India’s stance on nuclear proliferation treaty

After the World War II concluded, the world got engaged into an armed race of
manufacturing nuclear weapons. To mitigate this malicious race, many arm control treaties
such as SALT-1, SALT-2, LTBT, START-1 and START-2 were planned and signed by a
few nations across the world. Among such agreements was Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) - factually most pivotal, world wide, and influential among them.

The NPT was declared in 1958 by Frank Aiken, the then External affairs minister of Ireland.
At the time the NPT was assumed there was a prediction that within next 20 years the world
would have 25-30 nuclear weapon nations. The NPT is based on a union bargain “The NPT
non-nuclear nations (nations that did not have nuclear accessibility before 1968) agree never
to acquire nuclear weapons and NPT nuclear nations (nations that had nuclear weapons
before 1968) in bargain agree to share the gains coming out of peaceful nuclear technology.
The NPT has a Preamble and eleven articles.

The NPT was declared for signature in 1968 and implemented in 1970. So far 190 nations
have joined the agreement, Finland was the first nation to sign. The NPT acknowledges five
Nuclear Weapon nations: USA, UK, USSR (Russia after crackdown of the Soviet Union),
France and China. Four UN member nations never joined NPT: India, Pakistan, Israel, South
Sudan. North Korea agreed to the treaty in 1985 but left later in 2003.1

India’s stand on NPT

India is among the very few nations who have never signed the Nuclear Non- Proliferation
pact. India takes its stance that it can join the NPT as a nuclear non-weapon nation citing that
“externally prescribed norms or standards” cannot be agreed upon the issues that are contrary
to its national gains or counter on its sovereignty. India’s stance is based on the fact that the
NPT is the last remainder of the separation in the global system, conceding as it does to five
nations the right to be nuclear-weapons nations while not accepting the same right to others.
If nuclear weapons are disastrous and India accepts that they are, then no one should have
them. What is the ethical, moral, or legal basis for suggesting that some can and others
cannot? What control do the “official” nuclear powers possess that democratic India lacks?

India additionally remains a solid advocate of general atomic demobilization. India's

approach depends on the conviction that non-proliferation can't be an end in itself; rather, it
must be connected to atomic demobilization in a commonly fortifying procedure. India
communicates its failure with constrained advance on atomic demilitarization, where five
approved atomic weapon countries still have 22,000 warheads in their joined reserve and
have demonstrated hesitance to incapacitate further. India contends that the UN has neglected
to agree to Article VI as they couldn't make demilitarization a penetrating power in national
arranging and arrangement concerning Nuclear weapons. India accepts compelling
demobilization must upgrade the security everything being equal, not, as the NPT guarantees,
only that of a couple.

India additionally reinforces its position by indicating genuine worries over its security issues
because of fringe debate with one of the five atomic weapon countries China and atomic
1
NTI, ‘Treaty on non proliferation of nuclear weapons’ (NTI, 15April, 2018)
http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons/
accessed 23 august 2018
power Pakistan. India has just battled 5 wars with its neighbours, 4 with Pakistan and 1 with
China. India contends that China, which went to war with India in 1962, has atomic weapons
pointed at it, making it difficult to sign an arrangement that would incapacitate India
singularly.

India understands that within a reasonable time-frame, atomic weapons will stay dynamic
apparatuses of worldwide tact and may well choose the forms of intensity governmental
issues similarly as the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review underlines the striking nature of atomic
weapons in the contemporary world. In this situation, India might particularly want to clutch
its atomic weapons. The ongoing regular citizen atomic agreement amongst India and the
USA, likewise called 'the Indo-US atomic arrangement', has acknowledged India as a nation
with cutting edge atomic innovation - an inferred acknowledgment of its weapon abilities. It
has given India an extraordinary status of being the main nation outside the NPT which has
been permitted to trade in touchy atomic innovation and material. Article III of the NPT
denies atomic exchange with non-NPT countries. This special case is additionally fortified by
the IAEA-India Safeguards agreement. The understanding enables India to have both regular
citizen and military atomic projects. Under the NPT just the Nuclear Weapon Nations -
countries whose ownership of atomic weapons is acknowledged under Article I of the NPT-
have this benefit. 2

Conclusion

The probability of India joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon nation are very bleak.
However, no one will willing to see the treaty undermined by accommodating India as a
nuclear Weapon nation. The only viable option which serves the gains of both India and the
NPT is to maintain the present existing scenario.

2
Henry Sokolski, ‘REVIEWING THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY’ may 2010
https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB987.pdf accessed 22 august 2018
Objective analysis of the pros and cons of the Nuclear non proliferation treaty with
respect to India.

In an anticipated arrangement, the US Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Non

proliferation, Andrew Sammel, commented at the simply closed NPT Review
Conference that India should inevitably sign the NPT as a non-atomic weapon country.
He affirmed: "The circumstance in South Asia (likewise) postures one of a kind
difficulties. Give me a chance to emphasize that the United Nations stays focused on
NPT all inclusiveness." But in the meantime he likewise featured the way that neither
India nor Pakistan may join the Treaty for a long time to come. What he didn't country
was regarding how the issue of NPT's 'all inclusiveness' could provide food for its
'adequacy', which, tragically, now remains very far-fetched.

As stipulated in the NPT, legitimate nuclear commerce remains restricted only amongst
the ‘few’ due to the technology control regimes. Moreover, the emergence of amorphous
entities and ‘private’ nuclear networks and their links to the nuclear programmes in Iran,
Libya and North Korea raise serious doubts about the effectiveness of the NPT and its
nation’s aims. Additionally, the verification regime also seems to have lost its
effectiveness, if not completely failed. Unfortunately, debates within the NPT Rev Con
have completely failed to address some of these concerns. Even worse, the 2005 NPT
Rev Con has closed without any agreed set of decisions because of the politics and
diametrically opposed positions of various actors — a reflection of the fact that the NPT
is on its way to oblivion.

As regards India's position versus the NPT, it streams from its long standing regularizing
way to deal with the bargain being inalienably oppressive as far as setting distinctive
'rights' and 'commitments' between the five atomic 'haves' and 'have-nots'. Also, New
Delhi had an understood (later express) national enthusiasm of ensuring its atomic
'weapon' choice — an alternative implanted in its civilian program. Hence, India needed
to oppose the imperatives upon its indigenous atomic research exercises which could
encroach upon its endeavours to secure the atomic 'choice'. Therefore, India had rejected
the NPT, a position, which proceeds till date. 3

Because of this, the issue of non proliferation has remained a noteworthy combative
issue between New Delhi and the P-5, especially the United Nations. This separation
extended in 1996 when India dismissed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and
contended that it would not sign the arrangement in its present shape 'not currently, nor
later'.

In any case, after the 1998 atomic tests in Pokhran, New Delhi seems to have adjusted
itself to the limitation interests of whatever remains of the world. In spite of assents
forced by USA in 1998, the Jaswant-Talbott talks, President Clinton's visit to India, the
visit of India's Prime Minister to Washington, all added to the fortifying of In do-US
respective ties, and subsequently, a superior comprehension of India's security worries in
the US today than anytime in ongoing history. The 'Subsequent stages in Strategic
Partnership (NSSP)' amongst India and the US along these lines has concentrat ed more
3
ETH Zurich, ‘The Crisis of the NPT: Ahead of the 2010 Review Conference’ December 2009
http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSS-
Analyses-65.pdf accessed 22 august 2018
towards encouraging more extensive two-sided participation on issues identified with
atomic vitality, space and high innovation exchanges.

Unexpectedly, post-9/11, there is a probability that Washington's way to deal with

fighting proliferation may by and by clash with New Delhi's own enthusiasm of
anchoring further atomic collaboration in the circle of regular citizen atomic innovation.
As it shows up from the NPT Rev Con discusses, Washington's endeavours have been
towards setting up more successful controls over 'basic' innovations. Towards this end, it
proposes all inclusive reception of IAEA's Additional Protocol, which would in the long
run give IAEA meddling investigation rights inside countries' domain to examine and
screen consistence. All inclusive adherence of IAEA's Additional Protocol incidentally,
has been seen as an initial move towards enhancing implementation of protections. When
this is accomplished, the US additionally plans to propose the development of a unique
advisory group of the IAEA's board individuals to investigate ways and intends to
additionally improve check.

It likewise gives the idea that the NSG individuals are probably going to make
acknowledgment of the Additional Protocol a required condition for atomic exchanges.
Also, the NWS, initiated by the US, are currently advancing the view that Articles II, III
and IV are interrelated and that Article IV is subordinate to Articles II and III. In the
event that this contention is broadened further, it implies that the IAEA would need to
confine itself to guaranteeing consistence with the NPT first as opposed to advancing the
reason for tranquil employments of atomic vitality. This appears to conflict with the soul
of Article IV which approaches the NWS to share non military personnel atomic
innovation, suggesting that the NWS are in resistance with the Article.

Obviously, such all inclusive utilization of NPT-type defends, or even adherence to the
Additional Protocol as a pre-condition for atomic business would influence India's case
for atomic power since it is exceedingly impossible that New Delhi would ackno wledge
NPT-type shields. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has as of late mentioned that the
"conditions were 'not ready' for India to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at the
present time." He included that, "India has reliably taken the position that the NPT is
unequal and biased and that it won't sign the settlement. The weight on New Delhi to
sign it mounted after the May 1998 atomic tests yet there has been no adjustment in
India's situation on the issue." 4

Be that as it may, in the meantime, it additionally should be featured that India stays
focused on the atomic restraint administration in its actual soul. To address the dangers
developing out of pilferage of WMD to the 'rebels/psychological militants', New Delhi as
of late endorsed a parliament Bill on the 'WMD and Their Delivery Systems (Prohibition
of Unlawful Activities)'. In addition to other things, the Bill is clear in one regard that
New Delhi stays focused on its longstanding limitation concerns. It mentions: "India's
arrangement has dependably been not to help, empower or incite some other nation to
fabricate weapons of mass decimation, including atomic weapons or other atomic
gadgets" and includes that "India likewise stays resolved to avert non -country on-screen
characters and psychological oppressors from procuring WMD and their methods for
conveyance." The bill repeats India's dedication "not to exchange atomic weapons or
4
Herald Mullar, ‘Between Power and Justice: Current Problems and Perspectives of the NPT Regime’
(tandfonline 30 march 2010) https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09700160903542740 accessed
21 august 2018
other atomic touchy gadgets, or exchange control over such weapons or dangerous
gadgets, and not at all help, energize or actuate some other nation to produce atomic
weapons or other atomic hazardous gadgets." This is what is additionally stipulated in
Article I of the NPT. The reception of the Bill, consequently, is on a par wi th sticking to
the arrangements of the NPT.

India should have an enthusiasm for the talks at the NPT Rev Con to the degree that they
have an effect on development and task of atomic power reactors to meet India's vitality
necessities. India's reactor designs have, before, saw impressive postponements in
appointing and some outside onlookers have communicated questions on its capacity to
accomplish the present targets.

While there is a request, there is likewise an enormous provider base. Significant

European atomic firms Framatome and KWU might maybe want to enter India with their
LEU – light water PWRs. Not withstanding, rigid non proliferation concerns intensified
with strict NSG arrangements hinder their endeavours also. It is in this setting Nations
like the US should shed their conventionality.

On India's part, New Delhi will likewise need to do some fine tuning of its atomic laws,
guidelines and directions to empower joint dares to be introduced presence with the
Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) holding value alongside European firms.

Affectability as for plutonium produced in such power reactors could likewise be tended
to agreeably by transportation spent fuel back to the LEU-providing nation since India
does not require plutonium for its program.

India trusts that with the developing globalization endeavours there would be
increasingly worldwide reliance as far as atomic vitality. In this unique situation, Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh's discourse at the Golden Jubilee function of the Department
of Atomic Energy on October 23, 2004 ought to give the terms to India's participation
with whatever remains of the world.

“India will not be the source of proliferation of sensitive technologies. We will also
ensure the safeguarding of those technologies that we already possess. We will remain
faithful to this approach, as we have been for the last several decades. We have done so
despite the well-known glaring examples of proliferation which have directly affected
our security interests.”

The confinements of the present non-proliferation administration ought not be additionally

highlighted by counterfeit limitations on authentic peaceful nuclear applications. technology
denial and shutting roads for universal collaboration in such an essential field is
commensurate to the fore swearing of formative advantages to a great many individuals,
whose lives can be changed by the usage of atomic vitality and pertinent advancements.5

5
Rajesh Rajgopalan, ‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation: An Indian Perspective’ (October 2008)
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/05793.pdf accessed 23 august 2018