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Viewing cable 06BERLIN2546, SPD IN DRIVER'S SEAT FOR BERLIN ELECTION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin

2006-08-30 2010-11-28
06BERLIN2546 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Berlin
15:03 18:06
VZCZCXYZ0005
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRL #2546/01 2421538

ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 301538Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5009
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE
file:///F|/EWACS/wikileaks/Germany/06BERLIN2546.html (2 of 5)12/5/2010 6:58:05 PM

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C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 002546
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2021

TAGS: PGOV GM
SUBJECT: SPD IN DRIVER'S SEAT FOR BERLIN ELECTION
Classified By: PolCouns John Bauman. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d)
¶1. (U) Summary. With three weeks to go, opinion polls and
political commentators and contacts all say Berlin's September 17
election of a new parliament is the SPD's to lose. The Social
Democrats lead the Christian Democrats by over ten percent in all
polls and the ratings gap between the two parties' candidates for
Mayor is even greater. Real interest is already focusing on whom
the SPD will chose as a coalition partner – the Left Party.PDS
with which the SPD now governs the city, or the Green Party. The
election, which is expected, in essence, to confirm Berlin's left
of center majority, will have no immediate national political
implications. However, Mayor Wowereit has signaled his interest
in playing a role in national SPD politics in the future. Because
of the predicted low turnout, concerns have been expressed by
some observers that parties of the far-right will gain seats in
some of Berlin's district assemblies. End Summary.
The Campaign: SPD in Charge; CDU in Tatters

--------------------------------------------
¶2. (C) The state of Berlin leaves much to be desired – the weak
school system has been the subject of a steady drumbeat of
critical headlines for months; the business climate is at best
stagnant and high-profile departures or attempted departures of
big employers are an issue; the city's enormous debt continues to
grow steadily and is now at 60 billion euros. Nonetheless,
support for the SPD remains strong at 30-35 percent (ahead of the
29 percent taken in 2001) and Mayor Wowereit is genuinely
popular. CDU xxxxx admits that the CDU's lead candidate,
Friedbert Pflueger, simply cannot match Wowereit for charisma and
campaign skills. Moreover, the Berlin CDU has been damaged by: 1)
years of infighting and tension between modernizers in the party,
including Pflueger, and old-school conservatives; and 2) the
lingering effects of a banking scandal that drove it from office
in 2001. Pflueger, from Lower Saxony, also suffers from a
carpetbagger image – his last-minute announcement that he would
give up his Bundestag membership and Defense Ministry State
Secretaryship to concentrate on Berlin has not helped. The CDU
has been hovering at around 20 percent in polls since even before

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the campaign began.
¶3. (C) CDU and SPD contacts agree that the turnout for the
election will likely be very low. SPD Berlin Business Manager
Ruediger Scholz fears this could hurt the SPD more than the CDU
and so the party intends to focus on getting its core supporters
to the polls in the final weeks of the campaign. Scholz points
out that a low turnout is likely to benefit smaller parties with
more ideological voters – meaning the far-left WASG and the far-
right NPD and Republicans. He and most other interlocutors seem
to expect that the far-right will win seats in the district
assemblies in at least some of Berlin's eastern districts while
the WASG could win seats in Kreuzberg-Friedrichshain. The
threshold for entry is winning only three percent of district
votes. Neither far-right nor far-left is given any chance of
clearing the five percent threshold for entry into the state
parliament.
Coalition Politics
-----------------
¶4. (C) The Left Party.PDS, according to Berlin leader Klaus

Lederer, cannot expect a repeat of its 23 percent performance in
2001. That showing was the result of the banking scandal, which
briefly tarred the SPD as well as CDU, and the star quality of
then-PDS lead candidate Gregor Gysi, now fully occupied in the
Bundestag. Polls put the LP.PDS at around 15 percent, which is
where the Greens also stand. Thus, either party could be a
plausible partner for the SPD. Mayor Wowereit has stated his
desire to remain in government with the LP.PDS, though the two
parties have not concluded a formal electoral alliance. The SPD's
Scholz, Green Berlin caucus leader Sibyll Klotz, and Berlin FDP
leader Markus Loening all agree that the LP.PDS would make the
more comfortable partner for Wowereit because of the ease of
their cooperation thus far and because keeping the LP.PDS in
government defuses a large bloc of voters who could be mobilized
easily to protest the cuts and privatizations which the
government has used to try and recover control of the budget.
However, Scholz notes that it would probably be better for the
city and for Wowereit given his political ambitions, if he were
to form a coalition with the Greens, who are more centrist
(especially on finance) and, at the federal level, presentable.
Green state parliament member Oezcan Mutlu argued strongly that
Wowereit will opt for the Greens based on these considerations,
though he acknowledged that working with the Greens would be
harder. He even said that, given Green fractiousness, they would
have to bring a 7-8 seat majority into a coalition to make it
stable.
¶5. (C) If the numbers did not work out for a two-party coalition
(and all our contacts reject the idea of a Grand Coalition), then
the most likely option seems to be an SPD-LP.PDS-Green alliance.

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However, some in the FDP (now at 8-9 percent in polls) hope that
in such a situation, they might have a chance of sidling into
power. Berlin FDP lead candidate Martin Lindner and Loening have
told us that they believe the Greens would rather work with them
than the LP.PDS. This seems quite a long shot, though, as Berlin
Greens stand quite far to the left in the Green spectrum.
Comment
-------
¶6. (C) The Berlin election is unlikely to have major national

significance under any circumstances. The Grand Coalition
recognizes this and, unlike in the period before the spring
elections in Baden-Wuerttemberg, Rhineland-Palatinate and Saxony-
Anhalt, is not postponing debate on contentious issues. However,
in two aspects the elections are noteworthy. First, a victory
will boost Klaus Wowereit's chance of playing a greater role in
the SPD nationally, especially as he is seen as a standard-bearer
for the party left. Second, even very localized success by the
far-right will provoke comment and a measure of consternation and
signal that the particular problem posed by far-rightist
ideologues in eastern Germany remains to be resolved. End
Comment.
KOENIG

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Viewing cable 07BERLIN242, AL-MASRI CASE -- CHANCELLERY AWARE OF USG

CONCERNS
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additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary,
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for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash
containing the reference ID e.g. #07BERLIN242.

2007-02-06 2010-11-28
07BERLIN242 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Berlin
17:05 18:06
VZCZCXYZ0015
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRL #0242 0371748

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 061748Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/02/07BERLIN242.html (16 of 18)12/5/2010 6:36:26 PM

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6940
S E C R E T BERLIN 000242
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR S/ES-O, EUR AND L
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017

TAGS: KJUS PTER PREL PGOV GM
SUBJECT: AL-MASRI CASE -- CHANCELLERY AWARE OF USG CONCERNS
REF: A. BERLIN 230
¶B. BERLIN 200
Classified By: DCM John M. Koenig for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S/NF) In a February 6 discussion with German Deputy

National Security Adviser Rolf Nikel, the DCM reiterated our
strong concerns about the possible issuance of international
arrest warrants in the al-Masri case. The DCM noted that the
reports in the German media of the discussion on the issue
between the Secretary and FM Steinmeier in Washington were
not accurate, in that the media reports suggest the USG was
not troubled by developments in the al-Masri case. The DCM
emphasized that this was not the case and that issuance of
international arrest warrants would have a negative impact on
our bilateral relationship. He reminded Nikel of the
repercussions to U.S.-Italian bilateral relations in the wake
of a similar move by Italian authorities last year.
¶2. (S/NF) The DCM pointed out that our intention was not to
threaten Germany, but rather to urge that the German
Government weigh carefully at every step of the way the
implications for relations with the U.S. We of course
recognized the independence of the German judiciary, but
noted that a decision to issue international arrest warrants
or extradition requests would require the concurrence of the
German Federal Government, specifically the MFA and the
Ministry of Justice (MOJ). The DCM said our initial
indications had been that the German federal authorities
would not allow the warrants to be issued, but that
subsequent contacts led us to believe this was not the case.
¶3. (S/NF) Nikel also underscored the independence of the

German judiciary, but confirmed that the MFA and MOJ would
have a procedural role to play. He said the case was subject

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to political, as well as judicial, scrutiny. From a judicial

standpoint, the facts are clear, and the Munich prosecutor
has acted correctly. Politically speaking, said Nikel,
Germany would have to examine the implications for relations
with the U.S. At the same time, he noted our political
differences about how the global war on terrorism should be
waged, for example on the appropriateness of the Guantanamo
facility and the alleged use of renditions.
¶4. (S/NF) Nikel also cited intense pressure from the

Bundestag and the German media. The German federal
Government must consider the "entire political context," said
Nikel. He assured the DCM that the Chancellery is well aware
of the bilateral political implications of the case, but
added that this case "will not be easy." The Chancellery
would nonetheless try to be as constructive as possible.
¶5. (S/NF) The DCM pointed out that the USG would likewise
have a difficult time in managing domestic political
implications if international arrest warrants are issued. He
reiterated our concerns and expressed the hope that the
Chancellery would keep us informed of further developments in
the case, so as to avoid surprises. Nikel undertook to do
so, but reiterated that he could not, at this point "promise
that everything will turn out well."
TIMKEN JR

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Viewing cable 07BERLIN802, SCENESETTER FOR ANGELA MERKEL IN

WASHINGTON: GOALS



Discussing cables

2007-04-20 2010-11-28
07:07 18:06
VZCZCXRO1520
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHRL #0802/01 1100748
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 200748Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN

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RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000802
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2022

TAGS: PREL PGOV ECUN EU GM
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ANGELA MERKEL IN WASHINGTON: GOALS
FOR EUROPE, GOALS AT HOME
REF: BERLIN 747
Classified By: DCM John Koenig. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary. Angela Merkel arrives in Washington in an

enviable position of political strength, both at home and in
the EU. However, she is conscious that her strength derives
largely from the weakness of her counterparts and other
factors beyond her control. Achieving her goals for the EU -
in the trans-Atlantic context these are focused on climate
change and the Transatlantic Economic Initiative - will
reinforce her position at home and in the EU, and serve as a
springboard to success on the larger G-8 stage. A success
for Merkel is also a success for the U.S. Even after the
German EU Presidency, we will want the Atlanticist Merkel to
remain a dominant force within the EU. In Berlin, a
successful summit will strengthen her and other
trans-Atlanticists against those who favor a policy of vocal,
public antagonism. End Summary.
Leading in the EU; Muddling Through at Home

-------------------------------------------
¶2. (C) Angela Merkel's role as Germany's and Europe's leader

is undisputed. No other leader of a large member state is
politically fit enough to offer himself up as a leader. Her
leadership of the G-8 and Germany's intrinsic weight and
economic recovery are further boosts. At home, Merkel is not
only riding high in opinion polls (70 percent popularity
rating) and enjoying the benefits of leadership at a time of
long-sought economic growth, but has also wrong-footed her
coalition partner Social Democrats with reformist domestic
social policies. However, in both cases her apparent
strength is not entirely of her own making, but derives in
large part from her office, the weakness of her counterparts,
or from other factors beyond her control. She took the helm

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of the EU at a time when progress on the European project had

largely come to a halt, when European institutions were
unsure of how or in which direction to move, and (as noted)
no alternative leaders were present. In Berlin, her coalition
partner and rival, the Social Democrats (SPD), are dealing
with weak leadership, a vacuum of ideas, and a challenge from
the left.
¶3. (C) Merkel has responded to these similar circumstances

with quite different tactics. In the EU, she has asserted
German and her personal leadership over the Council
Secretariat, especially with respect to her goal of
SIPDIS
developing a road map for furthering the EU constitution.
She has sidelined Brussels by putting her own representatives
on the road to discuss the constitution in other capitals and
has weighed in personally as needed to find compromises that
keep the constitutional project moving forward. Likewise,
she has vigorously pursued the Transatlantic Economic
Initiative within the EU to remove regulatory barriers, and
has pushed for agreement on the new EU climate change and
energy initiatives. She has not succeeded in all her
undertakings -- prospects for a new EU Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement with Russia remain distant, for
example. Still, the view that we hear from Brussels is of
vigorous and effective leadership. In Berlin, Merkel is
known for her reticence to engage in aggressive politics,
preferring to stay in the background until the "correlation
of forces" is clear and then engaging to nudge the debate in
her preferred direction. Though the SPD is weak, Merkel has
been reluctant to push it hard. Her strategy appears to be
aimed at building and consolidating her own and her party's
dominance with a view toward a clear victory in 2009
elections, rather than attempting to score victories now that
could alienate significant voter groups.
Washington: What's In It for Merkel

-----------------------------------
¶4. (C) We sum up Merkel's goal for the U.S.-EU Summit as

being to achieve substantive progress in the U.S.-EU
relationship for its own sake and to build a lasting
foundation for her leadership in the EU and in Germany. The
substantive agenda is clear and we need not explore it in
detail here. It is focused on our political cooperation in
key areas - climate change and energy security as well as the
Transatlantic Economic Initiative. We recognize that in
these and other areas, European goals are not exactly aligned
with our own. Nonetheless, success in these areas, the
former a key concern of European publics and the latter
important to sustaining European growth, after a long period

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in which trans-Atlantic relations were dominated by negative

headlines and exchanges focused on other regions, would prove
Merkel's particular competence at succeeding in Europe's key
external relationship. After success in Washington, Merkel
BERLIN 00000802 002 OF 002
can count on maintaining her position in Europe against any

incoming French President and UK Prime Minister-in-waiting
Brown. Success in Washington will also strengthen her hand
in the follow-on summits with Russia, Canada, and Japan and
sets the stage for success in G-8 summit deliberations on
climate change.
¶5. (C) At home, a Summit success may enable Merkel to end the
SPD's ability to use loud, public "principled" criticism of
the U.S. as a winning tactic. Gerhard Schroeder won the 2002
election with his public attacks on U.S. Iraq policy, but if
Merkel brings home meaningful agreements -- especially on
issues with domestic resonance such as climate change and
trans-Atlantic economic cooperation -- she will have shown
the German public that her policy of constructive engagement
with the U.S. brings real benefits on issues of concern to
it. Foreign policy, especially trans-Atlantic relations, is
one of the few areas where the SPD still enjoys greater
public support than does the CDU/CSU. Success in Washington
may undercut the SPD on that theme, as the CDU/CSU has
already undercut it on many domestic social themes.
A Note on Style
---------------
¶6. (C) Merkel is pushing for a Summit that is more than a
predictable set-piece, quickly forgotten. She looks for real
decisions to be made during the Summit discussions. This
does more than just ensure that she has something important
to do. It emphasizes her personal commitment to restoring
European-American relations and her belief in face-to-face
engagement. We recognize the difficulty of organizing
discussions in this format, but believe we too stand to gain
by such an approach.
What's In This for Washington

-----------------------------
¶7. (C) Post has previously reported on Merkel's risk-averse

approach to foreign policy. We do not expect her to change
her leadership style because of success in Washington. The
real benefits for the U.S. lie in how success will affect the
public understanding of how Germany can best build a
relationship with Washington and its view of the U.S., the

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changing of which is a frequent theme in conversations with

German leaders and thinkers. A successful Summit will also
reinforce our message that the U.S. and EU are natural
partners, closely bound by common interests. As a cautious
conservative in a difficult coalition, Merkel will not run
great risks for the U.S. But, if she can show the public
that cooperation with the U.S. works, the effect will be to
cut the risk she runs by cooperating with the U.S. It is a
more complex path to a closer and more effective relationship
than we would perhaps like, but our observation of Merkel and
our conversations with her advisors lead us to see it as the
best path available.
TIMKEN JR

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Viewing cable 08BERLIN122, WELCOME TO BERLIN




Discussing cables

2008-01-29 2010-11-28
16:04 18:06
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRL #0122/01 0291625

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 291625Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0334

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INFO RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2018

TAGS: PGOV PREL GM
SUBJECT: WELCOME TO BERLIN
Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION JOHN KOENIG FOR REASONS

1.4 (B)
AND (D)
------------------------------------------
Electoral Fever Puts Pressure on Coalition
------------------------------------------
¶1. (C) NSA Hadley: Mission Germany looks forward to

welcoming you to Berlin January 31 to February 1. Germany is
currently consumed by the aftermath of bitterly fought state
elections that took place on January 27 in Hesse and Lower
Saxony. They are being seen as barometers for next year's
nationwide vote. Although the conservative Christian
Democrats (CDU) won comfortably in Lower Saxony, the CDU
suffered a major setback in Hesse, where CDU
Minister-President Roland Koch ran a divisive election
campaign that took his party from a commanding lead in early
polls to a virtual tie with the Social Democratic party
(SPD). The country is also digesting the significance of the
unexpected political gains by the (neo-Communist) Left Party
and its entry into both Hesse and Lower Saxony parliaments.
Over the next several weeks, state and national politicians
will evaluate coalition options, none of which appear to
please any of the major parties. The CDU's poor showing in
Hesse could energize its competitors and lead to further
domestic partisanship, thereby complicating Chancellor Angela
Merkel's goal of solidifying the political center in advance
of the 2009 national elections. On the other hand, the
success of CDU Minister-President Christian Wulff's
relatively low-key, centrist re-election campaign in Lower
Saxony has been seen as a vindication of Merkel's domestic
political strategy.
¶2. (C) The outcome of these two state elections, and that of

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the February 24 Hamburg elections, will likely reverberate in

the day-to-day functioning of the CDU-SPD coalition.
Already, Merkel's conservatives and Foreign Minister
Frank-Walter Steinmeier's Social Democrats resemble the
proverbial couple that hated each other but stayed together
for the sake of the children: the lack of any other viable
coalition options is what sustains the partnership between
the CDU/CSU and the SPD at this point. On key priorities
like Afghanistan and Kosovo (and on certain aspects of Iran),
the gap between Merkel and Steinmeier is not so wide, and
cooperation with the U.S. has not been harmed by domestic
politics. Differences are becoming more evident on some
foreign policy issues however: Steinmeier's January 17
meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister Muallem, over strong
opposition from the Chancellery, is just the latest example.
Increasingly, Christoph Heusgen and the Chancellery's small
staff are being blindsided by the Foreign Ministry on policy
matters that are significant but outside the spotlight.
Overall, we can expect Merkel's government to be more
hamstrung by partisan and interagency rivalries between now
and the fall of 2009 than was the case in its first two years
in office.
------------------------------------
Steinmeier's Evolving Political Role
------------------------------------
¶3. (C) Steinmeier, who came to office with a reputation as a

technocrat, is increasingly a political rival to the
Chancellor. Like most of his predecessors, he has benefited
from the visibility conferred on the Foreign Minister. He
has become the most popular SPD politician in Germany and the
second most popular overall, trailing only Merkel. He
recently was named Vice Chancellor, was elected as one of
three national deputy chairmen of the SPD, and announced he
will run for a federal parliament seat in 2009. Steinmeier
is regarded, both within the SPD and among the general
public, as an attractive possible chancellor candidate in
2009, should SPD Chairman Kurt Beck stumble.
¶4. (C) With Steinmeier's evolution from technocrat to

political leader, he must cultivate much greater
rank-and-file support within the SPD. This is a particular
challenge for him, because on domestic issues he is seen as
relatively conservative. He was a key architect of Gerhard
Schroeder's economic reforms and stood by with a studied
detachment as Kurt Beck and the SPD's left wing began to roll
them back last fall. This is all the more reason for
Steinmeier to seek out foreign policy issues like arms
control and disarmament on which he can strike chords that
resonate with SPD voters (regardless of the shortcomings we
find in these ideas). Similarly, in policy toward Russia,

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the former Soviet republics, and the Middle East, Steinmeier

misses no opportunity to evoke the legacy of Willy Brandt,
elevating dialog and economic engagement above open
expression of disagreement as tools of diplomacy.
¶5. (C) These internal factors amplify the tendency of

Steinmeier and his Foreign Office to pursue initiatives not
in harmony with the Chancellor's instincts or policy
preferences. Germany has a weak foreign policy coordination
process and the German constitution grants broad autonomy to
ministers. Therefore, the ability of the Chancellor and her
staff to rein in the Foreign Office is limited. A result is
that Germany does not always speak with a single, clear voice.
---------------------------------------------
IRAN: Importance of International Cooperation
---------------------------------------------
¶6. (S) Although Merkel and the Chancellery have more

consistently toed our common firm line on Iran, both the
Chancellery and the Foreign Office are firmly committed to
securing a third UNSCR sanctions resolution as a basis for
more biting EU autonomous measures. MFA officials called the
January 22 P5 1 Ministerial a success in demonstrating unity
among the members, both by producing a new UNSC resolution
text and by showing a unified strategic approach in dealing
with Iran. MFA officials have told us in private that EU
autonomous sanctions would not be discussed at the January
28-29 GAERC. In conversations prior to January 22, German
officials have emphasized the importance of the broadest
possible international coalition, and thus highly value
efforts to keep all members of the P5-plus-1 on board,
deploying this argument when approached about either
unilateral or EU autonomous measures. However, they point to
pressures from their business community (as well as from the
Finance and Economics Ministries) as constraints on adopting
stronger unilateral action against the Iranian regime.
Privately, senior officials in the Chancellery and Foreign
Office have expressed frustration that the NIE has
complicated international diplomatic efforts. On December 4,
FM Steinmeier said the NIE on Iran offered the chance "inject
new momentum" into the nuclear negotiations and called on all
sides not to squander this opportunity. Merkel said publicly
on January 15 that the NIE had slowed the momentum behind
further UN sanctions; she simultaneously underscored the
seriousness of Iran's nuclear activities and the need for
international solidarity.
----------------------------------------
AFGHANISTAN: Need for Broader Deployment
----------------------------------------

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¶7. (C) Encouraging greater German involvement in Afghanistan

is a key priority of Mission Germany; we have made some
progress, but the Germans remain very reluctant about
deploying combat forces outside of the North. In advance of
the April NATO Summit, Germany will increase its involvement
in the training of the Afghan National Army and will probably
agree to take over responsibility for the 150-man quick
reaction force (QRF) in the north. We should welcome the QRF
decision, because it would represent the first German ISAF
contingent deployable on short notice (including possibly in
exceptional and temporary circumstances outside the north),
which would be a qualitatively new and significant step
toward greater involvement in kinetic operations. Secretary
Gates' recent written request to Defense Minister Jung to
deploy German Special Operations Forces (SOF) under ISAF in
the south of Afghanistan is likely to be very controversial
here, but may prove acceptable in the end if, in return, we
were to offer Germany the option of ending its current offer
of SOF for OEF. Moving the German SOF commitment from OEF to
ISAF would also have the benefit of allowing us to shift the
considerable diplomatic resources and attention we devoted
last fall to getting the German OEF mandate renewed to
activities that may yield more practical benefits, such as
pressing Germany to increase its contributions to ISAF.
¶8. (C) We should encourage greater German leadership in the

EUPOL effort to train Afghanistan's civilian police force.
EUPOL is led by German Juergen Scholz, and Germany
contributes more police trainers than any other EU country,
but the program has been slow to start and the planned
ceiling of 195 EU police trainers is inadequate for the job.
Furthermore, activities are not currently planned at the
district level where the need is greatest. Germany should be
urged to accelerate the deployment of EU trainers to
Afghanistan, increase the number of trainers, and broaden the
geographic range of activities.
------------------------
RUSSIA: Split Approaches
------------------------
¶9. (C) There are significant differences between the

Chancellery and the Foreign Office on Russia, which invites
Russian wedge-driving. Merkel has never shied away from
plain talk about disturbing trends inside Russia. Steinmeier
was the first foreign visitor to get a meeting with
presidential candidate Medvedev after his nomination (a
meeting with President Putin was thrown in as well). Lately,
the combination of Russian CFE suspension, backsliding on
democracy, and intransigence on Kosovo has pushed even some
in the SPD to offer criticism. Still, the Foreign Ministry
will likely continue to seek an unhelpful bridging role with

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Russia, in particular on CFE and other matters related to

arms control. The Chancellery can help constrain these
impulses, but we will also need to keep up pressure among the
Quad partners as well as from other key allies (e.g. Turkey
and Norway) to make clear that German unilateral initiatives
put transatlantic solidarity at risk.
-------------------------
KOSOVO: Close Cooperation
-------------------------
¶10. (C) We discern very little daylight between the

Chancellor and Steinmeier on Kosovo, and there is keen
interest in working closely with the U.S. to resolve status
and seal the EU's leadership role. While the Bundestag will
engage in intensive debate following an anticipated
coordinated declaration of independence, we expect the
multiparty consensus in favor of independence and the KFOR
and ESDP missions to hold.
-------------------------------------
COUNTERTERRORISM: Building on Success
-------------------------------------
¶11. (C) Your visit comes at a time when U.S.-German bilateral

cooperation on security issues is as close as it has ever
been. The successful cooperation surrounding the
September 4 arrests of three individuals planning large-scale
attacks and the upcoming conclusion of a new bilateral
agreement on fingerprint, DNA and other data sharing are the
latest evidence of this trend. Furthermore, no German senior
official pushes as hard, or argues so publicly, for closer
bilateral cooperation on security issues as Interior Minister
Wolfgang Schaeuble. Should the opportunity arise, you should
inform German officials that we are eager to build on our
successful record of counterterrorism cooperation and explore
how we might work together to address threats such as
European residents who seek terrorist training at overseas
camps and become jihadists in Iraq or Afghanistan.
----------------------------
ECONOMICS: Commitment to TEC
----------------------------
¶12. (C) Merkel highly values the U.S.-EU Transatlantic

Economic Council (TEC) -- a centerpiece of her 2007 EU
presidency -- aimed at reducing regulatory barriers to
transatlantic trade and investment. She is concerned,
however, about maintaining the momentum in the TEC and fears
that the European Commission and future EU presidencies
(including France) may lose enthusiasm for the project.
German officials also worry that a changing U.S.

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Administration could derail what they regard as a highly

successful new transatlantic economic instrument; we should
emphasize our continued commitment to the TEC, and encourage
the Germans to maintain a leading role in it. The German
economy is expected to grow at only 1.7 percent this year.
Previous higher estimates were lowered due to rising oil
prices, the strength of the Euro, slower U.S. growth, and
continuing turmoil in financial markets. German economists
and business leaders are also worried about the possibility
of a national minimum wage as well as increased labor union
demands for wage increases, both of which could affect the
economy adversely. Merkel plans to highlight employment
gains -- as opposed to minimum wages -- as the focus of her
economic plan looking ahead to the 2009 national elections.
-----------------------------------
CLIMATE CHANGE: Aggressive Measures
-----------------------------------
¶13. (C) Chancellor Merkel and the rest of Germany's political

leadership remain serious about pursuing aggressive
international measures to meet the challenges of global
warming. Merkel has made climate change a priority of her
Chancellorship and enjoys the overwhelming domestic support
on this. Merkel's support for mandatory, targeted global
limits on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and an international
cap-and-trade regime reflects a deep-seated belief that only
drastic, concerted efforts on the part of the international
community can slow -- and ultimately reverse -- the human
contribution to global warming. If anything, Steinmeier
supports tougher standards. While the Germans have been
willing to consider alternative solutions, such as new
technologies for clean coal and renewables, fundamental
differences in our approaches to the issue of climate change
remain, and could lead to more public disagreement in the
future. For example, while Germany will send a delegation to
the January 30 Major Economies Meeting (MEM), the German
Government remains skeptical about the value that the Major
Economies Process (MEP) adds to the UNFCCC track. The Germans
are particularly concerned about the need to avoid
duplication of effort in the various other climate
change-related forums, including the UNFCCC and the G-8.
TIMKEN JR

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Viewing cable 08BERLIN531, GERMAN GRAND COALITION FACES STRAIN OF

UPCOMING



Discussing cables

2008-04-25 2010-11-28
09:09 18:06
VZCZCXRO7856
OO RUEHBW RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHRL #0531/01 1160925
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 250925Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1036

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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2018

TAGS: PGOV PREL GM
SUBJECT: GERMAN GRAND COALITION FACES STRAIN OF UPCOMING
2009 ELECTIONS
REF: A. BERLIN 313

¶B. 07 BERLIN 0674
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission John Koenig for Reasons

1.4 (b)
and (d)
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) The German Grand Coalition will increasingly face

tensions created by the need for the lead candidates to
position themselves for the 2009 national electoral campaign.
Chancellor Angela Merkel and Foreign Minister Frank-Walter
Steinmeier both remain highly popular. Merkel, however,
faces political risks if the economy turns for the worse. In
the second half of this year, as the Social Democratic Party
(SPD) moves closer to a decision about its chancellor
candidate, potential candidate Steinmeier will likely face
scrutiny and criticism from his own party's left-wing. It is
too early to predict the likely coalition outcome in 2009 --
although Merkel's Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Christian
Social Union (CSU) are likely to come out ahead, they may not
have a better coalition option than continuing the current
Grand Coalition with the SPD. U.S. foreign policy is not
likely to play a central role in the campaign leading up to
Germany's national elections in fall 2009. Improved
U.S.-German relations under Merkel and German fascination
with the vibrant democratic process in the U.S. primary
elections have played significant roles in improving German
attitudes towards the U.S., thereby dampening the likelihood
that the SPD will use anti-American rhetoric to rally voters
as former chancellor Gerhard Schroeder did in 2002. End
summary.
---------------------------------------------

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Merkel's Possible Archilles Heel: The Economy

---------------------------------------------
¶2. (U) Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) remains highly popular

among Germans, who view her as an effective leader with a
strong international stature. Her approval rating is 71
percent. In large part due to Merkel's popularity, the CDU
has held a commanding 8- to 14-point lead over the SPD in
polls over the last year.
¶3. (C) Although Merkel's high popularity is expected to

continue, she faces diffuse risks on economic issues. CDU
parliamentarians suggest that an economic downturn would be
the principal threat to Merkel's high popularity Economic
forecasts currently favor Merkel, with projections of 1.6 to
1.8 percent growth for this year (though slightly lower for
2009), but with no real evidence of recession despite the
global slowdown.
¶4. (C) Among CDU leaders there is a sense that the CDU may
have peaked (perhaps too early) and that caution is the
watchword. Merkel, who campaigned in 2005 on a program of
economic liberalization and watched a commanding lead in the
polls nearly vanish during the campaign, appears to be moving
toward the political center in an attempt to expand her base
and consolidate centrist support that the SPD is losing
because of its leftward shift. She is demonstrating
ever-greater focus on domestic policy and espousing popular
middle class enticements such as pension increases, a longer
duration of unemployment benefits for older workers, and
enhancement of nursing care insurance. While many consider
this move to be politically smart, some on the CDU's
right-wing have criticized the Chancellor for abandoning core
CDU values.
--------------------------------------------- -----
Steinmeier Could Get Roughed Up by SPD's Left Wing
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶5. (C) Social Democrats have speculated in recent months that

SPD Chairman Kurt Beck will eventually defer to the much more
popular Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier as the
party's eventual chancellor candidate (ref A). SPD insiders
consider this a 50-50 proposition. Kurt Beck's recent
victory in guiding competing factions of the SPD to agreement
on privatization of the railway monopoly Deutsche Bahn may
help shore up his position (septel). It is uncertain whether
Steinmeier would choose to accept the SPD nomination at a
time when the SPD is hovering in the mid 20's in the polls
and its electoral prospects seem poor. Note: In any case,
Steinmeier will run for political office, a federal
parliament seat from Brandenburg City, for the first time in

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¶2009. End note.
¶6. (C) Steinmeier would face some detractors in his own
BERLIN 00000531 002 OF 002
party. Deputy SPD Chair Andrea Nahles, the leading left-wing

critic of Steinmeier's centrist approach, told Political M/C
that she was unhappy that "the U.S. knows more about
Steinmeier than I do," referring to Steinmeier's role as
Chancellery Chief of Staff and Intelligence Coordinator under
Gerhard Schroeder. Nahles suggested strongly that the left
wing of the SPD could portray Steinmeier as too close to the
U.S. on intelligence-related issues, especially his role in
the Murat Kurnaz affair (ref B), thereby damaging his
candidacy.
¶7. (C) Nahles admitted, however, that the SPD likely would do
better at the polls with Steinmeier as chancellor candidate
(between 30 and 35 percent of the vote). This would mean
more SPD parliamentarians holding onto their seats -- a
consideration that could have an effect on the SPD's choice.
Nahles added that Steinmeier "has little experience in
managing the party, but he's a fast learner."
----------------------------------
Grand Coalition Fated to Continue?
----------------------------------
¶8. (C) Deputy CDU national chairman and Lower Saxony

Minister-President Christian Wulff (CDU) told the DCM that
another grand coalition is the most likely outcome in 2009 if
the political landscape does not change significantly in the
coming months. The SPD's Nahles agrees. While Merkel and
the CDU still prefer to govern with the Free Democrats (FDP),
the numbers may not suffice for a majority. Although
experiments such as the CDU-Greens coalition in Hamburg are
enticing, replicating them at the national level remains
difficult.
¶9. (C) Comment: The CDU's fear of opening up its flanks to

SPD attacks -- and the SPD's self-obsession during a period
of turmoil in the party -- reveal a degree of caution on
policy issues that is remarkable even by German standards.
This is reflected in German caution on foreign policy issues
of interest to us such as Afghanistan and Iran. A particular
USG concern is whether the SPD or others will try to employ
anti-American rhetoric to curry voter support, much as former
chancellor Gerhard Schroeder did in 2002. Even SPD
left-wingers like Nahles tell us, however, that foreign
policy is not as great a consideration for German voters as

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it was around the time of the Iraq war, and therefore will
not likely be a decisive factor in next year's national
elections. It is also important to note that German
attitudes towards the U.S. have improved over the past year
due to our improved bilateral relations and German
fascination with democracy on display in the U.S. primary
elections. The current improvement is evidenced by a recent
Harris poll which showed a dramatic 21 percentage-point
increase in the number of Germans who regard the U.S. as a
trustworthy partner. Also, the German federal election
campaign will occur during what is expected here to be an
extended popular "honeymoon" for the new U.S. administration.
Consequently, German politicians might perceive less
political advantage in a critical stance toward the U.S. End
comment.
TIMKEN JR

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Viewing cable 08BERLIN643, s) germany requests information concerning




Discussing cables

2008-05-16 2010-12-05
08BERLIN643 SECRET Embassy Berlin
10:10 12:12
Appears in these articles:
http://www.spiegel.de
VZCZCXRO6021
PP RUEHDE
DE RUEHRL #0643 1371014
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 161014Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1230

INFO RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0151
RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 0195
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 0154
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0105
S e c r e t berlin 000643
Sipdis, isn/mtr, eur/ags and eur/pra
E.o. 12958: decl: 05/16/2033

Tags: parm, prel, ettc, mtcre, ksca, ir, gm
Subject: (s) germany requests information concerning
iranian procurement of xxxxxxxxxxxx test chamber
Ref: a. 07 state 75839

b. State 15220
c. Berlin 195
d. State 40087
e. Berlin 511
Classified By: Glbal Affairs Unit Chief Don L. Brown for

reasons 14 (b) and (d).
¶1. (u) this is an action request. Please see para 5.
¶2. (S) On May 13, MFA Export Control Division Desk Officer
Wiebke Wacker provided Global Affairs Oficer with a
German-language nonpaper requesting nformation from U.S.
concerning an Iranian natioal, xxxxxxxxxxxx, in connection with
the Iranian
procurement of a German origin environmental test chamber
from the firm xxxxxxxxxxxx. In support of a
current investigation, the Germans are specifically
interested in knowing whether the USG has any information
indicating that xxxxxxxxxxxx was aware that the Iranian
firm Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (SBIG) would be the
actual end-user of the environmental test chamber.
¶3. (S) In a May 5 meeting, Wacker provided Global Affairs

Officer with further background information concerning this
information request. According to the German Customs Office
of Criminal Investigation (Zollkriminalamt, or ZKA), Wacker
said, xxxxxxxxxxxx was confronted (and possibly detained)
by U.S. authorities in February 2008 while applying for a
visa at AmConGen Dubai. Wacker said the ZKA has assessed
that information concerning xxxxxxxxxxxx business contacts with
xxxxxxxxxxxx is a critical piece of evidence needed to
support the ZKA's ongoing investigation into xxxxxxxxxxxx
and Iranian efforts to procure an environmental

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chamber from xxxxxxxxxxxx.
¶4. (S) Begin informal Embassy translation of German-language

nonpaper:
With reference to the Non-Papers from June 1, 2007, August 3,

2007, December 18, 2007, February 15, 2008, and April 21,
2008 regarding the procurement of an environmental test
chamber by the Iranian xxxxxxxxxxxx from the German xxxxxxxxxxxx
via Romania and Croatia, we take this opportunity
to ask the U.S. authorities about the following points:
The German export control authorities have learned that

xxxxxxxxxxxx was approached by U.S. authorities about
these matters. Because the German authorities have also
undertaken investigative measures, we are interested in
information concerning the results of these conversations.
The U.S. authorities reported in their Non Paper from April

21, 2008, that the Iranian firm SBIG is the actual intended
recipient of the test chamber. The German export control
authorities are accordingly interested in knowing whether the
German citizen xxxxxxxxxxxx had knowledge of this
end-user.
We thank you for the information in connection with the

SBIG's procurement attempts and we look forward to continuing
our excellent cooperation in the area of export controls.
End text of informal Embassy translation.
¶5. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Post requests Department guidance

in responding to the questions posed in the German nonpaper.
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Viewing cable 08BERLIN1068, s) germany requests release of xxxxxxxxxxxx




Discussing cables

2008-08-06 2010-12-05
07:07 12:12
VZCZCXRO4409
PP RUEHDE
DE RUEHRL #1068 2190727
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 060727Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN

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RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0107
S e c r e t berlin 001068
Sipdis
state for isn/mtr (herrmann), eur/ce, and eur/pra (hardiman)
E.o. 12958: decl: 08/06/2033

Tags: parm, prel, ettc, mtcre, ksca, ir, aec, gm
Subject: (s) germany requests release of xxxxxxxxxxxx
nonpaper to the german criminal customs office (zka)
Ref: a. State 77660

b. Berlin 1000
Classified By: Global Affairs Unit Chief Don L. Brown for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (u) this is an action request. Please see para 4.
¶2. (S) The German MFA requested USG permission to release

the REF A nonpaper to the German Customs Office of Criminal
Investigation (ZKA) (not/not for further dissemination) in
support of a continued investigation. It appears as though
the ZKA investigation into xxxxxxxxxxxx is still active,
contrary to a previous MFA statement, but this case has not
progressed to the German court system.
¶3. (S) On August 4, German MFA Export Control Division Desk
Officer, Wiebke Wacker, told Global Affairs Officer that the
ZKA had asked her office for additional information regarding
the business dealings between xxxxxxxxxxxx
business and Iran's primary solid fuel missile developer, the
Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (SBIG). (Comment: Wacker had
previously indicated (REF B) that the ZKA halted their
investigation into xxxxxxxxxxxx due to a lack of
evidence linking xxxxxxxxxxxx with SBIG. End Comment). In
response to the ZKA request, Wacker informed the ZKA of the
REF A nonpaper passed to her on July 21 but told them that
she could release the information due to a restriction on
third party dissemination stated in the nonpaper's caveat.
She informed the ZKA that she would make the appropriate
request through U.S. Embassy Berlin. (Comment: It should be
noted that the REF A nonpaper was classified as SECRET//REL
GERMANY, so there might not be any issue releasing this
nonpaper to the ZKA. End Comment).
¶4. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Post requests Department guidance

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in responding to the dissemination request posed in paragraph
¶3. Koenig

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Viewing cable 08BERLIN1387, GERMANY: BUNDESTAG SET TO RENEW A BEEFED-

UP ISAF



Discussing cables

2008-10-10 2010-12-02 CONFIDENTIAL// Embassy
08BERLIN1387
17:05 21:09 NOFORN Berlin
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRL #1387/01 2841731

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ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O 101731Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0564
RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2018

TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV AF GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY: BUNDESTAG SET TO RENEW A BEEFED-UP ISAF
MANDATE AND A SCALED-DOWN OEF COUNTERPART
REF: A. BERLIN 1045

¶B. SECDEF MSG DTG 301601z SEP 08
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JOHN KOENIG. REASONS: 1.4 (B)

AND (D).
¶1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: The Bundestag is expected to approve on
October 16 a 14-month extension of the parliamentary mandate
that authorizes Bundeswehr participation in the NATO ISAF
mission in Afghanistan. The renewed ISAF mandate will
continue to limit German forces essentially to the north of
Afghanistan, although provisions for deploying some
non-combat support in the rest of the country will be spelled
out for the first time. The renewed mandate will have a
significantly higher troop ceiling (an increase from 3,500 to
4,500), allowing Germany to fulfill its commitments on ANA
training and offering additional flexibility in responding to
crisis situations and in surging forces in support of the
Afghan presidential election. The renewed ISAF mandate will
not include authorization to participate in the planned NATO
AWACS mission, thereby requiring the government to seek a
separate stand-alone mandate once there is a NATO decision.
The new mandate will also not include expanded authority to
conduct counternarcotics interdiction, as has been requested
by SACEUR. Meanwhile, Chancellor Merkel, FM Steinmeier and
DefMin Jung have agreed to eliminate the German Special

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Forces (KSK) element from the separate OEF parliamentary

mandate when it comes up for renewal in November. Steinmeier
and the SPD have been spinning this in the media as an SPD
success, much to the annoyance of the Chancellery.
Eliminating the controversial KSK element -- which has gone
unused for the past four years -- was seen as a price to pay
to ensure strong parliamentary support (especially in the
SPD) for renewal of the ISAF mandate. The elimination of the
KSK element from the OEF mandate may open opportunities for
the USG to press Germany to increase its Special Forces
capability within ISAF. END SUMMARY.
Large majority expected for mandate renewal
¶2. (SBU) The German cabinet agreed October 7 to seek a

14-month extension of the parliamentary mandate that
authorizes Bundeswehr participation in the NATO ISAF mission
in Afghanistan. This longer mandate (the normal mandate
period is one year) is intended to ensure that the
mandate will not come up for renewal until after the seating
of the new Bundestag following the September 2009
parliamentary election, diminishing Afghanistan as a campaign
issue next year. The Bundestag held the first reading of the
draft mandate right after cabinet approval
and is scheduled to vote on it October 16. All indications
are that the mandate extension will be approved by a wide
margin, with all the Bundestag parties supporting it, except
for the small Left Party, which opposes all overseas
deployments and which has consistently voted as a solid block
against the mandate. Most Green Party parliamentarians
either abstained or voted against the mandate last year, but
are expected to support it this time around, given that their
concerns about the possible combat role of the German Tornado
reconnaissance aircraft under the mandate have not
materialized.
Rolling-over the previous mandate
¶3. (C) The proposed mandate is similar to the existing one,

which essentially limits German forces to the north of
Afghanistan. The mandate technically allows deployments,
limited in time and scope, outside the north on an
exceptional basis, if deemed by the German defense
minister to be absolutely essential to the ISAF mission. But
up to now, the German government has been very reluctant to
exercise this authority in regard to combat forces. For
example, the government still does not allow German
Operational and Mentoring Liaison Teams (OMLTs) to
accompany their assigned Afghan National Army (ANA) units on
deployments outside the north. With less than a year to go
before Bundestag elections, we anticipate the government will
remain exceedingly cautious and conservative in making use of

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the exception in the mandate.
New features in renewed mandate
¶4. (SBU) While the renewed mandate will be mostly unchanged,

there are a few notable improvements:
-- Increase in the troop ceiling from the 3,500 to 4,500:

Germany is currently right up against the 3,500 troop ceiling
because of the need over the past several months to
deploy additional troops to respond to the deteriorating
security situation in the north, to fill in for departing
Allied troops (primarily Czech and Danish soldiers who
re-deployed to the south and east), and to take on new tasks
(like the 200-man RC-North Quick Reaction Force). Defense
Minister Jung has emphasized that the increase in the troop
ceiling does not mean Germany will be sending an additional
1,000 soldiers to Afghanistan immediately. While there may
be a small increase in troops right away (up to 3,800 or
3,900) so that Germany can fulfill its previous ANA training
commitments, the rest of the additional troop authorization
will be held in reserve. It will be used to give military
leaders additional flexibility in responding to crisis
situations and in surging forces in support of the 2009
Afghan presidential elections.
-- Blanket authorization to exceed the troop ceiling during

rotations: This will give the Bundeswehr more flexibility in
moving units in and out of Afghanistan without having to
worry about temporarily exceeding the troop ceiling.
-- Explicit permission for certain units and assets to

operate throughout Afghanistan: Some 30 radio operators have
been based in Kandahar for more than a year under the
exception in the mandate that allows time-limited deployments
outside the north. Under the new mandate, they
will be covered as a permanent deployment. Other assets and
personnel that will be included in this category:
Psychological operations personnel, Tornado reconnaissance
aircraft, C-160 aircraft providing intra-theater airlift, and
MEDEVAC helicopters.
No authorization for awacs
¶5. (C) After much hand-wringing over the summer about the
potential impact on maintaining a strict divide between
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and ISAF (ref A), the
government was prepared to include an authorization in the
renewed ISAF mandate for German air crews to
participate in the proposed NATO AWACS mission in
Afghanistan. But those plans were dashed in late September
when France blocked a NATO decision giving the green light

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for planning the mission. MFA officials have rejected

including language in the renewed ISAF mandate that would
anticipate a future NATO decision on AWACS, claiming that the
Bundestag would oppose this as a "blank check." As a result,
the renewed ISAF mandate will be completely silent
on the issue, requiring, therefore, the government to seek a
separate stand-alone mandate on AWACS later once there is a
NATO decision authorizing the mission. We have been assured
by senior sources in the Chancellery (protect) that Germany
will approve the required mandate for the deployment of
German AWACS crews, once NATO approves the AWACS mission.
¶6. (C) Current thinking in the MFA is that the government

will not seek a AWACS mandate until the end of the NATO
decision-making process, when all the details over financing
and stationing of the NATO AWACS have been worked out. This
ensures that there will be a decent interval between approval
of the ISAF mandate and the need for the government to go
back to the Bundestag for the stand-alone AWACS mandate. MFA
officials acknowledge that waiting until the end of the
process to seek Bundestag authorization also ensures that
they do not waste political capital on obtaining a mandate
that may never be used because of possible problems or delays
in NATO decision-making.
No additional authority on counternarcotics
¶7. (C) The renewed ISAF mandate will also contain no expanded
authorization for the Bundeswehr soldiers to engage in
counternarcotics (CN) interdiction in Afghanistan. According
to xxxxxxxxxxxx, the Chancellery supported
including language to expand ISAF CN tasks in the Bundestag
mandate, but was pushed back by DefMin Jung. At this stage,
German officials remain opposed to a Bundeswehr lead role in

CN interdiction operations. xxxxxxxxxxxx
told the DCM that Germany would try to support the temporary
"opt in" arrangement endorsed by NATO Defense Ministers at
their October 9-10 meeting in Budapest. He saw potential
problems, including with the Bundestag, if Allies that "opt
in" need to draw on common ISAF capabilities. He said
assurances on this score would be helpful. The MFA has also
stressed its reservations about other Allies or ISAF
contributors taking a lead role in CN operations, for fear of
the knock-on effects for German forces. As a result, under
the renewed ISAF mandate, the Bundeswehr will be limited to
the CN support activities already outlined in the current
ISAF Operations Plan (OPLAN).
No deadline for withdrawal
¶8. (U) Peter Ramsauer, the Bundestag leader of the Christian

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Social Union (CSU), the Bavarian sister party of Chancellor

Merkel's CDU, had publicly advocated adopting an "exit
strategy" and setting a timeline for the eventual withdrawal
of the Bundeswehr from Afghanistan, but this was rejected by
both Merkel and Steinmeier. A government spokesman said the
Chancellor and Foreign Minister "were agreed that it would be
irresponsible to discuss a withdrawal deadline or an end of
the mandate now."
Oef mandate
¶9. (C) There is a separate parliamentary mandate that covers

the Bundeswehr's participation in OEF, the renewal of which
will be debated and voted on in November. The current
mandate authorizes the deployment of up to 100 German Special
Forces (KSK) in Afghanistan as well as the deployment of
naval personnel and ships around the Horn of Africa. The
current OEF troop ceiling is 1,400, but only about 250
Bundeswehr military personnel are now deployed under the
mandate, all of whom participate in the maritime mission; the
KSK reportedly has not been deployed to Afghanistan under OEF
in the last four years. Jung announced months ago that he
planned to seek a reduction in the OEF ceiling to 800 during
the next mandate renewal.
¶10. (S/NF) One of the most dramatic developments in recent

weeks has been the decision of the government to eliminate
the German Special Forces (KSK) element from the separate OEF
parliamentary mandate when it comes up for renewal in
November. Steinmeier and his Social Democratic Party (SPD)
have spun this to the public as their achievement.
Eliminating the controversial KSK element -- which has gone
unused for the past four years -- was seen by the governing
coalition as a price to pay to ensure strong parliamentary
support, especially in the SPD, for renewal of the ISAF
mandate. xxxxxxxxxxxx While deleting the
KSK from the OEF mandate will have no practical effect on the
ground in Afghanistan, it will formally end Germany's
participation in OEF in Afghanistan, which could be
misconstrued by some as a symbolic step back from supporting
the war on terror.
Total cost of mission: over 1 billion euros per year
¶11. (SBU) Germany's military deployment is expected to cost

almost 700 million Euros over the next year. Combined with
the 140 million Euros that it has budgeted for
reconstruction, development and humanitarian assistance, plus
what it spends on the police training mission, Germany's
total outlay per year for the mission in Afghanistan is now
more than 1 billion Euros.

Cable Viewer
Comment
¶12. (C) Germany remains committed to the ISAF mission

without time limits or conditions and has steadily increased
its overall contributions and filled all the shortfalls in
its region. However, up to now, it has remained unwilling to
deploy combat troops outside the north. The elimination of
the KSK element from the OEF mandate may open opportunities
to seek greater use of German Special Forces on a
country-wide basis under ISAF. The KSK is, in fact, already
deployed in Afghanistan, and has been for months, but is
apparently there under German national control to track down
those responsible for recent attacks on the Bundeswehr. As
far as we are aware, the KSK has not yet been made available
to COMISAF for ISAF missions outside the north, even though
such missions could be covered under the exception in the
ISAF mandate. Convincing the Germans to make the KSK
available for country-wide missions under ISAF would take
time and would probably require direct engagement with
Chancellor Merkel and FM Steinmeier. Even after general
approval was received, each specific deployment outside the
north would likely require the consent of DefMin Jung as
specified in the ISAF mandate.
Koenig

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Viewing cable 09BERLIN168, GERMAN ECONOMICS MINISTER THROWS IN TOWEL




Discussing cables

2009-02-11 2010-11-28
06:06 18:06
VZCZCXRO8118
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHRL #0168/01 0420612
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 110612Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

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RUEHRL/AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF PRIORITY 0187

RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT PRIORITY 7859
RUEHAG/AMCONSUL HAMBURG PRIORITY 0263
RUEHMZ/AMCONSUL MUNICH PRIORITY 1988
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
STATE FOR EUR/AGS(SCHROEDER), EEB/IFD/OMA, AND DRL/ILCSR

LABOR FOR ILAB(BRUMFIELD)
TREASURY FOR ICN(KOHLER) AND OASIA
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2019

TAGS: EFIN PREL PGOV GM
SUBJECT: GERMAN ECONOMICS MINISTER THROWS IN TOWEL
BERLIN 00000168 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JOHN KOENIG. REASONS: 1.4 (B)

AND (D).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. The sudden resignation of Economics Minister

Michael Glos (CSU) on February 7 caught Chancellor Angela
Merkel (CDU) and her party off guard at a time when
addressing Germany's economic downturn is paramount. To
minimize damage, the CSU quickly replaced Glos with its
Secretary General Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, a decision
which continues to draw criticism from other parties as well
as from within the CDU due to thirty-seven-year-old,s
minimal background in economic policy. The shuffle reveals
strains between the CDU and CSU, and presents an opportunity
for Merkel's political foes to portray her as lacking control
as the country tries to deal with its worst economic crisis
since World War II. END SUMMARY.
INITIAL CONFUSION OVER RESIGNATION

----------------------------------
¶2. (C) Citing his age and intention to leave the cabinet
after the September 2009 elections, the sixty-four-year-old
Glos submitted his resignation as Minister for Economics and
Technology on February 7. Chairman of the Christian Social
Union (CSU), the Bavarian sister party of Chancellor Merkel's
Christian Democratic Union (CDU), and Bavarian Minister
President Horst Seehofer named Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg,
37, as his successor. Zu Guttenberg had been CSU Secretary
General for only three months following a major party

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reshuffle. Glos explained his departure would allow the CSU

to campaign with a new minister in place, and help restore
trust in the CSU following its poor showing in the Bavarian
regional elections in September 2008. The timing of his
departure -- during the financial and economic crises --
however, was awkward. In addition, Glos submitted his
resignation to Seehofer instead of Merkel, which the media
has portrayed as a snub to the Chancellor. (NOTE: Bavarian
political reactions to be reported in ConGen Munich SEPTEL.)
ENTER THE YOUNG TURK

--------------------
¶3. (SBU) Under pressure to resolve an apparent power vacuum

at a key ministry, Seehofer, who as CSU Party Chairman had
the right to fill the slot, had to find a replacement for
Glos quickly. At a February 9 press conference announcing
the choice of zu Guttenberg, Seehofer said that he chose the
rising CSU star partly in order to have a minister
representing the northern region of Bavaria. He lauded zu
Guttenberg's international contacts and his presumed ability
to promote German exports. Seehofer denied reports that
before accepting the new post, zu Guttenberg had demanded the
high-level position of CSU Bundestag Spokesman and CDU/CSU
Caucus Chief in case the CDU/CSU lost the September
elections. For his part, zu Guttenberg welcomed the
opportunity to take on the economics portfolio. He described
Germany's "social market economy" as the "guiding principle"
of his economic thinking, and underscored the importance of
free trade. Zu Guttenberg also said he would work to lower
taxes for small- and medium-sized companies.
GLOS'S ROUGH RIDE

-----------------
¶4. (C) Glos had always been an awkward fit for the Economics
Ministry job, which he took on in November 2005. Glos did
bring intimate knowledge of federal politics to the job, but
was not an economist and had never shown strong interest in
the Economics Ministry's portfolio. Chancellor Merkel
instinctively turned to her Finance Minister Peer Steinbrueck
(SPD) to coordinate the response to the financial crisis,
sidelining Glos. Glos's inability to overcome CDU and SPD
objectives and get additional tax cuts into the stimulus plan
may have cost the CSU the recent Bavarian elections, to the
dismay of Seehofer and others in the CSU.
¶5. (C) A devastating profile of Glos a few months ago in "Der

Spiegel," whose main points Ministry contacts did not
contadict, portrayed him as weak, out of touch with the
bureaucracy, bored with his job, and looking forward to a

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nice sinecure for himself after retirement. In a farewell
BERLIN 00000168 002.2 OF 002
meeting with former Ambassador Timken in late November 2008,

Glos appeared under great strain and confessed to tremendous
frustration over his inability to influence Merkel on tax
cuts as part of the stimulus package.
NO LOVE LOST
------------
¶6. (C) SPD party stalwarts are giddy over perceived turmoil
in the CSU and the perception that Merkel is not in control
of developments. Chancellor-candidate Frank-Walter
Steinmeier (SPD) said the CDU/CSU lacked "orientation" in
their management of the economic crisis and called for "party
order and discipline." A CDU staffer expressed irritation
over Seehofer's handling of the shuffle, but she shed no
tears over Glos's departure. On zu Guttenberg, FDP economics
expert Rainer Bruederle commented to us that "as far as
economics is concerned, it seems to be enough these days for
the CSU to find someone who can read and write."
¶7. (C) The business community has mixed views. An IBM

lobbyist told Econoff that she regarded Glos as the only
"counterweight to Steinbrueck" on economic policymaking in
the Germany government. A contact from the German industry
association (BDI) conceded that Glos was "not the strongest
Minister in the Cabinet," adding that BDI had often wished
for someone in the position who was "more outspoken." On zu
Guttenberg, he conceded the new Minister was well-versed in
foreign policy and transatlantic issues, though young and
inexperienced.
COMMENT
-------
¶8. (C) Glos's resignation caught the CDU/CSU party hierarchy

off-guard at a time when everyone in Berlin and Munich was
concentrating on the Munich Security Conference. This
high-profile resignation opens the door to criticism of
Merkel,s handling of the economic and financial crises, as
well as Seehofer's leadership style. Zu Guttenberg's first
challenge will be to help resolve the debate between the
CDU/CSU and SPD over the stimulus package. His appointment
has been heavily criticized within the CDU, with some calling
him a mere "place holder" until the September elections,
raising questions about Merkel,s ability to steer her party
effectively through a long &super8 election year. If not
addressed, the SPD and the opposition FDP could emerge

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strengthened by the affair, which has come at a very

inopportune time for Chancellor Merkel,s CDU and its sister
party, the CSU. END COMMENT.
¶9. (U) This cable was coordinated with ConGens Frankfurt and
Munich.
Koenig

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Viewing cable 09BERLIN345, SCENESETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S BILATERAL

MEETING



Discussing cables

2009-03-24 2010-11-28
12:12 18:06
VZCZCXRO8237
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHRL #0345/01 0831251
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 241251Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN

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INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1001
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 2024
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0399
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000345
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JOHN M. KOENIG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2034
TAGS: GM MARR NATO PGOV PHUM PREL
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S BILATERAL MEETING
WITH CHANCELLOR MERKEL ON THE MARGINS OF THE NATO SUMMIT
BERLIN 00000345 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires John M. Koenig for reasons 1.4

(b) and
(d)
¶1. (S/NF) Chancellor Merkel will be focused on a productive,

substantive meeting when you visit Baden-Baden April 3.
Germany holds the greatest untapped potential in Europe for
our transatlantic agenda; unlocking it will take sustained
effort by the Administration, and the payoff will not be
immediate. What is most on Merkel,s mind is her political
future, six months before national elections, with her poll
numbers wobbling and her coalition increasingly
dysfunctional. Germany,s capacity to act is constrained by
(1) the short-term demands of domestic politics (about which
we can do little), (2) the slow pace of change in public
support for a German leadership role (a focus of our
engagement), and (3) the constant demands of the economic
crisis. Your meeting provides an opportunity to map out key
priorities with Germany for the remainder of Merkel,s
current term and beyond.
---------------------------------
Merkel,s Own Crisis -- Leadership
---------------------------------

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¶2. (S/NF) Merkel is methodical, rational, and pragmatic --

qualities that propelled her to stratospheric levels of
public support early in her tenure, when she presided over a
recovering economy and a successful presidency of the
European Union. The past year has been less kind, and the
almost exactly equal split in the German electorate between
left and right is re-emerging as elections approach. Merkel
now faces a &Gordian knot8 of rising unemployment, economic
crisis, and domestic political dissatisfaction at a time when
she can least afford a wrong move. The effectiveness of
Merkel,s &Grand Coalition8 government is declining as her
Christian Democrats (CDU) and their Social Democratic (SPD)
partners begin in earnest their campaigns for the September
2009 election. The Chancellor,s edge over the rival SPD,
led by Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, is
diminishing. When cornered, Merkel can be tenacious but is
risk averse and rarely creative. This suggests she will
remain a very circumspect Ally until the election.
¶3. (C/NF) The collapse of German exports and industrial

activity has shocked Chancellor Merkel and her advisors.
They had thought Germany would escape the worst of the world
recession thanks to its competitive position in emerging
markets. In the New Year, Merkel and Finance Minister Peer
Steinbrueck (SPD) rushed a relatively robust stimulus program
through the Bundestag that is timed to counter a surge in
unemployment just before the September elections. Like most
Germans, they doubt further deficit spending will generate
lasting growth, and fear too large a stimulus may cause
stagflation at home and dangerous new global imbalances.
Merkel and Steinbrueck remain bitter at the brush-off they
allegedly received during the last administration when they
advocated tighter financial oversight. Tougher regulations,
they insist, are essential to restore confidence in the
banking system and get credit flowing again, thus creating
the pre-conditions for a sustainable recovery.
¶4. (C/NF) Hoping to escape responsibility for the economic

crisis, Merkel has issued public critiques of U.S. recovery
policy that exaggerate the differences between Washington and
continental Europe. In fact, Germany faces many of the same
difficult choices as the U.S. The Chancellor is expected to
put forward a further stimulus package later this year. Her
government has bailed out big banks while holding firm on
state aid to ailing firms like Opel. The conventional wisdom
in Germany is that Opel could be rescued with minimum state
aid if only it could be separated from GM, but in fact there
is no viable business plan for the firm to stand on its own.
The Chancellor is surrounded by bad options: an
interventionist approach would further alienate economic
conservatives in her CDU (who are already defecting in droves
to the free-market FDP); if she does nothing, Steinmeier and

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the SPD will harvest the goodwill of centrist voters for

trying to save Opel. Merkel has not been above shifting
responsibility to the USG and General Motors, which she and
BERLIN 00000345 002.2 OF 002
the German media unfairly blame for bleeding Opel dry. In

the end, Merkel,s government will likely be forced to prop
up at least parts of the automaker.
--------------------------------------------
Increasing Political Caution during Campaign
--------------------------------------------
¶5. (S/NF) Merkel and Steinmeier are pragmatists; on foreign

policy, in particular, there is more that unites them than
divides them. But the centrifugal forces of the election
campaign and the growing mistrust between the CDU and SPD
make it increasingly difficult for them to agree on any big
ideas about Germany,s role in the world or its relations
with the United States. Buffeted by events, Merkel is
struggling to define a convincing vision for &her8 Germany;
&competence8 is the sole component at this point. She is
blessed that Steinmeier, her principal competitor, faces even
greater difficulties. His party has lost its bearings in the
Grand Coalition and is plagued by internal divisions.
Steinmeier himself is a technocrat and a latecomer to
electoral politics -- his shortcomings on stage are
significant. Steinmeier has tried to make up ground on
Merkel by publicly identifying himself with the new U.S.
Administration. However, his ability to deliver on policy
initiatives without the Chancellor,s political support is
limited.
¶6. (C/NF) Afghanistan is an example. Merkel has been

cautious throughout her chancellorship and has doggedly
resisted real or perceived pressure for Germany to take on a
larger military role. She and Steinmeier both have supported
the Comprehensive Approach, but the Chancellor,s CDU, in the
face of public skepticism, is reluctant even to consider
increasing police or civilian support. Steinmeier and the
SPD have been more forward-leaning, but they cannot deliver
on their own. You should emphasize that at the moment the
U.S. is not seeking significant additional military forces
from Germany, but that every member of the international
community will need to do much more (e.g., training security
forces and providing civilian assistance) if we are to be
successful.
---------------------------------------
Policy Opportunities on Russia and Iran

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---------------------------------------
¶7. (C/NF) Germany should play a central role with the U.S.
in defining a coordinated western Russia policy that resets
the relationship without retreating from our values. The
winter gas crisis made Germans rethink Russia,s reliability
as a supplier, but the lack of alternatives and the
desirability of gas as a clean energy source have left the
government resigned to dependency on Russia in the
near-to-medium term. On energy as well as Georgia, neither
Merkel nor Steinmeier has identified areas where German
policy steps could help create a more persuasive set of
incentives for Russia to integrate further into rules-based
relationships and institutions. Meanwhile, Germany is
concerned about threats to economic and social stability in
Central and Eastern Europe, but prefers EU and IMF approaches
to limit its share of the bill.
¶8. (C/NF) Both Merkel and Steinmeier welcomed your Nowruz

address to the Iranian people and government. They support
the U.S. investment in the diplomatic track and agree that
Germany and the EU need to invest in the economic pressure
track. Germany,s close ties to Israel include an imperative
to defend Israel,s right to exist and to play an active role
in international non-proliferation efforts toward Iran.
Merkel will be looking to the meeting to gain a better
understanding of how you see the USG Iran policy unfolding
and what role we need Germany to play.
¶9. (U) Mr. President, Mission Germany is honored to support

you on your first overseas trip as President, and we look
forward to welcoming you in Baden-Baden.
Koenig

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Viewing cable 09BERLIN406, S) GERMANY TAKING ACTION ON SHIPMENT OF ...




Discussing cables

2009-04-03 2010-12-05
17:05 12:12
VZCZCXRO9339
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHRL #0406/01 0931755
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 031755Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN

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RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1004
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9721
RUCXONI/ONI WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRL/USDAO BERLIN GE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 000406
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/CE PETER SCHROEDER
STATE FOR EUR/CE, EUR/PRA, ISN/CPI, AND T
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2034

TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC IR UK GM
SUBJECT: (S) GERMANY TAKING ACTION ON SHIPMENT OF ...

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Viewing cable 09BERLIN1106, CHANCELLOR ANGELA "TEFLON" MERKEL TAKES

LIMELIGHT



Discussing cables

2009-09-09 2010-11-28
16:04 18:06
VZCZCXRO1733
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHRL #1106/01 2521657
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 091657Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN

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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2019

TAGS: GM PREL PGOV
SUBJECT: CHANCELLOR ANGELA "TEFLON" MERKEL TAKES LIMELIGHT
AS FDP WAITS IN THE WINGS
Classified By: MINISTER COUNSELOR FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS GEORGE

GLASS FO
R REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C) Less than two weeks after her party suffered losses
in two state elections, CDU Chancellor Angela Merkel found
her fighting spirit before 8,000 party faithful at a
September 6 election rally in Duesseldorf launching the "hot
phase" of the CDU/CSU electoral campaign. The CDU has been
shifting party tactics after its losses in the August 30
elections in Saarland and Thuringia, where the Social
Democratic Party (SPD) may now be in a position to form
coalitions with the Left Party. Merkel -- to great applause
-- focused in on the specter of a so-called red-red
government composed of the SPD and The Left Party. She
described the SPD as suffering from an "identity crisis," and
needing a vacation from political decision-making and time in
opposition. Along with the entire CDU leadership and
incumbent CDU/CSU Ministers-president, Merkel made her case
for a CDU/CSU coalition with the pro-business but socially
liberal FDP. She repeated the CDU/CSU's election mantra: "we
have the strength" throughout her speech, aiming to convince
the German electorate that a strong CDU/CSU is required for
Germany to emerge from its worst economic recession in
post-war history. CDU views on whether the issue of
Germany's role in Afghanistan would become a more prominent
campaign theme were mixed.
¶2. (C) With three weeks to go before the parliamentary

elections, all signs point to Chancellor Merkel returning to
office, although she and her party recognize that they face a
difficult campaign. It remains uncertain whether the CDU and
the FDP will gain enough support to form a majority
coalition. If not, another Grand Coalition (CDU/CSU-SPD) is
very likely; other options require a three-party
constellation that would force the ill-suited Greens and FDP

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to work together. But, there seems to be an almost one

hundred percent certainty -- given the SPD's chronic slump in
the polls and limited coalition options -- that SPD Foreign
Minister and Chancellor-candidate Frank Walter Steinmeier
will not become Chancellor. End summary.
MERKEL CASTS ASIDE SPD, EMBRACES FDP

------------------------------------
¶3. (C) Chancellor Merkel -- to rapturous cries of "Angie,

Angie" and a standing ovation -- took to the floor at her
party's September 6 rally before some 8,000 supporters
affirming that the CDU/CSU "have the best chance to win the
parliamentary elections" but also cautioning that "the
election's outcome has not yet been decided." On the one
hand, she praised her Grand Coalition government's record,
noting its success in countering Germany's economic and
financial crisis. On the other hand, she called for a new
CDU/CSU coalition with the FDP after the upcoming elections--
casting aside the SPD. She asserted that such a coalition
would anchor Germany in the "middle" of the political
spectrum and take the country out of its current economic
crisis faster. Merkel said: "Our country needs a government
that will support growth, security and work for everyone."
In a swipe at the SPD (COMMENT: Merkel never mentioned
Steinmeier by name. END COMMENT.), she said the party is
currently plagued by an "identity crisis," adding that, "The
SPD is devoid of any reality and is distraught." She asked,
"How can a party that achieved 10, 18, and 24 percent at the
recent state elections in Saxony, Thuringia, and Saarland be
taken seriously?" Dismissing SPD warnings against a
so-called "black-yellow" (CDU/CSU-FDP) coalition, Merkel said
that the country should be more worried about the SPD's plans
to form coalitions with The Left Party on the state and
federal levels. (Note: The SPD has warned that a
black-yellow coalition would represent wealthy Germany and
business interest at the expense of the middle and lower
classes.)
¶4. (U) CDU leaders also tried to cast the CDU at the state
level in a positive light after its poor showing in the
Saarland and Thuringia state elections on August, causing the
Minister President of the latter state to resign. Lower
Saxony's CDU Minister President Christian Wulff asserted that
the most prosperous and successful "Laender" (states) in
Germany are those ruled by the CDU/CSU and FDP. He cited
Berlin, governed by SPD Mayor Klaus Wowereit's Berlin (NOTE:
in Berlin the SPD rules with The Left Party. END NOTE), as
being the worst case. Hesse's Minister President Roland Koch
-- to great applause -- noted that he could not understand
how the SPD could possibly cooperate on a state or national
level with a Left Party that is "anti-American and

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anti-European." (Note: In Saarland and Thuringia the option
BERLIN 00001106 002 OF 003
exists for the SPD to form a governing coalition with the

Left Party. END NOTE.)
CSU Truce with FDP?

-------------------
¶5. (C) CSU Bavarian Minister-President Horst Seehofer threw

his party's support behind a CDU/CSU coalition with the FDP,
despite his well-publicized doubts about the FDP's real
coalition intentions after the parliamentary elections. Even
as Seehofer pronounced his support for the FDP in
Duesseldorf, however, media reports from Munich confirmed
that the CSU had decided to continue attacking the FDP. The
CSU has been buffing its economic bona fides by attacking the
FDP on its own themes while basking in the reflected glory
from popular Economics Minister zu Guttenberg, the new CSU
champion. Seehofer has publicly suspected that FDP Chairman
Guido Westerwelle -- in an attempt to enter government at all
costs -- might support a "traffic light" coalition with the
SPD and the Greens, although this political constellation
appears unlikely at present. In addition, Bavarian politics
trump national politics, especially during a time when the
CSU longs for the days when their party alone wielded
political power in Munich, rather than as it does today, in a
coalition with the FDP. Seehofer is also aware that the CSU
needs to be strong and the FDP proportionally more weak for
the CSU to win more and better ministerial posts in a
CDU/CSU-FDP coalition. He did not use his appearance in
Duesseldorf to chide the FDP, to the great delight of those
pleading that recent CDU/CSU-FDP bickering had been harmful
and counter-productive during the campaign.
AFGHANISTAN - A DOMESTIC CAMPAIGN ISSUE?

----------------------------------------
¶6. (C) The September 4 air strike against two fuel tankers
near Kunduz, Afghanistan hit the press right before the
CDU/CSU rally. In light of the German media's frenzy, PolOff
asked the CDU's Head of International Relations Klemens
Moemkes whether Germany's ISAF commitment might emerge as a
potential domestic campaign issue. Moemkes noted that the
SPD could make Afghanistan an issue but this would be very
odd given Foreign Minister Steinmeier's support for Germany's
military role in ISAF. However, the prospect of Afghanistan
becoming a major theme clearly had the CDU's xxxxx
spooked. He told PolOff that it would be very difficult for

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the Chancellor not to address Germany's role in Afghanistan

in the coming weeks. Given the German public's overwhelming
support for a withdrawal of German troops from Afghanistan,
this was not an issue the Chancellor wanted to address in the
run-up to the parliamentary elections.
COMMENT
-------
¶7. (C) While it is all but certain that Chancellor Merkel

will return to office as Chancellor after the next
parliamentary elections on September 27, it is too close to
call whether she will achieve a coalition with the FDP.
Bavarian MP Seehofer's attacks on the FDP in Bavaria could
weaken that party there and further undermine the chances of
a coalition. The FDP wants the same but political bickering
over future ministerial positions and CSU attacks on the FDP
in Bavaria and on FDP Chairman Guido Westerwelle suggest that
a possible CDU/CSU-FDP coalition will not be a marriage made
in heaven. Some FDP contacts admit that they harbor doubts
about the Chancellor's promise to form a coalition with the
FDP. They insinuate that in reality she may prefer another
Grand Coalition with the SPD, although Chancellor Merkel has
used every public opportunity to advertise for a CDU/CSU-FDP
coalition. Backing down on this pledge would call into
question her reputation.
¶8. (C) Paradoxically, however, it is the CDU/CSU's relative

weakness in the polls (35-36 percent) that threatens a
possible CDU/CSU-FDP coalition. The FDP is clearly riding on
a high with double-digit successes in the state elections of
Saarland, Saxony, and Thuringia, but this may not be enough.
The CDU refuses to engage in any self-introspection after its
defeats in Saarland and Thuringia and the party can really
only take comfort from the SPD's perennial weakness. The
fear in the CDU is acute that the Chancellor's high
popularity ratings may not be enough to ensure a comfortable
win for the CDU/CSU at the parliamentary elections.
¶9. (C) Merkel, once again, vehemently denies any intention

to form a Grand Coalition with the SPD but the electoral math
on September 27 may force her -- despite intense CDU/CSU
reservations, not to mention those of the German public -- to
look at the SPD as a partner. As for the SPD, Steinmeier is
BERLIN 00001106 003 OF 003
looking desperate. The SPD has failed to reach over 25

percent in the last six elections and Steinmeier's unlikely
path to the chancellorship is only possible if he reneges on
a campaign promise not to form a coalition with The Left

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Party. This will not happen in 2009 but the CDU/CSU will not
tire of raising the fear of a red-red coalition in 2009 or in
¶2013. The Chancellor appears to be in a win-win situation
but three weeks on the campaign trail can be an eternity.
End comment.
Murphy

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Viewing cable 09BERLIN1108, GERMANY: POLITICAL FALL-OUT OVER KUNDUZ AIR




Discussing cables

2009-09-10 2010-12-02
06:06 21:09
VZCZCXRO2166
OO RUEHSL
DE RUEHRL #1108/01 2530651
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 100651Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN

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RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0531
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2019

TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS NATO PGOV AF GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY: POLITICAL FALL-OUT OVER KUNDUZ AIR
STRIKES CONTAINED -- FOR NOW
REF: A. BERLIN 970

¶B. BERLIN 837
Classified By: DCM GREG DELAWIE. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Chancellery is confident that Chancellor

Merkel's policy statement to the Bundestag on September 8 has
succeeded -- at least for now -- in settling the domestic
political controversy surrounding the September 4 air strikes
against two hijacked fuel tankers in Kunduz. Ironically, the
Greens called for the special parliamentary session in a
clear attempt to embarrass the government and to make a
campaign issue out of the controversy, but Merkel used it to
her advantage to elicit support for the German deployment in
Afghanistan by all the major parties, save for the Left
Party, which has always opposed the mission. While it had
been expected that internal critics would seize on the
bombing to score political points against the Chancellor and
Defense Minister Jung, the Chancellery, MFA and MOD all
expressed dismay that their closest Allies -- especially the
French -- had made a rush to judgment. Officials at both the
MFA and MOD also expressed disappointment that despite
Germany's excellent track record in avoiding civilian
casualties, COMISAF GEN McChrystal, in their view, quickly
assumed the worst about German actions in this case. The MOD
emphasized that while everything was calm now, this issue
would need to be carefully managed in the coming weeks to
prevent it from becoming a source of anti-Americanism. Both
MFA and Chancellery officials emphasized that the joint
German-UK-France proposal for an international conference on
Afghanistan was not made in reaction to the Kunduz event and
is not a cover for trying to secure a date certain for

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withdrawal. END SUMMARY.
Chancellor's statement
¶2. (C) In her policy statement to the Bundestag on September

8, Chancellor Merkel appealed to ISAF allies as well as
critics at home to reserve judgment regarding the September 4
decision by the German PRT commander in Kunduz to call in air
strikes against two fuel tankers that had been hijacked by
insurgents. At the same time, she promised a full inquiry
into the matter and gave assurances that Germany took the
issue of collateral damage very seriously. "Even the death
of one innocent person is one too many," she stressed. In
retreating from the initial stand taken by Defense Minister
Jung -- who had insisted that only insurgents had been killed
in the nighttime attack -- she succeeded in deflating some of
the early indignation over the incident, since Jung's
statements seemed to defy clear evidence to the contrary.
All the major parties, with the exception of the Left Party,
which opposes all Bundeswehr deployments, used the special
Bundestag session to reaffirm their support for the
Afghanistan mission and to reject calls for withdrawal.
Chancellery: "astonished" at allies' reaction
¶3. xxxxxxxxxxxx
Mod: jung's initial approach was wrong
¶4. xxxxxxxxxxxx
¶5. xxxxxxxxxxxx
¶6. xxxxxxxxxxxx
¶7. xxxxxxxxxxxx
Comment
¶8. (C) With only three weeks before German national

elections, it goes without saying that the Kunduz incident
comes at a very politically sensitive time. Fortunately, the
Chancellor, in her policy statement to the Bundestag, has
been able to limit the damage to the delicate political
Berlin 00001108 003 of 003
consensus here in favor of the Afghanistan deployment. She

has successfully rallied all the main political parties in

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rejecting calls for withdrawal. The hope is that the Allies

and others will refrain from any further premature judgments
or speculation about what happened in Kunduz, which could be
exploited by the Left Party and other Afghanistan opponents
for electoral advantage.
¶9. (C) The Kunduz incident ironically also comes at a time

when the views of the United States and Germany regarding the
approach to Afghanistan have never been closer. All of our
interlocutors warmly welcome COMISAF's new counterinsurgency
guidance, which emphasizes protecting the Afghan population
over chasing down and killing insurgents. They view the new
U.S. emphasis on avoiding civilian casualties as moving
toward a position they have long advocated. At the same
time, they now acknowledge that their own forces, in view of
the deteriorating security situation in the north, have to be
more active in providing security and being willing to use
force as appropriate. Their new rules of engagement (ref A)
have gone a long way in this regard. Along similar lines,
the old debate between the U.S. and Germany on the best way
to train Afghan police -- i.e., the U.S. supposedly stressing
speed and quantity versus the Germans stressing quality -- is
over. The Germans have completely signed up to the U.S.
focused district development (FDD) police training program
and are moving toward to taking responsibility for FDD
throughout the north (ref B).
¶10. (C) It is this convergence of views, and their belief

that they are one of our most reliable Allies in Afghanistan,
that makes the Germans so sensitive to any perceived U.S.
criticism of their actions. They feel that their careful and
dependable management of the north -- while acknowledging the
growing problems with the insurgency there -- have earned
them the benefit of the doubt when incidents like the fuel
tanker bombing in Kunduz occur. As we go forward with our
plans to deploy some 300 U.S. Special Forces in Mazar-e
Sharif to assist the Germans in meeting the growing
insurgency threat, we will want to be careful not to give the
impression that we do not have faith in the Germans to do
what is necessary to continue to secure the north as they
have been for almost six years. While the Germans have been
consistently reluctant about deploying combat troops outside
the north, they have been equally consistent in ensuring that
all the troop and equipment needs in the north -- including
OMLTs for the training of the Afghan National Army (ANA) --
are fulfilled. It is our interest for the Germans to
continue to feel "ownership" of this part of the country.
Murphy

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Viewing cable 09BERLIN1162, GERMANY'S NEXT FOREIGN MINISTER?: THE WORLD




Discussing cables

09BERLIN1162
VZCZCXRO9293
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHRL #1162/01 2611602
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181602Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN

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NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2019

TAGS: PGOV PREL GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY'S NEXT FOREIGN MINISTER?: THE WORLD
ACCORDING TO FDP CHAIRMAN GUIDO WESTERWELLE
REF: BERLIN 594
Classified By: MINISTER-COUNSELOR FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS GEORGE

GLASS FO
R REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D)
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C//NF) Free Democratic Party (FDP) Chairman Guido

Westerwelle may be on the verge of becoming Foreign Minister
and Vice-Chancellor in a Christian Democratic Union
(CDU)/Christian Social Union (CSU)-FDP government after the
parliamentary elections on September 27. He has a strong
craving for political power and recognition after spending
eleven years in opposition. Westerwelle previewed his
foreign and security policy objectives and views in a major
speech at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) on
May 4, a speech for which the media nicknamed him "Guido
Genscher," playing on Westerwelle's ideological leanings and
close relationship with former FDP Foreign Minister
Hans-Dietrich Genscher.
¶2. (C//NF) Westerwelle's DGAP remarks provided us with a

glimpse of Westerwellian thought. They were short on
substance, suggesting that Westerwelle's command of complex
foreign and security policy issues still requires deepening
if he is to successfully represent German interests on the
world stage (see REFTEL). While he is a Transatlanticist,
Westerwelle questions the breadth of U.S. power and U.S.
calls for stronger German engagement. He also harbors
resentment that he has not been taken more seriously by the
Washington political establishment. (NOTE: Embassy will
report SEPTEL on more detailed foreign policy implications
for the U.S. of a Westerwelle-led MFA). END SUMMARY.
WESTERWELLE'S FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES

---------------------------------------
¶3. (C) Westerwelle's most important foreign policy

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priorities will be focused on global disarmament and arms

control. In remarks in Schwerin on September 17, Westerwelle
called again for the removal of all U.S. tactical nuclear
weapons -- within the context of negotiations with NATO --
from German soil. He was very critical of the Bush
Administration's Missile Defense plans but was quick to
praise President Obama's recent announcement on Missile
Defense, saying "this move created additional international
confidence." Westerwelle remains a committed
Transatlanticist but he has been consistently cautious of
committing German troops to out-of-area deployments.
Afghanistan was the exception. Westerwelle continues to
support Germany's ISAF mandate, but he has also indicated
that the FDP wants to bring German troops home from
Afghanistan as soon as possible provided the mission has been
successfully completed. Westerwelle and the FDP support
close engagement with Russia and see it as a "strategic
partner. Westerwelle has pursued close ties with Russia's
leadership during his eleven years in opposition. On Iran,
Westerwelle has talked about the need for dialogue but his
party's pro-business orientation makes him particularly
skeptical of sanctions and resistant to unilateral efforts to
cut back trade.
THE UNLIKELY FOREIGN MINISTER

-----------------------------
¶4. (C//NF) By his own admission, Westerwelle has never

seriously harbored a fascination for international affairs.
FDP Bundestag member Marina Schuster told PolOff recently
that foreign policy is not Westerwelle's "true love," but
that he will take this position due to its high profile and
as it is tied to the position of Vice-Chancellor. FDP
contacts tell us that he plans to remain a foreign policy
generalist, which suggests he will have plenty of time to wax
lyrical on domestic politics - to the potential detriment of
political harmony in a possible future CDU/CSU-FDP coalition.
He also finds very appealing the prospect of being one of
the only cabinet members besides the chancellor who can
choose his media advisors, which suggests that Westerwelle
will continue to place great emphasis on cultivating his
public image.
¶5. (C//NF) There is a contrast between Westerwelle's

increased public support and successful leadership of the FDP
versus the continued skepticism, often bordering on contempt,
shown by much of the German foreign policy elite toward him.
Opinion polls show that Westerwelle's public image has
improved substantially in the last year in particular. But,
as one well known foreign policy analyst in Berlin told
PolOff, he lacks the gravitas and is seen as too

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BERLIN 00001162 002 OF 004
opportunistic to be trusted as foreign minister. At the

conclusion of his DGAP speech, several MFA desk officers
remarked to PolOff that they were not yet persuaded that
Westerwelle had the "foreign and security policy expertise
necessary" to become a successful Foreign Minister, although
they had no doubts about his ability to get up to speed
quickly. There was a consensus among desk officers --
driven, perhaps, by political bias -- that Westerwelle was
arrogant and too fixated on maintaining his "cult of
personality." Negative reaction to his DGAP speech reflects
the foreign policy community's skepticism of Westerwelle.
HE'S NO GENSCHER
----------------
¶6. (C//NF) Like Dan Quayle in 1992, Westerwelle wants to

compare himself to his mentor, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, but in
the eyes of the foreign policy community, he is no Genscher.
Nevertheless, Westerwelle's world-views have to a large
extent been shaped by "Genscherism." British academic
Timothy Garton Ash described "Genscherism" as an attempt "to
maintain and improve Germany's ties with a wide range of
states, which were themselves pursuing quite different and
quite contrary objectives. This complex balancing act
involved saying somewhat different things in different
places." Genscherism also embraced a foreign policy "culture
of restraint," while emphasizing the models of "cooperation"
and "continuity" in German foreign policy, which Westerwelle
discussed in his May 4 speech at the DGAP. Genscher's
"culture of restraint" had a profound influence on
Westerwelle's thinking, thus making him very skeptical about
committing Germany's armed forces to overseas military
operations (NOTE: Afghanistan was an exception, although
with the caveat that Germany's area of responsibility there
would remain limited to the north and would concentrate on
police training and civil reconstruction efforts (SEPTEL).
END NOTE).
A TRANSATLANTICIST WITH A TWIST

-------------------------------
¶7. (C//NF) At the June 30 meeting, Westerwelle quickly

confirmed his Transatlanticist credentials. Westerwelle's
views on the United States' role in the world, however, also
defines his brand of Transatlanticism. According to
Westerwelle's political biographer Majid Sattar, Westerwelle
has never been able to shake his skepticism about how the
United States wields power in the world. Citing an exchange
with former U.S. Ambassador to Germany Richard Burt

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(1985-1989), Sattar recalls how Westerwelle forcefully

intervened in a discussion the Ambassador was having on U.S.
foreign policy during the Cold War to say: "But you are not
the police of the world." Sattar comments further that
Westerwelle was immune to any "transatlantic brainwashing."
Although Westerwelle used his DGAP speech to criticize the
United States under the Bush Administration for its excessive
focus on the War on Terror and unilateralism, saying that the
United States had lost its compass more than once,
Westerwelle quickly changed his tune when he talked about the
positive impact that President Obama has had on U.S. foreign
policy since his election.
¶8. (C//NF) Westerwelle also made clear that he believes

Germany needs to be more engaged in U.S. policy-making. He
criticized Chancellor Merkel for not having been more engaged
with Washington on issues of mutual interest, especially arms
control, when Washington has been engaged in extensive policy
reviews. He suggested that the FDP would quickly fill the
vacuum should they enter government.
WESTERWELLE TO WASHINGTON: WHAT ABOUT ME?

-----------------------------------------
¶9. (C//NF) Westerwelle has found it hard to conceal his

resentment toward Washington based on his feeling that
neither its top leadership nor the Embassy in Berlin had
courted him during his time in opposition. At a June 30
meeting between the former CDA and Westerwelle, he criticized
the Bush Administration for its failure to seek a political
dialogue with him. Also revealing was Westerwelle's slight
edge on his sense of humor, first charming us by inquiring
about Secretary Clinton's health after her elbow injury and
next joking that he would ask the Secretary if the Embassy
had conveyed his best wishes.
¶10. (C//NF) Partially due to his insistence on only
high-level meetings in Washington (and therefore limited
contact), Westerwelle remains a relatively unknown political
figure in the U.S., although he has traveled there many
times. Unlike his future potential cabinet colleague,
BERLIN 00001162 003 OF 004
Christian Social Union (CSU) Economics Minister Karl-Theodor

zu Guttenberg, Westerwelle has little professional experience
in the United States since he never made extensive efforts to
introduce himself to the Washington policy community.
Unfortunately, our attempts to reach out to Westerwelle were
often rebuffed with the excuse that he would only meet the
Ambassador. Only after extensive Embassy negotiations with

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Westerwelle's staff were former CDA and PolOff able to secure

the June 30 meeting.
COMMENT
-------
¶11. (C//NF) One week before the parliamentary elections,

polls indicate that Westerwelle stands a good chance of
becoming Germany's next foreign minister, a position he has
been preparing for since 2002. If Westerwelle becomes
Foreign Minister, we can expect tough love diplomacy from
someone who prides himself in being our "close" friend, but
who in reality remains skeptical about the U.S. and its
foreign policy objectives. Westerwelle will be a friend, but
he will not hesitate to criticize us if vital German
interests are at stake or being challenged. Westerwelle's
prickliness toward the United States would likely be
neutralized by the long-sought attention from Washington he
would receive if he becomes foreign minister. Germany's
foreign policy elite will continue to view him with
skepticism. The factor that assuages some of this concern,
however, is that no one expects him to be able to match
Chancellor Merkel if he does become Foreign Minister, and
policy experts tell us that foreign policy influence is
likely to shift even further to the Chancellery. END COMMENT.
BIO NOTES
---------
¶12. (U) Dr. Guido Westerwelle was born on December 27, 1961
in Bad Honnef (near Bonn) to Dr. Heinrich and Erika
Westerwelle. Family members note that Westerwelle inherited
the unbridled, aggressive temperament of his father and the
calculated, deliberate, and hesitant cleverness of his
mother. His parents divorced when he was 8 years old, which
according to Westerwelle himself, left a scar on his
educational and physical development. After the divorce,
Westerwelle was raised by his father -- a lawyer -- and he
maintained a close relationship with his mother, also a
career lawyer, who lived nearby. Stefan and Henrik, Guido's
half brothers, one from each of his parents' previous
relationships, were older and soon left the house to live on
their own. Westerwelle grew up with his younger brother Kai;
they were very similar and both were considered active
extroverts who enjoyed debates. Westerwelle enjoys horses
and to this day he is an avid equestrian.
¶13. (SBU) Westerwelle is openly gay. He has said that this

was not a problem at home since he was raised to be
self-confident and his family was very liberal. In addition,
Bonn, where Westerwelle went to university was a liberal
town. Westerwelle officially came out rather quietly in the

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political world in 2005 at Merkel's 50th birthday party when

he brought his partner, Michael Mronz, a sports manager, to
the party. Mronz is currently a steering board member of the
2009 Berlin World Track and Field World Championships.
Ironically, Westerwelle is conservative on gay rights. He is
keen to protect the special status of marriages and families
under German law. He opposes adoption by same sex couples
but says that he wishes he could have children.
¶14. (U) Westerwelle developed an early taste for politics,

being the editor of his high school newspaper. He caused a
school controversy when he named teachers who he felt did not
respect students who had transferred into the secondary high
school system from the grammar school system. As a result of
his story, many teachers developed a dislike for Westerwelle.
He further developed his political thinking when he attended
an event with Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Otto Graf Lambsdorff
during the 1980 parliamentary elections. It was at that time
that he decided to join the FDP and form an FDP youth group
in Bonn. Westerwelle eventually became a lawyer but his
younger brother Kai once said he had the impression that
being a lawyer was never his brother's real goal. His
understanding of the media and their use for his own
political purposes is envied by many politicians. He takes a
pro-active approach to overseeing his party's media
operations. In front of the camera, Westerwelle comes across
as serious, sharp, and calculating, and almost comical at
times with what is perceived as a very exaggerated presence.
In person, people say Westerwelle is very gallant, funny, and
sarcastic.
BERLIN 00001162 004 OF 004
¶15. (U) In his free time, Westerwelle enjoys attending

concerts and reading. He enjoys running, beach volleyball,
sailing, horseback riding, and mountain biking. He collects
paintings from New Leipzig School artists such as Neo Rauch
and Tim Eitel and is a fond collector of works by Norbert
Bisky and Joerg Immendorff. He enjoys vacationing in Italy
and Spain.
Murphy

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Viewing cable 09BERLIN1167, DATA PRIVACY TRUMPS SECURITY: IMPLICATIONS OF

A



Discussing cables

2009-09-21 2010-11-28
08:08 18:06
VZCZCXRO0245
RR RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHRL #1167/01 2640826
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 210826Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN

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INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE

RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RHEFHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/HQ USEUCOM LO WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR, L, S/CT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2019

TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KJUS KHLS GM
SUBJECT: DATA PRIVACY TRUMPS SECURITY: IMPLICATIONS OF A
FDP VICTORY ON COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION
REF: A. BERLIN 988

¶B. 2008 BERLIN 504
¶C. 2008 BERLIN 354
Classified By: Global Affairs Unit Chief Don Brown for Reasons 1.4
(b) a
nd (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Current polling data suggest that the
Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Free Democratic Party
(FDP) could receive sufficient votes in the September 27
national elections to form a governing coalition. The FDP
are strong defenders of citizens' privacy rights and these
views have led the FDP to oppose all of Germany's recent
counterterrorism legislative proposals, as well as voice
concerns about U.S.-German and U.S.-EU information sharing
initiatives. Throughout these debates, the FDP has favored
data protection measures over the need for governments to
strengthen security-related information sharing for
counterterrorism purposes. The FDP's strong views on
individual liberties and personal privacy could lead to
complications concerning law enforcement security cooperation
and data sharing. Were the FDP to join the government, we
expect they would closely scrutinize any proposals for
security officials to access and/or share information
concerning private persons with international partners,
including the USG. End Summary.

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THE FDP AND DATA PRIVACY

------------------------
¶2. (C) The FDP defines itself as a independent pro-business

party, advocating low taxes, open trade, and minimal
government intervention in business and private life. The
party promotes European liberalism, championing freedom and
individual responsibility under a government "as extensive as
necessary, and as limited as possible." The FDP's limited
government viewpoint shapes their views on counterterrorism
policy. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks and in
reaction to a number of terrorist plots uncovered in Germany,
successive German governments have passed a series of
legislative packages that have strengthened Germany's
counterterrorism legal frameworks and broadened the
investigative powers of law enforcement agencies. The FDP,
which was not a member of these post-9/11 governing
coalitions, regularly criticized these amendments for
infringing on citizens' personal privacy rights. The FDP's
criticisms of security-related data sharing agreements have
also extended to the U.S.-Germany bilateral "Pruem-like"
agreement to share personal information on serious crime and
terrorism suspects (ref C), the U.S.-EU Passenger Name
Recognition (PNR) initiative, and elements of the Visa Waiver
Program that involve sharing information on travelers.
FDP Objections to Counterterrorism Laws

---------------------------------------
¶3. (C) FDP parliamentarians and party leaders were strong
critics of the CDU/CSU - SPD government's introduction of two
new counterterrorism legislative proposals, the BKA Law and
the Terror Camp Law. Passed in 2008 and enacted at the
beginning of 2009, the BKA Law increased the investigative
powers of the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation (BKA).
The most controversial aspect of the BKA Law was that it
permitted security officials to use a variety of technical
surveillance measures in terrorism investigations (Ref B).
Specifically, the law provides the BKA with the power to
conduct remote, on-line investigations of the computers of
terrorism and serious crime suspects. The FDP strongly
opposed these measures as an unnecessary invasion of privacy,
despite the limitation of on-line searches to only
life-threatening situations (or threats to the constitutional
order of the German state). These cases would require a
judge's advance approval and are expected to number just a
dozen cases per year. Nevertheless, FDP parliamentarian Max
Stadler called the measures "constitutionally questionable,"

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and in a meeting with EMIN, Stadler feared that authorities

would carry out surveillance without sufficient evidence of
wrongdoing. FDP parliamentarian Gisela Piltz warned that the
law would turn the BKA into a "super spy agency resembling
the FBI." Former FDP Federal Interior Minister, Gerhart
Baum, blasted the law, saying it violated privacy rights,
freedom of the press, and the inviolability of private
residences.
¶4. (C) Earlier this summer, the government passed legislation

developed by the Justice Ministry that criminalized a range
of terrorism-related preparatory actions such as distributing
information on bomb-making and participating in para-military
training overseas (ref A). The law was developed in response
to the September 2007 arrests in Germany of three homegrown
terrorists who had attended an Islamic Jihad Union terrorism
training camp in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region.
Justice Ministry officials and prosecutors have told EconOffs
that the new law has closed gaps in Germany's legal framework
that had previously prevented German prosecutors from
charging German citizens and residents with activities that
directly or indirectly supported terrorist groups. Prior to
the passage of the law, the FDP criticized the draft as
unnecessary, claiming that existing legislation was
sufficient to arrest and prosecute potential terrorists in
Germany. The FDP also criticized that law for allegedly
requiring prosecutors to be able to prove that individuals
who participate in training at overseas terrorist camps
actually intend to carry out attacks; that the law would
thereby permit the punishment for thoughts, rather than for
actions. Justice Ministry officials have indicated to
EconOffs that these criticisms are unfounded hyperbole and
that prosecutors will be able to build strong cases against
those who undergo training at foreign terrorist training
sites.
FDP Objects to U.S.-German Data Sharing Agreement

--------------------------------------------- ----
¶5. (C) Immediately following the March 2008 completion of the

U.S.-German data sharing agreement to enhance cooperation in
preventing and combating terrorism and other serious crime
(aka, the Pruem-like agreement, Ref C), FDP parliamentarians
began to express concerns regarding the agreement. FDP
members took particular aim at an article in the agreement
that calls for additional data protection measures to be
taken if special categories of personal data (such as ethnic
origin, political opinion, religion, trade union membership,
and sexual orientation) are transferred among law enforcement

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agencies. (Comment: In our discussions with FDP

parliamentarians, we explained that negotiators did not
foresee that such information would need to be transferred
regularly and that the article was inserted as a means of
providing extra data privacy protections in the rare
occurrence that such information was pertinent to an
investigation. End Comment.) In meetings with EMIN, Stadler
and Piltz also expressed objections to the data retention
periods of the agreement, questioned which USG law
enforcement agencies would have access to the information,
and voiced a general concern about potential misuse of the
personal information (names, DOBs, addresses, passport
numbers, etc.) that would be shared by the agreement. Piltz
further claimed that the U.S. government as a whole lacked
effective data protection measures in comparison to Germany
and questioned why the USG does not have a overall federal
data protection commissioner as Germany does. (Comment:
Piltz' remark underscores the importance of ensuring German
officials receive information about USG data protection
policy. The April visit to Berlin by DHS Chief Privacy
Officer Callahan was useful in this regard, but more needs to
be done to ensure German officials understand U.S. data
protection policy. End Comment.)
¶6. (C) FDP leaders have also taken aim at U.S.-EU agreements
that include data sharing elements. Following the July EU
GAERC decision to give the Swedish EU Presidency a mandate to
begin negotiating a successor agreement governing USG access
to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunications (SWIFT) database of financial
transactions, FDP head Guido Westerwelle called the plan
"totally unacceptable" and said that the "plan must be
stopped." Parliamentarian Piltz, who is a member of the
Bundestag Interior Committee, has criticized the U.S.-EU
Passenger Name Record (PNR) data transfer agreement for
collecting "pointless" information on travelers and she
doubts whether the information collected under PNR would be
of any value to law enforcement officials. In meetings with
EconOffs, Piltz broadly spoke of governments, particularly
that of the U.S., accumulating large amounts of data on their
(mostly) innocent citizens. Piltz expressed concerns that
German commercial interests could be damaged when U.S.
authorities obtained PNR data on German business travelers
that might somehow be shared with American competitors.
Would the FDP be a reliable security partner?

---------------------------------------------
¶7. (C) The FDP's voting record on counterterrorism

legislation and the views of leading FDP security policy
figures described here suggest that cooperation on security

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matters, particularly those involving information sharing,

with a future German government that includes the FDP could
be problematic. At times, the FDP's fixation on data privacy
and protection issues looks to have come at the expense of
the party forming responsible views on security policy. The
FDP has been out of power for over 10 years and lack
experience tackling security issues in the Internet age. The
FDP appears not to fully grasp the transnational character of
terrorism today and terrorists' increasing use of the
Internet and related technology to recruit, train and
organize. Current Interior Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble (CDU)
has repeatedly drawn attention to terrorist use of the
Internet, which he calls the "main medium of holy war against
the West - it is the communication platform, advertising
medium, distance university, training camp, think tank and
recruiting instrument for terrorists." Schaeuble understands
that combating terrorism in a globalized world requires
international cooperation and for security officials to use
modern technology. No FDP leader has displayed a similar
understanding of the need to find a proper balance between
personal freedoms and security measures; the FDP has all too
often found it politically expedient to cast these goals as
mutually exclusive.
¶8. (C) At election campaign rallies last week FDP Chairman

Guido Westerwelle criticized the on-line surveillance
measures contained in the BKA law and championed the FDP as
the sole party committed to data privacy and protection
issues. FDP parliamentarian Sabine
Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger has been suggested as a possible
Justice Minister in a CDU/CSU - FDP government, a job she
previously held under Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU). Given
that she resigned as Justice Minister in 1996 after failing
to obtain support for her rejection of a CDU proposal to
expand the state's right to monitor private citizens, we
would expect her to closely scrutinize all bilateral and
U.S.-EU information sharing proposals. In particular, a
FDP-led Justice Ministry could well complicate implementation
of the bilateral Pruem-like agreement, prevent negotiations
on a HSPD-6 terrorist screening data sharing arrangement, and
raise objections to U.S.-EU information sharing initiatives.
¶9. (C) An MFA official working in the counterterrorism office

noted that one reason the FDP has been so vocal in opposing
Germany's counterterrorism legislative drafts, bilateral and
U.S.-EU security initiatives is due to the fact that they are
in the opposition. Pure political considerations dictate
that the role of the opposition is to oppose the governing
coalition's proposals. Following this line of reasoning,
were the FDP to join the CDU/CSU in a governing coalition,
the responsibilities of power would perhaps convince them to
take a more constructive approach to counterterrorism and

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security issues. Furthermore, given that the FDP would be

the junior partner in the coalition, we hope that CDU/CSU
leadership would ensure that German legal frameworks are
adequate and that law enforcement and security officials
continue our current close cooperation and robust information
sharing on operational matters.
Murphy

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Viewing cable 09BERLIN1176, MERKEL VS. STEINMEIER? WHAT DO THE GERMAN




Discussing cables

09BERLIN1176
VZCZCXRO1354
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHRL #1176/01 2651345
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 221345Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN

Cable Viewer

NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/CE, INR (KEETON)

TREASURY FOR ICN (KOHLER)
NSC FOR JEFF HOVENIER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2019

TAGS: ECON EFIN EINV ENRG ETRD GM KJUS PGOV PREL
PTER, SENV
SUBJECT: MERKEL VS. STEINMEIER? WHAT DO THE GERMAN
ELECTIONS REALLY MEAN FOR U.S. INTERESTS?
REF: A. BERLIN 32
¶B. BERLIN 1002
¶C. BERLIN 1136
¶D. BERLIN 1138
¶E. BERLIN 1162
Classified By: MINISTER COUNSELOR FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS GEORGE

GLASS FO
R REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D)
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C/NF) This is not a "change" election. The German public

does not see the September 27 parliamentary elections as
decisive, and on many foreign policy fronts, including
Afghanistan, arms control, and Russia, we do not foresee
significant or distinct policy differences between the two
most feasible coalition options. The most likely results of
the elections are a CDU/CSU-FDP (black-yellow) coalition or a
continued CDU/CSU-SPD Grand Coalition. However, in some
areas there may be changes, including on Iran, tax policy,
and nuclear energy. More importantly, there may be a new
foreign minister who will likely need to get up to speed
quickly on such crucial issues as Iran, Afghanistan, and
NATO's strategic posture. Leaders from the CDU/CSU and FDP
promise a government more friendly toward the United States.
The near certainty that Angela Merkel will remain chancellor
argues for this, but the unpredictability of Foreign

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Minister-aspirant and FDP Chairman Guido Westerwelle may call

for focused diplomatic engagement with the new FDP political
actors (see REFTEL E for Post's comprehensive expose of
Westerwelle). END SUMMARY.
BLACK-YELLOW (CDU/CSU-FDP)?
---------------------------
¶2. (C/NF) It is virtually certain that Angela Merkel will

retain her position as Chancellor after this Sunday's
elections. But it is impossible to predict the final
composition of the next coalition given that about a third of
the electorate is still undecided and the polls show only a
narrow parliamentary majority for black-yellow. Chancellor
Merkel has repeatedly voiced her preference for a
black-yellow coalition and has promised to form one even with
a one-vote parliamentary majority. The FDP's Westerwelle has
echoed this sentiment as its first choice as well.
¶3. (C/NF) The SPD has almost no prospect of leading a

government and is only likely to remain in power as a
weakened junior partner in another Grand Coalition, should
the CDU/CSU-FDP come up short of a parliamentary majority.
The SPD has failed to gain much momentum, although it has
more recently risen a couple of points in the polls. It
continues to suffer from an inability to profile itself
against the CDU (or even a lack of desire to break with the
CDU in any significant way), with which it has been in
government for the past four years. Also unhelpful have been
a string of losses in local, state, and the June European
Parliament elections.
¶4. (C/NF) U.S. interests will not only be affected by the
composition of the next coalition but also which parties are
in the opposition. A CDU/CSU-FDP coalition would bring to
power a new set of top players at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Justice, Environment, and at either Economics or
Finance (as well as probably at least one other FDP-led
ministry with some turnover in CDU/CSU ministries as well).
The extent to which policy will change is less obvious,
however, because FDP Chairman and Foreign Minister aspirant
Guido Westerwelle has promised considerable continuity with
Steinmeier's approach to foreign policy. In addition, the
FDP's economic reform goals will face considerable resistance
from the Bavarian CSU as well as parts of the CDU. The lack
of coordination and consistency, including between the
Chancellery and MFA, that often occurs in German policy
making will continue to be a challenge for the United States.
¶5. (C/NF) A black-yellow coalition will face a more united

opposition led by an SPD that is likely to move left if it

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leaves government and seeks to profile itself against the

Greens and the Left Party, based on the profiles of SPD
leaders waiting in the wings for Steinmeier and SPD Chairman
BERLIN 00001176 002 OF 006
Franz Muentefering to leave. German governments can operate

with narrow majorities due to strict party discipline (which
gets stricter the narrower the majority), but Merkel has not
shown much courage in using her considerable personal
popularity to push through policies that lack public support.
On Afghanistan, in particular, a black-yellow coalition may
seek to simply roll over the ISAF mandate unchanged when it
comes up for renewal in December, rather than risk a row in
the Bundestag over an increase in the troop ceiling, which
the Defense Ministry has concluded is necessary to deal with
the growing insurgency in the German north.
OR GRAND COALITION (CDU/CSU-SPD)?

---------------------------------
¶6. (C/NF) However, another Grand Coalition cannot be

discounted, even though nobody professes to want it. It is a
historical fact that the center-right parties have not won a
parliamentary majority since 1994. Another Grand Coalition
would almost certainly be even more difficult for the CDU/CSU
and the SPD than the current one since both parties would be
eyeing each other with distrust and the expectation that the
government may not last an entire term. Further, Merkel's
position within her party would be weakened by what would be
viewed as her failure to achieve a coalition with the FDP
while the Free Democrats would continue to take advantage of
conservative dissatisfaction with the Grand Coalition's
disgruntled CDU voters.
¶7. (C/NF) The SPD leadership might be secretly relieved not

to lose their government posts, but its continued partnership
with the CDU/CSU would likely cause further bleeding of the
party's more leftist supporters to the Greens and Left Party,
further weakening its base. In addition, the SPD left-right
split might be exacerbated, with leftists tempted to
prematurely rupture the Grand Coalition to build a majority
red-red-green government where the SPD would hold the
chancellorship. CDU officials certainly believe -- and have
told the Embassy -- that they expect the SPD would seek to
replace a Grand Coalition with a red-red-green one some time
during the term. Even though Steinmeier has insisted that
any coalition agreement would be for the entire legislative
period, the distrust between the parties would remain. Plus,
if the SPD performs badly in the election, Steinmeier
literally may no longer be in a position to keep his word.

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GERMANY'S NEXT FOREIGN MINISTER - WESTERWELLE OR STEINMEIER?

--------------------------------------------- ---------------
¶8. (C/NF) The election's most obvious impact on bilateral

relations will be in terms of a potential change in foreign
ministers. Our extensive experience with Steinmeier allows
us to comfortably predict how a Steinmeier-led MFA would
pursue German interests globally, and vis-a-vis the United
States. On the other hand, Westerwelle continues to remain
an enigma who has been unable to establish himself as a
significant voice on foreign affairs. The FDP's foreign
policy spokesman Werner Hoyer -- a well known foreign policy
analyst in Germany and internationally, including in the
United States -- has taken the lead here. When we asked
Hoyer this week what would change with Westerwelle, he
struggled to say anything. Westerwelle is a domestic
political animal with little appetite for foreign policy and
international affairs. He will, therefore, continue to be
dependent for foreign policy advice on his mentor, former
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher as well as on Hoyer
and whichever Ministry diplomats gain his trust (REFTEL E).
¶9. (C/NF) Westerwelle's attempt to position himself among

Germany's foreign policy elite with a speech in May at the
German Foreign Relations Council (DGAP) did not produce the
intended results and instead revealed his limitations on such
major issues as Middle East peace. If Westerwelle becomes
Germany's next foreign minister, his learning curve will be
steep. Germany's small foreign and security policy elite --
already skeptical of Westerwelle -- will resent his rise into
the second most powerful political office of the land. And
we will be faced with the question of how best to approach
someone who has clearly had a mixed relationship with the
United States. Despite Westerwelle's praise and respect for
the current Obama Administration, we should not forget that,
as part of the opposition, he has criticized the United
States for the last eight years, while at the same time
BERLIN 00001176 003 OF 006
offering very few ideas of his own on how to solve

international problems (see REFTEL E).
¶10. (C/NF) If Steinmeier is able to lead the SPD to a strong

enough showing to force a Grand Coalition, he certainly could
maintain his position as Foreign Minister. He would also
have the increased political clout provided by a mandate in
the Bundestag and his success in blocking a CDU/CSU-FDP
coalition. Obviously, there would be a high degree of
foreign policy continuity. Unlike Westerwelle, Steinmeier is

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already on board with both sides of the U.S. approach to

Iran, and he has told the Ambassador that he supports
additional sanctions should Tehran fail to respond to U.S.
overtures. However, competition between Steinmeier and
Merkel over control of foreign policy will not end with the
election, and Steinmeier would likely try to focus on a few
key issues where he could differentiate himself and his party
from Merkel and the CDU, with arms control, Afghanistan, and
Russian relations being likely choices. Steinmeier wants to
work closely with Washington on these issues and is less
likely to surprise Washington than the Chancellery would be.
¶11. (C/NF) The goodwill that marked the first year of the
Grand Coalition is unlikely to be repeated in a second term,
particularly as Steinmeier contends with those in his own
party who would prefer a leftist coalition. If there is not
enough support for a CDU/CSU-FDP coalition, then there would
likely be a numerical red-red-green majority in the
Bundestag. The strained communication that currently marks
Chancellery-MFA relations is likely to continue. Both
Steinmeier and Merkel are responsible realists, however, who
understand the need to work together on the big issues, as
was evident during the Russian invasion of Georgia, their
approach to the Middle East, and their reaction to the
international financial melt down. If new crises arise, the
two are likely to continue to put their own interests aside
long enough to speak with a single voice.
FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES IN BLACK-YELLOW AND GRAND COALITIONS

--------------------------------------------- -------------
¶12. (C/NF) AFGHANISTAN (Some Change): Westerwelle is one of

the few German politicians who justifies the Afghanistan
deployment on the basis of "German national security
interests" and the FDP as a whole has been a consistent
supporter of the ISAF mandate. But with only a narrow
majority in the Bundestag and facing an SPD opposition ready
to accuse them of militarizing the German mission, a
CDU-CSU/FDP coalition ironically might be less willing (and
able) to push through necessary troop increases than a Grand
Coalition. On the other hand, there is likely to be no
difference between the two on the support for police
training, economic assistance and other civilian aid.
¶13. (SBU) ARMS CONTROL/NONPROLIFERATION (Little change):

Westerwelle proudly says that the motto of the MFA under his
leadership will be "peace through disarmament," thereby
seeking to be even more pro-arms control than Steinmeier.
Although Westerwelle has called for the removal of all U.S.
tactical nuclear weapons from German soil by 2013, it is
questionable whether he will manage to include this in a
coalition agreement with the CDU/CSU given their likely

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resistance.
¶14. (C/NF) RUSSIA (No change): Like the SPD, the FDP sees
Russia as a "strategic partner" in addressing issues such as
Iran, energy, and Afghanistan and believes engagement and
assistance with modernization is the best way to address
Russia's democratic deficits. Like Merkel and Steinmeier,
Westerwelle has pursued close ties to Russian leaders,
including Foreign Minister Lavrov and Defense Minister
Ivanov, both of whom gave him high-profile meetings in Moscow
this past spring.
¶15. (C/NF) IRAN (Some change): Steinmeier has been a steady

supporter of US policy toward Iran -- both in terms of
dialogue and the need for increased sanctions if necessary,
while Westerwelle has spoken almost exclusively about the
need for dialogue. In addition, Westerwelle's FDP's
pro-business orientation makes it particularly skeptical of
sanctions and is also resistant to unilateral efforts to cut
back trade. Merkel will likely have to take a stronger role
in this issue to keep Germany's position from falling back to
BERLIN 00001176 004 OF 006
the least common denominator.
¶16. (C/NF) TURKEY (Some change): A black-yellow coalition

may result in a subtle, less favorable, shift in Germany's
policy towards Turkey with the exit of the SPD -- Turkey's
staunchest supporter -- from the government. Although FDP
foreign policy experts recognize that EU membership is an
important factor in encouraging additional domestic reforms
in Turkey, it has kept an open mind on the issue. However,
the FDP is more vocal than the SPD in its criticism of
Turkey.
¶17. (C/NF) MIDDLE EAST (Little change): Westerwelle's views

on Israel and Middle East peace may stem more from his past
experience in addressing criticism against Israel and his
interpretation of Germany's historical role toward Israel
than from his own Middle East policy or strategic
calculations. Some attribute Westerwelle's current
pro-Israel stance as the result of his having been burned
politically both domestically and in Israel in 2002. At that
time, Westerwelle defended an FDP politician, Juergen
Moellemann, who had published a brochure strongly critical of
then Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's actions towards
the Palestinians. Some claimed the brochure was
anti-Semitic. While in Israel shortly thereafter,
Westerwelle was questioned by then-PM Sharon about what
Sharon referred to as a growing anti-Semitism in Germany and

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Europe. In an August 2009 interview with "Der Spiegel,"

Westerwelle explained his decision to vote against Germany's
participation in UNIFIL with his view that Germany cannot
take a neutral position in the Middle East because of its
past. He noted that he had visited the Golan Heights in
Israel as a young man and was impressed with the
vulnerability of the country. Even more so than Steinmeier,
however, Westerwelle may seek a greater role for Germany and
the EU in the Middle East. In the "Spiegel" interview, he
called for the EU to launch an initiative to establish a
conference for security and cooperation in the Middle East.
We could expect both Steinmeier and Westerwelle to hold to
U.S. messages on the Middle East, with both competing with
the Chancellery for the lead on this issue.
¶18. (C/NF) GUANTANAMO (No change): Steinmeier would likely

take a more accommodating approach toward Germany accepting
some of the Guantanamo detainees than would Westerwelle, but
the key ministry in deciding this issue will continue to be
Interior. In either a black-yellow or another Grand
Coalition, Wolfgang Schaeuble (CDU) could continue on as
Interior Minister, although there is some talk of his being
named as EU commissioner. Schaeuble has been very skeptical
of accepting detainees from a security standpoint. More
recently, he told the Ambassador that Germany would only take
detainees who will require no surveillance.
¶19. (SBU) ECONOMIC CRISIS/INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION

(Little Change): All potential government parties share a
similar strategy; increase regulation and supervision of the
financial sector with differences at the margin. The SPD
advocates taxing share trades over 1000 euros and monitoring
private equity funds more closely, while the CDU/CSU and FDP
propose concentrating financial supervision under the
Bundesbank. A black-yellow government would result in a new
Finance Minister; if Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg remains at
the Economics Ministry, then the FDP might be given the
Finance Minister, with Hans-Otto Solms, an experienced and
cautious financial policy expert, the most likely replacement.
¶20. (C) CLIMATE CHANGE (No Change): There is little

difference between the parties on issues in play at the
upcoming UNFCCC's COP-15 in Copenhagen, and Merkel maintains
strong control over German policy in this area. There will
be a new Environment Minister should a black-yellow
government be formed, however, and it is unclear which party
would then control the Ministry. In previous CDU/CSU-FDP
coalitions, the CDU ran it but if the FDP does as well as
current polls suggest, it might make a play for the Ministry.
Current SPD Environment Minister Sigmar Gabriel has had a
high profile in his party's Bundestag campaign and could
remain in place in a Grand Coalition.

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¶21. (C) ENERGY (Some Change): The SPD insisted on

continuation of the previous government's plan to phase out
nuclear power plants during the last coalition negotiations
BERLIN 00001176 005 OF 006
and would stick to this position again. In contrast, the FDP

has been the party most open to nuclear energy, insisting
that the phase-out itself should be at least slowed down to
protect Germany's supply of energy. The CSU/CSU also wants
to extend the possible life of existing nuclear power plants,
provided they are safe, during a "transitional" period to
provide time for Germany to switch to greater reliance on
renewable sources. Recent controversies over the safety of
some nuclear power plants have made Merkel and even the FDP
less willing to press for reliance on nuclear energy.
¶22. (C/NF) DATA PROTECTION (Little Change): Data privacy has

been a second-tier campaign issue but does arise in debates
on domestic security policy. Another Grand Coalition could
leave Justice Minister Brigitte Zypries (SPD) in place; she
reluctantly agreed to the landmark data sharing initiative on
serious crime and terrorism suspects (the Pruem-like
agreement) due to privacy concerns. A CDU/CSU-FDP coalition
might return Sabine Leutheusser-Scharrenberger to the Justice
Ministry, which she headed from 1992-96 in the last
black-yellow coalition (she resigned her office after the her
party agreed to wiretapping legislation proposed by the
CDU/CSU). She or any FDP Justice Minister would likely
continue to see their role as the protector of civil
liberties and therefore they would carefully scrutinize all
bilateral and U.S.-EU data sharing initiatives.
¶23. (C/NF) COUNTER-TERRORISM/LAW ENFORCEMENT (Little change):
The CDU will likely remain in control of the Interior
Ministry regardless of the coalition, and Schaeuble, although
67, is likely but not certain to stay on for another term.
He has brought U.S.-German CT cooperation to an unprecedented
level, and no other German official has offered as much
cooperation (except on the issue of resettling Guantanamo
detainees where the focus on internal German security
supersedes his desire to work with Washington). Any possible
replacement -- Chancellery Chief Thomas de Maiziere has been
mentioned in the press -- is unlikely to have his authority
or expertise but will likely continue his policies.
¶24. (U) TRADE (No change): All five parties are committed to
open market but the SPD, Greens, and The Left Party want
environmental and social standards included while the CDU/CSU
stresses the need for protection of intellectual property and

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the FDP worries about domestic subsidies and market access.

None of the parties wants to restructure the German economy
to reduce export-dependency and address global imbalances.
Other U.S. interests, such as concluding the Doha round of
trade negotiations, would not likely be affected by a change
in coalition.
¶25. (U) TAX POLICY (Some change): Tax policy is often cited
as the area where a black-yellow government would produce
change. The FDP proposes a radical overhaul of the tax
system to simplify the tax code and stagger the corporate
rate. CSU leader and Bavaria Minister-President Horst
Seehofer has been critical of the FDP plan, which he says
will run up the deficit and impose an excessive burden on the
public budget. Neither the CDU/CSU's nor FDP's tax proposals
are realistic, however, in light of budget deficits that are
expected to be more than 2 percent this year and 4 percent in
2010, just as mid-term targets for Germany's balanced budget
amendment kick in. Some sort of tax increase therefore is a
near certainty, perhaps in the form of an increase in the
value-added tax.
COMMENT
-------
¶26. (C/NF) Chancellor Merkel will continue to exert strong

influence on German foreign policy in an attempt to create a
political legacy in international affairs. This will be true
whether the MFA is led by Steinmeier or Westerwelle. We can
also predict that tensions between the Chancellery and MFA
will remain based on different coalition partners controlling
them. If Steinmeier returns to office, he will be a reliable
partner. Westerwelle is a wild card; his exuberant
personality does not lend itself to taking a back seat to
Chancellor Merkel on any issue. If he becomes foreign
minister, there is the possibility of higher profile discord
between the Chancellery and MFA. This may demand focused
diplomatic engagement by the USG with the new FDP political
actors. END COMMENT.
BERLIN 00001176 006 OF 006
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Viewing cable 09BERLIN1197, WESTERWELLE'S SURGE CLINCHES BLACK-YELLOW

IN



Discussing cables

2009-09-28 2010-11-28
11:11 18:06
VZCZCXRO5783
DE RUEHRL #1197/01 2711128
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 281128Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN

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SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/CE, INR (KEETON)

NSC FOR JEFF HOVENIER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2019

TAGS: GM PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: WESTERWELLE'S SURGE CLINCHES BLACK-YELLOW IN
GERMANY; MERKEL GAINS SECOND TERM
REF: A. BERLIN 1188

¶B. BERLIN 1186
¶C. BERLIN 1176
¶D. BERLIN 1167
¶E. BERLIN 1162
¶F. BERLIN 1138
¶G. BERLIN 1179
Classified By: AMBASSADOR PHILIP D. MURPHY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)

and (D)
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C) Chancellor Merkel achieved her goal of a solid

parliamentary majority for her Christian Democratic Union
(CDU) with its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social
Union (CSU), and the pro-business Free Democratic Party
(FDP), but will have to contend with a self-confident FDP
that is likely to seek major concessions in terms of policy
and personnel. Nonetheless, the CDU/CSU's 33.8 percent
showing was its lowest since 1949, while the FDP's 14.6
percent was its strongest in the history of the Federal
Republic. The SPD crashed, while the Left Party and Greens
were able to score their highest results ever, with the Left
Party surpassing the Greens overall and overtaking the SPD in
the eastern German states by a wide margin. Merkel hopes
that coalition negotiations with the FDP will be "quick and
decisive," while FDP Chairman Guido Westerwelle -- widely
expected to be the next foreign minister -- has emphasized
his intention to press for the party's goals of a fundamental
tax reform, more emphasis on education, and stronger
protection of civil liberties. Merkel and Westerwelle
already met privately election night (September 27) and
coalition negotiations should begin soon, most likely with

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the goal of having a formal agreement with the selection of a

cabinet by the time the Bundestag convenes a month from now.
End Summary.
OVERALL TREND: MAJOR PARTIES IN DECLINE

---------------------------------------
¶2. (U) The results show the decline of the major parties --
particularly the SPD -- and the strengthening of a five-party
system. Preliminary results give CDU/CSU 33.8 percent
(versus 35.2 percent in 2005); the FDP 14.6 percent (9.8);
the SPD 23.0 (34.3); the Left Party 11.9 (8.7), and the
Greens 10.7 (8.1). The decline in the CDU/CSU percentage is
due particularly to the CSU's losses in Bavaria, where the
party suffered its worst Bundestag result ever at 42.6
percent, down from 49.2 percent in 2005, but it still won all
45 of its constituencies. These preliminary results give the
CDU 24 "surplus mandates" because of the high number of
constituency seats it won despite its low 33.8 percent second
vote showing (see REFTEL G).
¶3. (U) The new coalition should end up with control of both
the Bundestag and the Bundesrat (Upper Council). Based on
the preliminary official results, the CDU/CSU will have 239
seats in the Bundestag (up from 226), which along with the 93
FDP Bundestag seats (previously 61) would give the new
government a solid majority. The SPD will have 146 seats in
the Bundestag (down from 222), the Left Party 76 (versus 54)
and the Greens 68 (versus 51). The Schleswig Holstein
election on September 27 also appears to have given the CDU
and FDP a parliamentary majority in that state. With CDU-FDP
governments there and in Saxony, where the two parties won a
majority on August 30, the new CDU/CSU-FDP coalition will
soon have a majority in the Bundesrat and should be able to
gain its approval of future coalition legislation.
¶4. (C) Chancellor Merkel and her CDU/CSU Union are somewhat
disappointed by their party's results, but are publicly
emphasizing that the CDU/CSU-SPD Grand Coalition has met its
demise and will be replaced by a center-right coalition
composed of the CDU/CSU and FDP. "We achieved something
fantastic," said Chancellor Merkel, now facing a second
four-year term. "We achieved a stable majority in Germany
for a new government...We can party tonight, but there is a
lot of work waiting for us." An uncharacteristically
emotional Merkel -- clearly relieved by her victory --
promised to be the "Chancellor of all Germans" -- old and
young, entrepreneurs and workers -- and said the CDU/CSU
would be sufficiently dominant in the new coalition to
prevail "in questions that affect social balance."
¶5. (C) Despite her huge personal popularity, however, Merkel

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led her CDU/CSU Union to its second poorest result in

history, leaving her vulnerable to future backstabbing within
BERLIN 00001197 002 OF 003
her party. Merkel -- while happy to be rid of the Grand

Coalition with the SPD -- now faces the challenging task of
entering a coalition with a party that could prove to be more
difficult to manage than the SPD. Merkel will start talks
with the FDP within days. It could, however, take up to the
end of October for the parties to forge the policy
compromises and work out the distribution of cabinet posts
necessary to seal a coalition deal.
FDP: THE REAL WINNER

--------------------
¶6. (C) The FDP will return to government after eleven years
in opposition, having achieved its best election results in
the party's history. Its leader, FDP Party Chairman Guido
Westerwelle, will most likely become Germany's next foreign
minister (see REFTEL E). At the FDP election celebration,
Westerwelle told his party faithful that "We want to be part
of the government. But this means responsibility, and we are
ready to take on this responsibility." Westerwelle said his
party would work to ensure that Germany gets a "fair tax
system and better educational opportunities" and that civil
rights would once again be respected. The FDP will be in a
very powerful position to demand a larger number of cabinet
seats in a new German government. They are likely to expect
to get at least the equivalent of what they have had in the
past: the foreign office, either justice or perhaps interior
(which they led from 1969-82), economics or possibly finance,
and at least one other ministry (in the past they have had
education and economic cooperation (i.e. development).
However, the FDP will find it difficult to negotiate a
coalition agreement with the CDU/CSU over the coming weeks,
especially in the areas of tax cuts (see REFTEL F) and civil
rights, including data privacy (see REFTEL D).
SPD: HARD ROAD AHEAD

--------------------
¶7. (C) It would be hard to exaggerate the dimension of the

SPD defeat. The party fell more than 11 points to its worst
result in the post-war period. Its share of the eastern
German vote was 19 percent, behind both the CDU and Left
Party, and the FDP came within striking distance of the SPD
in some western German states, including Bavaria, where the
SPD's 17 percent was just ahead of the FDP's 15 percent. The
SPD election-night party was like a funeral, and Steinmeier

Cable Viewer
and SPD party chairman Muentefering appeared grim-faced to

announce that Steinmeier would be the Bundestag caucus
chairman and thus unofficial leader of the opposition to the
new black-yellow government. Muentefering did not, as many
expected, announce his resignation but it is likely to come
by the time of the next party conference in mid-November.
¶8. (C) Exit polls show that the SPD lost more than a million
votes to former supporters who simply stayed home and
additional voters to the Left Party and Greens, and that the
public still blames it for the changes in unemployment
insurance and the retirement age enacted during the Schroeder
government and as part of the grand coalition. The SPD, with
only four minister-presidents and a shrunken parliamentary
caucus, will have to decide how to profile itself against its
two fellow leftist opposition parties, and the party left is
likely to press for coalitions with the Left and Greens at
the state level.
LEFT OVERTAKES GREENS

---------------------
¶9. (C) The Left Party -- under Oskar Lafontaine's and Gregor
Gysi's leadership -- can also claim electoral victory with
their party's best showing ever in a parliamentary election.
Having won 11.9 per cent of the total vote and 20 direct
mandates -- the largest number ever for one of the smaller
parties -- it will be difficult for Germany's other parties,
especially the SPD, to ignore The Left's steady rise in
popularity in east and west Germany (see REFTEL B). The
party successfully stole the SPD's thunder and was partially
responsible for the SPD's poorest showing ever in German
election history. The Left Party can now concentrate on
achieving the ultimate prize in German politics in 2013: a
governing coalition with the SPD and the Greens. Berlin SPD
Governing Mayor Klaus Wowereit has already said that this
year's election must be the last one in which the SPD
excludes the possibility of cooperation with the Left, and he
and other left-wingers in the SPD will likely fight to bring
the two parties closer together.
GREENS: HOW TO STAY RELEVANT?
BERLIN 00001197 003 OF 003
-----------------------------
¶10. (C) The Greens may have celebrated their first double
digit showing (10.7 per cent) in a parliamentary election,
but the party was unsuccessful in preventing a black-yellow
coalition or becoming the third strongest party in the

Cable Viewer
Bundestag (see REFTEL A). Party Co-Chairman Cem Oezdemir --

who failed to win his direct mandate and was too low on the
party list to win a seat in the Bundestag -- said that the
Greens would establish themselves as a "think tank for social
issues and for Germany as a whole." The SPD's disastrous
electoral result will remind the Greens that they may need to
reach out to the CDU if they are to remain a relevant
political power. For the foreseeable future, Oezdemir hinted
that his party would concentrate on achieving good results at
future state elections and plotting their return to power in
¶2013.
COMMENT
-------
¶11. (C) Chancellor Merkel's main campaign objective -- to

attract centrist support by out-positioning the SPD as the
best protector of Germany's social welfare state -- was
successful, although her CDU/CSU union suffered losses,
primarily because of the CSU. She will now have to find a
way to balance this promise with FDP demands for greater
reforms while dealing with the likely struggles between a
strengthened FDP and a CSU that is concerned about its
continued decline. The parties will now enter complex
coalition negotiations with pressure to complete them by the
time that the new Bundestag convenes in late October, these
talks have the potential to be very contentious. Merkel will
want to stamp her authority on the coalition agreement, while
Westerwelle will be a tough bargaining partner for Merkel as
he aims to extract the maximum amount of policy and personnel
concessions from the CDU/CSU. Finally, as a weakened SPD
moves into the opposition, it can be expected that it will
seek to continue the public debate on the major campaign
issues and begin to rebuild itself, a process that could
include its strong re-positioning to the left.
¶12. (C) What does a CDU/CSU-FDP victory mean for the United
States? On a practical level, Germany will have a new
foreign minister, most likely Guido Westerwelle, who has
enjoyed a difficult relationship with the United States
during his time spent in opposition (see REFTEL D).
Westerwelle will face a steep learning curve at the MFA, but
we should not expect him to play second fiddle to Chancellor
Merkel. The foreign and security policy rivalry between the
MFA and Chancellery during the Bush Administration will not
disappear. Indeed, they may be enhanced with Westerwelle's
attempt to profile and make an international name for himself
as quickly as possible, making it difficult for us to
identify who is in the lead on any given issue. Chancellor
Merkel and Westerwelle will be competing for attention; the
latter's flamboyant and outgoing style may give him a leg up
but Chancellor Merkel will be keen to assert her primacy in

Cable Viewer
international affairs, especially on economic and EU matters.

She has more government and foreign policy experience that
will come in handy in this future duel, and in an age of
international summitry, the Chancellor rather than the
Foreign Minister calls the shots. We should not
underestimate her desire to carve out a political legacy for
herself, especially in the international arena, and her
record of strong cooperation with Washington suggests that
her dominance is likely to have a net benefit for US
interests.
¶13. (U) This cable was coordinated with Consulates General

Duesseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Leipzig, and Munich.
Murphy

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Viewing cable 09BERLIN1271, WESTERWELLE FIRM ON REMOVAL OF NUCLEAR

WEAPONS



Discussing cables

09BERLIN1271
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRL #1271/01 2821248

ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 091248Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN

Cable Viewer

INFO RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV MNUC MARR GM
SUBJECT: WESTERWELLE FIRM ON REMOVAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
FROM GERMANY IN COALITION NEGOTIATIONS
REF: A. BERLIN 1162

¶B. BERLIN 1241
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor George Glass for

reasons 1.
4 (b,d).
¶1. (C//NF) Summary: A well-placed FDP source said that on

the first day of coalition negotiations (October 5) between
the CDU, CSU and the FDP, FDP leader Westerwelle argued for
the removal of the remaining non-strategic nuclear weapons
from German soil. Interior Minister Schaeuble (CDU) asserted
that the weapons serve as a deterrent. Other foreign policy
issues discussed included support for Afghanistan and
Turkey's accession to the EU. Source said that Chancellor
Merkel (CDU) may push to complete the negotiations by October
18, but noted that the FDP is in no hurry. He provided
Emboffs with a list of the membership of the negotiations
plenary and working groups as well as timetable. Cabinet
composition will only be decided at the end of coalition
negotiations. End summary.
Westerwelle Firm on Removal of Nuclear Weapons

--------------------------------------------- -
¶2. (C//NF) Formal coalition negotiations between Guido

Westerwelle's Free Democratic Party (FDP), Chancellor
Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian
Social Union (CSU) on a coalition agreement began on October
¶5. FDP strategist shared with Emboffs and visiting Senior
Germany Desk Officer October 7 information on issues
discussed during the first two days of these negotiations as
well as the negotiations schedule and working group make-up.
Source serves as his party's notetaker for the negotiations
and has been a long-standing close Embassy contact.

Cable Viewer
¶3. (C//NF) Source said that on October 5 negotiations

included discussion on arms control in general and removal of
the remaining non-strategic nuclear weapons from German soil.
He said that Federal Interior Minister Schaeuble argued that
the weapons serve as a deterrent to Iran. (Note: Regarding
Schaeuble, source commented that he is "neurotic" in that he
sees threats everywhere. He questioned whether Schaeuble's
influence is as great as it once was and whether he will stay
in his position. End note.) According to source,
Westerwelle asserted that nuclear weapons on German soil do
not serve as a deterrent against Iran since they could not
reach Iran. He said that Westerwelle underlined that
President Obama is moving forward toward a "nuclear-free
world" and that he wants Germany to be in the lead. Source
said that Chancellor Merkel quipped in response that Germany
is not that important in this regard -- the world would
hardly take notice if there were action on this matter.
According to source, Merkel wanted to avoid discussion of
this topic. Source also said that there was criticism of
Social Democratic Party Foreign Minister Steinmeier that he
did not respond adequately to President Obama's Prague speech
in which he discussed arms control. In response to Poloff
query, source said that the issue of removal of nuclear
weapons is very important to Westerwelle and that he could
well seek to include something specific in the coalition
agreement.
Turkey's EU Membership; Afghanistan; Transatlantic Relations

--------------------------------------------- ---------------
¶4. (C//NF) Source said that Turkey's accession to the EU was

also discussed, with general agreement that Turkey is not
ready for membership and could not fulfill membership
criteria. Source said that there was agreement that no
decision would have to be reached on this issue within the
next four years in any case. Westerwelle also spoke against
any type of automatic decision in favor of membership for
Turkey. There was also general agreement that the EU is not
ready for new members at this time beyond Croatia.
¶5. (C//NF) Afghanistan was also an issue, but source only

noted that there was general agreement on the need to
continue efforts in Afghanistan. Source also stressed that
the three parties support strong transatlantic relations and
continuity in foreign policy.
The Devil's in the Details; What's the Rush?

--------------------------------------------
¶6. (C//NF) Source assessed some differences in Merkel's and

Westerwelle's approach to the negotiations, although he also
noted that the atmosphere was "very friendly and relaxed."

Cable Viewer
He observed that Merkel preferred less detail and more

general provisions, whereas Westerwelle was interested in a
detailed agreement that would guide the coalition over the

next four years. In addition, source noted that Merkel is
trying to push the negotiations along since she would like to
have the new government in place before she travels to
Washington in early November and before the EU summit at the
end of October. Source indicated that Westerwelle might try
to use Merkel's desire for speed to his advantage in the
negotiations. While he did not indicate that the FDP would
prolong negotiations intentionally, he noted that the FDP was
in no hurry to complete them.
Ministries Divided Among Parties Last

-------------------------------------
¶7. (C//NF) Regarding the possible make-up of the cabinet,

source said that no decisions will be made until the end of
coalition negotiations and that the current membership of
working groups should not be seen as an indication of who
will end up in which ministry (see ref B). Source also said
that the coalition agreement may only say which ministerial
posts go to which coalition parties, without any names being
given. The names would only be provided later, perhaps after
the Chancellor is voted in by the Bundestag. Source noted
that only two positions are certain: Angela Merkel will be
Chancellor and Guido Westerwelle will be Vice Chancellor. He
added that Westerwelle will most likely also become the next
foreign minister. He then commented that during October 5
negotiations, Economics Minister zu Guttenberg demonstrated
his interest in foreign policy and Hermann Otto Solms (FDP)
showed he could play an increasingly important role in the
financial area. Source provided Emboffs with the names of
those serving in the plenary rounds of the negotiations and a
schedule of when those rounds will take place.
--Plenary Members from the CDU: Chancellor Merkel, Interior

Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble, Chancellery Chief Thomas de
Maziere, Education Minister Annette Shavan, CDU/CSU Caucus
Chief Volker Kauder, CDU General Secretary Ronald Pofalla,
Minister President of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) Juergen
Ruettgers, Minister President of Hesse Roland Koch, Minister
President of Lower Saxony Christian Wulff.
--Plenary Members from the CSU: Minister President of Bavaria

and CSU Chair Horst Seehofer, Economics Minister Karl-Theodor
zu Guttenberg, Head of CSU Bundestag group Peter Ramsauer,
CSU Secretary General Alexander Dobrindt, Bavaria State
Parliament President Barbara Stamm, Bavaria Plenipotentiary
Markus Soeder, Bavaria Finance Minister Georg Fahrenschon,
Bavaria Justice Minister Beate Merk.

Cable Viewer
--Plenary Members from the FDP: Party Chair Guido

Westerwelle, FDP Secretary General Dirk Niebel, Bundestag
Vice President Hermann Otto Solms, FDP Deputy Caucus
Chairperson Birgit Homburger, Lower Saxony Minister for
Economics Philipp Roesler, FDP deputy chair Rainer Bruederle,
Deputy Minister President for NRW Andreas Pinkwart, Deputy
Chairperson Bundestag Education Committee Cornelia Pieper,
Bavaria State Chairperson Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger.
Comment
-------
¶8. (C//NF) Westerwelle has made the removal of nuclear

weapons from Germany one of his flagship issues in the
foreign policy arena and has raised this in various fora in
the past. It is not clear how hard he will push to have a
specific provision on this included in the coalition
agreement. Judging by source's description of the
discussion, Merkel would rather have a more general provision
regarding disarmament included and preferred to avoid
prolonged discussion on this issue.
¶9. (C//NF) The CDU/CSU is the only party that still supports
German participation in the NATO nuclear share and the
deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Germany. While the
CDU/CSU leadership is willing to fight for the current
policy, it is concerned that the ongoing Nuclear Posture
Review could significantly change U.S. policy on the
deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe,
putting it at a significant political disadvantage vis-a-vis
the rest of the German political establishment. In fact,
senior Chancellery officials have already requested that they
be pre-notified about any possible change in U.S. policy (ref
C). We expect that in these coalition negotiations, the
CDU/CSU may hedge their bets against a possible U.S. policy
change by agreeing to language that commits the next
government to seek consultations on this issue at NATO, with
the caveat that any decision must be made by the Alliance as
a whole and must take account of the large number of Russian

non-strategic nuclear weapons oriented against NATO member
states. Post will seek meetings with source after the
plenary negotiation rounds to see if additional readouts are
possible.
¶10. (C//NF) FDP source is a young, up-and-coming party

loyalist, who has offered Emboffs internal party documents in
the past. Excited with his role as FDP negotiations
notetaker, he seemed happy to share his observations and
insights and read to us directly from his notes. He also

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provided copies of documents from his "negotiations" binder.

Murphy

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Viewing cable 09BERLIN1273, GERMANS MAY BE WILLING TO SURGE IN

AFGHANISTAN,



Discussing cables

2009-10-09 2010-12-02
15:03 21:09
VZCZCXYZ0020
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRL #1273/01 2821547

Cable Viewer
ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O 091547Z OCT 09 (CCY ADC1AECC MSI3311-632)
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0862
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSNAVEUR NAPLES IT PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T COPY - ADDRESSEES ADDED
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR NATO EUN AF GM
SUBJECT: GERMANS MAY BE WILLING TO SURGE IN AFGHANISTAN,
BUT MUCH DEPENDS ON RESULT...

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Viewing cable 09BERLIN1296, GERMANY COULD HAVE NEW COALITION

GOVERNMENT WITHIN



Discussing cables

09BERLIN1296
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRL #1296/01 2891501

ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161501Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN

Cable Viewer

NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2019

TAGS: PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: GERMANY COULD HAVE NEW COALITION GOVERNMENT WITHIN
TWO WEEKS
REF: BERLIN 1271
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor George Glass for

reasons 1.
4 (b,d).
¶1. (C//NF) Summary: A well-placed Free Democratic Party

(FDP) source told Emboffs October 15 that Chancellor Angela
Merkel aims to finish coalition negotiations between her
Christian Democratic Union, the Christian Social Union, and
the FDP by October 18, but that the FDP viewed a completion
of October 23 to be more feasible. Either date would allow
the parties to hold conventions to approve the agreement
during the following days and enable the Bundestag to elect
Angela Merkel Chancellor on October 28, one day after the
first scheduled meeting of the new Bundestag. FDP source
said that in any case, the virtually certain future Foreign
Minister Guido Westerwelle would want to do the Chancellor
"the favor" of ensuring her election before her upcoming
visit to Washington on November 2. A worst case scenario --
and least likely -- is that she would be elected by November
8, source said, just prior to the November 9 fall of the Wall
anniversary. Source provided Emboffs with a list of the 15
mostly domestic-oriented points included in the FDP campaign
platform that it wants to see included in the coalition
agreement, including withdrawal of the remaining
non-strategic nuclear weapons from German soil, the only one
addressing foreign policy (reftel). End summary.
¶2. (C//NF) Source provided Emboffs with a schedule of the

next days of the coalition negotiations. The schedule showed
that the various working groups of the negotiations would
each report to the plenary (see reftel) October 16-17, with a
smaller group of the plenary then meeting on October 17 to
iron out disputed issues and beginning discussions on
division of the ministerial portfolios between the parties.

Cable Viewer
Chancellor Merkel, source said, hopes to wrap up the

coalition negotiations on October 18 after a full-day plenary
session, a goal he described as "very ambitious but
possible." Source noted that the FDP was not as optimistic
that a conclusion could be reached as of October 18, and
scheduled three more plenary sessions for October 21, 22 and
¶23. He noted that it is feasible that a coalition agreement
could be concluded by that date and that the three parties
would then hold conventions to approve the agreement in the
days following.
¶3. (C//NF) This schedule would enable the Bundestag to then

elect Merkel as Chancellor October 28, the day after its
first plenary. Source noted, however, that the FDP has
alerted the party of three possible party convention dates:
October 25 -- if things go as plans, November 1 -- if
negotiations are prolonged, or November 8 -- worst case
scenario. Source said that it would not be "unattractive"
for Westerwelle to attend the EU Summit October 29-30. This
would be a good "debut" for Westerwelle, he added. In the
event negotiations are prolonged, source said that
Westerwelle would like to do the Chancellor "the favor" by
enabling her to be elected Chancellor before she travels to
Washington November 2.
¶4. (C//NF) About the actual negotiations, FDP source

provided Emboffs with 15 points from their election platform
that the FDP would like to see included in the coalition
agreement. The majority of the 15 points focus on domestic
economic and social issues, including structural tax reform,
amendments to the social welfare and pension systems, and
support for education. The points also include the goal of
ending what is termed "unnecessary and ineffective" measures
to censor the internet and preventing domestic military
deployments. The final point, and the only one that concerns
foreign policy, calls for "entering negotiations with our
allies" in order to achieve a withdrawal of nuclear weapons
stationed in Germany during the next legislative term.
(Note: In response to Emboff questions, source said that the
goal really is to develop a plan for the withdrawal of the
nuclear weapons. End note.) FDP source said that
conscription is a disputed issue that is still under
discussion. Regarding Turkey's EU membership, FDP source
said that the FDP would rather not include anything on this
subject in the agreement, arguing that it will not be at
issue during the next four years.
¶5. (C//NF) FDP source assessed that about 85 percent of the

issues will be decided during this coming weekend. The FDP
intends to keep the remaining 15 percent of the issues open
and use them as bargaining tools for decisions on the
division of ministerial portfolios. Regarding portfolios,

Cable Viewer
FDP source commented off the record that current Interior

Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble had been trying to serve as the
CDU's "grey eminence," seeking to exert influence over many

of the working groups, beyond his own working group of
internal security. Source said that the FDP viewed his role
negatively, and that he was referred to within the FDP as "an
angry old man." He indicated that he hoped the CDU would
also view his role as counterproductive. Source, however,
noted that the agreement will only state which ministerial
portfolios each party will receive, without providing any
names. He stressed that it is up to each party to then
decide who will fill those positions.
Murphy

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Viewing cable 09BERLIN1360, THE NEW GERMAN CABINET - AN OVERVIEW


2009-10-29 2010-11-28 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR Embassy
09BERLIN1360
06:06 18:06 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Berlin
VZCZCXRO3059
RR RUEHIK
DE RUEHRL #1360/01 3020636
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 290636Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN

Cable Viewer
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BERLIN 001360
SENSITIVE
DEPT FOR EUR/CE

SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PGOV PINR GM
SUBJECT: THE NEW GERMAN CABINET - AN OVERVIEW
Ref: Berlin 1337, Berlin 1340, Berlin 1167
BERLIN 00001360 001.2 OF 004
¶1. (SBU) Chancellor Merkel's new Cabinet emerged early on

October 24
after a month of intense media speculation about its make-up; it
contained several surprises. Perhaps the most unexpected
announcements were that of former Interior Minister Schaeuble as
Finance Minister and former Economics Minister Karl-Theodor zu
Guttenberg as the new Defense Minister. The Christian Democratic
Union (CDU) will run the Chancellery as well as six ministries
and
have a minister without portfolio, the Free Democratic Party
(FDP)
will hold five as well as the Vice Chancellorship, and the
Christian
Social Union (CSU), three. The ministerial competencies and
their
names remain unchanged. Following is a short description of
Merkel's new Cabinet, which was formally sworn in on October 28:
Chief of the Chancellery and Minister

Without Portfolio: Ronald Pofalla (CDU)
--------------------------------------
Pofalla, 50, takes over from Thomas de Maiziere as the
Chancellor's
chief of staff. Pofalla is a lawyer and since 2005 served as CDU
Secretary General. He is known as a close confidant of Angela
Merkel. As Secretary General, he had been criticized as lacking
a
public profile and not being aggressive enough. From 2004-2005
he
served as deputy caucus leader for economics and labor issues in
the
Bundestag. Also within the Chancellery, Merkel's security and
foreign policy advisor Christoph Heusgen remains, as do Maria
Boehmer as Minister of State for Migration, Refugees and
Integration

Cable Viewer
and Bernd Neumann, Minister of State for Culture and Media.

Eckart
von Klaeden (CDU and a Merkel confidant) becomes State Minister
in
the Chancellery for coordination with the federal states and
parliamentary contacts.
Foreign Affairs: Guido Westerwelle (FDP)

---------------------------------------
Westerwelle, 47, becomes Foreign Minister and Vice-Chancellor --

as
expected. Economic Assistance will not be included in the
Foreign
office, but the FDP will also control that ministry. Minister of
State within the MFA will be Werner Hoyer, who already served in
that function under Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel from 1994-1998.
He also was Westerwelle's foreign policy adviser in the election
campaign. He will cover all divisions apart from "culture" and
"economics and sustainable development." The other Minister of
State is Cornelia Pieper, deputy FDP chairperson, who has no
experience in this field and will reportedly focus on cultural
and
communication issues. Martin Biesel, Westerwelle's Bundestag
chief
of staff, will become a State Secretary within the MFA to
coordinate
the work of the FDP ministries with the Chancellery. Westerwelle
has described Biesel as his closest advisor.
Defense: Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg (CSU)

----------------------------------------
The CSU's rising star, zu Guttenberg, 37, seemed certain to

remain
in the cabinet. However, there was speculation that his
Economics
Ministry seat would be up for grabs. When Economics went to the
FDP
and Finance to Schaeuble, zu Guttenberg's best fit was in
Defense.
The DefMin job gives zu Guttenberg the opportunity to work on
foreign and security issues again, which was his main area of
interest as a parliamentarian. He is seen as a good and capable
replacement for Jung, who was widely criticized for being overly
cautious and inarticulate in explaining security and defense
issues
to the German public. Zu Guttenberg is expected to improve the
Defense Ministry's image, prestige and weight within the cabinet
through his popularity and public relations talents. His
appointment has already boosted morale among working level
officials
in the MOD, who believe that zu Guttenberg will make MOD a real

Cable Viewer
player once again in German security policy debates. He is a

transatlanticist and well known in Washington. He will likely
give
the Defense Ministry a higher profile. He will retain the
current
Parliamentary State Secretaries Thomas Kossendey (CSU) and
Christian
Schmidt (CSU).
Interior: Thomas de Maiziere (CDU)

---------------------------------
De Maiziere, 55, a lawyer, is a confidant of Angela Merkel and

has
served as her chief of staff in the Chancellery for four years.
He
had been mentioned as a potential finance minister, but
reportedly,
his personal preference was interior. He brings some experience
to
the job, since he served as state interior minister in Saxony
2004-2005 and as state minister of justice 2002-2004. However,
some
of the issues he will face as federal interior minister, namely
international terrorism, are topics he has less exposure to. De
Maiziere is known to be a consensus builder who works the
interagency process well and is a good problem solver.
BERLIN 00001360 002.2 OF 004
Finance: Wolfgang Schaeuble (CDU)

---------------------------------
Merkel wanted a political heavy weight in this difficult position

during the financial and economic crisis. Schaeuble, 67, is an
experienced, strong and well established politician from
Germany's
southwest, who is expected to fill his new role quite well. He
has
by far the longest federal government experience in Merkel's
cabinet. Confined to a wheel chair since he was shot during a
campaign rally in 1990, the conservative politician from the
German
southwest is not known as a close friend of Chancellor Merkel's.
A
member of the Bundestag since 1972, he is pragmatic, copes well
with
pressure, and is known for his fierce loyalty. He does not shy
away
from confrontation and will be ready to pursue unpopular or

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controversial measures. In light of his age and his political

standing, he does not have to fear any consequences for his
future
career, which a younger candidate would take into consideration.
While he had to give up the Interior Ministry (which he
reportedly
liked very much), he is being compensated by running one of the
most
influential ministries in the cabinet. While he cooperated well
during the coalition talks, political observers would have
expected
major clashes with FDP Justice Minister Leutheusser-
Schnarrenberger
over domestic security issues if he had remained in the Interior
Ministry.
Economics and Technology: Rainer Bruederle (FDP)

--------------------------------------------- --
Bruederle, 64, has been deputy caucus chief and economic

spokesman
of the FDP in the Bundestag. He already served as economic
minster
in Rhineland Palatinate 1987-1998, where he strongly promoted
wine-growers, trade, and small and midsize business. Since 1983
he
has been state chairman of the FDP in Rhineland Palatinate and
member of the national executive committee and since 1995 deputy
national party chairman. Hans-Joachim Otto and Ernst Burgbacher
(both FDP) will become State Secretaries within that Ministry.
Labor and Social Affairs: Franz-Josef Jung (CDU)

--------------------------------------------- --
Defense Minister Jung, 60, was unexpectedly switched to the Labor

and Social Affairs ministry. Jung had fallen victim to much
criticism during his tenure as Defense Minister and Merkel had
been
pressured to replace him. Merkel, however, had to find another
cabinet post for Jung to maintain a proportional regional
representation in the cabinet - Jung's state of Hesse had to be
represented. Another reason for Merkel to keep Jung in the
cabinet
in spite of his weaknesses and previous failures is his loyalty
as a
minister.
Justice: Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger (FDP)

--------------------------------------------- --
Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, 58, is FDP chairperson and caucus

chief
in Bavaria. She successfully ran the 2008 FDP election campaign

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in
that state, where the FDP reentered the state parliament after 14
years of absence. She was the FDP's chief negotiator on Justice
in
the coalition talks. She previously served as Justice Minister
under Chancellor Kohl from 1992-1996, but resigned in opposition
to
legislation allowing electronic eavesdropping of private
residences,
which was planned by her own government. She has a strong focus
on
civil rights and data protection, and has been critical of what
she
views are overly intrusive wiretapping and other electronic
surveillance measures (see ref C).
Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women

and Youth: Ursula von der Leyen (CDU)
--------------------------------------
Von der Leyen, 51, a medical doctor and mother of seven, had
indicated a strong interest in moving to the health portfolio and
worked out that respective section of the coalition agreement for
the CDU. Merkel reportedly was not interested, however, in the
CDU
controlling the health ministry in light of the necessary but
unpopular reforms and increasing costs of health care for
citizens.
Since the health ministry went to the FDP, von der Leyen will
remain
in her current position. In the past few years, von der Leyen has
successfully modernized the family policy of the CDU and thus its
image in this sector. She is one of Germany's most popular
politicians according to public opinion polls.
Health: Philipp Roesler (FDP)

----------------------------
Roesler, 36, is the youngest member of the cabinet and his

nomination was a surprise. He is sharp and dynamic and a rising
star of the FDP. He was state secretary general, state party
chairman and eventually economics minister in Lower-Saxony. He
was
born in Vietnam and was adopted by a German family. Both Roesler
BERLIN 00001360 003.2 OF 004
and his wife are medical doctors, which gives him some practical
background for his new portfolio. Roesler negotiated the health
section of the coalition agreement for the FDP.
Environment, Nature Conservation and

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Nuclear Safety: Norbert Roettgen (CDU)

-------------------------------------
Roettgen, 44, a close confidant of Chancellor Merkel had also

been
named as potential chief of staff at the Chancellery. He has
worked
closely with the Chancellor since her days as caucus chairman
2002-2005. Merkel reportedly appreciates his loyalty and
analytical
talents. During the financial crisis he became one of her
closest
advisors. While he does not have a reputation for expertise in
his
new portfolio, Merkel obviously wanted to position many of her
confidants in the new cabinet. Environmental issues, especially
climate change, will figure prominently for Merkel.
Education and Research: Annette Schavan (CDU)

---------------------------------------------
Schavan, 54, will keep her current cabinet position. Even though
she did not have a prominent record, as a confidant of Angela
Merkel, it was assumed that she would stay on as a member of the
cabinet.
Transportation, Building, and Urban

Development: Peter Ramsauer (CSU)
-----------------------------------
Since November 2005, Ramsauer, 55, has served as head of the CSU
group in the Bundestag and deputy CDU/CSU caucus chief. As
minister
for construction, housing and transportation, he will have a huge
budget to work with.
Food, Agriculture, and Consumer Protection:

Ilse Aigner (CSU)
-------------------------------------------
Aigner, 44, only became Minister for Agriculture and Consumer

Protection in October 2008. She came to this job as an expert on
research issues and new to the realities of production
agriculture.
In her tenure, some parts of the German agriculture community
have
been critical of her performance, particularly her close
relationship to Bavarian Minister President Horst Seehofer. The
CSU
was interested in keeping this portfolio since agriculture
continues
to play an important and tactical role in Bavaria.

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Economic Cooperation and Development: Dirk Niebel (FDP)

--------------------------------------------- -----
Niebel, 46, has been Secretary General of the FDP since May 2005
and
belongs to the inner leadership circle of the FDP. He was named
as
a potential minister since he made strong contributions to the
electoral success of the FDP. His actual expertise would have
been
labor and social affairs. However, that portfolio went to the
CDU.
The FDP sought in the coalition talks to have the Ministry of
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) merged with the MFA,
but
failing that, having control of both ministries goes a long way
to
meeting its concern that BMZ development policy be in line with
MFA
priorities, especially on key issues like Afghanistan. Media
commentary has focused on Niebel's lack of previous experience in
development assistance, and how he may essentially serve as a
department head under Foreign Minister Westerwelle.
Comment
-------
¶2. (SBU) With five ministries in the new cabinet, the FDP is
arguably one of the most powerful junior coalition partners in
recent German history in terms of both the number and quality of
their cabinet appointments. The Greens had three, mostly junior,
ministries in their coalition with the Social Democrats from
1998-2005. The FDP has one more than it had during its last
coalition with the CDU. This is due in part to the election
outcome
in which the FDP had its strongest-ever performance, with 14.6
percent of the vote. CDU officials also describe the
appointments
as partial compensation for the policy concessions the FDP made
during coalition negotiations. The CDU/CSU will have the popular
and competent Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg as Defense Minister,
balancing the FDP's control over Foreign Affairs and Development
Assistance. Zu Guttenberg -- a strong transatlanticist -- is
well-connected in Washington and already has a strong background
in
foreign and security policy. There has been some criticism that
the
new Cabinet does not have any representation from eastern states.
Merkel responded to the criticism reminding that in fact the
Chancellor herself counts as representing the East. End comment.

Cable Viewer
BERLIN 00001360 004.2 OF 004
¶3. (U) This cable was coordinated with Consulates Frankfurt,

Leipzig, Munich, Hamburg and Duesseldorf.
Murphy

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Viewing cable 09BERLIN1393, GERMANY'S NEW INTERIOR MINISTER FACES STEEP




Discussing cables

2009-11-04 2010-11-28
12:12 18:06
VZCZCXYZ0005
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRL #1393/01 3081215

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 041215Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN

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RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/HQ USEUCOM LO WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUKAAKA/USAREUR ACE DARMSTADT GE
RUEHRL/USDAO BERLIN GE
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR, S/CT, L
DHS FOR OIA SCARDAVILLE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2019

TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL KHLS KJUS GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY'S NEW INTERIOR MINISTER FACES STEEP
LEARNING CURVE
REF: A. BERLIN 1377

¶B. BERLIN 1167
¶C. BERLIN 988
¶D. 2008 BERLIN 1455
¶E. 2008 BERLIN 504
Classified By: Robert A. Pollard, Minister-Counselor for Economic

Affai
rs for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Germany's new federal interior minister,

Thomas de Maiziere, is known for being a competent
administrator who performed effectively over the past four
years as the Chancellery Chief of Staff. De Maiziere is a
close confidant of Chancellor Merkel, their professional
relationship dates back to 1990, and he developed a
reputation as a reliable crisis manager and interagency
master over the past four years. Although de Maiziere
previously served as a state interior minister in Saxony, he
has less direct experience dealing with the international
security issues - most prominently counterterrorism - that he
will face as federal interior minister. Furthermore, de
Maiziere is not known for being ideological or outspoken. In
this respect, de Maiziere represents a marked change from his

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predecessor, powerhouse Wolfgang Schaeuble, who had strong

views on security policy and was willing to endure
considerable criticism to achieve his policy goals. We do
not expect de Maiziere to push for further expanding law
enforcement powers of police and/or security services. De
Maiziere indicates that he intends to focus on integration of
foreigners into German society and will continue the
Ministry's Islam Conference, a controversial Schaeuble
initiative that had advanced the country's discussion on
immigration and discrimination issues. He also intends to
promote the further integration of former east and west
Germany. END SUMMARY
An Aristocratic Westerner Makes His Name in the East

--------------------------------------------- -------
¶2. (U) De Maiziere, 55, is a lawyer by training who was born

and raised in Bonn, but has spent nearly the last two decades
in the eastern states of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Saxony.
He is a descendent of the noble Maiziere-les-Metz family who,
as Huguenots, fled France for asylum in Prussia in the late
seventeenth century. De Maiziere's father, Ulrich, was
Inspector General of the German Armed Forces. His cousin,
Lothar, was the last, and only democratically elected,
Premier of the German Democratic Republic, who later served
as a minister in the Kohl government. As a staffer in the
offices of Berlin Governing Mayor Richard von Weizsacker, and
later Eberhard Diepgen, de Maiziere participated in the
negotiations on German reunification. After 1990, de
Maiziere worked to re-establish democratic structures in
eastern states starting first in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern.
From 1998 through 2005, de Maiziere served in Saxony as head
of the State Chancery, and as Finance, Justice and Interior
Minister. De Maiziere joined the Christian Democratic Union
(CDU) as a student in 1972. De Maiziere won a direct mandate
in the September 27 national parliamentary election and is
now a member of the Bundestag representing the district of
Meissen in Saxony.
¶3. (C) De Maiziere first met Angela Merkel in 1990 and his
recommendation of her to his cousin Lothar de Maiziere is
said to have facilitated her entry into CDU politics.
Chancellor Merkel and de Maiziere are known to have a very
close professional relationship and to share a similar sober
and analytical approach to governing. De Maiziere is
reported to have performed well throughout his tenure as
Merkel's Chancellery Chief and Minister for Special Duties.
As Chancellery Chief of Staff, de Maiziere was known as a
consensus builder who understands and effectively works the

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interagency process, sometimes requiring competing ministers

to resolve disputes among themselves. The Chancellor no
doubt appreciated de Maiziere's efforts to shield her from
these policy battles given her general propensity to stay
above the fray and to express an opinion on an issue only
when consensus has been reached at the cabinet level.
De Maiziere Faces a Steep Learning Curve

----------------------------------------
¶4. (C) De Maiziere's experience in eastern Germany helped him

gain new responsibilities for the Federal Interior Ministry:
the entire Department of Eastern German affairs has been
moved from the Transportation and Urban Affairs Ministry to
the Interior Ministry. In his remarks to ministry employees
on his first day in office, de Maiziere said that with this
move the interior ministry is now responsible for not only
immigrant integration, but also the integration of Eastern
and Western Germany and the cohesion of German society. De
Maiziere will continue the German Islam Conference, an
initiative started by his predecessor, which seeks to improve
the integration of Germany's Muslim population and open a
dialogue between the government and Germany's Muslim
community. The Islam Conference has met with some
controversy and came under scrutiny earlier this year when it
was discovered that some Muslim representatives were alleged
to have links with extremist groups.
¶5. (S/NF) De Maiziere has some familiarity with security

issues given that his duties in the Chancellery included
overall coordination of Germany's intelligence services. De
Maiziere was helpful in promoting cooperation between German
ministries and security services with USG counterparts both
during the 2007 Sauerland Islamic Jihad Union terrorist cell
case and following extremist threats surrounding the recent
national elections. De Maiziere's predecessor Wolfgang
Schaeuble spent considerable time dealing with the issue of
terrorism and working to update Germany's legal frameworks
and expand the mandates of law enforcement agencies to ensure
they had the capabilities to address the phenomena. In
contrast, de Maiziere said virtually nothing in public on the
issue of terrorism during his time in the Chancellery, and he
has not emphasized the topic since moving to Interior.
Therefore, there is some question concerning the depth of his
knowledge of the transnational character of terrorism,
radicalization pathways, and terrorists' increasing use of
the Internet and related technology to recruit, train and
organize, aspects of the issue that most affect Germany today.

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¶6. (C) During his first day remarks to employees, de Maiziere

made the peculiar statement that "the Interior Ministry is
responsible for internal matters, and the Foreign Ministry is
responsible for issues external to Germany." This
characterization of the MoI's tasks contrasts sharply with EU
law enforcement integration initiatives under Schaeuble such
as the Pruem data sharing agreement. Observers are concerned
that de Maiziere's limited perspective could result in
diminished bilateral cooperation and mark a significant
departure from former minister Schaeuble, who placed a heavy
emphasis throughout his tenure on increasing security
cooperation with European and other international partners.
De Maiziere would benefit from learning about the benefits of
international cooperation first hand from his counterparts at
the G6 meeting in London this week, which DHS Secretary
Napolitano and senior DoJ representatives will attend.
(Note: The G6 is an informal grouping of the interior
ministers of Germany, Italy, Spain, France, Poland and the
UK. Schaeuble made a point of inviting the USG to G6
meetings that he hosted, a custom that UK Minister Jacqui
Smith is following for this week's London meeting. Ref D.)
Will de Maiziere be a Strong Security Partner?

--------------------------------------------- -
¶7. (C) We do not expect de Maiziere to be aggressive in

pushing for expanded security powers. However, there is less
need for this as two recent legislative packages have already
strengthened Germany's counterterrorism legal framework (Refs
C and E). More relevant is whether de Maiziere will build on
Schaeuble's record of deepening U.S.-German security
cooperation, such as the successful negotiations of a
bilateral "Pruem-like" agreement to exchange information on
terrorism and serious crime suspects, as well as establish an
automated fingerprint checking system. Final implementation
of our agreement is awaiting resolution of some concerns
raised by a Green Party Justice Senator from Hamburg. We
will likely need support from de Maiziere to break this
impasse, but it is unclear whether de Maiziere is willing to
make the effort on an initiative that his predecessor
initiated and for which he received heavy criticism due to
data privacy concerns. On the issue of resettlement of
Guantanamo detainees, de Maiziere has yet to express a
viewpoint one way or the other.
¶8. (C) We anticipate that data protection and domestic

security issues will be a continuing theme that the new

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coalition government of the Christian Democrats (CDU and CSU)

and Free Democrats (FDP) will struggle with. During the
previous administration, the FDP regularly criticized former
interior minister Schaeuble for policies which the FDP
believed trampled on citizens' privacy rights (Ref B).
Germany's new Justice Minister Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger
(FDP) believes that Schaeuble went too far in giving police
new powers of investigation, and she was successful in
committing the new government to modify a number of these
powers and introducing added data protection measures in the
recently completed coalition agreement (Ref A). The FDP has
found it politically expedient to cast personal freedoms and
security policy as mutually exclusive. In this debate, de
Maiziere's greatest advantage is that he is not Schaeuble.
As Interior Minister, de Maiziere is expected to support
existing laws and practices initiated by his predecessor, and
his reputation for reasonableness and consensus-building
should serve him well in these discussions.
MURPHY

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Viewing cable 09BERLIN1395, GM DECISION NOT TO SELL OPEL GREETED BY

SHOCK AND



Discussing cables

2009-11-05 2010-11-28
06:06 18:06
VZCZCXRO9510
RR RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL
RUEHSR
DE RUEHRL #1395/01 3090620
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 050620Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN

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TO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE

RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 8317
RUEHAG/AMCONSUL HAMBURG 0339
RUEHMZ/AMCONSUL MUNICH 2211
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5681
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2086
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2019

TAGS: ETRD ECON ELAB PREL RU GM
SUBJECT: GM DECISION NOT TO SELL OPEL GREETED BY SHOCK AND
ANGER IN GERMANY
REF: A. BERLIN 01131

¶B. BERLIN 01093
¶C. BERLIN 00390
¶D. BERLIN 00272
¶E. BERLIN 00214
BERLIN 00001395 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: ECONMIN Robert A. Pollard for reasons 1.4 (b,d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Just hours after Chancellor Merkel's historic

November 3 address to a joint session of Congress, General
Motors (GM) canceled its sale of Opel to Canadian auto parts
manufacturer Magna. The decision, which followed repeated
assurances from GM that it was a done deal, came as a
complete shock in Germany and dominated media coverage
throughout the day. Merkel herself was reportedly highly
upset over GM's flip flop. Ulrich Wilhelm, the Chancellor's
spokesman on Opel said the German government "regretted" the
decision, and reminded GM that it must now repay Berlin's 1.5
billion bridge loan to Opel by the end of the month, while
FDP Economics Minister Rainer Bruederle described GM's action
as "totally unacceptable." The cabinet was expected to
discuss the GM move on November 4. Opel's labor unions, which
had strongly backed the Magna sale because of its promise to
save jobs and keep plants open, announced that workers would
withdraw all concessions made under the terms of the Magna
deal and sta
rt a general strike at Opel plants on November 5. While
anger is widespread, there are already some voices outside
the government advocating acceptance of GM's announcement as

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the only viable alternative to a total collapse of Opel. End

Summary.
Germany's Political Establishment Reacts with Anger

--------------------------------------------- ------
¶2. (C) Opinion across the political spectrum has been

uniformly negative. FDP Economics Minister Rainer Bruederle
blasted GM's behavior as "totally unacceptable." Juergen
Ruettgers, Minister President of Nordrhein Westfallen (CDU),
asserted that GM's decision showed "the ugly face of turbo
capitalism."
The leadership of the FDP, whose opposition to government
intervention in the Opel deal is well known, joined in the
condemnation of GM. A high-level source indicated that
Chancellor Merkel is furious over the GM move and refuses to
talk to GM's leadership. It is likely to be only a matter of
time before critics will call Merkel herself into account for
her strong support of the
now collapsed Magna deal. The Cabinet has been called into
session and is likely to confirm the withdrawal of all
financial support and a demand that GM repay the government's
1.5 billion Euro bridge loan by the end of the month.
¶3. (C) Jochen Homann, the Economic Ministry State Secretary

heading the German interagency working group on Opel, told
EMIN on November 4 that there was no possibility of further
German financial assistance to Opel in the foreseeable
future. The failure of the Magna deal and GM's reputation as
"an unreliable partner" would likewise complicate
negotiations with other governments seeking to preserve Opel
jobs and factories. Although no one directly blamed the USG,
the Germans are still having trouble understanding how GM
could act independently of Washington. Dr. Schubert, one of
Homann's lieutenants, complained to the Embassy that "if the
U.S. Government had GM under better control, this would not
have happened." It is now up to GM, he said, to submit a new
restructuring and financing plan, as their previous one is
out of date. Schubert was adamant that this time "there will
be no special treatment for Opel" and GM's plan would have to
go through normal channels.
Matched by Threats from Organized Labor

---------------------------------------
¶4. (SBU) Klaus Franz, the head of Opel's Works Council,

announced on November 4 that Opel's 25,000 employees in
Germany will begin an indefinite strike on November 5 to
protest the GM decision. Franz called on all 55,000 Opel
workers across Europe to join in. Accusing GM of

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"blackmailing" governments and workers in Europe to sign on

to its "unacceptable" restructuring Plan, he also revoked
prior labor commitments to contribute 388 million dollars in
foregone benefits to the Magna sale.
BERLIN 00001395 002.2 OF 002
¶5. (C) Oliver Burkhardt, head of the Metal Workers in NRW,

likewise condemned the decision as "bold and unfriendly," not
only to Opel employees, but to the German government.
However, Burkhardt conceded that he is waiting to see a long
term GM plan for Opel that relies on more than cost-cutting
and down-sizing. In contrast to Klaus Franz, Burkhardt
contended that non-German labor unions were "elated" over the
failure of the Magna deal (which was tilted against workers
in other countries) and doubted they would heed Franz's
strike call. He also predicted that the strikes in Germany
will be short-term and largely symbolic rather than actual
closures, adding "we are not going to close the door on a
solution with GM." Similarly, Fred Irwin - Citigroup's
country manager in Germany and the Chair of the Opel Trust
that oversaw the Magna negotiations - predicted that unions
will eventually reconcile with GM once they realize there is
no other choice.
While Despair Permeates Opel Executives

---------------------------------------
¶6. (C) Opel managers such as Berlin Representative Uwe

Berlinghoff, who almost uniformly favored the Magna contract,
were also "taken completely by surprise" by the GM
announcement. Berlinghoff now expects GM to resurrect its
pre-Magna restructuring plans, including closure of plants at
Bochum (and Antwerp, Belgium) and the sale or closure of the
Eisenach plant. Berlinghoff also expected the German
government to cancel the expected 4.5 billion dollar loan
guarantee package, as "GM has demonstrated its lack of
credibility with German politicians."
Research and Development and IPR Could be Key

---------------------------------------------
¶7. (C) German auto industry insiders have privately

identified compelling reasons why GM cancelled the Magna
deal. Among these are the importance of the GM/Opel Research
and Development facility in Ruesselsheim and its patents to
GM's development of small efficient cars in Europe, the U.S.
and elsewhere. GM was also reportedly skeptical that it

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could adequately protect crucial IPR from Russian

exploitation because of the Sberbank/Gaz partnership with
Magna. Moreover, Magna had oversold its ability to penetrate
the Russian market. GM's announcement stressed its plans to
build on its already significant business in Russia while
retaining Opel and to work closely with Gaz without a Magna
partnership.
But Auto Leader Welcomes the Move

---------------------------------
¶8. (C) Dr. Norbert Reithofer, the CEO of BMW, told the
Ambassador on November 4 that GM's move would be welcomed by
the German auto industry. Reithofer was adamant that there
was no way BMW and the other German auto manufacturers would
have purchased auto parts from Magna once it became a direct
competitor as an auto manufacturer. In Reithofer's view,
Magna made the Opel purchase proposal in a moment of panic at
the height of the economic crisis, but now that a recovery is
in the offing, probably is not unhappy to see it dissolve.
Comment
-------
¶9. (C) Despite the considerable German ire aimed at GM, much
of it is aimed at GM's handling of Opel (in particular the
timing of the November 3 announcement), rather than its
business rationale for retaining its German subsidiary.
Thoughtful German opinion leaders, including former Economics
Minister zu Guttenberg conservatives in the German business
community, were equally critical of Berlin's strong arm
lobbying on behalf of Magna. An Opel Trust Board Member and
FDP politician Dirk Pfeil has already issued a statement
urging Berlin to provide 3 billion Euro in state aid to keep
GM afloat. Like it or not, the German governments will need
to seek an accommodation with GM to keep Opel alive.
MURPHY

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Viewing cable 09BERLIN1403, SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY CLINTON'S VISIT TO




Discussing cables

2009-11-05 2010-11-28
16:04 18:06
VZCZCXRO0135
DE RUEHRL #1403/01 3091603
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051603Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN

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SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2019

TAGS: PGOV PREF MNUC AF RS IR KPAL KWBG GM
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY CLINTON'S VISIT TO
BERLIN, NOVEMBER 8-10
Classified By: Ambassador Phillip Murphy for reasons 1.4 (b,d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Embassy Berlin warmly welcomes you to

Germany for the historic 20th Anniversary of the Fall of the
Berlin Wall. Berlin is hosting all four-powers and EU
leaders at Berlin's Brandenburg Gate to mark this occasion.
Your visit includes meetings with Chancellor Merkel and
Foreign Minister Westerwelle. Chancellor Merkel will likely
raise concern about General Motors' November 3 decision to
keep its German subsidiary, Opel, and Westerwelle may likely
raise his interest in removal of nuclear weapons from
Germany. You may wish to encourage from them:
-- Assurances that the proposed Afghanistan conference will

not slip past January and that Germany will go immediately to
the Bundestag if increases in contributions are warranted;
-- Support for including banking and insurance relations with
Iran in calculations for possible new sanctions, and no
backsliding on export controls;
-- Assurances that Germany and the EU will work with the U.S.
at Copenhagen and not seek to isolate;
-- Agreement to tone down the public rhetoric on Opel;
-- German prodding of Russia to engage constructively on
security issues and human rights.
Recognizing Germany's prominent and international role on

this occasion is important to Merkel. She is still trying to
get a sense of working with the new Washington Administration
and seems uncertain at times. Of course, Westerwelle is
learning the ropes and being watched by Merkel to see if he
can be an effective FM for her. Alternatively, Merkel may
look to new Defense Minister zu Guttenberg (CSU) to play an
alternative role on foreign policy. End summary.
Political Climate
-----------------
¶2. (C) The political divisions that marked the recent

election campaign, culminating in the October 28 swearing-in

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of a center-right coalition led by Chancellor Merkel, will be

swept aside for your celebratory visit. Merkel just returned
from what she considers an exceptional visit to Washington,
which front-paged her address to Congress in every
publication. Merkel will be focused on setting her
priorities for the next legislative term -- she gives a major
state of the union-like address on November 10 on all issues
-- and will seek U.S. cooperation in promoting economic
recovery and growth (Opel, regulation), progress in
addressing climate change (Copenhagen), and strengthening
Germany's international profile (Afghanistan). Westerwelle
will have spent a total of some two days work in the foreign
ministry by the time your arrive. His ministry is not sure
what he wants yet.
Economic Climate
----------------
¶3. (C) Germany's export-driven economy is showing initial

signs of recovery from its deepest recession since WW II.
For the full year 2009, GDP will shrink around 5%, but should
show modest growth of 1% next year. Unemployment has
remained relatively low thanks to government-subsidized
programs, but is expected to rise next year. Given the
government's record budget deficit, there is heated debate
over the wisdom of the new coalition's proposed tax cuts,
intended to boost growth. Germany was pleased with the
outcome of the G-20 Summit in Pittsburgh, but is keener on
the G-20's regulatory agenda than addressing global
imbalances.
¶4. (C) GM's sudden decision on November 3 to cancel the sale

of its European subsidiary Opel in a deal underwritten by the
German government shocked and angered Germans. Merkel's
chief economic advisor told the Ambassador November 4 that
Merkel was so furious at GM's about-face that she refused to
take a call from GM CEO Fritz Henderson. Merkel subsequently
called the President. Federal and state governments are
demanding that GM immediately pay back 1.2 billion Euros in
bridge loans they had extended to the car maker. What
particularly irked the Germans was that GM had failed to
forewarn them of their latest flip-flop after months of
laborious negotiations and a total of 4.5 billion Euros in
loans/guarantees in exchange for promises to retain most Opel
jobs and plants in Germany. (Merkel found out about the GM
decision just hours after delivering her address before
Congress.) The Opel story has dominated the news November
4-5. Opel workers are likely to strike in the next few days,
and politicians and others are citing the GM action as
another example of American "turbo-capitalism."
Berlin 00001403 002 of 003

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Iran/Export Controls
-----------------------
¶5. (C) You should express appreciation for Merkel's strong

statement during her speech to Congress that there should be
"zero tolerance" for Iranian acquisition of weapons of mass
destruction. You should stress the importance of German
support for EU measures or measures taken by "like-minded"
countries should a UNSCR be unattainable due to a possible
Iranian rejection of the engagement track. With Westerwelle,
it remains imperative that you raise the importance of P5 1
unity again. In addition, you should stress the particular
importance of continued German leadership on export control,
particularly in light of recent interdictions of Iranian arms
shipments. The new German coalition seeks to expand exports
by normalizing German export control policy (of arms and
dual-use items) with the EU. Germany contends that its
intention is to raise the EU to the German standard, but the
danger is that German standards could be watered down to an
EU lowest common denominator.
Arms Control/Disarmament
------------------------
¶6. (C) Westerwelle is on a bit of a tangent by publicly

calling for removal of nuclear weapons from Germany, although
he insists that Berlin will not act unilaterally. This gets
him attention and he then offers assurances that everything
must be done in the NATO context, but it distracts from other
issues. This is one of the few foreign policy positions that
distinguishes his FDP from Chancellor Merkel's CDU, and
Westerwelle may feel pressed to mention this. The MFA
emphasizes that Westerwelle's position does not necessarily
mean that Germany intends to cease participation in the NATO
nuclear share. Germany may be willing to maintain its fleet
of dual-capable aircraft, but have the applicable nuclear
weapons stored in the U.S. or elsewhere. Westerwelle also
understands that some Allies may want to maintain their
current stock of NATO nuclear weapons. Your meeting with
Westerwelle is a good opportunity to emphasize any red lines
or concerns we have before this effort gets too far down the
road. For its part, the Chancellery, MFA and MOD are
uncomfortable with Westerwelle's push and sees no reason to
tackle this issue right now.
Afghanistan: Small Window for More Troops

-----------------------------------------
¶7. (C) FM Westerwelle has strongly defended German

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engagement in Afghanistan, both military and civilian, as

vital to German national security interests. However, he
supports the Chancellor's recent decision to put off any
consideration of deploying additional German soldiers until
after the proposed international conference on Afghanistan
early next year, notwithstanding the significantly
deteriorated security situation in the north. The new
government sees the
conference as critical for setting a new framework and
benchmarks for the international engagement in Afghanistan,
as well as for prescribing what is expected of the Afghan
government in return. It is in our interest to capitalize on
the Germans' sense of "ownership" of the north in getting a
commitment from Westerwelle to seriously re-consider a troop
increase after the Afghanistan conference early next year,
if, in fact, he and Merkel rule out any increase before then.
Within this context, it would be important to acknowledge
that Germany is the fourth largest provider of civilian
development assistance in Afghanistan and is an enthusiastic
supporter of the U.S. Focused District Development (FDD)
civilian police training program, which it joined in January
of this year.
Middle East
-----------
¶8. (C) You should thank Merkel for her strong statements
before Congress where she stressed the overarching importance
of Israel's security and a two-state solution. In general,
Merkel has been very supportive of U.S. efforts in the Middle
East. She is now planning the second round of German-Israeli
government consultations, likely before the end of the year.
She may raise this with you and seek your advice on messages
to Netanyahu. We understand that Westerwelle may also be
planning to visit Israel. The MFA said that Westerwelle may
seek a greater German role to promote peace, for example to
offer German support in coordinating Middle East policy with
the EU. According to the MFA, Westerwelle may also raise the
concept of creating some type of OSCE-like security structure
BERLIN 00001403 003 of 003
for the Middle East.
Reluctance with Overseas Deployments

------------------------------------
¶9. (C) Germany continues to wrestle with the issue of

overseas deployments. Westerwelle, and the FDP in general,
tend to be more skeptical than Merkel's CDU on this topic and
this is reflected in the government coalition agreement. The

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coalition agreement calls for a "gradual reduction" of German

participation in UNIFIL "with the perspective of bringing it
to an end." Similarly, the agreement calls for a "critical
review" of the "multitude" of parliamentary mandates for the
Bundeswehr to participate in counterterrorism and piracy
operations off the Horn of Africa, again with a view toward
reducing them. It would be helpful for you to emphasize how
important we view Germany's contributions to these
international operations.
Russia/Energy Security
----------------------
¶10. (C) We expect Germany to be less forgiving of Russian

bullying of its eastern European neighbors through cut-offs
of natural gas supplies, especially given the departure of
former Foreign Minister Steinmeier -- known for his
relatively pro-Russian views. Still, we expect Germany to
continue to place a heavy emphasis on maintaining good
relations with Russia, believing that constructive engagement
and assistance with modernization are the best way to deal
with this difficult "strategic partner." Germany is Europe's
largest energy user and is highly dependent on Russia for
energy supplies, but Berlin does not view this as a
vulnerability, believing that Moscow is equally dependent on
Germany as a consumer. Germany nevertheless recognizes that
it must diversify its sources of supply, routes, and means of
energy generation to gain greater energy security.
Climate Change
--------------
¶11. (C) As the Chancellor's remarks underline, German
officials want strong U.S. leadership going into the
Copenhagen Summit. They are advocating for a unified US/EU
position towards the major emerging economies, particularly
China and India, to urge them to commit to ambitious national
actions at Copenhagen. They are looking for signals of our
commitment to domestic and international actions that will
allow us to collectively meet science-based targets. German
leaders recognize the challenge of passing climate change
legislation in the U.S. and have lowered their expectations
for the possibility of reaching a legally binding agreement
next month at Copenhagen. They have begun to describe the
Summit as one step in a larger process -- a politically
binding framework -- and may be preparing the German public
for a less ambitious outcome.
Mission Germany
---------------
¶12. (SBU) Madam Secretary, the U.S. government presence in

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Germany currently numbers 744 US direct-hire (USDH)

employees, 683 locally engaged (LE) staff, and 951 USG EFMs
and a State operating budget of $153 million annually. This
includes a Frankfurt cohort of over 500 USDH employees whose
responsibilities support USG operations globally. Berlin's
USG presence -- over 500 USDHs and LE staff -- is centered in
the new Chancery next to the Brandenburg Gate. The LE staff
includes many employees who have worked for the USG for over
30 years. Mission Germany is on the cutting edge of using IT
solutions xxxxx.
MURPHY

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Viewing cable 09BERLIN1433, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR HEUSGEN ON

AFGHANISTAN,



Discussing cables

2009-11-12 2010-11-28
17:05 18:06
VZCZCXRO6312
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHRL #1433/01 3161743
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 121743Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN

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SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2019

TAGS: PREL MARR NATO MNUC PARM KNNP GM IR RU AF
SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR HEUSGEN ON AFGHANISTAN,
MIDDLE EAST, IRAN, DETAINEES, RUSSIA, NUKES AND BALKANS
Classified By: AMBASSADOR PHILIP D. MURPHY. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND

(D).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Chancellery National Security Advisor

Christoph Heusgen told EUR A/S Phil Gordon and Ambassador
Murphy in a November 10 meeting in Berlin that Germany
strongly preferred that the proposed international conference
on Afghanistan be held outside the country to make it easier
to press Karzai to commit to the necessary reforms. On the
Middle East, Heusgen thought Netanyahu had to do much more on
settlements if there was to be any hope of re-starting
negotiations. On Iran, Heusgen hoped for some conclusion by
early next month on whether the diplomatic track was going to
bear fruit so that this issue could be discussed at the
December 10 EU Summit. Heusgen said Germany was ready to
discuss taking Guantanamo detainees, but stressed the
importance of dealing directly with the Ministry of Interior
and keeping the negotiations confidential. While arguing for
being rhetorically supportive of the Medvedev European
Security proposal, Heusgen shared U.S. skepticism about a new
treaty and an OSCE Summit hosted by Kazakhstan. Heusgen
distanced the Chancellery from the proposal to remove all
remaining tactical nuclear weapons from Germany, stressing
the need to get reciprocal cuts from the Russians. Also
discussed was CFE, the Macedonian name issue and Bosnia. END
SUMMARY.
AFGHANISTAN
¶2. (C) Heusgen confirmed that Germany would only announce

additional resources for Afghanistan after the proposed
international conference, which Chancellor Merkel and UK PM
Brown are now proposing for January 28 in London. He said
the conference is key because this is where the Germans
expect the Afghan government to make specific commitments to
improve governance and to gradually begin assuming
responsibility from the international community. President

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Karzai had to be put under international pressure to perform

according to prescribed benchmarks. Toward that end, the
Chancellery felt strongly that the conference should be held
outside of Afghanistan and not on Karzai's "home turf."
Heusgen complained that the German and U.S. embassies in
Kabul are on "a different track" and pushing for a conference
in Kabul. It was important to "make up our minds" quickly on
the way ahead. If the conference slipped to February or
later, and the UK were no longer able to host it in view of
the upcoming parliamentary elections there, then Germany
would be willing to.
¶3. (C) Heusgen at first expressed concern that the U.S. would
undermine international leverage on Karzai by rolling out its
new strategy and resource commitments before he made any
reciprocal commitments to reform. Gordon assured him that
the formal U.S. roll-out would only come after the November
19 inauguration, where Karzai is expected to "say the right
things" in his inaugural address. Gordon also highlighted
the need to coordinate on the U.S. roll-out to avoid the
perception that the U.S. was "Americanizing" the
international effort in Afghanistan. It should be announced
as a common strategy and not as a U.S. strategy to which the
Allies then respond. Heusgen agreed in principle, but
indicated that Germany would stick to its approach of holding
back on any announcement of new commitments until after the
international conference.
MIDDLE EAST
¶4. (C) Referring to the Secretary's recent public statements

on settlements, Heusgen said that Germany "perceives this
differently" and thought Netanyahu needed "to do more" in
order bring the Palestinians to the negotiating table. With
Palestinians in East Jerusalem getting notices from Israeli
authorities that their houses will be destroyed, it would be
"suicide" for President Abbas to move under the current
circumstances. Heusgen said he could not fathom why
Netanyahu did not understand this. He suggested pressuring
Netanyahu by linking favorable UNSC treatment of the
Goldstone Report to Israel committing to a complete stop in
settlement activity. Gordon said that making a direct
linkage between the two would almost certainly be
counterproductive, but agreed that it was worth pointing out
to the Israelis that their policy on settlements was making
it difficult for their friends to hold the line in the UNSC.
Heusgen said this certainly would be an issue when Netanyahu
and "half of his cabinet" visit Berlin on November 30 for
bilateral government consultations.
IRAN

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¶5. (C) Heusgen praised the U.S. for its patience with Iran,
BERLIN 00001433 002 OF 003
but noted that at some point, it would be necessary to move

to the second track in order to maintain credibility.
Heusgen said that he and his British counterpart agreed that
ideally, there would be some conclusion on this by early next
month so that the way ahead could be discussed by EU leaders
at their summit on December 10. Gordon agreed that there had
to be a time limit, noting that President Obama had given the
Iranians "by the end of the year" to respond favorably. He
also noted that the U.S. could support a Turkish role in the
proposed exchange of low-enriched uranium for reactor fuel if
that would make it easier for Iran to accept the deal.
Gordon indicated, however, that Turkish PM Erdogan needed to
be careful about losing credibility in Washington if he
continued to make comments about Ahmadinejad being his
"friend."
GUANTANAMO DETAINEES
¶6. (C) Heusgen noted that now that the Bundestag election was
past, Germany was ready to help on detainees, as it had
promised earlier. He advised the USG to work directly with
new Interior Minister de Maiziere, rather than going first to
MFA and the Chancellery, which had irritated de Maiziere's
predecessor and made him less willing to cooperate. In this
regard, he thought that it would be helpful if DHS Secretary
Napolitano made direct contact with de Maiziere. Heusgen
also suggested that the discussions be kept confidential
until MOI had come to a decision on which detainees to accept
and in which state they would be settled. Premature public
disclosure could doom the whole initiative. Heusgen said
that Uighurs would be "too difficult," but that Germany could
probably accept "2-3 others." (Comment: The reluctance about
Uighurs is due to the expected negative reaction of the
Chinese government. End Comment.)
EUROPEAN SECURITY PROPOSAL AND POSSIBLE OSCE SUMMIT
¶7. (C) Heusgen said that while the West should try to react
positively to whatever the Russians propose in advancing the
Medvedev European security proposal, nothing should be
accepted that would undermine current European security
institutions, including the OSCE. He shared Gordon's
misgivings about a proposed treaty. He was also skeptical
about the idea of an OSCE Summit in Astana, agreeing that
Kazakhstan's human rghts record and the lack of substantive
agenda items made it unattractive. Heusgen suggested that an
OSCE Summit be offered to the Russians on the condition they

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solve the frozen conflict in Transnistria, which he said

Moscow could accomplish "in about a month."
TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
¶8. (C) In response to Gordon's question about how the

government planned to take forward the commitment in the
coalition agreement to seek the removal of all remaining
nuclear weapons from Germany, Heusgen distanced the
Chancellery from the proposal, claiming that this had been
forced upon them by FM Westerwelle. Heusgen said that from
his perspective, it made no sense to unilaterally withdraw
"the 20" tactical nuclear weapons still in Germany while
Russia maintains "thousands" of them. It would only be worth
it if both sides drew down. Gordon noted that it was
important to think through all the potential consequences of
the German proposal before going forward. For example, a
withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Germany and perhaps from
Belgium and the Netherlands could make it very difficult
politically for Turkey to maintain its own stockpile, even
though it was still convinced of the need to do so.
CFE
¶9. (C) Gordon asked for Heusgen's views on a German CFE paper
that had been delivered to the State Department just a few
days earlier. Heusgen said he did not know anything about
it, claiming that he did not follow this issue closely or
"believe in it." He noted that MFA "loved this disarmament
business," which was okay, but it had to be balanced or the
"Russians will sit there and laugh."
MACEDONIAN NAME ISSUE
¶10. (C) Gordon briefed Heusgen on the current state of the

negotiations, noting that the two key issues were the
geographic modifier and international usage. Heusgen noted
that the Chancellor knew PM Macedonian Gruevski through their
common membership in the European People's Party and would be
willing to engage him on this issue if that would be helpful.
BOSNIA
BERLIN 00001433 003 OF 003
¶11. (C) Heusgen revealed that Serb President Tadic was coming
to Berlin the week of November 16 for consultations. He
noted that while Tadic always claimed to be tough on
Republika Srpska PM Dodic, he needed to be tougher. While
expressing pessimism about whether it would ever be possible

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to turn Bosnia into a "working state," Heusgen agreed it was

important to keep trying.
MURPHY

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Viewing cable 09BERLIN1528, COALITION TESTED AS US-EU TFTP/SWIFT

AGREEMENT



Discussing cables

2009-12-03 2010-11-28
10:10 18:06
VZCZCXRO6301
DE RUEHRL #1528/01 3371019
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 031019Z DEC 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN

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RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCXONI/ONI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
SIPDIS
TREASURY FOR OFAC SZUBIN, MONBORNE, MAHER

JUSTICE FOR BRUCE SWARTZ
USEU FOR CHASE, DODMAN, SNYDER
STATE FOR S/ES-O, EUR/ERA, EUR/CE, L AND S/CT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2019
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL KJUS KHLS GM
SUBJECT: COALITION TESTED AS US-EU TFTP/SWIFT AGREEMENT
PASSES ON GERMAN ABSTENTION
REF: A. BERLIN 1393

¶B. BERLIN 1377
¶C. BERLIN 1167
Classified By: DCM Greg T. Delawie for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: German Federal Interior Minister Thomas de

Maiziere overruled Justice Minister Sabine
Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger and abstained from voting at the
November 30 COREPER vote in Brussels on an interim U.S.-EU
agreement to continue the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program.
De Maiziere's decision allowed the agreement to pass and
followed weeks of engagement in Berlin, Brussels and
Washington as well as high-level interventions from Secretary
Clinton, Treasury Secretary Geithner, Attorney General
Holder, National Security Advisor Gen. Jones and Ambassador
Murphy. De Maiziere's decision was difficult for him to make
given that the coalition agreement called for specific
revisions to the SWIFT agreement, none of which Germany
achieved, except a shortening of the interim period from 12
to 9 months. The episode has tested Germany's new coalition
government just weeks after its formation with
Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger heavily criticizing the
abstention. This experience suggests that we will need to
pay close attention to Germany during our negotiations on a
long-term TFTP agreement. END SUMMARY

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Germany Relents Following Intense Pressure

---------------
¶2. (C) Ambassador Murphy met with Interior Minister de

Maiziere on November 27 and urged him to support U.S.-EU
negotiations on an interim TFTP agreement, to which de
Maiziere indicated that he would abstain from voting on the
agenda item at the November 30 COREPER meeting. De
Maiziere's decision, which followed a German request to
shorten the duration of the interim agreement to nine months
rather than twelve, facilitated the passing of the agreement
as Germany was the strongest holdout. De Maiziere's decision
followed two weeks of intense lobbying in Berlin, Brussels
and Washington by Embassy Berlin, USEU, the Departments of
Treasury, State and Justice and the NSC. The campaign
included calls by Secretaries Clinton, Geithner, the Attorney
General and the National Security Advisor to their German
counterparts. State Department Counterterrorism Coordinator
Benjamin urged support for the agreement during a two-day
visit to Berlin (see septel). Ambassador Murphy twice wrote
to all five relevant ministers (Interior, Justice, Finance,
Chancellery, and MFA) and made repeated calls to senior
decision makers, stressing the importance of the interim
agreement and the need for Germany to not block it. The DCM,
Econ M/C, and staff from multiple embassy sections heavily
engaged on the issue as well.
¶3. (C) De Maiziere (CDU) stressed that his decision was not
an easy one given that the Christian Democrat/Social Union
(CDU/CSU) and Free Democratic Party (FDP) coalition had
differing views on the TFTP program. The outcome
particularly irritated Justice Minister
Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger because she had expressed
concerns about the TFTP dating back to the initial July
decision to give the negotiating mandate to the Swedish EU
Presidency. Furthermore, in October
Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger had inserted language into the
CDU/CSU-FDP coalition agreement specifically addressing the
TFTP negotiations and directing Germany to call upon the EU
to work towards a higher level of data protection (see Ref
B). Following de Maiziere's decision, the Justice Minister
complained that her views were ignored and that the decision
has "upset millions of citizens of Europe." De Maiziere told
the Ambassador that he would be expressing some criticisms of
the agreement publicly in order to reflect MoI concerns and
to deflect public criticism. He was subsequently quoted as
saying that "a not completely satisfactory agreement is
better than none at all."

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BERLIN 00001528 002 OF 002
German Vote Comes with Costs for the Coalition

----------
¶4. (C) De Maiziere intimated, and working level contacts have

confirmed, that Germany would like to avoid a repeat of our
all-out lobbying effort during the negotiations for a
long-term TFTP agreement. De Maiziere's strong preference is
to seek consensus with his ministry colleagues. He
particularly wants to avoid another clash with the Justice
Minister on this issue as it has caused no small amount of
discord between the new coalition partners, who are having a
rocky start on a number of fronts. The incident is
particularly difficult for de Maiziere as he entered the
Interior Ministry stressing that he represented a break from
his predecessor Wolfgang Schaeuble, whom he felt overly
focused on security issues (see Ref A). De Maiziere surely
finds this whole experience regrettable as it put him in
exactly the position he did not want to be in: seemingly
siding with the U.S. over German interests, causing
disruption within the coalition, and compromising the data
privacy rights of German citizens.
Engaging the FDP on Data Privacy

---------
¶5. (C) It is not altogether surprising that this disagreement

arose given the FDP's reputation as a staunch defender of
citizens' privacy rights (see Ref C). Nevertheless, the
intensity of this dispute should be a wake up call - we must
avoid repeating this as we look to completing the long-term
U.S.-EU TFTP agreement. The coalition agreement calls for
strict limitations on the use of TFTP data, no automatic
access to the system, data deletion requirements, clear rules
on sharing information with third parties and legal redress.
These positions will guide Germany's views in the follow-on
negotiations, and we need to consider how to take them into
account in a way that does not complicate TFTP
implementation.
¶6. (C) Embassy Berlin is examining how we can reach out to

FDP ministers and parliamentarians to educate them on U.S.
data protection structures as this experience has
demonstrated that they are often misinformed on the nature of
our policies. We will likewise reach out to CDU/CSU decision
makers, in part to enlist their help in reaching the German

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public. We also intend to make the point that countering

terrorism in a globalized world, where terrorists and their
supporters use open borders and information technology to
quickly move people and financing, requires robust
international data sharing.
MURPHY

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Viewing cable 09BERLIN1548, GERMANY RENEWS CONSIDERATION OF

GUANTANAMO



Discussing cables

09BERLIN1548
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRL #1548/01 3410728

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ZNY CCCCC ZZH

P 070728Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5983
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO S/GC MICHAEL WILLIAMS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PTER GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY RENEWS CONSIDERATION OF GUANTANAMO
DETAINEES FOR RESETTLEMENT
REF: A. STATE 50242

¶B. BERLIN 600
¶C. BERLIN 625
Classified By: Ambassador Philip D. Murphy for reasons 1.4 (b,d).
¶1. (C/NF) Summary: In separate December 1 meetings with

Ambassador Dan Fried, Special Envoy for Closure of the
Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility (S/GC), the Ministry of the
Interior, Foreign Ministry and Chancellery expressed a
willingness to consider seven new cases of Guantanamo
detainees for resettlement as well as three cases that had
already been provided to the former government last spring.
All interlocutors stressed that the MOI is the competent
ministry handling this issue. They also expressed the desire
to be helpful in the spirit of the strong U.S.-German
bilateral relationship. Interior Ministry State Secretary
Beus said that any decision on the cases would likely take up
to two months and agreed with S/E Fried on the following way
forward:
-- the Interior Ministry would be the only ministry

addressing this issue, especially in regard to sharing
information on the detainees;
-- the U.S. and Germany will uphold strict confidentiality
during this review phase and coordinate timing and content of
any public messages;
-- while Germany prefers non-Uighur cases because of expected
tension with China, it will consider the cases of two Uighurs
based on humanitarian grounds;
-- Germany prefers to accept detainees with a connection to
Germany, which S/E Fried explained to be the case with only
one detainee, a Tunisian whose file was previously provided;
-- the German MOI will maintain direct communication with

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S/GC at this stage in the process;

-- Germany will decide on the need to interview any
candidates at the end of its review process.
In a later meeting, Chancellery Security Advisor Christoph

Heusgen stressed his confidence in Interior Minister Thomas
de Maiziere to handle this issue, noting de Maiziere's close
relationship with Chancellor Merkel. End summary.
Interior Ministry is Key

------------------------
¶2. (C/NF) Based on a schedule recommended by the

Chancellery, S/E Fried and Ambassador Murphy met first with
Interior Ministry State Secretary Beus and expressed
appreciation for the new government's willingness to consider
resettling detainees. S/E Fried reviewed the numerous
European countries which had accepted or pledged to resettle
detainees at this point, noting that progress has been made
but more is needed. He noted he would only be passing along
detainee dossiers to the MOI and discussing case specifics
with the MOI, and not with other Government ministries, per
earlier requests from the government. S/E Fried handed over
the dossiers of seven detainees: two Egyptians, two Syrians,
a Libyan, and two Palestinians. He explained that if the MOI
has questions or requires additional information, it can do
so through established liaison channels and additionally
offered for a German team to visit Guantanamo to conduct
interviews with detainees under consideration. While
recognizing Germany's preference for non-Uighur detainees,
S/E Fried raised two Uighur cases for consideration based on
humanitarian grounds, one who has psychological problems and
the other, his brother, who serves as a caregiver. He also
acknowledged the German interest in detainees who have some
connection to Germany, noting the one Tunisian case whose
file had been conveyed last spring as the single detainee
with those ties to Germany. In total, S/E Fried requested
that Germany consider 10 detainee cases for resettlement,
three cases already conveyed and seven new cases.
¶3. (C/NF) State Secretary Beus expressed his ministry's

willingness to consider all the cases, including the Uighurs,
and said that his experts would review the files as soon as
possible. Shortly after he began, Interior Minister Thomas
de Maiziere dropped in to stress his desire to be of help.
Continuing, Beus underlined the importance of keeping the
current discussions and review of the detainees confidential,
to which S/E Fried strongly agreed. Beus underlined
Germany's preference for detainees who have some ties to
Germany, noting that this connection would provide the
government with a "plausible" explanation for accepting
certain detainees when faced with the argument that the U.S.

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should be resettling them. Beus said that he would be

willing to consider the two Uighur cases on humanitarian
grounds, but noted that they would present special
difficulties because of the diplomatic row which would likely
ensue. Beus also highlighted that even if the federal

government agrees to accept any detainees, it must then find
a German state willing to accept them. He also said that
German services would naturally keep an eye on any resettle
detainees within reasonable resource means.
¶4. (C/NF) Beus also expressed strong interest in

coordinating the timing and content of any public message on
Germany's consideration of and decision on resettling
detainees to prevent political pressure from those who oppose
the move, but regardless the government will advocate in
public in favor of taking detainees if they come to a
positive decision. He added that being able to say to the
public that the U.S. has also accepted detainees or otherwise
explain why the U.S. is not doing so would also be helpful.
S/E Fried expressed his readiness to coordinate and noted
that the U.S. has admitted and plans to admit the more
dangerous detainees for legal proceedings.
Process and Timeframe

---------------------
¶5. (C/NF) Beus said that he and his experts would review the
files and determine if additional information is needed. He
agreed that additional information would go through
intelligence channels and expressed his preference to
communicate directly with S/E Fried on any matters at this
stage of the process. He said that they would decide whether
interviews are necessary when the experts have completed
their review of the information. He estimated that a
decision on taking detainees would take one-to-two months.
MFA Plays Peripheral Role

-------------------------
¶6. (C/NF) It was clear from the later meeting with MFA State
Secretary Wolf Born that the Foreign Office would not be a
major decision-maker as on this issue. S/E Fried reviewed in
general terms the cases of detainees that we are asking the
MOI to consider and also highlighted the humanitarian nature
of the two Uighur cases, which Born noted. Born said that
Foreign Minister Westerwelle wants to be "positive," but
added that it is the MOI which is the "competent" ministry on
this issue. Born mainly asked questions about the numbers of
detainees still at Guantanamo, U.S. plans for addressing the
various groups, and the possible closing date, all of which
S/E Fried discussed with him.

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Chancellery Confirms Reticence about Uighurs

--------------------------------------------
¶7. (C/NF) In the last meeting, Chancellery Security and

Foreign Policy Advisor Christoph Heusgen expressed
appreciation that S/E Fried had proceeded along the lines
that the MOI and Chancellery had requested through Ambassador
Murphy. Heusgen appeared to be already fully briefed on S/E
Fried's earlier meeting that day with Beus. He told S/E
Fried that if Germany were to take any Uighurs, it would be
best to do so in combination with other European countries to
prevent China from focusing its opposition on any one
country. Heusgen was not optimistic that China would
demonstrate any understanding for the two humanitarian cases.
Heusgen inquired as to whether any alternatives for the
Uighurs exists. S/E Fried explained possible options, while
highlighting the difficulty of resettling the two individuals
he is asking Germany to consider.
Comment
-------
¶8. (C/NF) The new government, now in place since October 29,
appears willing to renew consideration of resettling GTMO
detainees and has expressed a clear desire to be of help. In
contrast to former Interior Minister Schaeuble, current MOI
de Maiziere has not (and is unlikely to) flouted security
concerns about cases in the press, nor indicated that Germany
would be hardpressed to accept any detainees put forth for
security reasons. Nor has de Maiziere indicated that the
fact that the U.S. itself has not resettled detainees
presents an insurmountable roadblock, although Beus indicated
that U.S. resettlement would help Germany's PR efforts to
resettle. All interlocutors expressed a strong interest in
keeping the matter confidential and coordinating the timing
and content of any public message. Beus projected sincerity
and realism, noting that even if the federal government
agrees, it must still identify a state that is willing to
resettle the detainees. While all interlocutors did not
outright reject the two Uighur cases, Heusgen made clear that
the prospect of being the only European country to irritate
China by accepting Uighurs would make it difficult, although
it is unclear whether Germany would take part in any broader

European decision to resettle Uighurs.
¶9. (SBU) There has to date been no mention in the press of

S/E Fried's visit.
¶10. (U) This cable has been cleared by S/E Dan Fried.
MURPHY

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Viewing cable 09BERLIN1609, GERMANY'S NEW DEVELOPMENT MINISTER

CONNECTS



Discussing cables

09BERLIN1609
VZCZCXRO2092
PP RUEHIK
DE RUEHRL #1609/01 3551631
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 211631Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN

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RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0602
RUEHDF/AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF PRIORITY 0263
RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT PRIORITY 8348
RUEHAG/AMCONSUL HAMBURG PRIORITY 0352
RUEHLZ/AMCONSUL LEIPZIG PRIORITY 0257
RUEHMZ/AMCONSUL MUNICH PRIORITY 2223
SENSITIVE
STATE FOR EEB/IFD/ODF (LEATHAM, ALEXANDER), SCA/A (BRADY),

NEA/IPA (LENTZ), EUR/CE (HODGES, SCHROEDER)
TREASURY FOR SMART, ICN (NORTON), IMB, OASIA
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: EAID ECON EFIN PGOV PREL GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY'S NEW DEVELOPMENT MINISTER CONNECTS
DEVELOPMENT WITH SECURITY POLICY
BERLIN 00001609 001.3 OF 002
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Dirk Niebel (FDP) was an odd pick as

Germany's new Development Minister -- he had no experience in
international development, and had previously suggested
abolishing the Development Ministry. Now in charge, Niebel
has big shoes to fill, following on the heels of Heidemarie
Wieczorek-Zeul (SPD). Important differences with his
predecessor are already apparent: he would like to integrate
Germany's development policy more closely with its foreign
and security policy, including in Afghanistan. Niebel is
also a firm believer in free markets, and sees a successful
conclusion of the Doha Development Round as critical for
developing countries. For Niebel, nothing is sacrosanct: he
intends to phase out German aid to China, which he regards as
no longer a developing country. With the ministry under new
management, there may be additional opportunities for
collaboration between the United States and Germany on
development policy. END SUMMARY.
DIRK WHO?
---------
¶2. (SBU) Dirk Niebel struck many as an unlikely choice for

Development Minister in the coalition government of

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Chancellor Merkel's Christian Democratic Union

(CDU)/Christian Social Union (CSU) and Guido Westerwelle's
Free Democratic Party (FDP) (the "Black-Yellow" coalition).
A Hamburg native, Niebel's previous work experience includes
eight years as a paratrooper in the German armed forces, and
five years as a placement officer at a job center in
Heidelberg. In 1998, he was elected to the Bundestag (lower
house of Parliament), where he became caucus spokesperson for
labor market policy and a member of the Labor Committee. In
2005, FDP Chairman (and current Foreign Minister) Westerwelle
tapped him as FDP Secretary General -- a position he held
until Chancellor Merkel appointed him Development Minister in
November 2009. As Secretary General, Niebel had called for
the elimination of the ministry he would later head, the
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).
(NOTE: This option appears off the table for now. END NOTE)
Niebel succeeds Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul of the Social
Democratic Party (SPD), who headed BMZ for a record 11 years.
CONNECTED SECURITY
------------------
¶3. (SBU) In a December 18 meeting with Ambassador Murphy,

Niebel said he intended to "make some changes at BMZ." One
such change is linking development policy more closely with
foreign and security policy -- a concept he referred to as
"connected security." Niebel told the Ambassador he planned
to coordinate very closely with Foreign Minister Guido
Westerwelle, and that he foresaw much greater cooperation
between BMZ and the German military in northern Afghanistan.
(NOTE: Days prior to the meeting with Ambassador Murphy,
Niebel had announced BMZ would increase civilian assistance
to Afghanistan by around 50 million euros, bringing Germany's
2009 total to over 260 million euros. END NOTE)
¶4. (SBU) In a separate meeting several months ago,

Chancellery National Security Advisor Christoph Heusgen had
told us that BMZ under a Black-Yellow coalition would be less
wedded to "old" notions of doing development work. This
assessment now appears to be accurate. Wiezcorek-Zeul had
ensured that German development staff worked and lived in
separate compounds, away from provincial reconstruction teams
(PRTs) and other bases from which the Ministry of Defense,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Interior
operated. She even refused to ride in German military
vehicles when she visited Afghanistan. This kind of
separation seems likely to end under Niebel, both physically
and substantively.
¶5. (SBU) Among other ideas Niebel brings to the table is a

plan to partner with third country donors like Israel on

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projects in developing countries. Niebel told the Ambassador

that Israel,s expertise in border protection could be shared
BERLIN 00001609 002.3 OF 002
with African countries, for example. By teaming up with

Germany, Israel could participate in certain capacity
building projects where it might not otherwise have access.
LAISSEZ-FAIRE DEVELOPMENT
-------------------------
¶6. (SBU) Shortly after becoming Minister, Niebel remarked

that his overall development philosophy was helping recipient
countries help themselves. He regards the successful
conclusion of World Trade Organization's (WTO's) Doha
Development Round as especially meaningful for developing
countries. "There is more money being lost by trade barriers
than all the development aid can make up for," he said. This
perspective marks a noteworthy departure from the approach of
Wieczorek-Zeul, dubbed "red Heide" for her affiliation with
the Young Socialists years ago.
¶7. (SBU) Niebel also opposes a proposed tax on international

financial transactions to fund development assistance. Both
Chancellor Merkel and Wieczorek-Zeul had championed the
so-called "Tobin tax." Citing "differences" within the
government on the issue, Niebel has reportedly ended BMZ's
participation in an international working group on the
proposed tax.
¶8. (SBU) Niebel is keen to reorient BMZ's assistance.
Reflecting on comments made publicly in his first days as
Minister, Niebel told Ambassador Murphy that Germany planned
to stop providing development assistance to China, currently
one of the largest recipients of German aid. He added that
China was "only a developing country when it came to climate
change negotiations." BMZ will carry out its existing aid
obligations to China only through next year. The decision
has proved controversial, as BMZ's assistance to China had
reportedly benefitted German companies doing business there.
TRAVEL PLANS
------------
¶9. (SBU) Niebel said he planned to spend the holidays in

Israel. (NOTE: Niebel is a long-standing member of the
German-Israeli Society. END NOTE) His first official travel
to the developing world will be a late January trip to
"Rwanda, eastern Congo, Mozambique, Afghanistan and Asia."
The Ambassador suggested Niebel visit Washington to meet with

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new USAID Administrator Shah once confirmed. Niebel said he

would coordinate dates for the visit with the Embassy.
COMMENT
-------
¶10. (SBU) Niebel takes charge of BMZ at a challenging time:

Germany will run its largest post-war deficit in 2010, and
pressure to rein in spending will strain every ministry.
Niebel's close relationship with Westerwelle should be an
asset, however, and could help minimize cuts on key
priorities. The close relationship will also facilitate
Niebel's vision of integrating development policy with
foreign and security policy. Since taking over at BMZ,
Niebel has increased assistance to Afghanistan, where Germany
was already the third largest donor, and appears open to
doing more in support of an integrated strategy in the north.
An early meeting between the new USAID Administrator, who
oversees the world's largest aid budget, and the new German
Development Minister, who oversees the world's second
largest, could be an important step in building stronger
U.S.-German cooperation on our top development priorities.
DELAWIE

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Viewing cable 09BERLIN1636, Lame Duck German Governor Kicked Upstairs as New



Discussing cables

09BERLIN1636
VZCZCXRO9015
RR RUEHIK
DE RUEHRL #1636 3651406
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 311406Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES

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RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC

RUEHBS/USMISSION USEU
UNCLAS BERLIN 001636
STATE PASS to EEB

STATE PASS TO USTR
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: ECON EFIN ETRD ELAB GM
SUBJECT: Lame Duck German Governor Kicked Upstairs as New
Energy Commissioner in Brussels
REF: Frankfurt 002808

Sensitive but unclassified; not for Internet Distribution.
¶1. (SBU) Chancellor Angela Merkel nominated Baden-
Wuerttemberg (BW) Minister President Guenther Oettinger as EU
Energy Commissioner primarily to remove an unloved lame duck
from an important CDU bastion. The move was not the promotion
of a valued colleague as Merkel's allies sought to portray it.
Rather, Oettinger's increasing loss of party support in BW
compelled Merkel to push Oettinger out to protect her support
base there. Oettinger is noted for a lackluster public
speaking style, and some commentators have asserted that
Merkel, who has often stood out at EU meetings, wanted to
appoint a German Commissioner who would not outshine her.
¶2. (SBU) Germany has a time-honored tradition of sending
unwanted politicians to the EU Commission, although departing
SPD EU Industry Commissioner Guenter Verheugen proved his
worth during his tenure. Oettinger has criticized Merkel for
her policy stances (on federal support to Opel and on generous
subsidies to the former eastern states, for instance) and her
purported lack of leadership while antagonizing other
influential CDU leaders. In addition to being a poor public
speaker, he has a tendency to put his foot in his mouth. The
best-known example was his ill-advised 2007 defense of a CDU
predecessor as an opponent of the National Socialist regime,
despite his documented pro-Nazi war record. Nonetheless,
Oettinger is said by industry sources in Baden-Wuerttemberg to
be an efficient behind-the-scenes negotiator.
¶3. (U) Merkel was criticized for choosing the energy
portfolio, which many derided as too insignificant for
Germany. Werner Langen, CDU/CSU caucus spokesman in the EU
Parliament, said the portfolio has "lost significance."
Prominent Green Member of the European Parliament, Reinhard
Buetikofer characterized it as "not particularly influential,"

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and Der Spiegel called it a "makeshift job." The EU Energy

Commissioner is responsible for issues such as supply
security, energy R&D and efficiency, competition in the gas
and electricity markets, infrastructure and low carbon
technologies. However, key issues such as energy security and
climate change are not in the portfolio; nor will Oettinger
take over the role of EU Commission Vice President from
Verheugen.
¶4. (U) Oettinger has an academic background in law and
economics and professional experience as a tax consultant and
accountant. His political expertise is in media policy. His
background in energy appears limited to public support for
nuclear power and the extension of power plant operating
licenses. His pro-nuclear stance is in stark contrast to many
other German politicians, who support the phase out of nuclear
power. This endears him to the EU, which is focused on
diversification of energy sources and does not exclude nuclear
energy. Nuclear power plants supply most of BW's energy while
renewable energy and fossil fuels do not play a significant
role. Oettinger has not expressed interest to date in energy
issues other than nuclear. His priorities in his list
submitted to the EU Parliament in the run up to the January
hearings of the candidate Commission are reportedly vague.
¶5. (SBU) Parliamentarians, skeptical of several members of

the new Commission, are likely to display particular interest
in Oettinger's views on binding energy efficiency targets and
encouraging more competition in internal energy markets.
Although Germany has embraced a controversial domestic goal of
increasing energy efficiency by 20% by 2020, it has yet to
translate the EU energy efficiency directive into national
law. Germany has also steadfastly opposed liberalization of
its power sector oligopoly (what Brussels calls "unbundling")
although individual German companies are slowly moving in that
direction. Oettinger's stance on the internal energy market
will also be of particular interest to European
parliamentarians, who see France, and particularly French
power giant EdF, as a major barrier to opening up the market.
EdF is a major share-holder in BW regional energy supplier
ENBW, which operates the state's nuclear power plants -- and
with which Oettinger is known to have warm relations.
DELAWIE

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Viewing cable 09BERLIN1577, NOW FOR THE HARD PART: MERKEL,S TEAM
EXAMINES NEXT

2009-12-14 2010-11-28
07:07 18:06
VZCZCXRO5162
RR RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHNP
RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRL #1577/01 3480754
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 140754Z DEC 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN

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RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2019

TAGS: PGOV PREL KNNP ETTC EFIN IR GM
SUBJECT: NOW FOR THE HARD PART: MERKEL,S TEAM EXAMINES NEXT
STEPS IN IRAN
Classified By: Ambassador Philip D. Murphy for reasons 1.4 b/d.
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Chancellor Merkel set the German agenda on

Iran with her early November statement before the U.S.
Congress on "zero tolerance" for a nuclear armed Iran and the
need for tougher sanctions should engagement not work.
During a private roundtable hosted by Ambassador Murphy,
however, members of Germany's Iran "brain-trust" from the
German Parliament, MFA, Ministry of Economics and top
government funded think tank welcomed the President's
engagement policy, recommended broadening the dialogue to
areas of cooperation (drugs, Afghanistan, diplomatic
relations), betrayed little beyond a superficial knowledge of
the nuclear program, argued that Germany took the largest
economic hit from recent sanctions, and expressed doubts as
to the efficacy of sanctions, giving us a window into the
difficult task Chancellor Merkel will have in keeping her
government on her page. In the end, we assess that Merkel
will have her way. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) The November 24 event at the Embassy included members

of Parliament from the four main German political parties:
FDP Elke Hoff, CDU Andreas Schockenhoff, Greens Kerstin
Mueller, and SPD Rolf Muetzenich. From the MFA, Policy
Planner Markus Ederer, DG for Economics Ruediger von Fritsch,
DG for Disarmament and Nonproliferation Amb. Peter Gottwald,
and Iran Task Force Director Andreas Krueger attended.
Ministry of Economics DG for External Economic Policy
Karl-Ernst Brauner and the Director of the German government
funded research institute Stiftung fuer Wissenschaft und
Politik (SWP, or Institute for Science and Politics) Volker
Perthes also attended.
-----------------------------------------
MFA: TRR Not Dead Yet; But Not Well Either
-----------------------------------------

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¶3. (C) The Ambassador opened the discussion by thanking the

German government for its excellent cooperation on Iran and
asked his guests to share their thoughts on the Iranian
internal situation, especially given recent reports of the
expanded role of the IRGC in the cultural/educational spheres
of life, and how that might affect Iran's external policy.
MFA DG for Disarmament Gottwald stated that if we were
correct in assessing the Iranian regime's primary goal to be
survival, then we still had a chance with a negotiated
solution. He said that while the Tehran Research Reactor
(TRR) deal was not "well," Germany wasn't ready to pronounce
it "dead" quite yet. He concluded with a strong statement
saying that a nuclear armed Iran would be a nightmare in and
of itself and a disastrous blow to the NPT regime which was
why Germany would be a strong partner in support of further
sanctions.
¶4. (C) MFA Policy Planer Ederer said he thought Iran was
confused about what it wants and that the West might be even
more confused about how to get what we want. He said we want
Iranian behavior change, but we don't agree yet what will get
us there. He said UN sponsored sanctions would isolate Iran
and limit its capacity, but questioned whether they would
change Tehran's behavior. He said he realized sanctions
remained a good alternative to military action, but
questioned whether they were really capable of anything other
than just buying time.
------------------------------------------
More Carrots before we Reach for the Sticks
------------------------------------------
¶5. (C) SWP's Perthes argued Iranian Supreme Leader
Khamenei's primary interest was to maintain the security of
the system and prevent regime change. Perthes said Khamenei
feared a velvet revolution over all else, though regional
instability was a close second. He noted Iran remained
besieged by problems of drug smuggling, piracy, and
instability in Pakistan. He recommended more emphasis be
placed on trying to find an incentive for the regime to
cooperate on the regional track, which had already shown some
progress. He said the April 2009, 300 million dollar Iranian
pledge at the Pakistan donor's conference was an important
symbol of the value the regime placed on regional security.
He suggested the West "broaden" relations with Iran to areas
where cooperation could be had: drugs, Afghanistan, and
diplomatic (especially Consular) ties. POL M/C noted this
was fine, but ignored the fact that time was not on our side.
Rather, Iran was installing new centrifuges each week. If
Iran wanted to build confidence or "broaden" relations, it
could modulate that pace, but time was not a luxury we had.
Gottwald agreed emphatically.

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BERLIN 00001577 002 OF 003
¶6. (C) Changing course, Perthes said that if "sticks" had to

be used, he suggested more focus on "export-control" and less
on sanctions. He noted evidence suggested export control
regimes had already worked in slowing down centrifuge
progress. He concluded by saying that if sanctions must be
used, we should avoid all use of the word "crippling" and
instead focus on "targeted" sanctions in order not to turn
the Iranian masses against us and right back into
Ahmadinejad's hands. He also suggested that "unofficial"
sanctions such as Russia's decision not to sell the S300s
were more effective than most formal sanctions. If formal
sanctions had to be pursued he said only global sanctions
would be effective, and therefore advocated UNSC action.
Perthes said he saw readiness in the German business
community to accept financial loss if sanctions were truly
global, but they don't want to see business opportunities
being lost to China or India.
--------------------------------------------- ----
Green Party : Too Late to Prevent, Need To Contain
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶7. (C) From the opposition, Green Party Foreign Policy

Spokesperson Kerstin Mueller said she was glad that the new
U.S. administration no longer talked about a threat of a
military option. But she also said she was skeptical that
Iran can be prevented from obtaining a nuclear capability
without a military option, and that it might even be too late
for a military option to be effective. She said she didn't
see compromise within the interests of the regime and thought
the West should focus more attention on how to "control" a
nuclear-armed Iran.
-------------------------------------------
FDP: Rank and File Grudging Partner on Iran?
--------------------------------------------
¶8. (C) FDP Spokeswoman on Defense Policy, Elke Hoff opened

her remarks with a grudging acknowledgment of the coalition
agreement in which her party agreed that if engagement with
Iran on the nuclear dossier failed, sanctions would be
implemented. She added that she remained personally
skeptical as to their efficacy. She said additional
sanctions would serve the unintended consequence of rallying
the masses around Ahmadinejad.
¶9. (C) Hoff said she often hears from constituents in the

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business community that German companies are getting

pressured from their American counterparts not to do business
in Iran, and yet they see plenty of U.S. products for sale in
Iran. Econ M/C intervened and stressed that the U.S. was
ready to prosecute any U.S. businesses in violation of U.S.
sanctions and had already done so. Hoff also suggested
offering German businesses financial compensation should new
sanctions come into play. In response to a criticism from
Hoff on whether the U.S. deadline created for engagement on
Iran reflected Obama's domestic political agenda, the
Ambassador emphasized the deep commitment of the
administration to engagement.
----------------------------
Germany is the Largest Loser
----------------------------
¶10. (C) MFA DG for Economics Von Fritsch agreed with

Perthes' suggestion to focus more on the carrots and not the
sticks. He noted that no single country has (recently)
sacrificed as much financially as Germany has, not just in
existing trade, but also in long term future contracts. Econ
M/C noted that U.S. business had also suffered enormous trade
and investment losses after 1979. Von Fritsch said if
sanctions were inevitable, German business preferred global
and clear sanctions as opposed to vague wording that can be
left open to differing interpretations. On correspondent
banking relations, Von Fritsch said the German government was
still examining the issue but that a complete severance of
correspondent banking relations including with Iran's central
bank would not be possible since it would amount to a total
trade embargo.
¶11. (C) Ministry of Economics DG for External Policy Brauner
referenced the inclusion in German law of the presumptive
right to trade, and said that he was concerned that what the
German Customs and BAFA (export control agency under the
Ministry of Economics) were doing to encourage "Nullbescheid"
(pre-certification that specific trade with Iran is not
illicit) might actually be illegal, as German business had
complained. He said one important consideration for Germany
BERLIN 00001577 003 OF 003
was that a further crackdown on trade with Iran could

endanger repayment of the 4.5 billion Euros in outstanding
credits that Iran owed Germany. Germany had agreed not to
issue any new credit under its Hermes (OPIC-like) program,
but expected to be able to collect on outstanding credits.
Nonetheless, both Brauner and Von Fritsch emphasized that in
the event of no progress in negotiations with Iran, Germany

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was ready to enter a new round of stronger sanctions, and

that we should look to Chancellor Merkel's statements in the
U.S. Congress and FM Westerwelle's reiterations of her strong
policy as the final say on which direction Germany would go
on Iran.
¶12. (C) CONCLUSION. The majority of the guests at the table

distinctly deferred to Perthes for guidance on where the Iran
issue might be headed or should be headed. This was striking
amongst such a high ranking group of people operationally
involved with the Iran issue. Also illuminating was the
variety of talking points employed by the participants to
define hurdles for sanction until debunked one at a time by
Embassy officers. The candor with which even some MFA and
Ministry of Economics officials expressed their skepticism on
the efficacy of pursuing tougher sanctions on Iran may mean
that Merkel will have to press hard within her own government
to deliver on her promise of implementing tougher sanctions
should engagement with Iran fail. None of our interlocutors,
however, questioned whether Merkel would, at the end of the
day, be able to "deliver" on her promises. If and when we
decide to go forward on the pressure track on Iran, the USG
may wish to reinforce Merkel's position by showing
appreciation for Germany's strong continuing support. END
CONCLUSION.
MURPHY

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Viewing cable 09BERLIN1626, MEDIA REACTION: TERRORISM, IRAN, CHINA, U.S.;

BERLIN

2009-12-29 2010-11-28
09BERLIN1626 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Berlin
07:07 18:06
VZCZCXRO6873
RR RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHLZ
DE RUEHRL #1626/01 3630713
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 290713Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
INFO RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

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RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 1857
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0579
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1095
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 2600
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1622
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0785
RHMFIUU/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//J5 DIRECTORATE (MC)//
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUKAAKC/UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE

STATE FOR INR/R/MR, EUR/PAPD, EUR/PPA, EUR/CE, INR/EUC, INR/P,
SECDEF FOR USDP/ISA/DSAA, DIA FOR DC-4A
VIENNA FOR CSBM, CSCE, PAA
"PERISHABLE INFORMATION -- DO NOT SERVICE"
SIPDIS
E.0. 12958: N/A

TAGS: OPRC KMDR KGHG US IR CH US
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: TERRORISM, IRAN, CHINA, U.S.;BERLIN
¶1. Lead Stories Summary

¶2. (U.S.) Failed Terrorist Attack
¶3. (Iran) New Protestsn4
¶4. (China) Reaction to Jailing of Liu Xiabo
¶5. (U.S.) Healthcare Reform
¶1. Lead Stories Summary
The majority of dailies opened with reports on the failed terror

attack on a Delta Airlines jet, while Sueddeutsche headlined:
"Protests Intensify - Riots in Iran" and FAZ led with the
headline:
"People Killed in Demonstrations in Iran." Editorials focused on

the
failed terror attack in the U.S., with the unrest in Iran and
with
the
state of the coalition government in Berlin. ZDF-TV's early

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evening
newscast heute and ARD-TV's early evening newscast Tagesschau

opened
with a report on violent clashes between the Iranian regime and

opponents.
¶2. (U.S.) Failed Terrorist Attack
All papers carry extensive reports the failed terrorist attack on

a
Delta Airlines airliners and reported that travelers flying to

the
United States must expect heightened security measures and
tougher
restrictions on their flights to the United States. Die Welt
headlined: "Terror Attempt Stirring up fear of Terror," while
Financial Times headlined: "Fear of Terror is Back."
In a front-page editorial, Die Welt (12/28) judged: "The fact

that
the
would-be attacker was able to board a plane with his dangerous
material reveals gaps in the control system. With metal
detectors
alone chemical explosives cannot be discovered."
Under the headline: "Flight 253," Frankfurter Allgemeine (12/28)

opined: "If someone really had believed that we have
transnational
terror under control, and that we can give an all-clear signal
with
respect to security, then those people have now been taught

better.
Irrespective of whether the attacker acted on his own or on the

instructions of al-Qaida, the danger is not over and that is why
travelers, not only to the Untied States, must accept new
inconveniences which are hopefully useful."
"Following the terror attempt in Detroit, the usual security

debate
will now begin," Frankfurter Rundschau (12/28) noted, and added:

"controls will be heightened, and agencies are trying to get us
to
do
everything possible to prevent another attack. This failed
terror

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attempt shows how unpredictable people can be who stop at

nothing.
For the time being, there is only one lesson we can learn from
the
events on Flight 253: It is the courageous effort of Jasper
Schuringa
who prevented even worse events. The unexpected resolve of
individuals can be the right answer to the threat that comes out
of
the blue."
In the view of Stuttgarter Zeitung (12/28), "Abdulmutallab was

miles
BERLIN 00001626 002 OF 005
away from the organizational level of the 9/11 attackers. But

the
Nigerian national succeeded in one thing: he totally unnerved
the
western world, and the terror fighting machinery of the United
States
in particular. Even though the U.S. government knew about the
danger
of the young man, he was able to fly around the world without
difficulty. Almost without any problems, he was able to smuggle
dangerous substances aboard an aircraft. But what if he really
had
the order from al-Qaida in Yemen to blow up the plane? How does
this
view then fit the U.S. focus on Afghanistan? Is Yemen, too, a
front
in the anti-terror war? Many question, but only a few answers."
Regional daily Nrnberger Nachrichten (12/28) and regional daily

Trierischer Volksfreund (12/28) judged: "How was it possible for
a
young man to get aboard with a one-way ticket and an Arabic
sounding
name, whose contacts with Islamic extremists were known and whose
father even warned the U.S. embassy? The lists of passengers
travelling to the United States are transferred in advance to the
U.S.
Homeland Security Department with all its data bases. But again
we

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see a big hole in the net that is supposed to capture potential

terrorists. Of course, one hundred percent security will never
exist,
but these gaps are dramatic and should be an alarm call which
politicians should not ignore."
Mannheimer Morgen (12/28) warned against hysteria and judged:

"Each
day terror investigators receive hundreds of tips and

indications.
How is it then possible to follow a vague suspicion? We should

not
exaggerate security measures for flights. The fact that in the

United
States no one is allowed to go to the bathroom one hour before
landing
is ridiculous. The same is true for the ban on liquids in
Europe.
Here there is a clear disproportion between cost and benefit."

MQrkische Allgemeine of Potsdam (12/28) opined: "If airlines, as
a
reaction to the failed attempt, force their passengers to remain
seated one hour before landing, then this is no more than a
gesture
of
helplessness. The second much more important aspect may be
dissatisfying at the moment, but there is no way around it:
Muslims
must preach again and again in their own ranks that terror is not
the
culmination of piety but a crime. Any incident like this should
stress to the Muslim world how urgent this message is."
Regional daily Westdeutsche Zeitung of Dsseldorf (12/28)

observed:
"Hectic measure such as barring passengers from getting up should

not
prevail in the long run. In the future, there will be no way
around
finding the right balance between possible improvements of our

security standards compared to the trouble caused by
them."SchwarzwQlder Bote (12/28) noted: "Everything we have
learned
about this attack does not strengthen our confidence in

international

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BERLIN 00001626 003 OF 005
security measures. It is certainly right that there cannot be

absolute security from mean terrorist attacks but this does not
the
least excuse the gaps in anti-terror measures.
¶3. (Iran) New Protests
All papers carry extensive coverage of the new clashes between

the
regime and opposition forces in Iran. Sueddeutsche headlined:
"Protests Intensify - Riots in Iran" and FAZ led with the
headline:
"People Killed in Demonstrations in Iran." Frankfurter Rundschau

reported on its front page: "The protests are directed against
Iranian
President Ahmadinejad." The paper also reported that "according
to
reports from Tehran, police officers partly disobeyed orders to

use
their guns against the protesters. The Internet page "Jaras,"

which
is critical of the government, reported that 'some [police

officers]
tried to fire their guns in the air when their superiors put
pressure
on them.'"
Sueddeutsche Zeitung (12/28) said in an editorial under the

headline:
"There is Growing Unrest among the People" that "if the
information
fragments from Tehran on the demonstrations during the Ashura

holidays
allow one conclusion, then this one: the rank and file of the
protests
are now overtaking their leaders. Posters of religious leader
Ali
Khamenei and the chorus of demonstrators who want to see the
dictator
dead do not correspond with the slogans of the two opposition
leaders

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Moussawi and Charrubi. They are now faced with a dilemma: If

they
stick to their view that they, in principle, recognize the

institutions of the Islamic republic and want to use the courts
to
make their political opposition heard, then it could be that
their
followers will leave them because many want something else:
regime
change."
Regional daily Suedwest Presse of Ulm (12/28) editorialized: "The

regime is using all its might to extinguish the massive protests.
The
few Internet reports in any case show the brutality of the
leading
clique around President Ahmadinejad. In the meantime, the regime
has
its back to the wall. The protests are no longer confined to
Tehran
but are spreading to other cities.... The government can no

longer
afford the good deeds with which it bought the loyalty of

Iranians.
All this is really worrying for the international community of

nations."
Ostsee Zeitung of Rostock (12/28) argued: "Despite jammed

cellular
phone networks and despite blocked access to the Internet, the
unrest
in Iran hardly seems to be stoppable. The resistance is still
limited
to a well-educated cosmopolitan, young, urban middle class.
Large
sectors of the population, however, seem to keep quiet or seem to
BERLIN 00001626 004 OF 005
support the regime. But the cyber revolt in Tehran has

demonstrated
that the mullahs no longer enjoy a monolithic power."
Regional daily Dresdner Neueste Nachrichten (12/28) opined:

"Since
the
allegedly manipulated re-election of President Ahmadinejad, a

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state
of
emergency has dominated in Iran. But this is not only the
struggle
of
a limited political protest movement against the president and
the
ayatollahs behind him. The country is now facing an endurance
test.
At issue is whether the country wants to become a fundamental

religious state or an Islamic republic. The pictures from Iran
are
shocking. It is the violence on both sides that makes us fear

the
worst."
¶4. (China) Reaction to Jailing of Liu Xiabo
Frankfurter Allgemeine (12/28) editorialized under the headline:

"Co-
Responsibility," that foreign countries must also be blamed that
a
man
like Liu Xiabo is jailed with such an absurdly high prison term.
The
foreign countries have treated China for economic considerations
with
political kid gloves for years. We can't blame China under these
circumstances because we think that it is unassailable? A
positive
reaction to any criticism of the verdict cannot be expected."
Sueddeutsche Zeitung (12/28) said in an editorial: "A subtle but

clearly visible trend is getting hold in China. Civil
disobedience
among the rank and file is spreading. It is an irony that this

tend
has become visible in the tough verdict against Liu Xiabo. In

front
of the court in which China's leadership organized the show

trial,
we
could not only see international reporters and diplomats, but
Chinese
supporters of Liu shouted slogans and unrolled posters thus
deliberately risking their arrest. Only a few courageous people

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went
to the court, but they showed that intimidation no longer works
as
successfully as in the past. This new trend is not only confined
to
the traditional political protest. Courageous lawyers of the

Weiquan
civil rights movement are defending victims of the arbitrariness
of
state agencies and they defend each other, too. And the number
of
peaceful and violent civil protests is on the rise. But the
Chinese
Communist Party fails miserably when it comes to channeling

communication with its critics into a constructive direction.
The
verdict against Liu Xiabo is one more example. It will only
partially
obtain the desired effect but not intimidate the people. At the
same
time, new embitterment, new disobedience is growing. With each
show
trial, the party is now doing of what it is accusing Liu: it

undermines the state's authority."
BERLIN 00001626 005 OF 005
¶5. (U.S.) Healthcare Reform
Under the headline: "Reform Blues," Sueddeutsche Zeitung (12/28)

had
this to say: "There is no doubt that the healthcare reform bill

that
has now been adopted in the Senate is a great work...and

trailblazing.
But enthusiasm about the success is limited. One reason is that
the
legislative process is so tiresome; but there is an even more

important reason: disappointment and doubts are spreading. The
advocates of the reform have been brought down to earth again
because
they were able to implement only a few of their demands. Thus
far,

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the Democrats have lost the fight for public opinion. They will
have
to do quite a lot in the election campaign in 2010 to avoid being
punished for a reasonable reform."
Die Welt (12/28) argued: "The Democrats will now have difficulty
explaining to their irritated voters why it is historic progress
that
31 million compatriots who have no coverage today will get health
insurance, and that health insurance companies can no longer
reject
sick Americans or demand astronomically high premiums. This

reform
is
supposed to carry itself and not burden the budget. But the
opponents
to the bill do not believe a word, arguing that the nation will
go
bankrupt. This is a highly imperfect, weakened bill and, at the
same
time, a giant step forward into an American future in which job
loss
no longer means the end of insurance protection for a former

employee
and their whole family."
DELAWIE

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Viewing cable 10BERLIN128, ACTION REQUEST: OVERCOMING GERMAN DOUBTS

ON U.S.



Discussing cables

2010-01-29 2010-11-28
06:06 18:06
VZCZCXRO1007
RR RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHRL #0128/01 0290635
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 290635Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN

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RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR, S/CT, L

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2020
TAGS: PTER KTFN KCRM KHLS ECPS ECON PREL KPAO KTIA
GM
SUBJECT: ACTION REQUEST: OVERCOMING GERMAN DOUBTS ON U.S.
DATA PRIVACY PRACTICES
REF: A. STATE 8403

¶B. 2009 BERLIN 1528
¶C. 2009 BERLIN 1377
¶D. 2009 BERLIN 1167
Classified By: Robert A. Pollard, Minister-Counselor for Economic

Affai
rs, for Reasons 1.4 (b,d).
¶1. (U) This is an action request.
¶2. (C) Embassy Berlin strongly recommends that the Washington

Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) and data privacy
experts currently scheduled to visit Brussels next week also
visit Berlin to discuss TFTP and U.S. data privacy policy
with German officials. Germany is critical to the debate on
data protection issues within the EU and we need to engage
German government interlocutors, parliamentarians and opinion
makers. The exaggerated data privacy views of the current
minority governing partner, the Free Democratic Party (FDP),
have contributed to a domestic discussion that distorts U.S.
policy and is negatively-influencing the European debate.
Embassy believes we will be most successful if we address
German data privacy concerns in a comprehensive way,
including various information sharing programs such as
HSPD-6, TFTP, and Passenger Name Records.

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¶3. (C) Germany has become a difficult partner with regards to

security-related information sharing initiatives following
the September 27 national elections, which brought the FDP
into the governing coalition. The FDP sees themselves as
defenders of citizens' privacy rights and these views have
led the FDP to oppose many of Germany's post-9/11
counterterrorism legislative proposals (see reftels). At
times, the FDP's fixation on data privacy and protection
issues looks to have come at the expense of the party forming
responsible views on counterterrorism policy.
¶4. (C) Over the past months, Ambassador Murphy, the DCM, and
other embassy staff have engaged German government
interlocutors, influential parliamentarians and law
enforcement officials to stress the importance of
security-related information sharing initiatives such as
TFTP. However, in these meetings, our German counterparts
consistently raise concerns about U.S. data protection
measures and policy. Furthermore, the German views often
distort and misrepresent U.S. policy. For example, current
Federal Justice Minister Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger
(FDP) - who has considerable influence - is particularly
outspoken and does not appear to have (or perhaps want) an
informed view of USG data privacy practices. It is critical
that we aggressively and vocally counter these
misrepresentations of U.S. policy.
¶5. (C) Embassy staff raised the prospect of an inter-agency

experts group visiting Berlin with xxxxx.
xxxxx who is a strong supporter of close U.S.-German
counterterrorism cooperation and information sharing,
welcomed the proposal and believed that skeptics of U.S.
policy in other ministries and Bundestag parliamentarians
would benefit from a comprehensive and factual discussion of
the details of U.S. data protection policy.
¶6. (C) In addition to our request that the Treasury visitors

to Brussels add a Berlin-stop, we strongly recommend that an
inter-agency data privacy experts delegation visit Berlin to
discuss overall U.S. data privacy policy with German
officials. The FDP returned to power after a ten-year foray
in the opposition and key leaders lack experience in the
practical matters of tackling real-world security issues in
the Internet age. In our meetings we have made the point
that countering terrorism in a globalized world, where
terrorists and their supporters use open borders and
information technology to quickly move people and financing,
requires robust international data sharing. We need to also

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BERLIN 00000128 002 of 002
demonstrate that the U.S. has strong data privacy measures in

place so that robust data sharing comes with robust data
protections.
Murphy

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Viewing cable 10BERLIN153, DEFLATED EXPECTATIONS FOR MERKEL'S DREAM

COALITION



Discussing cables

2010-02-03 2010-11-28
16:04 18:06
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRL #0153/01 0341656

ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 031656Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN

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SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2020

TAGS: PGOV PREL EFIN ECON GM
SUBJECT: DEFLATED EXPECTATIONS FOR MERKEL'S DREAM COALITION
AFTER FIRST 100 DAYS
REF: 2009 BERLIN 1528
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Greg Delawie for reasons

1.4 (b, d).
¶1. (C) Summary: One hundred days after Germany's black-yellow

coalition took office, a strong, unified government led by
Chancellor Merkel has yet to materialize. The much anticipated
“dream coalition” comprised of Merkel's Christian Democratic
Union (CDU), its Bavarian sister the Christian Social Union
(CSU), and Free Democratic Party (FDP) which promised a unified
conservative approach to the economy and “like minded” thinking
on social welfare, the environment, and foreign policy has become
bogged down in party politics with no end in sight. Recent polls
show that the bickering may be at least partly to blame for the
FDP's 5.6 percent fall in the polls, with it now down to 9
percent from its historic 14.6 percent election results (see
septel) and the CSU plummet to an historic low of 41 percent.
Indeed one minister is now threatening resignation. Sources from
the three coalition parties have admitted to problems, blaming
the other coalition parties, and downplaying their significance.
Merkel has come under criticism within her own party for not
taking strong public stands and reining in her coalition
partners, instead staying above the political fray. The
opposition, particularly the Social Democratic Party (SPD), is
trying to capitalize on this “divided we rule” coalition with an
eye toward unseating a teetering CDU-FDP coalition in North-Rhine
Westphalia (NRW) in May elections, thereby tipping the CDU-FDP
Bundesrat majority in its favor. Merkel is counting on better
economic and political indicators after the NRW election followed
by the release of the annual tax forecasts to congeal the
coalition. If the CDU/FDP coalition fails in NRW, coalition
divisions are likely to become more pronounced. End Summary.
Off to a Rocky Start

---------------------
¶2. (C) Concluding a coalition agreement in only three weeks,

prior to her November 2 departure for Washington to address

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Congress and in time for the 9 November 20 year anniversary of

German unity may have been Chancellor Merkel's first and only
major success to date in marshaling coalition unity. But the feat
may have had consequences. The haste to sign has left half-
resolved differences on tax cuts, economic policy, Afghanistan,
Turkey, health care, data protection (see reftel) and other
issues that continue to gurgle to the surface. Important to
recognize is that each party is operating under its own political
pressures from different voting constituencies. The FDP's main
goal is to deliver on campaign promises – particularly tax relief
– and shore up its base, the CSU is desperate to regain its
dominance in Bavaria, and the CDU is seeking to rebuild its
eroded voter base. All three parties and the opposition are now
gearing up for May 9 elections in NRW. This election in Germany's
most populous state, referred to as a “small national election,”
is regarded as a partial vote of confidence on the national
coalition, and will determine the Bundesrat majority. If the NRW
CDU-FDP coalition fails to return to government, the national CDU-
FDP coalition will fall by six seats in the Bundesrat – from 37
to 31 seats – it will lose its majority. Such a loss could well
hamper the government's ability to pass major financial or
economic legislation.
¶3. (C) Each of the three coalition parties have pointed to the
others for instigating tension. CDU party contact xxxxx accused
the FDP of functioning as if it were still in the opposition.
Senior SPD parliamentarian Hans-Ulrich Klose attributed the
coalition strains to the FDP adjusting to being in government
after 11 years in the opposition. FDP contact xxxxx accused the
CDU/CSU of reacting to their own internal problems: for the CDU,
its controversy over the Kunduz airstrike, and for the CSU, its
involvement in a major bank scandal. The FDP also points to the
CSU's strong rivalry with the FDP, with which it now governs in
Bavaria. The CSU is still trying to recover from its historic low
voting results in the September 2008 state elections, which
forced it for the first time in 46 years to govern within a
coalition. All parties, however, have downplayed the significance
of the feuds, with senior CDU party operative xxxxx explaining in
January that the party leaderships are just now settling in after
an exhausting election campaign and intense coalition
negotiations. He hoped (more than predicted) that the parties
would soon settle into a more cooperative relationship. In
January, Merkel called a small summit for coalition leadership
with Westerwelle and Seehofer to smooth things over and commit to
a new beginning. While the coalition's political edginess receded
for a time, policy divisions continue to surface.
CDU/CSU vs FDP – the Economy

-----------------------------
¶4. (C) While CDU/CSU and FDP voters may be the most likely to
cross over to the other party, their mainstay voter bases are

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different, with the CDU/CSU appealing to economically

conservative voters who also support the social market economy,
but are socially conservative. The FDP base is composed of free-
market advocates, who are socially liberal and strong advocates
of civil liberties. The FDP's campaign and continuing mantra has
been for much larger tax cuts in 2011, worth 20-24 billion euros,
apparently at the expense of both coalition unity and the better
judgment of economic experts. The cuts would make getting the
deficit back under the EU ceiling of 3 percent of GDP by 2013
nearly impossible. National debt will rise from 66 percent of GDP
to 80 percent. There are growing public concerns over rising
debt, but also about perceived disarray in the coalition's tax
and budget policies. Merkel insists that a decision regarding the
tax reduction plans will not be taken before May, when the
overall tax revenue forecast is due. Waiting until May also means
the coalition will not have to go public with unpopular
consolidation measures until after the NRW elections. Finance
Minister Schaeuble (CDU) appears unenthusiastic at best about
further tax cuts. He has already said deficit reduction measures
would have to start in 2011. The CSU has also called the FDP's
call for speedy tax relief measures “unrealistic” despite the
fact that it had included such a demand during its election
campaign. The most recent squabble between the FDP and CSU is
over FDP Health Minister Roesler's plans for health care reform
which foresees more care options and the introduction of
competition. Seehofer has rejected the proposal, holding fast
against radical changes to the system. Roesler has indicated he
might resign over this issue.
Foreign Policy
--------------
¶5. (C) Coalition feuding over economic and tax policy has
trumped coalition divisions over foreign policy, although FM
Westerwelle has managed a few disruptions in the latter. As a
harbinger of hard times to come, as one of his first actions,
Westerwelle opposed the naming of CDU Bundestag member Erika
Steinbach to the foundation “Flight Expulsion and Reconciliation”
citing possible damage to relations with Poland. As President of
Germany's Federation of Expellees, Steinbach is disliked in
Poland. While the numbers are disputed, the expellee community,
which mainly votes CSU or CDU, has exerted influence on the
issue. National and State CDU and CSU politicians came out in
support of Steinbach with only Merkel keeping mum. The
controversy continues, despite ongoing attempts to reach a
compromise, threatening to drain coalition attention and good-
will.
¶6. (C) Coalition strains have also surfaced on the issue of

overseas deployments. Regarding a troop increase in Afghanistan,
Westerwelle's position was at first muddled, as he tried to
reflect his party's general negativity toward overseas military

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deployments while at the same time tending to his role as

Germany's chief diplomat in the run-up to the London Conference.
In the end, he (together with the opposition) likely played a
role in achieving a lower-than-expected troop increase.
Westerwelle also convinced the CDU to agree on gradually reducing
German participation in UNIFIL. The CSU also rocked the coalition
boat on Afghanistan, with Seehofer expressing general skepticism
on a troop increase, although he later came around. In addition,
CSU Secretary General Dobrindt has ridiculed the federal
government's reconciliation concept in Afghanistan as a “cash for
clunkers version for the Taliban.”
Comment
---------
¶7. (C) Chancellor Merkel may have ironically cast off the yoke
of the Grand Coalition only now to be encumbered with a new FDP-
CSU double yoke, restrained by an FDP bent on delivering on
campaign promises and a CSU distracted over its rivalry with the
FDP and internal problems. High expectations for the “dream
coalition” are certainly in part to blame for the current polls,
with popularity numbers for Merkel and Westerwelle both having
suffered. Worried most, however, are the CDU and FDP politicians
in NRW, who fear that the national coalition's squabbling could
negatively impact their own chances in the May 9 elections. The
leadership threesome – Merkel, Westerwelle, and Seehofer – may
make an extra effort to get along, or at least appear to get
along, as the NRW elections near. It is not clear that
Westerwelle and the FDP, however, believe that it is the
squabbling that is unhelpful, or rather its own inability to
deliver as yet on certain campaign promises. If it is the latter,

more coalition tensions could ensue as Westerwelle begins to
expend more energy as FDP Chairman and less as Foreign Minister,
gearing up his party for its NRW campaign. Berlin is once again
becoming bogged down in political squabbles as the NRW elections
near.
¶8. (U) Consulate Munich contributed to this cable.
Murphy

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Viewing cable 10BERLIN157, DEFENSE MINISTER ZU GUTTENBERG REVEALS

STRUGGLE



Discussing cables

2010-02-04 2010-11-28
16:04 18:06
VZCZCXRO6323
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL
RUEHSR
DE RUEHRL #0157/01 0351607
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 041607Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN

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INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2020

TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS NATO GM AF
SUBJECT: DEFENSE MINISTER ZU GUTTENBERG REVEALS STRUGGLE
WITH FM WESTERWELLE ON TROOP INCREASE FOR AFGHANISTAN
REF: A. BERLIN 138

¶B. BERLIN 112
Classified By: AMBASSADOR PHILIP D. MURPHY. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND

(D).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Defense Minister zu Guttenberg revealed in

a February 3 meeting with Ambassador Murphy that coalition
partner FM Westerwelle -- not the opposition Social
Democratic Party (SPD) -- had been the single biggest
obstacle
to the government seeking a bigger increase in German
troops for Afghanistan. But even with the modest planned
troop increase of 500 (with 350 more in reserve), zu
Guttenberg said a restructuring of the current Bundeswehr
presence would allow Germany to increase the number of
soldiers involved in the training of Afghan National Army
(ANA) by more than 1,000. While Westerwelle has portrayed
his skepticism about additional troops as principled, it
was also motivated by a desire to put zu Guttenberg "in his
place." While the size of the troop increase is settled,
the length of the new ISAF mandate remains open. The
government is hoping to have the new mandate approved by
the Bundestag before the end of February, with significant
(if not majority) support from the opposition SPD and
Greens. END SUMMARY.
WESTERWELLE: BIGGEST OBSTACLE
¶2. (C) In explaining the lower-than-expected planned

increase in the number of German troops for Afghanistan, zu
Guttenberg told the Ambassador that Westerwelle's opening
position in the coalition negotiations on the new mandate
had been "not one additional soldier." In that context, it

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had been difficult to get agreement on any increase at

all. (Comment: Zu Guttenberg proposed 1,500 additional
troops at the initial January 4 mini-cabinet meeting on
this issue. End Comment.)
DOING A LOT MORE WITH A LITTLE MORE
¶3. (C) To help justify the need for more troops, zu

Guttenberg said he had forced the Bundeswehr to do a
complete review of all the existing positions in
Afghanistan, which had confirmed that some could be
eliminated in light of the new ISAF counterinsurgency
strategy. He said a restructuring of the current
Bundeswehr presence, combined with the troop increase,
would boost the number of soldiers involved in the training
of the Afghan National Army (ANA) from 280 to 1,400. The
restructuring includes turning the battalion-size quick
reaction force based in Mazar into a "protection and
training" battalion. A second such battalion will be
created in Kunduz by augmenting the existing infantry
company there with new troops. Zu Guttenberg reiterated
that Germany strongly supports COMISAF's focus on
protection of the population and partnering with the Afghan
national security forces (ANSF), and that the German
"trainers" (i.e., the two new maneuver battalions) will
operate in the field with the ANSF.
PUTTING ZU GUTTENBERG IN HIS PLACE
¶4. (C) While zu Guttenberg said he is avoiding public

comment on whether the outcome of the coalition talks on
the new mandate is a "victory" for him or Westerwelle, FDP
Defense Policy Spokesman Elke Hoff told poloff separately
that Westerwelle's hard line against additional troops had
been motivated in part to "teach zu Guttenberg a lesson."
She claimed that zu Guttenberg had been too presumptuous
last fall in making speeches in Canada and the U.S. about
how Germany would significantly increase its troop
contribution to ISAF. He might have been able to get
agreement on a higher ceiling had he engaged
parliamentarians first and showed "greater respect for the
political process."
OPEN QUESTION: LENGTH OF THE MANDATE
¶5. (C) Zu Guttenberg confirmed that the cabinet would

formally agree on the proposed new ISAF mandate February 9
and that the first reading in the Bundestag would be
February 10. FM Westerwelle is scheduled to speak on
behalf of the government in introducing the proposed
mandate. The government is aiming to hold the final
Bundestag vote on the mandate -- following two weeks of

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committee hearings -- on February 26. Zu Guttenberg was
BERLIN 00000157 002 OF 002
confident that a large number (if not a majority) of

opposition politicians from the SPD and Greens would vote
in favor of the new mandate.
¶6. (C) A February 2 meeting of state secretaries

tentatively agreed that the new mandate should run, as is
the custom, for one year, expiring in February 2011. Zu
Guttenberg indicated, however, that it might be preferable to
stick to the length of the current mandate, which expires
in December 2010. He expressed concern that having the
mandate lap over into early 2011 could lead to a premature
debate on withdrawal, before the new strategy really had a
chance to work. (Comment: Another option under
consideration -- and favored by some in the Chancellery --
is a 18-month mandate, so that any debate on the future of
the troop presence would be put off until the fall of
¶2011. But the MFA objects that this would only raise the
ire of the opposition and give them an excuse to oppose the
mandate. End Comment.)
REASSURING THE GERMANS ON COMMAND OF THE NORTH
¶7. (C) Zu Guttenberg confirmed that Germany very much

welcomed the planned inflow of U.S. forces into the north,
especially the helicopter assets, which filled a
long-standing shortfall. He noted, however, that many in
Germany question whether the U.S. will be willing to accept
continued German leadership of RC-North in view of the
increased U.S. presence. Ambassador Murphy assured him
that the U.S. had no issues working for the German command in
the North.
Murphy

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Viewing cable 10BERLIN164, WESTERWELLE ON AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, TAC NUKES




Discussing cables

2010-02-05 2010-11-28
15:03 18:06
VZCZCXRO7703
OO RUEHSL
DE RUEHRL #0164/01 0361532
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 051532Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

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SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2020

TAGS: OTRA MARR NATO PARM PINS PREL PGOV GM AF IR
SUBJECT: WESTERWELLE ON AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, TAC NUKES
Classified By: Classified by Political M-C George Glass for

reasons 1.4
(b,d).
¶1. (C) German FM Westerwelle told Amb February 5 that it was

important to refocus Afghanistan efforts on civilian
reconstruction; that we needed to avoid suggesting German
troops engaged in less risk than other countries; that he did
not invite Iranian FM Mottaki to Germany or seek a meeting
with him; that any discussion of non-strategic nuclear
weapons needed to be conducted at 28 at NATO; and that he
could not influence any decision by the European Parliament
on the SWIFT agreement. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) The Ambassador asked about Westerwelle's first 100
days in office. Though in an ebullient mood, Westerwelle
said things were very difficult (FDP slipped another
percentage point in the polls hours before the meeting). He
said he had been in France February 4 for a joint cabinet
meeting, but that nothing substantive came of it. He
observed that one never really knew what was going to happen
with Sarkozy involved.
--------------
AFGHANISTAN
-------------
¶3. (C) The Ambassador reviewed his own recent trip to

Afghanistan. He shared his impression that the Germans were
doing a superb job at all levels from the RC-North commander
on down. He learned how critical mentoring and partnering
with Afghan security forces had become. He noted that the
U.S. was sending substantial forces to RC-North, where they
would conduct training and be under German command.
Westerwelle responded that this was important for Germany and
for international cooperation. The Ambassador added that the
U.S. was sending substantial helicopter support as well. He
said that Germans could be proud of their troops in
Afghanistan. Westerwelle responded that this was good news.
He said that the London Conference bore an excellent
conclusion, and was particularly useful for its focus on
civilian progress. He emphasized the importance of

Cable Viewer
underscoring civilian reconstruction.

¶4. (C) With a request for confidentiality, Westerwelle
referred to the January 20 "Bild Zeitung" interview with
General McChrystal, in which the general is quoted as urging
the Germans to take more risks. Westerwelle recounted that
he himself had had to answer questions about this article for
ten days, explaining that the Germans were not "peace
soldiers" while other countries provided the combat troops.
He said it was important that German troops not be
"relativized" and cast as second-class troops. He observed
that Germany had originally deployed 3,500 troops, increased
that mandate to 4,500, and was now planning an increase of
another 500 plus a reserve. He emphasized that this was a
major contribution compared with other European countries.
¶5. (C) The Ambassador noted that he had gained the
impression in Afghanistan that police training was more
challenging than he had originally understood. Troops were
usually required to provide force protection. But German
police training was the best.
¶6. (C) The Ambassador asked how the prospective February 26
Bundestag debate to extend the Bundeswehr mandate in
Afghanistan would play out. Westerwelle said the question
was how large a majority would approve the new mandate. He
said that SPD caucus chief Steinmeier displayed good will on
this issue. However, SPD chairman Gabriel wanted to
politicize the issue for domestic political gain.
Nevertheless, he thought some in the SPD would support the
new mandate. However, Westerwelle expected no support from
the Greens. Westerwelle noted that the May NRW state
elections were also affecting the issue in a negative way.
That said, he said he could not see Steinmeier opposing the
larger mandate. He hoped the Ambassador would speak with
Steinmeier.
------
IRAN
------
¶7. (C) Asked about the February 5 visit of Iranian FM

Mottaki to the Munich Security Conference, Westerwelle
emphasized that he (Westerwelle) had not invited Mottaki to
come to Germany, and Westerwelle had also not requested a
meeting with Mottaki. Rather, it was Mottaki who was asking
to see Westerwelle. Westerwelle said he had still not
decided whether he would talk to Mottaki or not. He
reflected concern that Tehran might try to exploit Mottaki's
visit to Germany as a distraction, and continue executing
people during the visit. In any case, Westerwelle said his
position was exactly the same as the U.S. on Iran, and he
would share the results of any meeting with Mottaki, if it
took place.

Cable Viewer
BERLIN 00000164 002 OF 002
¶8. (C) Westerwelle said he would meet Russian FM Lavrov and

(separately) Chinese FM Yang February 5. He suggested that
Moscow had been changing course on Iran sanctions since the
Qom revelations. The Russians now saw Iran as playing games
on the nuclear issue. However, he observed that China was
"hesitant," or even in opposition to sanctions. Reflecting
on his recent visit to China, Westerwelle said he had not
perceived any "good will" there at present. He said he would
ask Yang again about Iran and then share the results with the
U.S. Westerwelle opined that it was important also to focus
on Brazil as an opinion leader in the Third World. He noted
that President Lula had received Ahmadinejad warmly several
months ago. He added that he was uncertain what the Saudis
thought, but that the other Persian Gulf countries seemed to
be in an existential panic about the Iranian nuclear program.
-----------
TAC NUKES
-----------
¶9. (C) Touching briefly on arms control, Westerwelle stated

unequivocally that tactical nuclear weapons was an issue for
NATO. He said that when he had received Kissinger, Schulz,
Perry and Nunn on February 3 to talk about their global zero
proposal, tactical nuclear weapons was not discussed. He
said that the four statesmen were very supportive of
President Obama.
----------
TFTP
---------
¶10. (C) The Ambassador raised the challenge of getting the
European Parliament to approve an agreement to share data
with the U.S. on tracking terrorist finance. The Ambassador
noted the extensive efforts of the Treasury Department and
other U.S. agencies to explain the importance of the program
to our common security. He asked how one could get better
support for the program. Westerwelle replied that the German
government had been able to come up with a solution for
itself a few months ago when the issue first surfaced.
(Comment: In fact, German Interior Minister de Maziere's vote
to abstain in the EU Council vote on TFTP on November 30
reflected the complete deadlock within the Coalition
Government between TFTP advocates in the CDU-controlled
Interior Ministry and TFTP opponents in the FDP-controlled
Justice Ministery. End Comment.) However, Westerwelle said
that now that the issue was in the European Parliament, he
had no ability to influence it. He said that he was very,

Cable Viewer
very aware of the Secretary's interest in this issue.

Nevertheless, he had a sense that almost all groups in the
European Parliament had concerns with the proposed agreement.
He emphasized that this was not an issue that only concerned
his party, the FDP, but rather many others as well.
¶11. (C) Westerwelle shared that he had not yet appointed a
new Coordinator for German-American cooperation.
----------
COMMENT
---------
¶12. (C) Westerwelle (who spoke with ease in English) was in

a buoyant mood and more confident on his issues than we have
seen him so far. He seemed ready to defend any intimation
that he was less than supportive of a troop surge (Defense
Minister zu Guttenberg told the Ambassador two days ago that
Westerwelle had worked for no increase of German troops for
Afghanistan, see Berlin 157) with invocations of the
importance of civilian reconstruction. On Iran, he leapt at
the chance to tell us he had not invited Mottaki. His dodges
on both tactical nuclear weapons and terrorist finance were
all but practiced. His comment that he was unable to affect
the vote in the EU Parliament on TFTP was a bit disingenuous;
on February 4, an MFA official acknowledged to visiting
Treasury officials in Berlin that German MEPs were in fact
leading the charge against TFTP in the EU Parliament with the
tacit support of the FDP, if not of specialists in the
Justice Ministry and MFA themselves. Westerwelle still cuts a
good image in meetings and in the press here, even though his
party continues a bout of free fall in the polls. His
ministry, though, still wonders (privately to us) where he
gets his policy direction from. END COMMENT.
¶13. (U) The Ambassador did not have the chance to clear this
cable before departing Berlin.
Murphy

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Viewing cable 10BERLIN180, CHANCELLOR MERKEL ANGERED BY LACK OF

GERMAN MEP



Discussing cables

2010-02-12 2010-12-05
17:05 12:12
VZCZCXRO2876
DE RUEHRL #0180/01 0431709
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 121709Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN

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RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
ID: 248711
ORIGIN: 10BERLIN180
DATE: 2010-02-12 17:09:00
SOURCE: Embassy Berlin
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
MISC: 10BERLIN128|10BERLIN176
DESTINATION: VZCZCXRO2876RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSRRUEHRL
#0180/01 0431709CCCCC ZZH121709Z FEB 10AMEMBASSY BERLINRUEHC/
SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6546RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
PRIORITY/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
PRIORITY/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY/DEPT OF
JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY/DEPT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR, L, S/CT, EEB, INL

TREASURY FOR TFI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2020

TAGS: PTER KTFN PGOV PREL PINR ETTC EAIR EFIN KCRM
KJUS, KHLS, GM
SUBJECT: CHANCELLOR MERKEL ANGERED BY LACK OF GERMAN MEP
SUPPORT FOR TFTP
REF: A. BERLIN 176

¶B. BERLIN 128
Classified By: ROBERT A. POLLARD, Minister-Counselor for

Economics Affa
irs, for Reasons 1.4 (b and d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Chancellor Merkel is privately angry over the

lack of support German members of the European Parliament
gave the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) interim
agreement and is worried that Washington will view the EP's
veto as a sign that Europe does not take the terrorist threat
seriously. Merkel is particularly irritated with German MEPs
from her Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and sister
Christian Social Union (CSU) parties, most of whom reportedly

Cable Viewer
voted against the agreement despite previously indicating

they would support it. Public German reactions to the EP
vote have come exclusively from TFTP detractors who portrayed
the veto as a sign that the European Parliament has won a
victory over an arrogant Commission/Council, as well as
delivering a rebuke to U.S. counterterrorism policies that
undervalue data privacy. These events suggest the need to
intensify our engagement with German government
interlocutors, Bundestag and European parliamentarians, and
opinion makers to demonstrate that the U.S. has strong data
privacy measures in place. END SUMMARY
¶2. (C) Hamburg Mayor Ole von Beust (CDU) told Ambassador
today (2/12) that he had met with Chancellor Merkel last
night and she was "very, very angry - angrier than he had
ever seen her" with the outcome of the vote. Beust said that
the Chancellor had personally lobbied German MEPs from the
CDU/CSU parties to support the agreement, but that most of
these MEPs ended up voting against the agreement anyway.
Merkel expressed concerns to Beust that Washington will view
the EP veto as a sign that Europe does not take the terrorist
threat seriously. Merkel also worried about the
ramifications (presumably within Europe and for transatlantic
relations) that might follow were a terrorist attack to occur
that could have been prevented had SWIFT data been exchanged.
¶3. (C) Federal Justice Minister Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger,

a strong proponent of data privacy rights from the Free
Democratic Party (FDP; see reftels), quickly welcomed the
TFTP veto. She said "the citizens of Europe have won a
victory today that strengthened not just data protection, but
democracy in all of Europe." The Minister has been a vocal
critic of the TFTP and in interviews today stressed that the
EP veto will lead to a change of European policy in which
"data protection is no longer just an appendix of security
policy." She also restated her understanding that German
investigators believe TFTP data has not/not contributed
meaningfully to terrorism investigations. She said the EP
decision paves the way for new negotiations that take into
account European notions of data protection.
¶4. (C) Some German members of the European Parliament

likewise applauded the TFTP veto. Green Party MEP Jan
Philipp Albrecht stated that the vote would not cause a
"transatlantic ice-age" because President Obama has more
important concerns and would not "emphasize this defeat too
much at home." Werner Langen, head of the EP CDU/CSU group,
said that his group did not vote against the United States,
but rather against the European Commission and the Council
who had "negotiated a bad agreement." Martin Schulz, head of
the Social Democratic faction, said that the "negotiating
position of the EU is now better." FDP MEP Alexander Graf

Cable Viewer
Lambsdorff acknowledged that the decision could be a

temporary irritation in transatlantic relations, but believed
that this would not last long and the time would soon come to
"negotiate a reasonable agreement." Bavarian State Minister
Mueller told Munich CG that the CSU is interested in moving
forward with the negotiation of a new agreement that meets US
and European needs.
¶5. (C) COMMENT: Why did so many German MEPs oppose TFTP?
BERLIN 00000180 002 OF 002
First, the debate was not just about TFTP. Germans across
the political spectrum adamantly support data protection )
whether it has to do with Passenger Name Records, Google,s
supposed &monopoly8 on data searches, or individual credit
ratings. Recent scandals in which major firms such as
Deutsche Telekom and Deutsche Bahn illegally tapped phones or
files of tens of thousands of employees and customers
reinforced Germans, concerns about the misuse of data
technology. Historical memory also plays a part, as stories
about how the Stasi abused information to destroy people,s
lives still regularly circulate in the press. Paranoia runs
deep especially about U.S. intelligence agencies. We were
astonished to learn how quickly rumors about alleged U.S.
economic espionage ) at first associated with the new U.S.
air passenger registration system (ESTA), then with TFTP )
gained currency among German parliamentarians in the run-up
to the February 11 vote in Strasbourg. Moreover, the fact
that the libertarian Free Democratic Party (FDP) made data
privacy a central plank of the pact with its coalition
partners, the CDU/CSU ) and more importantly, captured the
Justice Ministry ) made it very difficult for TFTP advocates
like Interior Minister de Maiziere to speak up. None of this
may excuse the behavior of certain German MEPs, but it says
something about the challenge ahead.
¶6. (C) COMMENT CONT.: The overwhelming rejection of the

interim agreement by German MEPs from all political parties
nonetheless is surprising. Although we anticipated that the
FDP and Greens would come out strongly against the interim
agreement, the broad lack of support it received from the
CDU/CSU and Social Democrats was unexpected. We believe a
number of factors contributed to this including the fact that
MEPs of all stripes saw this as an early opportunity to exert
their new post-Lisbon powers and send a message to the
Commission and Council. Specific to Germany, the almost
complete absence of public statements by German leadership in
support of the agreement resulted in a situation in which
MEPs received no political coverage supporting a positive
vote and saw little political cost for a no vote.
Furthermore, the German public and political class largely

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tends to view terrorism abstractly given that it has been

decades since any successful terrorist attack has occurred on
German soil. This week's TFTP vote demonstrates that we need
to intensify our engagement with German government
interlocutors, Bundestag and European parliamentarians and
opinion makers to get our views across. We need to also
demonstrate that the U.S. has strong data privacy measures in
place so that robust data sharing comes with robust data
protections.
Murphy

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Viewing cable 06BERLIN2546, SPD IN DRIVER'S SEAT FOR BERLIN ELECTION

Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin

DE RUEHRL #2546/01 2421538

file:///F|/EWACS/wikileaks/Germany/06BERLIN2546.html (2 of 5)12/5/2010 6:58:05 PM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2021

Classified By: PolCouns John Bauman. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d)

The Campaign: SPD in Charge; CDU in Tatters

file:///F|/EWACS/wikileaks/Germany/06BERLIN2546.html (3 of 5)12/5/2010 6:58:05 PM

the campaign began.

¶4. (C) The Left Party.PDS, according to Berlin leader Klaus

file:///F|/EWACS/wikileaks/Germany/06BERLIN2546.html (4 of 5)12/5/2010 6:58:05 PM

¶6. (C) The Berlin election is unlikely to have major national

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Viewing cable 07BERLIN242, AL-MASRI CASE -- CHANCELLERY AWARE OF USG

originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.

includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.

specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or

Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin

DE RUEHRL #0242 0371748

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/02/07BERLIN242.html (16 of 18)12/5/2010 6:36:26 PM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6940

FOR S/ES-O, EUR AND L

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017

REF: A. BERLIN 230

¶B. BERLIN 200

¶1. (S/NF) In a February 6 discussion with German Deputy

¶3. (S/NF) Nikel also underscored the independence of the

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/02/07BERLIN242.html (17 of 18)12/5/2010 6:36:26 PM

to political, as well as judicial, scrutiny. From a judicial

¶4. (S/NF) Nikel also cited intense pressure from the

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/02/07BERLIN242.html (18 of 18)12/5/2010 6:36:26 PM

Viewing cable 07BERLIN802, SCENESETTER FOR ANGELA MERKEL IN

originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.

includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.

specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or

Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/04/07BERLIN802.html (16 of 20)12/5/2010 6:37:08 PM

INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000802

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2022

REF: BERLIN 747

Classified By: DCM John Koenig. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d)

¶1. (C) Summary. Angela Merkel arrives in Washington in an

Leading in the EU; Muddling Through at Home

¶2. (C) Angela Merkel's role as Germany's and Europe's leader

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/04/07BERLIN802.html (17 of 20)12/5/2010 6:37:08 PM

of the EU at a time when progress on the European project had

¶3. (C) Merkel has responded to these similar circumstances

Washington: What's In It for Merkel

¶4. (C) We sum up Merkel's goal for the U.S.-EU Summit as

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/04/07BERLIN802.html (18 of 20)12/5/2010 6:37:08 PM

in which trans-Atlantic relations were dominated by negative

BERLIN 00000802 002 OF 002

can count on maintaining her position in Europe against any

What's In This for Washington

¶7. (C) Post has previously reported on Merkel's risk-averse

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/04/07BERLIN802.html (19 of 20)12/5/2010 6:37:08 PM