more compelling interest. This issue
involves a pure question of fact.
B. Law of the case
Mr. Justice Carpio’s insistence, in his dissent, in attacking the ruling of this case interpreting the religious
clauses of the Constitution, made more than two years ago, is misplaced to say the least. Since neither
the complainant, respondent nor the government has filed a motion for reconsideration assailing this
ruling, the same has attained finality and constitutes the law of the case. Any attempt to reopen this final
ruling constitutes a crass contravention of elementary rules of procedure. Worse, insofar as it would
overturn the parties’ right to rely upon our interpretation which has long attained finality, it also runs
counter to substantive due process.
Be that as it may, even assuming that there were no procedural and substantive infirmities in Mr. Justice
Carpio’s belated attempts to disturb settled issues, and that he had timely presented his arguments, the
results would still be the same.
We review the highlights of our decision dated August 4, 2003.
1. Old World Antecedents
In our August 4, 2003 decision, we made a painstaking review of Old World antecedents of the religion
clauses, because "one cannot understand, much less intelligently criticize the approaches of the courts
and the political branches to religious freedom in the recent past in the United States without a deep
appreciation of the roots of these controversies in the ancient and medieval world and in the American
experience."17 We delved into the conception of religion from primitive times, when it started out as the
state
itself, when the authority and power of the state were ascribed to God. 18 Then, religion developed on its
own and became superior to the state,19 its subordinate,20 and even becoming an engine of state policy.21
We ascertained two salient features in the review of religious history: First, with minor exceptions, the
history of church-state relationships was characterized by persecution, oppression, hatred, bloodshed,
and war, all in the name of the God of Love and of the Prince of Peace. Second, likewise with minor
exceptions, this history witnessed the unscrupulous use of religion by secular powers to promote secular
purposes and policies, and the willing acceptance of that role by the vanguards of religion in exchange for
the favors and mundane benefits conferred by ambitious princes and emperors in exchange for religion’s
invaluable service. This was the context in which the unique experiment of the principle of religious
freedom and separation of church and state saw its birth in American constitutional democracy and in
human history. 22
Strictly speaking, the American experiment of freedom and separation was not translated in the First
Amendment. That experiment had been launched four years earlier, when the founders of the republic
carefully withheld from the new national government any power to deal with religion. As James Madison
said, the national government had no "jurisdiction" over religion or any "shadow of right to intermeddle"
with it. 23
The omission of an express guaranty of religious freedom and other natural rights, however, nearly
prevented the ratification of the Constitution. The restriction had to be made explicit with the adoption of
the religion clauses in the First Amendment as they are worded to this day. Thus, the First Amendment
did not take away or abridge any power of the national government; its intent was to make express the
absence of power.24 It commands, in two parts (with the first part usually referred to as the Establishment
Clause and the second part, the Free Exercise Clause), viz:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. 25
The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, it should be noted, were not designed to serve
contradictory purposes. They have a single goal—to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and
practices. In simplest terms, the Free Exercise Clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious
beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the Establishment Clause prohibits
government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words,
the two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either the carrot or the stick
to influence individual religious beliefs and practices.26
In sum, a review of the Old World antecedents of religion shows the movement of establishment of
religion as an engine to promote state interests, to the principle of non-establishment to allow the free
exercise of religion.
2. Religion Clauses in the U.S. Context
The Court then turned to the religion clauses’ interpretation and construction in the United States, not
because we are bound by their interpretation, but because the U.S. religion clauses are the precursors to
the Philippine religion clauses, although we have significantly departed from the U.S. interpretation as will
be discussed later on.
At the outset, it is worth noting that American jurisprudence in this area has been volatile and fraught with
inconsistencies whether within a Court decision or across decisions. For while there is widespread
agreement regarding the value of the First Amendment religion clauses, there is an equally broad
disagreement as to what these clauses specifically require, permit and forbid. No agreement has been
reached by those who have studied the religion clauses as regards its exact meaning and the paucity of
records in the U.S. Congress renders it difficult to ascertain its meaning. 27
U.S. history has produced two identifiably different, even opposing, strains of jurisprudence on the religion
clauses. First is the standard of separation, which may take the form of either (a) strict separation or (b)
the tamer version of strict neutrality or separation, or what Mr. Justice Carpio refers to as the second
theory of governmental neutrality. Although the latter form is not as hostile to religion as the former, both
are anchored on the Jeffersonian premise that a "wall of separation" must exist between the state and the
Church to protect the state from the church.28 Both protect the principle of church-state separation with a
rigid reading of the principle. On the other hand, the second standard, the benevolent neutrality or
accommodation, is buttressed by the view that the wall of separation is meant to protect the church from
the state. A brief review of each theory is in order.
a. Strict Separation and Strict Neutrality/Separation
The Strict Separationist believes that the Establishment Clause was meant to protect the state from the
church, and the state’s hostility towards religion allows no interaction between the two. According to this
Jeffersonian view, an absolute barrier to formal interdependence of religion and state needs to be
erected. Religious institutions could not receive aid, whether direct or indirect, from the state. Nor could
the state adjust its secular programs to alleviate burdens the programs placed on believers. 29 Only the
complete separation of religion from politics would eliminate the formal influence of religious institutions
and provide for a free choice among political views, thus a strict "wall of separation" is necessary. 30
Strict separation faces difficulties, however, as it is deeply embedded in American history and
contemporary practice that enormous amounts of aid, both direct and indirect, flow to religion from
government in return for huge amounts of mostly indirect aid from religion.31 For example, less than
twenty-four hours after Congress adopted the First Amendment’s prohibition on laws respecting an
establishment of religion, Congress decided to express its thanks to God Almighty for the many blessings
enjoyed by the nation with a resolution in favor of a presidential proclamation declaring a national day of
Thanksgiving and Prayer.32 Thus, strict separationists are caught in an awkward position of claiming a
constitutional principle that has never existed and is never likely to.33
The tamer version of the strict separationist view, the strict neutrality or separationist view, (or, the
governmental neutrality theory) finds basis in Everson v. Board of Education, 34 where the Court declared
that Jefferson’s "wall of separation" encapsulated the meaning of the First Amendment. However, unlike
the strict separationists, the strict neutrality view believes that the "wall of separation" does not require the
state to be their adversary. Rather, the state must be neutral in its relations with groups of religious
believers and non-believers. "State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to
favor them."35 The strict neutrality approach is not hostile to religion, but it is strict in holding that religion
may not be used as a basis for classification for purposes of governmental action, whether the action
confers rights or privileges or imposes duties or obligations. Only secular criteria may be the basis of
government action. It does not permit, much less require, accommodation of secular programs to religious
belief.36
The problem with the strict neutrality approach, however, is if applied in interpreting the Establishment
Clause, it could lead to a de facto voiding of religious expression in the Free Exercise Clause. As pointed
out by Justice Goldberg in his concurring opinion in Abington School District v. Schempp, 37 strict
neutrality could lead to "a brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and a passive, or even active,
hostility to the religious" which is prohibited by the Constitution. 38 Professor Laurence Tribe commented in
his authoritative treatise, viz:
To most observers. . . strict neutrality has seemed incompatible with the very idea of a free exercise
clause. The Framers, whatever specific applications they may have intended, clearly envisioned religion
as something special; they enacted that vision into law by guaranteeing the free exercise of religion but
not, say, of philosophy or science. The strict neutrality approach all but erases this distinction. Thus it is
not surprising that the [U.S.] Supreme Court has rejected strict neutrality, permitting and sometimes
mandating religious classifications.39
Thus, the dilemma of the separationist approach, whether in the form of strict separation or strict
neutrality, is that while the Jeffersonian wall of separation "captures the spirit of the American ideal of
church-state separation," in real life, church and state are not and cannot be totally separate. This is all
the more true in contemporary times when both the government and religion are growing and expanding
their spheres of involvement and activity, resulting in the intersection of government and religion at many
points.40
b. Benevolent Neutrality/Accommodation
The theory of benevolent neutrality or accommodation is premised on a different view of the "wall of
separation," associated with Williams, founder of the Rhode Island colony. Unlike the Jeffersonian wall
that is meant to protect the state from the church, the wall is meant to protect the church from the
state.41 This doctrine was expressed in Zorach v. Clauson,42 which held, viz:
The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of
Church and State. Rather, it studiously defines the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall be no
concert or union or dependency one or the other. That is the common sense of the matter. Otherwise, the
state and religion would be aliens to each other - hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly. Churches could
not be required to pay even property taxes. Municipalities would not be permitted to render police or fire
protection to religious groups. Policemen who helped parishioners into their places of worship would
violate the Constitution. Prayers in our legislative halls; the appeals to the Almighty in the messages of
the Chief Executive; the proclamations making Thanksgiving Day a holiday; "so help me God" in our
courtroom oaths- these and all other references to the Almighty that run through our laws, our public
rituals, our ceremonies would be flouting the First Amendment. A fastidious atheist or agnostic could even
object to the supplication with which the Court opens each session: "God save the United States and this
Honorable Court."
xxx xxx xxx
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being. We guarantee the freedom to
worship as one chooses. . . When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious
authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events, it follows the best of our traditions. For it then
respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs.
To hold that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the government show a
callous indifference to religious groups. . . But we find no constitutional requirement which makes it
necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen their
effective scope of religious influence. 43
Benevolent neutrality recognizes that religion plays an important role in the public life of the United States
as shown by many traditional government practices which, to strict neutrality, pose Establishment Clause
questions. Among these are the inscription of "In God We Trust" on American currency; the recognition of
America as "one nation under God" in the official pledge of allegiance to the flag; the Supreme Court’s
time-honored practice of opening oral argument with the invocation "God save the United States and this
Honorable Court"; and the practice of Congress and every state legislature of paying a chaplain, usually
of a particular Protestant denomination, to lead representatives in prayer. These practices clearly show
the preference for one theological viewpoint—the existence of and potential for intervention by a god—
over the contrary theological viewpoint of atheism. Church and government agencies also cooperate in
the building of low-cost housing and in other forms of poor relief, in the treatment of alcoholism and drug
addiction, in foreign aid and other government activities with strong moral dimension. 44
Examples of accommodations in American jurisprudence also abound, including, but not limited to the
U.S. Court declaring the following acts as constitutional: a state hiring a Presbyterian minister to lead the
legislature in daily prayers,45 or requiring employers to pay workers compensation when the resulting
inconsistency between work and Sabbath leads to discharge;46 for government to give money to
religiously-affiliated organizations to teach adolescents about proper sexual behavior;47 or to provide
religious school pupils with books;48 or bus rides to religious schools;49 or with cash to pay for state-
mandated standardized tests.50
(1) Legislative Acts and the Free Exercise Clause
As with the other rights under the Constitution, the rights embodied in the Religion clauses are invoked in
relation to governmental action, almost invariably in the form of legislative acts.
Generally speaking, a legislative act that purposely aids or inhibits religion will be challenged as
unconstitutional, either because it violates the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause or both.
This is true whether one subscribes to the separationist approach or the benevolent neutrality or
accommodationist approach.
But the more difficult religion cases involve legislative acts which have a secular purpose and general
applicability, but may incidentally or inadvertently aid or burden religious exercise. Though the
government action is not religiously motivated, these laws have a "burdensome effect" on religious
exercise.
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions,
accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government’s favored form of religion, but
to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. The purpose of
accommodations is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the "government [may] take religion into account…to exempt, when
possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and
practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in
which voluntary religious exercise may flourish."51 In the ideal world, the legislature would recognize the
religions and their practices and would consider them, when practical, in enacting laws of general
application. But when the legislature fails to do so, religions that are threatened and burdened may turn to
the courts for protection.52
Thus, what is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a
facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its "burdensome effect," whether by the
legislature or the courts.53 Most of the free exercise claims brought to the U.S. Court are for exemption,
not invalidation of the facially neutral law that has a "burdensome" effect. 54
(2) Free Exercise Jurisprudence: Sherbert, Yoder and Smith
The pinnacle of free exercise protection and the theory of accommodation in the U.S. blossomed in the
case of Sherbert v. Verner,55 which ruled that state regulation that indirectly restrains or punishes
religious belief or conduct must be subjected to strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise
Clause.56 According to Sherbert, when a law of general application infringes religious exercise, albeit
incidentally, the state interest sought to be promoted must be so paramount and compelling as to override
the free exercise claim. Otherwise, the Court itself will carve out the exemption.
In this case, Sherbert, a Seventh Day Adventist, claimed unemployment compensation under the law as
her employment was terminated for refusal to work on Saturdays on religious grounds. Her claim was
denied. She sought recourse in the Supreme Court. In laying down the standard for determining whether
the denial of benefits could withstand constitutional scrutiny, the Court ruled, viz:
Plainly enough, appellee’s conscientious objection to Saturday work constitutes no conduct prompted by
religious principles of a kind within the reach of state legislation. If, therefore, the decision of the South
Carolina Supreme Court is to withstand appellant’s constitutional challenge, it must be either because her
disqualification as a beneficiary represents no infringement by the State of her constitutional right of free
exercise, or because any incidental burden on the free exercise of appellant’s religion may be justified by
a "compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State’s constitutional power to
regulate. . . ."57 (emphasis supplied)
The Court stressed that in the area of religious liberty, it is basic that it is not sufficient to merely show a
rational relationship of the substantial infringement to the religious right and a colorable state interest.
"(I)n this highly sensitive constitutional area, ‘[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests,
give occasion for permissible limitation.’"58 The Court found that there was no such compelling state
interest to override Sherbert’s religious liberty. It added that even if the state could show that Sherbert’s
exemption would pose serious detrimental effects to the unemployment compensation fund and
scheduling of work, it was incumbent upon the state to show that no alternative means of regulations
would address such detrimental effects without infringing religious liberty. The state, however, did not
discharge this burden. The Court thus carved out for Sherbert an exemption from the Saturday work
requirement that caused her disqualification from claiming the unemployment benefits. The Court
reasoned that upholding the denial of Sherbert’s benefits would force her to choose between receiving
benefits and following her religion. This choice placed "the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of
religion as would a fine imposed against (her) for her Saturday worship." This germinal case of Sherbert
firmly established the exemption doctrine, 59 viz:
It is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all the laws of the land; but when general
laws conflict with scruples of conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some "compelling state
interest" intervenes.
Thus, Sherbert and subsequent cases held that when government action burdens, even inadvertently, a
sincerely held religious belief or practice, the state must justify the burden by demonstrating that the law
embodies a compelling interest, that no less restrictive alternative exists, and that a religious exemption
would impair the state’s ability to effectuate its compelling interest. As in other instances of state action
affecting fundamental rights, negative impacts on those rights demand the highest level of judicial
scrutiny. After Sherbert, this strict scrutiny balancing test resulted in court-mandated religious exemptions
from facially-neutral laws of general application whenever unjustified burdens were found. 60
Then, in the 1972 case of Wisconsin v. Yoder,61 the U.S. Court again ruled that religious exemption was
in order, notwithstanding that the law of general application had a criminal penalty. Using heightened
scrutiny, the Court overturned the conviction of Amish parents for violating Wisconsin compulsory school-
attendance laws. The Court, in effect, granted exemption from a neutral, criminal statute that punished
religiously motivated conduct. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, held, viz:
It follows that in order for Wisconsin to compel school attendance beyond the eighth grade against a
claim that such attendance interferes with the practice of a legitimate religious belief, it must appear either
that the State does not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its requirement, or that there is a state
interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise
Clause. Long before there was general acknowledgement of the need for universal education, the
Religion Clauses had specially and firmly fixed the right of free exercise of religious beliefs, and
buttressing this fundamental right was an equally firm, even if less explicit, prohibition against the
establishment of any religion. The values underlying these two provisions relating to religion have been
zealously protected, sometimes even at the expense of other interests of admittedly high social
importance. . .
The essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only those interests of the highest
order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion. . .
. . . our decisions have rejected the idea that religiously grounded conduct is always outside the
protection of the Free Exercise Clause. It is true that activities of individuals, even when religiously based,
are often subject to regulation by the States in the exercise of their undoubted power to promote the
health, safety, and general welfare, or the Federal government in the exercise of its delegated powers . . .
But to agree that religiously grounded conduct must often be subject to the broad police power of the
State is not to deny that there are areas of conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment and thus beyond the power of the State to control, even under regulations of general
applicability. . . .This case, therefore, does not become easier because respondents were convicted for
their "actions" in refusing to send their children to the public high school; in this context belief and action
cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight compartments. . . 62
The cases of Sherbert and Yoder laid out the following doctrines: (a) free exercise clause claims were
subject to heightened scrutiny or compelling interest test if government substantially burdened the
exercise of religion; (b) heightened scrutiny or compelling interest test governed cases where the burden
was direct, i.e., the exercise of religion triggered a criminal or civil penalty, as well as cases where the
burden was indirect, i.e., the exercise of religion resulted in the forfeiture of a government benefit; 63 and
(c) the Court could carve out accommodations or exemptions from a facially neutral law of general
application, whether general or criminal.
The Sherbert-Yoder doctrine had five main components. First, action was protected—conduct beyond
speech, press, or worship was included in the shelter of freedom of religion. Neither Sherbert’s refusal to
work on the Sabbath nor the Amish parents’ refusal to let their children attend ninth and tenth grades can
be classified as conduct protected by the other clauses of the First Amendment. Second, indirect
impositions on religious conduct, such as the denial of twenty-six weeks of unemployment insurance
benefits to Adel Sherbert, as well as direct restraints, such as the criminal prohibition at issue in Yoder,
were prohibited. Third, as the language in the two cases indicate, the protection granted was extensive.
Only extremely strong governmental interests justified impingement on religious conduct, as the absolute
language of the test of the Free Exercise Clause suggests. 64
Fourth, the strong language was backed by a requirement that the government provide proof of the
important interest at stake and of the dangers to that interest presented by the religious conduct at issue.
Fifth, in determining the injury to the government’s interest, a court was required to focus on the effect
that exempting religious claimants from the regulation would have, rather than on the value of the
regulation in general. Thus, injury to governmental interest had to be measured at the margin: assuming
the law still applied to all others, what would be the effect of exempting the religious claimant in this case
and other similarly situated religious claimants in the future? Together, the fourth and fifth elements
required that facts, rather than speculation, had to be presented concerning how the government’s
interest would be harmed by excepting religious conduct from the law being challenged. 65
Sherbert and Yoder adopted a balancing test for free exercise jurisprudence which would impose a
discipline to prevent manipulation in the balancing of interests. The fourth and the fifth elements
prevented the likelihood of exaggeration of the weight on the governmental interest side of the balance,
by not allowing speculation about the effects of a decision adverse to those interests nor accepting that
those interests would be defined at a higher level of generality than the constitutional interests on the
other side of the balance. 66
Thus, the strict scrutiny and compelling state interest test significantly increased the degree of protection
afforded to religiously motivated conduct. While not affording absolute immunity to religious activity, a
compelling secular justification was necessary to uphold public policies that collided with religious
practices. Although the members of the U.S. Court often disagreed over which governmental interests
should be considered compelling, thereby producing dissenting and separate opinions in religious
conduct cases, this general test established a strong presumption in favor of the free exercise of
religion.67 Most scholars and courts agreed that under Sherbert and Yoder, the Free Exercise Clause
provided individuals some form of heightened scrutiny protection, if not always a compelling interest
one.68 The 1990 case of Employment Division, Oregon Department of Human Resources v.
Smith,69 drastically changed all that.
Smith involved a challenge by Native Americans to an Oregon law prohibiting use of peyote, a
hallucinogenic substance. Specifically, individuals challenged the state’s determination that their religious
use of peyote, which resulted in their dismissal from employment, was misconduct disqualifying them
from receipt of unemployment compensation benefits. 70
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, rejected the claim that free exercise of religion required an
exemption from an otherwise valid law. Scalia said that "[w]e have never held that an individual’s religious
beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free
to regulate. On the contrary, the record of more than a century of our free exercise jurisprudence
contradicts that proposition." 71 Scalia thus declared "that the right of free exercise does not relieve an
individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability of the ground
that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’" 72
Justice Scalia’s opinion then reviewed the cases where free exercise challenges had been upheld—such
as Cantwell, Murdock, Follet, Pierce, and Yoder—and said that none involved the free exercise clause
claims alone. All involved "the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections,
such as freedom of speech and of the press, or the right of parents to direct the education of their
children." 73 The Court said that Smith was distinguishable because it did not involve such a "hybrid
situation," but was a free exercise claim "unconnected with any communicative activity or parental
right." 74
Moreover, the Court said that the Sherbert line of cases applied only in the context of the denial of
unemployment benefits; it did not create a basis for an exemption from criminal laws. Scalia wrote that
"[e]ven if we were inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the unemployment compensation
field, we would not apply it to require exemptions from a generally applicable criminal law." 75
The Court expressly rejected the use of strict scrutiny for challenges to neutral laws of general
applicability that burden religion. Justice Scalia said that "[p]recisely because ‘we are a cosmopolitan
nation made up of people of almost conceivable religious preference,’ and precisely because we value
and protect that religious divergence, we cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as
applied to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the
highest order." The Court said that those seeking religious exemptions from laws should look to the
democratic process for protection, not the courts. 76
Smith thus changed the test for the free exercise clause. Strict or heightened scrutiny and the compelling
justification approach were abandoned for evaluating laws burdening religion; neutral laws of general
applicability only have to meet the rational basis test, no matter how much they burden religion. 77
Justice O’Connor wrote a concurring opinion sharply criticizing the rejection of the compelling state
interest test, asserting that "(t)he compelling state interest test effectuates the First Amendment’s
command that religious liberty is an independent liberty, that it occupies a preferred position, and that the
Court will not permit encroachments upon this liberty, whether direct or indirect, unless required by clear
and compelling government interest ‘of the highest order.’"78 She said that strict scrutiny is appropriate for
free exercise challenges because "[t]he compelling interest test reflects the First Amendment’s mandate
of preserving religious liberty to the fullest extent possible in a pluralistic society." 79
Justice O’Connor also disagreed with the majority’s description of prior cases and especially its leaving
the protection of minority religions to the political process. She said that, "First Amendment was enacted
precisely to protect the rights of those whose religious practice are not shared by the majority and may be
viewed with hostility." 80
Justice Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. The
dissenting Justices agreed with Justice O’Connor that the majority had mischaracterized precedents,
such as in describing Yoder as a "hybrid" case rather than as one under the free exercise clause. The
dissent also argued that strict scrutiny should be used in evaluating government laws burdening
religion. 81
Criticism of Smith was intense and widespread.82 Academics, Justices, and a bipartisan majority of
Congress noisily denounced the decision. 83 Smith has the rather unusual distinction of being one case
that is almost universally despised (and this is not too strong a word) by both the liberals and
conservatives.84 Liberals chasten the Court for its hostility to minority faiths which, in light of Smith’s
general applicability rule, will allegedly suffer at the hands of the majority faith whether through outright
hostility or neglect. Conservatives bemoan the decision as an assault on religious belief leaving religion,
more than ever, subject to the caprice of an ever more secular nation that is increasingly hostile to
religious belief as an oppressive and archaic anachronism. 85
The Smith doctrine is highly unsatisfactory in several respects and has been criticized as exhibiting a
shallow understanding of free exercise jurisprudence.86 First, the First amendment was intended to
protect minority religions from the tyranny of the religious and political majority. 87 Critics of Smith have
worried about religious minorities, who can suffer disproportionately from laws that enact majoritarian
mores.88 Smith, in effect would allow discriminating in favor of mainstream religious groups against
smaller, more peripheral groups who lack legislative clout,89 contrary to the original theory of the First
Amendment.90 Undeniably, claims for judicial exemption emanate almost invariably from relatively
politically powerless minority religions and Smith virtually wiped out their judicial recourse for
exemption.91 Second, Smith leaves too much leeway for pervasive welfare-state regulation to burden
religion while satisfying neutrality. After all, laws not aimed at religion can hinder observance just as
effectively as those that target religion.92 Government impairment of religious liberty would most often be
of the inadvertent kind as in Smith considering the political culture where direct and deliberate regulatory
imposition of religious orthodoxy is nearly inconceivable. If the Free Exercise Clause could not afford
protection to inadvertent interference, it would be left almost meaningless. 93 Third, the Reynolds-Gobitis-
Smith94 doctrine simply defies common sense. The state should not be allowed to interfere with the most
deeply held fundamental religious convictions of an individual in order to pursue some trivial state
economic or bureaucratic objective. This is especially true when there are alternative approaches for the
state to effectively pursue its objective without serious inadvertent impact on religion. 95
At bottom, the Court’s ultimate concern in Smith appeared to be two-fold: (1) the difficulty in defining and
limiting the term "religion" in today’s pluralistic society, and (2) the belief that courts have no business
determining the significance of an individual’s religious beliefs. For the Smith Court, these two concerns
appear to lead to the conclusion that the Free Exercise Clause must protect everything or it must protect
virtually nothing. As a result, the Court perceives its only viable options are to leave free exercise
protection to the political process or to allow a "system in which each conscience is a law unto
itself." 96 The Court’s characterization of its choices have been soundly rejected as false, viz:
If one accepts the Court’s assumption that these are the only two viable options, then admittedly, the
Court has a stronger argument. But the Free Exercise Clause cannot be summarily dismissed as too
difficult to apply and this should not be applied at all. The Constitution does not give the judiciary the
option of simply refusing to interpret its provisions. The First Amendment dictates that free exercise of
"religion" must be protected. Accordingly, the Constitution compels the Court to struggle with the contours
of what constitutes "religion." There is no constitutional opt-out provision for constitutional words that are
difficult to apply.
Nor does the Constitution give the Court the option of simply ignoring constitutional mandates. A large
area of middle ground exists between the Court’s two opposing alternatives for free exercise
jurisprudence. Unfortunately, this middle ground requires the Court to tackle difficult issues such as
defining religion and possibly evaluating the significance of a religious belief against the importance of a
specific law. The Court describes the results of this middle ground where "federal judges will regularly
balance against the importance of general laws the significance of religious practice," and then dismisses
it as a "parade of horribles" that is too "horrible to contemplate."
It is not clear whom the Court feels would be most hurt by this "parade of horribles." Surely not religious
individuals; they would undoubtedly prefer their religious beliefs to be probed for sincerity and significance
rather than acquiesce to the Court’s approach of simply refusing to grant any constitutional significance to
their beliefs at all. If the Court is concerned about requiring lawmakers at times constitutionally to exempt
religious individuals from statutory provisions, its concern is misplaced. It is the lawmakers who have
sought to prevent the Court from dismantling the Free Exercise Clause through such legislation as the
[Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993], and in any case, the Court should not be overly concerned
about hurting legislature’s feelings by requiring their laws to conform to constitutional dictates. Perhaps
the Court is concerned about putting such burden on judges. If so, it would truly be odd to say that
requiring the judiciary to perform its appointed role as constitutional interpreters is a burden no judge
should be expected to fulfill.97
Parenthetically, Smith’s characterization that the U.S. Court has "never held that an individual’s religious
beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the state is free
to regulate"—an assertion which Mr. Justice Carpio adopted unequivocally in his dissent—has been
sharply criticized even implicitly by its supporters, as blatantly untrue. Scholars who supported Smith
frequently did not do so by opposing the arguments that the Court was wrong as a matter of original
meaning [of the religion clauses] or that the decision conflicted with precedent [i.e. the Smith decision
made shocking use of precedent]—those points were often conceded. 98
To justify its perversion of precedent, the Smith Court attempted to distinguish the exemption made in
Yoder, by asserting that these were premised on two constitutional rights combined—the right of parents
to direct the education of their children and the right of free exercise of religion. Under the Court’s opinion
in Smith, the right of free exercise of religion standing alone would not allow Amish parents to disregard
the compulsory school attendance law, and under the Court’s opinion in Yoder, parents whose objection
to the law was not religious would also have to obey it. The fatal flaw in this argument, however, is that if
two constitutional claims will fail on its own, how would it prevail if combined?99 As for Sherbert, the Smith
Court attempted to limit its doctrine as applicable only to denials of unemployment compensation benefits
where the religiously-compelled conduct that leads to job loss is not a violation of criminal law. And yet,
this is precisely why the rejection of Sherbert was so damaging in its effect: the religious person was more
likely to be entitled to constitutional protection when forced to choose between religious conscience and
going to jail than when forced to choose between religious conscience and financial loss. 100
Thus, the Smith decision elicited much negative public reaction especially from the religious community,
and commentaries insisted that the Court was allowing the Free Exercise Clause to disappear. 101 So
much was the uproar that a majority in Congress was convinced to enact the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993.102 The RFRA was adopted to negate the Smith test and require strict
scrutiny for free exercise claims. Indeed, the findings section of the Act notes that Smith "virtually
eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws
neutral toward religion."103 The Act declares that its purpose is to restore the compelling interest test as
set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder, and to guarantee its application in all cases where
free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and to provide a claim of defense to a person whose
religious exercise is substantially burdened by government.104 The RFRA thus sought to overrule Smith
and make strict scrutiny the test for all free exercise clause claims. 105
In the City of Boerne v. Flores, 106 the U.S. Supreme Court declared the RFRA unconstitutional, ruling that
Congress had exceeded its power under the Fourteenth Amendment in enacting the law. The Court ruled
that Congress is empowered to enact laws "to enforce the amendment," but Congress is not "enforcing"
when it creates new constitutional rights or expands the scope of rights. 107
City of Boerne also drew public backlash as the U.S. Supreme Court was accused of lack of judicial
respect for the constitutional decision-making by a coordinate branch of government. In Smith, Justice
Scalia wrote:
"Values that are protected against governmental interference through enshrinement in the Bill of Rights
are not thereby banished from the political process. Just as society believes in the negative protection
accorded to the press by the First Amendment is likely to enact laws that affirmatively foster the
dissemination of the printed word, so also a society that believes in the negative protection accorded to
religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation as well."
By invalidating RFRA, the Court showed a marked disrespect of the solicitude of a nearly unanimous
Congress. Contrary to the Court’s characterization of the RFRA as a kind of usurpation of the judicial
power to say what the Constitution means, the law offered no definition of Free Exercise, and on its face
appeared to be a procedural measure establishing a standard of proof and allocating the duty of meeting
it. In effect, the Court ruled that Congress had no power in the area of religion. And yet, Free Exercise
exists in the First Amendment as a negative on Congress. The power of Congress to act towards the
states in matters of religion arises from the Fourteenth Amendment. 108
From the foregoing, it can be seen that Smith, while expressly recognizing the power of legislature to give
accommodations, is in effect contrary to the benevolent neutrality or accommodation approach.
Moreover, if we consider the history of the incorporation of the religion clauses in the U.S., the decision in
Smith is grossly inconsistent with the importance placed by the framers on religious faith. Smith is
dangerous precedent because it subordinates fundamental rights of religious belief and practice to all
neutral, general legislation. Sherbert recognized the need to protect religious exercise in light of the
massive increase in the size of government, the concerns within its reach, and the number of laws
administered by it. However, Smith abandons the protection of religious exercise at a time when the
scope and reach of government has never been greater. It has been pointed out that Smith creates the
legal framework for persecution: through general, neutral laws, legislatures are now able to force
conformity on religious minorities whose practice irritate or frighten an intolerant majority. 109
The effect of Smith is to erase entirely the concept of mandatory accommodations, thereby emasculating
the Free Exercise Clause. Smith left religious freedom for many in the hands of the political process,
exactly where it would be if the religion clauses did not exist in the Bill of Rights. Like most protections
found in the Bill of Rights, the religion clauses of the First Amendment are most important to those who
cannot prevail in the political process. The Court in Smith ignores the fact that the protections found in the
Bill of Rights were deemed too important to leave to the political process. Because mainstream religions
generally have been successful in protecting their interests through the political process, it is the non-
mainstream religions that are adversely affected by Smith. In short, the U.S. Supreme Court has made it
clear to such religions that they should not look to the First Amendment for religious freedom. 110
(3) Accommodation under the Religion Clauses
A free exercise claim could result to three kinds of accommodation: (a) those which are found to be
constitutionally compelled, i.e., required by the Free Exercise Clause; (b) those which are discretionary or
legislative, i.e., not required by the Free Exercise Clause but nonetheless permitted by the Establishment
Clause; and (c) those which the religion clauses prohibit.111
Mandatory accommodation results when the Court finds that accommodation is required by the Free
Exercise Clause, i.e, when the Court itself carves out an exemption. This accommodation occurs when all
three conditions of the compelling interest test are met, i.e, a statute or government action has burdened
claimant’s free exercise of religion, and there is no doubt as to the sincerity of the religious belief; the
state has failed to demonstrate a particularly important or compelling governmental goal in preventing an
exemption; and that the state has failed to demonstrate that it used the least restrictive means. In these
cases, the Court finds that the injury to religious conscience is so great and the advancement of public
purposes is incomparable that only indifference or hostility could explain a refusal to make exemptions.
Thus, if the state’s objective could be served as well or almost as well by granting an exemption to those
whose religious beliefs are burdened by the regulation, the Court must grant the exemption. The Yoder
case is an example where the Court held that the state must accommodate the religious beliefs of the
Amish who objected to enrolling their children in high school as required by law. The Sherbert case is
another example where the Court held that the state unemployment compensation plan must
accommodate the religious convictions of Sherbert.112
In permissive accommodation, the Court finds that the State may, but is not required to, accommodate
religious interests. The U.S. Walz case illustrates this situation where the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of tax exemption given by New York to church properties, but did not rule that the state
was required to provide tax exemptions. The Court declared that "(t)he limits of permissible state
accommodation to religion are by no means co-extensive with the noninterference mandated by the Free
Exercise Clause."113 Other examples are Zorach v. Clauson,114 allowing released time in public schools
and Marsh v. Chambers,115 allowing payment of legislative chaplains from public funds. Parenthetically,
the Court in Smith has ruled that this is the only accommodation allowed by the Religion Clauses.
Finally, when the Court finds no basis for a mandatory accommodation, or it determines that the
legislative accommodation runs afoul of the establishment or the free exercise clause, it results to a
prohibited accommodation. In this case, the Court finds that establishment concerns prevail over potential
accommodation interests. To say that there are valid exemptions buttressed by the Free Exercise Clause
does not mean that all claims for free exercise exemptions are valid.116 An example where
accommodation was prohibited is McCollum v. Board of Education,117 where the Court ruled against
optional religious instruction in the public school premises.118
Given that a free exercise claim could lead to three different results, the question now remains as to how
the Court should determine which action to take. In this regard, it is the strict scrutiny-compelling state
interest test which is most in line with the benevolent neutrality-accommodation approach.
Under the benevolent-neutrality theory, the principle underlying the First Amendment is that freedom to
carry out one’s duties to a Supreme Being is an inalienable right, not one dependent on the grace of
legislature. Religious freedom is seen as a substantive right and not merely a privilege against
discriminatory legislation. With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent
neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.
Considering that laws nowadays are rarely enacted specifically to disable religious belief or practice, free
exercise disputes arise commonly when a law that is religiously neutral and generally applicable on its
face is argued to prevent or burden what someone’s religious faith requires, or alternatively, requires
someone to undertake an act that faith would preclude. In essence, then, free exercise arguments
contemplate religious exemptions from otherwise general laws. 119
Strict scrutiny is appropriate for free exercise challenges because "[t]he compelling interest test reflects
the First Amendment’s mandate of preserving religious liberty to the fullest extent possible in a pluralistic
society.120Underlying the compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental
right and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict scrutiny. 121
In its application, the compelling state interest test follows a three-step process, summarized as follows:
If the plaintiff can show that a law or government practice inhibits the free exercise of his religious beliefs,
the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate that the law or practice is necessary to the
accomplishment of some important (or ‘compelling’) secular objective and that it is the least restrictive
means of achieving that objective. If the plaintiff meets this burden and the government does not, the
plaintiff is entitled to exemption from the law or practice at issue. In order to be protected, the claimant’s
beliefs must be ‘sincere’, but they need not necessarily be consistent, coherent, clearly articulated, or
congruent with those of the claimant’s religious denomination. ‘Only beliefs rooted in religion are
protected by the Free Exercise Clause’; secular beliefs, however sincere and conscientious, do not
suffice.122
In sum, the U.S. Court has invariably decided claims based on the religion clauses using either the
separationist approach, or the benevolent neutrality approach. The benevolent neutrality approach has
also further been split by the view that the First Amendment requires accommodation, or that it only
allows permissible legislative accommodations. The current prevailing view as pronounced in Smith,
however, is that that there are no required accommodation under the First Amendment, although it
permits of legislative accommodations.
3. Religion Clauses in the Philippine Context: Constitution, Jurisprudence and Practice
a. US Constitution and jurisprudence vis-à-vis Philippine Constitution
By juxtaposing the American Constitution and jurisprudence against that of the Philippines, it is
immediately clear that one cannot simply conclude that we have adopted—lock, stock and barrel—the
religion clauses as embodied in the First Amendment, and therefore, the U.S. Court’s interpretation of the
same. Unlike in the U.S. where legislative exemptions of religion had to be upheld by the U.S. Supreme
Court as constituting permissive accommodations, similar exemptions for religion are mandatory
accommodations under our own constitutions. Thus, our 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions contain
provisions on tax exemption of church property,123 salary of religious officers in government
institutions,124 and optional religious instruction.125 Our own preamble also invokes the aid of a divine
being.126 These constitutional provisions are wholly ours and have no counterpart in the U.S. Constitution
or its amendments. They all reveal without doubt that the Filipino people, in adopting these constitutions,
manifested their adherence to the benevolent neutrality approach that requires accommodations in
interpreting the religion clauses.127
The argument of Mr. Justice Carpio that the August 4, 2003 ponencia was erroneous insofar as it
asserted that the 1935 Constitution incorporates the Walz ruling as this case was decided subsequent to
the 1935 Constitution is a misreading of the ponencia. What the ponencia pointed out was that even as
early as 1935, or more than three decades before the U.S. Court could validate the exemption in Walz as
a form or permissible accommodation, we have already incorporated the same in our Constitution, as a
mandatory accommodation.
There is no ambiguity with regard to the Philippine Constitution’s departure from the U.S. Constitution,
insofar as religious accommodations are concerned. It is indubitable that benevolent neutrality-
accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the
Philippine Constitution.128 As stated in our Decision, dated August 4, 2003:
The history of the religion clauses in the 1987 Constitution shows that these clauses were largely adopted
from the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution xxxx Philippine jurisprudence and commentaries on
the religious clauses also continued to borrow authorities from U.S. jurisprudence without articulating the
stark distinction between the two streams of U.S. jurisprudence [i.e., separation and benevolent
neutrality]. One might simply conclude that the Philippine Constitutions and jurisprudence also inherited
the disarray of U.S. religion clause jurisprudence and the two identifiable streams; thus, when a religion
clause case comes before the Court, a separationist approach or a benevolent neutrality approach might
be adopted and each will have U.S. authorities to support it. Or, one might conclude that as the history of
the First Amendment as narrated by the Court in Everson supports the separationist approach, Philippine
jurisprudence should also follow this approach in light of the Philippine religion clauses’ history. As a
result, in a case where the party claims religious liberty in the face of a general law that inadvertently
burdens his religious exercise, he faces an almost insurmountable wall in convincing the Court that the
wall of separation would not be breached if the Court grants him an exemption. These conclusions,
however, are not and were never warranted by the 1987, 1973 and 1935 Constitutions as shown by other
provisions on religion in all three constitutions. It is a cardinal rule in constitutional construction that the
constitution must be interpreted as a whole and apparently conflicting provisions should be reconciled
and harmonized in a manner that will give to all of them full force and effect. From this construction, it will
be ascertained that the intent of the framers was to adopt a benevolent neutrality approach in interpreting
the religious clauses in the Philippine constitutions, and the enforcement of this intent is the goal of
construing the constitution.129 [citations omitted]
We therefore reject Mr. Justice Carpio’s total adherence to the U.S. Court’s interpretation of the religion
clauses to effectively deny accommodations on the sole basis that the law in question is neutral and of
general application. For even if it were true that "an unbroken line of U.S. Supreme Court decisions" has
never held that "an individual’s religious beliefs [do not] excuse him from compliance with an otherwise
valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate," our own Constitutions have made
significant changes to accommodate and exempt religion. Philippine jurisprudence shows that the Court
has allowed exemptions from a law of general application, in effect, interpreting our religion clauses to
cover both mandatory and permissive accommodations.130
To illustrate, in American Bible Society v. City of Manila,131 the Court granted to plaintiff exemption from a
law of general application based on the Free Exercise Clause. In this case, plaintiff was required by an
ordinance to secure a mayor’s permit and a municipal license as ordinarily required of those engaged in
the business of general merchandise under the city’s ordinances. Plaintiff argued that this amounted to
"religious censorship and restrained the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession, to wit: the
distribution and sale of bibles and other religious literature to the people of the Philippines." Although the
Court categorically held that the questioned ordinances were not applicable to plaintiff as it was not
engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit, it also ruled that applying
the ordinance to plaintiff and requiring it to secure a license and pay a license fee or tax would impair its
free exercise of religious profession and worship and its right of dissemination of religious beliefs "as the
power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment." The decision
states in part, viz:
The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries
with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can only be justified like
other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any
substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. (citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
Another case involving mandatory accommodation is Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of

Schools.132 The case involved several Jehovah’s Witnesses who were expelled from school for refusing
to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, in violation of the
Administrative Code of 1987. In resolving the religious freedom issue, a unanimous Court overturned an
earlier ruling denying such exemption,133 using the "grave and imminent danger" test, viz:
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom (according to the
late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee in his dissenting opinion in German v. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514,
517) is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious
evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has
a right (and duty) to prevent. Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from
the schools is not justified.134 (emphases supplied)
In these two cases, the Court itself carved out an exemption from a law of general application, on the
strength directly of the Free Exercise Clause.
We also have jurisprudence that supports permissive accommodation. The case of Victoriano v. Elizalde
Rope Workers Union135 is an example of the application of Mr. Justice Carpio’s theory of permissive
accommodation, where religious exemption is granted by a legislative act. In Victoriano, the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350 was questioned. The said R.A. exempt employees from the
application and coverage of a closed shop agreement—mandated in another law—based on religious
objections. A unanimous Court upheld the constitutionality of the law, holding that "government is not
precluded from pursuing valid objectives secular in character even if the incidental result would be
favorable to a religion or sect." Interestingly, the secular purpose of the challenged law which the Court
upheld was the advancement of "the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion." 136
Having established that benevolent neutrality-accommodation is the framework by which free exercise
cases must be decided, the next question then turned to the test that should be used in ascertaining the
limits of the exercise of religious freedom. In our Decision dated August 4, 2003, we reviewed our
jurisprudence, and ruled that in cases involving purely conduct based on religious belief, as in the case at
bar, the compelling state interest test, is proper, viz:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the first case
on the Free Exercise Clause, American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and present
danger" test but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in subsequent cases on
religious liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced that the test of permissibility of religious freedom is
whether it violates the established institutions of society and law. The Victoriano case mentioned the
"immediate and grave danger" test as well as the doctrine that a law of general applicability may burden
religious exercise provided the law is the least restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law. The
case also used, albeit inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano, German went
back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate danger" test and overruled
the Gerona test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the "clear and present danger" test
in the maiden case of American Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which employed the "clear
and present danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test involved, in one form or another, religious
speech as this test is often used in cases on freedom of expression. On the other hand, the Gerona and
German cases set the rule that religious freedom will not prevail over established institutions of society
and law. Gerona, however, which was the authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag
which employed the "grave and immediate danger" test. Victoriano was the only case that employed the
"compelling state interest" test, but as explained previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to the
facts of the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in American Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo
where the "clear and present danger" and "grave and immediate danger" tests were appropriate as
speech has easily discernible or immediate effects. The Gerona and German doctrine, aside from having
been overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality approach, thus not appropriate in this
jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case involves purely conduct arising from religious belief.
The "compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human
conduct has different effects on the state’s interests: some effects may be immediate and short-term while
others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a
substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the
state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a
preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the
words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a
higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited government is premised upon an
acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order
to build a just and humane society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest
abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests
which balances a right with just a colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a
compelling interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires
the state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter
religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In determining which shall prevail
between the state’s interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The "compelling
state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time affording protection
to the paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e.
refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest" test, by upholding the paramount
interests of the state, seeks to protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be
preserved. 137 (citations omitted)
At this point, we take note of Mr. Justice Carpio’s dissent, which, while loosely disputing the applicability
of the benevolent neutrality framework and compelling state interest test, states that "[i]t is true that a test
needs to be applied by the Court in determining the validity of a free exercise claim of exemption as made
here by Escritor." This assertion is inconsistent with the position negating the benevolent neutrality or
accommodation approach. If it were true, indeed, that the religion clauses do not require accommodations
based on the free exercise of religion, then there would be no need for a test to determine the validity of a
free exercise claim, as any and all claims for religious exemptions from a law of general application would
fail.
Mr. Justice Carpio also asserts that "[m]aking a distinction between permissive accommodation and
mandatory accommodation is more critically important in analyzing free exercise exemption claims
because it forces the Court to confront how far it can validly set the limits of religious liberty under the
Free Exercise Clause, rather than presenting the separation theory and accommodation theory as
opposite concepts, and then rejecting relevant and instructive American jurisprudence (such as the Smith
case) just because it does not espouse the theory selected." He then asserts that the Smith doctrine
cannot be dismissed because it does not really espouse the strict neutrality approach, but more of
permissive accommodation.
Mr. Justice Carpio’s assertion misses the point. Precisely because the doctrine in Smith is that only
legislative accommodations are allowed under the Free Exercise Clause, it cannot be used in determining
a claim of religion exemption directly anchored on the Free Exercise Clause. Thus, even assuming that
the Smith doctrine actually espouses the theory of accommodation or benevolent neutrality, the
accommodation is limited to the permissive, or legislative exemptions. It, therefore, cannot be used as a
test in determining the claims of religious exemptions directly under the Free Exercise Clause because
Smith does not recognize such exemption. Moreover, Mr. Justice Carpio’s advocacy of the Smith doctrine
would effectively render the Free Exercise protection—a fundamental right under our Constitution—
nugatory because he would deny its status as an independent source of right.
b. The Compelling State Interest Test
As previously stated, the compelling state interest test involves a three-step process. We explained this
process in detail, by showing the questions which must be answered in each step, viz:
…First, "[H]as the statute or government action created a burden on the free exercise of religion?" The
courts often look into the sincerity of the religious belief, but without inquiring into the truth of the belief
because the Free Exercise Clause prohibits inquiring about its truth as held in Ballard and Cantwell. The
sincerity of the claimant’s belief is ascertained to avoid the mere claim of religious beliefs to escape a
mandatory regulation. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Second, the court asks: "[I]s there a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify this infringement of
religious liberty?" In this step, the government has to establish that its purposes are legitimate for the
state and that they are compelling. Government must do more than assert the objectives at risk if
exemption is given; it must precisely show how and to what extent those objectives will be undermined if
exemptions are granted. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Third, the court asks: "[H]as the state in achieving its legitimate purposes used the least intrusive means
possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal
of the state?" The analysis requires the state to show that the means in which it is achieving its legitimate
state objective is the least intrusive means, i.e., it has chosen a way to achieve its legitimate state end
that imposes as little as possible on religious liberties xxx. 138 [citations omitted]
Again, the application of the compelling state interest test could result to three situations of
accommodation: First, mandatory accommodation would result if the Court finds that accommodation is
required by the Free Exercise Clause. Second, if the Court finds that the State may, but is not required to,
accommodate religious interests, permissive accommodation results. Finally, if the Court finds that that
establishment concerns prevail over potential accommodation interests, then it must rule that the
accommodation is prohibited.
One of the central arguments in Mr. Justice Carpio’s dissent is that only permissive accommodation can
carve out an exemption from a law of general application. He posits the view that the law should prevail in
the absence of a legislative exemption, and the Court cannot make the accommodation or exemption.
Mr. Justice Carpio’s position is clearly not supported by Philippine jurisprudence. The cases of American
Bible Society, Ebralinag, and Victoriano demonstrate that our application of the doctrine of benevolent
neutrality-accommodation covers not only the grant of permissive, or legislative accommodations, but
also mandatory accommodations. Thus, an exemption from a law of general application is possible, even
if anchored directly on an invocation of the Free Exercise Clause alone, rather than a legislative
exemption.
Moreover, it should be noted that while there is no Philippine case as yet wherein the Court granted an
accommodation/exemption to a religious act from the application of general penal laws, permissive
accommodation based on religious freedom has been granted with respect to one of the crimes penalized
under the Revised Penal Code, that of bigamy.
In the U.S. case of Reynolds v. United States,139 the U.S. Court expressly denied to Mormons an
exemption from a general federal law criminalizing polygamy, even if it was proven that the practice
constituted a religious duty under their faith.140 In contradistinction, Philippine law accommodates the
same practice among Moslems, through a legislative act. For while the act of marrying more than one still
constitutes bigamy under the Revised Penal Code, Article 180 of P.D. No. 1083, otherwise known as the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, provides that the penal laws relative to the crime of
bigamy "shall not apply to a person married…under Muslim law." Thus, by legislative action,
accommodation is granted of a Muslim practice which would otherwise violate a valid and general
criminal law. Mr. Justice Carpio recognized this accommodation when, in his dissent in our Decision
dated August 4, 2003 and citing Sulu Islamic Association of Masjid Lambayong v. Malik, 141 he stated that
a Muslim Judge "is not criminally liable for bigamy because Shari’a law allows a Muslim to have more
than one wife."
From the foregoing, the weakness of Mr. Justice Carpio’s "permissive-accommodation only" advocacy in
this jurisdiction becomes manifest. Having anchored his argument on the Smith doctrine that "the
guaranty of religious liberty as embodied in the Free Exercise Clause does not require the grant of
exemptions from generally applicable laws to individuals whose religious practice conflict with those
laws," his theory is infirmed by the showing that the benevolent neutrality approach which allows for both
mandatory and permissive accommodations was unequivocally adopted by our framers in the Philippine
Constitution, our legislature, and our jurisprudence.
Parenthetically, it should be pointed out that a "permissive accommodation-only" stance is the antithesis
to the notion that religion clauses, like the other fundamental liberties found in the Bill or Rights, is a
preferred right and an independent source of right.
What Mr. Justice Carpio is left with is the argument, based on Smith, that the test in Sherbert is not
applicable when the law in question is a generally applicable criminal law. Stated differently, even if Mr.
Justice Carpio conceded that there is no question that in the Philippine context, accommodations are
made, the question remains as to how far the exemptions will be made and who would make these
exemptions.
On this point, two things must be clarified: first, in relation to criminal statutes, only the question of
mandatory accommodation is uncertain, for Philippine law and jurisprudence have, in fact, allowed
legislative accommodation. Second, the power of the Courts to grant exemptions in general (i.e., finding
that the Free Exercise Clause required the accommodation, or mandatory accommodations) has already
been decided, not just once, but twice by the Court. Thus, the crux of the matter is whether this Court can
make exemptions as in Ebralinag and the American Bible Society, in cases involving criminal laws of
general application.
We hold that the Constitution itself mandates the Court to do so for the following reasons.
First, as previously discussed, while the U.S. religion clauses are the precursors to the Philippine religion
clauses, the benevolent neutrality-accommodation approach in Philippine jurisdiction is more pronounced
and given leeway than in the U.S.
Second, the whole purpose of the accommodation theory, including the notion of mandatory
accommodations, was to address the "inadvertent burdensome effect" that an otherwise facially neutral
law would have on religious exercise. Just because the law is criminal in nature, therefore, should not
bring it out of the ambit of the Free Exercise Clause. As stated by Justice O’Connor in her concurring
opinion in Smith, "[t]here is nothing talismanic about neutral laws of general applicability or general
criminal prohibitions, for laws neutral towards religion can coerce a person to violate his religious
conscience or intrude upon his religious duties just as effectively as laws aimed at religion." 142
Third, there is wisdom in accommodation made by the Court as this is the recourse of minority religions
who are likewise protected by the Free Exercise Clause. Mandatory accommodations are particularly
necessary to protect adherents of minority religions from the inevitable effects of majoritarianism, which
include ignorance and indifference and overt hostility to the minority. As stated in our Decision, dated
August 4, 2003:
....In a democratic republic, laws are inevitably based on the presuppositions of the majority, thus not
infrequently, they come into conflict with the religious scruples of those holding different world views, even
in the absence of a deliberate intent to interfere with religious practice. At times, this effect is unavoidable
as a practical matter because some laws are so necessary to the common good that exceptions are
intolerable. But in other instances, the injury to religious conscience is so great and the advancement of
public purposes so small or incomparable that only indifference or hostility could explain a refusal to make
exemptions. Because of plural traditions, legislators and executive officials are frequently willing to make
such exemptions when the need is brought to their attention, but this may not always be the case when
the religious practice is either unknown at the time of enactment or is for some reason unpopular. In these
cases, a constitutional interpretation that allows accommodations prevents needless injury to the religious
consciences of those who can have an influence in the legislature; while a constitutional interpretation
that requires accommodations extends this treatment to religious faiths that are less able to protect
themselves in the political arena.
Fourth, exemption from penal laws on account of religion is not entirely an alien concept, nor will it be
applied for the first time, as an exemption of such nature, albeit by legislative act, has already been
granted to Moslem polygamy and the criminal law of bigamy.
Finally, we must consider the language of the Religion Clauses vis-à-vis the other fundamental rights in
the Bill of Rights. It has been noted that unlike other fundamental rights like the right to life, liberty or
property, the Religion Clauses are stated in absolute terms, unqualified by the requirement of "due
process," "unreasonableness," or "lawful order." Only the right to free speech is comparable in its
absolute grant. Given the unequivocal and unqualified grant couched in the language, the Court cannot
simply dismiss a claim of exemption based on the Free Exercise Clause, solely on the premise that the
law in question is a general criminal law. 143 If the burden is great and the sincerity of the religious belief is
not in question, adherence to the benevolent neutrality-accommodation approach require that the Court
make an individual determination and not dismiss the claim outright.
At this point, we must emphasize that the adoption of the benevolent neutrality-accommodation approach
does not mean that the Court ought to grant exemptions every time a free exercise claim comes before it.
This is an erroneous reading of the framework which the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio seems to entertain.
Although benevolent neutrality is the lens with which the Court ought to view religion clause cases, the
interest of the state should also be afforded utmost protection. This is precisely the purpose of the test—
to draw the line between mandatory, permissible and forbidden religious exercise. Thus, under the
framework, the Court cannot simply dismiss a claim under the Free Exercise Clause because the conduct
in question offends a law or the orthodox view, as proposed by Mr. Justice Carpio, for this precisely is the
protection afforded by the religion clauses of the Constitution.144 As stated in the Decision:
xxx While the Court cannot adopt a doctrinal formulation that can eliminate the difficult questions of
judgment in determining the degree of burden on religious practice or importance of the state interest or
the sufficiency of the means adopted by the state to pursue its interest, the Court can set a doctrine on
the ideal towards which religious clause jurisprudence should be directed. We here lay down the doctrine
that in Philippine jurisdiction, we adopt the benevolent neutrality approach not only because of its merits
as discussed above, but more importantly, because our constitutional history and interpretation
indubitably show that benevolent neutrality is the launching pad from which the Court should take off in
interpreting religion clause cases. The ideal towards which this approach is directed is the protection of
religious liberty "not only for a minority, however small- not only for a majority, however large but for each
of us" to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. 145
II. THE CURRENT PROCEEDINGS
We now resume from where we ended in our August 4, 2003 Decision. As mentioned, what remained to
be resolved, upon which remand was necessary, pertained to the final task of subjecting this case to the
careful application of the compelling state interest test, i.e., determining whether respondent is entitled to
exemption, an issue which is essentially factual or evidentiary in nature.
After the termination of further proceedings with the OCA, and with the transmittal of the Hearing Officer’s
report,146along with the evidence submitted by the OSG, this case is once again with us, to resolve the
penultimate question of whether respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of
"disgraceful and immoral conduct." It is at this point then that we examine the report and documents
submitted by the hearing officer of this case, and apply the three-step process of the compelling state
interest test based on the evidence presented by the parties, especially the government.
On the sincerity of religious belief, the Solicitor General categorically concedes that the sincerity and
centrality of respondent’s claimed religious belief and practice are beyond serious doubt. 147 Thus, having
previously established the preliminary conditions required by the compelling state interest test, i.e., that a
law or government practice inhibits the free exercise of respondent’s religious beliefs, and there being no
doubt as to the sincerity and centrality of her faith to claim the exemption based on the free exercise
clause, the burden shifted to the government to demonstrate that the law or practice justifies a compelling
secular objective and that it is the least restrictive means of achieving that objective.
A look at the evidence that the OSG has presented fails to demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests" which could limit or override respondent’s fundamental right to religious freedom.
Neither did the government exert any effort to show that the means it seeks to achieve its legitimate state
objective is the least intrusive means.
The OSG merely offered the following as exhibits and their purposes:
1. Exhibit "A-OSG" and submarking — The September 30, 2003 Letter to the OSG of Bro. Raymond B.
Leach, Legal Representative of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of the Philippines, Inc.
Purpose: To show that the OSG exerted efforts to examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent’s
claimed religious belief and practice.
2. Exhibit "B-OSG" and submarking — The duly notarized certification dated September 30, 2003 issued
and signed by Bro. Leach.
PURPOSES: (1) To substantiate the sincerity and centrality of respondent’s claimed religious belief and
practice; and (2) to prove that the Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness, being a purely internal
arrangement within the congregation of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, cannot be a source of any legal
protection for respondent.
In its Memorandum-In-Intervention, the OSG contends that the State has a compelling interest to override
respondent’s claimed religious belief and practice, in order to protect marriage and the family as basic
social institutions. The Solicitor General, quoting the Constitution148 and the Family Code,149 argues that
marriage and the family are so crucial to the stability and peace of the nation that the conjugal
arrangement embraced in the Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness should not be recognized or given
effect, as "it is utterly destructive of the avowed institutions of marriage and the family for it reduces to a
mockery these legally exalted and socially significant institutions which in their purity demand respect and
dignity."150
Parenthetically, the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Carpio echoes the Solicitor General in so far as he
asserts that the State has a compelling interest in the preservation of marriage and the family as basic
social institutions, which is ultimately the public policy underlying the criminal sanctions against
concubinage and bigamy. He also argues that in dismissing the administrative complaint against
respondent, "the majority opinion effectively condones and accords a semblance of legitimacy to her
patently unlawful cohabitation..." and "facilitates the circumvention of the Revised Penal Code." According
to Mr. Justice Carpio, by choosing to turn a blind eye to respondent’s criminal conduct, the majority is in
fact recognizing a practice, custom or agreement that subverts marriage. He argues in a similar fashion
as regards the state’s interest in the sound administration of justice.
There has never been any question that the state has an interest in protecting the institutions of marriage
and the family, or even in the sound administration of justice. Indeed, the provisions by which
respondent’s relationship is said to have impinged, e.g., Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Sec. 46(b)(5) of the
Revised Administrative Code, Articles 334 and 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and even the provisions
on marriage and family in the Civil Code and Family Code, all clearly demonstrate the State’s need to
protect these secular interests.
Be that as it may, the free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in
our Constitution. It is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights — "the
most inalienable and sacred of human rights," in the words of Jefferson. Hence, it is not enough to
contend that the state’s interest is important, because our Constitution itself holds the right to religious
freedom sacred. The State must articulate in specific terms the state interest involved in preventing the
exemption, which must be compelling, for only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can
limit the fundamental right to religious freedom. To rule otherwise would be to emasculate the Free
Exercise Clause as a source of right by itself.
Thus, it is not the State’s broad interest in "protecting the institutions of marriage and the family," or even
"in the sound administration of justice" that must be weighed against respondent’s claim, but the State’s
narrow interest in refusing to make an exception for the cohabitation which respondent’s faith finds moral.
In other words, the government must do more than assert the objectives at risk if exemption is given; it
must precisely show how and to what extent those objectives will be undermined if exemptions are
granted.151 This, the Solicitor General failed to do.
To paraphrase Justice Blackmun’s application of the compelling interest test, the State’s interest in
enforcing its prohibition, in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim, cannot be
merely abstract or symbolic. The State cannot plausibly assert that unbending application of a criminal
prohibition is essential to fulfill any compelling interest, if it does not, in fact, attempt to enforce that
prohibition. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the
concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. The State has never sought to
prosecute respondent nor her partner. The State’s asserted interest thus amounts only to the symbolic
preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Incidentally, as echoes of the words of Messrs. J. Bellosillo and
Vitug, in their concurring opinions in our Decision, dated August 4, 2003, to deny the exemption would
effectively break up "an otherwise ideal union of two individuals who have managed to stay together as
husband and wife [approximately twenty-five years]" and have the effect of defeating the very substance
of marriage and the family.
The Solicitor General also argued against respondent’s religious freedom on the basis of morality, i.e.,
that "the conjugal arrangement of respondent and her live-in partner should not be condoned because
adulterous relationships are constantly frowned upon by society"; 152 and "that State laws on marriage,
which are moral in nature, take clear precedence over the religious beliefs and practices of any church,
religious sect or denomination on marriage. Verily, religious beliefs and practices should not be permitted
to override laws relating to public policy such as those of marriage."153
The above arguments are mere reiterations of the arguments raised by Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago in
her dissenting opinion to our Decision dated August 4, 2003, which she offers again in toto. These
arguments have already been addressed in our decision dated August 4, 2003.154 In said Decision, we
noted that Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago’s dissenting opinion dwelt more on the standards of morality,
without categorically holding that religious freedom is not in issue.155 We, therefore, went into a discussion
on morality, in order to show that:
(a) The public morality expressed in the law is necessarily secular for in our constitutional order,
the religion clauses prohibit the state from establishing a religion, including the morality it
sanctions.156 Thus, when the law speaks of "immorality" in the Civil Service Law or "immoral" in
the Code of Professional Responsibility for lawyers,157 or "public morals" in the Revised Penal
Code,158 or "morals" in the New Civil Code,159 or "moral character" in the Constitution,160 the
distinction between public and secular morality on the one hand, and religious morality, on the
other, should be kept in mind;161
(b) Although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state
interests;162
(c) The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever
pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bar should be understood only in this realm where
it has authority.163
(d) Having distinguished between public and secular morality and religious morality, the more
difficult task is determining which immoral acts under this public and secular morality fall under
the phrase "disgraceful and immoral conduct" for which a government employee may be held
administratively liable.164 Only one conduct is in question before this Court, i.e., the conjugal
arrangement of a government employee whose partner is legally married to another which
Philippine law and jurisprudence consider both immoral and illegal. 165
(e) While there is no dispute that under settled jurisprudence, respondent’s conduct constitutes
"disgraceful and immoral conduct," the case at bar involves the defense of religious freedom,
therefore none of the cases cited by Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago apply.166 There is no
jurisprudence in Philippine jurisdiction holding that the defense of religious freedom of a member
of the Jehovah’s Witnesses under the same circumstances as respondent will not prevail over the
laws on adultery, concubinage or some other law. We cannot summarily conclude therefore
that her conduct is likewise so "odious" and "barbaric" as to be immoral and punishable by law. 167
Again, we note the arguments raised by Mr. Justice Carpio with respect to charging respondent with
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and we reiterate that the dissent offends due
process as respondent was not given an opportunity to defend herself against the charge of "conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service." Indeed, there is no evidence of the alleged prejudice to the
best interest of the service.168
Mr. Justice Carpio’s slippery slope argument, on the other hand, is non-sequitur. If the Court grants
respondent exemption from the laws which respondent Escritor has been charged to have violated, the
exemption would not apply to Catholics who have secured church annulment of their marriage even
without a final annulment from a civil court. First, unlike Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Catholic faith considers
cohabitation without marriage as immoral. Second, but more important, the Jehovah’s Witnesses have
standards and procedures which must be followed before cohabitation without marriage is given the
blessing of the congregation. This includes an investigative process whereby the elders of the
congregation verify the circumstances of the declarants. Also, the Declaration is not a blanket authority to
cohabit without marriage because once all legal impediments for the couple are lifted, the validity of the
Declaration ceases, and the congregation requires that the couple legalize their union.
At bottom, the slippery slope argument of Mr. Justice Carpio is speculative. Nevertheless, insofar as he
raises the issue of equality among religions, we look to the words of the Religion Clauses, which clearly
single out religion for both a benefit and a burden: "No law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof…" On its face, the language grants a unique advantage to
religious conduct, protecting it from governmental imposition; and imposes a unique disadvantage,
preventing the government from supporting it. To understand this as a provision which puts religion on an
equal footing with other bases for action seems to be a curious reading. There are no "free exercise" of
"establishment" provisions for science, sports, philosophy, or family relations. The language itself thus
seems to answer whether we have a paradigm of equality or liberty; the language of the Clause is clearly
in the form of a grant of liberty. 169
In this case, the government’s conduct may appear innocent and nondiscriminatory but in effect, it is
oppressive to the minority. In the interpretation of a document, such as the Bill of Rights, designed to
protect the minority from the majority, the question of which perspective is appropriate would seem easy
to answer. Moreover, the text, history, structure and values implicated in the interpretation of the clauses,
all point toward this perspective. Thus, substantive equality—a reading of the religion clauses which
leaves both politically dominant and the politically weak religious groups equal in their inability to use the
government (law) to assist their own religion or burden others—makes the most sense in the
interpretation of the Bill of Rights, a document designed to protect minorities and individuals from
mobocracy in a democracy (the majority or a coalition of minorities). 170
As previously discussed, our Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room
for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. 171 Thus, in arguing
that respondent should be held administratively liable as the arrangement she had was "illegal per se
because, by universally recognized standards, it is inherently or by its very nature bad, improper, immoral
and contrary to good conscience,"172 the Solicitor General failed to appreciate that benevolent neutrality
could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state
interests.173
Finally, even assuming that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate
that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any
more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state, i.e., it has chosen a way to achieve its
legitimate state end that imposes as little as possible on religious liberties. 174 Again, the Solicitor General
utterly failed to prove this element of the test. Other than the two documents offered as cited above which
established the sincerity of respondent’s religious belief and the fact that the agreement was an internal
arrangement within respondent’s congregation, no iota of evidence was offered. In fact, the records are
bereft of even a feeble attempt to procure any such evidence to show that the means the state adopted in
pursuing this compelling interest is the least restrictive to respondent’s religious freedom.
Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these distinct circumstances, respondent Escritor’s
conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based
on her fundamental right to freedom of religion. The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld
in order that freedoms - including religious freedom - may be enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as
a preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the
state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the
state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing that such state interest exists, man
must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant administrative complaint is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice

Cases CHR

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SUPREME COURT

G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994

BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO

The City Attorney for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.

xxx xxx xxx

Hence, this recourse.

The petitioners pose the following:

Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:

b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and

The petition has merit.

The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987

(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.

xxx xxx xxx

The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.

MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.

If I remember correctly, Madam President, Commissioner Garcia, after mentioning the

MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the Declaration of Torture of 1985?

MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner mentioned another.

MR. GUINGONA. I know.

MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.

MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.

xxx xxx xxx

The term "civil rights,"31 has been defined as referring —

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

G.R. No. 204934

G.R. No. 204957

G.R. No. 204988

G.R. No. 205003

EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,

G.R. No. 205043

EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE

G.R. No. 205138

PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its National

G.R. No. 205478

G.R. No. 205491

G.R. No. 205720

PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as Executive Director,

G.R. No. 206355

G.R. No. 207111

G.R. No. 207172

G.R. No. 207563

ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,

(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited

• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53

The Status Quo Ante

(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws

Prior to the RH Law

Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo

1] Power of Judicial Review

2] Actual Case or Controversy

6] One Subject/One Title Rule

II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:

3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech

5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom

9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA

10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM

The Power of Judicial Review