Office of The Inspector General Koschman Report - Sgt. Sam Cirone

SUMMARY REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
Office of Inspector General Case # 11-0225 (Sgt. Sam Cirone)

December 4, 2015
This report consists of a summary of the evidence set out in a separate “Chronology of
Events,” all relevant investigative materials, an index of the investigative materials, and the
Office of Inspector General’s (OIG’s) analysis of those materials.
I. INTRODUCTION AND REPORT FORMAT
An OIG investigation has established that Chicago Police Department (CPD) Sergeant
Sam Cirone violated CPD rules and regulations in the course of his supervision of CPD’s
investigation of the homicide of David Koschman. Accordingly, and as detailed below, OIG
recommends that CPD impose discipline up to and including discharge against Sgt. Cirone,
commensurate with the gravity of his violations, past disciplinary and work history, department
standards, and any other relevant considerations.
The attached Chronology of Events details the facts relevant to the Koschman
investigation with citation to all supporting evidence. This evidence includes that obtained by the
Office of Special Prosecutor (OSP) and the special grand jury and disclosed to OIG by order of
the Circuit Court of Cook County for use in this administrative investigation. All grand jury
material remains subject to a protective order.1 The evidence also includes additional
investigative materials and statements obtained by OIG following the release of the Report of the
Special Prosecutor, Dan K. Webb. Due to the length of the Chronology, a complete summary of
the evidence is not repeated here, and is cited with reference to the Chronology (Chron. ¶)
throughout.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Summary of CPD’s Investigation of the Koschman Homicide
At approximately 3:15 a.m. on April 25, 2004, David Koschman, Scott Allen, James
Copeland, David Francis, and Shaun Hageline (the “Koschman group”) were walking westward
on Division Street when they encountered Richard J. Vanecko, Craig Denham, and Kevin and
Bridget McCarthy (the “Vanecko group”) on the south sidewalk at approximately 43 West
Division Street in Chicago. (Chron. ¶ 9.) A verbal altercation ensued. (Chron. ¶ 9.) During that
verbal altercation, Vanecko forcibly struck Koschman in the face causing Koschman to fall
straight back and hit his head on the pavement. (Chron. ¶ 9.) Koschman was immediately taken
to the hospital, where he died 11 days later of his injuries. (Chron. ¶¶ 13, 77.)
1
Pursuant to the protective order, grand jury materials may be used by OIG, the Mayor of the City of Chicago and
his designees, the CPD Superintendent and his designees, employees of the City of Chicago Department of Law
directly involved in the implementation of disciplinary, proceedings, CPD employees against whom disciplinary
action is sought (the “subjects”), and the subjects’ counsel (collectively, the “authorized persons”), solely in
connection with the prosecution and defense of any disciplinary proceedings arising out of OIG’s investigation, and
for no other purpose, and in connection with no other proceeding, without further order of the Circuit Court of Cook
County.
OIG Case # 11-0225 (Sgt. Cirone) December 4, 2015
At the scene of the incident, the responding officer, Edwin Tremore, took initial crime
scene investigatory steps while also facilitating the call for immediate medical attention for the
seriously injured Koschman. (Chron. ¶¶ 11-12.) Tremore interviewed Kevin McCarthy,
Hageline, and one bystander witness at the scene. (Chron. ¶¶ 14, 18.) In calling for a “records
division number” (RD number), Tremore mistakenly classified the incident as a simple battery
when the circumstances at the scene were more appropriately classified as the more serious
offense of aggravated battery. (Chron. ¶¶ 23-24.) This misclassification resulted in a delayed
field investigation. (Chron. ¶¶ 28-29.) No detectives were called to the scene in the immediate
aftermath of the incident. (Chron. ¶¶ 28-29.) CPD therefore did not conduct a canvass or secure
all witnesses and evidence immediately following the incident. (Chron. ¶¶ 28-29.)
Later that morning, Area 3 Violent Crimes Sergeant Robert O’Leary assigned Second
Watch Area 3 Detectives Rita O’Leary and Robert Clemens to follow up on the case, despite
knowing that both detectives were scheduled for three-week furloughs starting two days later.
(Chron. ¶¶ 31, 34.) The only tasks Dets. O’Leary and Clemens performed before leaving on
furlough were to interview two witnesses and check on Koschman’s condition on April 25, 2004.
(Chron. ¶¶ 42, 45, 52.). The detectives identified six additional witnesses but did not contact
them. (Chron. ¶ 60.) CPD performed no further investigative work for the 13-day period from
April 26, 2004, to May 9, 2004, that included 12 days while Dets. O’Leary and Clemens were
out on furlough. (Chron. ¶¶ 509-70, 79.) Although, at the time, Lt. Denis Walsh was a Field
Lieutenant in the 18th District where the crime occurred, he was not on duty on April 25, 2004,
and, according to CPD records, he had no official involvement in the initial Koschman
investigation. (Chron. ¶ 30.)
Three days after Koschman’s death on May 6, 2004, CPD, likely Sgt. O’Leary, assigned
Area 3 Homicide Detectives Ronald Yawger and Anthony Giralamo to the investigation. (Chron.
¶ 79.) As with CPD personnel who preceded them in connection with the matter, Dets. Yawger
and Giralamo failed to conduct a canvass to identify additional witnesses or identify and secure
available video footage of the altercation. (Chron. ¶¶ 61-62.) Neither did the detectives take any
steps to pursue phone records for the individuals involved, which the grand jury investigation
years later would reveal to contain critical information that could have been used to materially
advance the investigation. (Chron. ¶¶ 114-15.)
On May 20, 2004, Det. Yawger conducted a lineup with the male members of the
Vanecko group, including Vanecko himself. (Chron. ¶ 117.) None of the witnesses to the lineup
definitively identified Vanecko as Koschman’s assailant. (Chron. ¶ 120.) Although Det. Yawger
consulted with Assistant State’s Attorney Darren O’Brien about the case, CPD never formally
presented the case to the State’s Attorney’s Felony Review Unit for a charging decision. (Chron.
¶¶ 127, 142.) Yawger did not submit a concluding Case Supplementary Report (CSR) until
November 10, 2004, nearly six months after he performed his last investigative action in the
case. (Chron. ¶ 157.)
In the final CSR, Det. Yawger concluded that the identity of the offender could not be
determined, notwithstanding all the evidence pointing to Vanecko. (Chron. ¶ 158.) Craig
Denham and the McCarthys stated they were not the ones who hit Koschman, and the Koschman
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friends informed police that the largest male of the group struck Koschman. (Chron. ¶¶ 105,
124.) The largest and tallest person of the group was Vanecko. (Chron. ¶ 261.) In the final report,
Det. Yawger further concluded that Koschman was the aggressor, and the offender acted in self-
defense. (Chron. ¶ 158.) However, Yawger reached this conclusion without attempting to
interview Vanecko or his attorney and despite the fact that members of the Koschman group
flatly denied that Koschman was the aggressor (contrary to Yawger’s interview notes, which
conflicted not merely with the recollections of the members of the Koschman group, but also
with aspects of the recollections of bystander witnesses). (Chron. ¶¶ 89-91, 158.) Det. Yawger’s
decision to forgo identifying Vanecko as the likely offender meant that Vanecko’s name would
not appear in CPD records as a suspect. Additionally, because Area 3 detectives allowed the case
to remain open, CPD’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) unit, as a matter of practice, would
not publicly release the case file in response to FOIA requests filed by the Chicago Sun-Times
and Chicago Tribune over the next seven years. (Chron. ¶ 404.)
The Koschman case remained open, unworked, and untracked by Area 3 from November
2004 until January 2011. (Chron. ¶¶ 160-167.)
On January 6, 2011, the Chicago Sun-Times submitted a FOIA request to CPD seeking
the Koschman homicide file. (Chron. ¶ 163.) In response, Lt. Denis Walsh and other Area 3 staff,
at the direction of Commander Gary Yamashiroya, searched for—but were unable to locate—the
complete original homicide case file. (Chron. ¶¶ 168, 175-76.) Although Area 3 staff did locate a
set of photocopies of certain CSRs and had access to reports maintained in CPD’s electronic case
management system, the detectives’ original General Progress Reports (GPRs), Crime Scene
Processing Reports, and hospital records from 2004 were missing from the photocopied file.
(Chron. ¶¶ 175-81, 203.)
Prompted by the FOIA request, and after a review of the available reports from 2004,
senior CPD command personnel ordered that the Koschman homicide be fully reinvestigated.
(Chron. ¶¶ 182-83, 186.) Deputy Chief of Detectives Dean Andrews personally reviewed the
available case file materials and concluded that the Area 3 detectives had not gathered key
information. (Chron. ¶ 183.) Dep. Chief Andrews reassigned the investigation from Area 3 to
Area 5 to avoid any appearance of impropriety and instructed Area 5 personnel, specifically,
Detectives James Gilger and Nicholas Spanos, Sergeant Sam Cirone, and Commander Joseph
Salemme, to conduct a full reinvestigation of the case. (Chron. ¶¶ 186-87.) However, the Area 5
personnel did not pursue the investigative steps necessary to constitute a full reinvestigation.
(Chron. ¶¶ 206-23.) Among other things, they failed to perform critical investigative tasks, failed
to present the case to the State’s Attorney for a charging decision, and on March 1, 2011,
misclassified the final disposition by closing the case as cleared exceptionally without making an
arrest. (Chron. ¶¶ 280-86.)
Under highly suspicious circumstances, months later, on June 29, 2011, Lt. Walsh
reported having found the missing original Koschman homicide file. (Chron. ¶ 341.) As
purportedly found by Lt. Walsh, the long-missing original case file contained most but not all
original investigative records. (Chron. ¶ 341.) According to Walsh, he found the case file among
the other Area 3 homicide files, a location that had been previously searched. (Chron. ¶ 341.)
When found, the case file material was contained in a blue binder that was visually distinguished
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and distinct from the other homicide case files maintained by Area 3, all of which were kept in
white binders. (Chron. ¶ 341.) Rather than immediately reporting the discovery of the partial
case file to Internal Affairs (IAD), Walsh waited for three weeks to do so, despite the fact that
the file had been the subject of an intensive search and was related to a case receiving intensive
public scrutiny. (Chron. ¶ 361.) Moreover, during these three weeks, without permission or any
legitimate reason to do so, Walsh removed the partial original file from CPD premises and
maintained it at his personal residence. (Chron. ¶ 343.)
After Walsh did report the disappearance and reappearance of the original case file, IAD
initiated an investigation. (Chron. ¶¶ 382-87.) However, the assigned IAD investigator closed the
investigation as not sustained after taking only one investigative step—an interview of Walsh.
(Chron. ¶¶ 386-87.) During this interview, Lt. Walsh failed to disclose significant details related
to the disappearance and reappearance of the case file. (Chron. ¶¶ 384-85.)
In December 2011, approximately ten months after CPD concluded its “reinvestigation”
and closed the case as cleared exceptionally with no arrest or charges, Koschman’s mother filed
a petition with the Circuit Court of Cook County seeking the appointment of a special prosecutor
to investigate her son’s death. (Chron. ¶ 443.) The Court granted Mrs. Koschman’s petition and
appointed Dan K. Webb as the Special Prosecutor. (Chron. ¶ 446.) An investigation led by the
Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), in which OIG participated as the investigative partner,
ensued. (Chron. ¶ 446.)
B. Procedural Background
1. OSP Special Grand Jury Investigation, Indictment, and Conviction
On April 23, 2012, Cook County Circuit Court Judge Michael P. Toomin appointed Dan
K. Webb, former U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois and Chairman of Winston &
Strawn LLP, as special prosecutor to investigate Koschman’s death. (Chron. ¶ 446.) The judge
ordered the special prosecutor to investigate whether criminal charges should be brought against
anyone in connection with the 2004 homicide of Koschman and whether employees of CPD and
the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office (CCSAO) acted intentionally to suppress and conceal
evidence, furnish false evidence, and generally impede the investigation into Koschman’s death.
(Chron. ¶ 446.) Judge Toomin designated OIG as the investigative body to assist the OSP in its
criminal investigation. (Chron. ¶ 446.) The OSP collected evidence under the auspices of a
special grand jury empaneled by the Circuit Court. Based on that investigation, the OSP sought
and obtained the conviction of Richard J. Vanecko for involuntary manslaughter. (Chron. ¶¶
449-50.) Vanecko pleaded guilty on January 31, 2014. (Chron. ¶ 450.) The OSP considered, but
did not seek, criminal charges against several members of CPD. (Chron. ¶ 451.)
On February 4, 2014, the OSP issued a public report summarizing its investigation, its
evidence, and its analysis of, among other things, CPD’s responses to Koschman’s death (the
OSP Report). (Chron. ¶ 451.) The issuance of the OSP Report and the OSP’s declination of
further criminal charges effectively brought its work, which was limited to criminal prosecution,
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to a close. The OSP’s work did not (and could not) consider or foreclose the question of
administrative disciplinary action by the City against any City employees.2
On February 3, 2014, the Circuit Court authorized the OSP to disclose materials obtained
through the Special Grand Jury, including the identities of subpoenaed witnesses, witness
testimony, and the nature and content of documents and physical evidence obtained through the
Special Grand Jury investigation, to OIG to be used in connection with its investigation into
potential violations of City administrative rules and regulations. (Chron. ¶ 451.)
2. OIG’s Administrative Investigation
a) CPD Superintendent’s Authorization of Investigation of

Allegations Older than Five Years and Referral of Investigation to
OIG
By letter dated July 24, 2014, OIG proposed to CPD Superintendent Garry McCarthy that
OIG, and not CPD’s Bureau of Internal Affairs (commonly known as IAD), conduct and
conclude any further disciplinary investigation relating to CPD’s administration of the
Koschman investigation because, among other reasons, IAD had both actual and apparent
conflict-of-interest issues with respect to the disciplinary investigation, including IAD’s prior
investigation into matters investigated by the OSP. (Chron. ¶ 452.)
On August 8, 2014, Superintendent McCarthy responded by authorizing OIG to

investigate “any and all complaints or allegations arising from the above mentioned matter [The
Death of David Koschman (OIG case No. 11-0225)] even if any of the alleged misconduct
concerning the incident or event occurred more than five years prior to the date the complaint or
allegation became known to the Department.”3 (Chron. ¶ 453.)
b) IPRA Affidavit Override
On August 29, 2014, OIG requested an override affidavit from IPRA. In support of its
request for an override affidavit, OIG provided IPRA nearly 2,000 pages of materials, including
the OSP Report, statements made to the OSP and its investigators, and all prior statements of the
subject police officers. (Chron. ¶ 454.)
On September 26, 2014, IPRA Chief Administrator Scott Ando issued an override
affidavit. Chief Ando attested that he had reviewed the documents provided and “determined that
2
OSP also did not address issues of civil liability. On March 24, 2014, Nanci Koschman sued the City of Chicago,
Cook County, and various other named defendants (including as relevant here, Sam Cirone). Koschman v. City of
Chicago et al., Case No. 14-cv-02041 (N.D. Ill.). On March 29, 2015, the City and Koschman settled Koschman’s
claims against the City and the CPD officers who were named defendants. The City agreed to pay Nanci Koschman
$250,000. On September 11, 2015, the Cook County State’s Attorney agreed to a $50,000 settlement with Nanci
Koschman, resolving Koschman’s claims against the remaining defendants: the County, Anita Alvarez, Dan Kirk,
Richard Devine, and Darren O’Brien. See Koschman v. City of Chicago et al., Case No. 14-3090 (7th Cir.).
3
Applicable CBAs require the Superintendent to authorize a disciplinary investigation of conduct occurring more
than five years prior.
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there exists sufficient objective and verifiable evidence such that the continued administrative
investigation of the allegations of misconduct in all matters relating to the death of David
Koschman is necessary and appropriate” for ten CPD members who were then actively
employed by the department. (Chron. ¶ 455.) On the basis of this affidavit, OIG served each of
the subject officers with the requisite notice of allegations and interviewed the officers as
required by applicable CBAs and CPD policies. (Chron. ¶ 455.)
c) OIG Interview of Sgt. Cirone
Pursuant to Section 6.1 of the applicable CBA, on October 15, 2014, OIG provided
Sgt. Cirone with a Notification of Interview, Notification of Allegations, and copies of
documents related to his March 22, 2013 interview with the OSP. (Chron. ¶ 455.)
On December 29, 2014, Sgt. Sgt. Cirone sent a letter objecting that the allegations
outlined in the Notification of Allegations lack specificity. (Chron. ¶ 455.)
On December 30, 2014, OIG investigators interviewed Sgt. Cirone under oath after
informing him of his administrative advisements orally and in writing. He provided oral and
written acknowledgement of his understanding of those advisements. The interview was
recorded by a certified court reporter. Sgt. Cirone was accompanied by his attorney, Daniel
Herbert. (Chron. ¶ 455.)
At his December 30, 2014 OIG interview, Sgt. Cirone renewed his objection to the
specificity of the allegations and, for the first time, objected to OIG’s authority to conduct the
investigation. Without waiving any of his objections, Sgt. Cirone answered all questions posed
by OIG. (Chron. ¶ 455.)
On February 26, 2015, OIG served Sgt. Cirone with a revised, more specific Notification
of Allegations and provided him the opportunity to appear for another interview should he have
any further information to provide. Sgt. Cirone declined the opportunity to appear. (Chron.
¶ 455.)
d) Grievance and Arbitration re: Affidavit Override Procedure
On October 28, 2014, the Policemen’s Benevolent & Protective Association (PB&PA)
Unit 156A filed Grievance Number SGT 14-023, arguing that OIG’s administrative investigation
of Sergeants Mills and Cirone was in violation of the CBA because OIG is ineligible to invoke
the affidavit override procedure having not been explicitly permitted to do so in the CBA. On
October 29, 2014, the PB&PA Unit 156B filed Grievance Number LTS-14-004 on behalf of
Lt. Walsh, with similar complaints. On December 22, 2014, CPD denied both grievances, and
the matters went to arbitration. An arbitration hearing was held on June 1, 2015. The arbitrator
issued the award on August 28, 2015, and a clarifying letter on September 2, 2015, finding the
OIG’s investigation could continue so long as OIG made a good faith effort to obtain an affidavit
from Special Prosecutor Dan Webb. Such affidavit was obtained on September 23, 2015. (Chron.
¶ 455.)
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C. Sam Cirone Employment History
Sgt. Cirone has worked for CPD since June 1992 when he started as a Police Officer. In
February 1995, Cirone was assigned as a Detective, and in November 2004 he was promoted to
Sergeant and assigned to District 11. In January 2005, Sgt. Cirone was assigned to Detective
Division Area 5 (now Detective Area North). Sgt. Cirone is a member of the PB&PA Unit 156,
Sergeants.
III. APPLICABLE RULES, REGULATIONS, AND LAW4
A. CPD Rules & Regulations (effective January 12, 2011)
The CPD Rules and Regulations set out the standards of conduct, departmental goals and
duties of members. Goals of the Department include, among others, the enforcement of all laws
and ordinances, the arrest of law violators, and assembly of competent evidence of the alleged
violation, and promotion of respect and cooperation of all citizens for the law and those sworn to
enforce it. Goals of Department members include maintenance of the highest standards of
integrity and ethics and excellence in the performance of duty.
Article V of the “Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Police Department,” sets forth
specifically prohibited acts as the CPD Rules of Conduct (the CPD Rules). In pertinent part, the
CPD Rules include the following prohibitions:
Rule 2 Any action or conduct which impedes the Department’s efforts to achieve its
policy and goals or brings discredit upon the Department.
Rule 3 Any failure to promote the Department’s efforts to implement its policy or
accomplish its goals.
Rule 6 Disobedience of an order or directive, whether written or oral.
Rule 11 Incompetency or inefficiency in the performance of duty.
Rule 14 Making a false report, written or oral.
Rule 22 Failure to report to the Department any violation of Rules and Regulations or any
other improper conduct which is contrary to the policy, orders or directives of the
Department.
4
Selected CPD Orders (OIG_Add’l_004542-OIG_Add’l_005133); DDSO 07-05 Treatment of Witnesses (eff. April
12, 2007) (CPD003057); DDSO 96-5 Uniform Crime Reporting Related Directives (eff. Nov. 7, 1996)
(CPD002822); DDSO 97-12 Detective Division Commanders and Supervisory Personnel Related Directives (eff.
June 2, 1997) (CPD002951); DDSO 97-7 Procedures Required of Detectives (eff. May 12, 1997) (CPD002909);
CPD Rules and Regulations (eff. Jan. 12, 2011) (OIG_Add’l_005497-OIG_Add’l_005516).
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B. CPD General Orders
Relevant provisions of CPD’s General Orders in effect at the time of the conduct at issue
are set forth below.
1. G08-01-02 Allegations of Misconduct – Specific Responsibilities (eff.

May 24, 2001 to March 17, 2013).
G08-01-02(II)(A)(5): Duty to Report Misconduct - Members who have knowledge of

circumstances relating to a complaint will submit an individual written report to a supervisor
before reporting off duty on the day the member becomes aware of the investigation. The report
will include the CR number and all facts relating to the incident known or reported to the
member. The supervisor will forward one copy of any such report or document, without
unnecessary delay, directly to either the Independent Police Review Authority or the Internal
Affairs Division. A letter of transmittal or cover report is not required when such reports or
documents are forwarded.
G08-01-02(II)(B)(2): Obligation of Supervisors re: Misconduct - When misconduct is

observed or a complaint relative to misconduct is received by supervisory or command
personnel, they will initiate a complete and comprehensive investigation in accordance with this
and other directives without looking to higher authority for such action.
C. CPD Detective Division Special Orders
1. DDSO 97-12 Detective Division Commanders and Supervisory Personnel

Related Directives (eff. June 2, 1997)
DDSO 97-12(V)(A): Area and Section Sergeants, General responsibilities - Sergeants

are responsible to their oversight lieutenant and will exercise their authority in their absence.
Sergeants are the first line of supervision. They will direct investigative and administrative
activity within the oversight unit, and are accountable for the conduct of their subordinates. They
will pay special attention to the training needs of personnel under their supervision. They will
stimulate competent performance by their subordinates and will maintain a high level of
discipline. They will constantly evaluate the effectiveness of their subordinates.
DDSO 97-12(V)(B): General duties of area and section sergeants – This section lists
out the specific duties of sergeants, including the following relevant duties:
 review, evaluate, and assign case reports received for field investigation.
 monitor the progress of cases assigned for investigation and frequently review case status
to keep detective assignments current and to avoid delinquencies in reporting.
 review field investigation Supplementary Reports for completeness and accuracy.
Sergeants will ensure that:
o detectives have made every effort to identify and arrest the offenders in suspended
cases and in cleared/open cases.
o the current crime classification is correct and that a copy of the original case
report is submitted with the Supplementary Report.
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o the current status and disposition are correct.

o the report meets division standards, UCR and IUCR Guidelines.
o after their review, they certify that the reports are complete and accurate by
signing the approval box of Supplementary Reports and the received by box of
General Progress Reports.
o they forward the approved Supplementary Reports to the Command Office for
additional review.
 review other reports and forms submitted by subordinates and approve them only when
they are neat, accurate, and complete.
 review assistant state’s attorneys’ rejections of felony charges to ascertain the reasons for
the rejections and determine if additional investigative effort is warranted to obtain
approval of the charges. If not, they will appraise the area field lieutenant or exempt area
commander of the circumstances of the case and ask for guidance.
2. DDSO 97-7 Procedures Required of Detectives (eff. May 12, 1997)
DDSO 97-7(II): Function of a Detective – This Special Order outlines the objectives of
detectives and requires detectives to be thorough, careful, and objective:
Detectives are a select group of Department members who are given the task of
investigating crimes reported to the Department. The objectives of their
investigative efforts are to determine if a crime actually occurred, gather evidence
of the crime, identify and arrest the person(s) responsible for criminal acts,
recover stolen property, and aid the prosecution of the arrestee.
Detectives will diligently investigate all cases they receive for follow-up. Their
investigation must be thorough, careful and objective. They must keep in mind
that, regardless of their perception of the seriousness of the crime, to the victim
the event was probably a shocking, lingering experience. As in any contact with
the public, detectives will be courteous and considerate in speech and manner
when interviewing victims and witnesses. DDSO 97-7(II).
DDSO 97-7(IV): Conducting a Field Investigation - This Special Order notes that “a
detective functions with considerable autonomy. However, certain investigative procedures must
be accomplished in each follow-up investigation. In every case received for field investigation
the assigned detective will” complete the following steps, as relevant here:
 Interview the complainant without delay;

 Canvass to identify witnesses
 Locate, secure and evaluate any evidence at the crime scene
 Determine whether to request a forensic investigator or evidence technician
 Obtain and review the Crime Scene Processing Report
 Determine where recovered evidence is being processed
 Analyze all information already obtained to determine additional necessary steps to
identify the offender
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 Pursue all investigative leads

 Verify the crime reporting classification is correct
 Prepare a Supplementary Report, recording all substantive information
DDSO 97-7 (VIII): Reporting the Results of an Investigation - This provision sets out
the standards for detectives’ supplementary reports and specifically requires the report to be
accurate, truthful, and include sufficient information to support the outcome:
The Supplementary Report will provide adequate information as required by UCR

and IUCR guidelines to support the outcome (cleared, unfounded, suspended,
closed non-criminal, or reclassified) of the investigation. DDSO 97-7 (VIII)(C).
...
The narrative must include a complete and concise summary of all important
facts. The information provided must be sufficient to explain and support the
classification and any action taken by the detective. DDSO 97-7(VIII)(D)(2)(bb).
...
Reports are a reflection of the entire department, division, unit and author. The
account of the incident will be thorough, accurate and understandable. The
probability of solution and conviction depends greatly upon the truthfulness and
thoroughness of the investigation and reports submitted. The reporting detective
and the approving supervisor will be held accountable. DDSO 97-7(VIII)(D)(4).
3. DDSO 07-05 Treatment of Witnesses (eff. April 12, 2007)
DDSO 07-05(V)(C): Responsibilities of Homicide Detectives – “Detectives

investigating crimes will ensure the integrity of the investigation, including the integrity of the
witness’s accounts and statements, to the extent reasonably possible.”
4. DDSO 96-5 Uniform Crime Reporting Related Directives (eff. Nov. 7,

1996)
DDSO 96-5: Definition of Exceptional Clearances - This Special Order sets out the
definition and requirements for any case closed as cleared exceptionally and provides additional
guidance regarding the requirements:
An exceptional clearance is the solving of a criminal offense when the offender

was not arrested, was not charged, or was not turned over to the court for
prosecution due to unusual circumstances. Detectives must identify the offender,
exhaust all investigative leads, and do everything possible to clear a case by arrest
before exceptionally clearing the case. DDSO 96-5(V)(A).
According to the UCR Handbook, a detective can clear cases exceptionally, if

each of the following questions are answered “yes.”
1. Has the investigation established the identity of the offender?
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2. Is there enough information to support an arrest, charge, and turning over

to the court for prosecution?
3. Is the exact location of the offender known so that he could be taken into
custody now?
4. Is there some reason outside law enforcement control that precludes

arresting, charging, and prosecuting the offender? DDSO 96-5(V)(B)
Detectives must list in their Supplementary Report the facts that support their
decision to exceptionally clear a case. DDSO 96-5(V)(D)
...
Supervisors will not approve an exceptionally cleared case if there is insufficient
information to support an arrest. DDSO 96-5(V)(D)(2)(g).
...
Bar to Prosecution . . . In murder investigations, if the Felony Review Unit has
rejected charges against the offender, the detective will list in the Supplementary
Report the reasons for the rejection and the facts which support the arrest of the
offender. The detective will request an exceptional clearance for the case.
Approval for exceptionally cleared homicide cases is the responsibility of the area
commander and the appropriate field group deputy chief. DDSO 96-
5(V)(D)(4)(a)(2).
5. DDSOP Chapter 18: Investigative Files (eff. 1992 to May 9, 2011)
DDSOP Chapter 18 – This Standard Operating Procedure sets out the Detective
Division policies regarding investigative file maintenance:
Ch. 18.2(F) Investigative File Control Card – “The Investigative File Control
card is a Department form which documents the temporary removal of
investigative files from the file repository.”
Ch. 18.3(A)(1) Responsibilities and Procedures – “The Detective Division unit

commanding officers will ensure that: the unit’s RD numerical sequence file and
investigative file case folders are properly maintained.”
Ch. 18.4(A)(2) File Retention – “Homicide file retention schedule: The Violent
Crimes Units will file homicide cases separate from other cases. During the first
period of each year the homicide files will be reviewed to determine their
retention period.
...
In cleared open homicide cases and in uncleared homicide cases the investigative
file case folder will be maintained in the unit for ten years and then sent to the
Records Division for permanent retention.”
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IV. ANALYSIS
The OIG disciplinary investigation established that Sgt. Cirone violated multiple CPD
Rules and Department orders in the course of his supervision of the 2011 reinvestigation of the
Koschman homicide. The Koschman homicide investigation had sat open and unworked for
seven years, when the media brought the case to CPD’s attention in January 2011. (Chron.
¶¶ 163-67.) A review of available records from the 2004 investigation revealed that the 2004
investigation was not thorough and had failed to identify the offender. (Chron. ¶¶ 183-84.)
Deputy Chief of Detectives Dean Andrews ordered that the case be reassigned away from Area 3
to Area 5 and fully reinvestigated to avoid any appearance of impropriety, particularly in light of
the allegations of improper, preferential treatment for the Mayor’s nephew, the prime suspect in
the case. (Chron. ¶¶ 186, 196.) Commander Salemme assigned Sgt. Cirone to directly supervise
the reinvestigation. (Chron. ¶¶ 206-07.)
Despite departmental concerns about the appearance of impropriety, the increased

scrutiny of the case by senior CPD leadership as well as the public, and the obvious
shortcomings of the 2004 investigation, Sgt. Cirone, as the direct supervisor of the 2011
reinvestigation, (Chron. ¶¶ 206-07), violated DDSO 97-12(V)(B) by failing to ensure that the
detectives he supervised performed a thorough and objective investigation. In addition, as the
supervising sergeant, Sgt. Cirone violated DDSO 97-12(V)(B)(8) by failing to review the
detectives’ supplementary reports for completeness and accuracy. Sgt. Cirone further failed to
ensure the detectives contacted CCSAO for a charging decision. Moreover, Sgt. Cirone
improperly approved the closure of the case as “cleared exceptionally.” As a consequence of
these failures, Sgt. Cirone provided or created the appearance of preferential treatment for
Vanecko. Sgt. Cirone further violated CPD Rules and orders by failing to report that the original
Koschman homicide file was missing and by conducting CPD business on an unsecured,
personal email account. Lastly, as the supervising sergeant, Sgt. Cirone is accountable for the
serious breaches in conduct committed by the detectives he supervised. See DDSO 97-12(V)(A).
All of these violations, detailed below, raise serious questions about Sgt. Cirone’s judgment and
ability to perform his duties as a CPD sergeant.
A. Failure to Ensure Detectives Completed Required Investigative Steps
Sgt. Cirone failed to require that Detectives Gilger and Spanos complete some of the
most basic investigative steps in a homicide investigation, including a canvass. Sgt. Cirone also
failed to ensure that the detectives pursued all relevant, material, and reasonable investigative
leads.
By failing to provide effective oversight of the work of Dets. Gilger and Spanos,
Sgt. Cirone violated:
 Rule 6: disobedience of an order or directive, namely, DDSO 97-12(V)(A-B), which

specifically makes sergeants accountable for the conduct of their subordinates and
requires them to monitor the progress of cases assigned to their reporting detectives;
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 Rule 3: any failure to promote the Department’s efforts to implement its policy or
accomplish its goals, including the goals of arrest of law violators, assembling competent
evidence of the alleged violation, and excellence in the performance of duty; and
 Rule 11: incompetency in the performance of duty.
1. Failure to Require a Canvass of the Scene
Under Sgt. Cirone’s lax supervision, Dets. Gilger and Spanos failed to canvass the scene
for witnesses or additional evidence as required by DDSO 97-7. DDSO 97-7(IV) requires the
assigned detective in every case received for field investigation to conduct a canvass of the area
in an effort to identify witnesses. In their OIG interviews, both detectives asserted that they
conducted a canvass by driving past the scene of the incident and looking for exterior video
cameras. (Chron. ¶¶ 275-76.) However, the detectives admit that they did not attempt to speak to
individuals at the nearby businesses to identify possible witnesses or determine whether any
video evidence still remained. (Chron. ¶¶ 275-76.) Thus, the detectives’ drive through the area,
without any effort to speak to individuals at the nearby businesses, does not constitute a canvass.
Moreover, the detectives did not document this purported canvass in a general progress
report (GPR) or case supplemental report (CSR). (Chron. ¶¶ 275-76.) Commander Salemme
agreed that, had the detectives conducted a canvass, it should have been documented in a GPR
and included in the CSR. (Chron. ¶ 278.) The fact that the detectives did not document the drive
through the area further suggests that they did not consider the activity to be a canvass. (Chron. ¶
274.) The lack of a canvass is additionally troubling because it was clear from the 2004 case
reports that the 2004 detectives also failed to canvass. (Chron. ¶¶ 21, 61.) As a result of
Sgt. Cirone’s insufficient supervision, no canvass was ever conducted by CPD in the Koschman
homicide case.
2. Failure to Require Pursuit of All Reasonable Investigative Leads
As a result of Sgt. Cirone’s lax supervision, detectives also failed to pursue reasonable
investigative leads as required by DDSO 97-7:
Detectives under Sgt. Cirone’s supervision did not seek telephone records of individuals
involved in the incident, including those of RJ Vanecko, Kevin McCarthy, Bridget McCarthy, or
Craig Denham. (Chron. ¶¶ 274-76.) The detectives assumed that no records would be available
in 2011. (Chron. ¶¶ 275-76.) However, the detectives made no attempt to obtain the records or to
confirm their assumption that the records were no longer available. Moreover, their assumption
was wrong. In 2012, OSP sought and successfully obtained relevant telephone records from
2004, including Bridget McCarthy’s cell phone records showing she placed a call to Vanecko
immediately after the incident. (Chron. ¶ 17.) This was direct evidence that Vanecko had phone
contact with the McCarthys after the incident during which he may have made statements about
what had occurred. Had the detectives obtained these records, they would have known to have
asked the McCarthys about this phone conversation. The 2004 detectives failed to obtain these
records, and, under Sgt. Cirone’s supervision, the detectives in 2011 repeated this failure.
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Detectives under Sgt. Cirone’s supervision did not ask Vanecko’s friend, Craig Denham,
obvious and relevant questions about where he and the rest of the Vanecko group went after the
incident and what statements, if any, Vanecko may have made about the incident. (Chron.
¶¶ 275-76.) Unlike the McCarthys, Denham voluntarily spoke to the detectives and would have
been a logical source of information about where they went and what was said. (Chron. ¶ 223.)
The detectives’ limited and incomplete questioning of Denham is clear from the GPRs and the
concluding CSR. (Chron. ¶¶ 223, 236.) The 2004 detectives failed to ask such obvious and
relevant questions, and Dets. Gilger and Spanos simply retraced the prior detectives’ steps. As a
result, it was not until 2012, before the special grand jury, that the McCarthys revealed that
immediately after the incident, the Vanecko group reconvened at the Pepper Canister, but by
then, could not recall what was discussed. (Chron. ¶ 48.) Detectives accordingly failed to seek
key pieces of evidence, namely, possible statements by the subject immediately after and about
the incident, including possible statements against interest.
Detectives under Sgt. Cirone’s supervision did not attempt to identify or interview any
additional individuals who attended the engagement party where Vanecko had been before the
incident in order to obtain possible statements by percipient witnesses or Vanecko. (Chron.
¶¶ 275-76.) The detectives also did not attempt to interview Megan McDonald, who Kevin
McCarthy identified in 2004 as the person he and his wife were on their way to meet at Butch
McGuire’s bar on Division Street at the time of the incident. (Chron. ¶¶ 275-76.) McDonald and
other third parties were possible sources of additional information, including possible statements
by percipient witnesses or Vanecko about the incident in the intervening years. Det. Gilger stated
that he did not consider interviewing McDonald because she was not at the scene. (Chron.
¶ 275.) And according to Det. Spanos, he and Det. Gilger did not attempt to interview those in
attendance at the engagement party simply because they were not direct witnesses. (Chron.
¶ 276.)
Detectives under Sgt. Cirone’s supervision did not speak with or interview Officer Edwin
Tremore or any of the detectives who worked on the 2004 Koschman investigation. (Chron.
¶¶ 30, 198, 275-76.) The responding officer and original detectives were obvious sources of
valuable information regarding the case, including their impressions of witnesses, opinions and
additional steps that may not have been documented in the remaining case files. Their knowledge
was particularly relevant given the fact that the original case file, including detectives’ GPRs,
were missing. With respect to Officer Tremore and Detectives O’Leary and Clemens, all three
were still working in the department at the time of the reinvestigation, yet Dets. Gilger and
Spanos did not contact them. (Chron. ¶¶ 30-31.) With respect to Detective Yawger, the primary
detective in 2004, Det. Gilger explained that he believed he was instructed not to contact him—
and that someone else would contact Yawger instead. (Chron. ¶ 198.) None of the other
reassignment meeting attendants support Det. Gilger’s statement on this point, and Dep. Chief
Andrews expected Det. Gilger to contact Yawger. (Chron. ¶ 199-201.) While others recalled
having discussed that Walsh was going to reach out to Yawger, the detectives never followed up
with Walsh or anyone else to ensure that Yawger had been contacted or to find out what he had
to say. (Chron. ¶¶ 200-01, 231.) Instead, Sgt. Cirone allowed the detectives to close the case
without pursuing any information from anyone involved in the 2004 investigation. (Chron.
¶¶ 275-76.)
Page 14 of 26
In sum, although the Area 5 detectives were assigned to fully reinvestigate the Koschman
homicide, as a result of Sgt. Cirone’s lax supervision, the detectives failed to exhaust many
obvious and relevant investigative leads. Sgt. Cirone’s poor supervision of the Koschman
homicide investigation thus violated his supervisory obligations under CPD Rules and orders and
reflects incompetency in the performance of his duties.
B. Failure to Ensure Detectives Drafted a Truthful, Complete, and Objective

Concluding Case Supplemental Report
Sgt. Cirone violated CPD Rules and orders by failing to ensure the detectives under his
supervision drafted a truthful, complete, and objective concluding CSR. Accordingly,
 Rule 6: disobedience of an order or directive, namely, DDSO 97-12(V)(B), which

explicitly requires that sergeants review field investigation supplementary reports for
completeness and accuracy and to ensure the reports meet division standards, as well as
UCR and IUCR Guidelines; and DDSO 97-7(VIII), which provides that reports “are a
reflection of the entire department, division, unit and author” and must be thorough,
accurate and understandable, and provides that “the reporting detective and approving
supervisor will be held accountable;”
 Rule 14: making a false report, written or oral;
accomplish its goals, including maintenance of the highest standards of integrity; and
Pursuant to DDSO 97-7(VIII), Sgt. Cirone, an approving supervisor, is accountable for

the false statements, inaccuracies, and mischaracterizations included in the concluding report.
Sgt. Cirone further bears direct responsibility for the drafting of an inaccurate and flawed CSR.
Sgt. Cirone took an active involvement in the review and editing of the detectives’ final CSR. As
revealed by email and telephone records, late in the evening the night before the report was
submitted for final approval, Sgt. Cirone used his personal email account to send Deputy Chief
Andrews and Commander Salemme two proposed “Corrections” to the closing CSR. (Chron.
¶ 242.) Det. Gilger was reportedly with Sgt. Cirone when he sent the email. (Chron. ¶ 247.) The
two “Corrections” included: (1) a description of Det. Gilger’s meeting with ASA Darren O’Brien
and O’Brien’s assessment that “charges were not warranted because of self-defense”; and (2) a
concluding paragraph that falsely attributed a quote to Koschman and supported the conclusion
that Vanecko had acted in self-defense. This concluding paragraph also recommended that the
case be closed as “cleared exceptionally.” (Chron. ¶¶ 242, 244.) By actively participating in the
editing of the flawed concluding CSR, Sgt. Cirone placed himself in a position of even greater
responsibility to ensure the concluding CSR met all professional and departmental standards and
was accurate and complete.
Sgt. Cirone was directly involved in the drafting of a closing CSR that is false and
misleading in five respects as described below.
Page 15 of 26
1. Inclusion of a False Quote Attributed to Koschman
First, the concluding CSR includes a purported verbatim statement placed in quotes that
is attributed to Koschman, despite the fact that there is no evidentiary support for this quote—for
neither the wording of the statement nor its attribution to Koschman—in any of the 2004 or 2011
reports. (Chron. ¶¶ 263, 268-69.) The report’s conclusion states:
R/Ds concluded that David KOSCHMAN, having yelled, ‘Fuck you! I’ll kick
your ass!’ by breaking away from his group of friends and aggressively going
after VANECKO was clearly the assailant in this incident. These aggressive
actions caused VANECKO to take action and defend himself.” (Chron. ¶ 263.)
None of the detectives’ GPRs include any quote from any witness with the language,
“Fuck you!” The GPR for Allen’s interview states only that “everyone started arguing and
yelling ‘screw you.’” (Chron. ¶ 215.) According to Dets. Gilger and Spanos, they believe it was
appropriate to attribute the “Fuck you” statement to Koschman because the witnesses reported
that others were also swearing. (Chron. ¶ 269.) However, as described above, Gilger’s GPR from
the Allen interview records only that “everyone started arguing and yelling ‘screw you.’”
(emphasis added) (Chron. ¶ 215.)
The second portion of the quote that the CSR attributes to Koschman, “I’ll kick your
ass!”, was purportedly based on statements made by Kevin McCarthy in 2004 as recorded in
Detective Yawger’s GPR summary of the interview. (Chron. ¶ 111.) However, although
Yawger’s GPR documents that the statement was made, it does not reflect that the statement was
specifically attributed to Koschman. (Chron. ¶ 111.) Rather, Yawger’s GPR reads,
“Mr. McCarthy states that at this time the primary kid (Koschman) and another kid were still
swearing, calling himself, Craig, and Richard names, and saying things like, ‘I’ll kick your ass’,
etc.” (Chron. ¶ 111.) Moreover, Dets. Gilger and Spanos included the statement and attributed
the statement to Koschman in their concluding CSR despite the fact that McCarthy had twice
lied to detectives before giving his statement to Yawger. (Chron. ¶¶ 267, 14, 47.) According to
Sgt. Cirone, it was proper for the detectives to rely on information McCarthy provided to
Yawger, despite the fact that McCarthy had lied twice to detectives. (Chron. ¶ 271.)
The detectives’ mischaracterization of the language and its attribution made Koschman
appear to be the aggressor thereby making the theory of self-defense on the part of Vanecko
more plausible. The false quote, along with the rest of the CSR’s conclusion explaining that
Vanecko acted in self-defense, was the product of a last-minute, late-night editing session
conducted by Det. Gilger and Sgt. Cirone, using Sgt. Cirone’s personal email account to
communicate with Dep. Chief Andrews and Commander Salemme the night before the report
was submitted for final approval. (Chron. ¶¶ 242-47.) The lack of supporting evidence and the
questionable circumstances by which the false quote entered the report suggest a concerted effort
to manufacture support for the finding of self-defense and the closure of the case without
charges.
The inclusion of a false statement in the concluding CSR is a grave violation of the
detectives’ and Sgt. Cirone’s obligations under CPD Rules and Detective Division orders to draft
Page 16 of 26
a truthful, complete, and objective report and constitutes a false written report under Rule 14.
The false statement significantly undermined the credibility and integrity of the closing report
and further undermines Sgt. Cirone’s credibility as a CPD officer and supervisor.
2. Failure to Provide an Objective Account of the Evidence
Second, the detectives failed to ensure the concluding CSR provided an objective account
of the evidence by omitting a witness account of the events that was in direct conflict with the
detective’s view of the case. Specifically, the concluding CSR makes no mention that, witness
Scott Allen, a member of the Koschman group, had stated that people in the Vanecko group were
the aggressors. (Chron. ¶¶ 215, 261, 263, 272.) The concluding CSR states, “R/Ds concluded that
David KOSCHMAN, having yelled, ‘Fuck you! I’ll kick your ass!’ by breaking away from his
group of friends and aggressively going after VANECKO was clearly the assailant in this
incident. These aggressive actions caused VANECKO to take action and defend himself.”
(Chron. ¶ 263.) In contrast however, Det. Gilger’s GPR notes from the Allen interview show that
Allen stated that, after the initial bump, “everyone started arguing and yelling ‘screw you’” and
that the people in the other group were “the aggressors.” (Chron. ¶ 215.) Det. Gilger’s GPR of
the Allen interview also states that Koschman “was in the thick of the argument and was also
yelling.” (Chron. ¶ 215.)
Nowhere in the concluding narrative, however, do the detectives acknowledge that Allen
described the Vanecko group as “the aggressors” or explain why they discounted Allen’s account
of the events. (Chron. ¶¶ 261, 263, 272.) The circumstances surrounding the late-night drafting
of the CSR’s conclusion suggest that the detectives and their supervisors were not focused on
ensuring an accurate and objective report, rather, were intent on justifying their ultimate
conclusion of self-defense. (Chron. ¶¶ 241-52.) Before the special grand jury, Det. Gilger
acknowledged that the failure to account for Allen’s description of the Vanecko group as the
aggressors was an omission of important evidence. (Chron. ¶ 272.) By not addressing the
conflicting account, the detectives mischaracterized the evidence in a way that supported their
ultimate conclusion, provided an incomplete account and analysis, and produced a report that, at
a minimum, does not appear objective.
3. Inclusion of a False Statement Regarding the Initial Delay in the 2004

Investigation
Third, the concluding CSR includes a statement that, before Koschman’s death, “[e]fforts
were being made to interview the additional witnesses that were at the scene of the incident,”
despite the fact that he had no evidentiary basis for this statement. (Chron. ¶ 273.) This statement
is a blatant falsity. There is no evidence of any investigative work performed in the two weeks
between when Dets. O’Leary and Clemens finished their preliminary work and left on furlough
and Koschman’s death. (Chron. ¶¶ 59-70.)
Det. Gilger acknowledged that he was “guessing” that the 2004 detectives were looking
for phone numbers and that he did not know what was done in the 2004 investigation. (Chron.
¶ 273.) Sgt. Cirone also did not know the basis for Gilger’s statement. (Chron. ¶ 273.) The
detectives’ inclusion of this statement was an attempt to explain away the obvious lack of
Page 17 of 26
investigative activity in the days leading up to Koschman’s death, erroneously suggesting that
detectives continued working on the case rather than letting it sit after the initial detectives went
on furlough. (Chron. ¶¶ 59-70.) Accordingly, the detectives included another false statement in
the concluding CSR, further undermining the overall credibility and objectivity of the report.
4. Inclusion of an Informal Conversation with Assistant State’s Attorney

O’Brien
Fourth, the concluding CSR includes a description of Det. Gilger’s conversation with
ASA Darren O’Brien that gives the false impression that the case was formally presented to the
CCSAO Felony Review Unit for a charging decision in 2011. Specifically, the report states that
Det. Gilger “spoke with ASA Darren O’Brien at the Cook County courthouse” and informed
O’Brien of the reinvestigation and the “current progress of the investigation. ASA O’Brien stated
he was consulted by Area 3 Detectives on possible charges, but after the consultation between
his office and the police department, it was agreed that charges were not warranted because the
actions of the offender constituted an act of self-defense.” (Chron. ¶¶ 242, 280.) The description
of the conversation with O’Brien does not specify that O’Brien met with Area 3 detectives in
2004 and not 2011 and does not make clear that Det. Gilger did not present O’Brien with any
reports from the 2011 investigation. As described by Det. Gilger, his 2011 meeting with O’Brien
was, in fact, a brief, chance encounter in the hallway of the CCSAO offices. (Chron. ¶ 209.)
Moreover, at the time of the meeting, O’Brien was no longer in the Felony Review Unit. (Chron.
¶ 209.)
The concluding CSR’s misleading reference to Gilger’s 2011 chance meeting with
O’Brien was also the result of the late-night editing session between Det. Gilger, Sgt. Cirone,
and Andrews. (Chron. ¶ 242.) This content of the CSR was included as “Correction #1” in Sgt.
Cirone’s email to Andrews and Salemme the night before the report was submitted. (Chron.
¶ 242.) According to Sgt. Cirone, he did not know who actually drafted the corrections, but
believed that it would have been him and Gilger. (Chron. ¶ 246.) He stated that he and Gilger
sent the corrections because the report needed to be reviewed by the chain of command before it
could be closed. (Chron. ¶ 246.) These circumstances strongly suggest that the misleading
portrayal of the O’Brien meeting was intended to support the report’s recommendation to close
the case as cleared exceptionally, which would have required the existence of a bar to
prosecution and an explanation of the Felony Review Unit’s reasons (if any) for rejecting
charges.
5. Failure to Document the Missing Homicide File and Missing Felony

Review File
Fifth, the detectives did not memorialize in any GPR or report prepared between January
13, 2011, the date of the reassignment meeting, and March 1, 2011, when the reinvestigation was
closed as cleared exceptionally, that the original 2004 Koschman homicide file was missing or
that the 2004 Cook County State’s Attorney Felony Review Folder was also missing. (Chron.
¶¶ 274-75.) Without the original file, detectives did not have access to several key documents
including original GPRs, Crime Scene Processing Reports, or hospital records. (Chron. ¶ 203.)
The detectives were required to review, at a minimum, the Crime Scene Processing Reports,
Page 18 of 26
under DDSO 97-7(IV). However, Sgt. Cirone permitted the detectives to close the investigation
without reviewing these records or even documenting in the concluding CSR that this important
case documentation was missing. Accordingly, the concluding CSR, which Sgt. Cirone directly
helped draft, was not thorough and complete.
C. Failure to Pursue a Charging Decision from CCSAO
Sgt. Cirone failed to ensure that the detectives under his supervision sought a charging
decision from the CCSAO Felony Review Unit in the Koschman homicide. Sgt. Cirone thereby
violated:
 Rule 6: disobedience of an order or directive, namely, DDSO 97-12(V)(B), which

specifically requires that sergeants “review assistant state’s attorneys’ rejections of felony
charges to ascertain the reasons for the rejections and determine if additional
investigative effort is warranted to obtain approval of the charges”;
accomplish its goals, including the goals of arrest of law violators and excellence in the
performance of duty; and
Under Sgt. Cirone’s supervision, the detectives failed to present the case to the Felony
Review Unit despite having, for the first time, identified Vanecko as the offender and determined
that Koschman had been punched, not merely pushed. (Chron. ¶¶ 264-66.) These new findings
would have been relevant to any charging decision. Moreover, the detectives reached the legal
conclusion that Vanecko acted in self-defense without presenting the case to the CCSAO for a
prosecutor’s legal evaluation of the evidence to determine if the conclusion was appropriate.
(Chron. ¶¶ 267, 280-81.) Having finally identified Vanecko as the offender in 2011, the
detectives’ failure to present the case to the Felony Review Unit further deprived CCSAO of the
opportunity to open discussion with Vanecko, through counsel, to specifically address the
question of self-defense. During the 2004 investigation, CPD did not seek a formal charging
decision from the CCSAO. Rather, detectives consulted with CCSAO Felony Review for “an
advice” only. (Chron. ¶¶ 141-42.) In 2011, Det. Gilger and Spanos failed to contact Felony
Review at all. (Chron. ¶ 280.) Thus, CPD never asked CCSAO for a formal charging decision in
the Koschman case.
According to the detectives, they did not seek charges from CCSAO because they had
“no new information” and believed they lacked probable cause to arrest Vanecko. (Chron.
¶ 281.) According to Sgt. Cirone, there was no obligation to formally request a charging decision
from the CCSAO during the 2011 reinvestigation because CCSAO had monitored the progress
of the investigation and because he believed the CCSAO Felony Review had reviewed the case
and rejected charges in 2004. (Chron. ¶ 282.) However, Sgt. Cirone’s explanations for not
contacting CCSAO are unpersuasive given the new findings of the 2011 reinvestigation. And
while Sgt. Cirone asserted that CCSAO was aware of the developments in the case, he had no
personal knowledge that CPD had provided reports to CCSAO or the Felony Review Unit.
(Chron. ¶ 282.) Moreover, it is clear that Sgt. Cirone’s superiors did not produce reports to the
Felony Review Unit, and reportedly relied on State’s Attorney Anita Alvarez’s statements to the
Page 19 of 26
media as an indication that CCSAO was declining to charge Vanecko. (Chron. ¶ 284.) However,
State’s Attorney Alvarez had not yet commented to the media about the reinvestigation by the
CPD closed the case. (Chron. ¶¶ 306-08, 311.) When she did comment, the State’s Attorney’s
statements were under-informed, given that CPD had failed to inform CCSAO that the original
case file was missing or that the detectives had, in fact, not conducted a full reinvestigation,
completed all investigative steps, or drafted a truthful, complete, and accurate concluding CSR.
(Chron. ¶¶ 310, 417.)
D. Improper Recommendation to Close Case as Closed/Cleared

Exceptionally
Sgt. Cirone violated CPD Rules and orders by failing to ensure the closing CSR reflected
the correct disposition for the case. Accordingly, Sgt. Cirone violated:
 Rule 6: disobedience of an order or directive, namely, DDSO 97-12(V)(B) and 96-

5(V)(D)(2)(g);
 Rule 2: any action or conduct which impedes the Department’s efforts to achieve its
policy and goals or brings discredit upon the Department; and
Sgt. Cirone approved the detectives’ recommendation to close the case as cleared
exceptionally, knowing that such a designation was inappropriate. DDSO 96-5(V)(A) provides
the requirements under the federal Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) handbook for such
clearances and defines an exceptional clearance as “the solving of a criminal offense when the
offender was not arrested, was not charged, or was not turned over to the court for prosecution
due to unusual circumstances.” (Chron. ¶ 288.) The special order requires that in any exceptional
clearance, “[d]etectives must identify the offender, exhaust all investigative leads, and do
everything possible to clear a case by arrest before exceptionally clearing the case.” (Chron.
¶ 287.)
Sgt. Cirone approved the detectives recommendation that the case be closed as “cleared
exceptionally” despite knowing that the detectives did not exhaust all investigative leads, and
there were not reasons outside law enforcement control precluding the arrest, charge, and
prosecution of Vanecko, or alternatively, according to Sgt. Cirone and the detectives, there was
not sufficient information to support Vanecko’s arrest, charge, and turning over to a court for
prosecution. (Chron. ¶¶ 286-295.)
DDSO 96-5(V) clearly sets out the requirements for classifying a the closing of a case as
“cleared exceptionally,” including that detectives exhaust all investigative leads and show that
four requirements (hereinafter referred to as “Requirements 1-4”) are met:
According to the UCR Handbook, a detective can clear cases exceptionally, if

each of the following questions are answered ‘yes.’
1. Has the investigation established the identity of the offender?
Page 20 of 26
2. Is there enough information to support an arrest, charge, and turning over

to the court for prosecution?
3. Is the exact location of the offender known so that he could be taken into
custody now?
4. Is there some reason outside law enforcement control that precludes

arresting, charging, and prosecuting the offender? DDSO 96-5(V)(B).
(Chron. ¶ 288.)
The order further states that if the reason outside law enforcement control is a bar to
prosecution in a murder investigation, and “the Felony Review Unit has rejected charges against
the offender, the detective will list in the Supplementary Report the reasons for the rejection and
the facts which support the arrest of the offender.” DDSO 96-5(V)(D)(4)(a)(2). (Chron. ¶ 296.)
Moreover, DDSO 96-5(V)(D)(2)(g) specifically provides that “[s]upervisors will not approve an
exceptionally cleared case if there is insufficient information to support an arrest.”
Sgt. Cirone was clearly aware that the criteria for closing a case as cleared exceptionally
had not been met. The detectives, who reported to Sgt. Cirone, believed that there was not
probable cause to arrest Vanecko, and there was not enough information to support Vanecko’s
“arrest, charge and turning over to the court for prosecution” as required under Requirement 2.
(Chron. ¶ 291.) Detective Gilger further admitted that there was no bar to prosecution of
Vanecko, and thus no reason outside law enforcement control that precluded arresting, charging,
and prosecuting the offender, as required under Requirement 4. (Chron. ¶ 292.)
Sgt. Cirone agreed that there was not enough information to arrest Vanecko, but opined
that Requirement 2 did not apply. (Chron. ¶ 291.) Sgt. Cirone argued that the four requirements
listed in DDSO 96-5(V) are not mandatory, because, under his interpretation, the word “can” in
the phrase, “a detective can clear cases exceptionally, if each of the following questions are
answered ‘yes,’” suggests that the requirements are merely permissive and not mandatory.
(Chron. ¶ 291.)
Alternatively, Sgt. Cirone asserted that the “true offender in this case is David Koschman
and when you look at him as the offender, as the aggressive one, as the one who made this
incident happen from the beginning, you can answer all these questions [under DDSO 96-5] yes
without hesitation.” (Chron. ¶ 294.) According to Sgt. Cirone, he did not express his opinion that
Koschman was the “true offender” to anyone else because he did not “think it mattered.” (Chron.
¶ 294.)
Sgt. Cirone clearly failed to ensure the detectives recommended the appropriate
disposition for the case as he was required to do under DDSO 97-12(V). Sgt. Cirone’s reading of
the four requirements under DDSO 96-5(V) for exceptional clearances as merely permissive is
self-serving and contrary to the clear and plain language of the order. If each requirement were
merely permissive, any case could be cleared exceptionally, contrary to the earlier language in
the order that the exceptional clearance is for “unusual circumstances.” See DDSO 96-5(V)(A).
His statement that he did not “think it mattered” that he believed detectives had incorrectly
Page 21 of 26
identified the “true offender” reflects poor leadership and supervision of the detectives and the
investigation. And while Sergeant Mills, and not Sgt. Cirone, provided the official supervisory
approval of the closing supplemental report in the CHRIS system, Mills approved the report only
because he was the sergeant working that day; Sgt. Cirone had primary supervisory
responsibility for the investigation. (Chron. ¶¶ 206-07, 260.)
E. Providing or Creating the Appearance of Preferential Treatment
Sgt. Cirone violated CPD Rules and orders by providing or creating the appearance of
preferential treatment for Vanecko. Sgt. Cirone’s failure to supervise Dets. Gilger and Spanos to
ensure they completed all required steps to investigate the Koschman homicide, his failure to
ensure the detectives drafted a truthful and objective CSR and his active involvement in edits to
the CSR that included false statements, his failure to ensure detectives formally contacted the
State’s Attorney’s Office for a charging decision, and his approval of the improper
recommendation to close the case as cleared exceptionally each had the effect of giving
favorable treatment and creating an appearance of preferential treatment for Vanecko, the
Mayor’s nephew. Accordingly, Sgt. Cirone’s violated:
 Rule 6: disobedience of an order or directive, namely, DDSO 97-12(V), holding

sergeants responsible for the conduct of their subordinates, and DDSO 07-05(V)(C),
requiring detectives to ensure the integrity of the investigation;
 Rule 2: any actions that impede the Department’s efforts to implement its policy or
accomplish its goals, including the departmental goals of integrity and promoting respect
for the law and those sworn to enforce it; and
In each instance of misconduct, Sgt. Cirone’s actions served to advance the ultimate
conclusion that Vanecko acted in self-defense and that he would not be arrested or charged. Sgt.
Cirone’s misconduct was particularly egregious in light of an already heightened concern within
CPD—and the general public—about an appearance of impropriety with respect to an open
homicide case involving the Mayor’s nephew. (Chron. ¶¶ 186, 196.) The appearance of
preferential treatment is further amplified by other indicia of favorable treatment for the Vanecko
group by the detectives under Sgt. Cirone’s supervision. First, Dets. Gilger and Spanos did not
ask Craig Denham, Kevin McCarthy, or Bridget McCarthy, all friends of Vanecko, to submit to
polygraphs as they did with the Koschman group. (Chron. ¶¶ 222-23, 275-76.) And second,
Dets. Gilger and Spanos did not take steps to further probe what they regarded to be untruthful
statements given to the investigation by Kevin McCarthy and Bridget McCarthy, (as well as
Craig Denham). (Chron. ¶¶ 274-76.) The detectives denied that they intended to provide any
preferential treatment to the Vanecko group but, nevertheless, the ultimate effect of the
misconduct, both in isolation and taken together, served to create the appearance of preferential
treatment for Vanecko, in order to protect him from arrest or charge for the homicide of David
Koschman.
Page 22 of 26
F. Failure to Report the Missing File to IAD
Sgt. Cirone violated CPD Rules and orders by failing to initiate an IAD investigation,
report, or ensure that anyone else reported, apparent misconduct to a supervisor or IAD, when, in
January 2011, he learned that the original Koschman homicide file was missing. Specifically,
 Rule 22: failure to report to the Department any violation of Rules and Regulations or
any other improper conduct which is contrary to the policy, orders or directives of the
Department;
 Rule 6: disobedience of an order or directive, namely, General Order 08-01-02(II)(A)(5),
which specifically requires members to report circumstances relating to a complaint of
misconduct to a supervisor the same day he learns the information so the information
may be forwarded to IAD or IPRA, as appropriate; and General Order 08-01-02(II)(B),
which further imposes greater responsibility on supervisory personnel, such as
Sgt. Cirone, to initiate an investigation of misconduct, without looking to higher authority
for such action; and
 Rule 3: failure to promote the Department’s goals, including maintenance of the highest
standards of integrity and ethics and excellence in the performance of duty.
On or about January 13, 2011, the date of the reassignment meeting, Sgt. Cirone first
learned that the original Koschman case file was missing: it was not appropriately stored with
other open homicide files and no records indicated who had removed it. (Chron. ¶¶ 202-03.) The
fact that the original homicide file was missing was clear indication of a violation of CPD Rule
41, which prohibits “removing any Department record or information concerning police matters
except at provided by Department orders.” (Chron. ¶¶ 150-54, 169-70, 182-86.) DDSOP Ch. 18,
which required commanding officers to ensure proper maintenance of the files, including the
storage of uncleared homicide files in the unit and the documentation of any file removal with an
Investigative File Control card. (Chron. ¶ 169.) Therefore, the unavailability of the original
homicide case file was an indication that DDSOP Chapter 18 had been violated.
The missing file was not indicative of just a technical rule violation; rather, the case was
the subject of media attention and allegations of preferential treatment for the Mayor’s nephew.
(Chron. ¶¶ 150-54, 163-67.) The fact that the original investigative file was missing was of even
greater significance in light of the surrounding circumstances and should have further triggered a
heightened awareness of possible officer misconduct that warranted reporting to IAD. According
to Sgt. Cirone, he did not report the file as missing because he did not believe CPD policy
required him to report the missing file to IAD. (Chron. ¶ 205.) And while other CPD officers
opined that there needed to be additional evidence of intentional misconduct to trigger the duty
to report, (Chron. ¶ 205), the CPD Rules and General Order do not limit the duty to report to
only intentional misconduct. Sgt. Cirone had a duty to report any misconduct in order to initiate
an investigation, yet he never made any report or initiated an investigation regarding the missing
file and simply allowed his detectives to conduct the reinvestigation without key CPD records
from the initial investigation.
Page 23 of 26
In addition, Sgt. Cirone’s failure to report the missing file to IAD or any other CPD unit
had significant, multiple consequences for CPD, which, as a result, responded to numerous file
requests on the basis of incomplete information and produced, to the State’s Attorney and OIG,
what it erroneously implied to be the complete file. In fact, CPD FOIA officer Rory O’Brien
reported he did not learn that the original file was missing until July 2011, well after CPD had
responded to the various FOIA requests for the Koschman investigative file. (Chron. ¶¶ 359,
422-23, 428, 441.) And, as a consequence, O’Brien and other CPD FOIA officers responded to
the Sun-Times FOIA request on the basis of inaccurate information. Similarly, CPD tendered
what was implied to be the complete original file to the Cook County State’s Attorney, who, in
turn tendered it to the Illinois State Police, incorrectly representing it as the complete file.
(Chron. ¶¶ 310, 316-17.) CPD also responded to OIG’s request for the investigative file by
tendering an incomplete copy without disclosing it was not the original or that the original was
missing. (Chron. ¶¶ 321, 323.) Indeed, CPD again searched for the original file in April and May
2011 in response to OIG’s request for certain original materials that were not present in CPD’s
first tender of photocopied materials related to the Koschman investigation. (Chron. ¶¶ 325-31.)
Had Sgt. Cirone reported the missing file to IAD, CPD likely would have avoided this entire
string of productions made under the implied pretense that CPD possessed the original file and
that its tenders in response to official requests were copies of the original file.
G. Transaction of Official CPD Business Using Personal Email
On three occasions, Sgt. Cirone conducted official CPD business through unofficial,
unsecured channels—his personal email account—regarding the reinvestigation of the
Koschman homicide. The use of personal email accounts undermines the ability of CPD to retain
those emails as public records as required under the Illinois Local Records Act, 50 Ill. Comp.
Stat. 205/1 et seq. In addition, personal email accounts used on personal computers or devices
are not assured to have the same level of security as CPD computers and as would be required
for discussion of an otherwise confidential, ongoing investigation. Accordingly, Sgt. Cirone
violated:
 Rule 2: any action or conduct which impedes the Department’s efforts to achieve its
policy and goals or brings discredit upon the Department; departmental goals include the
enforcement of all laws and ordinances, including the Local Records Act.
Specifically, on February 27, 2011, at 9:54 p.m., Sgt. Cirone sent an email from his
personal email address to Deputy Chief Andrews’s personal email address and to
Cmdr. Salemme’s CPD email address. (Chron. ¶ 242.) In that email, Sgt. Cirone sent two
“corrections” to Gilger and Spanos’s concluding CSR, including the description of Gilger’s
conversation with ASA O’Brien and the concluding paragraph recommending that the case be
closed as “cleared exceptionally.” (Chron. ¶ 242.) That same night, at 10:22 p.m., and again
several hours later, in the early morning of February 28, 2011, Sgt. Cirone sent emails from his
personal email address to Andrews’s personal email address, with just the concluding paragraph
to the report. (Chron. ¶ 244.)
Sgt. Cirone explained that he sent edits to the final CSR to Dep. Chief Andrews because
the exceptional clearance needed to be approved by a commander. (Chron. ¶ 246.) His only
Page 24 of 26
explanation for using his personal email account was that it was probably the account he had
open at the time. (Chron. ¶ 247.) He believed that he sent the emails to Andrews’s personal
account because that was the address he had saved for Andrews in his personal account. (Chron.
¶ 247.) Andrews asserted that there was no policy at the time restricting CPD members from
using personal email. (Chron. ¶ 249.) He noted that CPD did not issue detectives personal
communication devices, so many used their personal phones or communication devices for work
purposes. (Chron. ¶ 249.) Nevertheless, CPD is required to store and retain for specified periods
of time all public records used to conduct public business. These official emails, particularly
emails exchanged exclusively between personal accounts are not captured by CPD’s server, and
make storage and retrieval by CPD all but impossible. Moreover, the use of unofficial channels
to discuss official business creates the appearance of an attempt to conceal the communications
and shield them from any external review or possible FOIA request.
V. CONCLUSION
OIG’s investigation established that Sgt. Cirone violated multiple CPD Rules, General
Orders, and Detective Division Special Orders in the course of his supervision of the Koschman
homicide investigation. These violations raise serious concerns regarding Sgt. Cirone’s
judgment, integrity, objectivity, and competence to perform his role as a sergeant for the Chicago
Police Department.
Sgt. Cirone was assigned by the Deputy Chief to supervise Gilger and Spanos in the
reinvestigation of a homicide involving the Mayor’s nephew as the alleged offender. The case sat
open and unworked for seven years and was the focus of media attention in 2004 and again in
2011. Despite the heightened attention and concern for an appearance of impropriety, Sgt. Cirone
failed to ensure his detectives conducted a thorough, complete, and objective investigation.
Sgt. Cirone and his supervisors all defended the quality of the investigation and minimized or
dismissed the detectives’ violations. In addition to being held accountable for their own personal
lapses, Sgt. Cirone and his supervisors, share responsibility with the detectives for their
misconduct and incompetence.
Sgt. Cirone’s actions throughout the Koschman investigation demonstrated incompetence

in the performance of his duties. Accordingly, OIG recommends that CPD impose discipline up
to and including discharge against Sgt. Cirone, commensurate with the gravity of his violations,
past disciplinary and work history, department standards, and any other relevant considerations.
VI. CPD RULE VIOLATIONS
Rule 2 Any action or conduct which impedes the Department’s efforts to achieve its
policy and goals or brings discredit upon the Department.
Rule 3 Any failure to promote the Department’s efforts to implement its policy or
accomplish its goals.
Rule 6 Disobedience of an order or directive, whether written or oral.
Page 25 of 26
Rule 11 Incompetency or inefficiency in the performance of duty.
Rule 14 Making a false report, written or oral.
Rule 22 Failure to report to the Department any violation of Rules and Regulations
or any other improper conduct which is contrary to the policy, orders or
directives of the Department.
Page 26 of 26

Office of The Inspector General Koschman Report - Sgt. Sam Cirone

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Office of The Inspector General Koschman Report - Sgt. Sam Cirone

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SUMMARY REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

Office of Inspector General Case # 11-0225 (Sgt. Sam Cirone)

I. INTRODUCTION AND REPORT FORMAT

A. Summary of CPD’s Investigation of the Koschman Homicide

1. OSP Special Grand Jury Investigation, Indictment, and Conviction

2. OIG’s Administrative Investigation

a) CPD Superintendent’s Authorization of Investigation of

On August 8, 2014, Superintendent McCarthy responded by authorizing OIG to

b) IPRA Affidavit Override

c) OIG Interview of Sgt. Cirone

d) Grievance and Arbitration re: Affidavit Override Procedure

C. Sam Cirone Employment History

III. APPLICABLE RULES, REGULATIONS, AND LAW4

A. CPD Rules & Regulations (effective January 12, 2011)

Rule 6 Disobedience of an order or directive, whether written or oral.

Rule 11 Incompetency or inefficiency in the performance of duty.

Rule 14 Making a false report, written or oral.

B. CPD General Orders

1. G08-01-02 Allegations of Misconduct – Specific Responsibilities (eff.

G08-01-02(II)(A)(5): Duty to Report Misconduct - Members who have knowledge of

G08-01-02(II)(B)(2): Obligation of Supervisors re: Misconduct - When misconduct is

C. CPD Detective Division Special Orders

1. DDSO 97-12 Detective Division Commanders and Supervisory Personnel

DDSO 97-12(V)(A): Area and Section Sergeants, General responsibilities - Sergeants

o the current status and disposition are correct.

2. DDSO 97-7 Procedures Required of Detectives (eff. May 12, 1997)

 Interview the complainant without delay;

 Pursue all investigative leads

The Supplementary Report will provide adequate information as required by UCR

3. DDSO 07-05 Treatment of Witnesses (eff. April 12, 2007)

DDSO 07-05(V)(C): Responsibilities of Homicide Detectives – “Detectives

4. DDSO 96-5 Uniform Crime Reporting Related Directives (eff. Nov. 7,

An exceptional clearance is the solving of a criminal offense when the offender

According to the UCR Handbook, a detective can clear cases exceptionally, if

1. Has the investigation established the identity of the offender?

2. Is there enough information to support an arrest, charge, and turning over

4. Is there some reason outside law enforcement control that precludes

5. DDSOP Chapter 18: Investigative Files (eff. 1992 to May 9, 2011)

Ch. 18.3(A)(1) Responsibilities and Procedures – “The Detective Division unit

Despite departmental concerns about the appearance of impropriety, the increased

A. Failure to Ensure Detectives Completed Required Investigative Steps

 Rule 6: disobedience of an order or directive, namely, DDSO 97-12(V)(A-B), which

1. Failure to Require a Canvass of the Scene

2. Failure to Require Pursuit of All Reasonable Investigative Leads

B. Failure to Ensure Detectives Drafted a Truthful, Complete, and Objective

 Rule 6: disobedience of an order or directive, namely, DDSO 97-12(V)(B), which

Pursuant to DDSO 97-7(VIII), Sgt. Cirone, an approving supervisor, is accountable for

1. Inclusion of a False Quote Attributed to Koschman

2. Failure to Provide an Objective Account of the Evidence

3. Inclusion of a False Statement Regarding the Initial Delay in the 2004

4. Inclusion of an Informal Conversation with Assistant State’s Attorney

5. Failure to Document the Missing Homicide File and Missing Felony

C. Failure to Pursue a Charging Decision from CCSAO

 Rule 6: disobedience of an order or directive, namely, DDSO 97-12(V)(B), which

D. Improper Recommendation to Close Case as Closed/Cleared

 Rule 6: disobedience of an order or directive, namely, DDSO 97-12(V)(B) and 96-

According to the UCR Handbook, a detective can clear cases exceptionally, if

1. Has the investigation established the identity of the offender?

2. Is there enough information to support an arrest, charge, and turning over

4. Is there some reason outside law enforcement control that precludes

E. Providing or Creating the Appearance of Preferential Treatment

 Rule 6: disobedience of an order or directive, namely, DDSO 97-12(V), holding

F. Failure to Report the Missing File to IAD