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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-45685 November 16, 1937

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING
CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG,
respondents.

Office of the Solicitor General Tuason and City Fiscal Diaz for the Government.
De Witt, Perkins and Ponce Enrile for the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation.
Vicente J. Francisco, Feria and La O, Orense and Belmonte, and Gibbs and McDonough for
respondent Cu Unjieng.
No appearance for respondent Judge.

LAUREL, J.:

This is an original action instituted in this court on August 19, 1937, for the issuance of the writ of
certiorari and of prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Manila so that this court may review the
actuations of the aforesaid Court of First Instance in criminal case No. 42649 entitled "The People of
the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", more particularly the application of the
defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng therein for probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221, and
thereafter prohibit the said Court of First Instance from taking any further action or entertaining further
the aforementioned application for probation, to the end that the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng may
be forthwith committed to prison in accordance with the final judgment of conviction rendered by this
court in said case (G. R. No. 41200). 1

Petitioners herein, the People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation, are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and the respondent herein Mariano
Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case entitled "The People of the Philippine
Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", criminal case No. 42649 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila and G.R. No. 41200 of this court. Respondent herein, Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad
interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard the application of the
defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal case.

The information in the aforesaid criminal case was filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila on
October 15, 1931, petitioner herein Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation intervening in the
case as private prosecutor. After a protracted trial unparalleled in the annals of Philippine
jurisprudence both in the length of time spent by the court as well as in the volume in the testimony
and the bulk of the exhibits presented, the Court of First Instance of Manila, on January 8, 1934,
rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng to indeterminate
penalty ranging from four years and two months of prision correccional to eight years of prision
mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the offended party, the Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation. Upon appeal, the court, on March 26, 1935, modified the sentence to
an indeterminate penalty of from five years and six months of prision correccional to seven years, six
months and twenty-seven days of prision mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects.
Mariano Cu Unjieng filed a motion for reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which
were denied on December 17, 1935, and final judgment was accordingly entered on December 18,
1935. The defendant thereupon sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to the Supreme Court
of the United States but the latter denied the petition for certiorari in November, 1936. This
court, on November 24, 1936, denied the petition subsequently filed by the defendant for
leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded the
case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment.

The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed by the herein respondent
Mariano Cu Unjieng on November 27, 1936, before the trial court, under the provisions of Act
No. 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng states in his
petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal
record and that he would observe good conduct in the future. The Court of First Instance of Manila,
Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office
which recommended denial of the same June 18, 1937. Thereafter, the Court of First Instance of
Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing on April 5, 1937.

On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to the
herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition on April 5,
1937, alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by
section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article
III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is
not uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial
boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their
respective provinces. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937,
elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative
power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal
concurred in the opposition of the private prosecution except with respect to the questions raised
concerning the constitutionality of Act No. 4221.

On June 28, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution with a finding that
"las pruebas no han establecido de unamanera concluyente la culpabilidad del peticionario y que
todos los hechos probados no son inconsistentes o incongrentes con su inocencia" and concludes
that the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda racional" of the crime of which
he stands convicted by this court in G.R. No. 41200, but denying the latter's petition for probation for
the reason that:

. . . Si este Juzgado concediera la poblacion solicitada por las circunstancias y la historia social
que se han expuesto en el cuerpo de esta resolucion, que hacen al peticionario acreedor de la
misma, una parte de la opinion publica, atizada por los recelos y las suspicacias, podria
levantarse indignada contra un sistema de probacion que permite atisbar en los procedimientos
ordinarios de una causa criminal perturbando la quietud y la eficacia de las decisiones ya
recaidas al traer a la superficie conclusiones enteramente differentes, en menoscabo del
interes publico que demanda el respeto de las leyes y del veredicto judicial.

On July 3, 1937, counsel for the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng filed an exception to the
resolution denying probation and a notice of intention to file a motion for reconsideration. An
alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed by counsel on July 13, 1937. This was
supplemented by an additional motion for reconsideration submitted on July 14, 1937. The aforesaid
motions were set for hearing on July 31, 1937, but said hearing was postponed at the petition of
counsel for the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng because a motion for leave to intervene in the case
as amici curiae signed by thirty-three (thirty-four) attorneys had just been filed with the trial court.
Attorney Eulalio Chaves whose signature appears in the aforesaid motion subsequently filed a
petition for leave to withdraw his appearance as amicus curiae on the ground that the motion for
leave to intervene as amici curiae was circulated at a banquet given by counsel for Mariano Cu
Unjieng on the evening of July 30, 1937, and that he signed the same "without mature deliberation
and purely as a matter of courtesy to the person who invited me (him)."

On August 6, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion with the trial court for the issuance
of an order of execution of the judgment of this court in said case and forthwith to commit the herein
respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng to jail in obedience to said judgment.

On August 7, 1937, the private prosecution filed its opposition to the motion for leave to intervene as
amici curiae aforementioned, asking that a date be set for a hearing of the same and that, at all
events, said motion should be denied with respect to certain attorneys signing the same who were
members of the legal staff of the several counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng. On August 10, 1937, herein
respondent Judge Jose O. Vera issued an order requiring all parties including the movants for
intervention as amici curiae to appear before the court on August 14, 1937. On the last-mentioned
date, the Fiscal of the City of Manila moved for the hearing of his motion for execution of judgment in
preference to the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae but, upon objection of counsel for
Mariano Cu Unjieng, he moved for the postponement of the hearing of both motions. The respondent
judge thereupon set the hearing of the motion for execution on August 21, 1937, but proceeded to
consider the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae as in order. Evidence as to the
circumstances under which said motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was signed and
submitted to court was to have been heard on August 19, 1937. But at this juncture, herein petitioners
came to this court on extraordinary legal process to put an end to what they alleged was an
interminable proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Manila which fostered "the campaign of the
defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable
Court on him, exposing the courts to criticism and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the
judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment of this court imposed on the defendant Mariano
Cu Unjieng."

The scheduled hearing before the trial court was accordingly suspended upon the issuance of a
temporary restraining order by this court on August 21, 1937.

To support their petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition, herein
petitioners allege that the respondent judge has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of his
jurisdiction:

I. Because said respondent judge lacks the power to place respondent Mariano Cu
Unjieng under probation for the following reason:

(1) Under section 11 of Act No. 4221, the said of the Philippine Legislature is made
to apply only to the provinces of the Philippines; it nowhere states that it is to be
made applicable to chartered cities like the City of Manila.

(2) While section 37 of the Administrative Code contains a proviso to the effect that
in the absence of a special provision, the term "province" may be construed to
include the City of Manila for the purpose of giving effect to laws of general
application, it is also true that Act No. 4221 is not a law of general application
because it is made to apply only to those provinces in which the respective
provincial boards shall have provided for the salary of a probation officer.

(3) Even if the City of Manila were considered to be a province, still, Act No. 4221
would not be applicable to it because it has provided for the salary of a probation
officer as required by section 11 thereof; it being immaterial that there is an Insular
Probation Officer willing to act for the City of Manila, said Probation Officer provided
for in section 10 of Act No. 4221 being different and distinct from the Probation
Officer provided for in section 11 of the same Act.

II. Because even if the respondent judge originally had jurisdiction to entertain the
application for probation of the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng, he nevertheless acted
without jurisdiction or in excess thereof in continuing to entertain the motion for
reconsideration and by failing to commit Mariano Cu Unjieng to prison after he had
promulgated his resolution of June 28, 1937, denying Mariano Cu Unjieng's application for
probation, for the reason that:

(1) His jurisdiction and power in probation proceedings is limited by Act No. 4221 to
the granting or denying of applications for probation.

(2) After he had issued the order denying Mariano Cu Unjieng's petition for probation
on June 28, 1937, it became final and executory at the moment of its rendition.

(3) No right on appeal exists in such cases.

(4) The respondent judge lacks the power to grant a rehearing of said order or to
modify or change the same.

III. Because the respondent judge made a finding that Mariano Cu Unjieng is innocent of
the crime for which he was convicted by final judgment of this court, which finding is not
only presumptuous but without foundation in fact and in law, and is furthermore in
contempt of this court and a violation of the respondent's oath of office as ad interim judge
of first instance.

IV. Because the respondent judge has violated and continues to violate his duty, which
became imperative when he issued his order of June 28, 1937, denying the application for
probation, to commit his co-respondent to jail.

Petitioners also avers that they have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.

In a supplementary petition filed on September 9, 1937, the petitioner Hongkong and

Shanghai Banking Corporation further contends that Act No. 4221 of the Philippine
Legislature providing for a system of probation for persons eighteen years of age or over
who are convicted of crime, is unconstitutional because it is violative of section 1,
subsection (1), Article III, of the Constitution of the Philippines guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws because it confers upon the provincial board of its province the
absolute discretion to make said law operative or otherwise in their respective provinces,
because it constitutes an unlawful and improper delegation to the provincial boards of the
several provinces of the legislative power lodged by the Jones Law (section 8) in the
Philippine Legislature and by the Constitution (section 1, Art. VI) in the National Assembly;
and for the further reason that it gives the provincial boards, in contravention of the
Constitution (section 2, Art. VIII) and the Jones Law (section 28), the authority to enlarge
the powers of the Court of First Instance of different provinces without uniformity. In
another supplementary petition dated September 14, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of
Manila, in behalf of one of the petitioners, the People of the Philippine Islands, concurs for
the first time with the issues raised by other petitioner regarding the constitutionality of Act
No. 4221, and on the oral argument held on October 6, 1937, further elaborated on the
theory that probation is a form of reprieve and therefore Act. No. 4221 is an encroachment
on the exclusive power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons and reprieves. On October
7, 1937, the City Fiscal filed two memorandums in which he contended that Act No. 4221
not only encroaches upon the pardoning power to the executive, but also constitute an
unwarranted delegation of legislative power and a denial of the equal protection of the
laws. On October 9, 1937, two memorandums, signed jointly by the City Fiscal and the
Solicitor-General, acting in behalf of the People of the Philippine Islands, and by counsel
for the petitioner, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, one sustaining the
power of the state to impugn the validity of its own laws and the other contending that Act
No. 4221 constitutes an unwarranted delegation of legislative power, were presented.
Another joint memorandum was filed by the same persons on the same day, October 9,
1937, alleging that Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional because it denies the equal protection
of the laws and constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power and, further, that
the whole Act is void: that the Commonwealth is not estopped from questioning the validity
of its laws; that the private prosecution may intervene in probation proceedings and may
attack the probation law as unconstitutional; and that this court may pass upon the
constitutional question in prohibition proceedings.

Respondents in their answer dated August 31, 1937, as well as in their oral argument and
memorandums, challenge each and every one of the foregoing proposition raised by the
petitioners.

As special defenses, respondents allege:

(1) That the present petition does not state facts sufficient in law to warrant the
issuance of the writ of certiorari or of prohibition.

(2) That the aforesaid petition is premature because the remedy sought by the
petitioners is the very same remedy prayed for by them before the trial court and
was still pending resolution before the trial court when the present petition was filed
with this court.

(3) That the petitioners having themselves raised the question as to the execution of
judgment before the trial court, said trial court has acquired exclusive jurisdiction to
resolve the same under the theory that its resolution denying probation is
unappealable.

(4) That upon the hypothesis that this court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court
of First Instance to decide the question as to whether or not the execution will lie,
this court nevertheless cannot exercise said jurisdiction while the Court of First
Instance has assumed jurisdiction over the same upon motion of herein petitioners
themselves.

(5) That upon the procedure followed by the herein petitioners in seeking to deprive
the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and elevate the proceedings to this
court, should not be tolerated because it impairs the authority and dignity of the trial
court which court while sitting in the probation cases is "a court of limited jurisdiction
but of great dignity."

(6) That under the supposition that this court has jurisdiction to resolve the question
submitted to and pending resolution by the trial court, the present action would not
lie because the resolution of the trial court denying probation is appealable; for
although the Probation Law does not specifically provide that an applicant for
probation may appeal from a resolution of the Court of First Instance denying
probation, still it is a general rule in this jurisdiction that a final order, resolution or
decision of an inferior court is appealable to the superior court.

(7) That the resolution of the trial court denying probation of herein respondent
Mariano Cu Unjieng being appealable, the same had not become final and
executory for the reason that the said respondent had filed an alternative motion for
reconsideration and new trial within the requisite period of fifteen days, which motion
the trial court was able to resolve in view of the restraining order improvidently and
erroneously issued by this court. lawphi1.net

(8) That the Fiscal of the City of Manila had by implication admitted that the
resolution of the trial court denying probation is not final and unappealable when he
presented his answer to the motion for reconsideration and agreed to the
postponement of the hearing of the said motion.

(9) That under the supposition that the order of the trial court denying probation is
not appealable, it is incumbent upon the accused to file an action for the issuance of
the writ of certiorari with mandamus, it appearing that the trial court, although it
believed that the accused was entitled to probation, nevertheless denied probation
for fear of criticism because the accused is a rich man; and that, before a petition for
certiorari grounded on an irregular exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court could lie,
it is incumbent upon the petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration specifying the
error committed so that the trial court could have an opportunity to correct or cure
the same.

(10) That on hypothesis that the resolution of this court is not appealable, the trial
court retains its jurisdiction within a reasonable time to correct or modify it in
accordance with law and justice; that this power to alter or modify an order or
resolution is inherent in the courts and may be exercise either motu proprio or upon
petition of the proper party, the petition in the latter case taking the form of a motion
for reconsideration.

(11) That on the hypothesis that the resolution of the trial court is appealable as
respondent allege, said court cannot order execution of the same while it is on
appeal, for then the appeal would not be availing because the doors of probation will
be closed from the moment the accused commences to serve his sentence (Act No.
4221, sec. 1; U.S. vs. Cook, 19 Fed. [2d], 827).

In their memorandums filed on October 23, 1937, counsel for the respondents maintain that Act No.
4221 is constitutional because, contrary to the allegations of the petitioners, it does not constitute an
undue delegation of legislative power, does not infringe the equal protection clause of the
Constitution, and does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the Executive. In an additional
memorandum filed on the same date, counsel for the respondents reiterate the view that section 11 of
Act No. 4221 is free from constitutional objections and contend, in addition, that the private
prosecution may not intervene in probation proceedings, much less question the validity of Act No.
4221; that both the City Fiscal and the Solicitor-General are estopped from questioning the validity of
the Act; that the validity of Act cannot be attacked for the first time before this court; that probation in
unavailable; and that, in any event, section 11 of the Act No. 4221 is separable from the rest of the
Act. The last memorandum for the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng was denied for having been filed
out of time but was admitted by resolution of this court and filed anew on November 5, 1937.
This memorandum elaborates on some of the points raised by the respondents and refutes those
brought up by the petitioners.

In the scrutiny of the pleadings and examination of the various aspects of the present case, we noted
that the court below, in passing upon the merits of the application of the respondent Mariano Cu
Unjieng and in denying said application assumed the task not only of considering the merits of the
application, but of passing upon the culpability of the applicant, notwithstanding the final
pronouncement of guilt by this court. (G.R. No. 41200.) Probation implies guilt be final judgment.
While a probation case may look into the circumstances attending the commission of the offense, this
does not authorize it to reverse the findings and conclusive of this court, either directly or indirectly,
especially wherefrom its own admission reliance was merely had on the printed briefs, averments,
and pleadings of the parties. As already observed by this court in Shioji vs. Harvey ([1922], 43 Phil.,
333, 337), and reiterated in subsequent cases, "if each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy
the privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be no end to litigation, and
judicial chaos would result." A becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of
the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the intergrated judicial system of the
nation.

After threshing carefully the multifarious issues raised by both counsel for the petitioners and the
respondents, this court prefers to cut the Gordian knot and take up at once the two fundamental
questions presented, namely, (1) whether or not the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been
properly raised in these proceedings; and (2) in the affirmative, whether or not said Act is
constitutional. Considerations of these issues will involve a discussion of certain incidental questions
raised by the parties.

To arrive at a correct conclusion on the first question, resort to certain guiding principles is necessary.
It is a well-settled rule that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by
the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented inappropriate cases and is necessary
to a determination of the case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented.
(McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu [1915], 30 Phil., 563, 568; 6 R. C. L., pp. 76, 77; 12 C. J., pp. 780-
782, 783.)

The question of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature is frequently raised in ordinary actions.
Nevertheless, resort may be made to extraordinary legal remedies, particularly where the remedies in
the ordinary course of law even if available, are not plain, speedy and adequate. Thus, in Cu Unjieng
vs. Patstone ([1922]), 42 Phil., 818), this court held that the question of the constitutionality of a
statute may be raised by the petitioner in mandamus proceedings (see, also, 12 C. J., p. 783); and in
Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927], 50 Phil., 259 [affirmed in Springer vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands (1928), 277 U. S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845]), this court declared
an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action of quo warranto brought in the name of the
Government of the Philippines. It has also been held that the constitutionality of a statute may be
questioned in habeas corpus proceedings (12 C. J., p. 783; Bailey on Habeas Corpus, Vol. I, pp. 97,
117), although there are authorities to the contrary; on an application for injunction to restrain action
under the challenged statute (mandatory, see Cruz vs. Youngberg [1931], 56 Phil., 234); and even on
an application for preliminary injunction where the determination of the constitutional question is
necessary to a decision of the case. (12 C. J., p. 783.) The same may be said as regards prohibition
and certiorari.(Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271 U. S., 500; 70 Law. ed.,
1059; Bell vs. First Judicial District Court [1905], 28 Nev., 280; 81 Pac., 875; 113 A. S. R., 854; 6 Ann.
Cas., 982; 1 L. R. A. [N. S], 843, and cases cited). The case of Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra,
decided by this court twelve years ago was, like the present one, an original action for certiorari and
prohibition. The constitutionality of Act No. 2972, popularly known as the Chinese Bookkeeping Law,
was there challenged by the petitioners, and the constitutional issue was not met squarely by the
respondent in a demurrer. A point was raised "relating to the propriety of the constitutional question
being decided in original proceedings in prohibition." This court decided to take up the constitutional
question and, with two justices dissenting, held that Act No. 2972 was constitutional. The case was
elevated on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States which reversed the judgment
of this court and held that the Act was invalid. (271 U. S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059.) On the question of
jurisdiction, however, the Federal Supreme Court, though its Chief Justice, said:

By the Code of Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands, section 516, the Philippine supreme
court is granted concurrent jurisdiction in prohibition with courts of first instance over inferior
tribunals or persons, and original jurisdiction over courts of first instance, when such courts are
exercising functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction. It has been held by that court that
the question of the validity of the criminal statute must usually be raised by a defendant in the
trial court and be carried regularly in review to the Supreme Court. (Cadwallader-Gibson
Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192). But in this case where a new act seriously affected
numerous persons and extensive property rights, and was likely to cause a multiplicity of
actions, the Supreme Court exercised its discretion to bring the issue to the act's validity
promptly before it and decide in the interest of the orderly administration of justice. The court
relied by analogy upon the cases of Ex parte Young (209 U. S., 123;52 Law ed., 714; 13 L. R. A.
[N. S.] 932; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 441; 14 Ann. Ca., 764; Traux vs. Raich, 239 U. S., 33; 60 Law.
ed., 131; L. R. A. 1916D, 545; 36 Sup. Ct. Rep., 7; Ann. Cas., 1917B, 283; and Wilson vs. New,
243 U. S., 332; 61 Law. ed., 755; L. R. A. 1917E, 938; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 298; Ann. Cas. 1918A,
1024). Although objection to the jurisdiction was raise by demurrer to the petition, this is now
disclaimed on behalf of the respondents, and both parties ask a decision on the merits. In view
of the broad powers in prohibition granted to that court under the Island Code, we acquiesce in
the desire of the parties.

The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and
directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a
jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, p. 705.) The
general rule, although there is a conflict in the cases, is that the merit of prohibition will not lie whether
the inferior court has jurisdiction independent of the statute the constitutionality of which is
questioned, because in such cases the interior court having jurisdiction may itself determine the
constitutionality of the statute, and its decision may be subject to review, and consequently the
complainant in such cases ordinarily has adequate remedy by appeal without resort to the writ of
prohibition. But where the inferior court or tribunal derives its jurisdiction exclusively from an
unconstitutional statute, it may be prevented by the writ of prohibition from enforcing that statute. (50
C. J., 670; Ex parte Round tree [1874, 51 Ala., 42; In re Macfarland, 30 App. [D. C.], 365; Curtis vs.
Cornish [1912], 109 Me., 384; 84 A., 799; Pennington vs. Woolfolk [1880], 79 Ky., 13; State vs.
Godfrey [1903], 54 W. Va., 54; 46 S. E., 185; Arnold vs. Shields [1837], 5 Dana, 19; 30 Am. Dec.,
669.)

Courts of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings derived their jurisdiction solely from Act No.
4221 which prescribes in detailed manner the procedure for granting probation to accused persons
after their conviction has become final and before they have served their sentence. It is true that at
common law the authority of the courts to suspend temporarily the execution of the sentence is
recognized and, according to a number of state courts, including those of Massachusetts, Michigan,
New York, and Ohio, the power is inherent in the courts (Commonwealth vs. Dowdican's Bail [1874],
115 Mass., 133; People vs. Stickel [1909], 156 Mich., 557; 121 N. W., 497; People ex rel. Forsyth vs.
Court of Session [1894], 141 N. Y., 288; Weber vs. State [1898], 58 Ohio St., 616). But, in the leading
case of Ex parte United States ([1916], 242 U. S., 27; 61 Law. ed., 129; L. R. A., 1917E, 1178; 37
Sup. Ct. Rep., 72; Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355), the Supreme Court of the United States expressed the
opinion that under the common law the power of the court was limited to temporary suspension, and
brushed aside the contention as to inherent judicial power saying, through Chief Justice White:

Indisputably under our constitutional system the right to try offenses against the criminal laws
and upon conviction to impose the punishment provided by law is judicial, and it is equally to be
conceded that, in exerting the powers vested in them on such subject, courts inherently possess
ample right to exercise reasonable, that is, judicial, discretion to enable them to wisely exert
their authority. But these concessions afford no ground for the contention as to power here
made, since it must rest upon the proposition that the power to enforce begets inherently a
discretion to permanently refuse to do so. And the effect of the proposition urged upon the
distribution of powers made by the Constitution will become apparent when it is observed that
indisputable also is it that the authority to define and fix the punishment for crime is legislative
and includes the right in advance to bring within judicial discretion, for the purpose of executing
the statute, elements of consideration which would be otherwise beyond the scope of judicial
authority, and that the right to relieve from the punishment, fixed by law and ascertained
according to the methods by it provided belongs to the executive department.

Justice Carson, in his illuminating concurring opinion in the case of Director of Prisons vs. Judge of
First Instance of Cavite (29 Phil., 265), decided by this court in 1915, also reached the conclusion that
the power to suspend the execution of sentences pronounced in criminal cases is not inherent in the
judicial function. "All are agreed", he said, "that in the absence of statutory authority, it does not lie
within the power of the courts to grant such suspensions." (at p. 278.) Both petitioner and
respondents are correct, therefore, when they argue that a Court of First Instance sitting in probation
proceedings is a court of limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction in such proceedings is conferred
exclusively by Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature.

It is, of course, true that the constitutionality of a statute will not be considered on application for
prohibition where the question has not been properly brought to the attention of the court by objection
of some kind (Hill vs. Tarver [1901], 130 Ala., 592; 30 S., 499; State ex rel. Kelly vs. Kirby [1914], 260
Mo., 120; 168 S. W., 746). In the case at bar, it is unquestionable that the constitutional issue has
been squarely presented not only before this court by the petitioners but also before the trial court by
the private prosecution. The respondent, Hon. Jose O Vera, however, acting as judge of the court
below, declined to pass upon the question on the ground that the private prosecutor, not being a party
whose rights are affected by the statute, may not raise said question. The respondent judge cited
Cooley on Constitutional Limitations (Vol. I, p. 339; 12 C. J., sec. 177, pp. 760 and 762), and McGlue
vs. Essex County ([1916], 225 Mass., 59; 113 N. E., 742, 743), as authority for the proposition that a
court will not consider any attack made on the constitutionality of a statute by one who has no interest
in defeating it because his rights are not affected by its operation. The respondent judge further
stated that it may not motu proprio take up the constitutional question and, agreeing with Cooley that
"the power to declare a legislative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the fallibility of
the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with
due regard to duty and official oath decline the responsibility" (Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol.
I, p. 332), proceeded on the assumption that Act No. 4221 is constitutional. While therefore, the court
a quo admits that the constitutional question was raised before it, it refused to consider the question
solely because it was not raised by a proper party. Respondents herein reiterates this view. The
argument is advanced that the private prosecution has no personality to appear in the hearing of the
application for probation of defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng in criminal case No. 42648 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, and hence the issue of constitutionality was not properly raised in the lower
court. Although, as a general rule, only those who are parties to a suit may question the
constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been held that since the decree
pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, where the jurisdiction of the court depends on the
validity of the statute in question, the issue of the constitutionality will be considered on its being
brought to the attention of the court by persons interested in the effect to be given the statute.(12 C.
J., sec. 184, p. 766.) And, even if we were to concede that the issue was not properly raised in the
court below by the proper party, it does not follow that the issue may not be here raised in an original
action of certiorari and prohibitions. It is true that, as a general rule, the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not
be raised at the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not considered on appeal. (12 C. J., p.
786. See, also, Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192, 193-195.) But we
must state that the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sounds discretion,
may determine the time when a question affecting the constitutionality of a statute should be
presented. (In re Woolsey [1884], 95 N. Y., 135, 144.) Thus, in criminal cases, although there is a very
sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may be raised for the first time at any stage of
the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. (12 C. J., p. 786.) Even in civil cases, it has
been held that it is the duty of a court to pass on the constitutional question, though raised for the first
time on appeal, if it appears that a determination of the question is necessary to a decision of the
case. (McCabe's Adm'x vs. Maysville & B. S. R. Co., [1910], 136 ky., 674; 124 S. W., 892; Lohmeyer
vs. St. Louis Cordage Co. [1908], 214 Mo., 685; 113 S. W. 1108; Carmody vs. St. Louis Transit Co.,
[1905], 188 Mo., 572; 87 S. W., 913.) And it has been held that a constitutional question will be
considered by an appellate court at any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the court below
(State vs. Burke [1911], 175 Ala., 561; 57 S., 870.) As to the power of this court to consider the
constitutional question raised for the first time before this court in these proceedings, we turn again
and point with emphasis to the case of Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra. And on the hypotheses that
the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, represented by the private prosecution, is not the
proper party to raise the constitutional question here — a point we do not now have to decide — we
are of the opinion that the People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the
Fiscal of the City of Manila, is such a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule
is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It
goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines,
in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of
grater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound
inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled
rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws. In Government of the Philippine Islands
vs. Springer ([1927]), 50 Phil., 259 (affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands
[1928], 277 U.S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional
in an action instituted in behalf of the Government of the Philippines. In Attorney General vs. Perkins
([1889], 73 Mich., 303, 311, 312; 41 N. W. 426, 428, 429), the State of Michigan, through its Attorney
General, instituted quo warranto proceedings to test the right of the respondents to renew a mining
corporation, alleging that the statute under which the respondents base their right was
unconstitutional because it impaired the obligation of contracts. The capacity of the chief law officer of
the state to question the constitutionality of the statute was though, as a general rule, only those who
are parties to a suit may question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it has
been held that since the decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction in void, where the
jurisdiction of the court depends on the validity of the statute in question, the issue of constitutionality
will be considered on its being brought to the attention of the court by persons interested in the effect
to begin the statute. (12 C.J., sec. 184, p. 766.) And, even if we were to concede that the issue was
not properly raised in the court below by the proper party, it does not follow that the issue may not be
here raised in an original action of certiorari and prohibition. It is true that, as a general rule, the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the
pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised a the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be
considered on appeal. (12 C.J., p. 786. See, also, Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario,
26 Phil., 192, 193-195.) But we must state that the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the
exercise of sound discretion, may determine the time when a question affecting the constitutionality of
a statute should be presented. (In re Woolsey [19884], 95 N.Y., 135, 144.) Thus, in criminal cases,
although there is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may be raised for the
first time at any state of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. (12 C.J., p. 786.) Even
in civil cases, it has been held that it is the duty of a court to pass on the constitutional question,
though raised for first time on appeal, if it appears that a determination of the question is necessary to
a decision of the case. (McCabe's Adm'x vs. Maysville & B. S. R. Co. [1910], 136 Ky., 674; 124 S. W.,
892; Lohmeyer vs. St. Louis, Cordage Co. [1908], 214 Mo. 685; 113 S. W., 1108; Carmody vs. St.
Louis Transit Co. [1905], 188 Mo., 572; 87 S. W., 913.) And it has been held that a constitutional
question will be considered by an appellate court at any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the
court below (State vs. Burke [1911], 175 Ala., 561; 57 S., 870.) As to the power of this court to
consider the constitutional question raised for the first time before this court in these proceedings, we
turn again and point with emphasis to the case of Yu Cong Eng. vs. Trinidad, supra. And on the
hypothesis that the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, represented by the private
prosecution, is not the proper party to raise the constitutional question here — a point we do not now
have to decide — we are of the opinion that the People of the Philippines, represented by the
Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is such a proper party in the present
proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates the
Constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a
substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal
expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the
enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity
of its own laws. In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927]), 50 Phil., 259 (affirmed
in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands [1928], 277 U.S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845), this
court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action instituted in behalf of the
Government of the Philippines. In Attorney General vs. Perkings([1889], 73 Mich., 303, 311, 312; 41
N.W., 426, 428, 429), the State of Michigan, through its Attorney General, instituted quo warranto
proceedings to test the right of the respondents to renew a mining corporation, alleging that the
statute under which the respondents base their right was unconstitutional because it impaired the
obligation of contracts. The capacity of the chief law officer of the state to question the
constitutionality of the statute was itself questioned. Said the Supreme Court of Michigan, through
Champlin, J.:

. . . The idea seems to be that the people are estopped from questioning the validity of a law
enacted by their representatives; that to an accusation by the people of Michigan of usurpation
their government, a statute enacted by the people of Michigan is an adequate answer. The last
proposition is true, but, if the statute relied on in justification is unconstitutional, it is statute only
in form, and lacks the force of law, and is of no more saving effect to justify action under it than
if it had never been enacted. The constitution is the supreme law, and to its behests the courts,
the legislature, and the people must bow . . . The legislature and the respondents are not the
only parties in interest upon such constitutional questions. As was remarked by Mr. Justice
Story, in speaking of an acquiescence by a party affected by an unconstitutional act of the
legislature: "The people have a deep and vested interest in maintaining all the constitutional
limitations upon the exercise of legislative powers." (Allen vs. Mckeen, 1 Sum., 314.)

In State vs. Doane ([1916], 98 Kan., 435; 158 Pac., 38, 40), an original action (mandamus) was
brought by the Attorney-General of Kansas to test the constitutionality of a statute of the state. In
disposing of the question whether or not the state may bring the action, the Supreme Court of Kansas
said:

. . . the state is a proper party — indeed, the proper party — to bring this action. The state is
always interested where the integrity of its Constitution or statutes is involved.

"It has an interest in seeing that the will of the Legislature is not disregarded, and
need not, as an individual plaintiff must, show grounds of fearing more specific injury.
(State vs. Kansas City 60 Kan., 518 [57 Pac., 118])." (State vs. Lawrence, 80 Kan.,
707; 103 Pac., 839.)

Where the constitutionality of a statute is in doubt the state's law officer, its Attorney-General, or
county attorney, may exercise his bet judgment as to what sort of action he will bring to have the
matter determined, either by quo warranto to challenge its validity (State vs. Johnson, 61 Kan.,
803; 60 Pac., 1068; 49 L.R.A., 662), by mandamus to compel obedience to its terms (State vs.
Dolley, 82 Kan., 533; 108 Pac., 846), or by injunction to restrain proceedings under its
questionable provisions (State ex rel. vs. City of Neodesha, 3 Kan. App., 319; 45 Pac., 122).

Other courts have reached the same conclusion (See State vs. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. [1917], 197 S.
W., 1006; State vs. S.H. Kress & Co. [1934], 155 S., 823; State vs. Walmsley [1935], 181 La., 597;
160 S., 91; State vs. Board of County Comr's [1934], 39 Pac. [2d], 286; First Const. Co. of Brooklyn
vs. State [1917], 211 N.Y., 295; 116 N.E., 1020; Bush vs. State {1918], 187 Ind., 339; 119 N.E., 417;
State vs. Watkins [1933], 176 La., 837; 147 S., 8, 10, 11). In the case last cited, the Supreme Court of
Luisiana said:

It is contended by counsel for Herbert Watkins that a district attorney, being charged with the
duty of enforcing the laws, has no right to plead that a law is unconstitutional. In support of the
argument three decisions are cited, viz.: State ex rel. Hall, District Attorney, vs. Judge of Tenth
Judicial District (33 La. Ann., 1222); State ex rel. Nicholls, Governor vs. Shakespeare, Mayor of
New Orleans (41 Ann., 156; 6 So., 592); and State ex rel., Banking Co., etc. vs. Heard, Auditor
(47 La. Ann., 1679; 18 So., 746; 47 L. R. A., 512). These decisions do not forbid a district
attorney to plead that a statute is unconstitutional if he finds if in conflict with one which it is his
duty to enforce. In State ex rel. Hall, District Attorney, vs. Judge, etc., the ruling was the judge
should not, merely because he believed a certain statute to be unconstitutional forbid the district
attorney to file a bill of information charging a person with a violation of the statute. In other
words, a judge should not judicially declare a statute unconstitutional until the question of
constitutionality is tendered for decision, and unless it must be decided in order to determine the
right of a party litigant. State ex rel. Nicholls, Governor, etc., is authority for the proposition
merely that an officer on whom a statute imposes the duty of enforcing its provisions cannot
avoid the duty upon the ground that he considers the statute unconstitutional, and hence in
enforcing the statute he is immune from responsibility if the statute be unconstitutional. State ex
rel. Banking Co., etc., is authority for the proposition merely that executive officers, e.g., the
state auditor and state treasurer, should not decline to perform ministerial duties imposed upon
them by a statute, on the ground that they believe the statute is unconstitutional.

It is the duty of a district attorney to enforce the criminal laws of the state, and, above all, to
support the Constitution of the state. If, in the performance of his duty he finds two statutes in
conflict with each other, or one which repeals another, and if, in his judgment, one of the two
statutes is unconstitutional, it is his duty to enforce the other; and, in order to do so, he is
compelled to submit to the court, by way of a plea, that one of the statutes is unconstitutional. If
it were not so, the power of the Legislature would be free from constitutional limitations in the
enactment of criminal laws.

The respondents do not seem to doubt seriously the correctness of the general proposition that the
state may impugn the validity of its laws. They have not cited any authority running clearly in the
opposite direction. In fact, they appear to have proceeded on the assumption that the rule as stated is
sound but that it has no application in the present case, nor may it be invoked by the City Fiscal in
behalf of the People of the Philippines, one of the petitioners herein, the principal reasons being that
the validity before this court, that the City Fiscal is estopped from attacking the validity of the Act and,
not authorized challenge the validity of the Act in its application outside said city. (Additional
memorandum of respondents, October 23, 1937, pp. 8,. 10, 17 and 23.)

The mere fact that the Probation Act has been repeatedly relied upon the past and all that time has
not been attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila but, on the contrary, has been impliedly
regarded by him as constitutional, is no reason for considering the People of the Philippines estopped
from nor assailing its validity. For courts will pass upon a constitutional questions only when
presented before it in bona fide cases for determination, and the fact that the question has not been
raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later. The fiscal and all others
are justified in relying upon the statute and treating it as valid until it is held void by the courts in
proper cases.

It remains to consider whether the determination of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is necessary
to the resolution of the instant case. For, ". . . while the court will meet the question with firmness,
where its decision is indispensable, it is the part of wisdom, and just respect for the legislature,
renders it proper, to waive it, if the case in which it arises, can be decided on other points." (Ex parte
Randolph [1833], 20 F. Cas. No. 11, 558; 2 Brock., 447. Vide, also Hoover vs. wood [1857], 9 Ind.,
286, 287.) It has been held that the determination of a constitutional question is necessary whenever
it is essential to the decision of the case (12 C. J., p. 782, citing Long Sault Dev. Co. vs. Kennedy
[1913], 158 App. Div., 398; 143 N. Y. Supp., 454 [aff. 212 N.Y., 1: 105 N. E., 849; Ann. Cas. 1915D,
56; and app dism 242 U.S., 272]; Hesse vs. Ledesma, 7 Porto Rico Fed., 520; Cowan vs. Doddridge,
22 Gratt [63 Va.], 458; Union Line Co., vs. Wisconsin R. Commn., 146 Wis., 523; 129 N. W., 605), as
where the right of a party is founded solely on a statute the validity of which is attacked. (12 C.J., p.
782, citing Central Glass Co. vs. Niagrara F. Ins. Co., 131 La., 513; 59 S., 972; Cheney vs. Beverly,
188 Mass., 81; 74 N.E., 306). There is no doubt that the respondent Cu Unjieng draws his privilege to
probation solely from Act No. 4221 now being assailed.

Apart from the foregoing considerations, that court will also take cognizance of the fact that the
Probation Act is a new addition to our statute books and its validity has never before been passed
upon by the courts; that may persons accused and convicted of crime in the City of Manila have
applied for probation; that some of them are already on probation; that more people will likely take
advantage of the Probation Act in the future; and that the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng has been
at large for a period of about four years since his first conviction. All wait the decision of this court on
the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant case has
assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that the
constitutionality of Act No. 4221 be now resolved. (Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385;
[1926], 271 U.S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059. See 6 R.C.L., pp. 77, 78; People vs. Kennedy [1913], 207
N.Y., 533; 101 N.E., 442, 444; Ann. Cas. 1914C, 616; Borginis vs. Falk Co. [1911], 147 Wis., 327; 133
N.W., 209, 211; 37 L.R.A. [N.S.] 489; Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil., 304.) In
Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra, an analogous situation confronted us. We said: "Inasmuch as the
property and personal rights of nearly twelve thousand merchants are affected by these proceedings,
and inasmuch as Act No. 2972 is a new law not yet interpreted by the courts, in the interest of the
public welfare and for the advancement of public policy, we have determined to overrule the defense
of want of jurisdiction in order that we may decide the main issue. We have here an extraordinary
situation which calls for a relaxation of the general rule." Our ruling on this point was sustained by the
Supreme Court of the United States. A more binding authority in support of the view we have taken
can not be found.

We have reached the conclusion that the question of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been
properly raised. Now for the main inquiry: Is the Act unconstitutional?

Under a doctrine peculiarly American, it is the office and duty of the judiciary to enforce the
Constitution. This court, by clear implication from the provisions of section 2, subsection 1, and
section 10, of Article VIII of the Constitution, may declare an act of the national legislature invalid
because in conflict with the fundamental lay. It will not shirk from its sworn duty to enforce the
Constitution. And, in clear cases, it will not hesitate to give effect to the supreme law by setting aside
a statute in conflict therewith. This is of the essence of judicial duty.

This court is not unmindful of the fundamental criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable
doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature
approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. The responsibility of
upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature as well. "The question
of the validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative department of the government
itself." (U.S. vs. Ten Yu [1912], 24 Phil., 1, 10; Case vs. Board of Health and Heiser [1913], 24 Phil.,
250, 276; U.S. vs. Joson [1913], 26 Phil., 1.) And a statute finally comes before the courts sustained
by the sanction of the executive. The members of the Legislature and the Chief Executive have taken
an oath to support the Constitution and it must be presumed that they have been true to this oath and
that in enacting and sanctioning a particular law they did not intend to violate the Constitution. The
courts cannot but cautiously exercise its power to overturn the solemn declarations of two of the three
grand departments of the governments. (6 R.C.L., p. 101.) Then, there is that peculiar political
philosophy which bids the judiciary to reflect the wisdom of the people as expressed through an
elective Legislature and an elective Chief Executive. It follows, therefore, that the courts will not set
aside a law as violative of the Constitution except in a clear case. This is a proposition too plain to
require a citation of authorities.

One of the counsel for respondents, in the course of his impassioned argument, called attention to
the fact that the President of the Philippines had already expressed his opinion against the
constitutionality of the Probation Act, adverting that as to the Executive the resolution of this question
was a foregone conclusion. Counsel, however, reiterated his confidence in the integrity and
independence of this court. We take notice of the fact that the President in his message dated
September 1, 1937, recommended to the National Assembly the immediate repeal of the Probation
Act (No. 4221); that this message resulted in the approval of Bill No. 2417 of the Nationality Assembly
repealing the probation Act, subject to certain conditions therein mentioned; but that said bill was
vetoed by the President on September 13, 1937, much against his wish, "to have stricken out from
the statute books of the Commonwealth a law . . . unfair and very likely unconstitutional." It is
sufficient to observe in this connection that, in vetoing the bill referred to, the President exercised his
constitutional prerogative. He may express the reasons which he may deem proper for taking such a
step, but his reasons are not binding upon us in the determination of actual controversies submitted
for our determination. Whether or not the Executive should express or in any manner insinuate his
opinion on a matter encompassed within his broad constitutional power of veto but which happens to
be at the same time pending determination in this court is a question of propriety for him exclusively
to decide or determine. Whatever opinion is expressed by him under these circumstances, however,
cannot sway our judgment on way or another and prevent us from taking what in our opinion is the
proper course of action to take in a given case. It if is ever necessary for us to make any vehement
affirmance during this formative period of our political history, it is that we are independent of the
Executive no less than of the Legislative department of our government — independent in the
performance of our functions, undeterred by any consideration, free from politics, indifferent to
popularity, and unafraid of criticism in the accomplishment of our sworn duty as we see it and as we
understand it.

The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is challenged on three principal grounds: (1) That said Act
encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executive; (2) that its constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power and (3) that it denies the equal protection of the laws.

1. Section 21 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law, in force
at the time of the approval of Act No. 4221, otherwise known as the Probation Act, vests in the