SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 151060. August 31, 2005.]

JN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, and SPS. RODRIGO and LEONOR

STA. ANA , petitioners, vs . PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN
GUARANTEE CORPORATION , respondent.

[G.R. No. 151311. August 31, 2005.]

NARCISO V. CRUZ , petitioner, vs . PHILIPPINE EXPORT and FOREIGN

LOAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION , respondent.

Raymond P. Palad for JN Dev't. Corporation and Spouses Sta. Ana.

Benito F. Ambrosio for N.V. Cruz.
The Government Corporate Counsel and Ma. Rosario S. Manalang-Demegillo &
Isabelo G. Gumaru for respondent.

SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; GUARANTY; RIGHT OF
EXCUSSION; THE GUARANTOR CANNOT BE COMPELLED TO PAY THE CREDITOR UNLESS
THE LATTER HAS EXHAUSTED ALL THE LEGAL REMEDIES AGAINST THE DEBTOR. —
Under a contract of guarantee, the guarantor binds himself to the creditor to ful ll the
obligation of the principal debtor in case the latter should fail to do so. The guarantor who
pays for a debtor, in turn, must be indemni ed by the latter. However, the guarantor cannot
be compelled to pay the creditor unless the latter has exhausted all the property of the
debtor and resorted to all the legal remedies against the debtor. This is what is otherwise
known as the bene t of excussion. It is clear that excussion may only be invoked after
legal remedies against the principal debtor have been expanded. Thus, it was held that the
creditor must rst obtain a judgment against the principal debtor before assuming to run
after the alleged guarantor, "for obviously the 'exhaustion of the principal's property'
cannot even begin to take place before judgment has been obtained." The law imposes
conditions precedent for the invocation of the defense. Thus, in order that the guarantor
may make use of the bene t of excussion, he must set it up against the creditor upon the
latter's demand for payment and point out to the creditor available property of the debtor
within the Philippines sufficient to cover the amount of the debt.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WAIVER THEREOF BY GUARANTOR CANNOT PREVENT HIM
FROM DEMANDING REIMBURSEMENT FROM THE DEBTOR; CASE AT BAR. — While a
guarantor enjoys the bene t of excussion, nothing prevents him from paying the obligation
once demand is made on him. Excussion, after all, is a right granted to him by law and as
such he may opt to make use of it or waive it. PhilGuarantee's waiver of the right of
excussion cannot prevent it from demanding reimbursement from petitioners. The law
clearly requires the debtor to indemnify the guarantor what the latter has paid. . . . The law
does not prohibit the payment by a guarantor on his own volition, heedless of the bene t
of excussion. In fact, it recognizes the right of a guarantor to recover what it has paid, even
if payment was made before the debt becomes due, or if made without notice to the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 debtor, subject of course to some conditions.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; A GUARANTOR IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM WAIVING HIS RIGHTS
TO BE NOTIFIED OF OR TO GIVE HIS CONSENT TO EXTENSIONS OBTAINED BY THE
DEBTOR. — The requirement that the guarantor should consent to any extension granted
by the creditor to the debtor under Art. 2079 is for the bene t of the guarantor. As such, it
is likewise waivable by the guarantor. Thus, even assuming that extensions were indeed
granted by TRB to JN, PhilGuarantee could have opted to waive the need for consent to
such extensions. Indeed, a guarantor is not precluded from waiving his right to be noti ed
of or to give his consent to extensions obtained by the debtor. Such waiver is not contrary
to public policy as it is purely personal and does not affect public interest. In the instant
case, PhilGuarantee's waiver can be inferred from its actual payment to TRB after the
latter's demand, despite JN's failure to pay the renewal/guarantee fee as indicated in the
guarantee.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF EXCUSSION; MAY ONLY BE INVOKED BY THE
GUARANTOR AT HIS DISCRETION. — [E]xcussion is a right granted to the guarantor and,
therefore, only he may invoke it at his discretion.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; BURDEN OF PROOF; FORGERY CANNOT BE
PRESUMED AND MUST BE PROVED BY CONVINCING EVIDENCE AND THE BURDEN OF
PROOF LIES ON THE PARTY ALLEGING FORGERY. — Forgery cannot be presumed and
must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on
the party alleging forgery. Mere denial will not su ce to overcome the positive value of the
Undertaking, which is a notarized document, has in its favor the presumption of regularity,
and carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. Even
in cases where the alleged forged signature was compared to samples of genuine
signatures to show its variance therefrom, this Court still found such evidence insu cient.
Mere variance of the signatures cannot be considered as conclusive proof that the same
were forged.

DECISION

TINGA , J : p

Before us are consolidated petitions questioning the Decision 1 of the Court of

Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61318, entitled Philippine Export and Foreign Loan
Guarantee Corporation v. JN Development Corporation, et al ., which reversed the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 60.
On 13 December 1979, petitioner JN Development Corporation ("JN") and Traders
Royal Bank (TRB) entered into an agreement whereby TRB would extend to JN an Export
Packing Credit Line for Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00). The loan was covered by
several securities, including a real estate mortgage 2 and a letter of guarantee from
respondent Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation ("PhilGuarantee"),
now Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines, covering seventy
percent (70%) of the credit line. 3 With PhilGuarantee issuing a guarantee in favor of TRB, 4
JN, petitioner spouses Rodrigo and Leonor Sta. Ana 5 and petitioner Narciso Cruz 6
executed a Deed of Undertaking 7 (Undertaking) to assure repayment to PhilGuarantee.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com

 It appears that JN failed to pay the loan to TRB upon its maturity; thus, on 8 October
1980 TRB requested PhilGuarantee to make good its guarantee. 8 PhilGuarantee informed
JN about the call made by TRB, and inquired about the action of JN to settle the loan. 9
Having received no response from JN, on 10 March 1981 PhilGuarantee paid TRB Nine
Hundred Thirty Four Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty Four Pesos and Thirty Four Centavos
(P934,824.34). 1 0 Subsequently, PhilGuarantee made several demands on JN, but the latter
failed to pay. On 30 May 1983, JN, through Rodrigo Sta. Ana, proposed to settle the
obligation "by way of development and sale" of the mortgaged property. 1 1 PhilGuarantee,
however, rejected the proposal.
PhilGuarantee thus led a Complaint 12 for collection of money and damages
against herein petitioners.
In its Decision dated 20 August 1998, the RTC dismissed PhilGuarantee's Complaint
as well as the counterclaim of petitioners. It ruled that petitioners are not liable to
reimburse PhilGuarantee what it had paid to TRB. Crucial to this holding was the court's
nding that TRB was able to foreclose the real estate mortgage executed by JN, thus
extinguishing petitioners' obligation. 1 3 Moreover, there was no showing that after the said
foreclosure, TRB had demanded from JN any de ciency or the payment of the difference
between the proceeds of the foreclosure sale and the actual loan. 1 4 In addition, the RTC
held that since PhilGuarantee's guarantee was good for only one year from 17 December
1979, or until 17 December 1980, and since it was not renewed after the expiry of said
period, PhilGuarantee had no more legal duty to pay TRB on 10 March 1981. 1 5 The RTC
likewise ruled that Cruz cannot be held liable under the Undertaking since he was not the
one who signed the document, in line with its finding that his signature found in the records
is totally different from the signature on the Undertaking. 1 6
According to the RTC, the failure of TRB to sue JN for the recovery of the loan
precludes PhilGuarantee from seeking recoupment from the spouses Sta. Ana and Cruz
what it paid to TRB. Thus, PhilGuarantee's payment to TRB amounts to a waiver of its right
under Art. 2058 of the Civil Code. 1 7
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, PhilGuarantee appealed to the CA. The appellate
court reversed the RTC and ordered petitioners to pay PhilGuarantee Nine Hundred Thirty
Four Thousand Six Hundred Twenty Four Pesos and Thirty Four Centavos (P934,624.34),
plus service charge and interest. 1 8
In reaching its denouement, the CA held that the RTC's nding that the loan was
extinguished by virtue of the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property had no factual
support, 1 9 and that such nding is negated by Rodrigo Sta. Ana's testimony that JN did
not receive any notice of foreclosure from PhilGuarantee or from TRB. 2 0 Moreover, Sta.
Ana even offered the same mortgaged property to PhilGuarantee to settle its obligations
with the latter. 2 1
The CA also ruled that JN's obligation had become due and demandable within the
one-year period of effectivity of the guarantee; thus, PhilGuarantee's payment to TRB
conformed with its guarantee, although the payment itself was effected one year after the
maturity date of the loan. 2 2 Contrary to the trial court's nding, the CA ruled that the
contract of guarantee was not extinguished by the alleged lack of evidence on
PhilGuarantee's consent to the extensions granted by TRB to JN. 2 3 Interpreting Art. 2058
of the Civil Code, 2 4 the appellate court explained that while the provision states that the
guarantor cannot be compelled to pay unless the properties of the debtor are exhausted,
the guarantor is not precluded from waiving the bene t of excussion and paying the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 obligation altogether. 2 5
Finally, the CA found that Narciso Cruz was unable to prove the alleged forgery of his
signature in the Undertaking, the evidence presented not being su cient to overcome the
presumption of regularity of the Undertaking which is a notarized document. 2 6
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Decision and prayed for the admission of
documents evidencing the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, but the motion for
reconsideration was denied by the CA for lack of merit. The CA ruled that the documentary
evidence presented by petitioners cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence, it
being already in existence while the case was pending before the trial court, the very forum
before which it should have been presented. Besides, a foreclosure sale per se is not proof
of petitioners' payment of the loan to PhilGuarantee, the CA added. 2 7
So now before the Court are the separate petitions for review of the CA Decision. JN
and the spouses Sta. Ana, petitioners in G.R. No. 151060, posit that the CA erred in
interpreting Articles 2079, 2058, and 2059 of the Civil Code in its Decision. 2 8 Meanwhile,
petitioner Narciso Cruz in G.R. No. 151311 claims that the CA erred when it held that
petitioners are liable to PhilGuarantee despite its payment after the expiration of its
contract of guarantee and the lack of PhilGuarantee's consent to the extensions granted
by TRB to JN. Moreover, Cruz questions the reversal of the ruling of the trial court anent his
liability as a signatory to the Undertaking. 2 9
On the other hand, PhilGuarantee maintains that the date of default, not the actual
date of payment, determines the liability of the guarantor and that having paid TRB when
the loan became due, it should be indemni ed by petitioners. 3 0 It argues that, contrary to
petitioners' claim, there could be no waiver of its right to excussion more explicit than its
act of payment to TRB very directly. 3 1 Besides, the right to excussion is for the bene t of
the guarantor and is not a defense for the debtor to raise and use to evade liability. 3 2
Finally, PhilGuarantee maintains that there is no su cient evidence proving the alleged
forgery of Cruz's signature on the Undertaking, which is a notarized document and as such
must be accorded the presumption of regularity. 3 3
The Court finds for PhilGuarantee. SAHEIc

Under a contract of guarantee, the guarantor binds himself to the creditor to ful ll
the obligation of the principal debtor in case the latter should fail to do so. 3 4 The
guarantor who pays for a debtor, in turn, must be indemni ed by the latter. 3 5 However, the
guarantor cannot be compelled to pay the creditor unless the latter has exhausted all the
property of the debtor and resorted to all the legal remedies against the debtor. 3 6 This is
what is otherwise known as the benefit of excussion.
It is clear that excussion may only be invoked after legal remedies against the
principal debtor have been expanded. Thus, it was held that the creditor must rst obtain a
judgment against the principal debtor before assuming to run after the alleged guarantor,
"for obviously the 'exhaustion of the principal's property' cannot even begin to take place
before judgment has been obtained." 3 7 The law imposes conditions precedent for the
invocation of the defense. Thus, in order that the guarantor may make use of the bene t of
excussion, he must set it up against the creditor upon the latter's demand for payment and
point out to the creditor available property of the debtor within the Philippines su cient to
cover the amount of the debt. 3 8
While a guarantor enjoys the bene t of excussion, nothing prevents him from paying
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 the obligation once demand is made on him. Excussion, after all, is a right granted to him
by law and as such he may opt to make use of it or waive it. PhilGuarantee's waiver of the
right of excussion cannot prevent it from demanding reimbursement from petitioners. The
law clearly requires the debtor to indemnify the guarantor what the latter has paid. 3 9
Petitioners' claim that PhilGuarantee had no more obligation to pay TRB because of
the alleged expiration of the contract of guarantee is untenable. The guarantee, dated 17
December 1979, states:
In the event of default by JNDC and as a consequence thereof,
PHILGUARANTEE is made to pay its obligation arising under the aforesaid
guarantee PHILGUARANTEE shall pay the BANK the amount of P1.4 million or
70% of the total obligation unpaid . . .

xxx xxx xxx

This guarantee shall be valid for a period of one (1) year from date hereof
but may be renewed upon payment by JNDC of the guarantee fee at the same
rate of 1.5% per annum. 4 0

The guarantee was only up to 17 December 1980. JN's obligation with TRB fell due
on 30 June 1980, and demand on PhilGuarantee was made by TRB on 08 October 1980.
That payment was actually made only on 10 March 1981 does not take it out of the terms
of the guarantee. What is controlling is that default and demand on PhilGuarantee had
taken place while the guarantee was still in force.
There is likewise no merit in petitioners' claim that PhilGuarantee's failure to give its
express consent to the alleged extensions granted by TRB to JN had extinguished the
guarantee. The requirement that the guarantor should consent to any extension granted by
the creditor to the debtor under Art. 2079 is for the bene t of the guarantor. As such, it is
likewise waivable by the guarantor. Thus, even assuming that extensions were indeed
granted by TRB to JN, PhilGuarantee could have opted to waive the need for consent to
such extensions. Indeed, a guarantor is not precluded from waiving his right to be noti ed
of or to give his consent to extensions obtained by the debtor. Such waiver is not contrary
to public policy as it is purely personal and does not affect public interest. 4 1 In the instant
case, PhilGuarantee's waiver can be inferred from its actual payment to TRB after the
latter's demand, despite JN's failure to pay the renewal/guarantee fee as indicated in the
guarantee. 4 2
For the above reasons, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that PhilGuarantee
was a mere volunteer payor and had no legal obligation to pay TRB. The law does not
prohibit the payment by a guarantor on his own volition, heedless of the bene t of
excussion. In fact, it recognizes the right of a guarantor to recover what it has paid, even if
payment was made before the debt becomes due, 4 3 or if made without notice to the
debtor, 4 4 subject of course to some conditions.
Petitioners' invocation of our ruling in Willex Plastic Industries, Corp. v. Court of
Appeals 4 5 is misplaced, if not irrelevant. In the said case, the guarantor claimed that it
could not be proceeded against without rst exhausting all of the properties of the debtor.
The Court, nding that there was an express renunciation of the bene t of excussion in the
contract of guarantee, ruled against the guarantor.
The cited case nds no application in the case a quo. PhilGuarantee is not invoking
the bene t of excussion. It cannot be overemphasized that excussion is a right granted to
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 the guarantor and, therefore, only he may invoke it at his discretion.
The bene t of excussion, as well as the requirement of consent to extensions of
payment, is a protective device pertaining to and conferred on the guarantor. These may
be invoked by the guarantor against the creditor as defenses to bar the unwarranted
enforcement of the guarantee. However, PhilGuarantee did not avail of these defenses
when it paid its obligation according to the tenor of the guarantee once demand was made
on it. What is peculiar in the instant case is that petitioners, the principal debtors
themselves, are muddling the issues and raising the same defenses against the guarantor,
which only the guarantor may invoke against the creditor, to avoid payment of their own
obligation to the guarantor. The Court cannot countenance their self-seeking desire to be
exonerated from the duty to reimburse PhilGuarantee after it had paid TRB on their behalf
and to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of PhilGuarantee.
Petitioners assert that TRB's alleged foreclosure of the real estate mortgage over
the land executed as security for the loan agreement had extinguished PhilGuarantee's
obligation; thus, PhilGuarantee's recourse should be directed against TRB, as per the pari-
passu provision 4 6 in the contract of guarantee. 4 7 We disagree.
The foreclosure was made on 27 August 1993, "after the case was submitted for
decision in 1992 and before the issuance of the decision of the court a quo in 1998". 4 8
Thus, foreclosure was resorted to by TRB against JN when they both had become aware
that PhilGuarantee had already paid TRB and that there was a pending case led by
PhilGuarantee against petitioners. This matter was not raised and proved in the trial court,
nor in the appeal before the CA, but raised for the rst time in petitioners' motion for
reconsideration in the CA. In their appellants' Brief, petitioners claimed that "there was no
need for the defendant-appellee JNDC to present any evidence before the lower court to
show that indeed foreclosure of the REM took place." 4 9 As properly held by the CA,
. . . Firstly, the documents evidencing foreclosure of mortgage cannot be
considered as newly discovered evidence. The said documents were already
subsisting and should have been presented during the trial of the case. The
alleged foreclosure sale was made on August 23, 1993 . . . while the decision was
rendered by the trial court on August 20, 1998 about ve (5) years thereafter.
These documents were likewise not submitted by the defendants-appellees when
they submitted their appellees' Brief to this Court. Thus, these cannot be
considered as newly discovered evidence but are more correctly ascribed as
suppressed forgotten evidence . . . Secondly, the alleged foreclosure sale is not
proof of payment of the loan by defendant-appellees to the plaintiffs-appellants.
50

Besides, the complaint a quo was led by PhilGuarantee as guarantor for JN, and its
cause of action was premised on its payment of JN's obligation after the latter's default.
PhilGuarantee was well within its rights to demand reimbursement for such payment
made, regardless of whether the creditor, TRB, was subsequently able to obtain payment
from JN. If double payment was indeed made, then it is JN which should go after TRB, and
not PhilGuarantee. Petitioners have no one to blame but themselves, having allowed the
foreclosure of the property for the full value of the loan despite knowledge of
PhilGuarantee's payment to TRB. Having been aware of such payment, they should have
opposed the foreclosure, or at the very least, led a supplemental pleading with the trial
court informing the same of the foreclosure sale. SHaIDE

Likewise, petitioners cannot invoke the pari-passu clause in the guarantee, not being
parties to the said agreement. The clause is clearly for the bene t of the guarantor and no
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 other.
The Court notes the letter 5 1 of Rodrigo Sta. Ana offering, by way of settlement of
JN's obligations to PhilGuarantee, the very same parcel of land mortgaged as security for
the loan agreement. This further weakens the position of petitioners, since it becomes
obvious that they acknowledged the payment made by PhilGuarantee on their behalf and
that they were in fact willing to negotiate with PhilGuarantee for the settlement of the said
obligation before the filing of the complaint a quo.
Anent the issue of forgery, the CA is correct in reversing the decision of the trial
court. Save for the denial of Narciso Cruz that it was not his signature in the Undertaking
and the perfunctory comparison of the signatures, nothing in the records would support
the claim of forgery. Forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive
and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. 5 2 Mere
denial will not su ce to overcome the positive value of the Undertaking, which is a
notarized document, has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and carries the
evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. 5 3 Even in cases
where the alleged forged signature was compared to samples of genuine signatures to
show its variance therefrom, this Court still found such evidence insu cient. 5 4 Mere
variance of the signatures cannot be considered as conclusive proof that the same were
forged. 5 5
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61318 is AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, with JJ. Mercedes Gozo-Dadole
and Bienvenido L. Reyes concurring. G.R. No. 151060, Rollo, pp. 21-34.
2. The real estate mortgage was on a parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-79587 located in
Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
3. RTC Records, pp. 31-35. The loan agreement also required a Deed of Undertaking to
mortgage the equipment to be purchased and a Deed of Suretyship executed by the
officers of JN.
4. RTC Records, pp. 36-37.
5. Petitioners in G.R. No. 151060.
6. Petitioner in G.R. No. 151311.
7. RTC Records, pp. 38-43.

8. Exhibits, Exhibit O, p. 70.

9. Id., Exhibit H, p. 35.
10. Id., Exhibit D, p.14.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 11. Exhibits, p. 71.
12. RTC Records, pp. 1-6.

13. Id. at 411.

14. Id. at 412.
15. Ibid.
16. Id. at 415.
17. Ibid.
18. CA Rollo, p. 211.
19. Id. at 205.
20. Ibid.
21. Id. at 206.
22. Id. at 207.
23. Ibid.
24. Art. 2058. The guarantor cannot be compelled to pay the creditor unless the latter has
exhausted all the property of the debtor, and has resorted to all the legal remedies
against the debtor.

25. CA Rollo, pp. 209-210.

26. Id. at 209.
27. Resolution dated 12 December 2001, CA Rollo, pp. 305-306.
28. G.R. No. 151060, Rollo, p. 8.
29. G.R. No. 151311, Rollo, p.17.

30. G.R. No. 151060, Rollo, p. 407, citing Art. 2066 of the Civil Code, which reads:
The guarantor who pays for a debtor must be indemnified by the latter.
The indemnity comprises:
(1) The total amount of the debt;

(2) The legal interests thereon from the time the payment was made known
to the debtor, even though it did not earn interest for the creditor;

(3) The expenses incurred by the guarantor after having notified the debtor
that payment had been demanded of him.

31. G.R. No. 151060, Rollo, p. 408.

32. PhilGuarantee's Memorandum, G.R. No. 151060, Rollo, pp. 405-406.
33. G.R. No. 151060, Rollo, pp. 408-410.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com

 34. Art. 2047, Civil Code.
35. Art. 2066, id.
36. Art. 2058, id.

37. Baylon v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 435, 444 (1999) citing Vda. de Syquia v. Jacinto,
60 Phil. 861 (1934).

38. Art. 2060, Civil Code.

39. Art. 2058, id.
40. Exhibits, p. 7.
41. People's Bank and Trust Co. v. Santana, 149 Phil. 169, 174 (1971).
42. Supra note 40.
43. Art. 2069. If the debt was for a period and the guarantor paid it before it became due, he
cannot demand reimbursement of the debtor until the expiration of the period unless the
payment has been ratified by the debtor.
Art. 2070. If the guarantor has paid without notifying the debtor, and the latter not
being aware of the payment, repeats the payment, the former has no remedy whatever
against the debtor, but only against the creditor. Nevertheless, in case of a gratuitous
guaranty, if the guarantor was prevented by a fortuitous event from advising the debtor
of the payment, and the creditor becomes insolvent, the debtor shall reimburse the
guarantor for the amount paid.
44. Art. 2068. If the guarantor should pay without notifying the debtor, the latter may
enforce against him all the defenses which he could set up against the debtor at the time
the payment was made.
45. G.R. No. 103066, 25 April 1996, 256 SCRA 478, cited in Petitioners' Memorandum, G.R.
No. 151060, Rollo, pp. 268-270.

46. Exhibits, p. 7.
". . . In the event of default by JNDC and as a consequence thereof, PHILGUARANTEE
is made to pay its obligation arising under the aforesaid guarantee, PHILGUARANTEE
shall pay the BANK the amount of P1.4 million or 70% of the total obligation unpaid, but
in no case shall such payment exceed the amount of its guarantee of P1.4 million.
However, any amount/s that PHILGUARANTEE or the BANK may subsequently recover
from JNDC or from any other source pertaining to this transaction shall be shared pari-
passu in the proportion of 70% for PHILGUARANTEE and 30% for the BANK." (Emphasis
supplied.)
47. Petitioners' Memorandum, G.R. No. 151060, Rollo, p. 257.
48. Omnibus Motion, CA Rollo, pp. 251-252.

49. CA Rollo, p. 21.

50. Id. at 305-306.
51. Exhibits, p. 71.
52. Ladignon v. Court of Appeals, 390 Phil. 1161, 1170 (2000).
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 53. Aznar Brothers Realty Company v. Court of Appeals, et al., 384 Phil. 95, 112 (2000).
54. Ladignon v. Court of Appeals, supra note 52.
55. Veloso v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 398 (1996).

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com