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SUMMARY REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

Office of Inspector General Case # 11-0225 (Det. James Gilger)


December 4, 2015

This report consists of a summary of the evidence set out in a separate “Chronology of
Events,” all relevant investigative materials, an index of the investigative materials, and the
Office of Inspector General’s (OIG’s) analysis of those materials.

I. INTRODUCTION AND REPORT FORMAT

An OIG investigation has established that Chicago Police Department (CPD) Detective
James Gilger violated CPD rules and regulations in the course of his involvement in CPD’s
investigation of the homicide of David Koschman. Accordingly, and as detailed below, OIG
recommends that CPD discharge Detective Gilger and refer him for placement on the ineligible
for rehire list maintained by the Department of Human Resources.

The attached Chronology of Events details the facts relevant to the Koschman
investigation with citation to all supporting evidence. This evidence includes that obtained by the
Office of Special Prosecutor (OSP) and the special grand jury and disclosed to OIG by order of
the Circuit Court of Cook County for use in this administrative investigation. All grand jury
material remains subject to a protective order.1 The evidence also includes additional
investigative materials and statements obtained by OIG following the release of the Report of the
Special Prosecutor, Dan K. Webb. Due to the length of the Chronology, a complete summary of
the evidence is not repeated here, and is cited with reference to the Chronology (Chron. ¶)
throughout.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Summary of CPD’s Investigation of the Koschman Homicide

At approximately 3:15 a.m. on April 25, 2004, David Koschman, Scott Allen, James
Copeland, David Francis, and Shaun Hageline (the “Koschman group”) were walking westward
on Division Street when they encountered Richard J. Vanecko, Craig Denham, and Kevin and
Bridget McCarthy (the “Vanecko group”) on the south sidewalk at approximately 43 West
Division Street in Chicago. (Chron. ¶ 9.) A verbal altercation ensued. (Chron. ¶ 9.) During that
verbal altercation, Vanecko forcibly struck Koschman in the face causing Koschman to fall
straight back and hit his head on the pavement. (Chron. ¶ 9.) Koschman was immediately taken
to the hospital, where he died 11 days later of his injuries. (Chron. ¶¶ 13, 77.)

1
Pursuant to the protective order, grand jury materials may be used by OIG, the Mayor of the City of Chicago and
his designees, the CPD Superintendent and his designees, employees of the City of Chicago Department of Law
directly involved in the implementation of disciplinary proceedings, CPD employees against whom disciplinary
action is sought (the “subjects”), and the subjects’ counsel (collectively, the “authorized persons”), solely in
connection with the prosecution and defense of any disciplinary proceedings arising out of OIG’s investigation, and
for no other purpose, and in connection with no other proceeding, without further order of the Circuit Court of Cook
County.
OIG Case # 11-0225 (Det. Gilger) December 4, 2015

At the scene of the incident, the responding officer, Edwin Tremore, took initial crime
scene investigatory steps while also facilitating the call for immediate medical attention for the
seriously injured Koschman. (Chron. ¶¶ 11-12.) Tremore interviewed Kevin McCarthy,
Hageline, and one bystander witness at the scene. (Chron. ¶¶ 14, 18.) In calling for a “records
division number” (RD number), Tremore mistakenly classified the incident as a simple battery
when the circumstances at the scene were more appropriately classified as the more serious
offense of aggravated battery. (Chron. ¶¶ 23-24.) This misclassification resulted in a delayed
field investigation. (Chron. ¶¶ 28-29.) No detectives were called to the scene in the immediate
aftermath of the incident. (Chron. ¶¶ 28-29.) CPD therefore did not conduct a canvass or secure
all witnesses and evidence immediately following the incident. (Chron. ¶¶ 28-29.)

Later that morning, Area 3 Violent Crimes Sergeant Robert O’Leary assigned Second
Watch Area 3 Detectives Rita O’Leary and Robert Clemens to follow up on the case, despite
knowing that both detectives were scheduled for three-week furloughs starting two days later.
(Chron. ¶¶ 31, 34.) The only tasks Dets. O’Leary and Clemens performed before leaving on
furlough were to interview two witnesses and check on Koschman’s condition on April 25, 2004.
(Chron. ¶¶ 42, 45, 52.). The detectives identified six additional witnesses but did not contact
them. (Chron. ¶ 60.) CPD performed no further investigative work for the 13-day period from
April 26, 2004, to May 9, 2004, that included 12 days while Dets. O’Leary and Clemens were
out on furlough. (Chron. ¶¶ 509-70, 79.) Although, at the time, Lt. Denis Walsh was a Field
Lieutenant in the 18th District where the crime occurred, he was not on duty on April 25, 2004,
and, according to CPD records, he had no official involvement in the initial Koschman
investigation. (Chron. ¶ 30.)

Three days after Koschman’s death on May 6, 2004, CPD, likely Sgt. O’Leary, assigned
Area 3 Homicide Detectives Ronald Yawger and Anthony Giralamo to the investigation. (Chron.
¶ 79.) As with CPD personnel who preceded them in connection with the matter, Dets. Yawger
and Giralamo failed to conduct a canvass to identify additional witnesses or identify and secure
available video footage of the altercation. (Chron. ¶¶ 61-62.) Neither did the detectives take any
steps to pursue phone records for the individuals involved, which the grand jury investigation
years later would reveal to contain critical information that could have been used to materially
advance the investigation. (Chron. ¶¶ 114-15.)

On May 20, 2004, Det. Yawger conducted a lineup with the male members of the
Vanecko group, including Vanecko himself. (Chron. ¶ 117.) None of the witnesses to the lineup
definitively identified Vanecko as Koschman’s assailant. (Chron. ¶ 120.) Although Det. Yawger
consulted with Assistant State’s Attorney Darren O’Brien about the case, CPD never formally
presented the case to the State’s Attorney’s Felony Review Unit for a charging decision. (Chron.
¶¶ 127, 142.) Yawger did not submit a concluding Case Supplementary Report (CSR) until
November 10, 2004, nearly six months after he performed his last investigative action in the
case. (Chron. ¶ 157.)

In the final CSR, Det. Yawger concluded that the identity of the offender could not be
determined, notwithstanding all the evidence pointing to Vanecko. (Chron. ¶ 158.) Craig
Denham and the McCarthys stated they were not the ones who hit Koschman, and the Koschman
friends informed police that the largest male of the group struck Koschman. (Chron. ¶¶ 105,

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OIG Case # 11-0225 (Det. Gilger) December 4, 2015

124.) The largest and tallest person of the group was Vanecko. (Chron. ¶ 261.) In the final report,
Det. Yawger further concluded that Koschman was the aggressor, and the offender acted in self-
defense. (Chron. ¶ 158.) However, Yawger reached this conclusion without attempting to
interview Vanecko or his attorney and despite the fact that members of the Koschman group
flatly denied that Koschman was the aggressor (contrary to Yawger’s interview notes, which
conflicted not merely with the recollections of the members of the Koschman group, but also
with aspects of the recollections of bystander witnesses). (Chron. ¶¶ 89-91, 158.) Det. Yawger’s
decision to forgo identifying Vanecko as the likely offender meant that Vanecko’s name would
not appear in CPD records as a suspect. Additionally, because Area 3 detectives allowed the case
to remain open, CPD’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) unit, as a matter of practice, would
not publicly release the case file in response to FOIA requests filed by the Chicago Sun-Times
and Chicago Tribune over the next seven years. (Chron. ¶ 404.)

The Koschman case remained open, unworked, and untracked by Area 3 from November
2004 until January 2011. (Chron. ¶¶ 160-167.)

On January 6, 2011, the Chicago Sun-Times submitted a FOIA request to CPD seeking
the Koschman homicide file. (Chron. ¶ 163.) In response, Lt. Denis Walsh and other Area 3 staff,
at the direction of Commander Gary Yamashiroya, searched for—but were unable to locate—the
complete original homicide case file. (Chron. ¶¶ 168, 175-76.) Although Area 3 staff did locate a
set of photocopies of certain CSRs and had access to reports maintained in CPD’s electronic case
management system, the detectives’ original General Progress Reports (GPRs), Crime Scene
Processing Reports, and hospital records from 2004 were missing from the photocopied file.
(Chron. ¶¶ 175-81, 203.)

Prompted by the FOIA request, and after a review of the available reports from 2004,
senior CPD command personnel ordered that the Koschman homicide be fully reinvestigated.
(Chron. ¶¶ 182-83, 186.) Deputy Chief of Detectives Dean Andrews personally reviewed the
available case file materials and concluded that the Area 3 detectives had not gathered key
information. (Chron. ¶ 183.) Dep. Chief Andrews reassigned the investigation from Area 3 to
Area 5 to avoid any appearance of impropriety and instructed Area 5 personnel, specifically,
Detectives James Gilger and Nicholas Spanos, Sergeant Sam Cirone, and Commander Joseph
Salemme, to conduct a full reinvestigation of the case. (Chron. ¶¶ 186-87.) However, the Area 5
personnel did not pursue the investigative steps necessary to constitute a full reinvestigation.
(Chron. ¶¶ 206-23.) Among other things, they failed to perform critical investigative tasks, failed
to present the case to the State’s Attorney for a charging decision, and on March 1, 2011,
misclassified the final disposition by closing the case as cleared exceptionally without making an
arrest. (Chron. ¶¶ 280-86.)

Under highly suspicious circumstances, months later, on June 29, 2011, Lt. Walsh
reported having found the missing original Koschman homicide file. (Chron. ¶ 341.) As
purportedly found by Lt. Walsh, the long-missing original case file contained most but not all
original investigative records. (Chron. ¶ 341.) According to Walsh, he found the case file among
the other Area 3 homicide files, a location that had been previously searched. (Chron. ¶ 341.)
When found, the case file material was contained in a blue binder that was visually distinguished
and distinct from the other homicide case files maintained by Area 3, all of which were kept in

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OIG Case # 11-0225 (Det. Gilger) December 4, 2015

white binders. (Chron. ¶ 341.) Rather than immediately reporting the discovery of the partial
case file to Internal Affairs (IAD), Walsh waited for three weeks to do so, despite the fact that
the file had been the subject of an intensive search and was related to a case receiving intensive
public scrutiny. (Chron. ¶ 361.) Moreover, during these three weeks, without permission or any
legitimate reason to do so, Walsh removed the partial original file from CPD premises and
maintained it at his personal residence. (Chron. ¶ 343.)

After Walsh did report the disappearance and reappearance of the original case file, IAD
initiated an investigation. (Chron. ¶¶ 382-87.) However, the assigned IAD investigator closed the
investigation as not sustained after taking only one investigative step—an interview of Walsh.
(Chron. ¶¶ 386-87.) During this interview, Lt. Walsh failed to disclose significant details related
to the disappearance and reappearance of the case file. (Chron. ¶¶ 384-85.)

In December 2011, approximately ten months after CPD concluded its “reinvestigation”
and closed the case as cleared exceptionally with no arrest or charges, Koschman’s mother filed
a petition with the Circuit Court of Cook County seeking the appointment of a special prosecutor
to investigate her son’s death. (Chron. ¶ 443.) The Court granted Mrs. Koschman’s petition and
appointed Dan K. Webb as the Special Prosecutor. (Chron. ¶ 446.) An investigation led by the
Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), in which OIG participated as the investigative partner,
ensued. (Chron. ¶ 446.)

B. Procedural Background

1. OSP Special Grand Jury Investigation, Indictment, and Conviction

On April 23, 2012, Cook County Circuit Court Judge Michael P. Toomin appointed Dan
K. Webb, former U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois and Chairman of Winston &
Strawn LLP, as special prosecutor to investigate Koschman’s death. (Chron. ¶ 446.) The judge
ordered the special prosecutor to investigate whether criminal charges should be brought against
anyone in connection with the 2004 homicide of Koschman and whether employees of CPD and
the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office (CCSAO) acted intentionally to suppress and conceal
evidence, furnish false evidence, and generally impede the investigation into Koschman’s death.
(Chron. ¶ 446.) Judge Toomin designated OIG as the investigative body to assist the OSP in its
criminal investigation. (Chron. ¶ 446.) The OSP collected evidence under the auspices of a
special grand jury empaneled by the Circuit Court. Based on that investigation, the OSP sought
and obtained the conviction of Richard J. Vanecko for involuntary manslaughter. (Chron.
¶¶ 449-50.) Vanecko pleaded guilty on January 31, 2014. (Chron. ¶ 450.) The OSP considered,
but did not seek, criminal charges against several members of CPD. (Chron. ¶ 451.)

On February 4, 2014, the OSP issued a public report summarizing its investigation, its
evidence, and its analysis of, among other things, CPD’s responses to Koschman’s death (the
OSP Report). (Chron. ¶ 451.) The issuance of the OSP Report and the OSP’s declination of
further criminal charges effectively brought its work, which was limited to criminal prosecution,

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OIG Case # 11-0225 (Det. Gilger) December 4, 2015

to a close. The OSP’s work did not (and could not) consider or foreclose the question of
administrative disciplinary action by the City against any City employees.2

On February 3, 2014, the Circuit Court authorized the OSP to disclose materials obtained
through the Special Grand Jury, including the identities of subpoenaed witnesses, witness
testimony, and the nature and content of documents and physical evidence obtained through the
Special Grand Jury investigation, to OIG to be used in connection with its investigation into
potential violations of City administrative rules and regulations. (Chron. ¶ 451.)

2. OIG’s Administrative Investigation

a) CPD Superintendent’s Authorization of Investigation of


Allegations Older than Five Years and Referral of Investigation to
OIG

By letter dated July 24, 2014, OIG proposed to CPD Superintendent Garry McCarthy that
OIG, and not CPD’s Bureau of Internal Affairs (commonly known as IAD), conduct and
conclude any further disciplinary investigation relating to CPD’s administration of the
Koschman investigation because, among other reasons, IAD had both actual and apparent
conflict-of-interest issues with respect to the disciplinary investigation, including IAD’s prior
investigation into matters investigated by the OSP. (Chron. ¶ 452.)

On August 8, 2014, Superintendent McCarthy responded by authorizing OIG to


investigate “any and all complaints or allegations arising from the above mentioned matter [The
Death of David Koschman (OIG case No. 11-0225)] even if any of the alleged misconduct
concerning the incident or event occurred more than five years prior to the date the complaint or
allegation became known to the Department.”3 (Chron. ¶ 453.)

b) IPRA Affidavit Override

On August 29, 2014, OIG requested an override affidavit from IPRA. In support of its
request for an override affidavit, OIG provided IPRA nearly 2,000 pages of materials, including
the OSP Report, statements made to the OSP and its investigators, and all prior statements of the
subject police officers. (Chron. ¶ 454.)

On September 26, 2014, IPRA Chief Administrator Scott Ando issued an override
affidavit. Chief Ando attested that he had reviewed the documents provided and “determined that

2
OSP also did not address issues of civil liability. On March 24, 2014, Nanci Koschman sued the City of Chicago,
Cook County, and various other named defendants (including as relevant here, James Gilger). Koschman v. City of
Chicago et al., Case No. 14-cv-02041 (N.D. Ill.). On March 29, 2015, the City and Koschman settled Koschman’s
claims against the City and the CPD officers who were named defendants. The City agreed to pay Nanci Koschman
$250,000. On September 11, 2015, the Cook County State’s Attorney agreed to a $50,000 settlement with Nanci
Koschman, resolving Koschman’s claims against the remaining defendants: the County, Anita Alvarez, Dan Kirk,
Richard Devine, and Darren O’Brien. See Koschman v. City of Chicago et al., Case No. 14-3090 (7th Cir.).
3
Applicable CBAs require the Superintendent to authorize a disciplinary investigation of conduct occurring more
than five years prior.

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OIG Case # 11-0225 (Det. Gilger) December 4, 2015

there exists sufficient objective and verifiable evidence such that the continued administrative
investigation of the allegations of misconduct in all matters relating to the death of David
Koschman is necessary and appropriate” for ten CPD members who were then actively
employed by the department. (Chron. ¶ 455.) On the basis of this affidavit, OIG served each of
the subject officers with the requisite notice of allegations and interviewed the officers as
required by applicable CBAs and CPD policies. (Chron. ¶ 455.)

c) OIG Interview of Det. Gilger

Pursuant to Section 6.1 of the applicable CBA, on October 16, 2014, OIG provided
Det. Gilger with a Notification of Interview, Notification of Allegations, and copies of prior
statements: copies of the transcripts from his sworn testimony before the special grand jury on
October 2, 2012, January 16, 2013, and January 23, 2013 (2011 Miscellaneous 46 Grand Jury, In
re Appointment of Special Prosecutor). (Chron. ¶ 455.)

On December 4, 2014, OIG investigators interviewed Det. Gilger under oath after
informing him of his administrative advisements orally and in writing. He provided oral and
written acknowledgement of his understanding of those advisements. The interview was
recorded by a certified court reporter. Det. Gilger was accompanied by his attorney, Colleen
Daly. (Chron. ¶ 455.)

At his December 4, 2014 OIG interview, Det. Gilger objected to OIG conducting the
investigation and its use of the affidavit override procedure. He objected to OIG’s use of special
grand jury testimony. He objected that the allegations in the Notification of Allegations lack
specificity. He also objected to the interview occurring before the resolution of a grievance filed
by FOP on October 30, 2014, regarding OIG’s authority to conduct the interview. And he
objected that the investigation is not timely. Without waiving any objections, Det. Gilger
answered all questions posed by OIG. (Chron. ¶ 455.)

On February 26, 2015, OIG served Det. Gilger with a revised, more specific Notification
of Allegations and provided him the opportunity to appear for another interview should he have
any further information to provide. Det. Gilger declined the opportunity to appear. (Chron.
¶ 455.)

d) Grievance and Arbitration re: Affidavit Override Procedure

On October 28, 2014, the Policemen’s Benevolent & Protective Association (PB&PA)
Unit 156A filed Grievance Number SGT 14-023, arguing that OIG’s administrative investigation
of Sergeants Mills and Cirone was in violation of the CBA because OIG is ineligible to invoke
the affidavit override procedure having not been explicitly permitted to do so in the CBA. On
October 29, 2014, the PB&PA Unit 156B filed Grievance Number LTS-14-004 on behalf of
Lt. Walsh, with similar complaints. On December 22, 2014, CPD denied both grievances, and
the matters went to arbitration. An arbitration hearing was held on June 1, 2015. The arbitrator
issued the award on August 28, 2015, and a clarifying letter on September 2, 2015, finding the
OIG’s investigation could continue so long as OIG made a good faith effort to obtain an affidavit

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OIG Case # 11-0225 (Det. Gilger) December 4, 2015

from Special Prosecutor Dan Webb. Such affidavit was obtained on September 23, 2015. (Chron.
¶ 455.)

C. James Gilger Employment History

Det. Gilger has worked for CPD since January 1988 when he started as a Police Officer.
In December 1996, Det. Gilger was assigned as a Detective in Area 5 (now Detective Area
North), and he has served in that position since. Det. Gilger is a member of FOP Lodge 7.

III. APPLICABLE RULES, REGULATIONS, AND LAW4

A. CPD Rules & Regulations (effective January 12, 2011)

The CPD Rules and Regulations set out the standards of conduct, departmental goals and
duties of members. Goals of the Department include, among others, the enforcement of all laws
and ordinances, the arrest of law violators, assembly of competent evidence of the alleged
violation, and promotion of respect and cooperation of all citizens for the law and those sworn to
enforce it. Goals of Department members include maintenance of the highest standards of
integrity and ethics and excellence in the performance of duty.

Article V of the “Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Police Department,” sets forth
specifically prohibited acts as the CPD Rules of Conduct (the CPD Rules). In pertinent part, the
CPD Rules include the following prohibitions:

Rule 2 Any action or conduct which impedes the Department’s efforts to achieve its
policy and goals or brings discredit upon the Department.

Rule 3 Any failure to promote the Department’s efforts to implement its policy or
accomplish its goals.

Rule 6 Disobedience of an order or directive, whether written or oral.

Rule 11 Incompetency or inefficiency in the performance of duty.

Rule 14 Making a false report, written or oral.

Rule 22 Failure to report to the Department any violation of Rules and Regulations or any
other improper conduct which is contrary to the policy, orders or directives of the
Department.

4
Selected CPD Orders (OIG_Add’l_004542-OIG_Add’l_005133); DDSO 07-05 Treatment of Witnesses (eff. April
12, 2007) (CPD003057); DDSO 96-5 Uniform Crime Reporting Related Directives (eff. Nov. 7, 1996)
(CPD002822); DDSO 97-7 Procedures Required of Detectives (eff. May 12, 1997) (CPD002909); CPD Rules and
Regulations (eff. Jan. 12, 2011) (OIG_Add’l_005497-OIG_Add’l_005516).

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OIG Case # 11-0225 (Det. Gilger) December 4, 2015

B. CPD General Orders

Relevant provisions of CPD’s General Orders in effect at the time of the conduct at issue
are set forth below.

1. G08-01-02 Allegations of Misconduct–Specific Responsibilities (eff. May


24, 2001 to March 17, 2013).

G08-01-02(II)(A)(5): Duty to Report Misconduct - Members who have knowledge of


circumstances relating to a complaint will submit an individual written report to a supervisor
before reporting off duty on the day the member becomes aware of the investigation. The report
will include the CR number and all facts relating to the incident known or reported to the
member. The supervisor will forward one copy of any such report or document, without
unnecessary delay, directly to either the Independent Police Review Authority or the Internal
Affairs Division. A letter of transmittal or cover report is not required when such reports or
documents are forwarded.

C. CPD Detective Division Special Orders

1. DDSO 97-7 Procedures Required of Detectives (eff. May 12, 1997)

DDSO 97-7(II): Function of a Detective – This Special Order outlines the objectives of
detectives and requires detectives to be thorough, careful, and objective:

Detectives are a select group of Department members who are given the task of
investigating crimes reported to the Department. The objectives of their
investigative efforts are to determine if a crime actually occurred, gather evidence
of the crime, identify and arrest the person(s) responsible for criminal acts,
recover stolen property, and aid the prosecution of the arrestee.

Detectives will diligently investigate all cases they receive for follow-up. Their
investigation must be thorough, careful and objective. They must keep in mind
that, regardless of their perception of the seriousness of the crime, to the victim
the event was probably a shocking, lingering experience. As in any contact with
the public, detectives will be courteous and considerate in speech and manner
when interviewing victims and witnesses. DDSO 97-7(II).

DDSO 97-7(IV): Conducting a Field Investigation - This Special Order notes that “a
detective functions with considerable autonomy. However, certain investigative procedures must
be accomplished in each follow-up investigation. In every case received for field investigation
the assigned detective will” complete the following steps, as relevant here:

 Interview the complainant without delay;


 Canvass to identify witnesses
 Locate, secure and evaluate any evidence at the crime scene
 Determine whether to request a forensic investigator or evidence technician

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OIG Case # 11-0225 (Det. Gilger) December 4, 2015

 Obtain and review the Crime Scene Processing Report


 Determine where recovered evidence is being processed
 Analyze all information already obtained to determine additional necessary steps to
identify the offender
 Pursue all investigative leads
 Verify the crime reporting classification is correct
 Prepare a Supplementary Report, recording all substantive information

DDSO 97-7 (VIII): Reporting the Results of an Investigation - This provision sets out
the standards for detectives’ supplementary reports and specifically requires the report to be
accurate, truthful, and include sufficient information to support the outcome:

The Supplementary Report will provide adequate information as required by UCR


and IUCR guidelines to support the outcome (cleared, unfounded, suspended,
closed non-criminal, or reclassified) of the investigation. DDSO 97-7 (VIII)(C).
...
The narrative must include a complete and concise summary of all important
facts. The information provided must be sufficient to explain and support the
classification and any action taken by the detective. DDSO 97-7(VIII)(D)(2)(bb).
...
Reports are a reflection of the entire department, division, unit and author. The
account of the incident will be thorough, accurate and understandable. The
probability of solution and conviction depends greatly upon the truthfulness and
thoroughness of the investigation and reports submitted. The reporting detective
and the approving supervisor will be held accountable. DDSO 97-7(VIII)(D)(4).

2. DDSO 07-05 Treatment of Witnesses (eff. April 12, 2007)

DDSO 07-05(V)(C): Responsibilities of Homicide Detectives – “Detectives


investigating crimes will ensure the integrity of the investigation, including the integrity of the
witness’s accounts and statements, to the extent reasonably possible.”

3. DDSO 96-5 Uniform Crime Reporting Related Directives (eff. Nov. 7,


1996)

DDSO 96-5: Definition of Exceptional Clearances - This Special Order sets out the
definition and requirements for any case closed as cleared exceptionally and provides additional
guidance regarding the requirements:

An exceptional clearance is the solving of a criminal offense when the offender


was not arrested, was not charged, or was not turned over to the court for
prosecution due to unusual circumstances. Detectives must identify the offender,
exhaust all investigative leads, and do everything possible to clear a case by arrest
before exceptionally clearing the case. DDSO 96-5(V)(A).

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OIG Case # 11-0225 (Det. Gilger) December 4, 2015

According to the UCR Handbook, a detective can clear cases exceptionally, if


each of the following questions are answered “yes.”

1. Has the investigation established the identity of the offender?

2. Is there enough information to support an arrest, charge, and turning over


to the court for prosecution?

3. Is the exact location of the offender known so that he could be taken into
custody now?

4. Is there some reason outside law enforcement control that precludes


arresting, charging, and prosecuting the offender? DDSO 96-5(V)(B)

Detectives must list in their Supplementary Report the facts that support their
decision to exceptionally clear a case. DDSO 96-5(V)(D)
...
Supervisors will not approve an exceptionally cleared case if there is insufficient
information to support an arrest. DDSO 96-5(V)(D)(2)(g).
...
Bar to Prosecution . . . In murder investigations, if the Felony Review Unit has
rejected charges against the offender, the detective will list in the Supplementary
Report the reasons for the rejection and the facts which support the arrest of the
offender. The detective will request an exceptional clearance for the case.
Approval for exceptionally cleared homicide cases is the responsibility of the area
commander and the appropriate field group deputy chief. DDSO 96-
5(V)(D)(4)(a)(2).

4. DDSOP Chapter 18: Investigative Files (eff. 1992 to May 9, 2011)

DDSOP Chapter 18 – This Standard Operating Procedure sets out the Detective
Division policies regarding investigative file maintenance:

Ch. 18.2(F) Investigative File Control Card – “The Investigative File Control
card is a Department form which documents the temporary removal of
investigative files from the file repository.”

Ch. 18.3(A)(1) Responsibilities and Procedures – “The Detective Division unit


commanding officers will ensure that: the unit’s RD numerical sequence file and
investigative file case folders are properly maintained.”

Ch. 18.4(A)(2) File Retention – “Homicide file retention schedule: The Violent
Crimes Units will file homicide cases separate from other cases. During the first
period of each year the homicide files will be reviewed to determine their
retention period.
...

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OIG Case # 11-0225 (Det. Gilger) December 4, 2015

In cleared open homicide cases and in uncleared homicide cases the investigative
file case folder will be maintained in the unit for ten years and then sent to the
Records Division for permanent retention.”

IV. ANALYSIS

The OIG disciplinary investigation established that Det. Gilger violated multiple CPD
Rules and Department orders in the course of his assignment to reinvestigate the Koschman
homicide. The Koschman homicide investigation had sat open and unworked for seven years,
when the media brought the case to CPD’s attention in January 2011. (Chron. ¶¶ 163-67.) A
review of available records from the 2004 investigation revealed that the 2004 investigation was
not thorough and had failed to identify the offender. (Chron. ¶¶ 183-84.)

Deputy Chief of Detectives Dean Andrews ordered that the case be reassigned away from
Area 3 to Det. Gilger at Area 5 and fully reinvestigated to avoid any appearance of impropriety,
particularly in light of the allegations of improper, preferential treatment for the Mayor’s
nephew, the prime suspect in the case. (Chron. ¶¶ 186, 196.)

Det. Gilger was aware that the investigation was of heightened concern for CPD: there
were departmental concerns about the appearance of impropriety, increased scrutiny of the case
by senior CPD leadership as well as the public, and the obvious shortcomings of the 2004
investigation. (Chron. ¶¶ 194-97, 206.) Det. Gilger, however, the more experienced detective
assigned to the 2011 reinvestigation, failed to perform a competent investigation, created the
appearance of preferential treatment to Vanecko and his friends, failed to formally contact the
State’s Attorney’s Office for charges, failed to draft a truthful and accurate closing
supplementary report, recommended the improper closure of the case as closed/cleared
exceptionally in direct contravention of departmental orders, and failed to report or document the
fact that the original homicide file was missing.

A. Failure to Complete Required Investigative Steps

Det. Gilger failed to complete basic, required investigative steps, including a canvass and
the pursuit of all relevant, material, and reasonable investigative leads. Accordingly, as detailed
below, Det. Gilger violated:

 Rule 6: disobedience of an order or directive, namely, DDSO 97-7, which requires


detectives to conduct a canvass and pursue all investigative leads;
 Rule 3: any failure to promote the Department’s efforts to implement its policy or
accomplish its goals, including the goals of arrest of law violators, assembling competent
evidence of the alleged violation, and excellence in the performance of duty; and
 Rule 11: incompetency in the performance of duty.

1. Failure to Conduct a Canvass of the Scene

Det. Gilger failed to canvass the scene for witnesses or additional evidence as required by
DDSO 97-7(IV). (Chron. ¶ 274.) DDSO 97-7(IV) requires the assigned detective in every case

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OIG Case # 11-0225 (Det. Gilger) December 4, 2015

received for field investigation to conduct a canvass of the area in an effort to identify witnesses.
In their OIG interviews, both Dets. Gilger and Spanos asserted that they conducted a canvass
when they drove past the scene and looked for exterior video cameras. (Chron. ¶¶ 275-76.)
However, the detectives admit that they did not attempt to speak to individuals at the nearby
businesses to identify possible witnesses or determine whether any video evidence remained
available. (Chron. ¶¶ 275-76.) Thus, the detectives’ drive through the area, without any effort to
speak to individuals at the nearby businesses, did not constitute a canvass.

Moreover, Det. Gilger did not document any canvass in a general progress report (GPR)
or case supplemental report (CSR). (Chron. ¶¶ 274-75.) Commander Salemme agreed that had
the detectives conducted a canvass, it should have been documented in a GPR and included in
the CSR. (Chron. ¶ 278.) While Det. Gilger asserted that that he did not document the purported
canvass in the concluding CSR due to an oversight, the fact that Det. Gilger did not document
the drive through the area further suggests that he himself did not consider the activity to be a
canvass. (Chron. ¶ 275.) The lack of a canvass is additionally troubling because it was clear from
the 2004 case reports that the 2004 detectives also failed to canvass. (Chron. ¶¶ 61-62.) As a
result, Det. Gilger was aware that no canvass was ever conducted in the Koschman homicide
case. What’s more, the OSP was able to recover video evidence from 2004 as part of its
independent investigation, establishing that the detectives’ failure to canvass, resulted in the
failure to secure relevant evidence (Chron. ¶ 61.)

2. Failure to Pursue All Reasonable Investigative Leads

Det. Gilger failed to pursue reasonable investigative leads as required by DDSO 97-7.

Det. Gilger did not seek telephone records of individuals involved in the incident,
including those of Vanecko, Denham, Kevin McCarthy, or Bridget McCarthy. (Chron. ¶ 274.)
Det. Gilger assumed that no records would still be available in 2011 and made no attempt to
obtain them. (Chron. ¶ 275.) Det. Gilger’s assumption was wrong. In 2012, OSP sought and
successfully obtained relevant telephone records from 2004, including Bridget McCarthy’s cell
phone records showing that she placed a call to Vanecko immediately after the incident. (Chron.
¶ 17) This was direct evidence that Vanecko had phone contact with the McCarthys after the
incident during which he may have made statements about what had occurred. Had the detectives
obtained these records, they would have known to have asked the McCarthys about this phone
conversation. The 2004 detectives failed to obtain these records, and Det. Gilger repeated this
failure.

Det. Gilger did not ask Vanecko’s friend, Craig Denham, obvious and relevant questions
about where he and the rest of the Vanecko group went after the incident and what statements, if
any, Vanecko may have made about the incident. (Chron. ¶ 275.) Unlike the McCarthys,
Denham voluntarily spoke to the detectives and would have been a logical source of information
about where they went and what was said. (Chron. ¶ 223.) The detectives’ limited and
incomplete questioning of Denham is clear from the GPRs and the concluding CSR. (Chron.
¶¶ 223, 236.) Det. Gilger acknowledged this failure and had no explanation. (Chron. ¶ 275.) The
2004 detectives failed to ask such obvious and relevant questions, and Dets. Gilger and Spanos
simply retraced the prior detectives’ steps. As a result, it was not until 2012, before the special

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OIG Case # 11-0225 (Det. Gilger) December 4, 2015

grand jury, that the McCarthys revealed that immediately after the incident, the Vanecko group
reconvened at the Pepper Canister, but by then, could not recall what was discussed. (Chron.
¶ 48.) Det. Gilger accordingly failed to seek key pieces of evidence, namely possible statements
by the subject immediately after and about the incident, including possible statements against
interest.

Det. Gilger did not attempt to identify or interview any additional individuals who
attended the engagement party where Vanecko had been before the incident in order to obtain
possible statements by percipient witnesses or Vanecko. (Chron. ¶ 275.) Det. Gilger also did not
attempt to interview Megan McDonald, who Kevin McCarthy identified in 2004 as the person he
and his wife were on their way to meet at Butch McGuire’s bar on Division Street at the time of
the incident. (Chron. ¶¶ 47, 275.) McDonald and other third parties were possible sources of
additional information, including possible statements by percipient witnesses or Vanecko about
the incident in the intervening years. Det. Gilger stated that he did not consider interviewing
McDonald because she was not at the scene. (Chron. ¶ 275.) And according to Spanos, he and
Det. Gilger did not attempt to interview those in attendance at the engagement party simply
because they were not direct witnesses. (Chron. ¶ 276.)

Det. Gilger did not speak with or interview Officer Edwin Tremore or any of the
detectives who worked on the 2004 Koschman investigation. (Chron. ¶¶ 30, 198, 274-75.) The
responding officer and original detectives were obvious sources of valuable information
regarding the case, including their impressions of witnesses, opinions and additional steps that
may not have been documented in the remaining case files. Their knowledge was particularly
relevant given the fact that the original case file, including detectives’ GPRs, were missing. With
respect to Officer Tremore and Detectives O’Leary and Clemens, all three were still working in
the department at the time of the reinvestigation, yet Dets. Gilger and Spanos did not contact
them. (Chron. ¶¶ 30-31.) With respect to Detective Yawger, the primary detective in 2004, Det.
Gilger explained that he believed he was instructed not to contact him—and that someone else
would contact Yawger instead. (Chron. ¶ 198.) None of the other meeting attendants support Det.
Gilger’s statement on this point, and Andrews expected Det. Gilger to contact Yawger. (Chron.
¶¶ 199-201.) While others recalled that Walsh was going to reach out to Yawger, Det. Gilger
never followed up with Walsh or anyone else to ensure that Yawger had been contacted or to
find out what he had to say. (Chron. ¶¶ 200-01, 231.) Instead, he closed the case without hearing
from any of the 2004 detectives. (Chron. ¶ 275.)

In sum, Dets. Gilger and Spanos were ordered to fully reinvestigate the Koschman
homicide but failed to exhaust obvious and relevant investigative leads, including the required
step of conducting a canvass. (Chron. ¶¶ 197, 274.) Dets. Gilger and Spanos reported that they
equally shared responsibility for the investigation, despite the fact that Det. Gilger took
responsibility for documenting the investigation in GPRs and the CSR. (Chron. ¶ 234.)
Nevertheless, Det. Gilger was the more experienced detective, having worked as a detective
since 1996. (Chron. ¶ 208.) Det. Gilger’s supervisors, Cirone, Salemme, and Andrews, all
defended the quality of the investigation, dismissing the additional leads described above as
unnecessary or unreasonable, particularly given the length of time that had passed since the
incident. (Chron. ¶¶ 276-79.) But Det. Gilger did not document investigative steps not taken due
to the passage of time, and with regard to several leads, he acknowledged that he did not even

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OIG Case # 11-0225 (Det. Gilger) December 4, 2015

consider them and had no explanation for his failure to pursue certain investigative options and
avenues. (Chron. ¶ 275.) Additionally, Det. Gilger failed to conduct a canvass of the area, an
important step in any homicide investigation. And as Salemme noted, had the detectives
conducted a canvass, it was required to be documented in a GPR or the CSR. (Chron.¶ 278.)
Given the many leads Det. Gilger failed to pursue, his investigation of the Koschman homicide
failed to meet standards set out in DDSO 97-7 and reflects incompetence in the performance of
his duties.

B. Failure to Draft a Truthful, Complete, and Objective Concluding Case


Supplemental Report

Det. Gilger violated the following CPD Rules and orders by failing to draft a truthful,
complete, and objective concluding CSR:

 Rule 14: making a false report, written or oral;


 Rule 2: any action or conduct which impedes the Department’s efforts to achieve its
policy and goals or brings discredit upon the Department, including the departmental
goals of integrity and promoting respect for the law and those sworn to enforce it;
 Rule 6: disobedience of an order or directive, namely, DDSO 97-7(II), which requires
detectives to be thorough, careful and objective in their investigations, and DDSO 97-
7(VIII)(D), which requires detectives’ reports to be accurate, truthful, and include
sufficient information to support the outcome; and
 Rule 11: incompetency in the performance of duty.

As outlined below, the concluding CSR for the 2011 Koschman investigation is false and
misleading in five respects as described below.

1. Inclusion of a False Quote Attributed to Koschman

First, Det. Gilger included in the concluding CSR a purported verbatim statement placed
in quotes that was attributed to Koschman, despite the fact that there was no support for this
quote—neither for the wording of the statement nor its attribution to Koschman—in any of the
2004 or 2011 reports. The report’s conclusion states:

R/Ds concluded that David KOSCHMAN, having yelled, ‘Fuck you! I’ll kick
your ass!’ by breaking away from his group of friends and aggressively going
after VANECKO was clearly the assailant in this incident. These aggressive
actions caused VANECKO to take action and defend himself.” (Chron. ¶ 263.)

None of the detectives’ GPRs include any quote from any witness with the language,
“Fuck you!” Det. Gilger asserted that he was justified in including the language “Fuck you!” as a
quote because Scott Allen reported that both groups were yelling obscenities and that Koschman
said the phrase “screw you.” (Chron. ¶ 269.) But Det. Gilger’s GPR from the interview of Allen
states only that “everyone started arguing and yelling ‘screw you.’” (emphasis added) (Chron.
¶ 215.)

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OIG Case # 11-0225 (Det. Gilger) December 4, 2015

The second portion of the quote that Dets. Gilger and Spanos attributed to Koschman,
“I’ll kick your ass!”, was purportedly based on statements made by Kevin McCarthy in 2004 as
recorded in Detective Yawger’s GPR summary of the interview. (Chron. ¶ 111.) However, while
Yawger’s GPR documented that the statement was made, it did not reflect that the statement was
specifically attributed to Koschman. (Chron. ¶¶ 111, 271.) Rather, Yawger’s GPR reads,
“Mr. McCarthy states that at this time the primary kid (Koschman) and another kid were still
swearing, calling himself, Craig, and Richard names, and saying things like, ‘I’ll kick your ass’,
etc.” (Chron. ¶ 111.) Dets. Gilger and Spanos included the statement and attributed the statement
to Koschman in their concluding CSR despite the fact that McCarthy had twice lied to detectives
before giving his statement to Yawger. (Chron. ¶¶ 267, 14, 47.) Det. Gilger asserted that this
particular statement of McCarthy’s was reliable because McCarthy’s attorney was present.
(Chron. ¶ 271.)

The mischaracterization of the language and its attribution to Koschman by Dets. Gilger
and Spanos made Koschman appear to be the aggressor, thereby making the theory of self-
defense on the part of Vanecko appear more plausible. The false quote, along with the rest of the
CSR’s conclusion explaining that Vanecko acted in self-defense, was the product of a last-
minute, late-night editing session conducted by Det. Gilger and Sgt. Cirone, using Cirone’s
personal email account to communicate with Dep. Chief Andrews the night before the report was
submitted for final approval. (Chron. ¶¶ 242-47.) The lack of supporting evidence and the
questionable circumstances by which the false quote entered the report suggest a concerted effort
to manufacture support for the finding of self-defense and the closure of the case without
charges.

The inclusion of a false statement in his concluding CSR is a grave violation of


Det. Gilger’s obligations under CPD Rules and Detective Division orders to draft a truthful,
complete, and objective report and constitutes a false written report under Rule 14. The false
statement significantly undermined the credibility and integrity of the closing report and further
undermines Det. Gilger’s credibility as a CPD officer.

2. Failure to Provide Objective Account of the Evidence

Second, Det. Gilger failed to ensure the concluding CSR provided an objective account
of the evidence because it omitted a witness account of events that was in direct conflict with the
detectives’ view of the case. Specifically, the concluding CSR makes no mention that, according
to witness Scott Allen, a member of the Koschman group, the people in the Vanecko group were
the aggressors. (Chron. ¶¶ 215, 261, 263, 272.) The concluding CSR states, “R/Ds concluded that
David KOSCHMAN, having yelled, ‘Fuck you! I’ll kick your ass!’ by breaking away from his
group of friends and aggressively going after VANECKO was clearly the assailant in this
incident. These aggressive actions caused VANECKO to take action and defend himself.”
(Chron. ¶¶ 263, 271-72.) In contrast however, Det. Gilger’s GPR notes from the Allen interview
show that Allen stated that, after the initial bump, “everyone started arguing and yelling ‘screw
you’” and that the people in the other group were “the aggressors.” (Chron. ¶ 215.) Det. Gilger’s
GPR of the Allen interview also states that Koschman “was in the thick of the argument and was
also yelling.” (Chron. ¶ 215.)

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OIG Case # 11-0225 (Det. Gilger) December 4, 2015

Nowhere in the concluding narrative, however, do the detectives acknowledge that Allen
described the Vanecko group as “the aggressors” or explain why Det. Gilger discounted Allen’s
account of the events. (Chron. ¶¶ 215, 261, 263, 272.) The circumstances surrounding the late-
night drafting of the CSR’s conclusion suggest that Det. Gilger and his supervisors were not
focused on ensuring an accurate and objective report, but rather, were intent on justifying their
ultimate conclusion of self-defense. (Chron. ¶¶ 241-52.) Before the special grand jury,
Det. Gilger acknowledged that his failure to account for Allen’s description of the Vanecko
group as the aggressors was an omission of important evidence. (Chron.¶ 272.) By not
addressing the conflicting account, the detectives mischaracterized the evidence in a way that
supported their ultimate conclusion, provided an incomplete account and analysis, and produced
a report that, at a minimum, does not appear objective.

3. Inclusion of a False Statement Regarding the Initial Delay in the 2004


Investigation

Third, Det. Gilger included a statement in the concluding CSR that, before Koschman’s
death, “[e]fforts were being made to interview the additional witnesses that were at the scene of
the incident,” despite the fact that he had no evidentiary basis for this statement. (Chron. ¶ 273.)
This statement is a blatant falsity. There is no evidence of any investigative work performed in
the two weeks between when Dets. O’Leary and Clemens finished their preliminary work and
left on furlough and Koschman’s death. (Chron. ¶¶ 59-70.)

Det. Gilger acknowledged that he was “guessing” that the 2004 detectives were looking
for phone numbers and that he did not know what was done in the 2004 investigation. (Chron.
¶ 273.) The detectives’ inclusion of this statement was an attempt to explain away the obvious
lack of investigative activity in the days leading up to Koschman’s death, erroneously suggesting
that detectives continued working on the case rather than letting it sit after the initial detectives
went on furlough. (Chron. ¶¶ 59-70.) Accordingly, Det. Gilger included another false statement
in the CSR, further undermining the overall credibility and objectivity of the report.

4. Inclusion of Informal, Casual Conversation with Assistant State’s


Attorney O’Brien

Fourth, Det. Gilger included in the CSR a description of his conversation with ASA
Darren O’Brien that gives the false impression that the case was formally presented to the
CCSAO Felony Review Unit for charges in 2011. Specifically, the report states that Det. Gilger
“spoke with ASA Darren O’Brien at the Cook County courthouse” and informed O’Brien of the
reinvestigation and the “current progress of the investigation. ASA O’Brien stated he was
consulted by Area 3 Detectives on possible charges, but after the consultation between his office
and the police department, it was agreed that charges were not warranted because the actions of
the offender constituted an act of self-defense.” (Chron. ¶¶ 242, 280.) Det. Gilger’s description
of the conversation with O’Brien does not specify that O’Brien met with Area 3 detectives in
2004 and not 2011 and does not make clear that Det. Gilger did not present O’Brien with any
reports from the 2011 investigation. As described by Det. Gilger, his 2011 meeting with O’Brien
was, in fact, a brief, chance encounter in the hallway of the CCSAO office. (Chron. ¶ 209.)

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OIG Case # 11-0225 (Det. Gilger) December 4, 2015

Moreover, at the time of the meeting, O’Brien was no longer in the Felony Review Unit. (Chron.
¶ 209.)

The concluding CSR’s misleading reference to Gilger’s 2011 chance meeting with
O’Brien was also the result of the late-night editing session between Det. Gilger, Sgt. Cirone,
and Dep. Chief Andrews. (Chron. ¶ 242.) This content was included as “Correction #1” in
Cirone’s email to Andrews and Salemme the night before the report was submitted.
(Chron.¶ 242.) These circumstances strongly suggest that the misleading portrayal of the O’Brien
meeting was intended to support the report’s recommendation to close the case as cleared
exceptionally, which would have required the existence of a bar to prosecution and an
explanation of the Felony Review Unit’s reasons (if any) for rejecting charges.

Det. Gilger denied that he included this conversation with O’Brien to suggest that he
consulted with Felony Review and to support his recommendation to close the case as cleared
exceptionally. (Chron. ¶ 280.) Rather, he claimed, he memorialized the encounter as another one
of his investigative steps. (Chron. ¶ 280.) Det. Gilger believed that Sgt. Cirone had asked him to
include a description of the encounter in the CSR. (Chron. ¶ 252.) Chief Andrews reported that
he had asked Det. Gilger to include the conversation in the CSR after noticing its absence in an
earlier draft. (Chron. ¶ 250.) Nevertheless, Det. Gilger’s mischaracterization of this brief
conversation further raises questions about the reliability of the content of the report.

5. Failure to Document the Missing Homicide File and Missing Felony


Review File

Fifth, Det. Gilger did not memorialize in any GPR or report prepared between January
13, 2011, the date of the reassignment meeting, and March 1, 2011, when the reinvestigation was
closed as cleared exceptionally, that the original 2004 Koschman homicide file was missing or
that the 2004 Cook County State’s Attorney Felony Review Folder was also missing. (Chron.
¶¶ 274-75.) Det. Gilger’s assertion that the missing files had no bearing on the investigation is
belied by his earlier acknowledgement that without the original file, detectives did not have
access to several key documents including original GPRs, Crime Scene Processing Reports, or
hospital records. (Chron. ¶¶ 203, 275.) The detectives were required to review, at a minimum,
the Crime Scene Processing Reports, under DDSO 97-7(IV). But Det. Gilger completed the
investigation without reviewing these records or even documenting in the concluding CSR the
fact that these records were unavailable. (Chron. ¶¶ 275, 364-65.) Accordingly, Det. Gilger’s
concluding CSR lacked relevant information and was not thorough or complete.

C. Failure to Pursue a Charging Decision from CCSAO

Det. Gilger violated CPD Rules and orders by failing to seek a charging decision from the
CCSAO Felony Review Unit regarding the Koschman homicide reinvestigation. Det. Gilger
failed to present the case to the Felony Review Unit despite having, for the first time, identified
Vanecko as the offender and determined that Koschman had been punched, not merely pushed,
and despite the fact that in 2011 there was a new State’s Attorney and new individuals staffed the
Felony Review Unit. Det. Gilger’s failure to formally present the case to the CCSAO Felony
Review Unit for charges violated:

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OIG Case # 11-0225 (Det. Gilger) December 4, 2015

 Rule 6: disobedience of an order or directive, namely, DDSO 97-7(II), which establishes


detectives’ obligations to identify and arrest the person(s) responsible for criminal acts,
and aid the prosecution of the arrestee;
 Rule 3: any failure to promote the Department’s efforts to implement its policy or
accomplish its goals, including the goals of arrest of law violators and excellence in the
performance of duty; and
 Rule 11: incompetency in the performance of duty.

In 2011, Dets. Gilger and Spanos made two significant new findings not made in the
2004 investigation. The 2011 reinvestigation concluded that Vanecko was the offender and that
Vanecko had punched, not pushed, Koschman. (Chron. ¶¶ 261-67.) These findings would have
been relevant to any charging decision. Moreover, the detectives reached the legal conclusion
that Vanecko acted in self-defense without presenting the case to the CCSAO for a prosecutor’s
legal evaluation of the evidence to determine if the conclusion was appropriate. (Chron. ¶¶ 267,
280-81.) Having finally identified Vanecko as the offender in 2011, the detectives’ failure to
present the case to the Felony Review Unit further deprived CCSAO of the opportunity to open
discussion with Vanecko, through counsel, to specifically address the question of self-defense. In
2004, detectives asked CCSAO Felony Review for “an advice” only. (Chron. ¶¶ 141-42.) In
2011, Dets. Gilger and Spanos failed to contact Felony Review at all. (Chron. ¶¶ 280-81, 284.)
Thus, CPD never asked CCSAO for a formal charging decision in the Koschman case.

Det. Gilger asserted that he and Spanos did not seek charges from CCSAO because they
had “no new information,” and he did not believe they had probable cause to charge Vanecko.
(Chron. ¶ 281.) With the exception of Sergeant Mills, the detectives’ superiors supported this
view, but largely asserted that CPD kept CCSAO informed of the findings of the reinvestigation
and therefore had no obligation to make a formal request for a charging decision. (Chron.
¶¶ 282-85.) But Det. Gilger’s own explanation for not contacting CCSAO is unpersuasive. To
the extent there was no “new information,” it was because Gilger and Spanos failed to fully
reinvestigate the case as ordered. (Chron. ¶ 274.) Moreover, the explanation is unavailing
because there were new findings including, most critically the identity of the assailant. And,
while Det. Gilger’s superiors asserted that CCSAO was well aware of the developments in the
case, no one in CPD produced reports to the Felony Review Unit. (Chron. ¶ 284.) Rather, they
reportedly relied on State’s Attorney Anita Alvarez’s statements to the media as an indication
that CCSAO was declining to charge Vanecko. (Chron. ¶ 284.) However, State’s Attorney
Alvarez had not yet commented to the media about the reinvestigation by the time CPD closed
the case. (Chron. ¶¶ 306-08, 311.) When she did comment, the State’s Attorney’s statements
were under-informed, given that CPD had failed to inform CCSAO that the original case file was
missing or that the detectives had, in fact, not conducted a full reinvestigation, completed all
investigative steps, or drafted a truthful, complete, and accurate concluding CSR. (Chron. ¶¶ 310,
417.)

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OIG Case # 11-0225 (Det. Gilger) December 4, 2015

D. Improper Recommendation to Close Case as Closed/Cleared


Exceptionally

Det. Gilger improperly recommended that the Koschman homicide investigation be


closed as cleared exceptionally. Accordingly, Det. Gilger violated:

 Rule 6: disobedience of an order or directive, namely, DDSO 96-5, which provides the
requirements under the Federal Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook for such clearances;
and
 Rule 2: any action which impedes the Department’s efforts to achieve its policy and
goals.

Specifically, Dets. Gilger and Spanos recommended the case be cleared exceptionally
despite the fact that they did not exhaust all investigative leads and there were not reasons
outside law enforcement control precluding the arrest, charge, and prosecution of Vanecko, or
alternatively, according to Det. Gilger, there was not sufficient information to support Vanecko’s
arrest, charge, and turning over to a court for prosecution. (Chron. ¶¶ 274, 291-92.)

DDSO 96-5(V)(A) defines an “exceptional clearance” as “the solving of a criminal


offense when the offender was not arrested, was not charged, or was not turned over to the court
for prosecution due to unusual circumstances.” (Chron. ¶ 287.) The special order requires that in
any exceptional clearance, “[d]etectives must identify the offender, exhaust all investigative
leads, and do everything possible to clear a case by arrest before exceptionally clearing the case.”
(Chron. ¶ 287.)

DDSO 96-5(V) clearly sets out the requirements for classifying the closing of a case as
cleared exceptionally, including that detectives exhaust all investigative leads and show that four
requirements (hereinafter “Requirements 1-4”) are met:

According to the UCR Handbook, a detective can clear cases exceptionally, if


each of the following questions are answered “yes.”

1. Has the investigation established the identity of the offender?

2. Is there enough information to support an arrest, charge, and turning over


to the court for prosecution?

3. Is the exact location of the offender known so that he could be taken into
custody now?

4. Is there some reason outside law enforcement control that precludes


arresting, charging, and prosecuting the offender? DDSO 96-5(V)(B).
(Chron. ¶ 288.)

The order further states that if the reason outside law enforcement control is a bar to
prosecution in a murder investigation, and “the Felony Review Unit has rejected charges against

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OIG Case # 11-0225 (Det. Gilger) December 4, 2015

the offender, the detective will list in the Supplementary Report the reasons for the rejection and
the facts which support the arrest of the offender.” DDSO 96-5(V)(D)(4)(a)(2). (Chron. ¶ 289.)

Det. Gilger admitted that because, in his opinion, there was not probable cause to arrest
Vanecko, there was not enough information to support Vanecko’s arrest, charge and turning over
to the court for prosecution as required under Requirement 2. (Chron. ¶ 291.) Det. Gilger further
admitted that there was no bar to prosecution of Vanecko in 2011, and thus no reason outside law
enforcement control that precludes arresting, charging, and prosecuting the offender, as required
under Requirement 4. (Chron. ¶ 292.) He asserted that CCSAO declined to charge the case in
2004 and that he concluded again in 2011 that Vanecko acted in self-defense. (Chron. ¶ 292.)
But, Det. Gilger acknowledged, he did not formally consult with CCSAO in 2011. Det. Gilger
noted that his superiors all approved his recommendation for clearing the case exceptionally.
(Chron. ¶ 292.) Nevertheless, Det. Gilger was responsible for compliance with all Detective
Division Special Orders, and Det. Gilger was aware that the required factors for an exceptional
clearance were not met.

E. Providing or Creating the Appearance of Preferential Treatment

Det. Gilger violated CPD Rules and orders by providing or creating the appearance of
preferential treatment for Vanecko. Det. Gilger’s actions violated:

 Rule 6: disobedience of an order or directive, namely, DDSO 07-05(V)(C), which


requires detectives to ensure the integrity of the investigation, and DDSO 97-7(II), which
requires detectives to be thorough, careful and objective;
 Rule 2: any action or conduct which impedes the Department’s efforts to achieve its
policy and goals or brings discredit upon the Department, including the departmental
goals of integrity and promoting respect for the law and those sworn to enforce it; and
 Rule 11: incompetency in the performance of duty.

Det. Gilger’s failure to complete all required steps to investigate the Koschman homicide,
his failure to draft a truthful and objective CSR, his failure to formally contact the State’s
Attorney’s Office for a charging decision, and his improper recommendation to close the case as
cleared exceptionally each had the effect of giving favorable treatment and creating an
appearance of preferential treatment for Vanecko, the Mayor’s nephew. In each instance, the
misconduct served to advance the ultimate conclusion that Vanecko acted in self-defense and
that he would not be arrested or charged. Det. Gilger’s misconduct was particularly egregious in
light of an already heightened concern within CPD—and the general public—about an
appearance of impropriety with respect to an open homicide case involving the Mayor’s nephew.
(Chron. ¶¶ 15-54, 163, 182-83, 186, 196.)

The appearance of preferential treatment is further amplified by other indicia of favorable


treatment to the Vanecko group. First, Dets. Gilger and Spanos did not ask Craig Denham, Kevin
McCarthy, or Bridget McCarthy, all friends of Vanecko, to submit to polygraphs as he did with
the Koschman group. (Chron. ¶¶ 222-23, 274-76.) And second, Dets. Gilger and Spanos did not
take steps to further probe what they regarded to be untruthful statements given to the
investigation by Kevin McCarthy and Bridget McCarthy, (as well as Craig Denham). (Chron.

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OIG Case # 11-0225 (Det. Gilger) December 4, 2015

¶¶ 274-76.) Det. Gilger denied that he provided any preferential treatment to the Vanecko group
but provided few explanations for these lapses that resulted in the appearance of favorable
treatment. (Chron. ¶ 275.) Det. Gilger asserted that he asked the Koschman group to take
polygraphs because, while he believed them, their stories had changed slightly. (Chron. ¶ 275.)
And he explained that he did not ask Vanecko’s friend, Denham, if he would take a polygraph
because he “kind of believed [Denham].” (Chron. ¶ 275.) He had no explanation for not seeking
grand jury subpoenas for the McCarthys except to say that it is not something detectives usually
do. (Chron. ¶ 275.) Moreover, Det. Gilger’s denials of providing preferential treatment to
Vanecko or his friends cannot overcome the ultimate effect that the misconduct served to create
the appearance of preferential treatment for Vanecko in the investigation of Koschman’s
homicide.

F. Failure to Report the Missing File to IAD

Finally, Det. Gilger violated CPD Rules and orders by failing to initiate an IAD
investigation, report, or ensure that anyone else reported, apparent misconduct to a supervisor or
IAD, when, in January 2011, he learned that the original Koschman homicide file was missing.
Specifically, Det. Gilger violated:

 Rule 22: failure to report to the Department any violation of Rules and Regulations or
any other improper conduct which is contrary to the policy, orders or directives of the
Department;
 Rule 6: disobedience of any order, namely, General Order 08-01-02(II)(A)(5), which
specifically requires members to report circumstances relating to a complaint of
misconduct to a supervisor the same day he learns the information so the information
may be forwarded to IAD or IPRA, as appropriate; and
 Rule 3: any failure to promote the Department’s efforts to implement its policy or
accomplish its goals, including maintenance of the highest standards of integrity and
ethics and excellence in the performance of duty.

At the reassignment meeting on January 13, 2011, Det. Gilger first learned that the
original homicide case file was missing: it was not appropriately stored with other open homicide
files and no records indicated who had removed it. (Chron. ¶¶ 202-03.) According to Det. Gilger,
at this meeting, he learned that at Area 3 personnel had looked for the file but could not find it.
(Chron. ¶ 203.) Det. Gilger knew he did not have any original GPRs, Crime Scene Processing
Reports, or hospital records, all of which Det. Gilger described as important for a homicide
investigation. (Chron. ¶ 203.) Eventually, Det. Gilger did obtain the “Blue Binder file,”
containing most but not all original Koschman homicide investigative records. (Chron. ¶ 364.)
However, the file was discovered well after Det. Gilger recommended closing the case, and Det.
Gilger never ensured that the apparent misconduct, as evidenced by the missing file, was
reported to IAD.

The fact that the original homicide file was missing was clear indication of a violation of
CPD Rule 41, which prohibits “removing any Department record or information concerning
police matters except as provided by Department orders.” (Chron. ¶¶ 150-54, 169-70, 182-86.)
More specifically, the missing file indicated a violation of DDSOP Ch. 18, which required

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OIG Case # 11-0225 (Det. Gilger) December 4, 2015

commanding officers to ensure proper maintenance of the files, including the storage of
uncleared homicide files in the unit and the documentation of any file removal with an
Investigative File Control card. (Chron. ¶ 169.) It was clear that Area 3 personnel did not find the
file where homicide files are regularly stored and no inventory record identified who had the file.

The missing file was not indicative of just a technical rule violation; rather, the case was
the subject of media attention and allegations of preferential treatment for the Mayor’s nephew.
(Chron. ¶¶ 150-54, 163-67.) The fact that the original investigative file was missing was of even
greater significance in light of the surrounding circumstances and should have further triggered a
heightened awareness of possible officer misconduct that warranted reporting to IAD.
Det. Gilger asserted that he did not report the missing file because he believed Area 3 was still
looking for it. (Chron. ¶ 205.) Nevertheless, Det. Gilger went on to complete his entire
reinvestigation and recommend closing the case on March 1, 2011, without ever hearing back
from Area 3 regarding any additional search efforts and without the benefit of the original
homicide file. (Chron. ¶¶ 274, 286.) By the time Det. Gilger recommended closing the case, it
was clear that the original file was missing, and Det. Gilger had a duty to report the apparent
misconduct. And while other CPD officers opined that there needed to be additional evidence of
intentional misconduct to trigger the duty to report, the CPD Rules and General Order do not
limit the duty to report to only intentional misconduct or otherwise exclude certain rules or
directives. (Chron. ¶ 205.) Det. Gilger’s failure to report to IAD would be mitigated had he
properly noted in the final CSR that the original file was missing (and that the copy he and
Spanos worked from was missing key documents). But he did not do so. (Chron. ¶¶ 274-75.)
Det. Gilger had a duty to report any misconduct, yet he never made any report or ensured that
anyone else made a report regarding the missing file and simply conducted his reinvestigation of
the homicide without key CPD records from the initial investigation.

Det. Gilger’s long-running failure to report the missing file to IAD or any other CPD unit
had significant, multiple consequences for CPD, which, as a result, responded to numerous file
requests on the basis of incomplete information and produced, to the State’s Attorney and OIG,
what it erroneously implied to be the complete file. In fact, CPD FOIA officer Rory O’Brien
reported he did not learn that the original file was missing until July 2011, well after CPD had
responded to the various FOIA requests for the Koschman investigative file. (Chron. ¶¶ 359,
422-23, 428, 442.) And, as a consequence, he and other CPD FOIA officers responded to the
Sun-Times FOIA request on the basis of inaccurate information. Similarly, CPD tendered what
was implied to be the complete original file to the Cook County State’s Attorney, who, in turn
tendered it to the Illinois State Police, incorrectly representing it as the complete file. (Chron.
¶¶ 310, 316-17.) CPD also responded to OIG’s request for the investigative file by tendering an
incomplete copy without disclosing it was not the original or that the original was missing.
(Chron. ¶¶ 321, 323.) Indeed, CPD again searched for the original file in April and May 2011 in
response to OIG’s request for certain original materials that were not present in CPD’s first
tender of photocopied materials related to the Koschman investigation. (Chron. ¶¶ 325-31.) Had
Det. Gilger reported the missing file to IAD, CPD likely would have avoided this entire string of
productions made under the implied pretense that CPD possessed the original file and that its
tenders in response to official requests were copies of the original file.

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OIG Case # 11-0225 (Det. Gilger) December 4, 2015

V. CONCLUSION

OIG’s investigation established that Det. Gilger violated multiple CPD Rules, General
Orders, and Detective Division Special Orders in the course of his investigation of the Koschman
homicide. Most, if not all, of these violations raise serious concerns regarding Det. Gilger’s
judgment, integrity, objectivity, and competence to perform his role as a homicide detective for
the City of Chicago.

At the time of the 2011 reassignment meeting, Det. Gilger was a highly experienced
homicide detective with approximately 15 years in the Detective Division. Det. Gilger was
assigned by the Deputy Chief to reinvestigate a homicide involving the Mayor’s nephew as the
alleged offender. The case had remained open and unworked for seven years and was the focus
of media attention in 2004 and again in 2011. Despite the heightened attention and the desire to
avoid any further appearance of impropriety, Det. Gilger failed to conduct a thorough, complete,
and objective investigation. As Det. Gilger noted, he is not solely responsible for the
investigation, and Det. Gilger’s supervisors all defended the quality of the investigation and
minimized or dismissed Det. Gilger’s violations. Det. Gilger’s supervisors, however, simply
share responsibility with Det. Gilger for his misconduct and incompetence, and their
explanations are, in turn, self-serving.

Det. Gilger’s actions throughout the Koschman investigation demonstrated incompetence


in the performance of his duties, including several false statements, which mischaracterized the
evidence and investigative steps being taken by CPD. Det. Gilger’s false statements raise
significant concerns regarding his credibility and ability to perform his duties as a sworn officer.
As a sworn officer, Det. Gilger’s reports are relied upon in criminal legal proceedings and his
credibility is therefore critical to his position. An officer who has made false statements in an
official investigation has irrevocably tainted his credibility and thus, at a minimum, has wholly
disqualified himself from effectively executing core police functions. Based on this conduct he
may be the subject of cross-examination in any contested proceedings in which he may appear as
a witness, see Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) (“Specific instances of conduct”), and his conduct and the
findings resulting from this investigation would further qualify as impeachment material that
should, in principle, be disclosed in any contested proceeding involving the official records or
testimony generated by Det. Gilger. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (requiring
disclosure in criminal case of information impeaching of government witness’s credibility).
Illinois courts have repeatedly noted that “‘as guardians of our laws, police officers are expected
to act with integrity, honesty, and trustworthiness’” and have found intentional false or
misleading statements by police officers to be sufficient cause for termination. Rodriguez v.
Weis, 408 Ill. App. 3d 663, 671 (1st Dist. 2011) (quoting Sindermann v. Civil Service Comm’n,
275 Ill. App. 3d 917, 928 (2nd Dist. 1995)).

OIG therefore recommends that CPD discharge Det. Gilger and refer him for placement
on the ineligible for rehire list maintained by the Department of Human Resources.

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OIG Case # 11-0225 (Det. Gilger) December 4, 2015

VI. CPD RULE VIOLATIONS

Rule 2 Any action or conduct which impedes the Department’s efforts to achieve its
policy and goals or brings discredit upon the Department.

Rule 3 Any failure to promote the Department’s efforts to implement its policy or
accomplish its goals.

Rule 6 Disobedience of an order or directive, whether written or oral.

Rule 11 Incompetency or inefficiency in the performance of duty.

Rule 14 Making a false report, written or oral.

Rule 22 Failure to report to the Department any violation of Rules and Regulations
or any other improper conduct which is contrary to the policy, orders or
directives of the Department.

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