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De-Idealizing Democracy On Thomas Hirsch PDF
De-Idealizing Democracy On Thomas Hirsch PDF
ANTHONY GARDNER
branded his work exemplary of how art can serve and even construct
Democracy.3 His use of everyday materials, including cardboard,
packing tape, and cheap disposable trinkets, underpins assertions that
Hirschhorn presents “an antihierarchical and more democratic mode
1 Thomas Hirschhorn, Swiss Swiss Democracy Preparatory Notes (2004), Swiss Swiss
Democracy Archives, Bibliothèque du Centre Culturel Suisse, Paris.
2 Conversation with the author, September 15, 2006.
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3 In keeping with both Hirschhorn’s own practice and, as we will see, the term’s overwhelm-
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ingly ideological (and thus highly contestable) authority, I refer throughout this article to
“Democracy” rather than the lowercase “democracy.” The only exceptions are when I am
citing another source that uses the lowercase.
4 For the respective quotations, see Frances Stracey, “The Caves of Gallizio and Hirschhorn:
Excavations of the Present,” October 116 (Spring 2006): 96; Hamza Walker, “Disguise the
Limits: Thomas Hirschhorn’s World Airport,” in Thomas Hirschhorn: Jumbo Spoons and Big
Cake: The Art Institute of Chicago: Flugplatz Welt/World Airport: The Renaissance Society at the
University of Chicago, ed. James Rondeau et al. (Chicago: Art Institute of Chicago, 2000),
22; and Patricia Falguières, “Merzing the World,” in Thomas Hirschhorn: United Nations
Miniature (Malaga: CAC Malaga, 2003), 75.
5 Okwui Enwezor and Thomas Hirschhorn, “Interview,” in Rondeau et al., Thomas
Hirschhorn: Jumbo Spoons and Big Cake, 27.
6 See respectively Stéphanie Sauzedde, “Au centre de l’oeuvre de Thomas Hirschhorn: La
notion de multitude,” Plastik 4 (Autumn 2004): 148–49; Jean-Philippe Uzel, “Thomas
Hirschhorn et la démocratie radicale,” Parachute 111 (June–August 2003): 66 (italics
removed from the original); and for Hirschhorn’s framing specifically within relational
aesthetics, see inter alia Sauzedde, “Au centre de l’oeuvre,” 141ff.; and Falguières, “Merzing
the World,” 81. Bourriaud discusses the “behavioral economy” of Democratization within
relational aesthetics in Nicolas Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, trans. Simon Pleasance,
Fronza Woods, and Mathieu Copeland (Dijon: Les Presses du réel, 2002), 104. The number
ARTMARGINS 1:1
of writers who categorize Hirschhorn’s art as intrinsically Democratic extends far beyond
those mentioned here. Other examples can be found in Claire Bishop, “Antagonism and
Relational Aesthetics,” October 110 (Fall 2004): 74–79, and Simon Sheikh, “Planes of
Immanence, or the Form of Ideas: Notes on the (anti-)Monuments of Thomas Hirschhorn,”
Afterall 9 (2004): 97.
30
is instead a politics he intentionally reacts against. This was particu-
larly apparent in the early 2000s when Hirschhorn’s work underwent
a significant shift (albeit one that has received scant critical attention
to date). Throughout the 1990s, Hirschhorn focused on two main
subjects: an expression of apparent fandom for artists and writers from
the early to mid-twentieth century—signified through his renowned
series of altars, monuments, and kiosks nominally dedicated to Liubov
Popova, Piet Mondrian, and others—and critical reflections of, and
arguably upon, globalized consumer culture and its domination of
everyday life, figured through the logos and refuse of consumer capital-
ism that, exaggerated in size and number, threatened to overwhelm
his sculptures like a viral swarm. These were allegorical displays about
contemporary phenomena, brimming with symbols of celebrity culture
and hypertrophic consumerism; cords of aluminum foil (or “ramifica-
tions,” as Hirschhorn called them)7 overran the sculptures, connecting
each symbol and element to every other element so as to symbolize the
globalized economic and political ties among nations, or the transforma-
tion of revolutionary modernists into contemporary political fashions.
By the 2000s, however, literal representations of global interconnection
were disappearing from his work, while other aesthetic forms emerged
in their stead. Symbols of contemporary global relations were replaced
with photographs taken during different international conflicts, from
images of children bearing grenade launchers, to the global protests
held on February 15, 2003, against the then imminent war in Iraq, to
bodies ripped apart by bombs and bullets in war-ravaged regions of
Palestine, Chechnya, and the former Yugoslavia. People’s participation
in the artworks became a central procedural motif as well, and it was at
this time that Hirschhorn became most vociferous about his ambition
to revolt against and “de-idealize” Democracy through his projects.
DE-IDEALIZING DEMOCRACY
7 As cited in Walker, “Disguise the Limits,” 23, and Hal Foster, “An Archival Impulse,”
October 110 (Fall 2004): 5–6.
31
ideology of “the West” during the Cold War to an ideological justifica-
tion for excusing and legitimizing globalized warfare (especially in Iraq
and Afghanistan after 2001)? How did this “de-idealization” happen?
And while Hirschhorn has declared that “art and the art world cannot
be removed from the larger world,”8 what implications does this have
for envisaging contemporary art history within that “larger world”?
These questions are crucial to thinking through Hirschhorn’s often
controversial work from the period, including Hotel Democracy (2003)
and Swiss Swiss Democracy (2004–5). Not only do these projects scup-
per the claims to Democracy made of Hirschhorn’s practice; they also
propose hitherto unrecognized relations with artists whose work simi-
larly critiqued the state of art’s politics, and particularly Democracy,
well before the 2000s, in parts of Europe with which Hirschhorn’s
practice is rarely associated: Central and Eastern Europe from the
period of late communism.
32
Thomas Hirschhorn. Swiss Swiss Democracy, 2004. © 2004 Centre Culturel
Suisse, Paris, all rights reserved. Photograph by Romain Lopez.
10 Thomas Hirschhorn, “8 Lettres = 8 Projets,” Swiss Swiss Democracy Journal 46 (January 26,
2005): n.p. (translations of this and all other texts from the Swiss Swiss Democracy Journal
are by the author).
33
can commit torture,”11 the press found controversy in another source
altogether: in two gestures presented during one of the work’s central
elements, a stage play of the myth of William Tell performed by Lyon-
based dramaturge Gwenaël Morin and his acting troupe. In the exhibi-
tion’s specially designed theatre, one performer pretended to vomit after
being ordered to vote, while another mimicked the act of a dog urinat-
ing on an image of the ultra-nationalist politician Christoph Blocher,
whose anti-immigration and anti-EU policies had elevated him to the
position of Switzerland’s justice minister in early 2004.
Swiss Swiss Democracy is a significant artwork here, though not
because of its controversial reputation. Nor am I interested in the inac-
curate media reporting of these theatrical gestures and their appar-
ent denigration of Switzerland’s political process of direct democratic
voting.12 Despite the various references to specifically Swiss contexts—
from William Tell’s mythologized liberation of the Swiss peoples to
the work’s double-barreled title—Swiss Swiss Democracy was not an
exhibition about Swiss politics alone. “I didn’t make a critical exhibi-
tion about Swiss democracy,” Hirschhorn declared, but an exhibition
in which the machinations of localized politics were associated with
broader political critique: “It’s a critical exhibition about democracy in
general,”13 he continued, and particularly Democracy in the context of
Iraq’s invasion by the so-called Coalition of the Willing in March 2003.
How do we know this? How can we determine that this recon-
textualization of local political forms within a globalized sphere of
11 Thomas Hirschhorn, Swiss Swiss Democracy Press Conference, recording from December
7, 2004, Swiss Swiss Democracy Archives, Bibliothèque du Centre Culturel Suisse, Paris.
The graffiti throughout the exhibition were taken “from politicians, scientists, ethnolo-
gists,” according to Hirschhorn, none of whom he formally sourced: Thomas Hirschhorn,
Jade Lindgaard, and Jean-Max Colard, “Mission: ‘Tenir le siege,’” Les Inrockuptibles 472
(December 15–21, 2004): 14–17. Other examples of the graffitied quotations, cited in this
article, included “democracy is evil, democracy is death,” “as long as there are dictatorships,
I will not have the heart to critique democracy,” “love of democracy is firstly a state of
mind,” and “democratic despots exist.”
12 One of the main disputes about Swiss Swiss Democracy was whether these two “antidemo-
cratic” actions involved literal or performed acts of vomiting and urination. In articles for
the Swiss newspapers Blick and Le Matin, the journalists presumed these acts to have actu-
ally occurred, when in fact they were merely simulated. For Swiss Swiss Democracy’s alleged
ARTMARGINS 1:1
34
Thomas Hirschhorn. Swiss Swiss Democracy, 2004. © 2004 Centre Culturel Suisse, Paris,
all rights reserved. Photograph by Romain Lopez.
14 Ibid., 16.
35
Marcus Steinweg expressed similar views in his inaugural lecture for
Swiss Swiss Democracy, the first of fifty lectures Steinweg gave in the
work’s auditorium, and which Hirschhorn hoped would stimulate dis-
cussion among audience members about how to de-idealize Democracy:
an interview with Florence Broizat from Télérama Sortir: “I want to de-idealize Democracy
so that we can finally question it. It’s become an unattackable subject! In its name, all can
be legitimised . . . [as with] what is happening in Iraq . . . I refuse that. I think that it’s
essential to critique the deviant uses of democracy.” See Florence Broizat, “Effervescence
démocratique,” Télérama Sortir, December 22–28, 2004.
36
Thomas Hirschhorn. Swiss Swiss Democracy:
Play “Guillaume Tell” by Gwenaël Morin, 2004. © 2004
Centre Culturel Suisse, Paris, all rights reserved.
Photograph by Romain Lopez.
37
gestures were continually haunted by contexts of war, invasion, and
death. Hirschhorn had mounted photographs of bomb-shattered and
bullet-ridden Iraqi corpses throughout the work, often next to equally
gruesome videos of the carnage committed in the name of Democracy.
The videos’ sound bled from one room to another, together with the
perpetual spectral presence of Iraq’s dead ensured that the voices and
images of war zones continually sought inclusion in any discussion
conducted within Swiss Swiss Democracy.
Here, montage was made spatial. Each photograph or declaration
(whether made through graffiti, images, or various types of text) was
juxtaposed with myriad others, creating a swarm of contrasts and unex-
pected correspondences between different representations of Democracy.
This, in turn, set the stage on which participants’ actions and momen-
tary interactions could occur, contextualizing those activities and
embroiling them within the flux of Democratic ideals and the destruc-
tion conducted in their interests. In practice, it also meant that partici-
pants’ gestures were inextricable from the aesthetic sphere enveloping
and contextualizing them; they too were juxtaposed or correlated with
the surrounding sprawl of imagery, text, and other forms of discourse.
If, in his past work, Hirschhorn used representational means to
connect objects and ideas (especially through the foil “ramifications”
crucial to his sculptures in the 1990s), then such motifs were no longer
central to Swiss Swiss Democracy. Ramifications were replaced with
more subtle ways of linking disparate elements: not by creating trails
of aluminum foil throughout the exhibition but by connecting gesture
and discourse through an all-enveloping context, “another world” as he
described it, of images and writing. This shift from literal representa-
tions of connection to an all-encompassing stage or sphere of contextu-
alization was equally registered in Hirschhorn’s discourse. By the early
2000s, he no longer spoke of ramifications in his practice. His works
now hinged, he declared, on a process of implication in which audience
engagement and other relational gestures became implicated within
contexts outside those of the artwork, contexts signified in Swiss Swiss
Democracy by images and discourses of war and Hirschhorn’s reaction
against the “tortures [committed] in the name of democracy.”16
ARTMARGINS 1:1
38
Hirschhorn’s strategies of implication are important for various
reasons, but one especially stands out: his distinction between implica-
tion and participation in art. “Rather than triggering the participation
of the audience, I want to implicate them,” Hirschhorn argued. “I
want to force the audience to be confronted with my work. This is the
exchange I propose. The artworks don’t need participation. It’s not an
interactive work. It doesn’t need to be completed by the audience.”17 The
distinction is subtle but significant. Hirschhorn’s desire to de-idealize
Democracy, along with his rejection of definitions of his work as
participatory or interactive, revealed an understanding that Democracy
and participation had become profoundly, even inherently, linked in
contemporary art. Of particular concern here was Hirschhorn’s aware-
ness of (and, to an extent, the incorporation of his work within) Nicolas
Bourriaud’s theories of relational aesthetics. We should remember
that, by 2004, Bourriaud’s intertwining of Democracy, audience par-
ticipation, and relational interaction in art had become a thoroughly
institutionalized aesthetic discourse both internationally and in Paris,
Hirschhorn’s home city and where he staged Swiss Swiss Democracy.
For Hirschhorn, though, such idealized conceptions of Democracy
as Bourriaud’s were highly problematic, a point emphasized in an
interview with curator Alison Gingeras. When she tried to position his
practice within Bourriaud’s theories, Hirschhorn responded imme-
diately and explicitly, “What I’m criticizing about participatory and
interactive installations is the fact that the artwork is judged as being a
‘success’ or ‘failure’ according to whether or not there’s participation. I
now see this kind of work as totally delusional.”18 Hirschhorn’s implica-
tion of relational gestures in Swiss Swiss Democracy can thus be seen as
an attempt to differentiate his work from Bourriaud’s, to take exception
to the ways that relational aesthetics and its effects on contemporary art
DE-IDEALIZING DEMOCRACY
of Contemporary Art, Seville. For examples of Hirschhorn’s work being contained within
discourses of relational aesthetics, see inter alia Nicolas Bourriaud, “L’art et la propagande,”
Beaux Arts Magazine 236 (January 2004): 33.
39
gested that there were subtle and disputable correspondences between
art’s presumed use value—its ability to enforce Democratization
through participation—and Democracy’s own, similarly presumed
use value (what Hirschhorn called “the deviant uses of democracy”) in
contemporary geopolitics.19
These strategies of implicating audience engagement within
highly politicized contexts—especially those engendered by photo-
graphic imagery—were not unique to Swiss Swiss Democracy. For
Chalet Lost History in 2003, Hirschhorn transformed Paris’s Galerie
Chantal Crousel into a makeshift country lodge, replete with card-
board wall paneling hand drawn to resemble wood. Inside the chalet,
Hirschhorn displayed refrigerators and pedestal fans, piles of empty
beer cans, a television lounge showing pornographic movies, and
thousands of photographic reproductions: photographs of the global
protests in February 2003 against the invasion of Iraq that would occur
the following month, of the aftereffects of wayward missiles once the
invasion started, and of American families mourning soldiers killed in
action. Audience engagement again played a significant role. Visitors
could sit and discuss the work while watching video footage of copula-
tion, or in corners throughout the chalet they could pick up and remove
empty Budweiser beer cans or five-pound notes with their recto embla-
zoned with hieroglyphs and the words “Central Bank of Egypt” and
their verso entirely blank. The contextualization of these implicated
actions was clear: the bombing of Baghdad that was—at least for some
people outside the city—a prime-time television spectacle, signaling an
invasion “legitimized” in the interests of Democratization. The removal
of “souvenirs” from Chalet Lost History recalled thefts from Baghdad’s
archaeological museum, not only of relics but of fridges and fans.20
Visitors responded to this context with their own anomic gestures,
from idly imbibing pornographic videos to purloining the empty cans
and counterfeit currency that lay carefully piled in corners like a candy
spill by one of the forebears of Bourriaud’s relational aesthetics, Felix
Gonzalez-Torres.
In Chalet Lost History, the supposedly utopian potential of partici-
pation and Democratic actions was deliberately staged, frustrated, and
ARTMARGINS 1:1
40
Thomas Hirschhorn. Chalet Lost History (French Version), 2003.
© 2003 Galerie Chantal Crousel, Paris, all rights reserved.
ultimately denied through little gestures of theft and the anomie those
thefts engendered. The strategy paralleled Hirschhorn’s contribution
to an exhibition titled Common Wealth, held in London’s Tate Modern
at the same time as Chalet Lost History, for which he again isolated
Democracy from utopianism. Hirschhorn presented two works for
Common Wealth: the U-Lounge (2003), a sociable library where visitors
could mingle, read, and pilfer forty-four texts by Marcus Steinweg on
DE-IDEALIZING DEMOCRACY
41
Thomas Hirschhorn. U-Lounge, Common Wealth, 2003.
© 2003 Tate Modern, London, all rights reserved.
and U-Lounge (in which “U” stands for utopia), were deliberately staged
apart in separate rooms. If relational gestures of reading, reflection,
and interaction were potentially utopian—or “micro-utopian,” as
Bourriaud famously argued22 —then the physical isolation of those
gestures from Hirschhorn’s model hotel meant they were not to be con-
flated with Democracy. Moreover, if Democracy were a utopian ideal,
then the hotel would suggest that it could not be divorced from the
violence shown in the hotel’s wallpaper imagery. For Hirschhorn, then,
Democracy and ideals of relaxed discussion and learning were largely
antithetical politics; at the very least, the one could not be subsumed
within the other.
Hirschhorn’s sculptures in the early 2000s, with their integration
of images of contemporary warfare and the destruction generated in the
name of Democratization, set the stage on which other important devel-
opments in Hirschhorn’s practice played out: most notably, his increas-
ing focus on how people physically engaged with his work, and how
ARTMARGINS 1:1
42
Thomas Hirschhorn. Hotel Democracy, Common Wealth, 2003.
© 2003 Tate Modern, London, courtesy Stephen Friedman Gallery, London.
23 Thomas Hirschhorn, “Utopia-Utopia = One World, One War, One Army, One Dress,” in
Thomas Hirschhorn: Utopia-Utopia = One World, One War, One Army, One Dress, ed. Nicholas
Baume, Ralph Rugoff, et al. (Boston: ICA, 2005), 13.
43
Not all of Hirschhorn’s confrontations and strategic gestures were
overlooked, of course. If the de-idealization of Democracy and contem-
porary aesthetic discourse was highly subtle in much of his oeuvre,
it became too confrontational, for some commentators, in Swiss Swiss
Democracy. And while the sculpture’s critics and their condemnation of
Hirschhorn’s politics may have provided an unexpectedly astute focus
on gesture’s importance in his work, that condemnation ultimately said
more about the sculpture’s explicitness than about his broader practice.
Indeed, a vital component of Hirschhorn’s sustained revolt was ignored
by commentators in both Swiss Swiss Democracy and his work more
generally. This was the influence of historical precedents that pushed
Hirschhorn’s critique beyond strictly contemporary theories, practices,
or aesthetics,24 toward a complex evaluation of political aspirations and
legacies in art history, and particularly histories of European modern-
ism, including the work of Joseph Beuys. Hirschhorn’s appraisal of
these legacies is my subject in the following pages, a subject that also
allows us to pinpoint connections with certain postcommunist prac-
tices and their own political critiques.
24 The persistence of this “presentist” focus dominates discussion of Hirschhorn’s work, and
is evident even in David Joselit’s analyses of spectatorship in Hirschhorn’s sculptures after
Swiss Swiss Democracy: see, for instance, David Joselit, “Truth or Dare,” Artforum 50, no. 1
ARTMARGINS 1:1
44
became most evident. His oft-repeated claim that his practice hinged
on energy relays among artist, work, and audience rather than conven-
tional notions of artistic success or monetary value—which quickly
became a mantra of “Energy, yes! Quality, no!”—alluded specifically
to Beuys’s belief that art was a healing force and a battery to recharge
society.27 Moreover, the term “battery” became one of Hirschhorn’s
preferred descriptions for his large-scale sculptures, especially those
in which human interaction and audience implication could “produce
resistance and friendship.”28
Hirschhorn’s practice after the 1990s equally drew upon Beuys’s
work, particularly the Office for Direct Democracy by Referendum that
Beuys staged at Documenta 5 in 1972. The photographs and other
reproductions that Hirschhorn taped to the walls of his sculptures ini-
tially functioned as art historical allusions to the affichages sauvages, or
“wild posters,” that Daniel Buren pasted throughout Paris in April and
May 1968. They more specifically referred, though, to the image repro-
ductions of famous women that Beuys and his staff taped to the Office’s
walls, as symbols of people who had suffered social oppression and
whose representation in the Office was intended to contextualize and
foment new discussions about society. Similarly, Hirschhorn’s perpet-
ual presence in his sculptures, including Swiss Swiss Democracy, and
his on-site fielding of questions about his politics deliberately mirrored
Beuys’s activities at Documenta 5, for like Hirschhorn thirty years later,
Beuys remained within his Office during the exhibition’s duration,
answering visitors’ questions about art’s investments in Democracy, or
about the communitarian forms art could propose. The task for both
artists thus seemed similar: to devise a social sculpture originating in
speech, a sculpture that used discussion to debate and even dismantle
the social status quo, and that located such debates within contexts
DE-IDEALIZING DEMOCRACY
27 See, for example, Hirschhorn in Francesco Bonami, “Thomas Hirschhorn: Energy Yes, Quality
No,” Flash Art 216 (January–February 2001): 90–93.
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28 These sculptures included Swiss Swiss Democracy, the Bataille Monument for 2002’s
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Documenta 11, and 24h Foucault staged in the Palais de Tokyo in 2004. Conversation with
Thomas Hirschhorn, September 15, 2006.
29 Uzel, “Thomas Hirschhorn,” 68.
45
Hirschhorn himself was more circumspect, however. “I am not
sure about this comparison [with Beuys],” he told Alison Gingeras
in 1998, except insofar as both artists sought to implicate art and its
reception within contexts of the larger world: “[F]or me Beuys liberates
the term ‘sculpture’ from aesthetic volumes.”30 Beyond that, the dif-
ferences were significant. Beuys’s goal, especially as manifest through
his Office, was for people to participate directly in political decision
making; direct dialogue and social engagement, for Beuys, would
thereby “realize what has not yet appeared in history, namely, democ-
racy . . . the basic democratic order as people would like it, according to
the will of the people.”31 In works like Swiss Swiss Democracy, however,
Hirschhorn engaged similar processes of direct dialogue, but for
starkly opposed ends. Hirschhorn’s aim was not only a critical demar-
cation of his practice and audience engagement from Democracy but
also to “revolt against Democracy, and direct Democracy”—against a
form of direct Democracy that could easily be limited to Swiss national
politics and the election of the ultra-nationalist Christoph Blocher were
it not for Hirschhorn’s very calculated repetition of Beuysian strate-
gies. By contextualizing that repetition within Swiss and international
corruptions of political formations, Hirschhorn “implicated” Beuys, his
practice, and his ideals in much the same way as he “implicated” audi-
ences and de-idealized their relational gestures. Art’s history became a
third force in Hirschhorn’s confrontation between theory and practice.
The reasons driving this implication of Beuys are complex,
extending beyond the many attempts by art historians since the 1970s
to discredit Beuys’s self-generated mythologies.32 Hirschhorn con-
ceived Beuys’s utopian social politics as serious and earnest; he also
understood, though, that such utopian ideals risked subsumption and
dissolution within the social status quo they initially seemed to protest.
This was certainly Hirschhorn’s view of Beuys’s advocacy of a democ-
ratizing social sculpture which “led to defeats as we know,” according
tique of Beuys’s (arguably hollowed-out) concept of Democracy, as well as the sources for
Beuys’s politics, see Stefan Germer, “Haacke, Broodthaers, Beuys,” October 45 (Summer
1988): 63–75.
32 The most well-known example of this is Benjamin H. D. Buchloh, “Beuys: The Twilight of
the Idol,” Artforum 18, no. 5 (January 1980): 35–43.
46
to an interview with Benjamin Buchloh.33 In particular, Hirschhorn
perceived that Beuys’s utopian aspirations were defeated when trans-
formed into the actual policies of political parties, as occurred when
Beuys became a candidate for West Germany’s Green Party. By seeking
endorsement within the recognized institution of the Greens, Beuys
harnessed his aesthetics within already-existing forms and parameters
of political organization. Confined to the status quo of political mobi-
lization, in other words, Beuys’s actions potentially devolved his art
and utopian rhetoric into tools, if not propaganda, for extant political
institutions and ideologies. Or, as Hirschhorn himself asserted,
[W]ith his engagement [in joining the Greens], Beuys showed the
limits of this approach . . . there is a great difference with what I do.
What interests me is not to go into politics, not to do it at all. Beuys
did it in a generous, superb manner, and also to show, I think, that
it’s not the path to follow.34
whose pink, yellow, and blue tones matched the colored paper stock for
the work’s Journal.35 According to Hirschhorn, these were “democra-
tized colors . . . economic colors,” because the artist Joseph Philippe—
whose paintings Hirschhorn displayed in the sculpture’s bar—had
found them to be the cheapest colors available in his local paint store.36
37 Pierre Restany, Yves Klein: Fire at the Heart of the Void (New York: Journal of Contemporary
Art Editions, 1992), 49–53.
38 Benjamin H. D. Buchloh, “Detritus and Decrepitude: The Sculpture of Thomas
ARTMARGINS 1:1
Hirschhorn,” Oxford Art Journal 24, no. 2 (2001): 54; and Benjamin H. D. Buchloh, “Cargo
and Cult: The Displays of Thomas Hirschhorn,” Artforum 40, no. 3 (November 2001): 173.
39 Buchloh, “Detritus and Decrepitude,” 54. This process also found parallels in Hirschhorn’s
atlas Les plaintifs, les bêtes, les politiques, which charted such historical shifts as the transfor-
mation of Rodchenko-style montage into Stalinist propaganda and thence into contempo-
48
recognize Hirschhorn’s ambivalence toward utopian ambitions. Yet
such observations about utopia’s dangerous fallout were not limited
to Buchloh alone. They were already made by historians including
Boris Groys, whose 1988 book Gesamtkunstwerk Stalin concentrated
on such reifications and devolutions of Soviet avant-garde practices
within Stalinist social engineering, including the May Day parades to
which Buchloh referred. 40 They were also a particularly recurrent trope
for artists from Central and Eastern Europe in the 1980s and 1990s,
with the reiteration and reevaluation of utopia and its failures proving
a potent response to the collapse of communist ideals. Among these
artists were the Ljubljana-based collective Neue Slowenische Kunst (or
NSK), and especially its subgroup IRWIN, for whom the critical reani-
mation of past utopian strategies—what NSK called its “retro” poli-
tics—was vital to critiquing the sociopolitical conditions of the world
around them. In their Was ist Kunst? series from 1984–85, for instance,
NSK created paintings that appropriated symbols valorized by the state
as nationalistic (including images of deer and peasant grain sowers),
and combined them with historical imagery that was simultaneously
redolent of utopianism and totalitarianism. Most notable here were
images from Kasimir Malevich’s Suprematist period that symbolized
for NSK (as they did for Groys) Russian revolutionaries’ hopes for social
change, as well as art’s sublation into statist propaganda after 1917. 41
In series such as this, NSK was decidedly not affirming the state, but
sought to deconstruct its heroized codings by replicating those codes
and conflating them with past totalitarian symbols. As another NSK
subgroup, the rock band LAIBACH, declared in 1982, “All art is subject
to political manipulation . . . except that which speaks the language of
the same manipulation.”42 Only by speaking that same language could
the totalitarian potential within that language be embodied, exceeded,
DE-IDEALIZING DEMOCRACY
rary advertising for celebrities or Chanel—all of which Hirschhorn labeled with ambivalent
acknowledgments of their beauty and which, to cite Buchloh again, equally highlighted “the
catastrophic outcome of what was once a utopian design culture.” Buchloh, “Interview,” 92.
40 Groys, The Total Art of Stalin: Avant-Garde, Aesthetic Dictatorship, and Beyond, trans. Charles
Rougle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).
41 Interview with Miran Mohar, Andrej Savski, and Borut Vogelnik from IRWIN, Ljubljana,
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November 9, 2007.
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49
Ilya Kabakov. Ten Characters, 1988. View of the installation, Ronald Feldman Fine Arts, New York. © 1988
Ilya and Emilia Kabakov, all rights reserved. Photograph by D. James Dee.
50
of implication—and particularly the implication of modernist figures
like Beuys—thereby suggest the development of his own retro politics,
one operating in similar ways to NSK’s.
Such parallels extended beyond NSK as well; more explicit still
were Hirschhorn’s many deliberate allusions to the work of Soviet artist
Ilya Kabakov. These allusions were often formal: the “other worlds”
Hirschhorn presented in Chalet Lost History and Swiss Swiss Democracy
(or later works like 2005’s Utopia-Utopia or 2006’s Superficial
Engagement) involved the near-total transformation of gallery and
museum spaces into overwhelmingly cluttered rooms very differ-
ent from their usual white cube appearance. These works were “total
environment[s],” as Swiss Swiss Democracy’s press release declared 43—a
clear reference to Kabakov’s renowned “total” installations from the
1980s and 1990s, such as his 1988 installation Ten Characters, in
which the only parts of the galleries to maintain their original appear-
ance were the ceilings. Everything else in Kabakov’s and Hirschhorn’s
works alike, from the walls to the lighting to the galleries’ layouts, was
carefully redesigned to simulate spaces at once familiar yet staged: a
chalet or reading lounge for Hirschhorn; for Kabakov, a large communal
space, often a decaying apartment filled with the empty tenements of
characters who had ostensibly fled their rooms and the omniscient gaze
of their viewers.
The appearance of these staged spaces provided only one part of
the art historical linkage between the two artists. More significant
still, these spaces were to be home to both artists’ critical engagements
with their contemporary reality. For Hirschhorn, to reiterate, this was
the implication of participatory gestures within transformed, and
largely hollowed-out, political and artistic discourses of Democracy. For
Kabakov’s “total” installations from the late 1980s, the situation was
DE-IDEALIZING DEMOCRACY
surprisingly little different, for the politics of the Cold War had equally
ideologized those installations and their reception outside the Soviet
Union. This was apparent even in Ten Characters, the first of Kabakov’s
“total” installations to be exhibited in America after his emigration
from Moscow in 1987. Critics responded to the work with an almost
unanimous voice. Kabakov’s apparent simulation of shabby Soviet
dwellings not only unveiled a sociopolitical regime on the verge of col-
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43 Centre Culturel Suisse, Swiss Swiss Democracy Exhibition Press Release, 2004.
51
Eleanor Heartney44—but also countered that with an insistence on
contexts more familiar to the work’s non-Soviet audiences. These
were contexts driven, according to New York–based émigré Margarita
Tupitsyn, by the “democratic . . . form” of installations—their openness
for viewers to wander freely through them, to engage with and partici-
pate in the worlds they unfolded—and thus their capacity to exude, in
the words of Guardian critic Tim Hilton, a “strange kind of democratic
power” for their audiences. 45 Both Kabakov and the fictional worlds of
his “total” installation had, it seemed, escaped the Soviet gloom and
landed in the hegemonic discourse of its Cold War rival.
The situation was more complex than this, though, and warrants
a slight detour before we return to Hirschhorn. 46 The reason is that if,
in the case of Ten Characters, contemporary art and its critical recep-
tion had thoroughly aligned itself with Cold War geopolitics, then
Kabakov himself took a different view altogether, one that remains
largely forgotten in analyses of his work. For him, as he later recounted,
“[f]reedom and the casualness of what was surrounding the visitor in
this place—a victory of democratic society—seemed to me to be fatal.
. . . I dreamed about some sort of contact between my works and the
viewer that would be more significant, fuller.”47 Central to this “fuller”
contact was less the satisfaction of audiences’ desires for free and open
engagement with the installations and their accompanying narra-
tives—as the critics’ yearnings for Democracy suggested—than the
frustration of those desires. This was especially true of Ten Characters.
Wooden slats across the entrance to the installation’s most well-known
room, belonging to The Man Who Flew into Space from His Apartment,
meant that visitors struggled to see, let alone enter, the room with its
damaged ceiling and catapult used (according to Kabakov’s narrative)
by its owner to escape; the rows of objects strung across the room of
The Man Who Never Threw Anything Away similarly prevented visitors
44 Eleanor Heartney, “Nowhere to Fly,” Art in America 78, no. 3 (March 1990): 177; Margarita
Tupitsyn, “Ilya Kabakov: The Simulation of a Soviet Communal Apartment in Soho,” Flash
Art 142 (October 1988): 116.
45 Tim Hilton, “Portraits of Mother Russia,” The Guardian, March 1, 1989, 46.
46 Readers should also note that the following paragraphs provide only a brief run-through of
some of the key points about Democracy in Kabakov’s practice. These arguments are elabo-
ARTMARGINS 1:1
rated in another article, to which I direct interested readers: Anthony Gardner, “Aesthetics
of Emptiness and Withdrawal: Contemporary European Art and Actually Existing
Democratization,” Postcolonial Studies 13, no. 2 (2010): 179–97.
47 Ilya Kabakov, On the “Total” Installation, trans. Cindy Martin (Ostfildern, Germany: Cantz
Verlag, 1995), 268.
52
Ilya Kabakov. The Man Who Flew into Space from His Apartment, 1988. Ronald Feldman Fine Art, New York.
© 1988 Ilya and Emilia Kabakov, all rights reserved. Photograph by D. James Dee.
53
from getting far into the space. This absence of free movement through
the installation was matched by another absence: that of the characters
themselves. Anyone seeking direct engagement with the inhabitants of
these “Soviet” spaces was met instead with the rooms’ strange empti-
ness, a state more attuned to the hands-off regulations of crime scenes
or conventional gallery hangs than lived-in domesticity. Visitor move-
ment through the installation was more akin to the anomic actions
of voyeurism and trespass than to the Democracy championed by
Kabakov’s commentators. Ten Characters thus did not provide an easy
sense of commensurability with the apartment and its residents, nor
the participatory engagement and interaction lauded by critics (both
at the time and since) as a hallmark of Kabakov’s installations. 48 What
it presented instead was a series of dioramas marked by distanciation,
and filled with the failed expectations of encounter. Or, as Kabakov
himself has argued, while the audience is pivotal to his works, “the
viewer should not forget that before him [sic] is deceit and that every-
thing has been made ‘intentionally’ . . . the total installation is a place
of halted action.”49
If Democracy was, for Kabakov, a politics to be resisted, this was
largely because it overdetermined the experience of the work—or,
more accurately, predetermined one’s experience of the work through
a ready-made ideology and political authority that disallowed more
nuanced possibilities beyond the Cold War binaries of East and West,
Soviet and American, communist and capitalist. To frustrate such
expectations, and to emphasize the “fatality” of Democracy, was con-
sequently to suggest that there were indeed other ways of experienc-
ing and understanding art outside the limiting frames of militarized,
political rhetoric. It opened up possibilities of perception not controlled
by geopolitical diktats, but potentially catalyzed by one’s presence in the
“other world” of the “total,” all-encompassing installation. For Kabakov,
this practice of disjunction and halted action, of possibility and destruc-
tion, was the basis for what his works proposed in lieu of ready-made
interpretive frames, including that of Democracy. This proposition was
his notion of “emptiness,” crucial for engaging with and understand-
ing his work. For Kabakov, emptiness was a self-generated, idiosyn-
ARTMARGINS 1:1
48 See, for example, Andrew Renton, “Ilya Kabakov: Riverside Studios, London,” Flash Art 147
(Summer 1989): 160; Svetlana Boym, “On Diasporic Intimacy: Ilya Kabakov’s Installations
and Immigrant Homes,” Critical Inquiry 24, no. 2 (Winter 1998): 14.
49 Kabakov, On the “Total” Installation, 246.
54
cratic premise that was inextricable from the discourses of the state
that surrounded Kabakov’s practice—“the sensation of propaganda”
was always present when standing inside his work, Kabakov later
claimed50 —but which could also be an unstable base from which to
reimagine one’s sense of the world, precisely by trying to find ways to
disrupt propaganda and predetermined expectations. Emptiness was
thus “a threat and a blessing,” according to Kabakov, inseparable from
the destructive capacities of statist bureaucratization, yet also signaling
“the victory of counter-ideology.”51 And although emptiness emerged in
the 1970s in Moscow as a field of white coloring in Kabakov’s paint-
ings and albums—referring both to Malevich’s use of white as the zero
point of art in the Suprematist avant-garde and to struggles against
the blinding ideology of post-Stalinist communism—it is significant
that Kabakov has identified emptiness in his “total” installations quite
differently. These installations were, he claims, designed precisely for a
“Western” audience: while some of the set pieces had been constructed
in Kabakov’s Moscow studio (including The Man Who Flew into Space)
and others were based on the illustrated albums he created there in
the 1970s, the installations nonetheless “can be examined only in
one context, in the context of Western contemporary art practices.”52
Emptiness, as a counterideology manifest through the installations,
was thus not specific to life under the Soviet state; it instead “inhabits
the place in which we live,” as Kabakov wrote in his 1990 treatise called
“On Emptiness,” “from ‘sea to shining sea.’”53 As Kabakov’s allusion
to the song “America the Beautiful” suggested, emptiness was a way
to perceive art beyond the rubric of Soviet communism and American
patriotism too, so as to shatter the harnessing of art to ready-made
political authority, and thus the ideologization of art during (cold) war.
I do not want to suggest here that Hirschhorn was necessarily
DE-IDEALIZING DEMOCRACY
50 Ilya Kabakov in Ilya Kabakov and Boris Groys, “ ” (“Emptiness”), in Dialogi 1990–
1994 (Moscow: Ad Marginem, 1999), 102.
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55
“total” installations are striking, not least because both have tried to
assert a kind of autonomy from dominant presumptions about what
art’s politics might be. They did so in similar ways: spatially, through
works that overwhelm their visitors, insisting upon installation as
a quasi-autonomous zone in which to critically reexamine everyday
reality; and discursively, through the remarkably prolific writings that
accompany and contextualize these “other worlds,” and their artistic
and political critiques.
In late 2001, Hirschhorn exhibited a rickety sculpture that filled
the small gallery of La Salle de Bains in Lyon. Titled Maison Commune
(or Communal House), the work comprised sixteen small rooms span-
ning two stories of the model house-cum-apartment block, the walls of
which were removed to let viewers see directly inside. What they saw were
rooms “personalized,” in Hirschhorn’s words, so that “[t]he spectator
knows that it resembles different apartments inhabited by different
people. There is no-one in the house nor any figurine or small human
model,”54 only photographic reproductions of people from across the
world bearing arms ready for war. Maison Commune clearly reiter-
ated Kabakovian forms, especially that of Ten Characters, given that
Kabakov had similarly removed the walls of his modeled communal
apartments in order to heighten visitors’ sense of voyeurism as they
sought to peer into the personalized yet uninhabited rooms. At the
same time, however, we can recognize that Maison Commune was also
an obvious precursor to 2003’s Hotel Democracy, and its own rickety
series of empty rooms personalized with images of weapons and
warmongering. If, as Hirschhorn argued of Maison Commune, it was
not the defense of specific causes but the violence of bearing arms that
was “communal” in contemporary society, then it was a communality
that Hirschhorn explicitly identified with militarized Democracy in
his later hotel.55 Moreover, if Kabakov’s “total” installations provided
the structural basis for Maison Commune’s assertions of anomic com-
munality and the domestication of war, then they similarly subtended
Hotel Democracy’s inflection of Democracy with death, and his disloca-
tion of Democracy from utopian ideals. We might remember here that
this separation of Democracy from utopian idealism was thoroughly
ARTMARGINS 1:1
56
deliberate: “utopianism” was, after all, staged
in a separate room of Tate Modern from
Hotel Democracy, in the U-Lounge with its
spaces for conversation sparked by Marcus
Steinweg’s philosophical pamphlets dis-
tributed throughout the work. And in these
texts, Steinweg advanced his, and arguably
Hirschhorn’s, conceptions of what utopia (or
at least social and aesthetic ideals) might still
be in the face of contemporary, militarized
Democracy: a perception of people with-
out predetermined identities and without
preconceptions about other people’s identi-
ties; a meeting point whose politics similarly
lacked predetermination; and a politics that
could thus “affirm an ‘enormous and terrible
emptiness’ . . . as a kind of ontological devia-
tion . . . as something which interrupts the
totality of an ordered system or body.”56 For
Steinweg to affirm such a Kabakovian notion
of “emptiness” at the heart of Hirschhorn’s
Thomas Hirschhorn. Maison Commune, 2001.
practice was undoubtedly suggestive, espe-
© 2001 La Salle de Bains, Lyon, all rights reserved.
cially given the formal correlations that
Hirschhorn painstakingly made between
his work and Kabakov’s during this period. What Steinweg’s asser-
tions also pinpointed, though, were deliberate conceptual correlations
between the two artists—correlations driven by a desire to interrupt
and deviate from the existing order of things, to reject predetermined
discursive frames, and, from this, to prize open a politics of emptiness
DE-IDEALIZING DEMOCRACY
57
were framed as defeated, absorbed, or, better still, implicated within the
mantras and trajectories of Democratization that Hirschhorn sought
to de-idealize. By contrast, the practices of NSK and especially Kabakov
provided Hirschhorn with a significant platform from which to launch
his revolt against Democracy. On one level, these practices sought to
deconstruct or reimagine what art’s politics might be, thus serving as
precedents for questioning the subsumption of art within the extant
political frames of the state. Remobilizing aspects of those past aesthetic
models within the present has been the basis for Hirschhorn’s mode
of retro politics. Just as importantly, the work of NSK and Kabakov has
also informed, for Hirschhorn, a lineage of art historical influence dif-
ferent from the normative Euro-American canon—a canon that would
include Beuys and Klein, and which underpins a seemingly “universal”
art history in much the same way that Democracy has come to under-
pin a “universal” politics in international relations. While much of the
commentary surrounding Hirschhorn’s projects aligns his work with
that canon, Hirschhorn himself has carefully sought distinction from
it, insisting instead upon a different set of correlations, and maybe even
a continuum, between his work and that from the period of late and
postcommunism. That continuum is one I want to focus on briefly in
the final section of this essay.
POSTSOCIALIST PROSPECTS
Two particular factors motivate Hirschhorn’s aesthetic of remobiliza-
tion. The first relates to his clear desire to connect with practices that,
from art history’s supposed “peripheries,” have sought to reimagine the
stakes of art’s engagement with the world around it, and especially art’s
sense of politics. Whether the critiques of Democracy that Hirschhorn
shares with artists like Kabakov or NSK also suggest a continuum
between the specific contexts to which these artists responded—that
is, a continuum between ideologies of Democracy as opposed to (and,
according to conservative thinking, soon to be “victorious” over) com-
munism during the Cold War,57 and Democracy as a globalized politics
spread militarily after 2001—is something that lies outside this essay’s
scope. What those critiques do intimate, however, is a shared interest
ARTMARGINS 1:1
57 The most infamous of these being, of course, Francis Fukuyama’s presumptions that the
“victory” of liberal Democracy over communism would end all forms of ideological conflict
and thus induce the end of history: Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man
(London: Penguin, 1992).
58
in debating, rethinking, and reopening art’s interpretive frames. To
de-idealize Democracy is to insist upon finding other means and inter-
pretive channels for understanding art’s politics. This is ultimately a
matter of legitimation, as Marcus Steinweg recognized in one of his
Swiss Swiss Democracy lectures: rejecting the subsumption of art within
ready-made political and ideological discourse means having to create a
different nomenclature for articulating art’s position within the larger
world around it. Whatever art’s political potentials may be, they can be
neither found nor legitimized through predetermined frames of refer-
ence; they instead emerge from the artwork itself, perhaps generated
through one’s experience with the work, but certainly in ways that are
idiosyncratic to that work. Hence the very distinctive discourses used
by these artists to theorize their practices—“emptiness” for Kabakov,
NSK’s “retro” politics—and which may help explain what Hirschhorn
means when he says that the goal of his projects is “making art politi-
cally” rather than making “political art.”58
This leads us to the second factor, for if Hirschhorn has turned
to precedents from late-communist Europe as one basis for his revolt
against Democracy, this was not only because they proffered an alter-
native frame of influence from the Western-centric canon, but, more
importantly, because those artists had already sought to de-idealize
the political status quo as it was presumed to apply to art. Their work
exemplified the very modes of reevaluating art’s politics, and its politi-
cized interpretations, that Hirschhorn pursued through his practice
of “de-idealization.”59 What Hirschhorn sought, in other words, was
to remobilize the potentialities of certain art practices from the late-
communist period, but in contexts that were not limited to either the
period or geographies of European communism. This has particular
significance, for what it proposes is a relevance and a mobility of these
DE-IDEALIZING DEMOCRACY
58 See, for example, Enwezor and Hirschhorn, “Interview,” 29; and Michael Stoeber, “Beauty
Is the Will for Truth: A Conversation with Thomas Hirschhorn,” Sculpture 26, no. 3 (April
2007): 33. According to Hirschhorn, the phrase was itself an example of remobilization,
derived from filmmaker Jean-Luc Godard’s assertion that “the problem is not to make
political films, but to make films politically.” Cited in Stoeber, “Beauty Is the Will,” 33.
59 Indeed, it was precisely their refusal to conform to dominant political frames that has led to
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NSK and Kabakov invariably being labeled “nonconformist”—a notoriously slippery term,
GARDNER
and one for which Hirschhorn’s notion of “de-idealization” may stand as a substitute. I
especially wish to think Magda Cârneci for reminding me of the difficulties associated with
terms like “nonconformism” in different contexts of Central and Eastern Europe.
59
specific histories to which these practices are almost invariably margin-
alized: namely, the contexts of late communism and postcommunism
in Central and Eastern Europe.
By returning to and remobilizing past aesthetics of de-idealization,
particularly those specific to postcommunist contexts, and by mobiliz-
ing them outside postcommunist Europe, Hirschhorn emphasizes
an important point of connection between contexts that otherwise
remain lamentably divided: the power of neoliberal globalization and
its political imperatives—including, clearly, Democracy—to obliterate
all forms of resistance to its ideals (a process that has become particu-
larly virulent after the dissolution of the communist parties). But, as
political theorist Chris Hann has written, this point of connection
emerges through the “general loss of faith in socialism as an ‘ideological
system’” in all parts of Europe,60 whether as official party politics (wit-
ness Scandinavia or France) or as an alternative to the ever-expansive,
colonizing impulses beating at neoliberalism’s core. A distinction thus
needs to be maintained between the communism of the party and
socialism as a broader international philosophy—one that Hirschhorn
may say was driven, like his practice, by “resistance and friendship”—
such that a much more expansive view can be taken of the possible
ramifications of socialism’s apparent collapse.61 And if this is correct,
then perhaps a similar distinction has also developed between post-
communism and postsocialism, including in the field of art.
In making this distinction, I realize I am arguing against an
exceptionally important body of scholarship that identifies postcommu-
nism and postsocialism as synonymous.62 Yet, I think this distinction
remains crucial, and not just because of their grounding in histori-
cal differences (whether that be socialism’s status as a stepping-stone
toward communism in Marxian teleologies, or the disparity between
the communist parties that governed specific nation-states and the
socialist philosophies they claimed, however erroneously, to promote).
60 Chris Hann, “Farewell to the Socialist ‘Other,’” in Postsocialism: Ideals, Ideologies and
Practices in Eurasia, ed. C. M. Hann (London: Routledge, 2002), 6.
61 This is also a consideration emphasized by philosopher Peter Osborne, for whom the col-
lapse of communism was part of a broader collapse of socialism as a philosophy pivotal to
ARTMARGINS 1:1
countries and cultures on both sides of the old “iron curtain.” See Peter Osborne, Socialism
and the Limits of Liberalism (London: Verso, 1991).
62 This is particularly true of the remarkable work produced in the former Yugoslavia, includ-
ing Marina Gržinic´, Fiction Reconstructed: Eastern Europe, Post-Socialism and the Retro-
Avantgarde (Vienna: Edition Selene, 2000); Aleš Erjavec, Postmodernism and the Postsocialist
60
It also emphasizes the distinction between postcommunism as it
affects art practices from Central and Eastern Europe and postsocial-
ism as a broader phenomenon, one that stretches out beyond the peri-
ods and European geographies of communism and postcommunism,
and which may still maintain the energy of “resistance and friendship”
within contemporary contexts of the global. This is especially impor-
tant as so-called global turns become a predominant feature in art
history, for it can sometimes be all too easy to replicate the biases and
blind spots that have become the hallmark of “globalization” socially,
politically, economically, and historically. The stakes of postsocial-
ist projects like Hirschhorn’s, by contrast, demand something else.
By reengaging past aesthetics of de-idealization within the different
conditions of the present, and in defiance of old “East/West” borders,
these postsocialist projects proffer modes of exchange and critique that
may articulate ways of thinking art’s global relations without returning
to neoliberal ideals and the oppression they can engender. They may
instead reopen the means by which art is engaged, interpreted, and
politicized, in ways that counter the discourses and perhaps even the
practices of globalized neoliberalism, in both art and its “larger world.”
And they can do so by retracing and reengaging prior cultural histories
that still have a symbolic authority, and that may spark other ways to
imagine art’s politics in the supposed aftermath not just of European
communism but of socialism internationally.
DE-IDEALIZING DEMOCRACY
Condition: Politicized Art under Late Socialism (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2003); and Rastko Moc̆ nik, “EAST!” in East Art Map: Contemporary Art and Eastern Europe,
ed. IRWIN (London: Afterall, 2006), 343–48. The conflation of postcommunism and post-
socialism continues in the work of other, non-Yugoslav theorists of communist-era Europe,
including Sibelan Forrester, Magdalena J. Zaborowska, and Elena Gapova, eds., Over the
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Indiana University Press, 2004), in which the editors’ introduction refers consistently to
“postsocialist cultural studies” (1–35), while the anthology’s title pinpoints its actual subject
matter as “postcommunist cultures.”
61