ANTI-ARSON LAW

DANTE BUEBOS and SARMELITO BUEBOS, petitioners,

vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 163938 | March 28, 2008

Facts:

Adelina Borbe was in her house watching over her sick child. She heard some noise, got up and saw the petitioners
congregating in front of her hut. When she went out, she saw the roof of her hut on fire. Instead of helping her,
petitioners fled.

Issue: WON petitioners are liable for simple arson or for arson of an inhabited house which merits a
penalty of up to reclusion perpetua (YES).

Held:
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness
of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended) constituting
Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which,
by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.
On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of
perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates
crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson.
However, acts falling under Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on
the qualifying circumstances present.

Prescinding from the above clarification vis-à-vis the description of the crime as stated in the accusatory portion
of the Information, it is quite evident that accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Simple Arson — for
having "deliberately set fire upon the two-storey residential house of ROBERTO SEPARA and family . . .
knowing the same to be an inhabited house and situated in a thickly populated place and as a consequence thereof
a conflagration ensued and the said building, together with some seven (7) adjoining residential houses, were
razed by fire."

Now, to the penalty. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should
range from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Considering that no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance attended the commission of the offense, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period [eight
(8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years]. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence is prision correctional,
which has a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, to be imposed in any of its periods.

The CA sentence is in accord with law and jurisprudence. We sustain it. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The appealed judgment is AFFIRMED in full. SO ORDERED
 ANTI-ARSON LAW

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. NESTOR G. SORIANO alias "Boy," appellant.
G.R. No. 142565 | July 29, 2003

Facts:

There was a disagreement between Soriano and Rosario regarding their child. It stemmed from the fact that
Honey’s brother, Oscar Cimagala, took their child out without the consent of accused-appellant who wanted both
Honey and Otoy instead to return with him to Manila. But Honey refused.

As their discussion wore on accused-appellant intimidated to Honey his desire to have sex with her, which he
vigorously pursued the night before with much success. This time Honey did not relent to the baser instincts of
Nestor; instead, she kicked him as her stern rebuke to his sexual importuning.

In the heated exchanges, Nestor struck Honey in the forehead. You are hurting me, she snapped back, just like
what you did to me in Manila. Nestor then moved away as he muttered: It is better that I burn this house, and then
took a match from the top of a cabinet, lighted a cigarette and set fire to the plastic partition that served as divider
of Honeys room. He also set on fire the clothes. As a result, the house occupied by Honey was totally burned
together with five (5) neighboring houses.

Issue: WON the defendant has committed the crime of destructive arson (NO).

Ruling:

Under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended, and PD 1613, Arson is classified into two kinds: (1)
Destructive Arson (Art. 320) and (2) other cases of arson. This classification is based on the kind, character and
location of the property burned, regardless of the value of the damage caused. Hence, accused-appellant must be
held guilty of Simple Arson for the act intentionally burning an inhabited house or dwelling.
 ANTI-ARSON LAW

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ALAMADA MACABANDO, appellant.

GR No. 188708 | July 31, 2013

Facts:

The evidence showed that at around 4:00pm, the appellant Alamada Macabando, broke bottles on the road while
holding a G.I. pipe, and shouted that he wanted to get even. Then he uttered that he would burn his house.
Thereafter on the same day, a witness heard his neighbors shout that there was a fire. He went out of his house
and saw smoke coming from Macabando’s house. When a neighbor tried to extinguish the fire, Macabando told
him not to interfere and then fired three shots in the air. He also told the people around that whoever would put
out the fire would be killed. The Bureau of Fire Protection conducted an investigation and the results revealed
that the fire was intentionally started in the man’s home.
The prosecution charged Macabando with the crime of destructive arson under Article 320 of the RPC. The RTC
found him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The CA
affirmed the RTC judgment in toto.

Issue: WON Macabando should be held liable for Simple Arson under P.D. 1613 and not Destructive
Arson under the RPC. (YES)

Ruling:

The CA convicted the appellant of destructive arson under Article 320 of the RPC, as amended. Article 320
contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains,
vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or commercial establishments by any person or group
of persons.

Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613, on the other hand, currently governs simple arson. Section 3 of this law
provides:

Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua shall be imposed if
the property burned is any of the following:

1. Any building used as offices of the government or any of its agencies;

2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
3. Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform or tunnel;
4. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain field, orchard, bamboo grove or forest;
5. Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and
6. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse. [italics and emphasis ours]

P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of size, not included
in Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This law punishes simple arson with a lesser
penalty because the acts that constitute it have a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness. Simple arson
contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political, and national security implications than
destructive arson.
 ANTI-ARSON LAW

The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b)
what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Both these elements have been proven in the
present case. The Information alleged that the appellant set fire to his own house, and that the fire spread to
other inhabited houses. These allegations were established during trial through the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses which the trial and appellate courts found credible and convincing, and through the report of the Bureau
of Fire Protection which stated that damaged houses were residential, and that the fire had been intentional.
Moreover, the certification from the City Social Welfare and Development Department likewise indicated that
the burned houses were used as dwellings. The appellant likewise testified that his burnt two-story house was
used as a residence. That the appellant's act affected many families will not convert the crime to destructive arson,
since the appellant's act does not appear to be heinous or represents a greater degree of perversity and viciousness
when compared to those acts punished under Article 320 of the RPC. The established evidence only showed that
the appellant intended to burn his own house, but the conflagration spread to the neighboring houses.

In this regard, our ruling in Buebos v. People is particularly instructive, thus: “The nature of Destructive Arson is
distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts
committed under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous
crimes "for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest
wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and
norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." On the other hand, acts committed under
PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law
punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social,
economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson.”