CREATION and DISSOLUTION OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

Martin: Chapter 3 & 4

Constitution: Secs. 1, 10, 11 & 12, 18 of Art. X
LGC: Secs. 6-10, 14, 118-119. 385-386, 441-442, 449-453, 460-462
R.A. 9009

A. CREATION
i. Nature of power
ii. Constitutional foundation
a. Units directly affected
iii. Essential requisites for incorporation
iv. Existence by prescription
v. DE FACTO municipal corporations
vi. Attack against validity of incorporation
vii. Commencement of corporate existence

Cases: Pelaez v Auditor, 15 SCRA 569;

Petitioners: EMMANUEL PELAEZ, Vice President of the Philippines

Respondents: THE AUDITOR GENERAL

Doctrine: Whereas the power to fix a common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts
of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature, the
authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature.

Facts:

● President Diosdado Macapagal issued EOs creating 33 municipalities. The EOs were
purportedly pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code.
● Section 68 provides: The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by
executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, sub-province,
municipality, municipal district or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish
the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces
(etc)
● Petitioner Pelaez, Vice President, and acting as a taxpayer, filed a suit for prohibition
against the Auditor General in order to restrain from passing audit any expenditure of
public funds in the implementation of the said EOs.
○ Pelaez asserts that such EOs were null and void because Section 68 has been
repealed by RA 2370 and constitute undue delegation of legislative power.
○ RA 2370 provides: Barrios may not be created or, their boundaries altered nor
their names changed except by: act of Congress, act of the provincial board upon
petition of a majority of voters, or recommendation of the council of the
municipalities.
○ Pelaez further asserts that if, under the new law, the president cannot create
even a barrio, then he should not be allowed to create a municipality, which is
composed of several barrios.
 ● Respondent avers that the new municipalities can be created without the need of
creating the barrio by placing the old barrios in the jurisdiction of the new municipality.

Issue/s:

● W/N the EOs are null and void, being an undue delegation of legislative power - YES.

Ratio:

● Whereas the power to fix a common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of
jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature
(involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law
creating said municipalities) the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially
legislative in nature.
● Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill
in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential,
to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law:
○ be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate
○ fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable
— to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions
○ Section 68 does not meet this requirement. It does not enunciate any policy to
be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard
sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to.
● Court further ruled: the last clause of Section 68, which states that the president, may
change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place therein as the
public welfare may require, only refers to the place of which the seat of government
may be transferred.
○ It does not refer to the president’s power in defining boundaries of the political
subdivisions.
○ Even if it were for the public welfare, the EO cannot be issued because it is still
an eminently legislative function. It can never be exercised by the president.
● Also, the EOs in question were issued after the legislative bills for the creation of the
municipalities involved in this case had failed to pass Congress. This proved that the
issuance of said EOs was actually an exercise of pure legislative functions.

Asuncion v Yriarte, 28 Phil 67;

Petitioners: Norberto Asuncion et al

Respondents: Manuel Yriarte

Doctrine:

The various barrios of the municipality have no right to own or hold property, they not being
recognized as legal
entities by any law.

Facts:

1. Respondent chief of the division of archives of the Execuive Bureau Manuel Yriarte
refused to file the articles of incorporation of petitioners on the ground that the object
of the Corporation was unlawful, hence not registrable based on Act No. 1459.
2. The object of the corporation is (a) to organize and regulate the management,
disposition, administration and control which the barrio of Pulo or San Miguel or its
inhabitants or residents have over the common property of said residents or inhabitants
or property belonging to the whole barrio as such; and (b) to use the natural products
of the said property for institutions, foundations, and charitable works of common utility
and advantage to the barrio or its inhabitants."
3. Petitioner filed an action to obtain a writ of mandamus to compel Yriarte to file the
articles of incorporation.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not the chief of the division of archives has authority, under the Corporation
for registration, to decide not only as to the sufficiency of the form of the articles, but
also as to the lawfulness of the purpose of the proposed corporation.— YES
2. Was the object of the Corporation unlawful?— YES

Ratio:

FIRST ISSUE
1.Section 6 of the Corporation Law states:
“Five or more persons, not exceeding fifteen, a majority of whom are residents of the
Philippine Islands, may form a private corporation for any lawful purpose by filing with the
division of archives, patents, copyrights, and trademarks if the Executive Bureau articles of
incorporation duly executed and acknowledged before a notary public, . . . .”

Simply because the duties of an official happens to be ministerial, it does not necessarily
follow that he may not, in the administration of his office, determine questions of law. We
are of the opinion that it is the duty of the division of archives, when articles of incorporation
are presented for registration, to determine whether the objects of the corporation as
expressed in the articles are lawful.

2. We are of the opinion that he may be mandamused if he act in violation of law or if he

refuses, unduly, to comply with the law.

SECOND ISSUE
1. The municipality of Pasig is a municipal corporation organized by law. It has the control of
all property of the municipality. The various barrios of the municipality have no right to own
or hold property, they not being recognized as legal entities by any law. The residents of the
barrios participate in the advantages which accrue to the municipality from public property
and receive all the benefits incident to residence in a municipality organized by law. If there
is any public property situated in the barrio of Pulo or San Miguel not belonging to the general
government or the province, it belongs to the municipality of Pasig and the sole authority to
manage and administer the same resides in that municipality. Until the present laws upon the
subject are charged no other entity can be the owner of such property or control or
administer it.
3. The object of the proposed corporation, as appears from the articles offered for
registration, is to make of the barrio of Pulo or San Miguel a corporation which will become
the owner of and have the right to control and administer any property belonging to the
municipality of Pasig found within the limits of that barrio. This clearly cannot be permitted.
Otherwise municipalities as now established by law could be deprived of the property which
they now own and administer. Each barrio of the municipality would become under the
scheme proposed, a separate corporation, would take over the ownership, administration,
and control of that portion of the municipal territory within its limits. This would disrupt, in a
sense, the municipalities of the Islands by dividing them into a series of smaller municipalities
entirely independent of the original municipality.

Dispositive: Judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Annotation, 15 SCRA 591-596;

Annotation on the Creation of Municipalities

I. Historical Background

A. Spanish Regime

● The procedure of the creation of municipalities has been prescribed by the Leyes de las
Indias
● An Ayuntamiento corresponds to the English term municipal corporation
● The unit of local administration was the "pueblo" which ordinarily embraces an area of.
many square miles and contained numerous barrios or villages

B. American Regime

● President William McKinley's Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission also

stressed the importance of the creation of municipal governments.
● The Philippine Commission enacted:
○ Act No 82 - for the organization and government of municipalities
 ○ Act No. 88 - for the organization of the provinces

II. Creation of Corporations

● The power of the municipal corporation is essentially legislative in nature.

● In the absence of any constitutional limitations, a legislative body may create any
corporation it deems essential for the more efficient administration of the government
● The legislative power to create municipal corporations may not be delegated
● The delegation, if at all, may be made if the legislature imposes conditions on which
the municipal corporation may be created
○ The Supreme Court held that a provision authorizing the President to
subdivide/divide/create/ etc. Barrios, Provinces, etc. is unconstitutional
because it is an undue delegation of power
● Congress may enact laws creating provinces, sub-provinces, cities, municipalities,
municipal districts, barrios and other local entities. It may group into one area those
which are already existing. It may subdivide them into several other local areas. It may
abolish them. There is no limitation upon Its power except the provisions of Art. VII,
Section 1 of the Constitution
● The legislative power to create an area of the local government involves two things:
○ (1) the determination of whether a local area shall be created or not;
(2) the determination of whether said decision shall have the force of law.

Tan v Comelec, 142 SCRA 727;

Petitioners: PATRICIO TAN, FELIX FERRER, JUAN M. HAGAD, SERGIO HILADO, VIRGILIO GASTON,
CONCHITA MINAYA, TERESITA ESTACIO, DESIDERIO DEFERIA, ROMEO GAMBOA, ALBERTO LACSON,
FE HOFILENA, EMILY JISON, NIEVES LOPEZ AND CECILIA MAGSAYSAY

Respondents: THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF NEGROS

OCCIDENTAL

Doctrine:

The Constitution provides that no new local government unit shall be created without the
conduct of a plebiscite in the “area or areas” affected. Such phrase shall be construed to mean
that the plebiscite should be conducted in the areas where the new province will be as well as
in the province from which such new province will be carved out from. The case of Paredes v.
Executive Secretary as invoked by respondents was abandoned by the Court for being contrary
to the Constitution. Further, the Court also held that the territory requirement in the LGC only
refers to the land area and does not include the territorial waters of the proposed province.
The area of the proposed Negros del Norte failed to reach the minimum of 3,500 square
kilometers of territory as provided for in the LGC.

Facts:
● BP Blg. 885 was passed which provided for the creation of the new Province of Negros
del Norte.
○ The new province was carved out of the already existing province of Negros
Occidental.
○ Negros del Norte was formed out of the northern part of the province of Negros
Occidental.
○ The same law provided that the plebiscite shall be conducted in the proposed
new province only.
● Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition on December 23, 1985 for the purpose of
stopping COMELEC from conducting the plebiscite.
○ Petitioners allege that such law is unconstitutional and does not conform to the
provisions of the Local Government Code regarding the requisites for creation of
new provinces.
● On the one hand, the Constitution provides in Article XI, Sec. 3 (which is now Art. X,
Sec. 10) that:
○ “No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval
by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.”
● On the other hand, according to Sec. 197 of the LGC:
○ “a province may be created if it has a territory of at least three thousand five
hundred square kilometers, a population of at least five hundred thousand
persons, an average estimated annual income, as certified by the Ministry of
Finance, of not less than ten million pesos for the last three consecutive
years, and its creation shall not reduce the population and income of the mother
province or provinces at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements under this section. The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two or more islands.”
● Due to the Christmas holidays when the Court was in recess, the plebiscite pushed
through on January 3, 1986 despite the pendency of the case because no TRO was issued.
○ Petitioners thereafter supplemented their petition and still prayed that a writ of
prohibition be issued against the COMELEC to desist from issuing official
proclamation of the results of the plebiscite.
○ They alleged that there was still serious issues with the plebiscite conducted.
○ For one thing, the plebiscite was only confined to the inhabitants of the territory
which would cover Negros del Norte. The other residents of Negros Occidental
were not included.
● On the part of the respondents, the Solicitor General argued that the law should be
given the presumption of legality.
○ The SolGen furthermore argued that there was no irregularity with the plebiscite
held because the areas of Negros Occidental which would not form part of Negros
del Norte do not fall within the meaning and scope of the term “unit or units
affected” as provided for in the Constitution.
○ It invoked the case of Paredes v. Executive Secretary. Such case held that when
a barangay is to be separated from the municipality in order to form a new
municipality, the plebiscite need not be held in the entire municipality. The
SolGen also moved that the case be dismissed because the issue was already
moot since the plebiscite already approved the creation of the new province
(164,734 in favor, 30,400 against).
Issue/s:

● W/N the creation of Negros del Norte is valid — NO

Ratio:

The phrase “unit or units affected” should be construed in its general sense.

● The boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental would be substantially

altered by the division of its existing boundaries in order that there can be created the
proposed new province of Negros del Norte.
● The two political units of Negros del Norte and Negros Occidental would indeed be
affected by the creation of the new political units.
○ They will be affected in terms of a change in the borders, change in the land
area, and a change in the economy of the province. (Seven out of 15 sugar mills
in Negros Occidental are located in the territory of Negros del Norte.)
● The alleged good intentions (of promoting autonomy of local governments) cannot
prevail and overrule the cardinal precept that what our Constitution categorically
directs to be done or imposes as a requirement must first be observed, respected and
complied with.
● The Constitution explicitly provides that the plebiscite should be conducted in the unit
or units affected.
○ As such, the plebiscite should have been conducted in the entire province of
Negros Occidental, not just the proposed Negros del Norte.
● The law creating Negros del Norte is indeed unconstitutional insofar as it provides that
the plebiscite should be conducted only in the new territory of Negros del Norte and not
in Negros Occidental.
● The plebiscite held on January 3 is null and void. However, a new plebiscite cannot be
conducted because there is no legal basis to do so.
● The creation of the province of Negros del Norte is thus without any legal basis and must
be erased.

The case of Paredes v. Executive Secretary is not availing in this case.

● The ruling rendered in said case was based on a claimed prerogative of the Court then
to exercise its discretion on the matter. It did not interpret the Constitution.
● The said case should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent. The case itself
mentioned that when a municipality is to be formed out of barangays to be separated
from the mother municipality, all the voters therein are affected.
● What is applicable is the case of Lopez v. COMELEC where it was held that it was
constitutionally infirm when not all the residents of Bulacan and Rizal were included in
a referendum which asked if the people were willing to give up some towns in the said
provinces to Metro Manila.
● The case of Paredes v. Executive Secretary was explicitly abandoned by the Court for
being contrary to the Constitution.

The province of Negros del Norte failed to comply with the land area requirement in the
LGC.
 ● “Territory” as used in the LGC refers to land area and excludes the waters.
○ There would have been no need for the legislators to use the adjective
“contiguous” if they had intended the term “territory” to embrace not only land
area but also territorial waters.
● The proposed new province of Negros del Norte would only cover a total land area of
2,765.4 square kilometers. Provinces are required to have at least 3,500 square
kilometers.
● Such measures were based on data by the National Census and Statistics Office.

Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamation
of the new province of Negros del Norte, as well as the appointment of the officials thereof are
also declared null and void.

Padilla v Comelec, GR No. 103328, Nov.19, 1992;

Petitioners: HON. ROY A. PADILLA, JR., In his capacity as Governor of the Province of Camarines
Norte

Respondents: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Doctrine:

● It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in
the political units directly affected," it means that residents of the political entity who
would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to
vote in said plebiscite.
● Evidently, what is contemplated by the phrase "political units directly affected," is the
plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite.
● Logically, those to be included in such political areas are the inhabitants of the 12
barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in the
parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte
Facts

● Pursuant to Republic Act 7155, the Commission on Elections promulgated on November

13, 1991, Resolution No. 2312 which creates the Municipality of Tulay-Na‑Lupa in the
Province of Camarines Norte to be composed of Barangays Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San
Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and
Calabasa, all in the Municipality of Labo, same province.
● Under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution the creation of a municipality shall
be subject to approval by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected, and pursuant to Section 134 of the Local Government Code (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337) said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections;
● In the plebiscite held on December 15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of Labo, only
2,890 votes favored its creation while 3,439 voters voted against the creation of the
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa.
 ● The Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared the rejection and disapproval of the
independent Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa by a majority of votes.
● Thus, in this special civil action of certiorari, petitioner as Governor of Camarines Norte,
seeks to set aside the plebiscite conducted on December 15, 1991 throughout the
Municipality of Labo and prays that a new plebiscite be undertaken as provided by RA
7155.In support of his stand, petitioner argues that with the approval and ratification
of the 1987 Constitution, particularly Article X, Section 10, the ruling set forth in Tan v.
COMELEC relied upon by respondent COMELEC is now passe, thus reinstating the case
of Paredes v.Executive Secretary which held that where a local unit is to be segregated
from a parent unit, only the voters of the unit to be segrated should be included in the
plebiscite

Issue/s:

● Whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in

promulgating Resolution No. 2312 and, consequently, whether or not the plebiscite
conducted in the areas comprising the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the
remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo is valid.
Ratio:YES

● Where a local unit is to be segregated from a parent unit, only the voters of the unit to
be segregated should be included in the plebiscite.COMELEC did not commit grave abuse
in promulgating Resolution No. 2312 and that the plebiscite, which rejected the creation
of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa, is valid.
● The deletion of the phrase "unit or" in Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution from
its precursor, Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution has not affected our ruling
in Tan v. COMELEC as explained by then CONCOM Commission Associate Justice Hilario
Davide
Mr. Davide. I would object. I precisely asked for the deletion of the words "unit or"
because in the plebiscite to... be conducted, it must involve all the units affected. If
it is the creation of a barangay, the municipality itself must participate... in the
plebiscite because it is affected. It would mean a loss of a territory

● It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in
the political units directly affected," it means that residents of the political entity who
would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to
vote in. said plebiscite.
● Evidently, what is contemplated by the phrase "political units directly affected," is the
plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite.
● Logically, those to be included in such political areas are the inhabitants of the 12
barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in
the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. Thus, we conclude that respondent
COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2312.
Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Umali v Comelec, GR No. 203974, Apr. 22, 2014;

On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed Resolution No. 183-
2011, requesting the President to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component
city of the province of Nueva Ecija into a highly urbanized city (HUC). Acceding to the request,
the President issued Presidential Proclamation No. 418, Series of 2012, proclaiming the City of
Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to "ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein, as
provided for in Section 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991." COMELEC then issued a
resolution requiring a plebiscite to convert the city to a highly urbanized city and that only
those registered residents of Cabanatuan City should participate in the said plebiscite. (The
COMELEC based this resolution on Sec. 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC).)

Thus, Petitioner argues that maintaining that the proposed conversion in question will
necessarily and directly affect the mother province of Nueva Ecija and according to Sec. 10,
Art. X of the Constitution, it calls for the people of the local government unit (LGU) directly
affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their rights and
responsibilities. The phrase "qualified voters therein" used in Sec. 453 of the LGC should then
be interpreted to refer to the qualified voters of the units directly affected by the conversion
and not just those in the component city proposed to be upgraded.

Private respondent Julius Cesar Vergara, city mayor of Cabanatuan, interposed an opposition
on the ground that Sec. 10, Art. X does not apply to conversions, which is the meat of the
matter. He likewise argues that a specific provision of the LGC, Sec. 453, as couched, allows
only the qualified voters of Cabanatuan City to vote in the plebiscite. Lastly, private respondent
pointed out that when Santiago City was converted in 1994 from a municipality to an
independent component city pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 7720, the plebiscite held was
limited to the registered voters of the then municipality of Santiago.

COMELEC En Banc ruled in favor of the private respondent and orders to schedule the conduct
of the Plebiscite.

ISSUES:
W/N the qualified registered voters of the entire province of Nueva Ecija can participate in
the plebiscite called for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city into an
HUC
HELD:

Yes.

The Court ruled that Sec. 453 of the LGC should be interpreted in accordance with Sec. 10, Art.
X of the Constitution. Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution should be the basis for determining
the qualified voters who will participate in the plebiscite to resolve the issue. Sec. 10, Art. X
reads:
 Section 10, Article X. – No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.

And the statement “directly affected” does not include the city of Cabanatuan but also the
entire Nueva Ecija.

The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of provinces,
cities, municipalities or barangays, which is pertinent in the case at bar, is essentially
legislative in nature. The framers of the Constitution have, however, allowed for the delegation
of such power in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution as long as (1) the criteria prescribed in the
LGC is met and (2) the creation, division, merger, abolition or the substantial alteration of the
boundaries is subject to the approval by a majority vote in a plebiscite.

With the twin criteria of standard and plebiscite satisfied in the case at bar, the delegation to
LGUs of the power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries has
become a recognized exception to the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative powers.

This means that it should be the entire Nuva Ecija that should be included in the plebiscite as
they are also directly affected when Cabanatuan is converted into a HUC.

Sema v Comelec, 2008;

Petitioners: BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA

Respondents: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

and DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN

Doctrine:

The Constitution is clear the power to create a province or a city inherently involves the power
to create a legislative district, which belongs exclusively to Congress.

Facts:

● The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative districts
for the Province of Maguindanao The First District includes of Cotabato City. Although
Cotabato City is included in the First District of Maguindanao, it (Cotabato) was not part
of ARMM.
● By virtue of RA 9054 (Organic Act that created ARMM), the ARMM Regional Assembly
(ARMM’s Legislature) exercised its power to create a PROVINCE by enacting Mindanao
 Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201). As a result, Province of Shariff Kabunsuan with
eight municipalities from Maguindanao’s first district was created.
● In 2006, voters of Maguindano ratified Shariff Kabunsuan’s creation in a plebiscite.
● Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Cotabato requested the Comelec to clarifiy the status of
Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular
province. In response, Comelec issued a Resolution, maintaining the status quo with
Cotabato City as part of Kabunsuan in the first legislative district of Maguindanao.
● Comelec then promulgated Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanao’s first
legislative district is composed of Cotabato City ONLY.
● Subsequently, Comelec again issued another resolution, Resolution No .7902, renaming
the first district of Maguindnao with Cotabato City as “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with
Cotabato City.”
● Petitioner Sema, who was a candidate for representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan Province
with Cotabato City” sought to nullify Comelec Resolution 7902 and to exclude votes
casted from Cotabato City. He said that hariff Kabunsuan should have its own
representative in Congress.
● In an answer, Comelec said Sema’s action became moot upon the proclamation of
Respondent Dilangalen as representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato
City.”
● For his part, Respondent Dilangalen said the resolution in question is constitutional
because it did not create or reapportion the legislative district of Maguindanao but
merely renamed Maguindanao’s first legislative district.

Issue/s:

● Is Sec 19, Art VI of RA 9054 unconstitutional insofar as it grants ARMM Regional Assembly
the power to create provinces and cities? – YES.
● Is MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan void? – YES.

Ratio:

● ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Under the
Constitution, the creation of any of the four local government units — province, city,
municipality or barangay — must comply with three conditions: (1) the creation of a
local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code; (2)
such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution; (3) there must
be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
● There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the
Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power
to create local government units. Congress under its plenary legislative powers can
delegate the power to create LGUs to local legislative bodies subject to reasonable
standards and so long as it does not cause conflict with the provisions of the
Constitution. But the Constitution is clear that only an Act of Congress can create
provinces, cities or municipalities.
● Pursuant to RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to
create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM.
● It is held that there is no conflict in delegating to regional legislative bodies the power
to create Baranagays. BUT creation of Provinces and Cities is a different matter. The
 Constitution clearly states that a province cannot be created without a legislative
district. Moreso, a city with a population of at least 250,000 people is still not
automatically entitled to have a representative to Congress without a Legislative
District. This is because the power to create a province or a city inherently involves the
power to create a legislative district, which belongs exclusively to Congress.
● Legislative Districts are created or reapportioned only by an Act of Congress. Pursuant
to Sec 5 (1), Art VI of the Constitution, Congress is vested with the power to increase,
through law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, which Sec 5(4),
Art VI empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts.
● In the present case, the creation of the ARMM and grant of legislative powers to its
Regional Assembly did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create legislative
districts. The Regional Assembly cannot create a national office given that its legislative
power extends to its regional territory only.
● In sum, the Constitution clearly grants Congress the exclusive power to create or
reapportion legislative districts.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we declare VOID Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.

Torralba v Mun. of Sibagat, 147 SCRA 390;

Petitioners: Clemento Torralba & Resolution Rugay

Respondents: The municipality of Sibagat, Province of Algusan del Sur & Municipal Officers

Doctrine:

The power to create a municipal corporation is legislative in nature. In the absence of any
constitutional limitation, a legislative body may create any corporation it deems essential for
the more efficient administration of government.

The absence of the Local Government Code (LGC) at the time of the enactment of BP 56 did
not curtail nor was it intended to cripple legislative competence to create municipal
corporations. Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution does not proscribe nor prohibit the
modification of territorial and political subdivisions before the enactment of the LGC. There is
no requirement that the LGC is a condition sine qua non for the creation of a municipality.
What Art. XI, section 3 means is that once said Code is enacted, the creation, modification or
dissolution of local government units should conform with the criteria thus laid down. In the
interregnum before the enactment of such Code, the legislative power remains plenary except
that the creation of the new local government unit should be approved by the people concerned
in a plebiscite called for the purpose.

Facts:
 ● Batas Pambansa Blg. 56 (BP 56) was enacted on 1 February 1980 creating the
Municipality of Sibagat, Province of Agusan del Sur. The pertinent provisions of BP 56
read:

Sec. 1. The barangays of Ilihan, Sinai, Sibagat, El Rio, Afga, Tabontabon, Perez, Magsaysay,
Santa Cruz, Santa Maria, San Isidro, Villangit, Del Rosario, Anahauan Mahayahay, and San
Vicente, all in the Municipality of Bayugan, Province of Agusan del Sur, are hereby
separated from said municipality to form and constitute an independent Municipality of
Sibagat without affecting in any manner the legal existence of the mother Municipality of
Bayugan.

Sec. 5. After ratification by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be conducted
in the area or areas affected within a period of ninety (90) days after the approval of this
Act, the President (Prime Minister) shall appoint the Mayor and other Officials of the new
Municipality of Sibagat.

● Petitioners are residents and taxpayers of Butuan City, with petitioner, Clementino
Torralba, being a member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the same City. The
petitioners contends that BP 56 is violative of Section 3, Article XI of the 1973
Constitution. Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution provides that:

Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged,

abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.

● Petitioners' argues that that under Art XI section 3, the LGC must first be enacted to
determine the criteria for the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of the boundary of any province, city, municipality, or barrio; and that since
no LGC had as yet been enacted as of the date BP 56 was passed, that statute could not
have possibly complied with any criteria when respondent Municipality was created,
hence, it is null and void.
● LGC came into being only on 10 February 1983 so that when BP 56 was enacted, the
code was not yet in existence. The evidence likewise discloses that a plebiscite had
been conducted among the people of the unit/units affected by the creation of the new
Municipality, who expressed approval thereof; and that officials of the newly created
Municipality had been appointed and had assumed their respective positions as such

Issue/s:
 ● W/N BP 56 is null and void? – NO, BP 56 is valid.

Ratio:

● The absence of the Local Government Code (LGC) at the time of its enactment did not
curtail nor was it intended to cripple legislative competence to create municipal
corporations. Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution does not proscribe nor
prohibit the modification of territorial and political subdivisions before the enactment
of the Local Government Code. It contains no requirement that the LGC is a condition
sine qua non for the creation of a municipality, in much the same way that the creation
of a new municipality does not preclude the enactment of a Local Government Code.
What the Constitutional provision means is that once said Code is enacted, the
creation, modification or dissolution of local government units should conform with
the criteria thus laid down. In the interregnum before the enactment of such Code,
the legislative power remains plenary except that the creation of the new local
government unit should be approved by the people concerned in a plebiscite called
for the purpose.
● The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat conformed to said requisite. A plebiscite
was conducted and the people of the unit/units affected endorsed and approved the
creation of the new local government unit. In fact, the conduct of said plebiscite is not
questioned herein. The officials of the new Municipality have effectively taken their
oaths of office and are performing their functions. A de jure entity has thus been
created.
● It is a long -recognized principle that the power to create a municipal corporation is
essentially legislative in nature. In the absence of any constitutional limitations a
legislative body may Create any corporation it deems essential for the more efficient
administration of government. The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat was a
valid exercise of legislative power then vested by the 1973 Constitution in the Interim
Batasang Pambansa.

Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

Separate Opinion:

CRUZ, J., concurring:

I concur on the assumption that the required plebiscite, although not questioned here,
nevertheless complied with Article XI, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, and was duly held
"in the unit or units affected," i.e. not only in the proposed municipality but also in the mother
municipality, in line with Tan v. Commission on Elections,, reversing Paredes v. Executive
Secretary and Lopez v. Metro Manila Commission insofar as these cases held that the plebiscite
could be confined only to the political unit proposed to be created.

Samson v Aguirre, GR No. 133076, Oct. 22, 1999;

Petitioners: MOISES S. SAMSON

Respondents: HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, in his capacity as the Executive Secretary,

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and the DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET

Doctrine: The creation of a local government unit or its conversion from one level to another
level shall be based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide
services: (a) income, (b) population, and (c) land area.

Under the Local Government Code, the proposed city must comply with requirements as regards
income and population or land area.

Facts:

● President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law Republic Act No. 8535, creating the City of
Novaliches out of 15 barangays of Quezon City. Petitioner Samson, incumbent councilor
of the first district of Quezon City, is now before the Court challenging the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8535.
● Samson bases his petition on the following grounds:
○ R.A. No. 8535 failed to conform to the criteria established by the Local
Government Code particularly, Sections 7, 11(a) and 450(a), as to the
requirements of income, population and land area; seat of government; and no
adverse effect to being a city of Quezon City, respectively, and its Implementing
Rules as provided in Article 11(b)(1) and (2), as to furnishing a copy of the Quezon
City Council of barangay resolution; and
○ The said law will in effect amend the Constitution.
● Samson asserts that certifications as to income, population, and land area were not
presented to Congress during the deliberations that led to the passage of R.A. No. 8535.
This, he argues, is clear from the minutes of the public hearings conducted by the Senate
Committee on Local Government on the proposed charter of the City of Novaliches. He
is silent, however, on the hearings held by the appropriate Committee in the House of
Representatives.
● Likewise, Samson points out that there is no certification attesting to the fact that the
mother local government unit, Quezon City, would not be adversely affected by the
creation of the City of Novaliches, in terms of income, population, and land area.

Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 8535 is constitutional. YES.

Ratio:
● The bill that eventually became R.A. No. 8535 originated in the House of
Representatives. Note that Samson merely alleged that no certifications were submitted
to the House Committee on Local Government, as is the usual practice in this regard.
Allegations, without more, cannot substitute for proof. The presumption stands that the
law passed by Congress had complied with all the requisites therefor.
● The Local Government Code of 1991 provides under Section 7:
SECTION 7. Creation and Conversion. As a general rule, the creation of a local
government unit or its conversion from one level to another level shall be based
on verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services,
to wit:

(a) Income. It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to

provide for all essential government facilities and services and special
functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of
the local government unit concerned;

(b) Population. It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants

within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned;
and

(c) Land Area. It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two or more

islands or is separated by a local government unit independent of the
others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical
descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such basic services and
facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.

Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department

of Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Land Management
Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

● The representative from the Bureau of Local Government Finance estimated the
combined average annual income of the 13 barangay for the years 1995 and 1996 to be
around P26,952,128.26. Under the Local Government Code, a proposed city must have
an average annual income of only at least P20,000,000.00 for the immediately preceding
two years.
● The representative from the NSO estimated the population in the barangays that would
comprise the proposed City of Novaliches to be around 347,310. This figure is more than
the 150,000 required by the Implementing Rules.
● There is no need to consider the land area, given these figures, since under the Local
Government Code, the proposed city must comply with requirements as regards income
and population or land area.
● Other than the income requirement, the proposed city must have the requisite number
of inhabitants or land area. Compliance with either requirement, in addition to income,
is sufficient. Judicial notice may also be taken that Novaliches is now highly urbanized.
 ● Samson then argues that R.A. No. 8535 failed to specify the seat of government of the
proposed City of Novaliches as required under Section 11(a) of the Local Government
Code:
SECTION 11. Selection and Transfer of Local Government Site, Offices, and
Facilities.

(a) The law or ordinance creating or merging local government units shall specify
the seat of government from where governmental and corporate service shall be
delivered. In selecting said site, factors relating to geographical centrality,
accessibility, availability of transportation and communication facilities,
drainage and sanitation, development and economic progress, and other relevant
considerations shall be taken into account.

● Indeed, a reading of R.A. No. 8535 will readily show that it does not provide for a seat
of government. However, this omission, to our mind, is not as fatal to the validity of
R.A. No. 8535 as Samson makes it to be. The Local Government Code also provides that
the City of Novaliches can still establish a seat of government after its creation.
● The proposed creation of the City of Novaliches will in no way result in a prohibited
amendment of the Constitution, contrary to Samson’s contention. The ordinance
appended to the Constitution merely apportions the seats of the House of
Representatives to the different legislative districts in the country. Nowhere does it
provide that Metro Manila shall forever be composed of only 17 cities and municipalities
as claimed by Samson. Too literal a reading of the ordinance in or appendix of the
Constitution will only result in its erroneous interpretation.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Navarro v Ermita, GR No. 180050, Apr. 12, 2011;

Petitioners: Rodolfo Navarro, et. al

Respondents: Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et. al

Doctrine:

The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of 1 or
more islands

Facts:

● Petitioners Navarro et al. filed a motion to declare RA 9355 (An Act Creating the Province
of Dinagat Islands) invalid.
● On February 10, 2010, the petitioners succeeded in having RA 9355 declared
unconstitutional. The court reasoned that R.A. 9355 failed to comply with the land area
requirements (1) having an area of only 802.12 square kilometers, and failing to meet
the population requirement (2) having only 106, 951 inhabitants.
● Such ruling was sustained in the October 2010 motion for reconsideration, further
stressing that a provision in the LGC-IRR which stated that “..the land area requirement
shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands.” is
 null and void for having no legal basis, the same exemption not being expressly stated
in the Local Government Code.
● Hence this motion to recall entry of judgment, where movant-intervenors argued the
constitutionality of RA 9355, reiterating their contention that:
○ the power to create a local government unit is vested with the Legislature
○ the acts of the Legislature and Executive in enacting into law RA 9355 should be
respected as petitioners failed to overcome the presumption of validity or
constitutionality

Issue/s:

● W/N the creation of Dinagat Island as a province is exempt from the land area
requirement - YES

Ratio:

DINAGAT ISLAND EXEMPT FROM THE LAND AREA REQUIREMENT

● The land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit,
is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account
its average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by
the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times more than the minimum
requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The delivery of basic
services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than
looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait
accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagat's existence as a
province, they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of
becoming a province. This Court should not be instrumental in stunting such capacity.

DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE LGC-IRR AND THE LGC

● It must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of
one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly
provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be
created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent
in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461
of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR.
● The court ruled that there is neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply
to cities and municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact, considering the physical
configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or
group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in
most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative
policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for
component cities) of the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for
provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9 (2) of the
LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section
461 of the LGC — and to reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then, be in order
for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR.
 ● With the formulation of the LGC-IRR, which amounted to both executive and legislative
construction of the LGC, the many details to implement the LGC had already been put
in place, which Congress understood to be impractical and not too urgent to immediately
translate into direct amendments to the LGC. But Congress, recognizing the capacity
and viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged province, enacted RA 9355 following
the exemption from the land area requirement, which, with respect to the creation of
provinces, can only be found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant
to its plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into that
exemption in Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted
RA 9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat.

Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to:

1. GRANT the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment by movants-intervenors, dated

and filed on October 29, 2010
2. RECONSIDER and SET ASIDE the July 20, 2010 Resolution, and GRANT the Motion for
Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of
the Resolution dated July 20, 2010
3. GRANT the Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12,
2010. The May 12, 2010 Resolution is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The provision in
Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR stating, "The land area requirement shall not apply where
the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared VALID.
Accordingly, RA 9355 is declared as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation
of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared
VALID
4. The petition is DISMISSED

Alvarez v Guingona, GR No. 118303, Jan. 31, 1996;

Petitioners: SENATOR HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, SENATOR JOSE D. LINA, JR., MR. NICASIO B.
BAUTISTA, MR. JESUS P. GONZAGA, MR. SOLOMON D. MAYLEM, LEONORA C. MEDINA, CASIANO
S. ALIPON

Respondents: HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON.
RAFAEL ALUNAN, in his capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ,
in his capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. JOSE MIRANDA, in his
capacity as Municipal Mayor of Santiago and HON. CHARITO MANUBAY, HON. VICTORINO
MIRANDA, JR., HON. ARTEMIO ALVAREZ, HON. DANILO VERGARA, HON. PETER DE JESUS, HON.
NELIA NATIVIDAD, HON. CELSO CALEON and HON. ABEL MUSNGI, in their capacity as
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBERS, MR. RODRIGO L. SANTOS, in his capacity as Municipal
Treasurer, and ATTY. ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, in his capacity as Municipal Administrator

Doctrine:
ANNUAL INCOME are revenues and receipts realized by provinces, cities and municipalities from
regular sources of the Local General Fund including the internal revenue allotment and other
shares provided for in Sections 284, 290 and 291 of the Code, but exclusive of non-recurring
receipts, such as other national aids, grants, financial assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed
assets, and similar others.

Facts:

● The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7720 entitled, An
Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an Independent Component
City to be known as the City of Santiago
● Petitioners claim that the Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum average
annual income required under Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in
order to be converted into a component city.
● Petitioners claim that Santiago could not qualify into a component city because its
average annual income for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant
prices falls below the required annual income of Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00)
for its conversion into a city, petitioners having computed Santiagos average annual
income in the following manner:
Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for 1991 P20,379,057.07

Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for 1992 P21,570,106.87

Total income for 1991 and 1992 P41,949,163.94

Minus:

IRAs for 1991 and 1992 P15,730,043.00

Total income for 1991 and 1992 P26,219,120.94

Average Annual Income P13,109,960.47

● By dividing the total income of Santiago for calendar years 1991 and 1992, after
deducting the IRAs, the average annual income arrived at would only be P13,109,560.47
based on the 1991 constant prices. Thus, petitioners claim that Santiago’s income is far
below the aforesaid Twenty Million Pesos average annual income requirement.
● The certification issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department
of Finance, which indicates Santiagos average annual income to be P20,974,581.97, is
allegedly not accurate as the Internal Revenue Allotments were not excluded from the
computation.
● Petitioners asseverate that the IRAs are not actually income but transfers and/or
budgetary aid from the national government and that they fluctuate, increase or
decrease, depending on factors like population, land and equal sharing
Issue/s:

● Whether or not the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be included in the
computation of the average annual income of a municipality for purposes of its
conversion into an independent component city - YES
Ratio:

● The court holds that petitioners asseverations are untenable because Internal Revenue
Allotments form part of the income of Local Government Units.
● For a municipality to be converted into a component city, it must, among others, have
an average annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. Such income must be duly certified by
the Department of Finance
● An LGU is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law and possessed
of substantial control over its own affairs.
○ It is an autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers, authority,
responsibilities and resources.
○ Power which used to be highly centralized in Manila, is thereby deconcentrated,
enabling especially the peripheral local government units to develop not only at
their own pace and discretion but also with their own resources and assets
○ Development through a decentralized local government system certainly
concerns the matter of financial resources
○ Broadened powers and more responsibilities entail more expenses so it needs
adequate resources to discharge its powers and effectively carry out its functions
● Availment of resources is effectuated through the vesting in every local government unit
of
○ the right to create and broaden its own source of revenue;
○ the right to be allocated a just share in national taxes, such share being in the
form of internal revenue allotments (IRAs); and
○ the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and
development of the national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries
● The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and national wealth utilization proceeds
accrue to the general fund of the local government and are used to finance its operations
subject to specified modes of spending the same as provided for in the Local
Government Code and its implementing rules and regulations
● Therefore, for purposes of budget preparation, which budget should reflect the
estimates of the income of the local government unit, among others, the IRAs and the
share in the national wealth utilization proceeds are considered items of income. This
is as it should be, since income is defined in the Local Government Code to be all
revenues and receipts collected or received forming the gross accretions of funds of the
local government unit
● For purposes of converting the Municipality of Santiago into a city, the Department of
Finance certified, among others, that the municipality had an average annual income of
at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991
constant prices. This, the Department of Finance did after including the IRAs in its
computation of said average annual income.
● Department of Finance Order No. 3593 correctly encapsulizes the full import of the
above disquisition when it defined ANNUAL INCOME to be revenues and receipts realized
by provinces, cities and municipalities from regular sources of the Local General Fund
including the internal revenue allotment and other shares provided for in Sections 284,
290 and 291 of the Code, but exclusive of non-recurring receipts, such as other national
aids, grants, financial assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed assets, and similar others
Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit with costs against petitioners.
 League of Cities v Comelec, GR Nos. 176951, 177499 & 178056, Dec. 21,
2009;

Petitioners: League of Cities of the Philippines

Respondents: COMELEC

Doctrine:

Congress can even, after making a codification, enact an amendatory law, adding to the existing
layers of indicators earlier codified, just as efficaciously as it may reduce the same.

Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all
members of the same class.The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the laws
challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory under the equal protection clause.

Facts:

● During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities
into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities
into cities.
● During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law RA 9009 which amended Section
450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for
conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The amendment
was due to "the mad rush" of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a
larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable
of fiscal independence.
● The House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29,
which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24
municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However,
the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
● During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No.
29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the
Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator
Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual
cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16
municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.
● The House of Representatives and the Senate approved the cityhood bills except that of
Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law
(Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President's
signature.
● The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the
voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality
into a city.
● 2008 Decision the SC declared the cityhood laws unconstitutional, deviating as they do
from the uniform and non-discriminatory income criterion prescribed by the LGC of
1991. In so doing, the ponencia veritably agreed with the petitioners that the
Constitution, in clear and unambiguous language, requires that all the criteria for the
creation of a city shall be embodied and written in the LGC, and not in any other law.
Issue/s:

● W/N the Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution - NO

● W/N the Cityhood Laws violate the Equal Protection Clause – NO

Ratio:

● The supposedly infringed Art. X, Sec. 10 is not a new constitutional provision. Save for
the use of the term barrio in lieu of barangay, may be instead of shall, the change of
the phrase unit or units to political unit and the addition of the modifier directly to the
word affected, the aforesaid provision is a substantial reproduction of Art. XI, Sec. 3 of
the 1973 Constitution
● Since Congress wields the vast poser of creating political subdivisions, surely it can
exercise the lesser authority of requiring a set of criteria, standards, or ascertainable
indicators of viability for their creation. Thus, the only conceivable reason why the
Constitution employs the clause in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code is to lay stress that it is Congress alone, and no other, which can
impose the criteria.
Fr. Bernas: Section 10 [Art. X of the 1987 Constitution], which is a legacy from the 1973
Constitution, goes further than the doctrine in the Pelaez case. It not only makes creation,
division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of provinces, cities,
municipalities x x x subject to criteria established in the local government code, thereby
declaring these actions properly legislative, but it also makes creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

● Consistent with its plenary legislative power on the matter, Congress can, via either a
consolidated set of laws or a much simpler, single-subject enactment, impose the said
verifiable criteria of viability. These criteria need not be embodied in the local
government code, albeit this code is the ideal repository to ensure, as much as possible,
the element of uniformity. Congress can even, after making a codification, enact an
amendatory law, adding to the existing layers of indicators earlier codified, just as
efficaciously as it may reduce the same. In this case, the amendatory RA 9009 upped
the already codified income requirement from PhP 20 million to PhP 100 million. At the
end of the day, the passage of amendatory laws is no different from the enactment of
laws, i.e., the cityhood laws specifically exempting a particular political subdivision
from the criteria earlier mentioned. Congress, in enacting the exempting law/s,
effectively decreased the already codified indicators.
● As a matter of settled legal principle, the fundamental right of equal protection does
not require absolute equality. It is enough that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights or privileges conferred and responsibilities or
obligations imposed. The equal protection clause does not preclude the state from
recognizing and acting upon factual differences between individuals and classes. It
 recognizes that inherent in the right to legislate is the right to classify] necessarily
implying that the equality guaranteed is not violated by a legislation based on
reasonable classification. Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.The Court finds
that all these requisites have been met by the laws challenged as arbitrary and
discriminatory under the equal protection clause.
● Due to extraneous circumstances, however, the bills for their conversion remained
unacted upon by Congress. Each of the 12 municipalities has all the requisites for
conversion into a component city based on the old requirements set forth under Section
450 of the [LGC], prior to its amendment by RA 9009.
● The classification is also germane to the purpose of the law. The exemption of
respondent LGUs/municipalities from the PhP 100 million income requirement was
meant to reduce the inequality occasioned by the passage of the amendatory RA 9009.
● Respondent municipalities and the 33 other municipalities, which had already been
elevated to city status, were all found to be qualified under the old Sec. 450 of the LGC
of 1991 during the 11th Congress. As such, both respondent LGUs and the 33 other
former municipalities are under like circumstances and conditions.
● Indeed, to deny respondent LGUs/municipalities the same rights and privileges accorded
to the 33 other municipalities when, at the outset they were similarly situated, is
tantamount to denying the former the protective mantle of the equal protection clause.
In effect, petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention are creating an absurd situation in
which an alleged violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution is remedied
by another violation of the same clause.
● The uniform exemption clause would apply to municipalities that had pending cityhood
bills before the passage of RA 9009 and were compliant with then Sec. 450 of the LGC
of 1991, which prescribed an income requirement of PhP 20 million.

Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions and declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws,
namely: Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408,
9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.

SO ORDERED.

NOTES:

2008 Decision: Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution requires that the creation of LGUs
must follow the criteria established in the LGC and not in any other law. Thus, Congress cannot
write any criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood laws.
 The intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political
units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely on the LGC. Any
derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the LGC violates Sec. 10, Art 10 of the
Constitution.

The Cityhood Laws violate the Equal Protection Clause. The exemption provision in the
Cityhood Laws gives the 16 municipalities a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date − the
filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11th Congress - as against all other
municipalities that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009

2011 Decision:

The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. “We should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16
cities covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills pending during the 11th
Congress, but have also complied with the requirements of the [Local Government Code] LGC
prescribed prior to its amendment by RA No. 9009. Congress undeniably gave these cities all
the considerations that justice and fair play demanded. Hence, this Court should do no less by
stamping its imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative intent and by duly recognizing
the certain collective wisdom of Congress.

“The Court reiterated that while RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, the Congress was well
aware of the pendency of conversion bills of several municipalities, including those covered by
the Cityhood Laws. The acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the exemption clauses
ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations of the clear
legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception, from the coverage of RA No.
9009. Thereby, RA 9009, and, by necessity, the LCG, were amended, not by repeal but by way
of the express exemptions being embodied in the exemption clauses.

The Court held that the imposition of the income requirement of P100 million from local sources
under RA 9009 was arbitrary. “While the Constitution mandates that the creation of local
government units must comply with the criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot be justified to
insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the LGC despite such
amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to promote
autonomy, decentralization, countryside development, and the concomitant national growth.”

Section 450. Requisites for Creation.

(a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if

it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least
Twenty million (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991
constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
 (i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as
certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000)
inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office:

Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population,
and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than
the minimum requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by

metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed
to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of specific funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.

Art. X, sec 10 of the Constitution:

Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided,

merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

Malabang v Benito, 27 SCRA 533;

Petitioners: THE MUNICIPALITY OF MALABANG, LANAO DEL SUR, and AMER MACAORAO
BALINDONG

Respondents: PANGANDAPUN BENITO, HADJI NOPODIN MACAPUNUNG, HADJI HASAN

MACARAMPAD, FREDERICK V. DUJERTE MONDACO ONTAL, MARONSONG ANDOY, MACALABA
INDAR LAO

Doctrine:

To be called a de facto corporation, either requisite must concur:

● A valid law enacted by the legislature.

An unconstitutional law, valid on its face, which has either (a) been upheld for a time by the
courts or (b) not yet been declared void; provided that a warrant for its creation can be found
in some other valid law or in the recognition of its potential existence by the general laws or
constitution of the state.

Facts:
 ● Municipality of Balabagan was once part of the Municipality of Malabang before it was
created into a separate municipality thru an executive order.
● The Municipality Malabang filed a suit against the Municipality of Balabagan for having
been created under an invalid EO 386 and to restrain the respondent municipal officials
from performing the functions of their respective offices.
○ Petitioner’s basis is the Pelaez case stating that Sec. 68 of the Administrative
Code is unconstitutional (a) because it constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power and (b) because it offends against Section 10 (1) of Article VII
of the Constitution, which limits the President's power over local governments
to mere supervision.
○ and that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10,
1917, must be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution,
in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory
enactment.
● The Respondents argue that the Mun. of Balabagan is at least a de facto corporation for
having been organized under color of a statute before this was declared unconstitutional
(the administrative code provision)
○ plus, its officers has been either elected or appointed, and the municipality itself
having discharged its corporate functions for the past five years preceding the
institution of this action.
○ It is contended that as a de facto corporation, its existence cannot be collaterally
attacked, although it may be inquired into directly in an action for quo warranto
at the instance of the State and not of an individual like the petitioner Balindong.
○ The method of challenging the existence of a municipal corporation is reserved
to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or other direct proceeding.
○ But the rule disallowing collateral attacks applies only where the municipal
corporation is at least a de facto corporation.
○ For where it is neither a corporation de jure nor de facto, but a nullity, the rule
is that its existence may be questioned collaterally or directly in any action or
proceeding by any one whose rights or interests are affected thereby, including
the citizens of the territory incorporated unless they are estopped by their
conduct from doing so.
Issue/s:

● W/N The Municipality of Balabagan is a de facto corporation?- NO

Ratio:

● The Municipality of Balabagan has no statute creating it since EO 386 was also declared
unconstitutional
● To be called a de facto corporation, either requisite must concur:
○ A valid law enacted by the legislature.
○ An unconstitutional law, valid on its face, which has either (a) been upheld for
a time by the courts or (b) not yet been declared void; provided that a warrant
for its creation can be found in some other valid law or in the recognition of its
potential existence by the general laws or constitution of the state.
● There can be no de facto municipal corporation unless either directly or potentially,
such a de jure corporation is authorized by some legislative fiat.
 ● There can be no color of authority in an unconstitutional statute alone, the invalidity of
which is apparent on its face.
● There can be no de facto corporation created to take the place of an existing de jure
corporation, as such organization would clearly be an usurper.
● Executive Order 386 "created no office."
○ however, that the acts done by the municipality of Balabagan in the exercise of
its corporate powers are not a nullity for the existence of Executive Order 386 is
an operative fact which cannot justly be ignored.

Dispositive:

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted, Executive Order 386 is declared void, and the
respondents are hereby permanent-ly restrained from performing the duties and
functions of their respective offices. No pronouncement as to costs.

Camid v Office of the President, GR No. 161414, Jan. 17, 2005;

Petitioners: SULTAN OSOP B. CAMID

Respondents: THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO, DEPARTMENT of FINANCE,
DEPARTMENT of BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and the CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES (HOUSE of REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE)

Doctrine:

Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has
claimed and exercised corporate functions with the knowledge and acquiescence of the
legislature, and without interruption/objection for period long enough to afford title by
prescription. It is presumed that they were duly incorporated in the first place and that their
charters had been lost. Camid did not have the opportunity to make an initial factual
demonstration of these circumstances before this Court. Andong does not meet the requisites
set forth by Sec. 442(d) of the LGC. In order to receive recognition, they must have their
respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of
LGC.

Facts:

● The factual antecedents derive from the promulgation of the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor
General: E.O. No. 107 creating 33 municipalities in Mindanao, including Andong, was
nullified.
- These orders were issued after legislative bills for the creation of such
municipalities failed to pass Congress. Pres. Macapagal justified the creation, citing
his powers under Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. This was repealed by
R.A. No. 2370 which constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
 ● Petitioner Camid represents himself as a current resident of Andong, suing as a private
citizen and taxpayer. He alleges that Andong has turned into a full-blown municipality
with a complete set of officials appointed to handle essential services, even though he
concedes that since 1968, no person has been appointed, elected or qualified to serve
any of the elective local government positions.
- The municipality has its own high school, Bureau of Posts, a Department of
Education, Culture and Sports office, and at least 17 barangay units with their own
respective chairmen.
- From 1964-1972 (according to Camid), the public officials have been serving through
the minimal means and resources with least honorarium and recognition from then
Pres. Macapagal.
● In support of his claim, Camid presented:
1. a Certification issued by the DENR-CENRO certifying the total land area of the
municipality,
2. a Certification issued by the Provincial Statistics Office of Marawi City concerning
the population of Andong at 14,059,
3. a list of governmental agencies and private groups that allegedly recognize Andong,
and
4. notes that other municipalities have recommended to the Speaker of the Regional
Legislative Assembly for the immediate revival/re-establishment of Andong.
● The petition assails a Certification issued by the Bureau of Local Government
Supervision of the DILG which enumerates 18 municipalities as existing, according to
records. These 18 are among the 33 (along with Andong) whose creations were voided
by this Court in Pelaez.
● He imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DILG in not classifying Andong
as a regular existing municipality and not including it in its records as such.
- He argues such non-classification as unequal treatment to the detriment of Andong,
especially in light of the current recognition given to the 18 municipalities similarly
annulled by reason of Pelaez.
● As appropriate relief, Camid prays:
1) the annulment of the DILG Certification;
2) the classification of Andong as a regular existing municipality;
3) all public respondents, to extend full recognition and support to Andong;
4) the Department of Finance and the Department of Budget and Management to
immediately release the internal revenue allotments of Andong; and
5) the DILG to recognize its Interim Local Officials
● He insists on the continuing validity of E.O. No. 107 and argues that Pelaez has already
been modified by supervening events consisting of subsequent laws and jurisprudence.
● As pointed out by the OSG, the case is not a fit subject for the special civil actions of
certiorari and mandamus, as it pertains to the appreciation of factual questions.
● There is no way to confirm several of Camid’s factual allegations pertaining to the
purported continuing operation of Andong.
- No trial court had the opportunity to ascertain the validity of these, which is beyond
the function of this Court since it is not a trier of facts.

Issue/s:

● W/N Andong is a de facto municipal corporation – NO RULING; Camid failed to make a

factual demonstration of the requisites
 ● W/N a municipality whose creation by executive fiat was previously voided by this Court
may attain recognition in the absence of any curative or reimplementing statute – NO

Ratio:

1st Issue

● Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that: 1) the

community has claimed and exercised corporate functions with the knowledge and
acquiescence of the legislature, and 2) without interruption/objection for period
long enough to afford title by prescription.
- It is presumed that they were duly incorporated in the first place and that their
charters had been lost.
- Camid did not have the opportunity to make an initial factual demonstration of
these circumstances before this Court.
- His ignorance of the principles of exhaustion of administrative remedies and
hierarchy of courts, as well as the prematurity of the present petition, cannot be
countenanced.

Additional notes:

● The assailed issuance is the Certification issued by the DILG, but the annulment of such
will really do nothing to serve Camid’s ultimate cause- the recognition of Andong. It
does not expressly refute the his claim, as there is nothing in the document that
comments on the present status of Andong.
● E.O. No. 107, which established Andong, was declared null and void ab initio in
Pelaez, along with 33 other executive orders.
- Pelaez was never reversed, but was expressly affirmed in 3 subsequent cases.
- No subsequent ruling declared Pelaez as overturned/inoperative and no subsequent
legislation has been passed creating a Municipality of Andong.
● The Court clarified in Malabang that the previous acts done by the municipality in the
exercise of its corporate powers were not necessarily a nullity.
- Camid devotes several pages of his petition in citing this point, yet the relevance of
such is unclear considering that he does not assert the validity of any corporate act
of Andong prior to its judicial dissolution.
● The Court also emphasized the unconstitutionality of the President's power to create
municipal corporations by way of presidential promulgations. However, there was a shift
in this ruling in Municipality of San Narciso:
- E.O.No. 353 which created the municipality of San Andres, Quezon issued by Pres.
Garcia was not one of the 33 issuances annulled by Pelaez. Consequently, it was not
nullified.
- The Court noted a circumstance which is not present in the case at bar: San Andres
was in existence for nearly 30 years before its legality was challenged.
- SC held: San Andres attained the unique status of a de facto municipal corporation
due to peculiar circumstances.

2nd Issue
 ● Sec. 442(d) of the LGC states that municipal districts "organized pursuant to presidential
issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal
officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be
considered as regular municipalities."
- The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature.
Congress did just that when it has incorporated Sec. 442(d) in the Code.
● Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective and aimed at giving "validity to acts
done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been
complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual
qualification against impairment of vested rights.
● Pelaez and its offspring cases ruled that the President has no power to create
municipalities, yet limited its nullificatory effects to the 33 particular municipalities
challenged in actual cases before this Court.
● However, with the promulgation of the LGC in 1991, the legal cloud was lifted over the
municipalities similarly created by executive order, but not judicially annulled.
- The de facto status of such municipalities (San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban) was
recognized by this Court and Section 442(b) of the LGC deemed curative whatever
legal defects to title these municipalities had.
- The major difference between Andong and these municipalities: the executive
order creating Andong was expressly annulled by order of this Court.
- To affirm Andong’s de facto status by reason of its alleged continued existence
despite its nullification would condone defiance of a valid court order.
● Based on Camid’s own admissions, Andong does not meet the requisites set forth by
Sec. 442(d) of the LGC. In order to receive recognition, they must have their
respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the
effectivity of LGC.
- Andong has never elected its municipal officers. This incapacity ties in with the fact
that Andong was judicially annulled in 1965.
- The national government ceased to recognize its existence, depriving its share of
the public funds and refusing to conduct municipal elections for the void
municipality.
- The certifications relied upon by Camid issued by the DENR-CENRO and the NSO can
hardly serve the purpose of attesting to Andong’s legal efficacy. Both certifications
qualify that they were issued upon the request of Camid to support his claim,
conceding that the municipality is at present inoperative.
● Sec. 442(d) of the LGC does not serve to affirm or reconstitute the judicially
dissolved municipalities such as Andong, which had been previously created by
presidential issuances or executive orders. It affirms the legal personalities only of
those municipalities such as San Narciso, Alicia, and Sinacaban, which may have been
created using the same infirm legal basis, yet were fortunate enough not to have been
judicially annulled.
● The municipalities judicially dissolved remain inexistent, unless recreated through
specific legislative enactments, as done with the 18 municipalities certified by the DILG.
- Those municipalities derive their legal personality not from the presidential
issuances/executive orders which originally created them or from Section 442(d),
but from the respective legislative statutes enacted to revive them.
● The solution is through the legislature and not judicial confirmation of void title.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

Mun. of San Narciso v Mendez, GR No. 103702, Dec. 6, 1994;

Petitioners: Municipality of San Narciso

Respondents: Hon. Antonio V. Mendez (RTC Judge)

Doctrine: The fact that in a span of 30 years, unquestioned, San Andres exercised powers and
authority of a duly created LGU leads to the conclusion that San Andres had at least attained
the status of a de facto municipal corporation.

Facts:

● In 1959, President Carlos Garcia issued EO No. 353 creating the municipal district of
San Andres, Quezon by segregating from the municipality of San Narciso several
barrios and their sitios which was under San Narciso. (Ninakaw ng San Andres daw
yung barrios ng San Narciso lol)
● The EO was issued upon the request of the municipal council of San Narciso in its
resolution.
● In 1965, Pres. Macapagal issued EO 174 which officially recognized the municipal district
of San Andres as having the status of a fifth class municipality beginning July 1963.
● Mun. of San Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto with the RTC against the officials
of the Municipality of San Andres.
○ sought to declare the nullity of EO 353
○ prayed that the local officials of San andres be permanently ordered to refrain
from performing the duties and functions of their respective offices.
○ Invoked ruling in Pelaez case saying that the EO was a clear usurpation of the
inherent powers of the legislature and in violation of the principle of
separation of powers.
● Respondents asked for the dismissal of the petition arguing that:
○ Petitioner is estopped from questioning the creation of the new municipality
because it was at its instance that San Andres was given life with issuance of EO
353.
○ San Andres was in existence since 1959
○ Petitioner is not the proper party because quo warranto cases are to be brought
by the State through the Solicitor General.
● San Andres moved for dismissal again on the ground that the petition was already moot
and academic due to the enactment of the Local Government Code
○ Under Sec. 442(d), Municipalities existing as of the date of LGC’s effectivity shall
continue to exist and operate.
● Petitioner opposed the motion alleging that Section 442 pertains to legally existing
municipalities and not to those whose mode of creation is void.
● RTC dismissed the petition reasoning that LGC cured whatever defects San Andres had.

Issue/s:

● W/N San Andres is a legally existing municipality – YES

Ratio:

● It took petitioners almost thirty years to question and challenge the legality of the
Executive Order creating San Andres.
● During the span of 30 years, San Andres exercised powers and authority of a duly created
local government unit. Public Interest demands the timely challenge against the lawful
authority of a political subdivision.
● Assuming EO 353 was null and void for being a unconstitutional delegation of legislative
powers, the circumstances in this case leads to the conclusion that San Andres had at
least attained the status of a de facto municipal corporation.
● When the Pelaez case was ruled upon, no one challenged EO 353, moreover, certain
governmental acts pointed to State’s recognition of the existence of San Andres which
is evidenced by EO 174 classifying it as a fifth class municipality after having surpassed
the income requirement.
● Municipal Circuit courts were established in San Andres, thus, legitimizing the
municipality.
● Furthermore, the ordinance appended in the 1987 Constitution considered San Andres
to be one of the 12 municipalities composing 3rd district of Quezon. Sec. 442 of LGC
also states that municipal districts organized pursuant to EOs are considered as a
regular municipality.
● The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did
just that when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code.
● Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, 21 and aimed at giving "validity to
acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been
complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual
qualification against impairment of vested rights.
● Taking all into consideration, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must
be dispelled.

Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED

Mun. of Jimenez v Baz, GR No. 105746, Oct. 2, 1996;

Petitioners: Municipality of Jimenez (Jimenez)

Respondents: Vicente Baz Jr. (Presiding Judge in RTC Branch 14, Oroquieta City) and
Municipality of Sinacaban (Sinacaban)

Doctrine: Where a municipality created by an Executive Order is later impliedly recognized and
its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned (de facto municipal
corporation).

Facts:

● Sinacaban was created by EO 258 of Pres. Quirino, pursuant to the 1917 Revised
Administrative Code.
 ● Municipal Council Resolution No. 171 (1988) - Sinacaban claimed four barrios
(Macabayao, Adorable, Sinara Baja, and Sinara Alto) and a portion of another one (Tabo-
o), all of which are under the current territory of the Jimenez. These barrios were in
Jimenez.
○ The claim was filed with the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental against
Jimenez.
○ Jimenez asserted jurisdiction on the basis of an agreement fixing their common
boundary (1950 Agreement), which was approved by the Provincial Board in its
Resolution No. 77.
■ The Resolution stated: “Macabayao, Sitio Adorable xxx will be a part of
the Jimenez down”
● The Provincial Board declared the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban.
○ Held that the previous resolution approving the agreement between the
municipalities was void because the Board had no power to alter the boundaries
of Sinacaban as fixed in EO 258, that power being vested in Congress pursuant to
the Constitution and the 1983 LGC
● Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in the RTC against
Sinacaban, the Provincial Board, COA, etc.
○ Alleged that in Pelaez v. Auditor General, the power to create municipalities is
essentially legislative and Sinacaban, which was created by an EO, had no legal
personality and no right to assert a territorial claim vis-- a vis Jimenez, of which
it remains part.
● RTC Decision held that Resolution No. 77 was void.
○ Sinacaban is a de facto corporation since it had completely organized itself even
prior to the Pelaez case and exercised corporate powers for 40 years before its
existence was questioned;
○ Ordered the Commissioners are hereby ordered to conduct the relocation survey
of the boundary of Sinacaban within 60 days from the time the decision shall
have become final and executory and another 60 days within which to submit
their report from the completion of the said relocation survey.

Issue/s:

● W/N Sinacaban legally exists and therefore has legal personality to file a claim - YES
● W/N Sec. 442 (d) of the LGC is valid - YES
● W/N the RTC correctly ordered the relocation survey - YES

Ratio:

FIRST ISSUE

● If Sinacaban legally exists, then it has standing to bring a claim.

● The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a municipal
corporation is Pelaez v. Auditor General:
○ That the creation of municipal corporations is essentially a legislative matter and
therefore the President is without power to create one
● However, we have since held that where a municipality created by an EO is later
impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no
longer be questioned.
 ● In Municipality of San Narciso v. Mendez, Sr., the ff. factors validated the creation of a
municipal corporation created by an EO before Pelaez:
○ (1) for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation had never been challenged;
○ (2) after Pelaez, no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the
executive order creating such municipality; and
○ (3) the fact that the municipality was later classified as a fifth class municipality,
organized as part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative
district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House of
Representatives.
○ Whatever doubt there might be as to the de jure character of the municipality
must be deemed to have been put to rest by the Sec. 442(d), 1991 LGC
● Here, the same factors are present so as to confer on Sinacaban the status of at least a
de facto municipal corporation in the sense that its legal existence has been
recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially.
○ Sinacaban had been in existence for 16 years when Pelaez was decided (1965).
Yet the validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned.
○ Created in 1949, it was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned and
only because it had laid claim to an area that apparently is desired for its
revenue.
○ This fact must be underscored because a quo warranto suit against a corporation
for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within five years from the time
the act complained of was done
○ The State and even Jimenez itself have recognized Sinacaban’s corporate
existence.
■ SC AO no. 33/B.P. Blg. 129: Sinacaban is part of municipal circuit for
purposes of the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
■ Jimenez had earlier recognized Sinacaban by entering into the 1950
Agreement regarding their common boundary, embodied in Resolution
no. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental.
● Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the
1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which
considered Sinacaban part of the Second District of Misamis Occidental.
● 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any
defect in the creation of Sinacaban.
○ Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue
to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to
presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set
of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the
Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.

SECOND ISSUE

● Jimenez: R.A. No. 7160, 442(d) is invalid, since it does not conform to the constitutional
and statutory requirements for the holding of plebiscites in the creation of new
municipalities.
● However, since Sinacaban had attained de facto status at the time the 1987 Constitution
took effect, it is not subject to the plebiscite requirement.
○ The plebiscite requirement applies only to new municipalities created for the
first time under the Constitution.
THIRD ISSUE

● Jimenez: the RTC erred in ordering a relocation survey of the boundary of Sinacaban
because the barangays which Sinacaban are claiming are not enumerated in EO 258 and
that in any event, the parties agreed that the barangays in question were considered
part of Jimenez.
● EO 258 does not say that Sinacaban comprises only the barrios (now called Barangays)
mentioned.
○ What it says is that Sinacaban contains those barrios, without saying they are the
only ones comprising it.
○ The reason for this is that the technical description, containing the metes and
bounds of its territory, is controlling.
● The trial court correctly ordered a relocation and consequently the question to which
the municipality the barangays in question belong.

FOURTH ISSUE: W/N the Provincial Board had the authority to approve the 1950 Agreement -
the SC didn’t definitely answer this issue idk why

● Jimenez: regardless of its conformity to EO 258, the 1950 Agreement as embodied in

Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board, is binding on Sinacaban.
● At the time Resolution No. 77 was passed, the applicable law was the 1917 Revised
Administrative Code:
○ SEC. 2167. Municipal boundary disputes. How settled. Disputes as to
jurisdiction of municipal governments over places or barrios shall be decided
by the provincial boards of the provinces xxx
● As held in Pelaez, the power of provincial boards to settle boundary disputes is of an
administrative nature involving as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into
effect the law creating said municipalities.
○ It is a power to fix common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of
jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities
○ It is thus limited to implementing the law creating a municipality.
○ It is obvious that any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the
law creating a municipality is not the carrying into effect of that law but its
amendment.
○ If, therefore, Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental is
contrary to the technical description of the territory of Sinacaban, it cannot be
used by Jimenez as basis for opposing the claim of Sinacaban.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Oroquieta City, Branch 14 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

Cawaling v Comelec, GR No. 146319, Oct. 26, 2001;

Petitioners: BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR

Respondents: THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and Rep. FRANCIS

JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO

Doctrine:

The abolition or the cessation of the corporate existence of the Municipalities of Bacon and
Sorsogon because of the merger is not a separate and different matter from the creation of
Sorsogon City. This is merely the logical and natural consequence of the merger. The subject
title cannot exclude the incidental effect of abolishing the two municipalities.

Facts:

President Estrada signed RA 8806 (“An Act Creating the City of Sorsogon by Merging the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the Province of Sorsogon, and Appropriating Funds
Therefor”).

o The COMELEC conducted a plebiscite on December 16th, 2000 in the Municipalities of Bacon
and Sorsogon, which was duly proclaimed that the creation of Sorsogon City has been ratified
and approved, by the Plebiscite Board.

-Benjamin E. Cawaling (resident + taxpayer of Sorsogon) sought the annulment of the plebiscite
and to enjoin the further implementation of the said law on the grounds that the creation of
said city by merging the two subject municipalities violates Section 450a of the Local
Government Code:

(a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has
an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty
million (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices,
and if it has either of the following requisites:

a. a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the
Lands Management Bureau;

b. or a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as
certified by the National Statistics Office:

Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income
of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements
prescribed herein.

and Section 10, Article X of the Constitution (that only “a municipality/a cluster of barangays”
may be converted into a component city) and that the law has two subjects (the creation of
the city and the abolition of the subject municipalities), thus violating the “one subject-one
bill” rule in Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.

- Petitioner also argued that the plebiscite was done too late.

Issue/s:

● W/N RA 8806 is unconstitutional? –NO, it is not.

●W/N the plebiscite was done too late? – NO, it was not.

Ratio:

- The petitioner’s argument regarding unconstitutionality is unmeritorious.

- “A municipality or a cluster of barangaysmay be converted into a component city” is
merely a mode of city creation and not a criterion.
- This is highlighted by: The word “converted.”
o Section 10, Article X of the Constitution:
 Allows the merger of LGUs to create a province, city, municipality, or
barangay, but should be in accordance with the Local Government Code.
o Section 8:
 “Divisionand mergerof existing [LGUs] shall comply with the same
requirements… prescribed for their creation…”
- There is actually one subject embraced by the law’s title, which is the creation of
Sorsogon City.
- The abolition or the cessation of the corporate existence of the Municipalities of Bacon
and Sorsogon because of the merger is not a separate and different matter from the
creation of Sorsogon City.
o This is merely the logical and natural consequence of the merger.
o The subject title cannot exclude the incidental effect of abolishing the two
municipalities.
- In fact, the Congress doesn’t need to provide everything in the title with such precision
to actually display the index or the contents of the law itself.
o There should be a liberal construction of the rule.
- The plebiscite was not late at all.
o Section 54, RA 8806.
o Sorsogon City shall acquire corporate existence upon the ratification of its
creation.
o This shall be done by a majority of votes in a plebiscite in Bacon and Sorsogon
within 120 days from the approval of this Act.
 “Approval” in this context means the completion of its publication as per
the requirements in the Tañadacase.
o Publication was completed on September 1st, 2000 (the law was published in a
newspaper of local circulation in Sorsogon Province).
o September 1st, 2000 was thus the reckoning point for the 120-day period to
conduct the plebiscite.
 - As per Section 10 of the Local Government Code, a plebiscite is required for the
creation/division/merger of LGUs.
o Generally, 120 days from the effectivity of the law.
o Except if the law fixes another date.

Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

Mejia v Balolong, 81 P 486 (including RESOLUTION of Motion for

reconsideration)

Doctrine: A cityhood statute becomes effectively upon its approval, and the city it creates
becomes a city upon this occurrence. A city comes into existence through the law that converts
it into a city, and not through the law which organizes its city government.

Facts:

● In November 1947, the general election for provincial, municipal and city officials was
held.
○ Petitioners were elected as councilors of Dagupan City
○ Respondents, though defeated in said election, were appointed as councilors by
the President of the Philippines on Dec 30, 1947
● Petitioners filed an action for quo warranto against respondents on the ground that their
appointments were null and void

Issue/s:

● W/N The appointments of respondents was null and void – YES

Ratio:

The validity of the appointments depends on whether the City of Dagupan was created and
came into existence on June 20, 1947, which is the date Act No. 17 came into effect, or if it
came into existence on January 1, 1948 when the city government was organized by E.O. 96.

The City of Dagupan was created in, and came into existence on June 20, 1947 when its cityhood
laws became effective

A cityhood statute becomes effectively upon its approval, and the city it creates becomes a
city upon this occurrence. A city comes into existence through the law that converts it into a
city, and not through the law which organizes its city government.

As a result, the position of councilor of the city of Dagupan was an elective position at the time
of respondents’ appointments. Therefore, their appointments are null and void.
Dispositive:

In view of all the foregoing, the four respondents shall be ousted and altogether excluded from
the position of councilor of the City of Dagupan which they are now unlawfully holding, and
that the four petitioners elected by popular vote during the general election on November 11,
1947, be placed in possession of those offices. It is so ordered with costs against the
respondents.

Motion For Reconsideration

Resolution: The Motion for Reconsideration is predicated on an erroneous premise or confusion

of the creation or existence of a municipal corporation.

If a juridical entity such as a city or municipality come into existence upon the organization of
their governments, then it would not have been necessary for the Sec. 2186 of the Admin Code
to provide a legal fiction that “Where provision is made for the creation or organization of a
new municipality, it shall come into existence as a separate corporate body upon qualification
of the president, vice-president, and a majority of the councilors, unless some other time be
fixed therefor by law.” If organization and the coming into existence cities and municipalities
were one and the same, then the law would not be able to fix some other time for its coming
into existence, at a time other the organization of their government and qualification of their
officers.

In Act 170, the law converting Dagupan into a City, Congress set June 20, 1947 as the date that
Dagupan would become a city. This was done when Congress provided that the same would
occur upon the effectivity of the Act which fell on said date.

The President is not authorized to create the City of Dagupan, but only to fix, by Proclamation,
the organization of the government of the City, and appoint the officers thereof, the Mayor and
the members of the city council, if the government of the City is organized before the next
general elections for provincial and municipal officials on November 1947, in which the
councilors of the City were to be elected, or appoint only the Mayor if the organization is made
after the said elections. The government of the city could not be organized and its officers
appointed or elected before the city had been created or come into existence, for it would be
absurd to elect or appoint the officers of a public or private corporation or any other entity
which does not yet exist.
 A. ALTERATION & DISSOLUTION

i. Boundaries & Territorial jurisdiction

a. Nature of power to fix boundaries
b. Settlement of boundary disputes
c. Necessity of fixing corporate limits
ii. Power to alter or dissolve
iii. Effect of annexation/consolidation/division/dissolution
iv. Limitations on power to dissolve
v. Effect of change of sovereignty
vi. Effect of conversion
vii. Non-user or Misuser of charter

Cases:

Pasig v Comelec, GR No. 129646, Oct. 10, 1999;

Petitioners: City of Pasig

Respondents: Comelec and the municipality of Cainta

Petitioners: Municipality of Cainta

Respondents: Comelec City of Pasig

Doctrine:

A requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly
identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries

Facts:

● The case involves the proposed Barangay Karangalan and the proposed Barangay Napico
● The city of Pasig claims these areas as part of its jurisdiction/territory while the
Municipality of Cainta claims that these proposed barangays encroached upon areas
within its territory/jurisdiction
● Upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village, the city council of Pasig passed
and approved Ordinance No. 21 creating Barangay Karangalan. The plebiscite on the
creation of said barangay was set for June 22, 1996
● Similarly on September 9, 1996 the City of Pasig passed a similar ordinance creating
Barangay Napico. The plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15, 1997
● Upon learning of the ordinances, the municipality of Cainta moved to suspend or cancel
the plebiscites and filed petitions with the COMELEC calling the attention of the
COMELEC to a pending case before the RTC for settlement of a boundary dispute
● COMELEC ordered the plebiscite to be held in abeyance until the court has settled the
boundary dispute with regard to the creation of Barangay Karangalan.
● COMELEC, however, dismissed the other petition for being moot in view of the holding
of the plebiscite as scheduled on March 15, 1997 where the creation of Barangay Napico
was ratified and approved by the majority
 ● Hence the filing of GR 125646 by the City of Pasig and the filing of GR 128663 by the
Municipality of Cainta

Issue/s:

● WON the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan and Napico
should be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute between the
two local governments? YES

Ratio:

● The court agrees with the position of COMELEC that the civil case involving the boundary
dispute presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided before plebiscites
for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held
● A requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly
identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries
● If not, the court could pave the way for potentially ultra vires acts of such barangays
● Moreover considering the expenses in the holding of plebiscites, it is more prudent to
hold in abeyance the conduct of the same
● Neither does the court agree that merely because a plebiscite had already been held in
the case of the proposed Barangay Napico, the petition of the Municipality of Cainta has
already been rendered moot and academic.
● Tan v Comelec
○ Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non-
compliance with constitutional requisites, the fact that such plebiscite had been
held and a new province proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case before
Us cannot truly be viewed as already moot and academic. Continuation of the
existence of this newly proclaimed province which petitioners strongly profess
to have been illegally born, deserves to be inquired into by this Tribunal so that,
if indeed, illegality attaches to its creation, the commission of that error should
not provide the very excuse for perpetration of such wrong. For this Court to
yield to the respondents urging that, as there has been fait accompli, then this
Court should passively accept and accede to the prevailing situation is an
unacceptable suggestion. Dismissal of the instant petition, as respondents so
propose is a proposition fraught with mischief. Respondents submission will
create a dangerous precedent. Should this Court decline now to perform its
duty of interpreting and indicating what the law is and should be, this might
tempt again those who strut about in the corridors of power to recklessly and
with ulterior motives, create, merge, divide and/or alter the boundaries of
political subdivisions, either brazenly or stealthily, confident that this Court
will abstain from entertaining future challenges to their acts if they manage
to bring about a fait accompli.

Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, premises considered,

1. The Petition of the City of Pasig in G.R. No. 125646 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; while
2. The Petition of the Municipality of Cainta in G.R. No. 128663 is GRANTED. The COMELEC
Order in UND No. 97-002, dated March 21, 1997, is SET ASIDE and the plebiscite held on March
15, 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico in the City of Pasig is declared null and void.
Plebiscite on the same is ordered held in abeyance until after the courts settle with finality the
boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta, in Civil Case No. 94-
300.

Kananga v Madrona, GR No. 141375, April 30, 2003;

Petitioners: Municipality of Kananga

Respondents: Hon. Madrona, Presiding Judge of RTC of Ormoc (Branch 35) and the City of
Ormoc

Doctrine: the RTC has general jurisdiction on boundary disputes

Facts:

● A boundary dispute arose between the Municipality of Kananga and the City of Ormoc.
● An amicable settlement cannot be reached
To settle the boundary dispute, the City of Ormoc filed before the RTC of Ormoc City
● Ruling of the Trial Court: RTC held that it had jurisdiction over the action under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129. It further ruled that Section 118 of the Local Government Code had
been substantially complied with, because both parties already had the occasion to
meet and thresh out their differences.In fact, both agreed to elevate the matter to the
trial court via Resolution No. 97-01. It also held that Section 118 governed venue; hence,
the parties could waive and agree upon it under Section 4(b) of Rule 4 of the Rules of
Court.

Issue/s:

● Whether RTC may exercise original jurisdiction over the settlement of a boundary
dispute between a municipality and an independent component city. YEEEEEEssss

Ratio:

● Both parties aver that the governing law at the time of the filing of the Complaint is
Section 118 of the 1991 Local Government Code (LGC), which provides:
● Sec. 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Disputes. Boundary
disputes between and among local government units shall, as much as possible, be
settled amicably. To this end:
● (a) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the same city or
municipality shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan concerned.
● (b) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same province
shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned.
● (c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces
shall be jointly referred for settlement to the sanggunians of the provinces concerned.
● (d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on the one hand and a
highly urbanized city on the other, or two (2) or more highly urbanized cities, shall be
jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the parties.
● (e) In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within sixty (60)
days from the date the dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that
effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned
which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days from the date of the certification
referred to above.
● Under this provision, the settlement of a boundary dispute between a component city
or a municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other -- or between
two or more highly urbanized cities -- shall be jointly referred for settlement to the
respective sanggunians of the local government units involved.
● There is no question that Kananga is a municipality constituted under Republic Act No.
542.
● By virtue of Section 442(d) of the LGC, it continued to exist and operate as such.
● However, Ormoc is not a highly urbanized, but an independent component, city created
under Republic Act No. 179. Section 89 thereof reads: Election of provincial governor
and members of the Provincial Board of the Province of Leyte. The qualified voters of
Ormoc City shall not be qualified and entitled to vote in the election of the provincial
governor and the members of the provincial board of the Province of Leyte.
● Under Section 451 of the LGC, a city may be either component or highly urbanized.
● Ormoc is deemed an independent component city, because its charter prohibits its
voters from voting for provincial elective officials. It is a city independent of the
province.
● In fact, it is considered a component, not a highly urbanized, city of Leyte in Region VIII
by both Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, which calls for a plebiscite; and the Omnibus Election
Code, which apportions representatives to the defunct Batasang Pambansa.
● There is neither a declaration by the President of the Philippines nor an allegation by
the parties that it is highly urbanized. On the contrary, petitioner asserted in its Motion
to Dismiss that Ormoc was an independent chartered city.
● Section 118 of the LGC applies to a situation in which a component city or a municipality
seeks to settle a boundary dispute with a highly urbanized city, not with an independent
component city.
● While Kananga is a municipality, Ormoc is an independent component city. Clearly then,
the procedure referred to in Section 118 does not apply to them.
● Nevertheless, a joint session was indeed held, but no amicable settlement was reached.
● A resolution to that effect was issued, and the sanggunians of both local government
units mutually agreed to bring the dispute to the RTC for adjudication.
● Inasmuch as Section 118 of the LGC finds no application to the instant case, the general
rules governing jurisdiction should then be used.
● The applicable provision is found in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. Section
19(6) of this law provides:
● Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction: (6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal,
person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
 ● Since there is no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or agency over
the settlement of boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent
component city of the same province, respondent court committed no grave abuse of
discretion in denying the Motion to Dismiss.
● RTCs have general jurisdiction to adjudicate all controversies except those expressly
withheld from their plenary powers. They have the power not only to take judicial
cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the first time, but also to do so to
the exclusion of all other courts at that stage. Indeed, the power is not only original,
but also exclusive.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the challenged Order AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.

Bgy. Mayamot v Antipolo, GR No. 187349, Aug. 17, 2016;

Petitioners: Barangay Mayamot, Antipolo City

Respondents: Barangay Mayamot, Antipolo City, Petitioner, v. Antipolo City, Sangguniang

Panglungsod Of Antipolo

Doctrine:

By virtue of the Local Government Code of 1991, the RTC lost its power to try, at the first
instance, cases of boundary disputes, and it is only when the intermediary steps have failed
that resort to the RTC will follow as provided in the laws.

Facts:

● In 1984, BP 787 to 794 were passed creating 8 new barangays in the then Municipality
of Antipolo. Each law creating the new barangay contained provisions regarding the
sitios comprising it, its boundaries, and mechanism for ratification of the law.
○ Antipolo became composed of 16 barangays.
● In order to integrate the territorial jurisdiction of the barangays into the map of
Antipolo, the Sangguniang Bayan of Antipolo passed Resolution No. 97-80, commissioning
the City Assessor to plot and delineate the territorial boundaries of the barangays
pursuant to the Bureau of Lands Cadastral Survey and the provisions of BP 787 to794.
● In 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan passed Resolution No. 97-89. It approved the barangay
boundaries specified and delineated in the plans/maps prepared by the City Assessor.
● In 1999, Barangay Mayamot filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity and/or Annulment
of Resolution No. 97-89 and Injunction against Antipolo City, Sangguniang Panglungsod
of Antipolo, Barangays Sta. Cruz, Bagong Nayon, Cupang, and Mambugan, the City
Assessor and the City Treasurer before the RTC of Antipolo City. They argue that
○ While BP Blg. 787 to 794 did not require Barangay Mayamot to part with any of
its territory, Resolution No. 97-89 reduced its territory to ½ of its original area
and was apportioned to other barangays.
○ The preparation of the plan and the adoption of Resolution No. 97-89 were not
preceded by any consultation nor any public hearing
○ Resolution No. 97-89 violated Section 82 of the LGC of 1983, the law in force at
the time, which provided that alteration, modification and definition of barangay
 boundaries shall be by ordinance and confirmed by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite called for the purpose.
● · RTC dismissed the petition.
○ Resolution No. 97-89 was passed pursuant to the Cadastral Survey Plan duly
approved by the Bureau of Lands and BP Blg. 787 to 794 and was not intended to
alter the territorial boundary of Barangay Mayamot. Not intending to alter any
territorial boundary, Resolution No. 97-89 is not an ordinance contemplated
under Section 82 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 as required to hold a plebiscite.
● · CA denied petitioner’s appeal.
○ The additional barangays were created by BP Blg. 787 to794 and were approved
by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held on February 5, 1986. It
agreed with the finding of the RTC that Resolution No. 97-89 was passed only in
consequence of BP Blg. 787 to 794 and did not alter the territorial boundary of
Barangay Mayamot. As such, the case was merely a boundary dispute.
○ Sections 118-119 of RA No. 7160 or the the LGC of 1991, the statute in force at
the time of commencement of Barangay Mayamot's action, provide the
mechanism for settlement of boundary disputes. RTC correctly dismissed the
case because it has no original jurisdiction to try and decide a barangay boundary
dispute, as the LGC of 1991 grants the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang
Bayan with original jurisdiction to actually hear and decide the dispute in
accordance with the procedures laid down in the law and its implementing rules
and regulations.

Issue/s:

● Whether or not the RTC has original jurisdiction over boundary disputes. - NO.

Ratio:

● Barangay Mayamot claimed that as a result of the consolidation and integration of the
boundaries of the old barangays and newly-created barangays and issuance of Resolution
No. 97-89, a portion of its territory was apportioned to other barangays. The issues
raised by Barangay Mayamot are centered on the alleged inconsistency between its
perceived actual and physical territory and its territory and boundaries, as defined and
identified after the Bureau of Lands Cadastral Survey and the provisions of BP Blg. 787
to 794 were consolidated and integrated by respondent City Assessor into the map of
Antipolo. The issue to be resolved is the boundary dispute between Barangay Mayamot
and the other barangays.
● There is a boundary dispute when a portion or the whole of the territorial area of a
Local Government Unit (LGU) is claimed by two (2) or more LGUs.
○ Here, Barangay Mayamot is claiming a portion of the territory of Barangays
Bagong Nayon, Sta. Cruz, Cupang and Mambugan. Unfortunately for petitioner,
the resolution of a boundary dispute is outside the jurisdiction of the RTC.
● Sec. 118 of the LGC of 1991 provides that boundary disputes involving two (2) or more
barangays in the same city or municipality shall be referred for settlement to the
sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned. In the event the sanggunian
fails to effect an amicable settlement within 60 days, it shall issue a certification to
that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned
 which shall decide the issue within 6) days from the date of the certification referred
to above.
● Sec. 119 of the same Code states that within the time and manner prescribed by the
Rules of Court, any party may elevate the decision of the sanggunian concerned to the
proper Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the area in dispute. The Regional
Trial Court shall decide the appeal within one (1) year from the filing thereof
● In Municipality of Sta. Fe v. Municipality of Aritao, and Municipality of Pateros v. Court
of Appeals, the Court previously held that by virtue of the Local Government Code of
1991, the RTC lost its power to try, at the first instance, cases of boundary disputes,
and it is only when the intermediary steps have failed that resort to the RTC will follow
as provided in the laws.

Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision
dated January 30, 2009 and Resolution dated March 31, 2009 of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED.

Mariano v Comelec, GR No. 118577, Mar. 7, 1995;

Petitioners: JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al.

Respondents: COMELEC, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE MUNICIPAL
TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI

Doctrine:

The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of
government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits
of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of
government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are
ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will
sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the
people's welfare. This is the evil sought to be avoided by the Local Government Code in
requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds,
with technical descriptions.

Facts: (Maraming possible issues but I think #1 yung most important.)

● In this case, there are 2 petitions to declare R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional.
● R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati.”
● The petitioners, suing as taxpayers, assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of
R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds:
o 1. Section 2 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of
Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section
10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code;
 o 2. Section 51 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local
elective officials, in violation of Sec. 8, Art. X and Sec. 7, Art. VI of the Constitution.
o 3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
▪ (a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter
in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment
law to be passed by Congress within 3 years following the return of every census;
▪ (b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill;
and
▪ (c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec.
5 (3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the
population of Makati stands at only 450,000.
Issue/s:

1. WON Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati
violating Sec. 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code on specifying metes and bounds with
technical descriptions? NO.
2. WON Section 51 Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with Section 8, Article X and Section 7,
Article VI of the Constitution stressing that they new city’s acquisition of a new corporate
existence will allow the incumbent mayor to extend his term to more than two executive
terms as allowed by the Constitution? NO.
3. WON the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional as the
reapportionment cannot be made by a special law? NO.
Ratio:

1. Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 was delineated properly:

“Sec. 2. The City of Makati. — The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly
urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which
shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila
Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by
the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities
of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig;
and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila.”

● The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit
of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define
the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately
exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction.
Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires.
● Any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts
in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's
welfare. This is the evil sought to be avoided by the Local Government Code in
requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in metes
and bounds, with technical descriptions.
● The delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by
Makati as a municipality.
 ● Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati.
In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's land area "shall
comprise the present territory of the municipality."
● “The territorial jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities should be described by
metes and bounds, with technical descriptions" — was made in order to provide a means
by which the area of said cities may be reasonably ascertained.
a. In other words, the requirement on metes and bounds was meant merely as tool in
the establishment of local government units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so long
as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably ascertained, i.e., by
referring to common boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in this case,
then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent behind the law has been
sufficiently served.

2. Sec. 51 Art. X of R.A. No. 7854 does not collide with collides with Sec. 8, Art. X and
Sec. 7, Art. VI of the Constitution:
“Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. — The represent elective officials of the Municipality
of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers
and functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall
have already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new
corporate existence.”

“Sec. 8 Art. VI of the Consti: The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected.”

● Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials have a term of 3
years and are prohibited from serving for more than 3 consecutive terms.
● Petitioners argue that by providing that the new city shall acquire a new corporate
existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal
elective officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously served by them.
● Basically, the don’t want Jejomar Binay serving more than 2 terms as Mayor of Makati.
Since at the time of the case, Binay was already mayor for 2 terms.
● SC: Petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor
Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in
said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998
elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners
merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.

3. The addition of another legislative district in Makati is constitutional.

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly provides that the Congress may be comprised
of not more than two hundred fifty members, unless otherwise provided by law. As thus
worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing
a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law.
Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Province of Zambo Del Norte v City of Zambo., 22 SCRA 1334;

Petitioners: Province of Zamboanga del Norte

Respondents: City of Zamboanga, Secretary of Finance, Commission of Internal Revenue

Doctrine:

If the property is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its public and
governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it.

But if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and
Congress has no absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process
and payment of just compensation.

Facts:

● Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the municipality of Zamboanga Province

used to be the provincial capital of the Zamboanga province
● Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the municipality into Zamboanga City
● CA 39 provides that buildings and properties which province shall abandon upon the
transfer of the capital to another place will be acquired and paid for by the City of
Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General
● The properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots and some buildings
constructed thereon located in the City of Zamboanga and covered individual by Torrens
certificates of title in the name of Zamboanga Province
● In 1945, the capital of Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog and in 1948, RA
286 was approved creating the municipality of Molave and making it the capital of
Zamboanga Province
● In 1949, the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General fixed the value of the
properties and buildings in question left by Zamboanga Province in Zamboanga City at
1,294,244.00
● RA 711 approved dividing the province of Zamboanga (del Norte and del Sur). The assets
and obligations of the old province were divided equitably between the two
● The Auditor General apportioned the assets and obligations of the defunct province of
Zamboanga (Norte – 54,89% Sur – 45.61%) of the 1,294,244
● Zamboanga del Norte therefore became entitled to 54.39 of 1,294,244, the total value
of the lots and buildings in question, or 704, 220.05 payably by Zamboanga City
● In 1959, the Executive Secretary issued a ruling that Zamboanga del Norte had a vested
right as owner of the properties mentioned in CA 39 and is entitled to the price threof
payable by Zamboanga City
● Cabinet resolution revoked this ruling conveying all 50 lots and buildings to Zamboanga
City for P1.00, effective as of 1945, when the provincial capital of then Zamboanga
Province was transferred to Dipolog
● The Secretary of Finance authorized the CIR to deduct 25% of the regular internal
revenue allotment for the City of Zamboanga for 3 quarters of fiscal year
 ● The deductions aggregating 57,373.46 was credited to the province of Zamboanga del
Norte, in partial payment of the 705,220,05 due it
● However, RA 3039 amended the CA 39 providing that all buildings, properties, and assets
belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located within the City of
Zamboanga are transferred, FREE OF CHARGE, in favor of the City of Zamboanga
● Secretary of finance ordered CIR to return to Zamboanga City the 57,373.46 taken from
it out of the internal revenue allotment of Zamboanga del Norte
● 43,030.11 of 57,373.46 has already been returned
● Zamboanga del Norte assailed the constitutionality of 3039

Issue/s:

● WON RA 3039 is constitutional? YES

Ratio:

● The validity of the law ultimately depends on the nature of the 50 lots and buildings
thereon in question
● DOCTRINE
● The capacity in which the property is held is, however, dependent on the use to which
it is intended and devoted.
● Applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law of Municipal
Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public
service are deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be
considered public, it is enough that the property be held and devoted for governmental
purposes like local administration, public education, public health, etc
● Republic Act 3039 is valid insofar as it affects the lots used as capitol site, school sites
and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites and the high school playground sites — a
total of 24 lots — since these were held by the former Zamboanga province in its
governmental capacity and therefore are subject to the absolute control of Congress
● But Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied to deprive Zamboanga del Norte of its share in
the value of the rest of the 26 remaining lots which are patrimonial properties since
they are not being utilized for distinctly governmental purposes.
● The fact that these 26 lots are registered strengthens the proposition that they are truly
private in nature
● The 24 lots used for governmental purposes are also registered is of no significance since
registration cannot convert public property to private.

Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and another judgment is
hereby entered as follows:

(1) Defendant Zamboanga City is hereby ordered to return to plaintiff Zamboanga del
Norte in lump sum the amount of P43,030,11 which the former took back from the latter
out of the sum of P57,373.46 previously paid to the latter, and
 (2) Defendants are hereby ordered to effect payments in favor of plaintiff of whatever
balance remains of plaintiff's 54.39% share in the 26 patrimonial properties, after
deducting therefrom the sum of P57,373.46, on the basis of Resolution No. 7 dated March
26, 1949 of the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General, by way of quarterly
payments from the allotments of defendant City, in the manner originally adopted by the
Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. No costs. So ordered.

Notes:

● The lower courts used the Civil code classification of properties which is a general law.
The SC used the Law of Municipal Corporation which is a special law. Under the Civil
Code:
"ART. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities,
consists of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares,
fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid
for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities.

"All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be

governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws."

Teves v Comelec, 90 Phil 370;

Petitioners: Edgar Y. Teves

Respondents: COMELEC and Herminio G. Teves

Doctrine:

It (moral turpitude) implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is
punishable by law or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be
inherently immoral.

Facts:

● Edgar was a candidate for Representative of the 3rd legislative district of Negros
Oriental during the May 14, 2007 elections.
● Herminio filed to disqualify Edgar (then Mayor) based on the latter being convicted in
Teves v. Sandiganbayan for violating Sec 3(h), RA 30191 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act for possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit.
○ that such violation was a crime involving moral turpitude carrying the accessory
penalty of perpetual disqualification of public office

1
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law,
the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with
which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from
having any interest.
1
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of
any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

○ (h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business,

contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in
his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any
law from having any interest.
● COMELEC disqualified Edgar since:
○ he turned over management of the cockpit to his wife, but did not divest of its
ownership - thus, he still maintained ownership by deceit
○ even if he transferred ownership to his wife, he would still have an interest as it
would belong to the conjugal property
○ his act is a betrayal of the trust reposed by the people
○ the crime involves moral turpitude
● Edgar filed a MR which was denied by COMELEC en banc for being moot since Edgar lost
in the 2007 elections.

Issue/s:

● W/N violation of Sec 3(h), RA 3019 involves moral turpitude - NO

Ratio:

● Moral turpitude - everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals;
an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man
owes his fellowmen, or to society in general.
● Elements of Sec 3(h):
1) The accused is a public officer;

2) he has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business,

contract or transaction;

3) he either:

a) (1st mode) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in

connection with such interest, or

b) (2nd mode) is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution

or by law.

○ In Teves v. Sandiganbayan, Edgar was convicted under the 2nd mode for having
pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit, prohibited under Sec. 89(2) of the
LGC of 1991.
○ Conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean that the same
involved moral turpitude. A determination of all surrounding circumstances of
the violation of the statute must be considered. Besides, moral turpitude does
 not include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies
in their being positively prohibited, as in the instant case.
■ It (moral turpitude) implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the
fact that it is punishable by law or not. It must not be merely mala
prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the
act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude.
■ Under the old LGC, mere possession of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was
not among the prohibitions enumerated.

Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
dated May 11, 2007 and October 9, 2007 disqualifying petitioner Edgar Y. Teves from running
for the position of Representative of the 3rd District of Negros Oriental, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new one is entered declaring that the crime committed by petitioner (violation of
Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019) did not involve moral turpitude.

Notes:

● The Sangguniang Bayan has the authority to issue a license for the establishment,
operation, and maintenance of cockpits.
○ Unlike in the old LGC, where the municipal mayor was the presiding officer of
the Sangguniang Bayan, under the LGC of 1991, the mayor is not so anymore and
is not even a member of the Sangguniang Bayan.
○ Hence, Mayor Edgar could not have intervened or taken part in his official
capacity in the issuance of a cockpit license because he was not a member of
the Sangguniang Bayan.
○ Neither did he intentionally hide his interest in the subject cockpit by
transferring the management thereof to his wife.
■ Said transfer occurred before the effectivity of the present LGC
prohibiting possession of such interest.
● Not moot - since his disqualification affected his running in the 2010 elections despite
the 5-year disqualification period

Miranda v Aguirre, GR No. 133064, Oct. 16, 1999;

Petitioners: JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, MANUEL H. AFIADO, MARIANO V. BABARAN

and ANDRES R. CABUYADAO

Respondents: HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, In his capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. EPIMACO
VELASCO, in his capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his
capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
HON. BENJAMIN G. DY, in his capacity as Governor of Isabela, THE HONORABLE SANGGUNIANG
PANLALAWIGAN OF ISABELA, ATTY. BALTAZAR PICIO, in his capacity as Provincial Administrator,
and MR. ANTONIO CHUA, in his capacity as Provincial Treasurer
Doctrine:

When an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division, abolition or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected is mandatory.

Facts:

● In 1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela,
into an independent component city.
● RA No. 7720 was approved by the people of Santiago in a plebiscite.
● In 1998, RA No. 8528 was enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that practically
downgraded the City of Santiago from an independent component city to a component
city.
● Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the lack of provision to submit
the law for the approval of the people of Santiago in a proper plebiscite.
● Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the said act
merely reclassified the City of Santiago from an independent component city into a
component city.
● It allegedly did not involve any “creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units,” therefore, a plebiscite of the
people of Santiago is unnecessary.
● They also questioned the standing of petitioners to file the petition and argued that the
petition raises a political question over which the Court lacks jurisdiction.

Issue/s:

1. W/N RA No. 8528 is unconstitutional. - YES

2. W/N the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the case at bar. - YES
3. W/N the petitioners have locus standi. - YES

Ratio:

YES. RA No. 8528 is unconstitutional.

● When an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division, abolition or

substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected is mandatory.

YES. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over said petition because it involves a justiciable
issue and not a political question, and of which only the court could decide whether or not
a law passed by the Congress is unconstitutional.
YES. Petitioners are directly affected by the implementation of RA No. 8528.

● Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City, Afiado was the President of the Sangguniang
Liga, and together with 3 other petitioners, all residents and voters in the City of
Santiago.
● It is their right to be heard in the conversion of their city through a plebiscite, to be
conducted by the COMELEC.
● The denial of their right by RA No. 8528 gives them proper standing to strike down the
law as unconstitutional.

Dispositive:

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional
and the writ of prohibition is hereby issued commanding the respondents to desist from
implementing said law.

Alvarez v Guingona, supra;

Tobias v Abalos, GR No. 114783, Dec. 8, 1994;

TLDR: The petitioners, in their capacity as taxpayers and residents of Mandaluyong, question
the constitutionality of RA 7675, which converted the municipality of Mandaluyong into a
highly-urbanized city. Previously, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan were taken
as one legislative district. A plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994, asking the residents of
Mandaluyong whether they approved of the bill. Despite the turnout being 14.41% of the
voting population, 18621 voted ‘yes’, while 7991 voted ‘no’. And thus, the act was ratified.

Detailed:

 As taxpayers and residents of Mandaluyong, petitioners assail Republic Act No. 7675 or
An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be
known as the City of Mandaluyong
 Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and
San Juan belonged to only one legislative district.
 Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10,
1994 where majority of the people of Mandaluyong voted in favor of the conversion.
 Petitioners contend that RA No. 7675 is unconstitutional for violating three
Constitutional provisions:
 First, it violates the one subject one bill rule as enunciated in Sec. 26(1), Article VI of
the
Constitution. The bill provides for the conversion of Mandaluyong to HUC as well as the
division of congressional district of San Juan and Mandaluyong into two separate
district.
 Second, it also violates Sec. 5, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that the
House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong
into separate congressional districts increased the members of the House of
Representative beyond that provided by the Constitution.
  Third, Sec. 5, Article V of the Constitution also provides that within three years
following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standard provided in Section 5. Petitioners stated
that the division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the minimum
population requirement was attained

ISSUES:

1. W/N the said law contravenes the “one subject-one bill” rule?
2. W/N the said law is unconstitutional based on the fact that Article 8, Section 49 of the
republic act, increases the number of the members of the House of Representatives,
which is a violation of Article 6, Section 5 of the Constitution?
3. W/N the said division of Mandaluyong and San Juan was not made pursuant to any
census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population
requirements?
4. W/N the said section has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion
legislative districts?

RATIO:

1. Liberal construction to the ‘one-subject, one-bill’ rule must be followed in order not
to cripple or impede legislation. It should be given a practical rather than a technical
construction.a
2. No. This said section of the said legislative statute is not absolute. The Constitution
provides the phrase, “unless otherwise provided by law”, which provides that if the
Congress itself mandates the said addition, then it is not unconstitutional.
3. No. Even if there was no mention of the census to show that said municipalities did
not reach the 250,000 minimum requirement, it is not sufficient enough to strike down
the validity of RA 7675. The said act enjoys the presumption of having passed through
regular congressional processes.
4. No. The fact that it was Congress itself that drafted, deliberated upon, and enacted
the assailed law shows that that the Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right
which pertains to itself.

Detailed Re: Unconsti

Section 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one

subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate
and distinct from the subject of its conversion. As explained in Lidasan v. COMELEC, a liberal
construction of the “one-title-one- subject” rule has been liberally adopted by the court as to
not impede legislation.

Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party
list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.

The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. The emphasis on the latter
clause indicates that the number of the House of Representatives may be increased, if
mandated via a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional
representation is not unconstitutional. Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and
San Juan do not qualify to have separate legislative districts, the assailed Section 49 of R.A.
No. 7675 must be allowed to stand.

Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall
make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this
section.

As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress
to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners
overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and
enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt
itself on a right which pertains to itself.

Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the subject law has resulted in
"gerrymandering," or the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular
candidate or party, is not worthy of credence. As the Solicitor General Contends, Rep.
Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the
former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing
San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency has in fact been diminished, which
development could hardly be considered as favorable to him.

DECISION: Petition is dismissed.

Umali v Comelec, supra;

Petitioners: Aurelio Umali

Respondents: Commission on Elections, Julius Cesar Vergara, and the City Government of
Cabanatuan

Doctrine:

Section 10, Article X of the Constitution addressed the undesirable practice in the past whereby
local government units were created, abolished, merged or divided on the basis of the vagaries
of politics and not of the welfare of the people. The changes that will result from the conversion
are too substantial that there is a necessity for the plurality of those that will be affected to
approve it.

Facts:
 ● The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cabanatuan City passed a Resolution requesting the
President to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city of the
province of Nueva Ecija into a highly urbanized city (HUC).
● President issued a Presidential Proclamation proclaiming the City of Cabanatuan as an
HUC subject to ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters.
● COMELEC issued a Minute Resolution declaring that for purposes of the plebiscite, only
those registered residents of Cabanatuan City should participate. COMELEC based this
resolution on Sec. 453 of the Local Government Code.
● Aurelio Umali, Governor of Nueva Ecija, opposed this and argued that:
○ In, Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution:
▪ “No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected.”
○ the phrase "political units directly affected" necessarily encompasses not only
Cabanatuan City but the entire province of Nueva Ecija
○ all the registered voters in the province are qualified to cast their votes in
resolving the proposed conversion of Cabanatuan City.
● Julius Cesar Vergara, mayor of Cabanatuan, argued that:
○ Sec. 10, Art. X does not apply to conversions
○ a specific provision of the LGC, Sec. 453, allows only the qualified voters of
Cabanatuan City to vote in the plebiscite
○ Section 453. “It shall be the duty of the President to declare a city as highly
urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimum
requirements prescribed in the immediately preceding Section, upon proper
application therefor and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters
therein.”
○ the phrase "registered voters therein" in Sec. 453 refers only to the registered
voters in the city being converted
Issue/s:

● W/N the registered voters of the entire province of Nueva Ecija should vote in the
plebiscite? YES

Ratio:

● The creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local

government units involve a common denominator - material change in the political and
economic rights of the local government units directly affected as well as the people
therein. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the
people "in the political units directly affected."
● While conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided in Sec. 10, Art. X of the
Constitution we nevertheless observe that the conversion of a component city into an
HUC is substantial alteration of boundaries.
● The province will inevitably suffer a corresponding decrease in territory. With the city’s
newfound autonomy, it will be free from the oversight powers of the province, which
reduces the territorial jurisdiction of the latter.
● The taxes imposed by the HUC will accrue to itself.
 ● The province will also be divested of jurisdiction over disciplinary cases concerning the
elected city officials of the new HUC, and the appeal process for administrative case
decisions against barangay officials of the city will also be modified accordingly.
● Likewise, the registered voters of the city will no longer be entitled to vote for and be
voted upon as provincial officials.

Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 203974, is
hereby GRANTED. COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 12-0797 dated September 11, 2012 and
Minute Resolution No. 12-0925 dated October 16, 2012 are hereby declared NULL and VOID.
Public respondent COMELEC is hereby enjoined from implementing the said Resolutions.
Additionally, COMELEC is hereby ordered to conduct a plebiscite for the purpose of converting
Cabanatuan City into a Highly Urbanized City to be participated in by the qualified registered
voters of Nueva Ecija within 120 days from the finality of this Decision. The Petition for
Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 204371, is hereby DISMISSED.

Vilas v City, supra.

Petitioners: Vilas

Respondents: City of Manila

Doctrine:

The mere change of sovereignty of a country does not necessarily dissolve the municipal
corporation organized under the former sovereign.

Facts:

1) Prior to the incorporation of the City of Manila under the Republic Act No. 183, Vilas is
the creditor of the City. After the incorporation, Vilas brought an action to recover the
sum of money owed to him by the city.
2) The City of Manila that incurred the debts has changed its sovereignty after the cession
of the Philippines to the US by the Treaty of Paris and its contention now is founded on
the theory that by virtue of the Act No. 183 its liability has been extinguished.

Issue/s:

● Whether or not the change of the sovereignty extinguishes the previous liability of the
City of Manila to its creditor--NO.

Ratio:
 1) The mere change of sovereignty of a country does not necessarily dissolve the
municipal corporation organized under the former sovereign.
2) The new City of Manila is in a legal sense the successor of the old city. Thus the new
city is entitled to all property and property rights of the predecessor corporation
including its liabilities.
3) The court held that only the governmental functions that are not compatible with the
present sovereignty are suspended.
4) Because the new City of Manila retains its character as the predecessor of the old city,
it is still liable to the creditors of the old City of Manila.
5) While military occupation or territorial cession may work a suspension of the
governmental functions of municipal corporations, such occupation or cession does not
result in their dissolution.
6) While there is a total abrogation of the former political relations of inhabitants of ceded
territory, and an abrogation of laws in conflict with the political character of the
substituted sovereign, the great body of municipal law regulating private and domestic
rights continues in force until abrogated or changed by the new ruler.
a) Although the United States might have extinguished every municipality in the
territory ceded by Spain under the Treaty of 1898, it will not, in view of the
practice of nations to the contrary, be presumed to have done so.
7) The legal entity of the City of Manila survived both its military occupation by, and its
cession to, the United States, and, as in law, the present city, as the successor of the
former city, is entitled to the property rights of its predecessor, it is also subject to its
liabilities.
a) The cession in the Treaty of 1898 of all the public property of Spain in the
Philippine Islands did not include property belonging to municipalities, and
the agreement against impairment of property and private property rights in that
treaty applied to the property of municipalities and claims against
municipalities.
8) One supplying goods to a municipality does so, in the absence of specific provision, on
its general faith and credit, and not as against special funds in its possession, and even
if such goods are supplied for a purpose for which the special funds are held, no specific
lien is created thereon.

Dispositive:

Our conclusion is that the decree in the Aguado case must be reversed and the case remanded,
with direction to render judgment and such other relief as may seem in conformity with law.
The judgments in the Trigas and Vilas cases will be reversed, and the cases remanded with
direction to overrule the respective demurrers, and for such other action as may be consistent
with law, and consistent with this opinion.