IMBONG vs.

OCHOA
(SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE)

KEY TAKE-AWAY:

The Reproductive Health Law is a consolidation and enhancement of existing reproductive laws. It seeks to enhance the
population control program of the government in order to promote public welfare. However, when coercive measures are
found within the law, provisions must be removed or altered in order to ensure that it does not defy the Constitution by
infringing on the rights of the people.

FACTS:

Petition: to declare provisions of Republic Act No. 10354 as unconstitutional

Factual Antecedents:

 December 21, 2012: Congress enacted RA No. 10354 also known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012 (RH LAW)
 The president’s imprimatur and support for the said law lead to a range of petitions against the law leading
to iuris controversy in court. Petitions for certiorari and prohibition were placed by numerous parties. All in all, 14
petitions and 2 petitions-in-intervention were filed.
 March 15, 2013:the RH-IRR or enforcement of the law took place
 March 19,2013: After deliberating the issues and arguments raised, the court issued Status Quo Ante Order(SQAO)
which lead to a 120 day halt on the implementation of the legislation
 Due to further arguments and debates from opposing parties, the SQAO was extended until further orders of the court
last July 16, 2013

Statute Involved: Republic Act 10354, “The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012”

Position of Petitioner:
 Petitioners claim that the provisions of RA 10354 are unconstitutional as they violate the rights to life, to health, to
freedom of expression and speech, to the privacy of families, to academic freedom, to due process of law, to equal
protection, and against involuntary servitude. They also intrude on the autonomy of local governments and the
ARMM, and violate natural law. Furthermore, they claim that Congress’ delegation of authority to the FDA in
determining which should be included in the EDL is invalid.

Position of Respondent:
 There is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination. Some
petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law.
 The petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the RH Law is unconstitutional on the grounds that it violates:

  Right to Life
 Right to Health
 Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
 The Family
 Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
 Due Process
 Equal Protection
 Involuntary Servitude
 Autonomy of Local Governments/ARMM
 Natural Law

2. Whether or not Congress’ delegation of authority to the FDA in determining which should be included in the EDL is
valid

RULING

1. Whether or not the RH Law is unconstitutional on the grounds that it violates

 Right to Life - NO

 The Constitution intended that 1.) conception to refer to the time of fertilization and 2.) the protection of the unborn upon
said fertilization. Not all contraceptives are to be banned (only those that kill a fertilized ovum).
 Contraceptives that prevent union of sperm and egg are thus permissible.
 It is intended by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to prevent the enacting of a law that legalizes abortion.

 RH law prohibits abortion

 RH law recognizes that abortion is a crime
 RH law prohibits abortifacients

 Right to Health - NO

 With the provisions of RA 4729 still in place, the status quo on the sale of contraceptives is maintained and the Court
believes that there are adequate measures that ensure that the public has access to contraceptives that have been
determined safe following testing, evaluation, and approval by the FDA.

 Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech – NO and YES

 RH law does not violate guarantee of religious freedom via the state-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, which
contravene the religious beliefs of the people including the petitioners. This is because in doing so, the state would be
adhering to one religion, making a de facto state religion which is contrary to religious freedom.
 The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
 There limits to the exercise of religious freedom (compelling state interest test)
 Benevolent neutrality
 RH law does not violate the guarantee of religious freedom by requiring would-be spouses, as a condition for the issuance
of a marriage license, to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition (sec.7, 23,
24)
 However, RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by compelling medical health practitioners, hospitals,
and health care providers, under pain of penalty, to refer patients to other institutions despite their conscientious
objections.

 The Family – YES

 Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which needs only the consent of the spouse undergoing the provision in order
to undergo reproductive procedures intrudes into marital privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional
safeguards for the family as the basic social institution.
 Not only that, but the exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent
or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution, which declares that the rearing of children by parents is a natural right.

 Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom – UNDECIDED

 The court decided that making a ruling on Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State to provide Age-and-
Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education, is premature. The Department of Education has not yet
created a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education, thus the constitutionality of the specifics in such
a curriculum still cannot be determined. The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH
education program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational
institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of
reproductive health education.
 Due Process – NO

 The definitions of several terms pinpointed by the petitioners in the RH Law are not vague.

 Private health care institution = private health care service provider.

 “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include giving information and performing medical
procedures, so hospitals run by religious groups can be exempted.
 “incorrect information” connotes a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead the public.

 Equal Protection – NO

 It is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the
underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.

 Involuntary Servitude – NO

 The State has the power to regulate the practice of medicine in order to ensure the welfare of the public. Not only that,
but Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service providers to give pro bono service; they do not
incur penalties if they refuse. Conscientious objects are exempt if their religious beliefs do not allow them to provide the
said services.

 Autonomy of Local Governments/ARMM – NO

 The RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of local governments. Under paragraph (c) of Section 17, unless a
local government unit (LGU) is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program
for which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual General Appropriations Act,
even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGUs. Not only that,
but LGUs are merely encouraged and not compelled to provide RH services. Provision of these services are not
mandatory. Lastly, Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 or the Organic Act of the ARMM merely outlines
the powers that may be exercised by the regional government and does not indicate the State’s abdication to
create laws in the name of public welfare.

 Natural Law – DISREGARDED

 Natural law, according to the Court, is not recognized as proper legal basis for making decisions.
FINAL RULING:

Petitions PARTIALLY GRANTED. The RA 10354 is declared constitutional and Status Quo Ante Order lifted with
respect to provisions of RA 10354 that have been declared as constitutional.

However, the following provisions and their corresponding provisions in the RH-IRR have been declared unconstitutional:

 Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they:

a.) require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious
group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and
b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning
without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;

 Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as
they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs
and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

 Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual,
not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health
procedures without the consent of the spouse;

 Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding rovision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of
parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.

 Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency
or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider
within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

 Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the
full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
  Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bono reproductive
health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation;

 Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining
abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section
4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LAGMAN

(DEFENSE OF STATE)

Facts:

Both defendants were charged with and convicted of refusal to register for military training as required by the
Commonwealth Act No. 1 (National Defense Act). On appeal, Zosa argued that he was fatherless and had a mother and
eight brothers to support, while Lagman alleged that he had a father to support, had no military learnings, and did not wish
to kill or be killed; and both claimed that the said statute was UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Issue:

Whether or not the National Defense Act was UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Ruling:

NO. The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional
provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot
be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this
duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.
BAYAN MUNA vs. ALBERTO ROMULO
(INCORPORATION CLAUSE)

FACTS:
In 2000, the RP, through Charge d’Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms, is “subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval” by the signatory states.

In 2003, via Exchange of Notes with the US government, the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, finalized a non-
surrender agreement which aimed to protect certain persons of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that
might be brought against them in international tribunals.

Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be
struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the respondents abuse their discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in concluding the RP-
US Non Surrender Agreement in contravention of the Rome Statute?
2. Is the agreement valid, binding and effective without the concurrence by at least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate?

HELD:
The Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it differ from, the Rome Statute. Far from going against each
other, one complements the other. As a matter of fact, the principle of complementarity underpins the creation of the ICC.
According to Art. 1 of the Statute, the jurisdiction of the ICC is to “be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions [of
the signatory states].” the Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states, like the RP, over serious
crimes committed within their respective borders, the complementary jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only when
the signatory states are unwilling or unable to prosecute.

Also, under international law, there is a considerable difference between a State-Party and a signatory to a treaty. Under the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a signatory state is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the
object and purpose of a treaty. The Philippines is only a signatory to the Rome Statute and not a State-Party for lack of
ratification by the Senate. Thus, it is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the
Rome Statute. Any argument obliging the Philippines to follow any provision in the treaty would be premature. And even
assuming that the Philippines is a State-Party, the Rome Statute still recognizes the primacy of international agreements
entered into between States, even when one of the States is not a State-Party to the Rome Statute.

The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has
been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history, we have entered executive agreements covering such
subjects as commercial and consular relations, most favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection,
postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned
by our courts.

2. Executive agreements may be validly entered into without such concurrence. As the President wields vast powers and
influence, her conduct in the external affairs of the nation is, as Bayan would put it, “executive altogether.” The right of the
President to enter into or ratify binding executive agreements has been confirmed by long practice.

FINAL RULING: DISMISSED.

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (through the D.O.J.) vs PURGANAN
(INCORPORATION CLAUSE)
Facts:

The petition at bar seeking to void and set aside the Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42.
The first assailed Order set for hearing petitioner’s application for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent
Mark B. Jimenez.

Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested the extradition of Mark Jimenez. A
hearing was held to determine whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. Afterwards, such warrant was issued but the
trial court allowed Jimenez to post bail for his provisional liberty.

Issue:

Whether or not the right to bail is available in extradition proceedings.

Discussions:

The constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be
subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable
doubt.” It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption
of innocence is not at issue.

Ruling:

NO. The court agreed with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word “conviction,” the constitutional provision on bail
quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and
detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts
do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had already been
conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before those proceedings could be
completed, it was hindered from continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process
now has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.

FINAL RULING: Petition is GRANTED. The bail bond posted by Private Respondent is CANCELLED. RTC was
redirected to conduct EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS pursuant to the spirit of Philippines’ EXTRADITION TREATY
with the US and our own EXTRADITION LAW.
Government of Hongkong v. Olalia,
Laws applicable: Right to bail under Bill of rights (INCORPORATION CLAUSE)
Facts.
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were issued and by virtue of a final
decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition for
the extradition of the private respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by the private respondent.

The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting the same in extradition cases and that
the respondent was a high “flight risk”. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and was granted by the
respondent judge subject to the following conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and
answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of
this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in
favor of the government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure
order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest
office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the
assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees
from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation
be noted therein accordingly.

Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent judge. Hence, this instant petition.

Issue:
WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail

Ruling:
A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.

Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential
extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.

On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a
prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.
Maximo Calalang Vs A. D. Williams Et. Al
G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Doctrine: Social Justice

Facts:
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public
Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing
along the following for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:

1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas

Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and

2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of theCommonwealth Act No. 54
8 which authorizes said Director with the approval from theSecretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulg
ate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.

On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the recommendations made by the Chairman
of the National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on
August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced
the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the
places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

Issue:

2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion
of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people?

Ruling:

No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception
may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the
maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of
powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,vs.EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant G.R. No.

187495 April 21, 2014

Marital Rape, VawC (WOMEN)

Facts:

Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married and have four children.
 On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her husband, the accused-appellant,
raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the
accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.

As to the charge of rape according to KKK, conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems between her
and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of course, responded
with equal degree of enthusiasm. However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her panties
and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so
she would resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into submission.

One night, in the spouse’s bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but she did not lie
thereon with the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him
to ask angrily: “Why are you lying on the cot?”, and to instantaneously order: “You transfer here to our bed.”

KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal pain due to her forthcoming
menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against
the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to
the bed.

The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to copulate with her by
tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his hand and reiterating that she was not feeling well.

The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by holding on to her
panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides. KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs.

The accused-appellant then raised KKK’s daster,41 stretched her legs apart and rested his own legs on them. She
tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and succeeded in penetrating her. As he was carrying out his carnal desires,
KKK continued to protest by desperately shouting: “Don ‘t do that to me because I’m not feeling well.”

Accused raised the defense of denial and alleged that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges as her revenge
because he took over the control and management of their businesses, and to cover up her extra-marital affairs.

Issue:

Whether or not there can be a marital rape.

Ruling:

YES. The Supreme Court held that husbands do not have property rights over their wives’ bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit
within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape.

Violation of equal protection clause

The Court ruled that to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in terms of the elements that
constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal protection clause.

The Court declared the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to be unconstitutional.

Said exemption states that a husband was endowed with absolute immunity from prosecution for the rape of his wife. The
privilege was personal and pertained to him alone. He had the marital right to rape his wife but he will be liable when he
aids or abets another person in raping her.

Moreover, Section 1 of RA 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist’s legal relationship with his victim.
According to the Court, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within marriage. A man who
penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State
Party to the CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.

Ichong v Hernandez

(INCORPORATION CLAUSE)

Legislature Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." Its purpose was to prevent persons
who are not citizens of the Phil from having a stranglehold upon people’s economic life. In effect it nationalizes the retail
trade business. The main provisions of the Act are:

(1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the
capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade;
(2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are
allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or
voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term
in case of juridical persons; ….and etc.

Petitioner Lao H. Ichong brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that Republic Act 1180 is unconstitutional, and
to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from
enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that:

(1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process
of law;
(2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof;
(3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.

In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that the Act was passed in the valid exercise
of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival.

Issue:
Whether or not Republic Act 1180 violates the equal protection of laws.

Held/Ruling:
No. According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also then provided that police power cannot
be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract. The enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police
power of the State. The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist
for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause,
because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and
reasonably protects their privilege. The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.

G.R.No.151445
April 11, 2002
Lim v. Executive Secretary

Incorporation Clause

Facts
Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) signed in 1999, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of
America started arriving in Mindanao to take partin "Balikatan 02-1” on January 2002. The Balikatan 02-1 exercises
involves the simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement
entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. The exercise is rooted from the international anti-terrorism
campaign declared by President George W. Bush in reaction to the 3 commercial aircrafts hijacking that smashed into twin
towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon building in Washington, D.C. allegedly by the al-
Qaeda headed by the Osama bin Laden that occurred on September 11, 2001.

Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition attacking the constitutionality of
“Balikatan-02-1”. They were subsequently joined by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both party-list
organizations, who filed a petition-in-intervention. Lim and Ersando filed suits in their capacities as citizens, lawyers and
taxpayers. SANLAKAS and PARTIDO on the other hand, claimed that certain members of their organization are residents
of Zamboanga and Sulu, and hence will be directly affected by the operations being conducted in Mindanao.

The petitioners alleged that “Balikatan-02-1” is not covered by the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) between the Philippines
and the United States. Petitioners posited that the MDT only provides for mutual military assistance in case of armed attack
by an external aggressor against the Philippines or the US. Petitioners also claim that the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)
does not authorize American Soldiers to engage in combat operations in Philippine Territory.

Issue:
Is the “Balikatan-02-1” inconsistent with the Philippine Constitution?

Ruling
NO. Petition and the petition-in-intervention are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of a new petition
sufficient in form and substance in the proper Regional Trial Court - Supreme Court is not a trier of facts

Doctrine of Importance to the Public

Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987
Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of
the Constitution and the laws that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside
technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition.

Although courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question based on the doctrine of separation of powers,
which enjoins upon the department of the government a becoming respect for each other's act, this Court nevertheless
resolves to take cognizance of the instant petition.

The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in "activities," the exact meaning of which
was left undefined. The expression is ambiguous, permitting a wide scope of undertakings subject only to the approval of
the Philippine government. The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United States
personnel must "abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political
activity." All other activities, in other words, are fair game.

Marcos vs Manglapus (DEFENSE OF THE STATE)

 Facts:
◦ Ferdinand E. Marcos was defrocked from presidency through the famed People Power Revolution in
February of 1986; with Corazon Aquino taking over the reins under a revolutionary government.
◦ The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by political leaders of Mr. Marcos, the takeover of television
station Channel 7 by rebel troops led by Col. Canlas with the support of "Marcos loyalists" and the
unsuccessful plot of the Marcos spouses to surreptitiously return from Hawaii awakened the nation to the
capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble even from afar and to the fanaticism and blind loyalty of their
followers in the country
 ◦ Former President Marcos expressed his desire to return to the Philippines to expire.
◦ President Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability
of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move
forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family
 Issue:
◦ Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
 Ruling
◦ The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from within
by a well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to
grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men, police officers and civilian officials,
to mention only a few. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcose's and their followers to
destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of the
Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and
instigate more chaos.
◦ It is within President Aquino’s residual and discretionary power to protect and promote the interest and
welfare of the people. Upholding the Constitution, the President must perpetrate the necessary expedients
to ensure the country’s self-preservation against detrimental elements
◦ The right to return to one’s country is not a right specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats
only the liberty to abode and right to travel.

TANADA VS. ANGARA GR No. 118295 May 2, 1997

(SOCIAL JUSTICE)

Facts:
The Philippines joined World Trade Organization as a founding member with the goal of improving Philippine access to
foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports. The President also saw
in the WTO the opening of new opportunities for the services sector, the reduction of costs and uncertainty associated with
exporting and the attraction of more investments into the country. On April 15, 1994, respondent Navarro, then DTI
Secretary, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Negotiations. On December 14, 1994, the Senate concurred in the ratification of the President of the Philippines of the
Agreement Establishing the WTO which includes various agreements and associated legal instruments. On December 16,
1994,the President signed the Instrument of Ratification. Contesting the constitutionality of the international agreement
establishing the World Health Organization, petitioners contend that the said agreement is in violation of the constitutional
mandate to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy

Issues:
1. Whether the WTO Agreement violated the mandated economic nationalism by the Constitution
2. Whether the provisions of the WTO Agreement restricts and impairs Philippine sovereignty, specifically the legislative
power vested in the Congress
3. Whether the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its annexes but not in the other documents referred to in
the Final Act is defective and insufficient and thus constitutes abuse of discretion

Ruling:
1. No. The Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and
services in the development of the Philippine economy. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair. The constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent
national economy does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither
economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community.
2. No. While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however
subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the
family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of
the world. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law,
which are considered to be automatically part of our laws. A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation on the
parties. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. The Philippines has
effectively agreed to limit the exercise of its sovereign powers of taxation, eminent domain and police power. The
underlying consideration in this partial sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the other contracting states in granting
the same privilege and immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its citizens. The same reciprocity characterizes the
same commitments under WTO-GATT. The point is that a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the
Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.

3. No. The petitioners submit that concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone is flawed because it is in effect a rejection of
the Final Act. The Court held that a final act is an instrument which records the winding up of the proceedings of a
diplomatic conference and not the treaty itself. On the other hand, the WTO Agreement itself expresses what multilateral
agreements are deemed included as its integral parts. It should be added that the Senate was well-aware of what it was
concurring in as shown by the member’s deliberation.

DECS vs San Diego (REARING OF THE YOUTH)

Facts:
Respondent Robert San Diego, a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology,
has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT). Invoking his constitutional right to academic freedom and
quality education, private respondent challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972; raising also
concerns regarding due process and equal protection

Issue:
Whether or not the NMAT “three-flunk-rule” is valid and constitutional.

Ruling:
Yes. It is the right and responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to
whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The method employed by the challenged regulation is not
irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The right to quality education is not absolute. The
Constitution provides that “ every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable
and equitable admission and academic requirements”. It is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a
guarantee of the Constitution but one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. Petition was
granted and the RTC ruling was reversed.

Estrada vs Escritor (SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE)

Facts:
Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a man who is not
her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she
entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.

Complainant Alejandro Estrada requested for an investigation of respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in the
Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, for living with a man not her husband, and having borne a child within this live-in
arrangement. Estrada believes that Escritor is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she
should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. Consequently,
respondent was charged with committing "disgraceful and immoral conduct" under Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Sec.
46(b)(5) of the Revised Administrative Code.

Escritor testified that, when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her husband having died in 1998.
She admitted that she started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage more than twenty years ago
when her husband was still alive but living with another woman. She also admitted that she and Quilapio have a son. But
as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society,
respondent asserted that their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs and has the approval of her
congregation. In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991, a "Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness." Such declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.

Issue:
Whether or not the State should penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

Held:
No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The free exercise of
religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most
inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic
in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any
concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest
only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public and
secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation
of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation
of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has
proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so
that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal
arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.

TARUC V DELA CRUZ, ET AL

DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE: SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE

Ponente: Corona, J.

FACTS
Petitioners were lay members of PH Independent Church in Socorro, Surigao del Norte. Dela Cruz and Florano were the
Bishops and Parish priest respectively.

The petitioners, led by Taruc, clamored for the transfer of Florano to another parish. It was found out that reason for this
was that Florano's wife belonged to a political party opposed to Taruc's. However, the Bishop denied it.

Meanwhile, hostility among members of PIC in Socorro worsened when Taruc tried to organize an open mass to be
celebrated by a certain Fr. Ambong in the said town, but Bishop dela Cruz convinced Taruc not to push it through because
Ambong was not a member of the Diocese of Surigao and that his credentials were in doubt. However, Bishop dela Cruz
failed to stop him and the planned mass open mass pushed through.

On June 28, 1993, Bishop dela Cruz declared petitioners expelled from the PIC due to the ff reasons:
(1) disobedience to duly constituted authority in the Church;

(2) inciting dissension, resulting in division in the Parish of Our Mother of Perpetual Help, Iglesia Filipina Independiente,
Socorro, Surigao del Norte when they celebrated an open Mass at the Plaza on June 19, 1996; and

(3) for threatening to forcibly occupy the Parish Church causing anxiety and fear among the general membership.

Petitioners then appealed to the Obispo Maximo regarding the above decision and opined that Fr Florano should step
down voluntarily to avoid the hostility among the members of PIC.

Bishop dela Cruz was then reassigned to the diocese of Odmozcan and was replaced by Bishop Timbang and the latter
also did not find any valid reason for Florano to transfer to another parish. Despite this, petitioners still continued to hold
masses celebrated by Fr Ambong.

Because of the order of expulsion, petitioners filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against dela Cruz
before RTC Surigao and stated therein that Florano and Bordas conspired with dela Cruz to have them expelled from the
PIC and that it was illegal because it is a violation of due process.

RTC- denied it for lack of jurisriction

CA- found it unnecessary to deal on its validity since said acts are purely ecclesiatical matters which the Court considers
to be outside the jurisriction of civil courts.

ISSUE
WoN the courts have jurisdiction to hear a case involving the expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious
institution

HELD
No, the courts do not have jurisdiction to hear cases involving expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious
institution. It was held that the Church and State are separate and distinct from each other.

The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of
the officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over
church authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of
religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations.

In the case of Fonacier v. Court of Appeals, the Court enunciated the doctrine that in disputes involving religious
institutions or organizations, there is one area which the Court should not touch: doctrinal and disciplinary differences.

The amendments of the constitution, restatement of articles of religion and abandonment of faith or abjuration alleged by
appellant, having to do with faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church and
having reference to the power of excluding from the church those allegedly unworthy of membership, are
unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts.
The case at bar is DENIED for lack for merit.
VILLAFUERTE V ROBREDO
PRINCIPLE: LOCAL AUTONOMY AND FISCAL AUTONOMY
Ponente : Reyes, J.
FACTS
COA conducted an examination and audit on the matter the LGUs utilized their Internal Revenue Allotment for calendar
years 1993-1994. Based on the exam report, 20% of some LGUs was not actually utilized for devt projects but was used
for Maintenance and Operating Expenses.
In 1995, DILG issued a memo enumerating the guidelines on the utilization of devt funds.
In 2005, Interior and Local Govt Sec. Reyes and Budget and Mngt Sec. Neri issued a memo indicating therein that the
20% of the IRA is to be used for social development, economic development and environmental mngt.
In 2010, Respondent issued a memo entitled Full Disclosure of Local Budget and Finances and Bids and Public Offerings
which aims to promote good governance through transparent and accountability of LGUs.
In 2011, Villafuerte, then Gov of CamSur filed a petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the assailed issuances of the
respondent for being unconstitutional* and having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
*The petitioner argues the ff:

1. That the assailed issuances of the respondent violate the local and fiscal autonomy of LGUs embodied in the
Constitution and the LGC, and that MC No. 2010-138 was unconstitutional when it restricted the meaning of
"development" and enumerated activities which the local government must finance from the 20% development
fund component of the IRA and provided sanctions for local authorities who shall use the said component of the
fund for other purposes.

2. That the respondent cannot substitute his own discretion with that of the local legislative council in enacting its
annual budget and specifying the development projects that the 20% component of its IRA should fund.

ISSUE
WoN DILG Sec committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed memo circulars in violation of the principles
of local autonomy and fiscal autonomy

HELD

No, it did not violate the principles of local autonomy and fiscal autonomy. It must be recalled that the assailed circular
was issued in response to the report of the COA that a substantial portion of the 20% development fund of some LGUs
was not actually utilized for development projects but was diverted to expenses more properly categorized as MOOE, in
violation of Section 287 of the LGC.

Contrary to the petitioners’ posturing, however, the enumeration was not meant to restrict the discretion of the LGUs in
the utilization of their funds. It was meant to enlighten LGUs as to the nature of the development fund by delineating it
from other types of expenses.

It was incorporated in the assailed circular in order to guide them in the proper disposition of the IRA and avert further
misuse of the fund by citing current practices which seemed to be incompatible with the purpose of the fund.
Even then, LGUs remain at liberty to map out their respective development plans solely on the basis of their own
judgment and utilize their IRAs accordingly, with the only restriction that 20% thereof be expended for development
projects.

KULAYAN v TAN

PRINCIPLE: SUPREMACY OF CIVILIAN AUTHORITY

Ponente: Sereno, J.

FACTS

Three members of the International Committee of the Red Cross were kidnapped in the vicinity of Provincial Capitol in
Patikul, Sulu. Andres Notter, Eugenio Vagni, and Maria Jean Lacaba were purportedly inspecting a water sanitation
project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized by three armed men who were later confirmed to be members of
the Abu Sayyaf Group.

A Local Crisis Committee was then formed by Tan, the Governor of Sulu, and in collaboration with the PNP, to
investigate the kidnapping incident.

Tan issued Proclamation No.1 s. 2009 declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. The proclamation cited the
kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to Human Security Act. It
also invoked Sec 465 of Local Govt Code which bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency
measure during man-made and natural disasters and calamities and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement
agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence.

In the said proclamation, Tan called upon the PNP and the Civilian Emergency Force to set up checkpoints and conduct
general search and seizures including arrests and other actions necessary to ensure public safety.

A punong barangay, three policemen, and a jeepney driver were apprehended because they were suspected as supporters
of the Abu Sayyaf Group.

Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines were issued ultra vires, and thus null and
void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise
emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed
forces. Additionally, petitioners claim that the Provincial Governor is not authorized by any law to create civilian armed
forces under his command, nor regulate and limit the issuances of PTCFORs to his own private army.

Petitioners then filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, claiming that Proclamation 1-09 was issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as it threatened fundamental freedoms guaranteed
under Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE

WoN a governor can exercise the calling-out powers of a President

HELD
It has been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This
means that when Section 1, Article 7 of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it granted to the President and no one
else. It is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under Sec 23, Art.
6 of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under Sec 7, Article 7.

Indeed, while the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution mandates that civilian authority is, at
all times, supreme over the military, making the civilian president the nation’s supreme military leader.

The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian President is the ceremonial,
legal and administrative head of the armed forces. The Constitution does not require that the President must be possessed
of military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military operations and to
determine military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual command of the armed forces to
military experts; but the ultimate power is his.

In the case at bar, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In
issuing the assailed proclamation, he exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and calling upon the
Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the
Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive is ultra
vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Sec. 465 of the LGC.

ESTRADA v DESIERTO

PRINCIPLE: MISELLANEOUS PROVISION: PUBLIC OFFICE IS A PUBLIC TRUST

Ponente: Puno, J.

FACTS

Former President Joseph Estrada was elected during 1998 elections. Sometime in October 2000, however, several
allegations of corruption and of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords were made against him before the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee. Some Congressmen moved to impeach Estrada which caused several sectors, former Presidents
Aquino and Ramos to call for Estrada’s resignation. Some senior advisers of Estrada as well as a number of his cabinet
resigned from their positions. Impeachment trial commenced with Chief Justice Davide presiding.

The impeachment trial was put to a halt after the public prosecutors tendered their collective resignation before the
Impeachment Tribunal caused by the decision of 11 Senators not to open the second envelope (an alleged secret account
of Erap amounting to 3.3B Pesos in the name of Jose Velarde). An indefinite postponement of the Impeachment
proceedings was granted by the Chief Justice.

The next day, EDSA 2 commenced with the PNP and AFP joining the crowd. In the succeeding days, a chain of
resignations from the military, the police, and the cabinet ensued. On January 20, Supreme Court declared the seat for
presidency as vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post.” At noon, Chief Justice, whose authority was
later unanimously confirmed by SC, administered the oath to Arroyo as President of the Philippines. That same afternoon,
Estrada and his family left Malacañang and transmitted a signed letter appointing then Vice-President Arroyo as Acting
President, citing Section 11, Article 7 of the Constitution, to the House Speaker and Senate President.

Several cases were filed against Estrada in the Office of the Ombudsman. Estrada filed with the Supreme Court a petition
for prohibition which sought to enjoin the Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against
him, not until his term as president ends. He also filed a petition for quo warranto praying for judgment confirming him to
be the lawful and incumbent President of the Philippines “temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office.”

HELD

The Constitution declared a state policy that the State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take
positive and effective measures against graft and corruption. It ordained that public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

Public office is a public trust. In the case at bar, petitioner lost the public's trust and as a consequence remained President
only in name. Having lost the command of the armed forces and the national police, he found himself vulnerable to threats
of mayhem.

The people power movement did not just happen at the call of some ambitious politicians, military men, businessmen
and/or prelates. It came about because the people, rightly or wrongly, believed the allegations of graft and corruption
made by Luis "Chavit" Singson, Emma Lim, Edgardo Espiritu, and other witnesses against petitioner. Their testimonies
during the impeachment trial were all televised and heard by millions of people throughout the length and breadth of this
archipelago. As a result, petitioner found himself on January 19, 2001 deserted as most of his cabinet members resigned,
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police withdrew their support of the
President, while civil society announced its loss of trust and confidence in him.