1
Alvero vs. Dizon [GR L-342, 4 May 1946]
En Banc, de Joya (J): 4 concur, 4 acting justices
concur
Facts: On 12 February 1945, while the battle for
Manila was raging, soldiers of the United States
Army, accompanied by men of Filipino Guerrilla
Forces, placed Aurelio S. Alvero under arrest,
having been suspected of collaboration with the
enemy, and seized and took certain papers from
his house in Pasay, Rizal. On or about 4 October
1945, Alvero was accused of treason, in criminal
case 3 of the People’s Court; after which, on 1
December 1945, he filed a petition, demanding
the return of the papers allegedly seized and
taken from his house. Alvero also filed a petition
for bail, at the hearing of which the prosecution
presented certain papers and documents, which
were admitted as part of its evidence, and said
petition was denied. At the trial of the case on the
merits, the prosecution again presented said
papers and documents, which were admitted as
part of its evidence, and were marked as exhibits.
On 26 February 1946, the judges issued an order
denying the petition for the return of the
documents, and admitted as competent
evidence the documents presented by the
prosecution. On the same date that said order
was issued, denying the petition for the return of
said documents, Alvero asked for the
reconsideration of said order, which was also
denied. Alvero filed a petition for certiorari with
injunction with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the documents seized by United
States Army personnel at Alvero’s home can be
used as evidence against the latter.
Held: The right of officers and men of the United
States Army to arrest Alvero, as a collaborationist
suspect, and to seize his personal papers, without
any search warrant, in the zone of military
operations, is unquestionable, under the provisions
of article 4, Chapter II, Section I, of the
Regulations relative to the Laws and Customs of
War on Land of the Hague Conventions of 1907,
authorizing the seizure of military papers in the
possession of prisoners of war; and also under the
proclamation, dated 29 December 1944, issued
by Gen. Douglas MacArthur, as Commander in
Chief of the United States Army, declaring his
purpose to remove certain citizens of the
Philippines, who had voluntarily given aid and
comfort to the enemy, in violation of the
allegiance due the Governments of the United
States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines,
when apprehended, from any position of political
and economic influence in the Philippines and to
hold them in restraint for the duration of the war.
The purpose of the constitutional provisions
against unlawful searches and seizures is to
prevent violations of private security in person and
property, and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of
the home, by officers of the law acting under
legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy
against such usurpations when attempted. But it
does not prohibit the Government from taking
advantage of unlawful searches made by a
private person or under authority of state law.
Herein, as the soldiers of the United States Army,
that took and seized certain papers and
documents from the residence of Alvero, were
not acting as agents or on behalf of the
Government of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines; and that those papers and
documents came into the possession of the
authorities of the Commonwealth Government,
through the Office of the CIC of the United States
Army in Manila, the use and presentation of said
papers and documents, as evidence for the
prosecution against Alvero, at the trial of his case
for treason, before the People’s Court, cannot
now be legally attacked, on the ground of
unlawful or unreasonable searches and seizures,
or on any other constitutional ground, as
declared by the Supreme Court of the United
States in similar cases. (See Burdeau vs. McDowell,
256 U. S., 465; Gambino vs. United States, 275 U. S.,
310.)
People vs. Andre Marti [GR 81561, 18 January
1991]
Third Division, Bidin (J): 3 concur
Facts: On 14 August 1987, Andre Marti and his
common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the
booth of the Manila Packing and Export
Forwarders in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita,
Manila, carrying with them 4 gift-wrapped
packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no
relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. Marti
informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the
packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Marti
filled up the contract necessary for the
transaction, writing therein his name, passport
number, the date of shipment and the name and
address of the consignee, namely, “WALTER FIERZ,
Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland.” Anita
Reyes did not inspect the packages as Marti
refused, who assured the former that the
packages simply contained books, cigars, and
gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view
of Marti’s representation, the 4 packages were
then placed inside a brown corrugated box, with
styro-foam placed at the bottom and on top of
the packages, and sealed with masking tape.
Before delivery of Marti’s box to the Bureau of
Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes
(proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes),
following standard operating procedure, opened
the boxes for final inspection, where a peculiar
2
odor emitted therefrom. Job pulled out a
cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening
of one of the gloves, and took several grams of
the contents thereof. Job Reyes forthwith
prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the
NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of
the samples he extracted from the cellophane
wrapper. At the Narcotics Section of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the box containing
Marti’s packages was opened, yielding dried
marijuana leaves, or cake-like (bricks) dried
marijuana leaves. The NBI agents made an
inventory and took charge of the box and of the
contents thereof, after signing a “Receipt”
acknowledging custody of the said effects.
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate Marti
but to no avail, inasmuch as the latter’s stated
address was the Manila Central Post Office.
Thereafter, an Information was filed against Marti
for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act. After trial, the Special
Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court,
Branch XLIX) rendered the decision, convicting
Marti of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in
relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2
(e)(i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Marti appealed.
Issue: Whether an act of a private individual,
allegedly in violation of the accused’s
constitutional rights, be invoked against the State.
Held: In the absence of governmental
interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
The contraband herein, having come into
possession of the Government without the latter
transgressing the accused’s rights against
unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees
no cogent reason why the same should not be
admitted against him in the prosecution of the
offense charged. The mere presence of the NBI
agents did not convert the reasonable search
effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and
seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to
observe and look at that which is in plain sight is
not a search. Having observed that which is open,
where no trespass has been committed in aid
thereof, is not search. Where the contraband
articles are identified without a trespass on the
part of the arresting officer, there is not the search
that is prohibited by the constitution. The
constitutional proscription against unlawful
searches and seizures therefore applies as a
restraint directed only against the government
and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of
the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the
State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. If the
search is made upon the request of law enforcers,
a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to
pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the
search is made at the behest or initiative of the
proprietor of a private establishment for its own
and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and
without the intervention of police authorities, the
right against unreasonable search and seizure
cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In
sum, the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures cannot be extended to
acts committed by private individuals so as to
bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government.
Bache & Co. (Phil.) Inc. vs. Ruiz [GR L-32409, 27
February 1971]
En Banc, Villamor (J): 7 concur, 1 filed a separate
concurring opinion to which 1 concurs, 1 concurs
in result
Facts: On 24 February 1970, Misael P. Vera,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter
addressed to Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting
the issuance of a search warrant against Bache &
Co. (Phil.), Inc. and Frederick E. Seggerman for
violation of Section 46(a) of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC), in relation to all other
pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections
53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue
Examiner Rodolfo de Leon to make and file the
application for search warrant which was
attached to the letter. In the afternoon of the
following day, De Leon and his witness, Arturo
Logronio, went to the Court of First Instance (CFI)
of Rizal. They brought with them the following
papers: Vera’s letter-request; an application for
search warrant already filled up but still unsigned
by De Leon; an affidavit of Logronio subscribed
before De Leon; a deposition in printed form of
Logronio already accomplished and signed by
him but not yet subscribed; and a search warrant
already accomplished but still unsigned by Judge.
At that time the Judge was hearing a certain
case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his
Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of
De Leon and Logronio. After the session had
adjourned, the Judge was informed that the
depositions had already been taken. The
stenographer, upon request of the Judge, read to
him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, the
Judge asked Logronio to take the oath and
warned him that if his deposition was found to be
false and without legal basis, he could be
charged for perjury. The Judge signed de Leon’s
application for search warrant and Logronio’s
deposition. Search Warrant 2-M-70 was then
signed by Judge and accordingly issued. 3 days
later (a Saturday), the BIR agents served the
search warrant to the corporation and
Seggerman at the offices of the corporation on
3
Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal. The corporation’s
lawyers protested the search on the ground that
no formal complaint or transcript of testimony was
attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless
proceeded with their search which yielded 6
boxes of documents. On 3 March 1970, the
corporation and Seggerman filed a petition with
the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal praying
that the search warrant be quashed, dissolved or
recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory writs of injunction be issued, that the
search warrant be declared null and void, and
that Vera, Logronio, de Leon, et. al., be ordered
to pay the corporation and Seggerman, jointly
and severally, damages and attorney’s fees. After
hearing and on 29 July 1970, the court issued an
order dismissing the petition for dissolution of the
search warrant. In the meantime, or on 16 April
1970, the Bureau of Internal Revenue made tax
assessments on the corporation in the total sum of
P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely, based on the
documents thus seized. The corporation and
Seggerman filed an action for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus.
Issue: Whether the corporation has the right to
contest the legality of the seizure of documents
from its office.
Held: The legality of a seizure can be contested
only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby, and that the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties. In Stonehill,
et al. vs. Diokno, et al. (GR L-19550, 19 June 1967;
20 SCRA 383) the Supreme Court impliedly
recognized the right of a corporation to object
against unreasonable searches and seizures;
holding that the corporations have their
respective personalities, separate and distinct
from the personality of the corporate officers,
regardless of the amount of shares of stock or the
interest of each of them in said corporations,
whatever, the offices they hold therein may be;
and that the corporate officers therefore may not
validly object to the use in evidence against them
of the documents, papers and things seized from
the offices and premises of the corporations, since
the right to object to the admission of said papers
in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong,
and may not be invoked by the corporate officers
in proceedings against them in their individual
capacity. The distinction between the Stonehill
case and the present case is that: in the former
case, only the officers of the various corporations
in whose offices documents, papers and effects
were searched and seized were the petitioners;
while in the latter, the corporation to whom the
seized documents belong, and whose rights have
thereby been impaired, is itself a petitioner. On
that score, the corporation herein stands on a
different footing from the corporations in Stonehill.
Moreover, herein, the search warrant was void
inasmuch as First, there was no personal
examination conducted by the Judge of the
complainant (De Leon) and his witness (Logronio).
The Judge did not ask either of the two any
question the answer to which could possibly be
the basis for determining whether or not there was
probable cause against Bache & Co. and
Seggerman. The participation of the Judge in the
proceedings which led to the issuance of Search
Warrant 2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to the
stenographer’s readings of her notes, to a few
words of warning against the commission of
perjury, and to administering the oath to the
complainant and his witness. This cannot be
consider a personal examination. Second, the
search warrant was issued for more than one
specific offense. The search warrant was issued for
at least 4 distinct offenses under the Tax Code.
The first is the violation of Section 46(a), Section 72
and Section 73 (the filing of income tax returns),
which are interrelated. The second is the violation
of Section 53 (withholding of income taxes at
source). The third is the violation of Section 208
(unlawful pursuit of business or occupation); and
the fourth is the violation of Section 209 (failure to
make a return of receipts, sales, business or gross
value of output actually removed or to pay the
tax due thereon). Even in their classification the 6
provisions are embraced in 2 different titles:
Sections 46(a), 53, 72 and 73 are under Title II
(Income Tax); while Sections 208 and 209 are
under Title V (Privilege Tax on Business and
Occupation). Lastly, the search warrant does not
particularly describe the things to be seized.
Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 tends to defeat the
major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the
elimination of general warrants, for the language
used therein is so all-embracing as to include all
conceivable records of the corporation, which, if
seized, could possibly render its business
inoperative. Thus, Search Warrant 2-M-70 is null
and void.
Stonehill vs. Diokno [GR L-19550, 19 June 1967]
En Banc, Concepcion (CJ): 6 concur
Facts: Upon application of the officers of the
government, Special Prosecutors Pedro D.
Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and Manuel Villareal Jr.
and Assistant Fiscal Manases G. Reyes; Judge
Amado Roan (Municipal Court of Manila), Judge
Roman Cansino (Municipal Court of Manila),
Judge Hermogenes Caluag (Court of First
Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch), and Judge
Damian Jimenez (Municipal Court of Quezon City)
issued, on different dates, a total of 42 search
warrants against Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P.
Brooks, HJohn J. Brooks, and Karl Beck, and/or the
4
corporations of which they were officers, directed
to any peace officer, to search the said persons
and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses
and/or residences, and to seize and take
possession of the following personal property to
wit: “Books of accounts, financial records,
vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and
other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursements
receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers)” as
“the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled
and proceeds or fruits of the offense,” or “used or
intended to be used as the means of committing
the offense,” which is described in the
applications adverted to above as “violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal
Code.” Alleging that the search warrants are null
and void, as contravening the Constitution and
the Rules of Court, Stonehill, et. al. filed with the
Supreme Court the original action for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and injunction. On 22
March 1962, the Supreme Court issued the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition.
However, by resolution dated 29 June 1962, the
writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the
papers, documents and things seized from the
offices of the corporations are concerned; but,
the injunction was maintained as regards the
papers, documents and things found and seized
in the residences of Stonehill, et. al.
Issue: Whether Stonehill, et. al. can assail the
legality of the contested warrants that allowed
seizure of documents, papers and other effects in
the corporate offices, and other places besides
their residences.
Held: Stonehill, et. al. maintained that the search
warrants are in the nature of general warrants
and that, accordingly, the seizures effected upon
the authority thereof are null and void. No warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the manner set forth
in said provision; and the warrant shall particularly
describe the things to be seized. None of these
requirements has been complied with in the
contested warrants. The grave violation of the
Constitution made in the application for the
contested search warrants was compounded by
the description therein made of the effects to be
searched for and seized. The warrants authorized
the search for and seizure of records pertaining to
all business transactions of Stonehill, et. al.,
regardless of whether the transactions were legal
or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of
all records of the corporate officers and the
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly
contravening the explicit command of our Bill of
Rights — that the things to be seized be
particularly described — as well as tending to
defeat its major objective: the elimination of
general warrants. However, the documents,
papers, and things seized under the alleged
authority of the warrants in question may be split
into (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found
and seized in the offices of the corporations and
(b) those found seized in the residences of
Stonehill, et. al. As regards the first group, Stonehill,
et. al. have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the
seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their
respective personalities, separate and distinct
from the personality of Stonehill, et. al., regardless
of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest
of each of them in said corporations, and
whatever the offices they hold therein may be.
Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a
seizure can be contested only by the party whose
rights have been impaired thereby, and that the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is
purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties. Consequently, Stonehill, et. al. may not
validly object to the use in evidence against them
of the documents, papers and things seized from
the offices and premises of the corporations
adverted to above, since the right to object to
the admission of said papers in evidence belongs
exclusively to the corporations, to whom the
seized effects belong, and may not be invoked
by the corporate officers in proceedings against
them in their individual capacity. With respect to
the documents, papers and things seized in the
residences of Stonehill, et. al., the 29 June 1962
Resolution of the Supreme Court, denying the
lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction
previously issued by the Court on the documents,
papers and things seized in the residences, in
effect, restrained the prosecutors from using them
in evidence against Stonehill, et. al. Thus, the
Court held that the warrants for the search of 3
residences are null and void; that the searches
and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ
of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in
connection with the documents, papers and
other effects thus seized in said residences is
made permanent, that the writs prayed for are
granted, insofar as the documents, papers and
other effects so seized in the residences are
concerned; and that the petition herein is
dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as
regards the documents, papers and other effects
seized in the 29 places, offices and other
premises.
5
Zurcher vs. Stanford Daily [436 US 547, 31 May
1978]
White (J): 3 concur, 1 filed a separate concurring
opinion, 2 filed separate dissenting opinions, to
which 1 joined, 1 took no part.
Facts: On 9 April 1971, officers of the Palo Alto
Police Department and of the Santa Clara
County Sheriff’s Department responded to a call
from the director of the Stanford University
Hospital requesting the removal of a large group
of demonstrators who had seized the hospital’s
administrative offices and occupied them since
the previous afternoon. After several futile efforts
to persuade the demonstrators to leave
peacefully, more drastic measures were
employed. The police chose to force their way in
at the west end of the corridor. As they did so, a
group of demonstrators emerged through the
doors at the east end and, armed with sticks and
clubs, attacked the group of nine police officers
stationed there. All nine were injured. The officers
themselves were able to identify only two of their
assailants, but one of them did see at least one
person photographing the assault at the east
doors. On April 11 (Sunday), a special edition of
the Stanford Daily (Daily), a student newspaper
published at Stanford University, carried articles
and photographs devoted to the hospital protest
and the violent clash between demonstrators and
police. The photographs carried the byline of a
Daily staff member and indicated that he had
been at the east end of the hospital hallway
where he could have photographed the assault
on the 9 officers. The next day, the Santa Clara
County District Attorney’s Office secured a
warrant from the Municipal Court for an
immediate search of the Daily’s offices for
negatives, film, and pictures showing the events
and occurrences at the hospital on the evening
of April 9. The warrant issued on a finding of “just,
probable and reasonable cause for believing
that: Negatives and photographs and films,
evidence material and relevant to the identity of
the perpetrators of felonies, to wit, Battery on a
Peace Officer, and Assault with Deadly Weapon,
will be located [on the premises of the Daily].” The
warrant affidavit contained no allegation or
indication that members of the Daily staff were in
any way involved in unlawful acts at the hospital.
The search pursuant to the warrant was
conducted later that day by 4 police officers and
took place in the presence of some members of
the Daily staff. The Daily’s photographic
laboratories, filing cabinets, desks, and
wastepaper baskets were searched. Locked
drawers and rooms were not opened. The search
revealed only the photographs that had already
been published on April 11, and no materials were
removed from the Daily’s office. A month later the
Daily and various members of its staff brought a
civil action in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C.
1983 against the police officers who conducted
the search, the chief of police, the district
attorney and one of his deputies, and the judge
who had issued the warrant. The complaint
alleged that the search of the Daily’s office had
deprived respondents under color of state law of
rights secured to them by the First, Fourth, and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution. The District Court denied the request
for an injunction but, on the newspaper staff’s
motion for summary judgment, granted
declaratory relief. The court did not question the
existence of probable cause to believe that a
crime had been committed and to believe that
relevant evidence would be found on the Daily’s
premises. It held, however, that the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments forbade the issuance of
a warrant to search for materials in possession of
one not suspected of crime unless there is
probable cause to believe, based on facts
presented in a sworn affidavit, that a subpoena
duces tecum would be impracticable. The District
Court further held that where the innocent object
of the search is a newspaper, First Amendment
interests are also involved and that such a search
is constitutionally permissible “only in the rare
circumstance where there is a clear showing that
(1) important materials will be destroyed or
removed from the jurisdiction; and (2) a
restraining order would be futile.” Since these
preconditions to a valid warrant had not been
satisfied, the search of the Daily’s offices was
declared to have been illegal. The Court of
Appeals affirmed per curiam, adopting the
opinion of the District Court. Zurcher, et. al. filed a
petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether the Fourth Amendment is to be
construed and applied to the “third party”
search, the recurring situation where state
authorities have probable cause to believe that
fruits, instrumentalities, or other evidence of crime
is located on identified property but do not then
have probable cause to believe that the owner
or possessor of the property is himself implicated in
the crime that has occurred or is occurring.
Held: First, a State is not prevented by the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments from issuing a
warrant to search for evidence simply because
the owner or possessor of the place to be
searched is not reasonably suspected of criminal
involvement. The critical element in a reasonable
search is not that the property owner is suspected
of crime but that there is reasonable cause to
believe that the “things” to be searched for and
seized are located on the property to which entry
is sought. Second, the District Court’s new rule
6
denying search warrants against third parties and
insisting on subpoenas would undermine law
enforcement efforts since search warrants are
often used early in an investigation before all the
perpetrators of a crime have been identified; and
the seemingly blameless third party may be
implicated. The delay in employing a subpoena
duces tecum could easily result in disappearance
of the evidence. Nor would the cause of privacy
be served since search warrants are more difficult
to obtain than subpoenas. Lastly, properly
administered, the preconditions for a search
warrant (probable cause, specificity with respect
to the place to be searched and the things to be
seized, and overall reasonableness), which must
be applied with particular exactitude when First
Amendment interests would be endangered by
the search, are adequate safeguards against the
interference with the press’ ability to gather,
analyze, and disseminate news that respondents
claim would ensue from use of warrants for third-
party searches of newspaper offices.
Wilson vs. Layne [526 US 603, 24 May 1999]
Rehnquist (CJ)
Facts: In early 1992, the Attorney General of the
United States approved “Operation Gunsmoke,”
a special national fugitive apprehension program
in which United States Marshals worked with state
and local police to apprehend dangerous
criminals. This effective program ultimately
resulted in over 3,000 arrests in 40 metropolitan
areas. One of the dangerous fugitives identified
as a target of “Operation Gunsmoke” was
Dominic Wilson, the son of Charles and Geraldine
Wilson. Dominic Wilson had violated his probation
on previous felony charges of robbery, theft, and
assault with intent to rob, and the police
computer listed “caution indicators” that he was
likely to be armed, to resist arrest, and to “assault
police.” The computer also listed his address as
909 North StoneStreet Avenue in Rockville,
Maryland. Unknown to the police, this was
actually the home of Dominic Wilson’s parents.
Thus, in April 1992, the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County issued three arrest warrants
for Dominic Wilson, one for each of his probation
violations. The warrants were each addressed to
“any duly authorized peace officer,” and
commanded such officers to arrest him and bring
him “immediately” before the Circuit Court to
answer an indictment as to his probation violation.
The warrants made no mention of media
presence or assistance. In the early morning hours
of 16 April 1992, a Gunsmoke team of Deputy
United States Marshals and Montgomery County
Police officers assembled to execute the Dominic
Wilson warrants. The team was accompanied by
a reporter and a photographer from the
Washington Post, who had been invited by the
Marshals to accompany them on their mission as
part of a Marshal’s Service ride-along policy. At
6:45 a.m., the officers, with media representatives
in tow, entered the dwelling at 909 North
StoneStreet Avenue in the Lincoln Park
neighborhood of Rockville. Charles and Geraldine
Wilson were still in bed when they heard the
officers enter the home. Charles Wilson, dressed
only in a pair of briefs, ran into the living room to
investigate. Discovering at least 5 men in street
clothes with guns in his living room, he angrily
demanded that they state their business, and
repeatedly cursed the officers. Believing him to be
an angry Dominic Wilson, the officers quickly
subdued him on the floor. Geraldine Wilson next
entered the living room to investigate, wearing
only a nightgown. She observed her husband
being restrained by the armed officers. When their
protective sweep was completed, the officers
learned that Dominic Wilson was not in the house,
and they departed. During the time that the
officers were in the home, the Washington Post
photographer took numerous pictures. The print
reporter was also apparently in the living room
observing the confrontation between the police
and Charles Wilson. At no time, however, were
the reporters involved in the execution of the
arrest warrant. Charles and Geraldine Wilson sued
the law enforcement officials in their personal
capacities for money damages, and contended
that the officers’ actions in bringing members of
the media to observe and record the attempted
execution of the arrest warrant violated their
Fourth Amendment rights. The District Court
denied the police officers’ motion for summary
judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. On
interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals, a
divided panel reversed and held that the officers
were entitled to qualified immunity. The case was
twice reheard en banc, where a divided Court of
Appeals again upheld the defense of qualified
immunity. The Court of Appeals declined to
decide whether the actions of the police violated
the Fourth Amendment. It concluded instead that
because no court had held (at the time of the
search) that media presence during a police
entry into a residence violated the Fourth
Amendment, the right allegedly violated by
petitioners was not “clearly established” and thus
qualified immunity was proper. 141 F. 3d 111 (CA4
1998). Five judges dissented, arguing that the
officers’ actions did violate the Fourth
Amendment, and that the clearly established
protections of the Fourth Amendment were
violated.
Issue: Whether the police officers were justified to
bring along the Washington Post reporters in the
execution of the warrant inside the house of
Charles and Geraldine Wilson.
7
Held: No. Although the officers undoubtedly were
entitled to enter the Wilson home in order to
execute the arrest warrant for Dominic Wilson,
they were not entitled to bring a newspaper
reporter and a photographer with them. While it
does not mean that every police action while
inside a home must be explicitly authorized by the
text of the warrant (Fourth Amendment allows
temporary detainer of homeowner while police
search the home pursuant to warrant), the Fourth
Amendment does require that police actions in
execution of a warrant be related to the
objectives of the authorized intrusion (The
purposes justifying a police search strictly limit the
permissible extent of the search). Certainly the
presence of reporters inside the home was not
related to the objectives of the authorized
intrusion. Inasmuch as that the reporters did not
engage in the execution of the warrant and did
not assist the police in their task, the reporters
were not present for any reason related to the
justification for police entry into the home–the
apprehension of Dominic Wilson. This is not a case
in which the presence of the third parties directly
aided in the execution of the warrant. Where the
police enter a home under the authority of a
warrant to search for stolen property, the
presence of third parties for the purpose of
identifying the stolen property has long been
approved by this Court and our common-law
tradition. The claim of the officers, that the
presence of the Washington Post reporters in the
Wilsons’ home nonetheless served a number of
legitimate law enforcement purposes ignores, the
importance of the right of residential privacy at
the core of the Fourth Amendment. It may well be
that media ride-alongs further the law
enforcement objectives of the police in a general
sense, but that is not the same as furthering the
purposes of the search. Were such generalized
“law enforcement objectives” themselves
sufficient to trump the Fourth Amendment, the
protections guaranteed by that Amendment’s
text would be significantly watered down.
Although it may be claimed the presence of third
parties could serve in some situations to minimize
police abuses and protect suspects, and also to
protect the safety of the officers, such a situation
is significantly different from the media presence
in this case, where the Washington Post reporters
in the Wilsons’ home were working on a story for
their own purposes. Taken in their entirety, the
reasons advanced by the officers fall short of
justifying the presence of media inside a home.
Thus, it is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for
police to bring members of the media or other
third parties into a home during the execution of
a warrant when the presence of the third parties
in the home was not in aid of the execution of the
warrant.
Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP [GR 64261, 26
December 1984]
En Banc, Escolin (J): 10 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-
Paño, Executive Judge of the then CFI Rizal
[Quezon City], issued 2 search warrants where the
premises at 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City,
and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the
“Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers,
respectively, were searched, and office and
printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia,
motor vehicles and other articles used in the
printing, publication and distribution of the said
newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
documents, books and other written literature
alleged to be in the possession and control of
Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the “We Forum”
newspaper, were seized. A petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction was filed
after 6 months following the raid to question the
validity of said search warrants, and to enjoin the
Judge Advocate General of the AFP, the city
fiscal of Quezon City, et.al. from using the articles
seized as evidence in Criminal Case Q-022782 of
the RTC Quezon City (People v. Burgos).
Issue: Whether allegations of possession and
printing of subversive materials may be the basis
of the issuance of search warrants.
Held: Section 3 provides that no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined by the judge, or such
other responsible officer as may be authorized by
law, after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. Probable cause for a search is defined as
such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are
in the place sought to be searched. In mandating
that “no warrant shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined by the judge, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce”;
the Constitution requires no less than personal
knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of
the facts upon which the issuance of a search
warrant may be justified. Herein, a statement in
the effect that Burgos “is in possession or has in his
control printing equipment and other
paraphernalia, news publications and other
documents which were used and are all
continuously being used as a means of
8
committing the offense of subversion punishable
under PD 885, as amended” is a mere conclusion
of law and does not satisfy the requirements of
probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as
would justify a finding of the existence of
probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as
basis for the issuance of a search warrant. Further,
when the search warrant applied for is directed
against a newspaper publisher or editor in
connection with the publication of subversive
materials, the application and/or its supporting
affidavits must contain a specification, stating
with particularity the alleged subversive material
he has published or is intending to publish. Mere
generalization will not suffice.
Chandler vs. Miller [520 US 305, 15 April 1997]
Ginsburg (J): 6 concur, 1 filed separate dissenting
opinion.
Facts: The Libertarian Party nominated Walker L.
Chandler for the office of Lieutenant Governor,
Sharon T. Harris for the office of Commissioner of
Agriculture, and James D. Walker for the office of
member of the General Assembly. In May 1994,
about one month before the deadline for
submission of the certificates required by §21-2-
140, Chandler, Harris, and Walker filed an action
in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia. They asserted, inter alia, that
the drug tests required by §21-2-140 violated their
rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution,
naming Governor Zell D. Miller and two other state
officials involved in the administration of §21-2-
140, as defendants. Chandler, et .al. requested
declaratory and injunctive relief barring
enforcement of the statute. In June 1994, the
District Court denied Chandlers’ motion for a
preliminary injunction. The provision in the statute
of the State of Georgia required candidates for
designated state offices to certify that they have
taken a drug test and that the test result was
negative. Chandler, et. al. apparently submitted
to the drug tests, obtained the certificates
required by §21-2-140, and appeared on the
ballot. After the 1994 election, the parties jointly
moved for the entry of final judgment on
stipulated facts. In January 1995, the District Court
entered final judgment for Miller, et. al. A divided
Eleventh Circuit panel, relying on the US Court’s
precedents sustaining drug testing programs for
student athletes, customs employees, and railway
employees, the United States affirmed and
judged the Georgia’s law to be constitutional.
Issue: Whether the suspicionless searches,
required in Georgia’s drug testing for candidates
for public offices, is reasonable.
Held: Georgia’s drug testing requirement,
imposed by law and enforced by state officials,
effects a search within the meaning of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. (Collection and
testing of urine to meet Georgia’s certification
statute “constitutes a search subject to the
demands of the Fourth Amendment”). As
explained in Skinner, government ordered
“collection and testing of urine intrudes upon
expectations of privacy that society has long
recognized as reasonable.” (Skinner and Von
Raab, 489 U.S., at 617). To be reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment, a search ordinarily must
be based on individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing. But particularized exceptions to the
main rule are sometimes warranted based on
“special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement.” When such “special needs”–
concerns other than crime detection–are alleged
in justification of a Fourth Amendment intrusion,
courts must undertake a context specific inquiry,
examining closely the competing private and
public interests advanced by the parties. In
limited circumstances, where the privacy interests
implicated by the search are minimal, and where
an important governmental interest furthered by
the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a
requirement of individualized suspicion, a search
may be reasonable despite the absence of such
suspicion. Our precedents establish that the
proffered special need for drug testing must be
substantial–important enough to override the
individual’s acknowledged privacy interest,
sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth
Amendment’s normal requirement of
individualized suspicion. Miller, et. al.’s defense of
the statute rests primarily on the incompatibility of
unlawful drug use with holding high state office;
but notably lacking therein is any indication of a
concrete danger demanding departure from the
Fourth Amendment’s main rule, and nothing in
the record hints that the hazards Miller, et. al.,
broadly describe (i.e. the use of illegal drugs
draws into question an official’s judgment and
integrity; jeopardizes the discharge of public
functions, including antidrug law enforcement
efforts; and undermines public confidence and
trust in elected officials) are real and not simply
hypothetical for Georgia’s polity. Further,
Georgia’s certification requirement is not well
designed to identify candidates who violate
antidrug laws; nor is the scheme a credible means
to deter illicit drug users from seeking election to
state office. What is left, after close review of
Georgia’s scheme, is the image the State seeks to
project. By requiring candidates for public office
to submit to drug testing, Georgia displays its
commitment to the struggle against drug abuse.
The need revealed, in short, is symbolic, not
“special,” as that term draws meaning from our
case law. Thus, however well meant, the
9
candidate drug test Georgia has devised
diminishes personal privacy for a symbol’s sake.
The Fourth Amendment shields society against
that state action. In fine, where the risk to public
safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless
searches calibrated to the risk may rank as
“reasonable.” But where, as herein, public safety
is not genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth
Amendment precludes the suspicionless search,
no matter how conveniently arranged.
People vs. Chua Ho San [GR 128222, 17 June 1999]
En Banc, Davide Jr. (CJ): 13 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: In response to reports of rampant
smuggling of firearms and other contraband, Jim
Lagasca Cid, as Chief of Police of the Bacnotan
Police Station, of La Union began patrolling the
Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While
monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala
on 29 March 1995, he intercepted a radio call at
around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan
Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao requesting
police assistance regarding an unfamiliar
speedboat the latter had spotted, which looked
different from the boats ordinarily used by
fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock at
Tammocalao shores. Cid and 6 of his men led by
his Chief Investigator, SPO1 Reynoso Badua,
proceeded forthwith to Tammocalao beach,
conferred with Almoite, and observed that the
speedboat ferried a lone male passenger. When
the speedboat landed, the male passenger
alighted, and using both hands, carried what
appeared a multicolored strawbag, and walked
towards the road. By this time, Almoite, Cid and
Badua, the latter two conspicuous in their uniform
and issued side-arms, became suspicious of the
man as he suddenly changed direction and
broke into a run upon seeing the approaching
officers. Badua, prevented the man from fleeing
by holding on to his right arm. Although Cid
introduced themselves as police officers, the man
appeared impassive. Speaking in English, then in
Tagalog, and later in Ilocano, Cid then requested
the man to open his bag, but he seemed not to
understand. Cid then resorted to “sign language,”
motioning with his hands for the man to open the
bag. The man apparently understood and
acceded to the request. A search of the bag
yielded several transparent plastic packets
containing yellowish crystalline substances. As Cid
wished to proceed to the police station, he
signaled the man to follow, but the latter did not
comprehend. Hence, Cid placed his arm around
the shoulders of the man and escorted the latter
to the police headquarters. At the police station,
Cid then “recited and informed the man of his
constitutional rights” to remain silent, to have the
assistance of a counsel, etc. Eliciting no response
from the man, Cid ordered his men to find a
resident of the area who spoke Chinese to act as
an interpreter. In the meantime, Badua opened
the bag and counted 29 plastic packets
containing yellowish crystalline substances. The
interpreter, Mr. Go Ping Guan, finally arrived,
through whom the man was “apprised of his
constitutional rights.” When the policemen asked
the man several questions, he retreated to his
obstinate reticence and merely showed his ID
with the name Chua Ho San printed thereon.
Chua’s bag and its contents were sent to the PNP
Crime Laboratory at Camp Diego Silang,
Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union for laboratory
examination. In the meantime, Chua was
detained at the Bacnotan Police Station. Later,
Police Chief Inspector and Forensic Chemist
Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid (wife of Cid),
conducted a laboratory examination of 29 plastic
packets, adn in her Chemistry Report D-025-95,
she stated that her qualitative examination
established the contents of the plastic packets,
weighing 28.7 kilos, to be positive of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
regulated drug. Chua was initially charged with
illegal possession of methamphetamine
hydrochloride before the RTC (Criminal Case
4037). However, pursuant to the recommendation
of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San
Fernando, La Union, the information was
subsequently amended to allege that Chua was
in violation of Section 15, Article III of RA 6425 as
amended by RA 7659 (illegal transport of a
regulated drug). At his arraignment on 31 July
1995, where the amended complaint was read to
him by a Fukien-speaking interpreter, Chua
entered a plea of not guilty. Trial finally ensued,
with interpreters assigned to Chua (upon the
RTC’s direct request to the Taipei Economic and
Cultural Office in the Philippines, after its failure to
acquire one from the Department of Foreign
Affairs). Chua provided a completely different
story, claiming that the bags belong to his
employer Cho Chu Rong, who he accompanied
in the speedboat; that they decided to dock
when they were low on fuel and telephone
battery; that the police, with nary any spoken
word but only gestures and hand movements,
escorted him to the precinct where he was
handcuffed and tied to a chair; that the police,
led by an officer, arrived with the motor engine of
the speedboat and a bag, which they presented
to him; that the police inspected opened the
bag, weighed the contents, then proclaimed
them as methamphetamine hydrochloride. In a
decision promulgated on 10 February 1997, the
RTC convicted Chua for transporting 28.7 kilos of
methamphetamine hydrochloride without legal
authority to do so. Chua prays for the reversal of
the RTC decision and his acquittal before the
Supreme Court.
10
Issue: Whether persistent reports of rampant
smuggling of firearm and other contraband
articles, Chua’s watercraft differing in
appearance from the usual fishing boats that
commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, Chua’s
illegal entry into the Philippines, Chua’s suspicious
behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee when he saw
the police authorities, and the apparent ease by
which Chua can return to and navigate his
speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the
high seas, constitute “probable cause.”
Held: No. Enshrined in the Constitution is the
inviolable right to privacy of home and person. It
explicitly ordains that people have the right to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose.
Inseparable, and not merely corollary or
incidental to said right and equally hallowed in
and by the Constitution, is the exclusionary
principle which decrees that any evidence
obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding. The
Constitutional proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures does not, of course, forestall
reasonable searches and seizure. This interdiction
against warrantless searches and seizures,
however, is not absolute and such warrantless
searches and seizures have long been deemed
permissible by jurisprudence. The Rules of Court
recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit:
(1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected
in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of escaped prisoners.
The prosecution and the defense painted
extremely divergent versions of the incident, but
the Court is certain that Chua was arrested and
his bag searched without the benefit of a warrant.
There are no facts on record reasonably
suggestive or demonstrative of Chua’s
participation in an ongoing criminal enterprise
that could have spurred police officers from
conducting the obtrusive search. The RTC never
took the pains of pointing to such facts, but
predicated mainly its decision on the finding that
“accused was caught red-handed carrying the
bagful of shabu when apprehended.” In short,
there is no probable cause. Persistent reports of
rampant smuggling of firearm and other
contraband articles, Chua’s watercraft differing in
appearance from the usual fishing boats that
commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, Chua’s
illegal entry into the Philippines, Chua’s suspicious
behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee when he saw
the police authorities, and the apparent ease by
which Chua can return to and navigate his
speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the
high seas, do not constitute “probable cause.”
None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or package
emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or
other prohibited drug, 20 confidential report
and/or positive identification by informers of
courier(s) of prohibited drug and/or the time and
place where they will transport/deliver the same,
suspicious demeanor or behavior and suspicious
bulge in the waist — accepted by the Court as
sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in the
case. There was no classified information that a
foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao
beach bearing prohibited drug on the date in
question. Chua was not identified as a drug
courier by a police informer or agent. The fact
that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no
resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did
not automatically mark him as in the process of
perpetrating an offense. The search cannot
therefore be denominated as incidental to an
arrest. To reiterate, the search was not incidental
to an arrest. There was no warrant of arrest and
the warrantless arrest did not fall under the
exemptions allowed by the Rules of Court as
already shown. From all indications, the search
was nothing but a fishing expedition. Casting
aside the regulated substance as evidence, the
same being the fruit of a poisonous tree, the
remaining evidence on record are insufficient,
feeble and ineffectual to sustain Chua’s
conviction.
People vs. Molina [GR 133917, 19 February 2001]
En Banc, Ynares-Santiago (J): 14 concur
Facts: Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino
Paguidopon, then a member of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) detailed at Precinct No. 3,
Matina, Davao City, received an information
regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana
pusher in Davao City. The first time he came to
see the said marijuana pusher in person was
during the first week of July 1996. SPO1
Paguidopon was then with his informer when a
motorcycle passed by. His informer pointed to the
motorcycle driver, Gregorio Mula y Malagura
(@”Boboy”), as the pusher. As to Nasario Molina y
Manamat (@ “Bobong”), SPO1 Paguidopon had
no occasion to see him prior to 8 August 1996. At
about 7:30 a.m. of 8 August 1996, SPO1
Paguidopon received an information that the
alleged pusher will be passing at NHA, Maa,
Davao City any time that morning. Consequently,
at around 8:00 a.m. he called for assistance at the
PNP, Precinct 3, Matina, Davao City, which
immediately dispatched the team of SPO4
Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2 Paguidopon
(brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and SPO1
Pamplona, to proceed to the house of SPO1
Marino Paguidopon where they would wait for
the alleged pusher to pass by. At around 9:30
a.m., while the team were positioned in the house
of SPO1 Paguidopon, a “trisikad” carrying Mula
and Molina passed by. At that instance, SPO1
Paguidopon pointed to Mula and Molina as the
11
pushers. Thereupon, the team boarded their
vehicle and overtook the “trisikad.” SPO1
Paguidopon was left in his house, 30 meters from
where Mula and Molina were accosted. The
police officers then ordered the “trisikad” to stop.
At that point, Mula, who was holding a black bag,
handed the same to Molina. Subsequently, SPO1
Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer
and asked Molina to open the bag. Molina
replied, “Boss, if possible we will settle this.” SPO1
Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which
revealed dried marijuana leaves inside.
Thereafter, Mula and Molina were handcuffed by
the police officers. On 6 December 1996, the
accused Mula and Molina, through counsel,
jointly filed a Demurrer to Evidence, contending
that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is
inadmissible as evidence for having been
obtained in violation of their constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
demurrer was denied by the trial court. A motion
for reconsideration was filed by the accused, but
this was likewise denied. The accused waived
presentation of evidence and opted to file a joint
memorandum. On 25 April 1997, the trial court
rendered the decision, finding the accused guilty
of the offense charged, and sentenced both to
suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection.
Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code
and Rule 122, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the
case was elevated to the Supreme Court on
automatic review.
Issue: Whether Mula and Molina manifested
outward indication that would justify their arrest,
and the seizure of prohibited drugs that were in
their possession.
Held: The fundamental law of the land mandates
that searches and seizures be carried out in a
reasonable fashion, that is, by virtue or on the
strength of a search warrant predicated upon the
existence of a probable cause. Complementary
to the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule
enshrined under Article III, Section 3, paragraph 2,
which bolsters and solidifies the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The
foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is
not without exceptions. Search and seizure may
be made without a warrant and the evidence
obtained therefrom may be admissible in the
following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful
arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3)
search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused
himself waives his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures; and (6) stop and frisk
situations (Terry search). The first exception (search
incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid
warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an
equally valid warrantless arrest which must
precede the search. Still, the law requires that
there be first a lawful arrest before a search can
be made — the process cannot be reversed.
Herein, Mula and Molina manifested no outward
indication that would justify their arrest. In holding
a bag on board a trisikad, they could not be said
to be committing, attempting to commit or have
committed a crime. It matters not that Molina
responded “Boss, if possible we will settle this” to
the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag.
Such response which allegedly reinforced the
“suspicion” of the arresting officers that Mula and
Molina were committing a crime, is an equivocal
statement which standing alone will not constitute
probable cause to effect an in flagrante delicto
arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino
Paguidopon, Mula and Molina could not be the
subject of any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise.
Further, it would appear that the names and
addresses of Mula and Molina came to the
knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they
were arrested, and such cannot lend a
semblance of validity on the arrest effected by
the peace officers. Withal, the Court holds that
the arrest of Mula and Molina does not fall under
the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the
search conducted on their person was likewise
illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the
peace officers could not be admitted as
evidence against them.
People vs. Salanguit [GR 133254-55, 19 April 2001]
Second Division, Mendoza (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 26 December 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar
applied for a warrant in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 90, Dasmariñias, Cavite, to search the
residence of Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan
St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as his
witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as
a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12
grams of shabu from Salanguit. The sale took
place in Salunguit’s room, and Badua saw that
the shabu was taken by Salunguit from a cabinet
inside his room. The application was granted, and
a search warrant was later issued by Presiding
Judge Dolores L. Español. At about 10:30 p.m. of
said day, a group of about 10 policemen, along
with one civilian informer, went to the residence
of Salunguit to serve the warrant. The police
operatives knocked on Salanguit’s door, but
nobody opened it. They heard people inside the
house, apparently panicking. The police
operatives then forced the door open and
entered the house. After showing the search
warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes
and his group started searching the house. They
found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic
bags containing a white crystalline substance, a
paper clip box also containing a white crystalline
substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which
12
appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint
having a total weight of approximately 1,255
grams. A receipt of the items seized was
prepared, but Salanguit refused to sign it. After
the search, the police operatives took Salanguit
with them to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon
City, along with the items they had seized. PO3
Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the
confiscated evidence. The white crystalline
substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams and
those contained in a small box with a total weight
of 8.37 grams were found to be positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the other
hand, the two bricks of dried leaves, one
weighing 425 grams and the other 850 grams,
were found to be marijuana. Charges against
Roberto Salanguit y Ko for violations of Republic
Act (RA) 6425, i.e. for possession of shabu and
marijuana, (Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-
64358, respectively) were filed on 28 December
1995. After hearing, the trial court rendered its
decision, convicting Salanguit in Criminal Cases
Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358 for violation of
Section 16 and 8, respectively, RA 6425, and
sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate
sentence with a minimum of 6 months of arresto
mayor and a maximum of 4 years and 2 months
of prision correccional, and reclusion perpetua
and to pay a fine of P700,000.00, respectively.
Salanguit appealed; contesting his conviction on
the grounds that (1) the admissibility of the shabu
allegedly recovered from his residence as
evidence against him on the ground that the
warrant used in obtaining it was invalid; (2) the
admissibility in evidence of the marijuana
allegedly seized from Salanguit to the “plain view”
doctrine; and (3) the employment of unnecessary
force by the police in the execution of the
warrant.
Issue: Whether the warrant was invalid for failure
of providing evidence to support the seizure of
“drug paraphernalia”, and whether the marijuana
may be included as evidence in light of the “plain
view doctrine.”
Held: The warrant authorized the seizure of
“undetermined quantity of shabu and drug
paraphernalia.” Evidence was presented showing
probable cause of the existence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The
fact that there was no probable cause to support
the application for the seizure of drug
paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion
that the search warrant is void. This fact would be
material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact
seized by the police. The fact is that none was
taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at
all, therefore, the search warrant is void only
insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug
paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of
methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which
evidence was presented showing probable cause
as to its existence. In sum, with respect to the
seizure of shabu from Salanguit’s residence,
Search Warrant 160 was properly issued, such
warrant being founded on probable cause
personally determined by the judge under oath or
affirmation of the deposing witness and
particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized. With respect to, and
in light of the “plain view doctrine,” the police
failed to allege the time when the marijuana was
found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous
with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether
it was recovered on Salanguit’s person or in an
area within his immediate control. Its recovery,
therefore, presumably during the search
conducted after the shabu had been recovered
from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in
his deposition, was invalid. Thus, the Court
affirmed the decision as to Criminal Case Q-95-
64357 only.
Sta. Rosa Mining Company vs. Assistant Provincial
Fiscal Zabala [GR L-44723, 31 August 1987]
En Banc, Bidin (J): 12 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: On 21 March 1974, Sta. Rosa Mining
Company filed a complaint for attempted theft of
materials (scrap iron) forming part of the
installations on its mining property at Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte against Romeo
Garrido and Gil Alapan with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Norte, then headed
by Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre. The case was
assigned to third Assistant Fiscal Esteban P.
Panotes for preliminary investigation who, after
conducting said investigation, issued a resolution
dated 26 August 1974 recommending that an
information for Attempted Theft be filed against
Garrido and Alapan on a finding of prima facie
case which resolution was approved by Fiscal
Ilustre. Garrido and Alapan sought
reconsideration of the resolution but the same
was denied by Fiscal Ilustre in a resolution dated
14 October 1974. On 29 October 1974, Fiscal
Ilustre filed with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Camarines Norte an Information dated 17
October 1987 (Criminal Case 821), charging
Garrido aand Alapan with the crime of
Attempted Theft. In a letter dated 22 October
1974, Garrido and Alapan requested the
Secretary of Justice for a review of the Resolutions
of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal dated 26
August 1974 and 14 October 1974. On 6
November 1974, the Chief State Prosecutor
ordered the Provincial Fiscal by telegram to
“elevate entire records PFO Case 577 against
Garrido et al., review in five days and defer all
proceedings pending review.” On 6 March 1975,
the Secretary of Justice, after reviewing the
13
records, reversed the findings of prima facie case
of the Provincial Fiscal and directed said
prosecuting officer to immediately move for the
dismissal of the criminal case. The Company
sought reconsideration of the directive of the
Secretary of Justice but the latter denied the
same in a letter dated 11 June 1975. A motion to
dismiss dated 16 September 1975 was then filed
by the Provincial Fiscal but the court denied the
motion on the ground that there was a prima
facie evidence against Garrido and Alapan and
set the case for trial on 25 February 1976. Garrido
and Alapan sought reconsideration of the court’s
ruling but in an Order dated 13 February 1976, the
motion filed for said purpose was likewise denied.
Trial of the case was reset to 23 April 1976.
Thereafter, Fiscal Ilustre was appointed a judge in
the CFI of Albay and Fiscal Zabala became
officer-in-charge of the Provincial Fiscal’s Office of
Camarines Norte. On 19 April 1976, Fiscal Zabala
filed a Second Motion to Dismiss the case. This
second motion to dismiss was denied by the trial
court in an order dated 23 April 1976. Whereupon,
Fiscal Zabala manifested that he would not
prosecute the case and disauthorized any private
prosecutor to appear therein. Hence, the
Company filed a petition for mandamus before
the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the fiscal can refuse to prosecute
the case if the Secretary of Justice reversed the
findings of prima facie case by the fiscal.
Held: If the fiscal is not at all convinced that a
prima facie case exists, he simply cannot move
for the dismissal of the case and, when denied,
refuse to prosecute the same. He is obliged by
law to proceed and prosecute the criminal
action. He cannot impose his opinion on the trial
court. At least what he can do is to continue
appearing for the prosecution and then turn over
the presentation of evidence to another fiscal or
a private prosecutor subject to his direction and
control. Where there is no other prosecutor
available, he should proceed to discharge his
duty and present the evidence to the best of his
ability and let the court decide the merits of the
case on the basis of the evidence adduced by
both parties. The mere fact that the Secretary of
Justice had, after reviewing the records of the
case, directed the prosecuting fiscal to move for
the dismissal of the case and the motion to dismiss
filed pursuant to said directive is denied by the
trial court, is no justification for the refusal of the
fiscal to prosecute the case. Once a complaint or
information is filed in Court any disposition of the
case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal
of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the
Court. The Court is the best and sole judge on
what to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss
the case filed by the fiscal should he addressed to
the Court who has the option to grant or deny the
same. It does not matter if this is done before or
after the arraignment of the accused or that the
motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the records of the investigation.
Paderanga vs. Drilon [GR 96080, 19 April 1991]
En Banc, Regalado (J): 14 concur
Facts: On 16 October 1986, an information for
multiple murder was filed in the Regional Trial
Court, Gingoog City, against Felipe Galarion,
Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie
Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe and Richard Doe, for
the deaths on 1 May 1984 of Renato Bucag, his
wife Melchora Bucag, and their son Renato
Bucag II. Venue was, however, transferred to
Cagayan de Oro City per Administrative Matter
87-2-244. Only Felipe Galarion was tried and
found guilty as charged. The rest of the accused
remained at large. Felipe Galarion, however,
escaped from detention and has not been
apprehended since then. In an amended
information filed on 6 October 1988, Felizardo
Roxas, alias “Ely Roxas,” “Fely Roxas” and “Lolong
Roxas,” was included as a co-accused. Roxas
retained Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga as his counsel.
As counsel for Roxas, Paderanga filed, among
others, an Omnibus Motion to dismiss, to Quash
the Warrant of Arrest and to Nullify the
Arraignment on 14 October 1988. The trial court in
an order dated 9 January 1989, denied the
omnibus motion but directed the City Prosecutor
“to conduct another preliminary investigation or
reinvestigation in order to grant the accused all
the opportunity to adduce whatever evidence he
has in support of his defense.” In the course of the
preliminary investigation, through a signed
affidavit, Felizardo Roxas implicated Atty.
Paderanga in the commission of the crime
charged. The City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro
City inhibited himself from further conducting the
preliminary investigation against Paderanga at
the instance of the latter’s counsel, per his
resolution dated 7 July 1989. In his first indorsement
to the Department of Justice, dated 24 July 1989,
said city prosecutor requested the Department of
Justice to designate a state prosecutor to
continue the preliminary investigation against
Paderanga. In a resolution dated 6 September
1989, the State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon,
who was designated to continue with the
conduct of the preliminary investigation against
Paderanga, directed the amendment of the
previously amended information to include and
implead Paderanga as one of the accused
therein. Paderanga moved for reconsideration,
contending that the preliminary investigation was
14
not yet completed when said resolution was
promulgated, and that he was deprived of his
right to present a corresponding counter-affidavit
and additional evidence crucial to the
determination of his alleged “linkage” to the
crime charged. The motion was, however, denied
by Gingoyon in his order dated 29 January 1990.
From the aforesaid resolution and order,
Paderanga filed a Petition for Review with the
Department of Justice. Thereafter, he submitted a
Supplemental Petition with Memorandum, and
then a Supplemental Memorandum with
Additional Exculpatory/Exonerating Evidence
Annexed, attaching thereto an affidavit of Roxas
dated 20 June 1990 and purporting to be a
retraction of his affidavit of 30 March 1990
wherein he implicated Paderanga. On 10 August
1990, the Department of Justice, through
Undersecretary Silvestre H. Bello III, issued
Resolution 648 dismissing the said petition for
review. His motion for reconsideration having
been likewise denied, Paderanga then filed the
petition for mandamus and prohibition before the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether there is no prima facie evidence,
or probable cause, or sufficient justification to
hold Paderangato a tedious and prolonged
public trial.
Held: A preliminary investigation is defined as an
inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of
determining whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well founded belief that a crime
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been
committed and that the respondent is probably
guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The
quantum of evidence now required in preliminary
investigation is such evidence sufficient to
“engender a well founded belief” as to the fact
of the commission of a crime and the
respondent’s probable guilt thereof. A preliminary
investigation is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for
the presentation of such evidence only as may
engender a well grounded belief that an offense
has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof. Preliminary investigation is
generally inquisitorial, and it is often the only
means of discovering the persons who may be
reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the
fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is
not a trial of the case on the merits and has no
purpose except that of determining whether a
crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is
guilty thereof, and it does not place the person
against whom it is taken in jeopardy. The
institution of a criminal action depends upon the
sound discretion of the fiscal. He has the quasi-
judicial discretion to determine whether or not a
criminal case should be filed in court. Hence, the
general rule is that an injunction will not be
granted to restrain a criminal prosecution. The
case of Brocka, et al. vs. Enrile, et al. cites several
exceptions to the rule, to wit: (a) To afford
adequate protection to the constitutional rights of
the accused; (b) When necessary for the orderly
administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions; (c) When there is a
prejudicial question which is sub-judice; (d) When
the acts of the officer are without or in excess of
authority; (e) Where the prosecution is under an
invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (f) When
double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (g) Where
the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (h)
Where it is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution; (i) Where the charges are manifestly
false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;
and (j) When there is clearly no prima facie case
against the accused and a motion to quash on
that ground has been denied. A careful analysis
of the circumstances obtaining in the present
case, however, will readily show that the same
does not fall under any of the aforesaid
exceptions.
Pita vs. Court of Appeals [GR 80806, 5 October
1989]
En Banc, Sarmiento (J): 10 concur, 3 concur in
result, 1 on leave
Facts: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an
Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the
City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of
the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxiliary
Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the
Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and
confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand
owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks,
magazines, publications and other reading
materials believed to be obscene, pornographic
and indecent and later burned the seized
materials in public at the University belt along
C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of
Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and
members of various student organizations. Among
the publications seized, and later burned, was
“Pinoy Playboy” magazines published and co-
edited by Leo Pita. On 7 December 1983, Pita
filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance
of the writ of preliminary injunction against Mayor
Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as
superintendent of Western Police District of the
City of Manila, seeking to enjoin and or restrain
Bagatsing, Cabrera and their agents from
confiscating his magazines or from otherwise
preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming
that the magazine is a decent, artistic and
educational magazine which is not per se
obscene, and that the publication is protected by
the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of
15
speech and of the press. On 12 December 1983,
Pita filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a
temporary restraining order against indiscriminate
seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiffs
“Pinoy Playboy” Magazines, pending hearing on
the petition for preliminary injunction in view of
Mayor Bagatsing’s pronouncement to continue
the Anti-Smut Campaign. The Court granted the
temporary restraining order on 14 December
1983. On 5 January 1984, Pita filed his
Memorandum in support of the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction, raising the issue as to
“whether or not the defendants, and or their
agents can without a court order confiscate or
seize plaintiff’s magazine before any judicial
finding is made on whether said magazine is
obscene or not.” The restraining order lapsed on 3
January 1984, Pita filed an urgent motion for
issuance of another restraining order, which was
opposed by Bagatsing on the ground that
issuance of a second restraining order would
violate the Resolution of the Supreme Court
dated 11 January 1983, providing for the Interim
Rules Relative to the Implementation of Batas
Pambansa 129, which provides that a temporary
restraining order shall be effective only for 20 days
from date of its issuance. On 11 January 1984, the
trial court issued an Order setting the case for
hearing on 16 January 1984 “for the parties to
adduce evidence on the question of whether the
publication ‘Pinoy Playboy Magazine’ alleged
(sic) seized, confiscated and or burned by the
defendants, are obscence per se or not.” On 3
February 1984, the trial court promulgated the
Order appealed from denying the motion for a
writ of preliminary injunction, and dismissing the
case for lack of merit. Likewise, the Appellate
Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the
freedom of the press is not without restraint, as the
state has the right to protect society from
pornographic literature that is offensive to public
morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the
author, publishers and sellers of obscene
publications; and that the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures recognizes
certain exceptions, as when there is consent to
the search or seizure, or search is an incident to
an arrest, or is conducted in a vehicle or movable
structure. Pita filed the petition for review with the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the Mayor can order the seizure of
“obscene” materials as a result of an anti-smut
campaign.
Held: The Court is not convinced that Bagatsing
and Cabrera have shown the required proof to
justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the
literature for which mandatory injunction had
been sought below. First of all, they were not
possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the
said materials to be pornography, and (2)
authorizing them to carry out a search and
seizure, by way of a search warrant. The fact that
the former Mayor’s act was sanctioned by “police
power” is no license to seize property in disregard
of due process. Presidential Decrees 960 and 969
are, arguably, police power measures, but they
are not, by themselves, authorities for high-
handed acts. They do not exempt our law
enforcers, in carrying out the decree of the twin
presidential issuances, from the commandments
of the Constitution, the right to due process of law
and the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, specifically. Significantly, the Decrees
themselves lay down procedures for
implementation. It is basic that searches and
seizures may be done only through a judicial
warrant, otherwise, they become unreasonable
and subject to challenge. The Court finds greater
reason to reprobate the questioned raid, in the
complete absence of a warrant, valid or invalid.
The fact that the present case involves an
obscenity rap makes it no different from Burgos vs.
Chief of Staff AFP, a political case, because
speech is speech, whether political or “obscene.”
Although the Court is not ruling out warrantless
searches, the search must have been an incident
to a lawful arrest, and the arrest must be on
account of a crime committed. Here, no party
has been charged, nor are such charges being
readied against any party, under Article 201, as
amended, of the Revised Penal Code. There is no
“accused” here to speak of, who ought to be
“punished”. Further, to say that the Mayor could
have validly ordered the raid (as a result of an
anti-smut campaign) without a lawful search
warrant because, in his opinion, “violation of
penal laws” has been committed, is to make the
Mayor judge, jury, and executioner rolled into
one. Thus, the court mae a resume, to wit: (1) The
authorities must apply for the issuance of a search
warrant from a judge, if in their opinion, an
obscenity rap is in order; (2) The authorities must
convince the court that the materials sought to
be seized are “obscene”, and pose a clear and
present danger of an evil substantive enough to
warrant State interference and action; (3) The
judge must determine whether or not the same
are indeed “obscene:” the question is to be
resolved on a case-to-case basis and on His
Honor’s sound discretion. (4) If, in the opinion of
the court, probable cause exists, it may issue the
search warrant prayed for; (5) The proper suit is
then brought in the court under Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code; and (6) Any conviction is
subject to appeal. The appellate court may assess
whether or not the properties seized are indeed
“obscene.” The Court states, however, that “these
do not foreclose, however, defenses under the
Constitution or applicable statutes, or remedies
16
against abuse of official power under the Civil
Code or the Revised Penal code.”
Abdula vs. Guiani [GR 118821, 18 February 2000]
Third Division, Gonzaga-Reyes (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 24 June 1994, a complaint for murder (IS
94-1361) was filed before the Criminal
Investigation Service Command, ARMM Regional
Office XII against Mayor Bai Unggie D. Abdula
and Odin Abdula and 6 other persons in
connection with the death of a certain Abdul
Dimalen, the former COMELEC Registrar of
Kabuntalan, Maguindanao. The complaint
alleged that the Abdulas paid the 6 other persons
the total amount of P200,000.00 for the death of
Dimalen. Acting on this complaint, the Provincial
Prosecutor of Maguindanao, Salick U. Panda, in a
Resolution dated 22 August 1994, dismissed the
charges of murder against the Abdulas and 5
other respondents on a finding that there was no
prima facie case for murder against them.
Prosecutor Panda, however, recommended the
filing of an information for murder against one of
the respondents, a certain Kasan Mama. Pursuant
to this Resolution, an information for murder was
thereafter filed against Kasan Mama before the
sala of Judge Japal M. Guiani. In an Order dated
13 September 1994, the Judge ordered that the
case (Criminal Case 2332), be returned to the
Provincial Prosecutor for further investigation. In
this Order, the judge noted that although there
were 8 respondents in the murder case, the
information filed with the court “charged only 1 of
the 8 respondents in the name of Kasan Mama
without the necessary resolution required under
Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court to
show how the investigating prosecutor arrived at
such a conclusion.” As such, the judge reasons,
the trial court cannot issue the warrant of arrest
against Kasan Mama. Upon the return of the
records of the case to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor for Maguindanao, it was assigned to
2nd Assistant Prosecutor Enok T. Dimaraw for
further investigation. In addition to the evidence
presented during the initial investigation of the
murder charge, two new affidavits of witnesses
were submitted to support the charge of murder
against the Abdulas and the other respondents in
the murder complaint. Thus, Prosecutor Dimaraw
treated the same as a re-filing of the murder
charge and pursuant to law, issued subpoena to
the respondents named therein. On 6 December
1994, the Abdulas submitted and filed their joint
counter-affidavits. After evaluation of the
evidence, Prosecutor Dimaraw, in a Resolution
dated 28 December 1994, found a prima facie
case for murder against the Abdulas and 3 other
respondents. He thus recommended the filing of
charges against the Abdulas, as principals by
inducement, and against the 3 others, as
principals by direct participation. Likewise in this
28 December 1994 Resolution, Provincial
Prosecutor Salick U. Panda, who conducted the
earlier preliminary investigation of the murder
charge, added a notation stating that he was
inhibiting himself from the case and authorizing
the investigating prosecutor to dispose of the
case without his approval. The reasons he cited
were that the case was previously handled by him
and that the victim was the father-in-law of his
son. On 2 January 1995, an information for murder
dated 28 December 1994 was filed against the
Abdulas and Kasan Mama, Cuenco Usman and
Jun Mama before Branch 14 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cotabato City, then the sala of Judge
Guiani. This information was signed by
investigating prosecutor Enok T. Dimaraw. A
notation was likewise made on the information by
Provincial Prosecutor Panda, which explained the
reason for his inhibition. The following day, the
judge issued a warrant for the arrest of the
Abdulas. Upon learning of the issuance of the said
warrant, the Abdulas filed on 4 January 1995 an
Urgent Ex-parte Motion for the setting aside of the
warrant of arrest on 4 January 1995. In this motion,
the Abdulas argued that the enforcement of the
warrant of arrest should be held in abeyance
considering that the information was prematurely
filed and that the Abdulas intended to file a
petition for review with the Department of Justice.
A petition for review was filed by the Abdulas with
the Department of Justice on 11 January 1995.
Despite said filing, the judge did not act upon the
Abdulas’ pending Motion to Set Aside the
Warrant of Arrest. The Abdulas filed the Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the judge may rely upon the
findings of the prosecutor in determining probable
cause in the issuance of search or arrest warrant.
Held: The 1987 Constitution requires the judge to
determine probable cause “personally,” a
requirement which does not appear in the
corresponding provisions of our previous
constitutions. This emphasis evinces the intent of
the framers to place a greater degree of
responsibility upon trial judges than that imposed
under previous Constitutions. Herein, the Judge
admits that he issued the questioned warrant as
there was “no reason for (him) to doubt the
validity of the certification made by the Assistant
Prosecutor that a preliminary investigation was
conducted and that probable cause was found
to exist as against those charged in the
information filed.” The statement is an admission
that the Judge relied solely and completely on
the certification made by the fiscal that probable
cause exists as against those charged in the
information and issued the challenged warrant of
arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutor’s findings
17
and recommendations. He adopted the
judgment of the prosecutor regarding the
existence of probable cause as his own. Clearly,
the judge, by merely stating that he had no
reason to doubt the validity of the certification
made by the investigating prosecutor has
abdicated his duty under the Constitution to
determine on his own the issue of probable cause
before issuing a warrant of arrest. Consequently,
the warrant of arrest should be declared null and
void.
Pasion Vda. de Garcia vs. Locsin [GR 45950, 20
June 1938]
First Division, Laurel (J): 6 concur
Facts: On 10 November 1934, Mariano G. Almeda,
an agent of the Anti-Usury Board, obtained from
the justice of the peace of Tarlac, Tarlac, a search
warrant commanding any officer of the law to
search the person, house or store of Leona Pasion
Vda. de Garcia at Victoria, Tarlac, for “certain
books, lists, chits, receipts, documents and other
papers relating to her activities as usurer.” The
search warrant was issued upon an affidavit given
by the said Almeda “that he has and there is just
and probable cause to believe and he does
believe that Leona Pasion de Garcia keeps and
conceals in her house and store at Victoria,
Tarlac, certain books, lists, chits, receipts,
documents, and other papers relating to her
activities as usurer, all of which is contrary to the
statute in such cases made and provided.” On
the same date, Almeda, accompanied by a
captain of the Philippine Constabulary, went to
the office of Pasion de Garcia in Victoria, Tarlac
and, after showing the search warrant to the
latter’s bookkeeper, Alfredo Salas, and, without
Pasion de Garcia’s presence who was ill and
confined at the time, proceeded with the
execution thereof. Two packages of records and
a locked filing cabinet containing several papers
and documents were seized by Almeda and a
receipt therefor issued by him to Salas. The papers
and documents seized were kept for a
considerable length of time by the Anti-Usury
Board and thereafter were turned over by it to the
provincial fiscal Felix Imperial, who subsequently
filed, in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac, 6
separate criminal cases against Pasion de Garcia
for violation of the Anti-Usury Law. On several
occasions, after seizure, Pasion de Garcia,
through counsel, demanded from the Anti-Usury
Board the return of the documents seized. On
January 7, and, by motion, on 4 June 1937, the
legality of the search warrant was challenged by
Pasion de Garcia’s counsel in the 6 criminal cases
and the devolution of the documents demanded.
By resolution of 5 October 1937, Judge Diego
Locsin (CFI) denied Pasion de garcia’s motion of
June 4 for the reason that though the search
warrant was illegal, there was a waiver on the
latter’s part. A motion for reconsideration was
presented but was denied by order of 3 January
1938. Pasion de Garcia registered her exception.
Issue: Whether the lack of personal examination
of witnesses renders the warrant void.
Held: Freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures is declared a popular right and for a
search warrant to be valid, (1) it must be issued
upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause
must be determined by the judge himself and not
by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the
determination of probable cause, the judge must
examine, under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and such witnesses as the latter may
produce; and (4) the warrant issued must
particularly describe the place to be searched
and persons or things to be seized. These
requirements are complemented by the Code of
Criminal Procedure, particularly with reference to
the duration of the validity of the search warrant
and the obligation of the officer seizing the
property to deliver the same to the corresponding
court. Herein, the existence of probable cause
was determined not by the judge himself but by
the applicant. All that the judge did was to
accept as true the affidavit made by agent
Almeda. He did not decide for himself. It does not
appear that he examined the applicant and his
witnesses, if any. Even accepting the description
of the properties to be seized to be sufficient and
on the assumption that the receipt issued is
sufficiently detailed within the meaning of the law,
the properties seized were not delivered to the
court which issued the warrant, as required by
law. Instead, they were turned over to the
provincial fiscal and used by him in building up
cases against Pasion de Garcia. Considering that
at the time the warrant was issued there was no
case pending against Pasion de Garcia, the
averment that the warrant was issued primarily for
exploration purposes is not without basis. The
search warrant was illegally issued by the justice
of the peace of Tarlac, Tarlac. In any event, the
failure on the part of Pasion de Garcia and her
bookkeeper to resist or object to the execution of
the warrant does not constitute an implied waiver
of constitutional right. It is, as Judge Cooley
observes, but a submission to the authority of the
law. As the constitutional guaranty is not
dependent upon any affirmative act of the
citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the
position of either contesting an officer’s authority
by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but
instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a
search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation
thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard
for the supremacy of the law.
18
Yee Sue Koy vs. Almeda [GR 47021, 15 June 1940]
Laurel (J): 3 concur, 1 concurs in result
Facts: In response to a sworn application of
Mariano G. Almeda, chief agent of the Anti-Usury
Board, dated 5 May 1938, the justice of the
peace of Sagay, Occidental Negros, after taking
the testimony of applicant’s witness, Jose Estrada,
special agent of the Anti-Usury Board, issued on
the same date a search warrant commanding
any peace officer to search during day time the
store and premises occupied by Sam Sing & Co.,
situated at Sagay, Occidental Negros, as well as
the person of said Sam Sing & Co., and to seize
the documents, notebooks, lists, receipts and
promissory notes being used by said Sam Sing &
Co. in connection with their activities of lending
money at usurious rates of interest in violation of
law, or such as may be found, and to bring them
forthwith before the aforesaid justice of the
peace of Sagay. On the same date, at 10:30 a.
m., search was accordingly made by Mariano G.
Almeda, Jose Estrada, 2 internal revenue agents
and 2 members of the Philippine Army, who
seized certain receipt books, vales or promissory
notes, chits, notebooks, journal book, and
collection list belonging to Sam Sing & Co. and
enumerated in the inventory receipt issued by
Mariano G. Almeda to the owner of the
documents, papers and articles seized.
Immediately after the search and seizure thus
effected, Mariano G. Almeda filed a return with
the justice of the peace of Sagay together. With a
request that the office of the Anti-Usury Board be
allowed to retain possession of the articles seized
for examination, pursuant to section 4 of Act 4109,
which request was granted. Under the date of 11
March 1939, Godofredo P. Escalona, counsel for
Sam Sing & Co. filed a motion with the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Occidental Negros praying
that the search warrant and the seizure effected
thereunder be declared illegal and set aside and
that the articles in question be ordered returned
to Sam Sing & Co., which motion was denied in
the order dated 24 July 1939. A similar motion was
presented to the justice of the peace of Sagay on
27 October 1939 but was denied the next day.
Meanwhile, an information dated 30 September
1939 had been filed in the CFI Occidental Negros,
charging Yee Fock alias Yee Sue Koy, Y. Tip and
A. Sing, managers of Sam Sing & Co., with a
violation of Act 2655. Before the criminal case
could be tried, Yee Sue Koy and Yee Tip filed the
petition with the Supreme Court on 6 November
1939. The petition is grounded on the propositions
(1) that the search warrant issued on 2 May 1938,
by the justice of the peace of Sagay and the
seizure accomplished thereunder are illegal,
because the warrant was issued three days
ahead of the application therefor and of the
affidavit of the Jose Estrada which is insufficient in
itself to justify the issuance of a search warrant,
and because the issuance of said warrant
manifestly contravenes the mandatory provisions
both of section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the
Constitution and of section 97 of General Orders
58, and (2) that the seizure of the aforesaid
articles by means of a search warrant for the
purpose of using them as evidence in the criminal
case against the accused, is unconstitutional
because the warrant thereby becomes
unreasonable and amounts to a violation of the
constitutional prohibition against compelling the
accused to testify against themselves.
Issue: Whether the application of the search
warrant is supported by the personal knowledge
of the witness, besides the applicant, for the
judge to determine probable cause in issuing the
warrant.
Held: Strict observance of the formalities under
section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the
Constitution and of section 97 of General Orders
58 was followed. The applicant Mariano G.
Almeda, in his application, swore that “he made
his own personal investigation and ascertained
that Sam Sing & Co. is lending money without
license, charging usurious rate of interest and is
keeping, utilizing and concealing in the store and
premises occupied by it situated at Sagay,
Occidental Negros, documents, notebooks, lists,
receipts, promissory notes, and book of accounts
and records, all of which are being used by it in
connection with its activities of lending money at
usurious rate of interest in violation of the Usury
Law.” In turn, the witness Jose Estrada, in his
testimony before the justice of the peace of
Sagay, swore that he knew that Sam Sing & Co.
was lending money without license and charging
usurious rate of interest, because he personally
investigated the victims who had secured loans
from said Sam Sing & Co. and were charged
usurious rate of interest; that he knew that the said
Sam Sing & Co. was keeping and using books of
accounts and records containing its transactions
relative its activities as money lender and the
entries of the interest paid by its debtors, because
he saw the said Sam Sing & d make entries and
records of their debts and the interest paid
thereon. As both Mariano G. Almeda and Jose
Estrada swore that they had personal knowledge,
their affidavits were sufficient for, thereunder, they
could be held liable for perjury if the facts would
turn out to be not as their were stated under oath.
That the existence of probable cause had been
determined by the justice of the peace of Sagay
before issuing the search warrant complained of,
is shown by the following statement in the warrant
itself, to wit: “After examination under oath of the
complainant, Mariano G. Almeda, Chief Agent of
the Anti-Usury Board, Department of Justice and
19
Special Agent of the Philippine Army, Manila, and
the witness he presented, . . . and this Court,
finding that there is just and probable cause to
believe as it does believe, that the above
described articles, relating to the activities of said
Sam Sing & Co. of lending money at usurious rate
of interest, are being utilized and kept and
concealed at its store and premises occupied by
said Sam Sing & Co., all in violation of law.”
Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas [GR
45358, 29 January 1937]
First Division, Imperial (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 3 June 1936, the chief of the secret
service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the Department
of Justice, presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez
David then presiding over the Court of First
Instance of Tayabas, an affidavit alleging that
according to reliable information, Narciso Alvarez
kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, books,
documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers
used by him in connection with his activities as a
moneylender, charging usurious rates of interest in
violation of the law. In his oath at the end of the
affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated
that his answers to the questions were correct to
the best of his knowledge and belief. He did not
swear to the truth of his statements upon his own
knowledge of the facts but upon the information
received by him from a reliable person. Upon the
affidavit the judge, on said date, issued the
warrant which is the subject matter of the petition,
ordering the search of the Alvarez’s house at any
time of the day or night, the seizure of the books
and documents and the immediate delivery
thereof to him to be disposed of in accordance
with the law. With said warrant, several agents of
the Anti-Usury Board entered Alvarez’s store and
residence at 7:00 p.m. of 4 June 1936, and seized
and took possession of the following articles:
internal revenue licenses for the years 1933 to
1936, 1 ledger, 2 journals, 2 cashbooks, 9 order
books, 4 notebooks, 4 check stubs, 2
memorandums, 3 bankbooks, 2 contracts, 4 stubs,
48 stubs of purchases of copra, 2 inventories, 2
bundles of bills of lading, 1 bundle of credit
receipts, 1 bundle of stubs of purchases of copra,
2 packages of correspondence, 1 receipt book
belonging to Luis Fernandez, 14 bundles of
invoices and other papers, many documents and
loan contracts with security and promissory notes,
504 chits, promissory notes and stubs of used
checks of the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
Corporation (HSBC). The search for and seizure of
said articles were made with the opposition of
Alvarez who stated his protest below the
inventories on the ground that the agents seized
even the originals of the documents. As the
articles had not been brought immediately to the
judge who issued the search warrant, Alvarez,
through his attorney, filed a motion on 8 June
1936, praying that the agent Emilio L. Siongco, or
any other agent, be ordered immediately to
deposit all the seized articles in the office of the
clerk of court and that said agent be declared
guilty of contempt for having disobeyed the order
of the court. On said date the court issued an
order directing Siongco to deposit all the articles
seized within 24 hours from the receipt of notice
thereof and giving him a period of 5 days within
which to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt of court. On 10 June,
Attorney Arsenio Rodriguez, representing the Anti-
Usury Board, filed a motion praying that the order
of the 8th of said month be set aside and that the
Anti-Usury Board be authorized to retain the
articles seized for a period of 30 days for the
necessary investigation. On June 25, the court
issued an order requiring agent Siongco forthwith
to file the search warrant and the affidavit in the
court, together with the proceedings taken by
him, and to present an inventory duly verified by
oath of all the articles seized. On July 2, the
attorney for the petitioner filed a petition alleging
that the search warrant issued was illegal and
that it had not yet been returned to date
together with the proceedings taken in
connection therewith, and praying that said
warrant be cancelled, that an order be issued
directing the return of all the articles seized to
Alvarez, that the agent who seized them be
declared guilty of contempt of court, and that
charges be filed against him for abuse of
authority. On September 10, the court issued an
order holding: that the search warrant was
obtained and issued in accordance with the law,
that it had been duly complied with and,
consequently, should not be cancelled, and that
agent Siongco did not commit any contempt of
court and must, therefore, be exonerated, and
ordering the chief of the Anti-Usury Board in
Manila to show cause, if any, within the
unextendible period of 2 days from the date of
notice of said order, why all the articles seized
appearing in the inventory should not be returned
to Alvarez. The assistant chief of the Anti-Usury
Board of the Department of Justice filed a motion
praying, for the reasons stated therein, that the
articles seized be ordered retained for the
purpose of conducting an investigation of the
violation of the Anti-Usury Law committed by
Alvarez. On October 10, said official again filed
another motion alleging that he needed 60 days
to examine the documents and papers seized,
which are designated on pages 1 to 4 of the
inventory by Nos. 5, 10, 16, 23, 25-27, 30-31 , 34, 36-
43 and 45, and praying that he be granted said
period of 60 days. In an order of October 16, the
court granted him the period of 60 days to
investigate said 19 documents. Alvarez, herein,
asks that the search warrant as well as the order
20
authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury Board to
retain the articles seized, be declared illegal and
set aside, and prays that all the articles in question
be returned to him.
Issue: Whether the search warrant issued by the
court is illegal because it has been based upon
the affidavit of agent Almeda in whose oath he
declared that he had no personal knowledge of
the facts which were to serve as a basis for the
issuance of the warrant but that he had
knowledge thereof through mere information
secured from a person whom he considered
reliable, and that it is illegal as it was not
supported by other affidavits aside from that
made by the applicant.
Held: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the
Constitution and Section 97 of General Orders 58
require that there be not only probable cause
before the issuance of a search warrant but that
the search warrant must be based upon an
application supported by oath of the applicant
and the witnesses he may produce. In its broadest
sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by
which a party signifies that he is bound in
conscience to perform an act faithfully and
truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an
outward pledge given by the person taking it that
his attestation or promise is made under an
immediate sense of his responsibility to God. The
oath required must refer to the truth of the facts
within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or
his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to
convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the
issuance of the warrant, of the existence of
probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an
affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is
whether it has been drawn in such a manner that
perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be
held liable for damages caused. The affidavit,
which served as the exclusive basis of the search
warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by
reason of the manner in which the oath was
made, and therefore, the search warrant and the
subsequent seizure of the books, documents and
other papers are illegal. Further, it is the practice
in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least
the applicant or complainant to the application.
It is admitted that the judge who issued the
search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon
the affidavit made by agent Almeda and that he
did not require nor take the deposition of any
other witness. Neither the Constitution nor General
Orders 58 provides that it is of imperative necessity
to take the depositions of the witnesses to be
presented by the applicant or complainant in
addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose
of both in requiring the presentation of depositions
is nothing more than to satisfy the committing
magistrate of the existence of probable cause.
Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or
complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense
with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the
affidavit of the agent was insufficient because his
knowledge of the facts was not personal but
merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to
require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for
the purpose of determining the existence of
probable cause to warrant the issuance of the
search warrant. When the affidavit of the
applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts
within his personal and direct knowledge, it is
sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists
probable cause; when the applicant’s
knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the
affidavit of one or more witnesses having a
personal knowledge of the facts is necessary. Thus
the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was
based only on the affidavit of the agent who had
no personal knowledge of the facts.
Mata vs. Bayona [GR 50720, 26 March 1984]
Second Division, de Castro (J): 3 concur, 2 concur
in result, 1 took no part
Facts: Soriano Mata was accused under
Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as amended by PD
1306, the information against him alleging that
Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on
the Jai Alai game by “selling illegal tickets known
as ‘Masiao tickets’ without any authority from the
Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or
from the government authorities concerned.”
Mata claimed that during the hearing of the
case, he discovered that nowhere from the
records of the said case could be found the
search warrant and other pertinent papers
connected to the issuance of the same, so that
he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its
whereabouts, and to which inquiry Judge
Josephine K. Bayona, presiding Jufe of the City
Court of Ormoc replied, “it is with the court”. The
Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who
attached them to the records. This led Mata to file
a motion to quash and annul the search warrant
and for the return of the articles seized, citing and
invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of
the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was
denied by the Judge on 1 March 1979, stating
that the court has made a thorough investigation
and examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles
and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the
Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police
District II INP; that in fact the court made a
certification to that effect; and that the fact that
documents relating to the search warrant were
not attached immediately to the record of the
criminal case is of no moment, considering that
the rule does not specify when these documents
are to be attached to the records. Mata’s motion
21
for reconsideration of the aforesaid order having
been denied, he came to the Supreme Court,
with the petition for certiorari, praying, among
others, that the Court declare the search warrant
to be invalid for its alleged failure to comply with
the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of
Court, and that all the articles confiscated under
such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the
case, or in any proceedings on the matter.
Issue: Whether the judge must before issuing the
warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation
the complainant and any witnesses he may
produce and take their depositions in writing, and
attach them to the record, in addition to any
affidavits presented to him.
Held: Under the Constitution “no search warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause to be
determined by the Judge or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce”.
More emphatic and detailed is the implementing
rule of the constitutional injunction, The Rules
provide that the judge must before issuing the
warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation
the complainant and any witnesses he may
produce and take their depositions in writing, and
attach them to the record, in addition to any
affidavits presented to him. Mere affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses are thus not
sufficient. The examining Judge has to take
depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and to attach them to
the record. Such written deposition is necessary in
order that the Judge may be able to properly
determine the existence or nonexistence of the
probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the
person giving it if it will be found later that his
declarations are false. We, therefore, hold that
the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the
failure of the Judge to conform with the essential
requisites of taking the depositions in writing and
attaching them to the record, rendering the
search warrant invalid.
Olaes vs. People of the Philippines [GR 78347-49, 9
November 1987]
First Division, Cruz (J): 4 concur
Facts: Adolfo Olaes and Linda M. Cruz were
charged for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Olaes and Cruz filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction, challenging
the admission by Judge Alicia L. Santos (in her
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Olongapo City, Branch 73) of evidence
seized by virtue of an allegedly invalid search
warrant and of an extrajudicial confession taken
from them without according them the right to
assistance of counsel; and thus seek to restrain
further proceedings in the criminal case against
them and ask that they be acquitted with the
setting aside of the questioned orders (the facts
do not provide the disposition of the said orders).
Olaes and Cruz claim that the search warrant
issued by the judge is unconstitutional because it
does not indicate the specific offense they are
supposed to have committed. There is, therefore,
according to them, no valid finding of probable
cause as a justification for the issuance of the said
warrant in conformity with the Bill of Rights.
Issue: Whether the lack of specific section of the
Dangerous Drugs Act renders the caption vague,
and negate the claim that the specific offense
was committed to serve as basis for the finding of
probable cause.
Held: No. The search warrant issued does not
come under the strictures of the Stonehill doctrine.
While in the case cited, there was a bare
reference to the laws in general, without any
specification of the particular sections thereof
that were alleged to have been violated out of
the hundreds of prohibitions contained in such
codifications, there is no similar ambiguity herein.
While it is true that the caption of the search
warrant states that it is in connection with
“Violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Acts of 1972,” it is clearly recited
in the text thereof that “There is probable cause
to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias ‘Debie’ and
alias ‘Baby’ of No. 628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta.
Rita, Olongapo City, has in their possession and
control and custody of marijuana dried
stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other
regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics
preparations which is the subject of the offense
stated above.” Although the specific section of
the Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there
is no question at all of the specific offense alleged
to have been committed as a basis for the finding
of probable cause. The search warrant also
satisfies the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the
particularity of the description to be made of the
“place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
Prudente vs. Dayrit [GR 82870, 14 December 1989]
En Banc, Padilla (J): 14 concur
Facts: On 31 October 1987, P/Major Alladin
Dimagmaliw, Chief of the Intelligence Special
Action Division (ISAD) of the Western Police District
(WPD), filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 33, presided over by Judge
Abelardo Dayrit, now Associate Justice of the
Court of Appeals, an application for the issuance
22
of a search warrant (Search Warrant 87-14) for
violation of Presidential Decree 1866 (Illegal
Possession of Firearms, etc.) entitled “People of
the Philippines vs. Nemesio E. Prudente.” On the
same day, the Judge issued the Search Warrant,
commanding Dimagmaliw “to make an
immediate search at any time in the day or night
of the premises of Polytechnic University of the
Philippines, more particularly (a) offices of the
Department of Military Science and Tactics at the
ground floor and other rooms at the ground floor;
(b) office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente
at PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at the
second floor, and forthwith seize and take
possession of the following personal properties, to
wit: (a) M 16 Armalites with ammunition; (b) .38
and .45 Caliber handguns and pistols; (c)
explosives and hand grenades; and (d) assorted
weapons with ammunitions.” On 1 November
1987, a Sunday and All Saints Day, the search
warrant was enforced by some 200 WPD
operatives led by P/Col. Edgar Dula Torre, Deputy
Superintendent, WPD, and P/Major Romeo
Maganto, Precinct 8 Commander. In his affidavit,
dated 2 November 1987, Ricardo Abando y
Yusay, a member of the searching team, alleged
that he found in the drawer of a cabinet inside
the wash room of Dr. Prudente’s office a bulging
brown envelope with 3 live fragmentation hand
grenades separately wrapped with old
newspapers. On 6 November 1987, Prudente
moved to quash the search warrant. He claimed
that (1) the complainant’s lone witness, Lt.
Florenio C. Angeles, had no personal knowledge
of the facts which formed the basis for the
issuance of the search warrant; (2) the
examination of the said witness was not in the
form of searching questions and answers; (3) the
search warrant was a general warrant, for the
reason that it did not particularly describe the
place to be searched and that it failed to charge
one specific offense; and (4) the search warrant
was issued in violation of Circular 19 of the
Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to
allege under oath that the issuance of the search
warrant on a Saturday was urgent. On 9 March
1988, the Judge issued an order, denying
Prudente’s motion and supplemental motion to
quash. Prudente’s motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied in the order dated 20 April 1988.
Prudente filed a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the allegations contained in the
application of P/ Major Alladin Dimagmaliw and
the declaration of P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles in his
deposition were sufficient basis for the issuance of
a valid search warrant.
Held: The “probable cause” for a valid search
warrant, has been defined “as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed, and that objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched.” This probable
cause must be shown to be within the personal
knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses
he may produce and not based on mere
hearsay. Thus, for a valid search warrant to issue,
there must be probable cause, which is to be
determined personally by the judge, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The probable cause must be in connection with
one specific offense,and the judge must, before
issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form
of searching questions and answers, in writing and
under oath, the complainant and any witness he
may produce, on facts personally known to them
and attach to the record their sworn statements
together with any affidavits submitted. Herein, in
his application for search warrant, P/Major Alladin
Dimagmaliw stated that “he has been informed”
that Nemesio Prudente “has in his control and
possession” the firearms and explosives described
therein, and that he “has verified the report and
found it to be a fact.” On the other hand, in his
supporting deposition, P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles
declared that, as a result of their continuous
surveillance for several days, they “gathered
informations from verified sources” that the
holders of the said firearms and explosives are not
licensed to possess them. In other words, the
applicant and his witness had no personal
knowledge of the facts and circumstances which
became the basis for issuing the questioned
search warrant, but acquired knowledge thereof
only through information from other sources or
persons. While it is true that in his application for
search warrant, applicant P/Major Dimagmaliw
stated that he verified the information he had
earlier received that petitioner had in his
possession and custody the firearms and
explosives described in the application, and that
he found it to be a fact, yet there is nothing in the
record to show or indicate how and when said
applicant verified the earlier information acquired
by him as to justify his conclusion that he found
such information to be a fact. He might have
clarified this point if there had been searching
questions and answers, but there were none. In
fact, the records yield no questions and answers,
whether searching or not, vis-a-vis the said
applicant. Evidently, the allegations contained in
the application of P/ Major Alladin Dimagmaliw
and the declaration of P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles in
his deposition were insufficient basis for the
issuance of a valid search warrant.
23
Chia vs. Acting Collector of Customs [GR L-43810,
26 September 1989]
First Division, Grino-Aquino (J): 4 concur
Facts: Acting on a verified report of a confidential
informant that assorted electronic and electrical
equipment and other articles illegally imported
into the Philippines by a syndicate engaged in
unlawful “shipside” activities (foreign goods are
unloaded from foreign ships in transit through
Philippine waters into motorized bancas and
landed on Philippine soil without passing through
the Bureau of Customs, thereby evading payment
of the corresponding customs duties and taxes
thereon) were found inside “Tom’s Electronics”
and “Sony Merchandising (Philippines)” stores
located at 690 and 691 Gonzalo Puyat corner
Evangelista Street, Quiapo, Manila, a letter-
request dated 23 April 1976 was addressed to the
Collector of Customs by the Deputy Director of
the Regional Anti-Smuggling Action Center,
Manila Bay Area (RASAC-MBA) for the issuance of
warrants of seizure and detention. After
evaluation, the Collector of Customs issued
Warrants of Seizure and Detention 14925 and
14925-A, directing the Anti-Smuggling Action
Center to seize the goods mentioned therein, i.e.
various electronic equipments like cassette tape
recorders, car stereos, phonograph needles
(diamond), portable TV sets, imported long
playing records, spare parts of TVs and radios and
other electrical appliances. A RASAC team was
formed and given a mission order to enforce the
warrants, which it implemented with the
assistance of: (1) the National Customs Police
(augmenting the team with 2 members), (2) the
Detective Bureau of the Manila Western Police
District Headquarters (with 3 detectives), as well
as, (3) Precinct 3 of the Manila Western Police
District which exercised jurisdictional control over
the place to be raided. The intended raid was
entered in the respective police blotters of the
police detective bureaus. On the strength of the
warrants of seizure and detention, the raid was
conducted in the afternoon of 25 April 1976 at the
2 stores of Tomas Chia. ASAC team leader Gener
Sula, together with his agents Badron Dobli, Arturo
Manuel, Rodolfo Molina and Servillano Florentin of
Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, assisted by two
customs policemen, Val Martinez and Renato
Sorima, and Manila policemen Rogelio Vinas and
John Peralta, recovered from the stores, assorted
electronic equipment and other articles, the
customs duties on which allegedly had not been
paid. They were turned over to the Customs
Auction and Cargo Disposal Unit of the Bureau of
Customs. On 17 May 1976, in the afternoon, the
hearing officer of Acting Collector of Customs
Alfredo Francisco conducted a hearing on the
confiscation of the goods taken by Gener Sula
and his agents. 2 days later, Chia filed the petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before
the Supreme Court to enjoin the Collector of
Customs and/or his agents from further
proceeding with the forfeiture hearing and
prayed that the search warrants be declared null
and void, that the latter be ordered to return the
confiscated articles to Chia, and to pay
damages.
Issue: Whether the warrants issued by the
Collector of Customs partakes the nature of a
general warrants, and thus are invalid.
Held: Not only may goods be seized without a
search and seizure warrant under Section 2536 of
the Customs and Tariff Code, when they (the
goods) are openly offered for sale or kept in
storage in a store as herein, but the fact is that
Chia’s stores — “Tom’s Electronics” and “Sony
Merchandising (Phil.)” — were searched upon
warrants of search and detention issued by the
Collector of Customs, who, under the 1973
Constitution, was “a responsible officer authorized
by law” to issue them. Sections 2208 and 2209 of
the Tariff and Customs Code provide when a
search may be made without a warrant and
when a warrant is necessary. Section 2208
provides that “For the more effective discharge of
his official duties, any person exercising the
powers herein conferred, may at any time enter,
pass through or search any land or inclosure or
any warehouse, store or other building, not being
a dwelling house. A warehouse, store or other
building or inclosure used for the keeping or
storage of articles does not become a dwelling
house within the meaning hereof merely by
reason of the fact that a person employed as
watchman lives in the place, nor will the fact that
his family stays there with him alter the case.” On
the other hand, Section 2209 provides that “A
dwelling house may be entered and searched
only upon warrant issued by a Judge of the court
or such other responsible officers as may be
authorized by law, upon sworn application
showing probable cause and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
person or thing to be seized.” The warrants issued
by the Collector of Customs in this case were not
general warrants for they identified the stores to
be searched, described the articles to be seized
and specified the provision of the Tariff and
Customs Code violated. Upon effecting the
seizure of the goods, the Bureau of Customs
acquired exclusive jurisdiction not only over the
case but also over the goods seized for the
purpose of enforcing the tariff and customs laws.
Further, a party dissatisfied with the decision of the
Collector may appeal to the Commissioner of
Customs, whose decision is appealable to the
Court of Tax Appeals in the manner and within the
period prescribed by law and regulations. The
24
decision of the Court of Tax Appeals may be
elevated to the Supreme Court for review. Since
Chia did not exhaust his administrative remedies,
his recourse to this Court is premature.
20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals [GR L-76649-51, 19 August 1988]
Third Division, Gutierrez J. (J): 4 concur
Facts: In a letter-complaint dated 26 August 1985,
20th Century Fox Film Corporation through
counsel sought the National Bureau of
Investigation’s (NBI) assistance in the conduct of
searches and seizures in connection with the NBI’s
anti-film piracy campaign. Specifically, the letter-
complaint alleged that certain videotape outlets
all over Metro Manila are engaged in the
unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted
films in videotape form which constitute a flagrant
violation of Presidential Decree 49 (Decree on the
Protection of Intellectual Property). Acting on the
letter-complaint, the NBI conducted surveillance
and investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the
film corporation and subsequently filed 3
applications for search warrants against the video
outlets owned by Eduardo M. Barreto, Raul
Sagullo, and Fortune Ledesma. The applications
were consolidated and heard by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 132. On 4
September 1985, the lower court issued the
desired search warrants, describing the articles
sought to be seized as”(c) Television sets, Video
Cassettes Recorders, rewinders, tape head
cleaners, accessories, equipments and other
machines used or intended to be used in the
unlawful reproduction, sale, rental/lease,
distribution of the above-mentioned video tapes
which she is keeping and concealing in the
premises above-described.”. Armed with the
search warrants, the NBI accompanied by the film
corporation’s agents, raided the video outlets
and seized the items described therein. An
inventory of the items seized was made and left
with Barreto, et. al. Acting on a motion to lift
search warrants and release seized properties
filed by Barreto, et. al., the lower court issued an
order dated 8 October 1985, lifting the 3 search
warrants issued earlier against them by the court,
due to the failure of the NBI to deliver the articles
to the Court, and thus ordered the return of the
articles to their respective owners. The lower court
denied a motion for reconsideration filed by the
film corporation in its order dated 2 January 1986.
The film corporation filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals to annul the orders of
the lower court. The petition was dismissed. The
20th Century Fox Film Corporation filed the
petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the inclusion of certain articles of
property which are usually connected to
legitimate business, and not involving piracy of
intellectual property or infringement of copyright
laws, renders the warrant to be unreasonable.
Held: Television sets, video cassette recorders,
rewinders and tape cleaners are articles which
can be found in a video tape store engaged in
the legitimate business of lending or renting out
betamax tapes. In short, these articles and
appliances are generally connected with, or
related to a legitimate business not necessarily
involving piracy of intellectual property or
infringement of copyright laws. Hence, including
these articles without specification and/or
particularity that they were really instruments in
violating an Anti-Piracy law makes the search
warrant too general which could result in the
confiscation of all items found in any video store.
In fact, this actually happened in the present
case. Although the applications and warrants
themselves covered certain articles of property
usually found in a video store, the Court believes
that the search party should have confined
themselves to articles that are according to them,
evidence constitutive of infringement of copyright
laws or the piracy of intellectual property, but not
to other articles that are usually connected with,
or related to, a legitimate business, not involving
piracy of intellectual property, or infringement of
copyright laws. So that a television set, a rewinder,
and a whiteboard listing Betamax tapes, video
cassette cleaners video cassette recorders as
reflected in the Returns of Search Warrants, are
items of legitimate business engaged in the video
tape industry, and which could not be the subject
of seizure. The applicant and his agents therefore
exceeded their authority in seizing perfectly
legitimate personal property usually found in a
video cassette store or business establishment. The
search and seizure is unreasonable.
Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano [GR L-69803, 8 October
1985]
En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (J): 7 concur, 1
concurs in the result, 1 took no part, 1 reserves his
vote
Facts: Prior to 6 August 1984, Mila Aguilar-Roque
was one of the accused of Rebellion in Criminal
Case SMC-1-1 before Special Military Commission
1, and also one of the accused of Subversion in
Criminal Case MC-25-113 of Military Commission
25, both cases being entitled “People of the
Philippines vs. Jose Ma. Sison, et al.” She was then
still at large. At around 9:00 a.m. on August 6, Lt.
Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a
Search Warrant from the Hon. Ernani Cruz Paño,
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in
25
Quezon City, to be served at No. 239-B Mayon
Street, Quezon City, determined to be the leased
residence of Aguilar-Roque, after almost a month
of “round the clock surveillance” of the premises
as a “suspected underground house of the
CPP/NPA.” Aguilar-Roque has been long wanted
by the military for being a high ranking officer of
the Communist Party of the Philippines,
particularly connected with the MV
Karagatan/Doña Andrea cases. At 11:30 a.m.,
Aguilar-Roque and Cynthia D. Nolasco were
arrested by a Constabulary Security Group (CSG)
at the intersection of Mayon Street and P. Margall
Street, Quezon City. The record does not disclose
that a warrant of arrest had previously been
issued against Nolasco. At 12:00 noon on the
same day, elements of the CSG searched the
premises at 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City.
Willie C. Tolentino, a person then in charge of the
premises, was arrested by the searching party
presumably without a warrant of arrest. The
searching party seized 428 documents and
written materials, and additionally a portable
typewriter, and 2 wooden boxes, making 431
items in all. On August 10, Aguilar-Roque, Nolasco
and Tolentino, were charged before the Quezon
City Fiscal’s Office upon complaint filed by the
CSG against the former for “Subversion/Rebellion
and/or Conspiracy to Commit
Rebellion/Subversion. On August 13, the City Fiscal
filed an Information for Violation of Presidential
Decree (PD) 33 (Illegal Possession of Subversive
Documents) against Aguilar-Roque, et. al. before
Branch 42 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City, Judge Antonio P. Santos, presiding.
On August 16, CSG filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with the City Fiscal, praying that
Aguilar-Roque and Nolasco be charged with
Subversion. The Motion was denied on November
16. On September 10, the CSG submitted an
Amended Return in the Search Warrant case
praying, inter alia, that the CSG be allowed to
retain the seized 431 documents and articles, “in
connection with cases that are presently pending
against Mila Aguilar Roque before the Quezon
City Fiscal’s Office and the court.” On December
13, Judge Paño admitted the Amended Return
and ruled that the seized documents “shall be
subject to disposition of the tribunal trying the
case against respondent.” A day before that,
Aguilar-Roque, et. al. filed a Motion to Suppress,
praying that such of the 431 items belonging to
them be returned to them. It was claimed that the
proceedings under the Search Warrant were
unlawful. Judge Santos denied the Motion on 7
January 1985 on the ground that the validity of
the Search Warrant has to be litigated in the other
case, apparently unaware of the Order issued by
Judge Paño on December 13. Nolasco, Aguilar-
Roque, and Tolentino filed the Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus to annul
and set aside the (1) Search Warrant issued by
RTC Judge Paño; (2) his Order admitting the
Amended Return and granting the Motion to
Retain Seized Items; and (3) Order of MTC Judge
Santos denying Aguilar-Roque, et. al.’s Motion to
Suppress.
Issue: Whether the description of the personalities
to be seized in the search warrant is too general
to render the warrant void.
Held: The disputed Search Warrant (80-84)
describes the personalities to be seized as
“Documents, papers and other records of the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples
Army and/or the National Democratic Front, such
as Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of these
groups, Programs, List of possible supporters,
subversive books and instructions, manuals not
otherwise available to the public, and support
money from foreign or local sources.” It is at once
evident that the Search Warrant authorizes the
seizure of personal properties vaguely described
and not particularized. It is an all-embracing
description which includes everything
conceivable regarding the Communist Party of
the Philippines and the National Democratic
Front. It does not specify what the subversive
books and instructions are; what the manuals not
otherwise available to the public contain to make
them subversive or to enable them to be used for
the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite
guideline to the searching team as to what items
might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of
the law discretion regarding what articles they
should seize as, in fact, taken also were a
portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus
in the nature of a general warrant and infringes
on the constitutional mandate requiring particular
description of the things to be seized. Search
warrants of similar description were considered
null and void for being too general.
Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the
Search Warrant and although, ordinarily, the
articles seized under an invalid search warrant
should be returned, they cannot be ordered
returned to Aguilar-Roque. Some searches may
be made without a warrant. Section 12, Rule 126,
Rules of Court, is declaratory in the sense that it is
confined to the search, without a search warrant,
of a person who had been arrested. It is also a
general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the
place or premises where the arrest was made can
also be search without a search warrant. In this
latter case, “the extent and reasonableness of the
search must be decided on its own facts and
circumstances, and it has been stated that, in the
application of general rules, there is some
confusion in the decisions as to what constitutes
the extent of the place or premises which may be
searched”. Considering that Aguilar-Roque has
26
been charged with Rebellion, which is a crime
against public order; that the warrant for her
arrest has not been served for a considerable
period of time; that she was arrested within the
general vicinity of her dwelling; and that the
search of her dwelling was made within a half
hour of her arrest, the Court was of the opinion
that, in her respect, the search at No. 239-B
Mayon Street, Quezon City, did not need a
search warrant; this, for possible effective results in
the interest of public order. Such being the case,
the personalities seized may be retained by CSG,
for possible introduction as evidence in the
Rebellion Case, leaving it to Aguilar-Roque to
object to their relevance and to ask Special
Military Commission 1 to return to her any all
irrelevant documents and articles.
PICOP - Paper Industries Corporation of the
Philippines vs. Asuncion [GR 122092, 19 May 1999]
Third Division, Panganiban (J): 3 concur, 1 took no
part
Facts: On 25 January 1995, Police Chief Inspector
Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search warrant
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 104,
of Quezon City, stating “(1) that the management
of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines,
located at PICOP compound, Barangay Tabon,
Bislig, Surigao del Sur, represented by its Sr. Vice
President Ricardo G. Santiago, is in possession or
has in its control high powered firearms,
ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject of
the offense, or used or intended to be used in
committing the offense, and which are being
kept and concealed in the premises herein
described; (2) that a Search Warrant should be
issued to enable any agent of the law to take
possession and bring to this Honorable Court the
following described properties: ‘Seventy (70) M16
Armalite rifles cal. 5.56, ten (10) M16 US rifles, two
(2) AK-47 rifle[s], two (2) UZI submachinegun[s],
two (2) M203 Grenade Launcher[s] cal 40mm.,
ten (10) cal. 45 pistol[s], ten (10) cal. 38 revolver[s],
two (2) ammunition reloading machine[s],
assorted ammunitions for said calibers of firearms
and ten (10) handgrenades.’” The joint Deposition
of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T.
Morito, as well as a summary of the information
and the supplementary statements of Mario Enad
and Felipe Moreno were attached to the
application. After propounding several questions
to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued
the contested search warrant. On 4 February
1995, the police enforced the search warrant at
the PICOP compound and seized various firearms
and ammunition. Believing that the warrant was
invalid and the search unreasonable, Paper
Industries Corporation of the Philippines, Evaristo
M. Narvaez Jr., Ricardo G. Santiago, Roberto A.
Dormendo, Reydande D. Azucena, Niceforo V.
Avila, Florentino M. Mula, Felix O. Baito, Harold B.
Celestial, Elmedencio C. Calixtro, Carlito S.
Legacion, Albino T. Lubang, Jeremias I. Abad and
Herminio V. Villamil filed a “Motion to Quash” 16
before the trial court. Subsequently, they also filed
a “Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to
Quash” and a “Motion to Suppress Evidence.” On
23 March 1995, the RTC issued the Order which
denied PICOP, et. al.’s motions. On 3 August 1995,
the trial court rendered its Order denying their
Motion for Reconsideration. PICOP, et. al. filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
Issue: Whether the fact that the warrant identifies
only one place, i.e. the “Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP
Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del
Sur,” satisfies the requirements of the particularity
of the place to be search, and thus render the
warrant valid.
Held: No. The fundamental right against
unreasonable searches and seizures and the
basic conditions for the issuance of a search
warrant are laid down in Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution. Consistent with the foregoing
constitutional provision, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court, detail the requisites for the
issuance of a valid search warrant. The requisites
of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause
is present; (2) such presence is determined
personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and
the witnesses he or she may produce are
personally examined by the judge, in writing and
under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and
the witnesses testify on facts personally known to
them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes
the place to be searched and the things to be
seized. In view of the manifest objective of the
constitutional safeguard against unreasonable
search, the Constitution and the Rules limit the
place to be searched only to those described in
the warrant. Thus, this Court has held that “this
constitutional right is the embodiment of a spiritual
concept: the belief that to value the privacy of
home and person and to afford it constitutional
protection against the long reach of government
no less than to value human dignity, and that his
privacy must not be disturbed except in case of
overriding social need, and then only under
stringent procedural safeguards.” Additionally,
the requisite of particularity is related to the
probable cause requirement in that, at least
under some circumstances, the lack of a more
specific description will make it apparent that
there has not been a sufficient showing to the
magistrate that the described items are to be
found in a particular place. Herein, the search
warrant is invalid because (1) the trial court failed
to examine personally the complainant and the
other deponents: (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who
27
appeared during the hearing for the issuance of
the search warrant, had no personal knowledge
that PICOP, et. al. were not licensed to possess
the subject firearms; and (3) the place to be
searched was not described with particularity. As
to the particularity of the place to be searched,
the assailed search warrant failed to described
the place with particularity. It simply authorizes a
search of “the aforementioned premises,” but it
did not specify such premises. The warrant
identifies only one place, and that is the “Paper
Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located
at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig,
Surigao del Sur.” The PICOP compound, however,
is made up of “200 offices/buildings, 15 plants, 84
staff houses, 1 airstrip, 3 piers/wharves, 23
warehouses, 6 POL depots/quick service outlets
and some 800 miscellaneous structures, all of
which spread out over some one hundred fifty-
five hectares.” Obviously, the warrant gives the
police officers unbridled and thus illegal authority
to search all the structures found inside the PICOP
compound. Because the search warrant was
procured in violation of the Constitution and the
Rules of Court, all the firearms, explosives and
other materials seized were “inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.”
Yousef Al-Ghoul vs. Court of Appeals [GR 126859,
4 September 2001]
Second Division, Quisumbing (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 31 March 1995, Judge Geronimo S.
Mangay, presiding judge of the Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch
125, Kalookan City, issued search warrants 54-95
and 55-95 for the search and seizure of certain
items in Apartment 2 at 154 Obiniana Compound,
Deparo Road, Kalookan City. On 1 April 1995, the
police searched Apartment 8, in the same
compound and found one (1) .45 caliber pistol.
Found in Apartment 2 were 2 M-16 rifles with 2
magazines and 20 live M-16 ammunitions, 1 Bar of
demolition charge, 1 Caliber Pistol with no. 634
and other nos. were placed with magazine of
Caliber .45 and 3 live 45 ammunitions, 1 22 Caliber
handgun with 5 live ammunitions in its cylinder, 1
Box containing 40 pieces of .25 caliber
ammunitions, 2 pieces of fragmentation grenade,
1 roll of detonating cord color yellow, 2 big bags
of ammonium nitrate suspected to be explosives
substance, 22 detonating cords with blasting
caps, ½ and ¼ pound of high explosives TNT, 1
timer alarm clock, 2 bags of suspected gun
powder, 2 small plastic bag of suspected
explosive substance, 1 small box of plastic bag of
suspected dynamites, One weighing scale, and 2
batteries 9 volts with blasting caps and
detonating cord. The firearms, ammunitions,
explosives and other incendiary devices seized at
the apartments were acknowledged in the
receipt signed by SPO2 Melanio de la Cruz.
Yousef Al Ghoul, Isam Mohammad Abdulhadi,
Wail Rashid Al-Khatib, Nabeel Nasser Al-Riyami,
Ashraf Hassam Al-Yazori, and Mohammad
Abushendi were charged before the Regional
Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 123, in
informations (Criminal Cases C-48666-67)
accusing them with illegal possession of firearms,
ammunitions and explosives, pursuant to
Presidential Decree 1866. Thereafter, they were
arrested and detained. They filed a motion for bail
on 24 May 1995, the resolution of which was held
in abeyance by the RTC pending the presentation
of evidence from the prosecution to determine
whether or not the evidence presented is strong.
On 7 February 1996, at the hearing for bail, the
RTC “admitted all exhibits being offered for
whatever purpose that they maybe worth” after
the prosecution had finished adducing its
evidence despite the objection by the petitioners
on the admissibility of said evidence. On 19
February 1996, the RTC denied their motion for
bail earlier filed. As their action before appellate
court also proved futile, with the appellate court
dismissing their special civil action for certiorari,
they filed the petition for review before the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the search and seizure orders are
valid, and the objects seized admissible in
evidence.
Held: As held in PICOP v. Asuncion, the place to
be searched cannot be changed, enlarged nor
amplified by the police. Policemen may not be
restrained from pursuing their task with vigor, but
in doing so, care must be taken that constitutional
and legal safeguards are not disregarded.
Exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence is the only
practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Hence, the search made at Apartment
No. 8 is illegal and the .45 caliber pistol taken
thereat is inadmissible in evidence against Al-
Ghoul, et. al. In contrast, the search conducted at
Apartment 2 could not be similarly faulted. The
search warrants specifically mentioned
Apartment 2. The search was done in the
presence of its occupants, in accordance with
Section 7 of Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court. The
articles seized during the search of Apartment 2
are of the same kind and nature as those items
enumerated in the search warrant. The items
seized from Apartment 2 were described with
specificity in the warrants in question. The nature
of the items ordered to be seized did not require a
technical description. Moreover, the law does not
require that the things to be seized must be
described in precise and minute details as to
leave no room for doubt on the part of the
searching authorities, otherwise, it would be
28
virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a
search warrant as they would not know exactly
what kind of things they are looking for. Once
described, however, the articles subject of the
search and seizure need not be so invariant as to
require absolute concordance between those
seized and those described in the warrant.
Substantial similarity of those articles described as
a class or species would suffice.
DEL ROSARIO y NICOLAS
vs.
PEOPLE, G.R. No. 142295, PARDO,
J itemsseized during the search including
FACTS: Accused-
appellant Vicente del Rosario was found guilt
y of violation of P. D. No. 1866 of the Regiona
l Trial Court of Malolos. Allegedly,
sometime in May 1996, the police received
a report that accused-appellant Vicente
del Rosario was in possession of certain
firearms without the necessary licenses.
Acting upon the report, the PNP Criminal
Investigation Group inquired from the
PNPFirearms and Explosive Division whether
or not the report was true. The PNP Firearms
and Explosives Division issued a Supreme Court
certificationstating that per records in his
office, the appellant is not a
licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind
and caliber. Armed with thesaid
certificationthe police applied for a search
warrant to enable them to search the house
of appellant.Upon the issuance of the
warrant, a team led by P/Sr. Insp. Adique
went to Norzagaray to serve the warrant.
Before proceeding tothe residence of the
appellant, the police officers requested
Barangay Chairman Rogelio de Silva and
Barangay Councilman AurelioPanteleon to
accompany them in the implementation of the
warrant. Upon arrival at the house of
appellant, the police officersintroduced
themselves to the wife of appellant. When the
appellant came out, P/Sr. Insp. Adique
informed him that they had asearch warrant
and that they were authorized to search his
house. After appellant gave his permission,
the police officers conducteda search of the
house. The search yielded the following
items: (a) a caliber .45 pistol with Serial No.
703792 with five magazines of caliber .45
(Exhibits B and H) found at the master's
bedroom; (b) five magazines of 5.56 M-16
rifle and two radios (Exhibits C to C-4)found
in the room of appellant's daughter; and (c) a
caliber .22 revolver with Serial No. 48673
(Exhibit F) containing 8 pieces of
liveammunition (Exhibit M) found in the
kitchen of the house. When asked about his
license to possess the firearms, the appellant
failedto produce any. This prompted the
police officers to seize the subject
firearms.For his defense, appellant contends
that he had a license for the caliber .45 pistol
recovered in his bedroom and that the other
the caliber .22 revolver, were merely planted
by the police officers. Appellant likewise
assails themanner in which the search was
carried out, claiming that the police officers
just barged into his house without asking
permission.Furthermore, he claimed that the
barangay officials arrived only after the police
already had finished the search. However,
after trialthe trial court rendered a judgment of
conviction which decision was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals.ISSUE: Whether or not
the seizure of items not mentioned in the
search warrant was illegal.HELD:The
REVERSES
the decision of the Court of Appeals and
ACQUITS
petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas
of thecharge of violation of P. D. No.
1866.Seizure is limited to those items
particularly described in a valid search
warrant. Searching officers are without
discretion regardingwhat articles they shall
seize. Evidence seized on the occasion of
such an unreasonable search and seizure
is tainted and excludedfor being the
proverbial "fruit of a poisonous tree." In the
language of the fundamental law, it shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in
any proceedingIn this case, the firearm was
not found inadvertently and in plain view. It
was found as a result of a meticulous search
in the kitchenof petitioner's house. This
firearm, to emphasize, was not mentioned
in the search warrant. Thus, the seizure is
illegal.True that as an exception, the police
may seize without warrant illegally possessed
firearm or any contraband for that
matter,inadvertently found in plain view.
However, "[t]he seizure of evidence in 'plain
view' applies only where the police officer is
29
notsearching for evidence against the
accused, but inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object."
52
Specifically, seizure of evidence in "plain
view" is justified when there is:(a) a prior valid
intrusion based on the valid warrantless
arrest in which the police are legally present
in the pursuit of their official duties;(b) the
evidence was inadvertently discovered by
the police who had the right to be where they
are.(c) the evidence must be immediately
apparent, and(d) "plain view" justified mere
seizure of evidence without further search.
Facts: The shooting incident by armed men
in Lanao led to the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. Petitioners assert that the respondent
Judge issued a warrant of arrest against fifty
(50) “John Does” transgressing the
Constitutional provision requiring that such
warrants should particularly describe the
persons or things to be seized.
Issue: Whether said warrant is valid
Held: No.
Insofar as said warrant is issued against fifty
(50) “John Does” not one of whom the
witnesses to the complaint could or would
identify, it is of the nature of a general
warrant, one of a class of writs long
proscribed as unconstitutional and once
anathematized as “totally subversive of the
liberty of the subject.”[30] Clearly violative of
the constitutional injunction that warrants
of arrest should particularly describe the
person or persons to be seized,[31] the
warrant must, as regards its unidentified
subjects, be voided.
WHEREFORE, the warrant complained of is
upheld and declared valid insofar as it orders
the arrest of the petitioners. Said warrant is
voided to the extent that it is issued against
fifty (50) “John Does.” The respondent Judge
is directed to forward to the Provincial Fiscal
of Lanao del Sur the record of the preliminary
investigation of the complaint in Criminal
Case No. 1748 of his court for further
appropriate action.
VALLEJO VS CA
FACTS: A SW was applied for and
subsequently issued by respondents to be
served in the Registry of Deeds, provincial
capitol of Isabela in which it enumerated the
things to be seized:
1. Undetermined number of Fake Land Titles,
Official Receipts in the Cashier's Office,
Judicial Form No. 39 known as Primary Entry
Book under No. 496 and other pertinent
documents related therewith;
2. Blank Forms of Land Titles kept inside the
drawers of every table of employees of the
Registry (sic) of Deeds;
3. Undetermined number of land Transfer
transactions without the corresponding
payment of Capital Gains Tax and payment
of documentary Stamps.
A motion to quash the SW was filed by the
respondent contending that the things to be
seized were not described with particularity
and was in a nature of a general warrant,
therefore, is a violation of the constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures but was denied by the RTC and
the CA. Hence, the present petition for
certiorari. (The OSG in its comment agreed
with petitioners.)
ISSUE: WON the warrant issued by the RTC
was valid.
HELD:
Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant.
– A search warrant shall not issue except
upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized which may be anywhere
in the Philippines.
Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. –
The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching
questions and answers, in writing and under
oath, the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce on facts personally known to
them and attach to the record their sworn
statements, together with the affidavits
submitted.
The things to be seized must be described
with particularity. Technical precision of
description is not required. It is only
necessary that there be reasonable
particularity and certainty as to the
identity of the property to be searched for
and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a
30
mere roving commission. Any description of
the place or thing to be searched that will
enable the officer making the search with
reasonable certainty to locate such place
or thing is sufficient. Thus, the specific
property to be searched for should be so
particularly described as to preclude any
possibility of seizing any other
property(test of particularity).
As correctly pointed out by the petitioner and
the OSG, the terms expressly used in the
warrant were too all-embracing, with the
obvious intent of subjecting all the records
pertaining to all the transactions of the
petitioner's office at the Register of Deeds to
search and seizure. Such tenor of a seizure
warrant contravenes the explicit command of
the Constitution that there be a particular
description of the things to be seized.
FACTS
Pursuant to a confidential information that
Ruben Del Castillo (petitioner) was engaged
in selling shabu, police officers, headed by
SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, secured a
search warrant from the RTC. In the search
warrant, the place of Del Castillo’s residence
was specifically designated and described.
The same police operatives then went to Gil
Tudtud St., Mabolo, Cebu City to serve the
search warrant to petitioner. But upon their
arrival, someone shouted “raid”, which
prompted them to proceed to Del Castillo’s
house and cordon/surround it. However,
before these police operatives can implement
the search warrant, Del Castillo allegedly fled
and ran to a nipa hut located 20 meters away
from Del Castillo’s residence. SPO3
Masnayon and his men chased Del Castillo
but failed to do so because they are not
familiar with the entrances and exits of the
place. Thereafter, all the police officers went
back to said residence and sought the
assistance of the barangay tanods.
In the presence of the barangay tanod,
Nelson Gonzalado, and the elder sister of
petitioner named Dolly del Castillo, Masnayon
and his men searched Del Castillo’s house,
including the nipa hut where he allegedly ran
for cover. The policemen who searched the
residence of the petitioner found nothing, but
one of the barangay tanods was able to
confiscate from the nipa hut several articles,
including four (4) plastic packs containing
white crystalline substance. Later, these
packs were found to be shabu after they were
sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination.
On the basis of such finding, an Information
for Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as
amended was filed against Del Castillo.
During arraignment, with the assistance of
counsel, he pleaded not guilty. Then, trial on
the merits ensued. Eventually, the Regional
Trial Court found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
Del Castillo, aggrieved by the trial court’s
decision, appealed his case to the Court of
Appeals. However, the appellate court
affirmed the court a quo’s decision, opining
that Del Castillo had constructive possession
of the nipa hut where the crystalline
substance were found. Thus, such
substance, which turned out to be shabu, are
under his dominion and control. Also, it
denied Del Castillo’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
Undaunted, Del Castillo filed before the
Supreme Court a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. He argued that
the packs of white crystalline substance
found in the nipa hut are inadmissible in
evidence against him. This is because the
prosecution failed to prove that he is the
owner of said hut and that he uses the same
as his electric shop.
ISSUE
Can Del Castillo be convicted of the crime
charged?
RULING
No. This is because the prosecution failed to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the nipa
hut, in which the illegal drugs were found, is
under Del Castillo’s control and dominion or
constructive possession, which is an element
of the crime charged.
31

Among other things, the prosecution must SHALIMAR PHILIPPINES

prove the accused’s possession of the
prohibited drug. Here, the testimonies of the G.R. No. 163858. June 28, 2005
witnesses for the prosecution do not provide
proof as to the ownership of the nipa hut
where the seized articles (packs of crystalline Facts:
substances) were found. During their direct
testimonies, they just said, without stating UNILAB hired a private investigator to
their basis, that the same structure was the investigate a place purported to be
shop of petitioner. In addition, the RTC, as manufacturing fake UNILAB products,
well as the CA, merely presumed that especially Revicon multivitamins. The
petitioner used the said structure due to the agent took some photographs where
presence of electrical materials, the petitioner the clandestine manufacturing operation
being an electrician by profession. was taking place. UNILAB then sought the
help of the NBI, which thereafter filed
Thus, the Supreme Court ruled: an application for the issuance
of search warrant in the RTC of Manila.
“The prosecution must prove that the After finding probable cause,
petitioner had knowledge of the existence the court issued a search warrant
and presence of the drugs in the place under directing the police to seize “finished or
his control and dominion, and the character of unfinished products of UNILAB,
the drugs. With the prosecution’s failure to particularly REVICON multivitamins.” No
prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner’s fake Revicon was however found; instead,
control and dominion, there casts a sealed boxes where seized, which, when
reasonable doubt as to his guilt. opened contained 60 ml bottles of
Disudrin and 200mg tablets of Inoflox,
In considering a criminal case, it is critical to both were brands used by UNILAB. NBI
start with the law’s own starting perspective prayed that some of the sized items be
on the status of the accused – in all criminal turned over to the custody of
prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) for
charge laid unless the contrary is proven examination. The court granted the
beyond reasonable doubt. motion. The respondents then filed a
motion to quash the search warrant or to
Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that suppress evidence, alleging that the
quantum of proof sufficient to produce a seized items are considered to be fruit of a
moral certainty that would convince and poisonous tree, and therefore
satisfy the conscience of those who act in inadmissible for any purpose in any
judgment, is indispensable to overcome the proceeding, which the petitioners
constitutional presumption of innocence. opposed alleging that the boxes of
Disudrin and Inoflox were seized under
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, the plain view doctrine. The court,
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. however, granted the motion of the
27819, which affirmed the Decision dated respondents.
March 14, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 12, Cebu, in Criminal Case No. CBU- Issue:
46291 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Ruben del Castillo is Whether or not the seizure of the sealed
ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. boxes which, when opened, contained
Disudrin syrup and Inoflox, were valid
SO ORDERED. under the plain view doctrine.

UNILAB, INC. vs. ERNESTO ISIP and/or Held:

It is true that things not described in the

32
warrant may be seized under the plain
view doctrine. However, seized things not
described in the warrant cannot be
presumed as plain view. The State must
adduce evidence to prove that the
elements for the doctrine to apply are
present, namely: (a) the executing law
enforcement officer has a prior
justification for an initial intrusion or
otherwise properly in a position from
which he can view a particular order; (b)
the officer must discover incriminating
evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be
immediately apparent to the police that
the items they observe may be evidence
of a crime, contraband, or otherwise
subject to seizure
It was thus incumbent on the NBI and the
petitioner to prove that the items were
seized on plain view. It is not enough that
the sealed boxes were in the plain view of
the NBI agents. However, the NBI failed to
present any of officers who were present
when the warrant was enforced to prove
that the the sealed boxes was discovered
inadvertently, and that such boxes and
their contents were incriminating and
immediately apparent. It must be stressed
that only the enforcing officers had
personal knowledge whether the sealed
boxes and their contents thereof were
incriminating and that they were
immediately apparent. There is even no
showing that the NBI agents knew the
contents of the sealed boxes before they
were opened. In sum then, the petitioner
and the NBI failed to prove that the plain
view doctrine applies to the seized items.
Facts: “In the morning of September 12,
1988, Joseph Layong, a PC constable with
the Mt. Province PC Command at Bontoc, Mt.
Province proceeded with other PC soldiers to
Barrio Dantay, Bontoc and, per instruction of
their officer, Capt. Eugene Martin, put up a
checkpoint at the junction of the roads, one
going to Sagada and the other to. They
stopped and checked all vehicles that went
through the checkpoint. At about 9:15 A.M.,
Layong and his teammate, Constable David
Osborne Famocod (sic), saw and flagged
down a cream-colored Ford Fiera bearing
Plate No. ABT-634 coming from the Bontoc
Poblacion and headed towards Baguio. The
vehicle was driven by appellant and had no
passengers. Layong and his companions
asked permission to inspect the vehicle and
appellant acceded to the request. When they
peered into the rear of the vehicle, they saw a
travelling bag which was partially covered by
the rim of a spare tire under the passenger
seat on the right side of the vehicle. Layong
and his companions asked permission to see
the contents of the bag. Appellant consented
to the request but told them that it only
contained some clothes. When Layong
opened the bag, he found that it contained
forty-one (41) plastic packets of different
sizes containing pulverized substances.
Layong gave a packet to his team leader,
constable David Osborne Fomocod, who,
after sniffing the stuff concluded that it was
marijuana. The PC constables, together with
appellant, boarded the latter’s Ford Fiera and
proceeded to the Bontoc poblacion to report
the incident to the PC The prohibited drugs
were surrendered to the evidence custodian,
Sgt. Angel Pokling. Major Carlos Figueroa, a
PC Forensic Chemist at Camp Dangwa, La
Trinidad, Benguet, who has conducted more
than 2500 professional examinations of
marijuana, shabu and cocaine samples,
conducted two chemistry examinations of the
substance contained in the plastic packets
taken from appellant and found them to be
positive for hashish or marijuana. A criminal
complaint was filed against the accused
where the judge convicting the accused of the
crime of transporting prohibited drugs
penalized under Section 4, Article II of R.A.
No. 6425, as amended. Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether the constitutional rights of the
accused against unreasonable search was
violated even if he consented the opening of
the said bag.
Held: He willingly gave prior consent to the
search and voluntarily agreed to have it
conducted on his vehicle and travelling bag.
Thus, the accused waived his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. When
one voluntarily submits to a search or
consents to have it made of (sic) his person
or premises, he is precluded from later
complaining thereof, he right to be secure
from unreasonable search may, like every
right, be waived and such waiver may be
made either expressly or impliedly. “Since in
33
the course of the valid search forty-one (41)
packages of drugs were found, it behooved
the officers to seize the same; no warrant
was necessary for such seizure. Besides,
when said packages were identified by the
prosecution witnesses and later on formally
offered in evidence, the accused did not raise
any objection whatsoever.
People vs correa
The record contains the following pertinent
facts. Defendant was employed as the
manager of Friendly Frank’s Comic Shop at
3427 Ridge Road in Lansing, Illinois. Youth
officer investigator Anthony Van Gorp served
in the Lansing police department. Officer Van
Gorp’s duties included observing areas where
youths congregate.
On the afternoon of November 28, 1986,
Officer Van Gorp and his partner went to the
comic book store. Three of the store’s four
walls were filled with cartoon comic books,
arranged on four rows of 825*825 shelves on
each wall. The cashier’s area was located on
the fourth wall. The officers perused the
comic books and found some that depicted
scenes of sexual conduct and nudity. These
comic books were not separated in one area
of the store; they were found on different
walls and on different levels. Van Gorp and
his partner returned to the police station and
reported to their supervisor.
On December 3, 1986, Officer Van Gorp
returned to the comic book store, which was
open for business. Van Gorp selected 15
cartoon comic books that depicted scenes of
sexual conduct and nudity. At the counter,
defendant examined each comic book to find
its price. The total bill was $41.10, which Van
Gorp paid from police department funds.
Defendant accepted payment from Van Gorp
and gave the officer change, a receipt, and a
bag containing the comic books.
On December 10, 1986, Officer Van Gorp
swore out a criminal complaint charging
defendant with obscenity, in that he
possessed obscene magazines with the
intent to disseminate them. Listing their titles,
the complaint charged that 7 of the 15
cartoon comic books which Van Gorp bought
were obscene. Van Gorp and another officer
then went to the comic book store and
arrested defendant.
Having waived a jury, defendant was tried by
the court. On January 1, 1988, the court
found defendant guilty as charged. The
sentencing hearing immediately followed
defendant’s conviction. At the close of the
hearing, the court sentenced defendant to
court supervision for one year and ordered
defendant to pay $750 in fines and costs.
Defendant appeals.
People v. Ramos
Annotate this Case
[Crim. No. 5024. Court of Appeals of
California, Fourth Appellate District, Division
One. June 16, 1972.]
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v.
RAMON RAMOS, Defendant and Appellant
(Opinion by Brown (Gerald), P. J., with
Whelan and Ault, JJ., concurring.)
COUNSEL
Norbert Ehrenfreund, under appointment by
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, Herbert
L. Ashby, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
William E. James, Assistant Attorney
General, Mark L. Christiansen and Derald E.
Granberg, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent. [26 Cal. App. 3d
110]
OPINION
BROWN (Gerald), P. J.
Defendant Ramon Ramos appeals one
judgment (order granting probation) and
denial of his motion to suppress evidence
under Penal Code section 1538.5 (CR-
23862); and three judgments in which
probation was revoked (CR-8424, CR-14336
and CR-20248).
Ramos and the district attorney made a
bargain, stated on a form and approved by
34
the court, in which Ramos pleaded guilty to
possessing dangerous drugs; seven other
counts were dismissed; and five prior
convictions were struck. Ramos was to be
credited with time already served, and was to
serve no additional time on the principal
charge. The court granted probation on the
principal charge, but revoked probation on
three of the five priors which had been struck.
Ramos appeals all four cases. We reverse
the four judgments on the ground the court
did not follow the bargain; we affirm the
denial of Ramos' motion to suppress
evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5.
When the plea was entered, the court told
Ramos, in accord with Penal Code section
1192.5, he had the right to withdraw his plea
if the court chose not to follow the plea
bargain.
At the sentencing hearing, the probation
department recommended probation in the
present case and continuation of probation in
the three others. Ramos told the court he
understood the plea bargain applied to all his
cases. The court said the agreement did not
say anything about the revocation matters,
and it would not have accepted a plea binding
on the prior cases. Proceedings were
suspended under Welfare and Institutions
Code section 3051.
When the hearing resumed, the deputy
district attorney said he concurred in the
probation department's recommendations,
and specifically with the recommendation not
to revoke probation in the three prior cases.
After Ramos moved to withdraw the plea
because the court indicated it would revoke
probation, the court said the form contained
the entire plea bargain and there was nothing
on it binding the court as to the priors. Ramos
argued the agreement covered all his cases,
the principal one and the priors; he had
pleaded guilty with the understanding he
would receive probation on all charges. The
court rejected this argument, granted
probation on the present case, and
sentenced Ramos to state prison for the term
prescribed by law on the priors, time to run
concurrently.
[1] If a defendant pleads guilty as part of a
bargain with an apparently authoritative and
reliable public official and is assured of
receiving [26 Cal. App. 3d 111] in return
some special consideration, the court may
not impose judgment contrary to the bargain
without giving the defendant an opportunity to
withdraw his guilty plea. (People v. Delles, 69
Cal. 2d 906, 910 [73 Cal. Rptr. 389, 447 P.2d
629].)
[2] While the court granted probation on the
charge to which Ramos pleaded guilty, giving
him no additional time, the fact remains the
court sentenced Ramos to state prison
despite Ramos' explanation he understood
the agreement applied to the priors, and
despite the deputy district attorney's
statement he concurred in the probation
department's recommendations of continuing
Ramos' probation on the priors. Furthermore,
the court did not tell Ramos before he
entered the guilty plea his probation on the
prior charges might be revoked, and he might
be sentenced on them.
Under the facts of this case it is reasonable
the agreement striking the priors meant there
would be no penalty imposed because of
them. Ramos would have had little to gain by
entering the guilty plea if he were to end up in
state prison anyway. In addition, having
granted probation in the principal case, the
court could immediately revoke it (Pen. Code,
§ 1203.2, subd. (a)). Because the court did
not sentence Ramos in accord with the plea
bargain, Ramos must be permitted to
withdraw that plea. (People v. Delles,
supra, 69 Cal. 2d 906, 910; Pen. Code,
§1192.5; cf. People v. Flores, 6 Cal. 3d
305 [98 Cal. Rptr. 822, 491 P.2d 406].)
[3] The idea behind court participation in plea
bargaining is to spread the entire bargain on
the table and make it a part of the record
(People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 610 [91 Cal.
Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d 409]). Implicit in the
concept is the requirement all participants
must conduct themselves openly and with the
utmost fairness. If the court was of the
opinion Ramos was not entitled to remain on
probation, it should have rejected the bargain
and permitted him to withdraw his guilty plea.
To give lip service to the bargain by granting
35
probation in the principal case and then
revoke probation in the prior cases does not
meet the required standard.
Ramos' motion to suppress evidence was
properly denied.
On April 26, 1971, a male wearing a black
sweater was seen walking away from a car
involved in a hit-and-run accident in National
City. Officer DeLucia, on his way to the scene
of the accident one-half hour later, saw
Ramos, wearing a black sweater, in a
telephone booth four blocks from the scene.
DeLucia asked Ramos if he knew of a recent
accident. Ramos replied he had been there,
but knew nothing about it. DeLucia told
Ramos he "was going to have to take him
back down there," but he was not arresting
him. Ramos "kind of agreed along with
that." [26 Cal. App. 3d 112]
DeLucia, following department policy, patted
Ramos down, found a switchblade knife,and
arrested him. Ramos swallowed a plastic
bag, secreted Seconal capsules in the police
car, and possessed Secobarbital when he
was booked. He admitted taking heroin and
Seconal that day; narcotic paraphernalia was
found in the accident car.
Ramos claims he was unlawfully detained. [4]
Not all police contacts are detentions (Batts v.
Superior Court, 23 Cal. App. 3d 435, 439
[100 Cal.Rptr. 181]).
[5] When DeLucia saw the black-sweatered
Ramos, he was performing his duty as a
policeman to investigate whether Ramos was
a witness to the hit-and-run accident. DeLucia
asked him a general question and rationally
suspected after Ramos answered, he was the
passenger who left the vehicle. DeLucia's
requiring Ramos to go with him to the scene
for more investigation was reasonable. The
patdown of Ramos before he was put in the
police car was a sensible precaution. People
v. Superior Court (Simon) 7 Cal. 3d 186 [101
Cal. Rptr. 837, 496 P.2d 1205], does not
dictate to the contrary. Ramos was not
handcuffed; policemen have been attacked
and killed by back seat passengers with
concealed guns and knives. DeLucia's arrest
of Ramos after he found a switchblade knife
was lawful.
In CR-23862, the probation order is vacated.
The orders revoking probation in CR-8424,
CR-20248 and CR-14336 are also set aside.
We reverse also the judgments imposing
sentence in the three cases in which
probation was revoked; in doing so we do not
hold there was not cause for revocation
independent of the guilty plea in case CR-
23862; but do so to leave the trial court
unhampered in its decision whether to permit
withdrawal of the plea of guilty in CR-23862
or to grant probation not subject to almost
immediate revocation under Penal Code
section 1203.2, subdivision (a) which would
result if probation were to be revoked in any
of the other three cases. All matters are
remanded and the court is directed to either
grant probation in CR-23862 and continue
probation in CR-8424, CR-20248 and CR-
14336 or to allow Ramos to withdraw his plea
of guilty. Our determination the court correctly
denied Ramos' motion to suppress evidence
shall be law of the case.
Whelan, J., and Ault, J., concurred.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
BONIFACIO BARROS
Facts:
Bonifacio Barros was charged with
violating Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended (known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972).
He was sentenced by the RTC Branch 35
of Bontoc, Mountain Province to Reclusion
Perpetua and a fine of P20,000
Barros now appeals from the judgment of
conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not the court deprived him of
his right to due process by ignoring manifest
absence of the mandatory warrant in the
arrest and search.
Held:
36
Not all searches and seizures are
prohibited. Those which are reasonable are
not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to
be determined by any fixed formula but is to
be resolved according to the facts of each
case. There are certain exceptions
recognized in our law, one of which relates to
the search of moving vehicles. In carrying out
warrantless searches of moving vehicles,
however, peace officers are limited to routine
checks, that is, the vehicles are neither really
searched nor their occupants subjected to
physical or body searches, the examination of
the vehicles being limited to visual inspection.
When, however, a vehicle is stopped and
subjected to an extensive search, such a
warrantless search would be constitutionally
permissible only if the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to
believe, before the search, that either the
motorist is a law-offender or the contents or
cargo of the vehicle are or have been
instruments or the subject matter or the
proceeds of some criminal offense. In the
case at bar, however, we have been unable
to find in the record of this case any
circumstance which constituted or could have
reasonably constituted probable cause for the
peace officers to search the carton box
allegedly owned by appellant Barros.
The peace officers here involved had not
received any information or "tip-off" from an
informer; no such a "tip-off" was alleged by
the police officers before or during the trial.
The police officers also did not contend that
they had detected the odor of dried
marijuana, or appellant Barros had acted
suspiciously in the course of boarding the bus
and taking a seat during the trip to Sabangan,
nor in the course of being asked whether he
owned the carton box later ascertained to
contain four (4) kilos of marijuana. The
testimony of the law enforcement officers who
had apprehended the accused (M/Sgt.
Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan), and
who had searched the box in his possession,
(C2C Fernando Bongyao), simply did not
suggest or indicate the presence of any such
probable cause.
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
35, Bontoc, Mountain Province, in Criminal
Case No. 687 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and appellant is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime charged, the
evidence lawfully before the trial court not
being sufficient to establish his guilt thereof
beyond reasonable doubt. No costs.
Spouses Veroy v. Layague, G.R. No. L-
95630, 210 SCRA 97, June 18, 1992
"Qualified consent"
The permission to enter a house and search
for persons and effects may be qualified, and
the searching officer may not act in excess of
the authority granted to him.
Although the offense of illegal possession of
firearms is a malum prohibitum, it does not
follow that the subjects may be seized simply
because they are prohibited. A search
warrant is still necessary in the context of this
case.
 The Veroys moved to QC and left their
house in Davao City to a caretaker who had
keys to the kitchen only. The Veroys had the
keys to the interior of the house.
 Capt. Obrero raided the house based
on an information that rebel soldiers are
allegedly hiding there.
 With the help of caretakers, they were
able to enter only up to the yard since the
owner was not around and they did not have
a search warrant.
 They contacted Mrs. Veroy, and
explained that the house was reportedly
being used as a hideout and recruitment
center of rebel soldiers. Mrs. Veroy then gave
permission to search the house with the
condition that Major Macasaet, a long-time
family friend, must be there during the
search.
 Despite the qualified consent, the
officers entered various rooms, including the
children’s room, and confiscated a .45 caliber
gun and other effects, which were the basis
of the charge of illegal possession of firearms
against them.
 Despite the fact that the warrants for
their arrest have not yet been served on
them, petitioners voluntarily surrendered
themselves to Brig. Gen. Pantaleon Dumlao,
PC-CIS Chief, since it was the CIS that
initiated the complaint. However, the latter
37
refused to receive them on the ground that
his office has not yet received copies of their
warrants of arrest.
 The Spouses Veroy assailed the
admissibility of the evidence for being
obtained in violation of their constitutional
right against unreasonable search and
seizure.
Issue : Whether the evidence is
admissible?
NO.
 Petitioners alleged that while Capt.
Obrero had permission to enter their house, it
was merely for the purpose of ascertaining
the presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers.
The permission did not include the authority
to conduct a room to room search inside the
house. The items taken were, therefore,
products of an illegal search, violative of their
constitutional rights. As such, they are
inadmissible in evidence against them.
 The Court ruled that the case at bar
does not fall on the exceptions for a
warrantless search. The reason for searching
the house is that it was reportedly being used
as a hideout and recruitment center for rebel
soldiers. While Capt. Obrero was able to
enter the yard, he did not enter the house
because he did not have a search warrant
and the owners were not present. This shows
that he himself recognized the need for a
search warrant, hence, he did not persist in
entering the house but rather contacted the
Veroys to seek permission to enter the same.
Permission was granted by Mrs. Veroy to
enter the house but only to ascertain the
presence of rebel soldiers.
 Under the circumstances the police
officers had time to procure a search warrant
but they did not.
 The Court also ruled that although the
offense of illegal possession of firearms is a
malum prohibitum, it does not follow that the
subjects may be seized simply because they
are prohibited. A search warrant is still
necessary.
 The rule having been violated and no
exception being applicable, the articles
seized were confiscated illegally and are
therefore protected by the exclusionary
principle. They cannot be used as evidence
against the petitioners in the criminal action
against them for illegal possession of
firearms.
People v. Damaso, G.R. No. 93516, 212
SCRA 547, August 12, 1992
"Maid allowed entry into the house"
The right against unreasonable searches and
seizures is a personal right.
The constitutional immunity from
unreasonable searches and seizures, being
personal one, cannot be waived by anyone
except 1) the person whose rights are
invaded or 2) one who is expressly
authorized to do so in his or her behalf.
 The group of Lt. Quijardo were sent to
verify the presence of CPP/NPA members in
Dagupan City.
 They put under surveillance the rented
apartment of Rosemarie, sister of someone
whom they earlier arrested.
 They interviewed Luzviminda
Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie, who stated
that she worked with Bernie Mendoza alias
Basilio Damaso, the appellant.
 Together with Morados, they reached
the house of Damaso where they saw Luz
Tanciangco, a helper. Tanciangco then
allowed the group to enter inside the house.
 The group of Lt. Quijardo entered the
dwelling of Damaso without a valid warrant
when the latter was absent. They requested
the persons in the house to allow them to
look around. In one of the rooms, they saw
subversive materials which they confiscated.
They likewise brought the persons found in
the house to the headquarters for
investigation and the persons revealed that
Damaso was the lessee of the house and
owned the items confiscated.
 Based on this, Damaso was charged
with illegal possession of firearms.
Whether the evidence is admissible? NO.
 The Court ruled that the law enforcers
failed to comply with the requirements of a
valid search and seizure. None of these
exceptions for a warrantless search is
present in this case.
 Moreover, the constitutional immunity
from unreasonable searches and seizures,
being personal one, cannot be waived by
anyone except 1) the person whose rights are
38
invaded or 2) one who is expressly
authorized to do so in his or her behalf.
 In this case, the records show that
Damaso was not in his house at that time
Luz, his alleged helper, allowed the
authorities to enter. There was no evidence
that would establish the fact that Luz was
indeed Damaso’s helper or if it was true that
she was his helper, that Damaso had given
her authority to open his house in his
absence.
 Being a helper, she does not qualify as
a person authorized to waive such right in
representation of her employer.
 Thus, the search being invalid for lack
of warrant, the evidence obtained thereafter
is inadmissible.
 CASE DIGEST
 JOSE G.
 LOPEZ
 vs.
 THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS
 , REPARATIONS COMMISSION,
DIRECTOR OF THENATIONAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION AND/OR ANY OF
THEIR AUTHORIZED AGENTSOR
REPRESENTATIVES
 FACTS:
 Sometime in 1964, the petitioner and
Reparations Commission entered into a
conditionalcontract, subject to the condition
that the title to and ownership of the vessel
shall remain withthe Commission until full
payment. Later on, petitioner entered into a
contract with one TomasVelasco, authorizing
the latter to supervise and manage the M/V
JOLO LEMA. The vesselhowever was
however apprehended, searched and then
seized by the Collector of Customs. ASeizure
Identification proceeding was instituted against
said vessel for smuggling into thePhilippines
1,408 sacks of Indonesian copra and 86 sacks
of Indonesian coffee beans, inviolation of
Section 2530 (a) and (k) of the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines.This appeal
taken by Lopez directly to the Supreme Court,
upon the ground that only questionsof law
would be taken up therein.
 ISSUE:
 Whether or not the Court of First Instance of
Manila has jurisdiction to interfere with the
SeizureIdentification proceeding No. 25/66
pending before the Commissioner of
Customs, on accountof the Indonesian
agricultural products smuggles into the
Philippines through the use of M/VJOLO
LEMA
 HELD:
 Lopez maintains that whatever powers the
Commissioner of Customs had, prior thereto,
over seizure identification proceedings had
been transferred to the Philippine Fisheries
Commission.The Supreme Court said that this
pretense is manifestly devoid of merit. Said
section 5 of Republic Act No. 3512 merely
transfers to the Philippine Fisheries
Commission the powers,functions and duties
of the Bureau of Customs, the Philippine Navy
and the PhilippineConstabulary over fishing
vessels and fishery matters. Such transfer
should be construed in thelight of section 1 of
said Republic Act No. 3512, reading.It is clear
that the powers transferred to the Philippine
Fisheries Commission by Republic ActNo.
3512 are limited to those relating to the
"development, improvement, management
andconservation of our fishery resources." All
other matters, such as those concerning
smuggling,particularly of agricultural products,
into the Philippines, are absolutely foreign to
the object andpurpose of said Act and could
not have been and were not transferred to the
aforementionedCommission. Seizure
Identification proceeding No. 25/66 for the
smuggling of Indonesianagricultural products
into the Philippines is certainly beyond the
jurisdiction of the PhilippineFisheries
Commission.
ELI LUI, ET AL. VS. MATILLANO, May 27,
2004
Right against unreasonable searches and
seizures; Mission Order does not
authorize an illegal search. Waiver of the
right against an unreasonable search and
seizure.
Facts: In search of the allegedly missing
amount of P45,000.00 owned by the
employer, the residence of a relative of the
suspect was forcibly open by the authorities
by kicking the kitchen door to gain entry into
the house. Thereafter, they confiscated
different personal properties therein which
were allegedly part of those stolen from the
employer. They were in possession of a
mission order but later on claimed that the
39
owner of the house gave his consent to the
warrantless search.
Issue: Are the things admissible in evidence?
Can they be sued for damages as a result of
the said warrantless search and seizure?
Held:
The right against unreasonable searches
and seizures is a personal right which may be
waived expressly or impliedly. BUT A
WAIVER BY IMPLICATION CANNOT BE
PRESUMED. There must be clear and
convincing evidence of an actual intention to
relinquish the right. There must be proof of
the following:
a. that the right exists;
b. that the person involved had
knowledge, either constructive or actual, of
the existence of said right;
c. that the said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right.
Finally, the waiver must be made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently in order that the
said is to be valid.
The search was therefore held illegal and the
members of the searching party held liable for
damages in accordance with the doctrine laid
down in Lim vs. Ponce de Leon and MHP
Garments vs. CA.
e. General or roving warrants
CABALLES vs. CA G.R. No. 136292. January
15, 2002 Warrantless Search
FEBRUARY 21, 2019
FACTS:
Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de
Castro, while on a routine patrol in Barangay
Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, spotted a preventing violations of smuggling or
passenger jeep unusually covered with
“kakawati” leaves.
Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with
smuggled goods, the two police officers
flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was
driven by appellant. When asked what was
loaded on the jeep, he did not answer, and
appeared nervous.
With appellant’s consent, the police officers
checked the cargo and they discovered
bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized
conductor wires exclusively owned by
National Power Corporation (NPC). When
asked where the wires came from, appellant
answered that they came from Cavinti, a town
approximately 8 kilometers away from
Sampalucan.
The court a quo rendered judgment finding
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Theft.
The CA affirmed the judgment of conviction.
Petitioner now comes to the Court contending
that the flagging down of his vehicle by police
officers who were on routine patrol, merely on
“suspicion” that “it might contain smuggled
goods,” does not constitute probable cause
that will justify a warrantless search and
seizure.
ISSUE:
Whether the evidence taken from the
warrantless search is admissible against the
appellant.
RULING:
It is not controverted that the search and
seizure conducted by the police officers in the
case at bar was not authorized by a search
warrant.
A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is
justified on the ground that it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
must be sought. Searches without warrant of
automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of
immigration laws, provided such searches are
made at borders or ‘constructive borders’ like
checkpoints near the boundary lines of the
State.
The mere mobility of these vehicles, however,
does not give the police officers unlimited
discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches
without warrants if made within the interior of
40
the territory and in the absence of probable
cause. Still and all, the important thing is that
there was probable cause to conduct the
warrantless search, which must still be
present in such a case.
Routine inspections are not regarded as
violative of an individual’s right against
unreasonable search. The search which is
normally permissible in this instance is limited
to the following instances:
(1) where the officer merely draws aside the
curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on
the public fair grounds; (2) simply looks into a
vehicle; (3) flashes a light therein without
opening the car’s doors; (4) where the
occupants are not subjected to a physical or
body search; (5) where the inspection of the
vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual
inspection; and (6) where the routine check is
conducted in a fixed area.
None of the foregoing circumstances is
obtaining in the case at bar. The police
officers did not merely conduct a visual
search or visual inspection of herein
petitioner’s vehicle.They had to reach inside
the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look
inside the sacks before they were able to see
the cable wires. It cannot be considered a
simple routine check.
The vehicle of the petitioner was flagged
down because the police officers who were
on routine patrol became suspicious when
they saw that the back of the vehicle was
covered with kakawati leaves which,
according to them, was unusual and
uncommon.
We hold that the fact that the vehicle looked
suspicious simply because it is not common
for such to be covered with kakawati leaves
does not constitute “probable cause” as
would justify the conduct of a search without
a warrant.
Neither can petitioner’s passive submission
be construed as an implied acquiescence to
the warrantless search.
Casting aside the cable wires as evidence,
the remaining evidence on record are
insufficient to sustain petitioner’s conviction.
His guilt can only be established without
violating the constitutional right of the
accused against unreasonable search and
seizure.
The impugned decision was REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and accused Rudy Caballes was
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
Title: PEOPLE vs ASIS
Reference: GR No. 142531
October 15, 2002
FACTS
Danilo Asis y Fonperada and Gilbert
Formento y Saricon were charged in an
Information; the information stating "That on
or about February 10, 1998, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping each other, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent to gain and by means of force and
violence upon person, to wit: by then and
there stabbing one YU HING GUAN @ ROY
CHING with a bladed instrument on the
different parts of the body thereafter take, rob
and carry away the following, to wit: Cash
money in the amount of P20,000.00; 1
wristwatch' 1 gold necklace; and
undetermined items; or all in the total amount
of P20,000.00 more or less, belonging to said
YU HING GUAN @ ROY CHING against his
will, to the damage and prejudice of the said
owner in the aforesaid amount more or less
of P20,000.00, Philippine Currency, and as a
result thereof, he sustained mortal stab
wounds which were the direct and immediate
cause of his death." When arraigned, both
accused pleaded not guilty. Found to be deaf-
mutes, they were assisted, not only by a
counsel de oficio, but also by an interpreter
from the Calvary Baptist Church. The
prosecution presented 9 witnesses. Although
none of them had actually seen the crime
committed, strong and substantial
circumstantial evidence presented by them
attempted to link both accused to the crime.
After due trial, both accused were found
guilty and sentenced to death. RTC of Manila
held that the "crime charged and proved is
robbery with homicide under Article 294, No.
1 of the RPC," ruled that "although no
41
witnesses to the actual killing and robbery
were presented, the circumstantial evidence
including the recovery of bloodstained
clothing from both accused definitely proved
that the two (2) committed the crime," and
appreciated the aggravating circumstances of
abuse of confidence, superior strength and
treachery and thus sentenced both accused
to the supreme penalty of death.
Hence, the automatic review before the
Supreme Court. Both the accused do not
question the legality of their arrest, as they
made no objection thereto before the
arraignment, but object to the introduction of
the bloodstained pair of shorts allegedly
recovered from the bag of Formento; arguing
that the search was illegally done, making the
obtainment of the pair of shorts illegal and
taints them
as inadmissible. The prosecution, on the
other hand, contends that it was Formento's
wife who voluntarily surrendered the bag that
contained the bloodstained trousers of the
victim, and thus claims that her act
constituted a valid consent to the search
without a warrant.
ISSUES
Whether or not Formento, a deaf-mute,
has given consent to the recovery of the
bloodstained pair of short, in his possession
during the warrantless search?
RULINGS
NO. Primarily, the constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
being a personal one, cannot be waived by
anyone except the person whose rights are
invaded or who is expressly authorized to do
so on his or her behalf. In the present case,
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
show that at the time the bloodstained pair of
shorts was recovered, Formento, together
with his wife and mother, was present.
Being the very subject of the search,
necessarily, he himself should have given
consent. Since he was physically present, the
waiver could not have come from any other
person. Lopez vs. Commissioner of Customs
does not apply as the accused therein was
not present when the search was made.
Further, to constitute a valid waiver, it
must be shown that first, the right exists;
second, the person involved had knowledge,
actual or constructive, of the existence of
such a right; and third, the person had an
actual intention to relinquish the right. Herein,
Formento could not have consented to a
warrantless search when, in the first place, he
did not understand what was happening at
that moment. There was no interpreter to
assist him -- a deaf-mute -- during the arrest,
search and seizure. The point in the case
Pasion vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, i.e. "as the
constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon
any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts
do not place the citizen in the position of
either contesting an officer’s authority by
force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but
instead they hold that a peaceful submission
to a search or seizure is not a consent or an
invitation thereto, but is merely a
demonstration of regard for the supremacy of
the law," becomes even more pronounced in
the present case, in which Formento is a
deaf-mute, and there was no interpreter to
explain to him what was happening. His
seeming acquiescence to the search without
a warrant may be attributed to plain and
simple confusion and ignorance. The
bloodstained pair of shorts was a piece of
evidence seized on the occasion of an
unlawful search and seizure. Thus, it is
tainted and should thus be excluded for being
the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. In
the language of the fundamental law, it shall
be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose
in any proceeding. Lastly, as to evidence vis-
a-is the case in its totality, circumstantial
evidence that merely arouses suspicions or
gives room for conjecture is not sufficient to
convict. It must do more than just raise the
possibility, or even the probability, of guilt. It
must engender moral certainty. Otherwise,
the constitutional presumption of innocence
prevails, and the accused deserves acquittal.
People vs. Tudtud
April 7, 2018Mia
GR 144037 September 23, 2003
FACTS: Sometime during the months of July
and August 1999, the Toril Police Station,
Davao City received a report from a “civilian
asset” named Bobong Solier about a certain
Noel Tudtud.
Solier related that his neighbours have been
complaining about Tudtud, who was allegedly
responsible for the proliferation of marijuana
in their area. Relating to the report, the police
42
conducted surveillance in Solier’s
neighbourhood in Sapa, Toril, Davao City.
For 5 days, they gathered information and
leared that Tudtud was involved in illegal
drugs. According to his neighbours, Tudtud
was engaged in selling marijuana.
Solier informed the police that Tudtud had
headed to Cotabato and would be back later
that day with new stocks of marijuana. Solier
described Tudtud as big bodied and short,
and usually wore a hat. At around 4:00 pm
that same day, a team of policemen posted
themselves at the corner of Saipon and
McArthur Highway to await. Tudtud’s arrival.
All wore civilian clothes. About 8:00 pm, 2
men disembarked from a bus and helped
each other carry a carton marked “King
Flakes.” Standing some 5 feet away from the
men, PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta
observed that one of the men fit Tudtud’s
description. The same man also toted a
plastic bag. PO1Floreta and PO1 Desierto
then approached the suspects and identified
themselves as police officers. PO1 Desierto
informed them that the police had received
information that stocks of illegal drugs would
be arriving that night. The man who
resembled Tudtud’s description denied that
he was carrying any drugs. PO1 Desierto
asked if he could see the contents of the box.
Tudtud then said “it was alright” and let them
see the box which contained bundles of dried
fish, one wrapped in a plastic bag and
another in newspapers. When the bundles
were unwrapped, there contained marijuana
leaves.
The police arrested Tudtud and his
comapanion. They were charged with illegal
possession of prohibited drugs before the
RTC of Davao City which convicted the
accused.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tudtud’s implied
acquiescence (Tudtud’s statement of “it’s
alright”) is considered a waiver.
RULING: NO. The right against unreasonable
searched and seizures is secured by Sec. 2,
Art. 3 of the Constitution. Appellants implied
acquiescence, if at all, could not have been
more than mere passive conformity given
under coercive or intimidating circumstances
and is, thus, considered no consent at all
within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee. Consequently, appellants lack of
objection to the search and seizure is not
tantamount to a waiver of his
constitutional right or a voluntary
submission to the warrantless search and
seizure.
As the search of appellant’s box does not
come under the recognized exceptions to a
valid warrantless search, the marijuana
leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible in
evidence. And as there is no evidence other
than the hearsay testimony of the arresting
officers and their informant, the conviction of
appellants cannot be sustained.
Finally, there is an effective waiver of rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures
if the following requisites are present:
1. It must appear that the rights exist;
2. The person involved had knowledge,
actual or constructive, of the existence of
such right;
3. Said person had an actual intention to
relinquish the right.
Here, the prosecution failed to establish the
second and third requisites. Records disclose
that when the police officers introduced
themselves as such and requested appellant
that they see the contents of the carton box
supposedly containing the marijuana,
appellant Tudtud said it was alright. He did
not resist and opened the box himself.
Acquiescence in the loss of fundamental
rights is not to be presumed. The fact that a
person failed to object to a search does not
amount to permission thereto.
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City is REVERSED. Appellants Noel Tudtud y
Paypa and Dindo Bolong y Naret are
ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.
(2006)
CASE DIGEST: SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL
HOTEL, INC. AND PANLILIO V. . SOLUTA
ET AL . 482 SCRA 660 (2006)
Published by arce on September 4,
2013 | Leave a response
SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC.
and PANLILIO v. SOLUTA et al . 482 SCRA
660 (2006)
Petitioner Jose Marcel Panlilio, Vice
President for Finance of petitioner Silahis
International Hotel, Inc. (Silahis), with his
personal secretary, a Bulletin reporter, and a
security guard entered the union office
located at the hotel basement. The same is
43
with the permission of union officer Henry
Babay. Babay was apprised about the
suspected illegal activities. During the
search they discovered marijuana flowering
tops in the union office. An Information
indicting the union officers was then filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for
violation of Republic Act 6425, as amended
by Batas Pambansa Bilang 179 (The
Dangerous Drugs Act). The RTC acquitted
the accused on the ground that the marijuana
tops are inadmissible as evidence. Soluta
and his fellow union officers including the
union thereafter filed before the RTC a
complaint against Silahis, Panlilio and those
who cooperated for malicious prosecution
and violation of their constitutional right
against illegal search. The RTC granted such
petition. It ruled that Silahis and Panlilio are
jointly and severally liable to pay for damages
in favor of Soluta et al. Silahis and Panlilio
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).
On appeal, the CA affirmed the lower court‘s
decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Silahis and Panlilio violated
the constitutional right of Soluta et al.
HELD:
As constitutional rights, like the right to be
secure in one‘s person, house, papers, and
effects against unreasonable search and
seizures, occupy a lofty position in every
civilized and democratic community and not
infrequently susceptible to abuse, their
violation, whether constituting a penal offense
or not, must be guarded against. The Code
Commission thus deemed it necessary to
hold not only public officers but also private
individuals civilly liable for violation of rights
enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil Code.
That is why it is not even necessary that
the defendant under this Article should have
acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it
would defeat its main purpose, which is the
effective protection of individual rights. It
suffices that there is a violation of the
constitutional right of the plaintiff. In the
present case, as priorly stated, Silahis and
Panlilio had, by their own claim, already
received reports in late 1987 of
illegal activities allegedly undertaken in the
union office and
Maniego conducted surveillance of the union
officers. Yet, in the morning of January 11,
1988, Silahis, Panlilio and their companions
barged into and searched the union office
without a search warrant, despite ample time
for them to obtain one, and notwithstanding
the objection of Babay. The course taken by
Silahis and company stinks in illegality, it not
falling under any of the exceptional instances
when a warrantless search is allowed by law.
Silahis and Panlilio‘s violation of individual
Soluta et al.‘s constitutional right against
unreasonable search thus furnishes the basis
for the award of damages under Article 32 of
the Civil Code. As for Silahis et
al.‘s contention that property rights
justified the search of the union office, the
same does not lie. For Soluta et al., being the
lawful occupants of the office, had the right to
raise the question of validity of the
search and seizure. Neither does Silahis et
al.‘s claim that they were allowed by union
officer Babay to enter the union office lie.
Babay‘s account of why Silahis and company
went to the union office – to consider
Panlilio‘s suggestion to settle the mauling
incident is more credible, as is his claim that
he protested the search, and even asked if
they were armed with a search warrant. While
it is doctrinal that the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right which may be waived
expressly or impliedly, a waiver by implication
cannot be presumed. There must be clear
and convincing evidence of an actual
intention to relinquish it to constitute a waiver
thereof. There must be proof of the following:
(a) that the right exists; (b) that the person
involved had knowledge, either actual
or constructive, of the existence of such right;
and, (c) that the said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right. In other
words, the waiver must be voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently made. The
evidence shows otherwise, however.
People vs Canton
Posted on March 2,
2017 by thecasedigester in Uncategorized
G.R. No. 148825 December 27, 2002
FACTS:
Appellant Susan Canton was charged before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City with
44
the violation of Section 16 of Article III of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act
No. 6425), as amended, under an Information
whose accusatory portion reads as follows:
That on February 12, 1998 at the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously has in her
possession NINE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT
POINT TWO EIGHT HUNDRED ZERO NINE
(998.2809) GRAMS of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the
corresponding prescription or license.
Unsatisfied with the decision of the trial court,
SUSAN imputing to the trial court the
following errors: (1) in justifying the
warrantless search against her based on the
alleged existence of probable cause; (2) in
holding that she was caught flagrante delicto
and that the warrantless search was
incidental to a lawful arrest; (3) in not ruling
that the frisker went beyond the limits of the
“Terry search” doctrine; (4) in not ruling that
SUSAN was under custodial investigation
without counsel; (5) in admitting to the
records of the case the report of Dr. Ma.
Bernadette Arcena, which was not testified on
or offered in evidence, and using the same in
determining her guilt; (6) in justifying under
the rule on judicial notice its cognizance of
the medical report that has not been offered
in evidence; and (7) in applying the ruling in
People v. Johnson.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless search and
subsequent seizure of the regulated drugs, as
well as the arrest of Susan were violative of
her constitutional rights.
RULING:
No, the search was made pursuant to routine
airport security procedure, which is allowed
under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235, “
Every ticket issued to a passenger by the
airline or air carrier concerned shall contain
among others the following condition printed
thereon: “Holder hereof and his hand-carried
luggage(s) are subject to search for , and
seizure of, prohibited materials or
substances. Holder refusing to be searched
shall not be allowed to board the aircraft,”
which shall constitute a part of the contract
between the passenger and the air carrier
PEOPLE VS. SUZUKI
Facts: Appellant was found guilty of illeal
possession of prohibited drugs and was
sentenced to death. Hence, the instant
review.
The facts of the case are:
Appellant was in the airport for his flight
to Manila. PASCOM and NARCOM agents
were in the airport to follow on reports on
drug trafficking.
When he walked through the metal detector,
the alarm sounded. He was bodily frisked and
nothing was found on his person so they
proceeded to check his luggage but appellant
refused then consented eventually and
opened it. There they found packs of
aluminum foil and when opened, it was found
to be marijuana.
Issue: WON the PASCOM agents were
authorized to conduct the search. WON
accused consented to the search. WON the
search was conducted was incidental to a
lawful arrest. WON the confiscated items
were in plain view.
Held:
In PPvs.Canton and PPvs.Johnson we
validated the search conducted on the
departing passengers and the consequent
seizure of the shabu found in their persons,
thus:
"Persons may lose the protection of the
search and seizure clause by exposure of
their persons or property to the public in a
manner reflecting a lack of subjective
expectation of privacy, which expectation
society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.xxx"
It should be stressed, however, that
whenever the right against unreasonable
search and seizure is challenged, an
individual may choose between invoking the
constitutional protection or waiving his right
by giving consent to the search or seizure.9
Here, appellant voluntarily gave his consent
to the search conducted by the PASCOM
agents.
It is axiomatic that a reasonable search is not
to be determined by any fixed formula but is
to be resolved according to the facts of each
case.12 Given the circumstances obtaining
here, we find the search conducted by the
airport authorities reasonable and, therefore,
45
not violative of his constitutional rights.
Hence, when the search of the box
of piaya revealed several marijuana fruiting
tops, appellant is deemed to have been
caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest
even without a warrant under Section 5(a),
Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.13 The packs of marijuana
obtained in the course of such valid search
are thus admissible as evidence against
appellant.14
Nonetheless, we find the trial court’s reliance
on the plain view doctrine misplaced. Such
doctrine finds application only when the
incriminating nature of the object is in the
"plain view" of the police officer.15 Here, it is
beyond cavil that the marijuana seized from
appellant is contained in the box
of piaya, wrapped in aluminum foil and not
immediately apparent to the airport
authorities.
Neither was the search incidental to a lawful
arrest since appellant was not yet arrested at
the time of the search. To be considered a
search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law
requires that there must be a lawful arrest
before the search can be made.
Luz vs. Philippines
MAY 8, 2017JEFF REY
G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012
RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner,
vs
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Facts:
PO3 Emmanuel L. Alteza testified that he
saw the accused driving a motorcycle without
a helmet and so he flagged him down. He
invited the accused to come inside their sub-
station since the place where he flagged
down the accused is almost in front of the
sub-station to where he is assigned as a
traffic enforcer. The accused violated a
municipal ordinance which requires all
motorcycle drivers to wear helmet while
driving said motor vehicle. While the officers
were issuing a citation ticket for violation of
municipal ordinance, PO3 Alteza noticed that
the accused was uneasy and kept on
reaching something from his jacket. He was
alerted and told the accused to take out the
contents of his jacket’s pocket as the latter
may have a weapon inside it. The accused
obliged, slowly put out the contents of his
jacket’s pocket which included two plastic
sachets of suspected shabu.
The RTC convicted petitioner of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs as the
substances are positive of methampethamine
hydrochloride. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed
the RTCs Decision.
Upon a petition for reiew on certiorari,
petitioner claims that there was no lawful
search and seizure, because there was no
lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that
there was a lawful arrest was erroneous,
since he was not even issued a citation ticket
or charged with violation of the city ordinance.
Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he
claims that he had never consented to the
search conducted upon him.
Issue:
Whether or not the arrest, searches and
seizure were invalid.
Held:
Yes, there was no valid arrest. When he was
flagged down for committing a traffic violation,
he was not, ipso facto and solely for this
reason, arrested. There being no valid arrest,
the warrantless search that resulted from it
was likewise illegal.
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation
and Traffic Code, the general procedure for
dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest
of the offender, but the confiscation of the
drivers license of the latter. At the time that
he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his
citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to
have been under arrest. rior to the issuance
of the ticket, the period during which
petitioner was at the police station may be
characterized merely as waiting time.
The subject items seized during the illegal
arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are the
very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their
inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls
for the acquittal of the accused.
CHIMEL VS CALIFORNIA
Facts. The police came to Defendant’s home
with an arrest warrant for an alleged burglary.
The police asked permission to “look around”
the house. The defendant refused the request
and the police proceeded to search the home
anyways. The police also made the
defendant’s wife remove contents of various
dresser drawers. The police seized coins and
46
medals which were later used to convict the
defendant of burglary.
Issue. Where a defendant is lawfully arrested
inside his home, is a warrantless search of
the area beyond the defendant’s immediate
control constitutional?
Held. Any search in an arrestee’s home
beyond arrestee’s person and the area within
his immediate control is unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.
Dissent. Where there is probable cause to
search and there is a clear danger that the
items which are the subject of the search may
be removed prior to police obtaining a search
warrant, a warrantless search of the area
beyond an arrestee’s immediate control is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment of
the Constitution.
Concurrence. Given the variety of
circumstances which police encounter, this
decision will create additional burdens on law
enforcement. Whether or not the warrant
requirement will protect individual rights in
each and every local situation is uncertain.
Discussion. Contemporaneous searches
incident to a lawful arrest are reasonable to
seize weapons as well as prevent the
destruction or concealment of evidence.
Searches beyond the scope of these
justifications are unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.
PEOPLE VS DELA CRUZ;
PEOPLE VS. DELA CRUZ
10:11 PM
G.R. No. 181545
People vs. Mark Dela Cruz
October 08, 2008
Facts:
Appellant Mark Dela Cruz was found guilty of
violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9165 after he allegedly sold
prohibited drugs to the poseur-buyer. The
prohibited drugs were handed to appellant by
companions identified to be an alias Amay
and an alias Tabo. Appellant denied the
charge and said that he was arrested after
refusing to give information about Amay,
whom the police were after. His testimony
was corroborated by other witnesses.
Lower court gave weight to the testimony by
the poseur-buyer and upheld the presumption
of regularity in the operation conducted by the
officers.
Appellant appealed, questioning the identity
of the shabu allegedly confiscated from him in
view of Section 21 (1) of RA No. 9165
(inventory of seized drugs) and Section 21 (3)
of the same law(certification of the forensic
laboratory examination results).
Ruling:
The elements necessary for the prosecution
of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the identities of
the buyer and the seller, the object, and
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment therefor. What is
material to the prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of
evidence of corpus delicti.
Citing jurisprudence, the failure of the police
to comply with the procedure in the custody
of the seized drugs raised doubt as to its
origins.
The chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that
the matter in question is what the proponent
claims it to be. TheCourt believed that the
prosecution failed to clearly establish the
chain of custody of the seized plastic sachets,
containing shabu from the time they were first
allegedly received until they were brought to
the police investigator. There were no records
to show that the procedural requirements in
Section 21 were complied with.
The presumption of regularity cannot prevail
over the constitutional right of presumption of
evidence in view of the circumstances. “The
presumption of regularity is merely just that--a
mere presumption disputable by contrary
proof and which when challenged by the
evidence cannot be regarded as binding
truth.”
47
The appellant was acquitted.
People v. Kalubiran [GR 84079, 6 May
1991]
First Division, Cruz (J): 4 concur
Facts:
Nestor Kalubiran was arrested on 12 July
1985, in Dumaguete City, byNarcotics
Command (NARCOM) elements. His arrest
was the result of a "buy-bust" operation in
which Pat. Leon Quindo acted as the buyer
while the otherteam members lay in wait to
arrest Kalubiran at the pre-arranged signal.
Quindoapproached the accused-appellant,
who was with a group of friends in front ofthe
Gamo Memorial Clinic, and asked if he could
"score," the jargon for buyingmarijuana.
Kalubiran immediately produced two sticks of
marijuana, for whichQuindo paid him a
previously marked P5.00 bill. Quindo then
gave the signaland Cpl. Levi Dorado
approached and arrested Kalubiran. Dorado
frisked theaccused-appellant. He recovered
the marked money and found 17 more
sticksof marijuana on Kalubiran's person. The
other team members, namely M/Sgt.Ranulfo
Villamor and Sgt. Ruben Laddaran, came
later in a jeep, where theyboarded Kalubiran
to take him to the police station. The 19 sticks
of marijuanawere marked and then taken to
the PC Crime Laboratory, where they
wereanalyzed, with positive results. Kalubiran
contended however that one
Quindoapproached and frisk him on the same
night, and found nothing on him.However, he
was called back by one Villamor, who told
him at gun point toboard the jeep and taken
to PC headquarters, then to the police
station. He wasreleased the following day
with the help of a lawyer. After trial, the
RegionalTrial Court (RTC) Dumaguete
City found Kalubiran guilty as charged
andsentenced him to life imprisonment plus a
P20,000 fine. Kalubiran appealed.
Issue;
Whether Kalubiran should be made to answer
for the 19 sticks ofmarijuana found in his
possession during his arrest.
Held:
Kalubiran was arrested in flagrante delicto as
a result of the entrapmentand so came under
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,
authorizing awarrantless arrest of any person
actually committing a crime. The search
wasmade as an incident of a lawful arrest and
so was also lawful under Section 12of Rule
116. In addition to the Rules, there is
abundant jurisprudence justifyingwarrantless
searches and seizures under the conditions
established in the case.However, Kalubiran
was accused only of selling the two sticks of
marijuanaunder Section 4 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act when he should also
have beencharged with possession of the 17
other sticks found on his person at the time
ofhis arrest.
PEOPLE VS MALMSTEDT
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. MIKAEL MALMSTEDTG.R. No.
91107 June 19, 1991
Facts:
Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding
officer of the first regional command
(NARCOM) stationed at camp Dangwa,
ordered his men to set up a temporary
checkpoint for the purpose of checking all
vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region.
The order to establish a checkpoint was
prompted by persistent reports that vehicles
coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana and other prohibited drugs. And
an information also was received about a
Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his
possession prohibited drugs.
In the afternoon the bus where accused
was riding stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC
Galutan boarded the bus and announced that
they were members of the NARCOM and that
they would conduct an inspection. During the
inspection CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on
accused waist. Suspecting the bulge on
accused waist to be a gun, the officer asked
for accused’s passport and other
identification papers. When accused failed to
comply, the officer required him to bring out
whatever it was that was bulging o his waist.
And it turned out to be a pouched bag and
when accused opened the same bag the
officer noticed four suspicious looking objects
wrapped in brown packing tape. It contained
hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
48

Thereafter, the accused was invited
outside the bus for questioning. But before he
alighted from the bus accused stopped to get
two travelling bags. The officer inspects the
bag. It was only after the officers had opened
the bags that the accused finally presented his
passport. The two bags contained a stuffed
toy each, upon inspection the stuff toy
contained also hashish.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a violation of
the constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure
Probable cause has been defined as such facts
and circumstances which could lead a
reasonable, discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed,
and that the object sought in connection with
the offense are in the placed sought to be
searched.
When NARCOM received the information
that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to
Baguio City was carrying with him a
prohibited drug, there was no time to obtain a
search warrant.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that under

Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
provides:

“Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a

peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:

a) When, in the presence, the person to be

arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;

b) When an offense has in fact just been

committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and

c) When the person to be arrested is a

prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporary confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to
another”
Accused was searched and arrested while
transporting prohibited drugs. A crime was
actually being committed by the accused and
he was caught in flagrante delicto, thus the
search made upon his personal effects falls
squarely under paragraph 1 of the foregoing
provision of law, which allows a warrantless
search incident to a lawful arrest.