BEFORE THE ETHICS REVIEW BOARD

OF THE CITY OF LEON VALLEY, TEXAS:

}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
Citizens of Leon Valley }
} FORMAL COMPLAINT AFFIDAVIT
}
against }
}
}
MONICA ALCOCER }
City Council Place 3 }
DONNA CHARLES }
City Council Place 1 }
KELLY KUENSTLER }
City Manager }
}

COMPLAINT (SUMMARY)

The complainants, listed above, allege that Monica Alcocer, Donna Charles, and
Kelly Kuenstler were active participants in wrongful events, actions, behaviors,
communications, and discussions over the previous 14 months in violation of the Leon
Valley Ethics Regulations, Texas Penal Code, Texas Elections Code, Leon Valley Code of
Ordinances, Leon Valley Home Rule Charter, and the Lion’s Roar Newsletter
Contribution and Content Policy. The evidence proves an ongoing quid pro quo
relationship, fraud and abuse of taxpayer dollars including issuances of unauthorized
payments, and an underlying conspiratorial scheme involving illicit and unethical conduct
that infringes upon fundamental rights afforded to citizens of Leon Valley, Texas, United

Page 1 of 63
States of America, including the ability for participation in a free and fair democratic
government.

Discussed in further detail throughout this complaint affidavit, the evidence shows
that:

1) Ms. Kuenstler, Councilor Charles, and Councilor Alcocer violated Leon Valley
policies, ethics regulations, ordinances, and state law by planting political opinion
pieces in the Lion’s Roar. These publications undoubtedly advocated against the
petitions signed by over 800 citizens to recall and remove Councilor Charles and
Councilor Alcocer in the May 2020 election. The publications were printed and
disseminated using tax dollars for personal and political gain.
2) Councilor Charles and Councilor Alcocer disregarded the segment of the §3.12
procedural ordinance requirement to appoint a “Designated Officer” who would be
neutral for the hearing, despite fellow Councilor Bradshaw bringing up the issue
on numerous occasions.
3) There is the appearance of impropriety in Ms. Kuenstler, as editor of the Lion’s
Roar, allowing the opinion pieces by Councilor Alcocer and Councilor Charles and
disallowing contrary opinion or factual pieces by Mayor Riley and Councilor
Bradshaw. This and other actions following Councilor Alcocer and Councilor
Charles’s articles appear related to the huge financial raise, increase in taxpayer
contributions to Ms. Kuenstler’s retirement account, increase in severance payout,
and contract extension granted to Ms. Kuenstler because of Councilor Alcocer and
Councilor Charles’s votes.
4) Ms. Kuenstler swore falsely in her testimony several times and demonstrated bias
against Martinez during his 3.12 hearing in order to have him unjustly removed
from elected office.
5) Ms. Kuenstler committed official oppression, abuse of office, misuse of official
information, and violated other laws in orchestrating complaints and leading the
complainants groundlessly to prosecute Mr. Martinez and have him removed from
office without just cause. She encouraged subordinates to do the same.
6) Ms. Kuenstler violated Leon Valley policies and procedures by failing to forward
Councilor Rodriguez’s and other personnel complaints to the Mayor. She kept all
complaints to herself and independently hired Mr. Ryan Henry.

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 7) Throughout the §3.12 process from December 18, 2018 through August 2019,
Kuenstler enabled and approved city staff members to spend enormous amounts of
time, paid for by the public, to find different ways to have Mr. Martinez removed
from office, because Mr. Martinez was critical of her administration (and would not
have approved of her desired excessive compensation package). This violates Texas
law.

INTRODUCTION

During the week of December 16-20, 2019, Lion’s Roar Volume 17, Issue 1
(December 2019 – January 2020) was disseminated to the residents of Leon Valley
(Exhibit B1). Page 8 of the Lion’s Roar, “Elected as a City Councilor – Now What?”, was
authored by Donna J. Charles, Leon Valley Councilor - Place 1 (Exhibit B1, Page 8). This
article is located side-by-side with a “republished” article from the San Antonio Express
News, which was requested for placement in the Lion’s Roar by Monica Alcocer, Leon
Valley Councilor – Place 3 (Exhibit B2). Located on page 9, this article was originally
published by the editorial board of the San Antonio Express News as an opinion-based
editorial and is incorrectly cited as “by Scott Huddleston, Staff Writer, San Antonio
Express News” (Exhibit B1, Page 9). When Mr. Huddleston was contacted, he stated that
he was not the author of the document (Exhibit B3). The editorial appears to be written or
influenced by someone with insider knowledge of the events unfolding in Leon Valley,
such as Ms. Kuenstler, Ms. Alcocer, Ms. Charles, Mr. Brandon Melland, or Mr. Joseph
Salvaggio, as it describes events from a vantage point that is distorted and convoluted.
The article attempts to politically influence, undermine, and dissuade readers from
participating in the ongoing recall petition efforts spearheaded by a large group of
concerned citizens. It contains nonfactual information, states the opinion that “there’s no
need for a recall in Leon Valley”, and incorrectly states that the recall efforts “exacerbate
political dysfunction at immense public cost” (Exhibit B1, Page 9), despite the facts that
all recall efforts are funded privately and serve as an accountability tool for elected
leaders who don’t adequately represent their constituents. Because of the misleading and
deceitful statements in both Donna Charles’ article and the article submitted by Monica
Alcocer, and the inaccurate implications and the article’s inherent attempt to influence
voters into voting against a specific measure, it is not only improper, but illegal for
publication in a taxpayer-funded newsletter throughout the community. Additionally, as

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the evidence proves, Ms. Kuenstler violated multiple ethics regulations, Texas laws, and
Leon Valley ethics regulations by enabling, using her official position as city manager,
such illicit behaviors to occur. Finally, the evidence shows an underlying quid pro quo
relationship between Ms. Alcocer, Ms. Charles, and Ms. Kuenstler – in which they each
provide “favors” to one another, in exchange for “favors” from another person.

According to Leon Valley Ordinance No. 2019-10, which has been added to the
Leon Valley Code of Ordinances as Article 1.12 City of Leon Valley Ethics Regulations,
the Ethics Review Board “shall have jurisdiction to investigate and make findings and
recommendations concerning: 1.) Any alleged violation of [the City of Leon Valley Ethics
Regulations]; 2.) Any alleged violation of the City Charter; 3.) Any alleged violation of
Local Government Code Chapter 171; 4.) Any alleged violation of Local Government Code
Chapter 176; 5.) Any alleged violation of Texas Penal Codes Section 36.02, 36.03, 36.07,
36.08, 39.02, AND 39.06; 6.) Any violation of Texas Government Code Chapter 553; 7.)
Any alleged violation of the City Code of Ordinances” (Exhibit A2, Article VII [2][a]). The
Ethics Review Board has the power to “conduct investigations” as well as “review, index,
maintain on file, and dispose of sworn complaints” (Exhibit A2, Article VII, (2)(c)(5-6)).
Additionally, due to requirements that Abuse of Official Capacity requires the actor
“violates a law” other than those listed as “Abuse of Official Capacity” in order to
constitute a violation, evidence and explanation are provided for the other applicable
violations of law that have occurred that predicate the Abuse of Official Capacity by
Donna Charles, Monica Alcocer, and Kelly Kuenstler (Exhibit A3, Texas Penal Code §
36.02).

Monica Alcocer and Donna Charles, collectively or separately, colluded with Kelly
Kuenstler for publication of the two “side-by-side” pages in the Lion’s Roar, knowing it
would get disseminated to the public. Using the credibility, reputation, and branding of
the Lion’s Roar (with an intellectual property of significant value due to the many decades
of distribution to the Leon Valley community), Ms. Kuenstler, Ms. Alcocer, and Ms.
Charles violated ethical rules, Texas laws, Election laws, Leon Valley ordinances, the
Leon Valley Home Rule Charter, and the Leon Valley policy regulating the content
allowed as publication of the Lion’s Roar. The violations occurred with intent to obtain
personal gain in order to advance their private interests and their personal political
agenda.

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 Ms. Kuenstler’s unfair granting of “special” privileges to elected officials willing to
“rubber stamp” her proposals and Ms. Kuenstler’s financial compensation represent a
systemic problem that has escalated significantly in recent months. This is evident in her
double-standard approach regarding her dealings with city counselors and the mayor with
regards to selective publication of content that she personally likes and agrees with, and
Ms. Kuenstler’s refusal to publish content or place items on an agenda that she does not
like or personally agree with. Many examples of these behaviors, described in more detail
within this complaint, show a concerning pattern of behavior consistent with a
government corruption scheme that likely will require compelling witnesses and sworn
testimony, subpoena of documents and devices, and review by many other agencies to
understand the full extent and truth of the collusion and coordination of the scheme,
including all parties included. Unfortunately, it is impossible for me and others to timely
examine all pertinent documents and evidence to understand the full scope of the
corruption scheme. This is largely due to the fact that the city manager and the previous
city attorney frequently attempted to avoid transparency with the public by persuading
the secretary to charge outrageous amounts for open records requests, failing to respond
to open records requests in accordance with Texas laws, falsely claiming attorney-client
privilege for many communications that were not privy to such assertions, and hiding
evidence altogether (Exhibit B4 – Exhibit B12).

DONNA CHARLES

Councilor Charles’ subjective, self-serving, non-fact based, taxpayer funded,

advertisement-styled article serves to promote private interests, defend Charles’ poor
decisions made during the § 3.12 Hearing over the summer, influence the outcome of the
pending recall election in May of 2020, and cast aspersions on the significance of over 800
petition signatures filed demanding the placement of a measure on the ballot, that would
seek to remove Ms. Charles from council. In addition to undermining the validity of the
recall petitions, Charles’ article specifically seeks to rebut reason #3 listed on the recall
petition: “Malfeasance during the administrative hearing of Councilor Benny Martinez,
including poor application of Leon Valley Home Rule Charter regarding allegations
against accused council member; inability to differentiate what evidence should be
considered subjective versus objective and thus, disregarded; improperly displaying
partiality, and improperly allowing bias to dictate decision making, as evidenced by

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dialogue during deliberations on August 14, 2019 council meeting” (Exhibit C1). In the
article, Councilor Charles makes false assertions that lack factual proof, including that
“there have been numerous negative, less than factual messages placed on a web site,
mailed, and spoken at meetings regarding [the political hearing of political opponent
Benny Martinez]”, that messages posted on websites, social media, and spoken at council
meetings “contain information which serves to deceive and mislead the general public and
citizens of the city”, and that these comments and information produced and funded by
concerned citizens and groups in the city are not the “whole story” (Exhibit B1, Page 8).
However, the most damning statement made in the article is that, “The allegations
contained within the recall petition are crafted to omit the foundation of the actions [I]
took […]”. This statement proves the intentionality behind Ms. Charles’ article: to
influence readers (voters) to believe the recall petition and basis for recall election in 2020
lacks credibility and validity, and as such, to influence them to vote against the recall
ballot measure in May of 2020.

The irony behind Ms. Charles’ article is that it attempts to destroy the credibility of
the very taxpayers that are funding the publication of the Lion’s Roar (and its
dissemination/ postage). These taxpayers, including the 800+ people signing the recall
petition for removal of Councilor Charles from office, have simply attempted to participate
in efforts, including using their own personal financial resources, to attract public
attention to the disgusting efforts promulgated by the city manager and carried out by Ms.
Charles. Though Charles’ article expresses disapproval of the constitutionally protected
First Amendment exercise by concerned citizens of the community, they were simply
working to correct the social injustice and unethical behaviors from the past year. Ms.
Charles was unwilling to use her personal resources to mount her defense and justify her
position to the community. The group of concerned citizens have promoted public interest
and awareness, engaged in lawful activities such as creating a web page (Exhibit C2),
social media pages (Exhibit C3), phone numbers, and even sent postcards to the residents
of Leon Valley using their personal financial resources (Exhibit C4). Ms. Charles seeks to
mount her defense at the expense of the taxpayers of Leon Valley, including the use of
thousands of dollars spent on the Lion’s Roar publication and dissemination/ postage to
serve her self-interest and mislead the public for political purposes (Exhibit C5, Exhibit
C6).

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 Donna Charles’ active acceptance of Lion’s Roar “real estate” at no cost, including
her submission of the article “Elected as a City Councilor – Now What?”, constitutes an
array of criminal and administrative violations. Charles’ submission of the article, which
was published and disseminated to the public (Exhibit C7), constituted a violation of the
Lion’s Roar Newsletter Contribution and Content Policy as well as several criminal
violations of the Texas Election Code related to requirement for political disclosure
statements and usage of taxpayer dollars to influence constituents and voters regarding
the recall election (Exhibit A6, Texas Election Code § 255.001, 255.003). Additionally, the
participation in the publication of this Lion’s Roar article constitutes a blatant Abuse of
Official Capacity (Exhibit A5, Texas Penal Code 39.02), Official Oppression (Exhibit A5,
Texas Penal Code 39.03), as well as many violations of Leon Valley’s Home Rule Charter.
The Home Rule Charter violations include the acceptance of compensation in the form of
Lion’s Roar publication space (Exhibit A1, Section 3.05[A]), the non-adherence to the
Hearing Protocols outlined in Ordinance No. 2019-26 (Exhibit A1, Section 3.10[B]; and
Section 3.12[B][5]) as evidenced by Charles’ acknowledgement that the “legal advice of the
Investigative and Conflict Attorney contracted by the City Manager” which conflicts with
requirement in Ordinance No. 2019-26 that the council vote to appoint the impartial
“Designated Officer”, and the intentional efforts to undermine and improperly influence
the process for citizens to participate in the recall process of a council member (Exhibit
A1, Section 6.01[C]). Additionally, the active participation in the publication of the Lion’s
Roar article constitutes a violation of multiple sections of the Leon Valley Ethics
Regulations (Exhibit A2), which constitutes a violation of the Home Rule Charter (Exhibit
A1, Section 3.10[B]), and is subject to the criminal penalties from violation of the Charter
(Exhibit A1, Section 7.13[A]). The acceptance of the opportunity and subsequent
publication of the Lion’s Roar article constitutes an ethical violation related to the “unfair
advancement of private interests” (Exhibit A2, Article II [2][a]), representation before the
city “using the prestige of office and improper influence” (Exhibit A2, Article II [5][2][a]),
improper usage of public property and resources, including “supplies for private purposes
(including political purposes)” (Exhibit A2, Article II [6]), and exceeding limitations on the
ethical boundaries of the political activities including the acceptable of “anything of value,
directly or indirectly, for political activity related to an item pending on the ballot”
(Exhibit A2, Article II [7][b]).

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 The use of the official position of City Councilor to submit an article for publication
a taxpayer funded newsletter in an unethical and illegal manner constitutes an Abuse of
Official Capacity (Exhibit A5, Penal Code 39.02) and Official Oppression (Exhibit A5,
Penal Code 39.03). On December 5, 2019 at 3:12 PM, an email was sent to Ms. Kelly
Kuenstler inquiring into how a citizen could “publish a full page op-ed in the Lion’s Roar
for publication in February/ March 2020” as well as “publish a San Antonio Express News
article in the February/ March 2020 Lion’s Roar side-by side with [the] op-ed” (Exhibit
C8). Ms. Kuenstler responded to the email on December 10, 2019 at 3:37PM, stating that,
“an editorial contribution to the newsletter may be submitted by the Mayor, City Council,
City Manager, City Secretary, and Leon Valley Staff members….” (Exhibit C9). The
communication from Ms. Kuenstler inherently shows that in order to submit an opinion
editorial to the Lion’s Roar, one must be either the Mayor, a City Council Member, City
Manager, City Secretary, or another city staff member. According to Ms. Kuenstler’s
correspondence, it takes a person acting in their official position to be granted the
privilege of publishing such editorial articles in the Lion’s Roar. Finally, it should be noted
that the question posed in the email correspondence, “How can [a citizen] publish a full
page op-ed in the Lion’s Roar?”, was rejected and subsequently unanswered by City
Manager Kelly Kuenstler (Exhibit C8).

According to Texas Law, an Abuse of Official Capacity occurs when “A public

servant commits an offense if, with intent to obtain a benefit or with intent to harm or
defraud another, he intentionally or knowingly […] misuses government property,
services, personnel, or any other thing of value belonging to the government that has come
into the public servant’s custody or possession by virtue of the public servant’s office or
employment” (Exhibit A5, Texas Penal Code § 39.02[a][2]). Further, “misuse” means to
“deal with property contrary to […] oath of office of a public servant” (Exhibit A5, Texas
Penal Code § 39.01(2)). The oath Ms. Charles swore to on May 21, 2019 includes that she
will “preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States and of
this State” (Council Meeting Video, May 21, 2019). The Texas Ethics Commission explains
that a misuse of government property occurs when “you misapply any thing of value
belonging to the government that has come into your custody or possession by virtue of
your public office or employment” (Exhibit A7, Page 6). Further, the Texas Ethics
Commission explains: “Simply stated, this means that you are to use government property

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for governmental purposes, not for personal or private purposes” (Exhibit A7, Page 6). The
Lion’s Roar publication is intellectual property belonging solely to the City of Leon Valley,
and a statement of ownership along with prohibitions on reproduction can be found on the
back cover of the publication (Exhibit B1). The City of Leon Valley’s policy regulating
content of the newsletter publication is contained in the Lion’s Roar Newsletter
Contribution and Content Policy (Exhibit A8). Examined in more detail below, Ms.
Charles disregarded and violated many elements of this policy. Therefore, it can be
concluded that Ms. Charles’ use of her official position as Council Member to promote her
political agenda, including to cast aspersions and influence readers (voters) on the ongoing
recall efforts by stating inaccurate statements, while simultaneously violating Texas
Ethics laws, Election laws, the Lion’s Roar Contribution and Content Policy, and Home
Rule Charter laws, constitutes an Abuse of Official Capacity.

Defined by Texas law, Official Oppression occurs when a person “acting under color
of his office or employment commits an offense if he […] intentionally denies another in
the exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity, knowing his conduct
is unlawful” (Exhibit A5, Texas Penal Code § 39.03[a][2]). The ability to submit recall
petitions to the City Council of Leon Valley is a privilege obtained by Leon Valley citizens
as a result of the Home Rule Charter passage in 2017. The ability for Leon Valley citizens
to use their personal funds and resources to advocate for such recall measures is afforded
by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution (Exhibit A9). Though Ms.
Charles could have chosen to use her own funds and resources to express discontent with
the ongoing recall efforts in the same manner as the citizens of Leon Valley, she did not.
Ms. Charles chose to use her official position and authority, simultaneously use hard-
earned taxpayer dollars, to illegally mount her defense to the public. The act of using the
color of the Office of City Council to weaponize a taxpayer-funded newsletter to undermine
and discredit ongoing recall efforts by deceiving, misleading, and discrediting recall
efforts, destroys the “enjoyment of the right” of citizens to circulate recall petitions and
advocate for recall measures afforded by the Leon Valley Home Rule Charter. Such
oppressive actions toward those with a dissenting opinion is dangerous when employed in
a democratic government by a person in an official position. Though the Home Rule
Charter grants subjects to recall to an optional 30-minute public hearing to provide a
rebuttal to the recall efforts, there is no privilege to use taxpayer-funded newsletters for

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mounting a rebuttal. In fact, this is a direct violation of other Texas laws and Ethics laws,
which makes the action also constitute official oppression.

In the article “Elected as a City Councilor – Now What?”, Ms. Charles admits that
“Another important responsibility was to follow the legal advice of the Investigative and
Conflict Attorney contracted by the city manager on the advice of Texas Municipal
League” (Exhibit B1, Page 8). As Ms. Charles stated and videos of the special meetings
prove, the “Investigative” attorney was contracted by the city manager and was not
“appointed by a majority vote of those members of the City Council entitled to deliberate
and vote”, as required by the § 3.12 Procedure (Exhibit A10, Section 1.04.006 [A][2]).
According to the § 3.12 Procedure approved by the City Council on June 4, 2019, the
investigative attorney Ms. Charles is referring to is the termed the “Designated Officer”,
who “examine[s] any complaints filed against the official conduct of any department,
agency, appointed boards, office, officers, officials, employees, or appointed board members
of the City” (Exhibit A10, Section 1.04.006 [A][2]). According to Leon Valley’s Charter, the
“City Council shall […] create rules of procedure for all City Council workshops, regular
and special meetings and public hearings by ordinance” (Exhibit A1, Section 3.10[B]).
Because of its importance, the requirement of City Council to form and follow a policy
when conducting a formal hearing for forfeiture of office is reiterated in the Charter again:
“The City Council shall by ordinance adopt rules of procedures to be followed” (Exhibit A1,
Section 3.12 [B][5]). During the special meetings on July 2, 2019, August 14, 2019, and
again on August 20, 2019, Councilor Will Bradshaw expressed his concern that such
“Designated Officer” had never been voted on by the City Council. He voiced that the new
ordinance (Ordinance No. 2019-26) requires that they vote to appoint a lawyer “in order to
promote neutrality in the process and a disinterested investigator” – however Mr.
Bradshaw’s recommendations were disregarded, including by Ms. Charles. Discussion
about appointing a “Designated Investigator” was never allowed by Charles or Councilor
Alcocer. The disregard for adherence to Ordinance No. 2019-26, later codified as Leon
Valley Code of Ordinances Section 1.04.006, is itself a violation of the Home Rule Charter,
as the Charter requires these “rules of procedure to be followed” (Exhibit A1, Section 3.12
[B][5]). Further, the violation of any provision of the Charter “shall, in addition to any
other penalty, be guilty of a misdemeanor” and may also be subject to civil penalties
(Exhibit A1, Section 7.13 [A-B]). Both Ms. Alcocer and Ms. Charles violated this provision

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of Ordinance No. 2019-26 (This is currently pending codification to Leon Valley Code of
Ordinances Section 1.04.006).

The Lion’s Roar Newsletter Contribution and Content Policy, which was originally
dated March 1, 2011 and amended January 12, 2015, January 19, 2016, and most recently
on March 15, 2016, creates specific guidelines and rules regarding the publication of the
bi-monthly Lion’s Roar newsletter. In accordance with the Home Rule Charter, “all
existing ordinances, resolutions, regulations, and other prior actions of the City Council,
not in conflict with this Charter, shall remain in effect” (Exhibit A1, § 8.01). Because the
Lion’s Roar Newsletter Contribution and Content Policy was in effect prior to adoption of
the Home Rule Charter and has not been amended since adoption of the Charter thus far,
it remains in full force and effect. Additionally, minutes from the meeting in which the
Lion’s Roar Newsletter Contribution and Content Policy was first adopted show that this
policy was adopted as a Resolution, though never received an official number identifying it
as a resolution assigned to it. After discussion of the Lion’s Roar Newsletter Contribution
and Content Policy, “motion by Councilman Reyna and second by Councilman Dean to
adopt the resolution contained within the Agenda packet” was taken, and subsequently
was voted on unanimously (Exhibit A12, Page 2-3).

The Lion’s Roar Newsletter Contribution and Content Policy states that the
newsletter “may contain factual information about elections, including the name of
candidates and the text of measures”, however “shall not contain any reference to political
parties or political affiliations” (Exhibit A8, Item 3). Additionally, the Lion’s Roar
Newsletter Contribution and Content Policy states that, “Express or implied support or
opposition to candidates or measures shall be prohibited” (Exhibit A8, Item 3). Charles’
article “Elected as a City Councilor – Now What?” attempts to discredit, invalidate, and
chastise participants in recall efforts by stating that “there have been numerous negative,
less than factual messages placed on a web site, mailed, and spoken at meetings regarding
[the political hearing of political opponent Benny Martinez]”, that messages posted
(related to the efforts to recall city council members) on websites, social media, and spoken
at council meetings “contain information which serves to deceive and mislead the general
public and citizens of the city”, and that these comments and information produced and
funded by concerned citizens and groups in the city are not the “whole story” (Exhibit B1,
Page 8). Ms. Charles’ comments, in opposition to the recall efforts and the subsequent

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recall measure that will appear on the ballot in May of 2020, are in direct violation of the
Lion’s Roar Newsletter Contribution and Content Policy, which states that “Express or
implied support or opposition to candidates or measures shall be prohibited” (Exhibit A8,
Item 3).

The aspersions cast by Charles’ article inherently displays the varying political
affiliations: 1.) the “WRONG” side - the group promoting the recall efforts by trying to
advocate for accountability of elected leaders and 2.) in Charles’ opinion, the “RIGHT” /
righteous side - the group of over-regulating oligarchs who believe constituents should not
be able to participate in the democratic process. Charles chastises the opposing,
dissenting political group by stating that, “The allegations contained within the recall
petition are crafted to omit the foundation of the actions [I] took […]” and that the efforts
by the recall petitioners are meant to “deceive and mislead the general public” (Exhibit
B1, Page 8). By attempting to influence readers by promoting Charles’ personal viewpoint,
political stance, and discredit the recall efforts as meant to “deceive and mislead” (Exhibit
B1, Page 8), Charles violates the Lion’s Roar Newsletter Contribution and Content Policy.
Though the policy states that “final discretion regarding newsletter article contributions
and content shall be by the City Manager”, the City Manager can not authorize
publication of an article that is in violation of other regulations and laws, including the
ethics ordinance, Texas Election Laws, and the Texas Penal Code (Exhibit A8, Item 11).
Finally, the policy requires that the contribution by city council members be “no more
than 500 words” (Exhibit A8, Item 7). The article submitted by Donna Charles is 645
words excluding the title and by-line, which also constitutes a violation of the Lion’s Roar
Newsletter Contribution and Content Policy.

Additionally, the appearance of impropriety related to the apparent Quid Pro Quo
is alarming. Within weeks of Kelly Kuenstler weaponizing an attorney (at the taxpayer’s
expense, to date costing more than $130,000 taxpayer dollars in direct and indirect legal
costs) to assist with the removal of Charles’, Alcocer’s, and Rodriguez’s political opponent
(who was elected by the voters for 3 consecutive terms), Ms. Kuenstler is given an
astronomical performance increase. The increase can be seen by comparing the old
contract (Exhibit C10) to the contract signed on October 16, 2019 (Exhibit C11). The
contract includes a compensation increase of more than $24,977 annually (despite poor
performance and division and hatred she has sparked in the community), an extension of

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Kuenstler’s contract by four (4) years, and a drastic change in her severance package to
almost dissuade a future Council from being able to terminate her employment without
hurting the taxpayers of the community (Exhibit C12). In return, Ms. Kuenstler granted
Alcocer and Charles special privileges to violate local laws, regulations, policies, and
Texas laws during the publication of the Lion’s Roar despite her prohibitions to publish
factually accurate articles the Mayor submitted months previously. The allowance by Ms.
Charles and Ms. Alcocer to allow Ms. Kuenstler to inappropriately censor the Mayor’s
fact-based article to prevent transparency with the people, yet submit their own subjective
articles chastising members of the community is appalling.

Ms. Charles’ choice to utilize the taxpayer-funded Lion’s Roar for her own personal
and political gain constitutes an unfair advancement of private interests and is a violation
of the Leon Valley Ethics Regulations. According to the Leon Valley Ethics Regulations, “a
city official or employee may not use his or her official position to unfairly advance or
impede private interests, or to grant or secure, or attempt to grant or secure, for any
person (including himself or herself) any form of special consideration, treatment
exemption, or advantage beyond that which is lawfully available to other persons”
(Exhibit A2, Ordinance No. 2019-10, Exhibit A, Article II [2][a]). As discussed earlier and
shown in email correspondence with Kelly Kuenstler, the ability to submit articles for
publication in the taxpayer funded Lion’s Roar is reserved to officials and employees.
Because of this, the use of official position to publish an article that seeks to destroy the
credibility of a recall petition effort and influence voters is not something that a “normal”
citizen can do, making it an “official action”. As defined by the Ethics Regulations, an
official action includes, “any affirmative act (including the marking of a recommendation)
within the scope of, or in violation of, an official’s or employee’s duties” (Exhibit A2,
Ordinance No. 2019-10, Exhibit A, Article I). The affirmative act of submitting an
editorial for publication containing a “marking of a recommendation” by Charles
constitutes a violation. Explicit recommendations provided by Charles in her article
include the statements: “by becoming fully informed, asking questions, assuring that what
is being told to you comes from a creditable source (not just Facebook, Nextdoor, Twitter,
or Web Site postings), attend meetings, and join committees, boards and commissions”
and to “Please remember and share this message with others” (Exhibit B1, Page 8).
Implied inherent negative recommendations by Charles in her article include that: “less

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than factual messages placed on a website, mailed, and spoken at meetings” are meant “to
deceive and mislead the general public and citizens of this city”, and that the “allegations
contained within the recall petition are crafted to omit the foundation of the actions that
the targeted councilors took” and do not tell the “whole story” (Exhibit B1, Page 8). Ms.
Charles is using her position, as a City Council Member, to dissuade readers (voters) to
think that the recall petitions lack credibility and substance. Because of Ms. Charles’
official position, she knows she can cast aspersion, write misleading and untruthful
statements, discredit, and undermine the recall effort mounted against her, knowing that
there is no ability for “everyday citizens” to provide a rebuttal in the “Lion’s Roar”. This is
unfair, and a monumental abuse of power that displays the true integrity of Ms. Charles.

The article “Elected as a City Councilor – Now What?” is cited as by “-Donna J.

Charles, Councilor Place 1”. The usage of the official title “Councilor Place 1”, used to
validate the author of the article, shows the intent to persuade the reader into believing
the article comes from a credible source. The intellectual property and branding of the
Lion’s Roar, which has been in existence for over 25 years (though only titled “Lion’s Roar”
for 17 years), has a public image and “brand” of high value because of the credibility it has
established for being honest, truthful, and apolitical. Ms. Charles’ usage of her official title
“Councilor Place 1” shows a prestige of office that is intended to improperly influence
readers into believing she is credible, though many of her statements, discussed earlier,
lack a factual basis. According to the Leon Valley Ethics Regulations, a city official who
“asserts the prestige of the official’s or employee’s city position for the purpose of
advancing private interests” such as the title of “City Councilor”, in a newsletter
disseminated to the community, is in violation of the regulation (Exhibit A2, Ordinance
No. 2019-10, Exhibit A, Article II [5][2][a]).

Use of city resources for personal and political gain also constitutes a violation of
Leon Valley’s Ethics Regulations. According to the regulations, “a city official or employee
shall not use, request, or permit the use of city facilities, personnel, equipment, or supplies
for private purposes (including political purposes) except: (a) pursuant to duly adopted city
policies or (2) to the extent and according to the terms that those resources are lawfully
available to the public” (Exhibit A2, Ordinance No. 2019-10, Exhibit A, Article II [6]). As
previously discussed, the adopted city policy related to the publication of the newsletter,
the Lion’s Roar Newsletter Contribution and Content Policy, was violated by both Donna

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Charles and Monica Alcocer, and the occurrence of violations enabled by Kelly Kuenstler.
Additionally, the resources of free “real estate” space in the Lion’s Roar for publication by
members of the public is prohibited, as confirmed by Kelly Kuenstler’s email of December
10, 2019 and outlined in the Lion’s Roar Contribution and Content Policy. Because city
policies were violated, including a prohibition on the publication of political, self-serving
articles in the Lion’s Roar, the act of using city resources for personal and political gain is
a violation of the Ethics Regulations (Exhibit A2, Ordinance No. 2019-10, Exhibit A,
Article II [6]).

According to the Texas Ethics Commission, political advertising “includes

communications supporting or opposing an officeholder, a political party, or a measure”,
such as a measure to recall councilmembers (Exhibit A11, Pg.1). It “includes
communications that are published in newsletters, magazines, or other periodicals in
return for consideration”, such as a bi-monthly publication of the Lion’s Roar magazine
(Exhibit A11, Pg.1). Texas Law requires that political advertising containing “express
advocacy” include a disclosure statement if a candidate, candidate’s agent, or a political
committee authorizes the political advertising (Exhibit A11, Pg.1). According to the Texas
Ethics Commission, express advocacy can be determined by questioning “whether the
communication expressly advocates the election or defeat of an identified candidate, or
expressly advocates the passage or defeat of a measure”, such as a measure to recall a
council member (Exhibit A11, Pg.2). Further, The Texas Ethics Commission states that
political advertising laws governing the “use of public funds by political subdivisions will
apply to political advertising regardless of whether the advertising contains express
advocacy” (Exhibit A11, Pg.2).

The act of Ms. Charles stating “there have been numerous negative, less than
factual messages placed on a web site, mailed, and spoken at meetings regarding [the
recall efforts related to handling of 3.12 Hearing]”, that “The messages contain
information which serves to deceive and mislead the general public and citizens of this
city”, and that “The allegations contained within the recall petition are crafted to omit the
foundation of the actions that the targeted councilors took […]” shows her intent to cast
aspersions on recall efforts and influence voters into believing the content contained
within recall petitions is not valid (Exhibit B1, Page 8). Ms. Charles’ attempts to influence
readers (voters) to believe that the substance of the recall petitions “deceives and misleads

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the general public” (Exhibit B1, Page 8) are influential statements intended to persuade
readers (voters) to vote against the recall measures on the May 2020 ballots. This is a
direct violation of Texas Election Code § 255.001, which mandates that a person may “not
knowingly use, cause or permit to be used, or continue to use any published, distributed,
or broadcast political advertising containing express advocacy” for or against a measure,
such as a measure to recall candidates for a political office (Exhibit A6, Election Code §
255.001[c]).

Additionally, the Texas Election Code outlines that use of public taxpayer funds for
political advertising is unlawful. Per the Texas Election Code, “An officer or employee of a
political subdivision may not spend or authorize the spending of public funds for a
communication describing a measure if the communication contains information that the
officer or employee knows is false; and is sufficiently substantial and important as to be
reasonably likely to influence a voter to vote for or against the measure” (Exhibit A6,
Texas Election Code § 255.003). False, unvalidated, and inaccurate statements authored
by Donna Charles include that “there have been numerous negative, less than factual
messages placed on a web site, mailed, and spoken at meetings regarding [the recall
efforts related to handling of 3.12 Hearing]”, that “The messages contain information
which serves to deceive and mislead the general public and citizens of this city”, and that
“The allegations contained within the recall petition are crafted to omit the foundation of
the actions that the targeted councilors took […]” (Exhibit B1, Page 8). These statements
are intended to cause readers (voters) to form an opinion against a recall measure on the
ballot. The act of an officer using public funds to influence voters to vote against a recall
election, using false information, constitutes a Class A misdemeanor (Exhibit A6, Texas
Election Code § 255.003).

MONICA ALCOCER

According to an email sent by City Manager Kelly Kuenstler on December 10 at

3:37PM, “Page 9 was submitted by Councilor Alcocer as her submission for this edition of
the Lion’s Roar” (Exhibit B2). According to various sources who desire to stay anonymous,
Ms. Alcocer has been carrying around this article on a day-to-day basis and showing it to
many residents in Leon Valley, her acquaintances, and even her healthcare providers.
Though this conduct is lawful (and really, expected), Ms. Alcocer’s decision to provide this

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article to Kelly for publication and dissemination in a taxpayer funded newsletter is a
blatant violation of ethical laws, election laws, Texas laws, the Lion’s Roar Newsletter
Contribution and Content Policy, and the Leon Valley Home Rule Charter.

The Lion’s Roar Newsletter Contribution and Content Policy, discussed earlier,
creates specific guidelines and rules regarding the publication of the bi-monthly Lion’s
Roar newsletter. The policy states that the newsletter “may contain factual information
about elections, including the name of candidates and the text of measures”, however
“shall not contain any reference to political parties or political affiliations” (Exhibit A8,
Item 3). The article Ms. Alcocer submitted expresses a dissenting opinion toward “a group
of residents in this beleaguered suburban municipality” and chastises those politically
affiliated with the group as exercising efforts that “are a distraction from the basis of
governance” (Exhibit B1, Page 9). The entire article’s basis is to express a dissenting
opinion toward those politically affiliated with the recall process, discredit the necessity
for recall in Leon Valley, and persuade and influence readers to believe the recall efforts
are unnecessary and waste time, energy, and money (Exhibit B1, Page 9). Further, the
Lion’s Roar Newsletter Contribution and Content Policy states that “Express or implied
support or opposition to candidates or measures shall be prohibited” (Exhibit A8, Item 3).
Ms. Alcocer’s submission, offering express and implied opposition to the recall measures,
is a blatant violation of the Lion’s Roar Newsletter Contribution and Content Policy.

The Lion’s Roar Newsletter Contribution and Content Policy states that, “An
author’s by-line shall be noted for each article contributed in the newsletter” (Exhibit A8,
Item 8). The article “Political dysfunction fallout is never good” contains a “by-line” that
states: “Republished article by Scott Huddleston, Staff Writer, San Antonio Express
News” (Exhibit B1, Page 9). The article contains many assertions and inferences that
appear to be those of a source very close to the events that transpired in Leon Valley over
the summer months, not simply a reporter or opinion writer that watched events from an
unbiased perspective. It would be understandable to believe that the likely main
contributor (source) is Ms. Kuenstler, Ms. Alcocer, Mr. Melland, Mr. Salvaggio, a city staff
member, or an elected official, that was greatly influenced by the perspective of Ms.
Kuenstler or another complainant over the summer. A reporter and/or opinion writer
would be able to discern and distinguish the bias of guidance offered by Attorney Ryan
Henry was guided by an underlying motive to “destroy” Mr. Martinez, at any cost.

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Knowing that a person with a “neutral” perspective would not draw the assertions and
inferences contained within the article, a clear conflict of interest would likely exist if this
article contained the true “author” and / or lead “contributor”: however it was left without
source citations or an author in the San Antonio Express News intentionally: if the source
of the content in the article was published, it would destroy the credibility of the opinion
piece, because it would be revealed than an “insider” directly involved in the events was
the main source of the information.

Because publishing the author and main contributor(s) of the article would destroy
the credibility, Ms. Alcocer allowed Ms. Kuenstler to falsify the article by-line, stating “By
Scott Huddleston”. Ms. Kuenstler should have known this was not truthful, because on
November 14, 2019, Mr. Huddleston wrote in an email to Ms. Kuenstler, “Hi, Kelly. That
was written by one of our editorial writers” (Exhibit C14). Also, in another
communication to a citizen in the community, Mr. Huddleston confirmed that “I did not
write that editorial” (Exhibit B3). Ms. Kuenstler, knowing that Ms. Alcocer had just
pushed (and voted) for a giant increase in her financial compensation during her annual
performance review, disregarded the truth, including the true author. Also, because Ms.
Kuenstler got what she wanted (a rubber stamp, increased financial compensation) in
exchange for giving Ms. Alcocer what she wanted (an example of Monica benefitting in the
ongoing quid pro quo relationship is the settlement agreement achieved by Ms. Kuenstler,
when she recommended the city purchase land directly across the street from Monica
Alcocer’s personal residence for $500,000), Ms. Kuenstler personally did not want Ms.
Alcocer to be recalled from her council seat (Exhibit C15, Pages 5-6). Knowing that if Ms.
Alcocer was recalled it would be more difficult to obtain “rubber stamp” approvals and
large compensation increases, Ms. Kuenstler wanted the public to be influenced by the
article: destroying credibility of the recall efforts would likely impact public perception.

The Lion’s Roar Newsletter Contribution and Content Policy requires that the
contribution by city council members be “no more than 500 words” (Exhibit A8, Item 7).
The article submitted by Monica Alcocer is a total of 565 words excluding the title and by-
line, which also constitutes a violation of the Lion’s Roar Newsletter Contribution and
Content Policy. Because the policy is a Resolution originally approved by the Leon Valley
City Council in 2011 (Exhibit A12, Pages 2-3), and still in effect after Home Rule Charter
passage in 2017 (Exhibit A1, § 8.01), the violation of the policy shows a concerning pattern

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of behavior inconsistent with a council member and city manager who are willing to follow
policies approved by the City Council. The disregard for existing policies shows that Ms.
Alcocer is willing to prioritize things that benefit her personally, despite the will and
intent of the City Council expressed in the Lion’s Roar Newsletter Contribution and
Content Policy.

According to the Texas Ethics Commission, political advertising “includes

communications supporting or opposing an officeholder, a political party, or a measure”,
such as a measure to recall councilmembers (Exhibit A11, Pg.1). It “includes
communications that are published in newsletters, magazines, or other periodicals in
return for consideration”, such as a bi-monthly publication of the Lion’s Roar magazine
(Exhibit A11, Pg.1). Texas Law requires that political advertising containing “express
advocacy” include a disclosure statement if a candidate, candidate’s agent, or a political
committee authorizes the political advertising (Exhibit A11, Pg.1). According to the Texas
Ethics Commission, express advocacy can be determined by questioning “whether the
communication expressly advocates the election or defeat of an identified candidate, or
expressly advocates the passage or defeat of a measure”, such as a measure to recall a
council member (Exhibit A11, Pg.2). Further, The Texas Ethics Commission states that
political advertising laws governing the “use of public funds by political subdivisions will
apply to political advertising regardless of whether the advertising contains express
advocacy” (Exhibit A11, Pg.2). The act of Ms. Alcocer submitting her article, “Political
dysfunction fallout is never good”, for publication in the Lion’s Roar is a violation of Texas
Election Code § 255.001 (Exhibit A6). Alcocer’s article, which advocates against the recall
measures in Leon Valley, lacks a disclosure statement in violation of Texas Election Code
§ 255.001.

Additionally, the Texas Election Code outlines unlawful uses of public taxpayer
funds for political advertising. Per the Texas Election Code, “An officer or employee of a
political subdivision may not spend or authorize the spending of public funds for a
communication describing a measure if the communication contains information that the
officer or employee knows is false; and is sufficiently substantial and important as to be
reasonably likely to influence a voter to vote for or against the measure” (Exhibit A6,
Election Code § 255.003). One of the false statements in the article submitted by Monica
Alcocer for publication include the misstatement that “the petitioners believe all the

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members of council should have voted”. This statement is not true – the petition, as well
as public comments stated by the petitioner’s committee do not hold this viewpoint. On
the contrary, the viewpoint held by the committee is that members of the council required
to abstain due to direct involvement (complainant, defendant) would still count as part of
the denominator portion of the 2/3 requirement. This statement casts aspersions on the
intent of the recall petitions, and this non-factual statement attempts to influence the
public into having an “anti-recall” opinion. Additionally, many opinions are stated as fact
in the article, though they are not facts. For example, the article states that recall
petitions “are a waste of taxpayer money when they are used to carry out political battles”,
when, in reality, the city absolutely does not incur any expenses except for the time it
takes for the city secretary to review the petitions for validity. Additionally, it should be
noted that if the subjects of the recall voluntarily “vacates his/her position, the election
shall be cancelled in accordance with state law” (Exhibit A1, § 6.06). The petitioners would
yield the opinion that the true “waste of taxpayer money” is the city manager opting to
force the council into excessive expenditure of over $100,000 in legal fees, personnel
expenses, and other expenses in a sham hearing process to boot out a duly elected official
who occasionally expresses a dissenting opinion. Another statement written as “fact”,
when, in reality it is an opinion (although we do not even know that it is an opinion, and
the true author is not cited) is that “There’s no need for a recall in Leon Valley”. The
opinion held, as evidenced by over 1600 signatures, is that there IS a need for a recall in
Leon Valley. Over 800 Leon Valley residents signed that they believe recall is needed to
make Leon Valley better and to end the tyrannical, oppressive, mismanaged government
and administration. The most significant piece of false information in the article
submitted by Monica Alcocer is that it is “by Scott Huddleston”, who is a veteran staff
writer at the San Antonio Express-News since 1985, and has built a career on truth and
covering news events in a factual manner (Exhibit C13). The false statement that this
article is “by Scott Huddleston” serves to mislead the public and the readers into believing
that this article is fact-based, as Scott Huddleston has written many other fact-based
articles covering Leon Valley events in the past year. The act of an officer, such as Ms.
Alcocer, using public funds to influence voters to vote against a recall election, using false
information, constitutes a Class A misdemeanor (Exhibit A6, Election Code § 255.003).

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 Monica Alcocer and Kelly Kuenstler colluded to make it appear as if the article,
“Political dysfunction fallout is never good”, was authored by a person other than the true
source- as they made it appear to emanate from Scott Huddleston. However, it is likely
that Ms. Kuenstler and the editor she conspired with for the original publication of the
editorial did not want their true identities revealed. Both Ms. Alcocer and Ms. Kuenstler
likely believed the use of the reputation, experience, and previous coverage by Scott
Huddleston would lend itself to make the opinion editorial appear more credible - - and
thus, more likely to influence citizens in Leon Valley. This itself is a violation of the Texas
Election Code, which states that “A person commits an offense if, with intent to injure a
candidate or influence the result of an election, the person enters into a contract or other
agreement to print, publish, or broadcast political advertising that purports to emanate
from a source other than its true source” (Exhibit A6, Election Code § 255.0034).

Ms. Alcocer’s choice to utilize the taxpayer-funded Lion’s Roar for her own personal
and political gain constitutes an unfair advancement of private interests and is a violation
of the Leon Valley Ethics Regulations. According to the Leon Valley Ethics Regulations, “a
city official or employee may not use his or her official position to unfairly advance or
impede private interests, or to grant or secure, or attempt to grant or secure, for any
person (including himself or herself) any form of special consideration, treatment
exemption, or advantage beyond that which is lawfully available to other persons”
(Exhibit A2, Ordinance No. 2019-10, Exhibit A, Article II [2][a]). As previously discussed,
the ability to submit articles for publication in the taxpayer funded Lion’s Roar is limited
to officials and employees. Because of this, the use of one’s official position to publish an
article that seeks to destroy the credibility of a recall petition effort and influence voters is
not something that a “normal” citizen can do, making it an “official action”. As defined by
the Ethics Regulations, an official action includes, “any affirmative act (including the
marking of a recommendation) within the scope of, or in violation of, an official’s or
employee’s duties” (Exhibit A2, Ordinance No. 2019-10, Exhibit A, Article I). The
affirmative act of submitting an editorial for publication containing a “marking of a
recommendation” by Alcocer constitute a violation. Explicit recommendations provided by
Alcocer in her submission include the statements: “[recall] should only be prescribed in
rare circumstances and never to threaten elected officials who might make sound, but
unpopular decisions” (Exhibit B1, Page 9). Another recommendation for citizens to not

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engage in recall efforts is the statement, “That might be worth a recall. This? Not so
much” (Exhibit B1, Page 9). Implied inherent negative recommendations by Alcocer in her
submission include that: “[recalls] are a waste of taxpayer money when they are used to
carry out political battles”; that “[recalls] are a distraction from the basis of governance”;
describes the recall measures as “petty politics”; implies that the recall efforts are a
“political game piece”; and implies that the efforts in Leon Valley “exacerbate[s] political
dysfunction at immense public cost” (Exhibit B1, Page 9). Ms. Alcocer uses her official
position, as a privileged City Council Member, to introduce this article that attempts to
dissuade readers (voters) to think that the recall petitions are unnecessary, waste tax
dollars, and are detrimental to the governance of Leon Valley. However, her opinion
differs from that of the 800+ citizens who believe such ability to petition the government is
fundamental to the governance of our democracy.

Initially, the article “Political dysfunction fallout is never good” did not cite the city
official or employee that contributed the article. However, the February/ March 2020
Lion’s Roar (Volume 17, Issue 2) distributed to Leon Valley residents in February 2020
corrects this on page seventeen (17). At the bottom of the page, there is a yellow box that
states: “The Express News Editiorial published in the December 2019—January 2020
edition of the Lion’s Roar was a submission by Councilor Monica Alcocer” (Exhibit B14,
Page 17). The use of the official title of “Councilor” is used to validate the author of the
article and shows an intent to persuade the reader into believing the article comes from a
credible source. The intellectual property and branding of the Lion’s Roar, which has been
in existence for over 25 years (though only titled Lion’s Roar for 17 years), has a public
image and “brand” of high value because of the credibility it has established for being
honest, truthful, and apolitical. Ms. Alcocer’s use of her official title “Councilor” shows a
prestige of office that is intended to improperly influence readers into believing she is
credible, though many of the statements contained within the article, discussed earlier,
lack a factual basis and are deceptive to readers. According to the Leon Valley Ethics
Regulations, it is a violation for a city official who “asserts the prestige of the official’s or
employee’s city position for the purpose of advancing private interests”. Ms. Alcocer used
her official position, as a city council member, to use special privileges to submit articles
for publication. She did so knowing the Lion’s Roar would be disseminated to the entire
community, and likely influence readers (voters). This act is in violation of the Leon

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Valley Ethics Regulations (Exhibit A2, Ordinance No. 2019-10, Exhibit A, Article II
[5][2][a]).

Use of city resources for personal and political gain also constitutes a violation of
Leon Valley’s Ethics Regulations. According to the regulations, “a city official or employee
shall not use, request, or permit the use of city facilities, personnel, equipment, or supplies
for private purposes (including political purposes) except: (a) pursuant to duly adopted city
policies or (2) to the extent and according to the terms that those resources are lawfully
available to the public” (Exhibit A2, Ordinance No. 2019-10, Exhibit A, Article II [6]). As
previously discussed, the adopted city policy related to the publication of the newsletter,
the Lion’s Roar Newsletter Contribution and Content Policy, was violated by Monica
Alcocer, and committing this violation was enabled by Kelly Kuenstler. Additionally, the
resources of free “real estate” space in the Lion’s Roar for publication by members of the
public is prohibited, as confirmed by Kelly Kuenstler’s email and outlined in the Lion’s
Roar Contribution and Content Policy. Because city policies were violated, including the
prohibition on the publication of political, self-serving articles in the Lion’s Roar, Alcocer’s
act to use city resources for personal and political gain is a violation of the Ethics
Regulations (Exhibit A2, Ordinance No. 2019-10, Exhibit A, Article II [6]).

KELLY KUENSTLER

As the direct and circumstantial evidence proves, Ms. Kelly Kuenstler, the Leon
Valley City Manager, carefully planned, coordinated, and executed a sequence of events
over the past 12 months to takeout a duly elected official, with collusion with staff and
City Council Members Donna Charles and Monica Alcocer. It started when Councilor
Catherine Rodriguez submitted her original complaint, dated December 12, 2018, via
email to the City Manager, Ms. Kuenstler. The complaint against Councilor Martinez by
Ms. Rodriguez, though weaponized and referenced against Martinez in the formal
administrative hearing, given to local media outlets, and mentioned by several city staff
members giving testimony, was ultimately not allowed to be used against Mr. Martinez.
On the final day of the administrative hearing, Mr. Henry stated something he likely
knew for months (referred to it as a “legal clarification”): Ms. Rodriguez’s complaint was
not within the parameters for it to constitute a Charter violation under § 3.08 of the City

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Charter, and so should not be discussed further (City Council Meeting Video, August 8,
2019; 1:21:50 and 1:26:20). What is striking is that it was the only complaint that was
ever brought against Mr. Martinez by a citizen, someone that lived within the City of Leon
Valley, and someone who is a citizen of Leon Valley; all other complaints were submitted
by subordinates of City Manager, Kelly Kuenstler, and by Ms. Kuenstler herself.

During the administrative hearing, while under oath, Kuenstler testified that after
receipt of Rodriguez’ complaint, she “was unsure of where to go or what to do. The city
attorney happened to be [….] couldn’t catch her at the time […] she happened to be gone,
she had court, something was going on. But when I finally did talk to her, she advised me
that I could not go to her for legal advice because she would be filing a complaint herself.
So, knowing that I had two complaints coming, I called our insurance representative
which is the Texas Municipal League with the Risk Management Pool” (City Council
Meeting Video, July 2, 2019, 01:23:12). Upon examination of the emails obtained via open
records requests, Rodriguez’s complaint was sent by email to Kelly Kuenstler at 5:25PM
on December 12, 2018 (Exhibit D1). Minutes later, at 5:37PM on December 12, 2018,
Kuenstler responded to Rodriguez, “Good evening, Dr. Rodriguez, I am in receipt of your
correspondence. I will be contacting the Texas Municipal League as to how to proceed.
Respectfully, Kelly” (Exhibit D2).

A simple timeline evaluation would reveal the receipt of Rodriguez’s complaint was
twelve (12) minutes before Kuenstler emailed her response to the complaint. Additionally,
after Councilor Bradshaw asked a question about Ms. Frederick submitting her complaint
on December 18th, Ms. Kuenstler replied that “No, I don’t know if I talked to Ms.
Frederick about it if on [December] 18th, or [December] 17th, I don’t know. I just
remember that I was having trouble connecting with her there for a few days, and when I
did nail her down, she told me that I was going to have to find someone else – that she
intended on filing a complaint herself. I’m going to guess it was the same day or the day
before…” (City Council Meeting Video, July 18, 2019, 00:23:15). This raises an important
question related to the sworn testimony that contradicts the email correspondence: how
did Kuenstler know she would be contacting the Texas Municipal League, if, in her sworn
testimony during the administrative hearing, she testified that she was unable to
immediately consult with Denise Frederick, the city attorney, because she “happened to
be gone” (City Council Meeting Video, July 2, 2019, 01:23:12)? If Ms. Frederick didn’t

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notify Ms. Kuenstler about her complaint until December 17th or 18th, 2018, yet
Kuenstler immediately wrote to Councilor Rodriguez that she would be contacting the
TML Risk Pool in an email on December 12, 2018, why did Ms. Kuenstler not provide this
information to the City Council during her sworn testimony? How did Ms. Kuenstler know
12 minutes after Ms. Rodriguez filed her written complaints that she would be contacting
TML, though in her testimony she states that the city attorney “happened to be gone” and
she was unable to confer with her until a later time? Why did Ms. Kuenstler try to deceive
the City Council by telling them she did not decide to contact Texas Municipal League
until 6 days after the submission of the complaint by Ms. Rodriguez?

Ms. Kuenstler’s false and misleading statement during sworn testimony at an

administrative hearing are a direct violation of Texas Law. Perjury, according to Texas
law, occurs when a person has “intent to deceive and with knowledge of the statement’s
meaning”, and makes a false statement under oath or a “false unsworn declaration”
under Chapter 132 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code (Exhibit A4, Texas Penal
Code § 37.02). In the council meeting on July 2, 2019, Ms. Kuenstler was sworn in by the
Leon Valley City Secretary, Saundra Passailaigue prior to her testimony and presentation
of the binders to City Council (City Council Meeting Video, July 2, 2019, 01:14:31). Ms.
Kuenstler swore “to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth”. A person
commits “aggravated perjury” if he or she makes a false statement under oath and the
statement was made “during or in connection with an official proceeding” and “is
material” (Exhibit A4, Texas Penal Code § 37.03). Because Ms. Kuenstler’s statements
were made during an official proceeding, it affected the merits of the hearing, including
potential influence of the governmental body to believe events occurred in a different
order than they truthfully occurred. This likely might lead a person to believe that the
onset of complaints filed was more of an orchestrated effort and question the validity and
sincerity of the complaints and complainants. Not only would this fact greatly influence
public opinion, but it also would likely have a direct effect on the impression left with
(what should have been) an impartial governmental body and sway their belief of all of
the other complainants, who are all subordinates of Ms. Kuenstler. A violation of Texas
Penal Code § 37.02 is a Class A misdemeanor offense, punishable by a fine not to exceed
$4,000 and/or up to one year in jail (Exhibit A4, Texas Penal Code § 37.02). Aggravated
perjury, such as Kelly’s statements, likely had an impact on the outcome of the formal

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administrative hearing, and were made during the actual hearing, constitute a Texas
Penal Code § 37.03 violation. Because of Ms. Kuenstler’s dishonesty during testimony,
Council Member Martinez lost fundamental rights related to the right to participate in
democratic government. Aggravated perjury is a felony of the third degree and is
punishable by 2 to 10 years in prison and/or a fine not to exceed $10,000 (Exhibit A4,
Texas Penal Code § 37.03).

Though the Ethics Ordinance does not authorize the Ethics Committee jurisdiction
of alleged violations of Texas Penal Code § 37.02 and § 37.03, the committee has purview
over violations of Texas Penal Code Sections 36.02, 36.03, 36.07, 36.08, 39.02, and 39.06
(Exhibit A2, Article VII [2][a]). Additionally, the committee retains the ability to subpoena
further documents and witnesses to better understand motives related to Ms. Kuenstler’s
deceptive statements and then determine culpability related to other violations, including
violations of the Home Rule Charter, Texas Laws, and the Ethics Ordinance.
Understanding the motives behind Mr. Kuenstler’s deceptive statements will assist the
committee to draw conclusions and inferences related to subsequent events that followed,
including the correlation between the deceptive statements and Ms. Kuenstler’s patterns
of behavior related to abuse of power and authority to advance her own personal and
political agenda and beliefs. Further examination will reveal how the patterns of behavior
show a quid pro quo relationship with elected council members, and as a result, Ms.
Kuenstler has (and continues to) received economic benefits. The committee can also
request further investigation by other law enforcement agencies, such as the Texas
Rangers, and forward any other determinations or findings to the Bexar County District
Attorney’s office for further investigation.

Ms. Kuenstler, using her official position as City Manager while violating other
Texas laws (such as these Penal Code §37.02 and §37.03 violations), likely understood that
if she truly testified about “the full truth, and nothing but the truth”, she might be unable
to achieve her priority: takeout the duly elected City Councilor Mr. Martinez, at any cost.
Because of the previously mentioned violations, as well as other deceitful statements and
intentionally withheld information, Ms. Kuenstler’s actions also constitute Official
Oppression, which is a violation of Texas Penal Code § 36.03. This is within the
jurisdiction of the Ethics Committee. Defined by Texas law, Official Oppression occurs
when a person “acting under color of his office or employment commits an offense if he […]

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intentionally denies another in the exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or
immunity, knowing his conduct is unlawful” (Exhibit A5, Texas Penal Code § 39.03 [a][2]).
By attempting to “takeout” Councilor Martinez by providing deceptive statements,
misleading the council, and influencing council members on the dais during the
administrative hearing, Ms. Kuenstler is using her official position as City Manager to
deprive Mr. Martinez to exercise his rights to serve as an elected leader.

Additional concerning activity is the multiple times throughout the administrative

hearing of Mr. Martinez when Ms. Kuenstler was observed whispering and passing notes
back and forth with Councilor Charles. In one example, Ms. Kuenstler and Councilor
Charles were whispering back and forth during Denise Frederick’s testimony, and after
the side conversation between Kuenstler (a complainant) and Charles (a “juror”),
Councilor Charles attempted to prohibit Will Bradshaw’s questioning of Denise
Frederick’s testimony (City Council Meeting Video, July 2, 2019, 07:02:20 - 7:03:30). The
logical conclusion is that Ms. Kuenstler encouraged Ms. Charles to interject about Mr.
Bradshaw’s line of questioning, as his line of questioning would have likely discredited the
testimony of Ms. Frederick – and infringed on Ms. Kuenstler’s ability to takeout Mr.
Martinez. Another example of improper conduct is immediately prior to Ms. Kuenstler
giving her testimony as Complainant against Mr. Martinez. Ms. Charles and Ms.
Kuenstler can be seen whispering back and forth with one another (City Council Meeting
Video, July 2, 2019, 09:09:20). Though there’s no way to know or prove the content of their
secret discussion, it should be obvious that whispering of complainant/ witness and jury
member would be improper and unethical, as would raise serious conflicts related to bias
and the impartial nature of the hearing. Another example is during the meeting on July 2,
2019, where Ms. Kuenstler can be observed scribbling a note on a scrap piece of paper and
passing it to Councilor Charles (City Council Meeting Video, July 2, 2019, 02:48:12 –
02:48:24). Immediately after obviously glancing over at the note, Councilor Charles, asks
Melinda Moritz, “Had you encountered him in Public Works before?” and “Do you have
any other relevant information?” The obvious collusion between Kelly Kuenstler and Ms.
Charles had obviously been ongoing; Ms. Charles had probably been coached by Ms.
Kuenstler on questions to act to fulfill the goal: destroy duly elected Council Member
Martinez. Another example of the collusion and improper conduct during the hearing is
when Ms. Charles looks over at another note Kelly Kuenstler has scribbled down (City

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Council Meeting Video, July 2, 2019, 02:49:48). Immediately after reading Ms. Kuenstler’s
note, Ms. Charles immediately darts her hand up in the air and states, “I just, uh, I failed
to ask… [inaudible], uh, we, uh… I, we failed to ask Councilor Rodriguez if she had
witnesses” (City Council Meeting Video, July 2, 2019, 02:50:03). It’s obvious that Ms.
Kuenstler is directing the administrative hearing, the witnesses, and even most members
of the “jury”, such as Donna Charles. Her goal is witnessed in her blatant actions: destroy
Mr. Martinez, at any cost.

Ms. Kuenstler’s carefully coordinated and executed efforts during the

administrative hearing of Council Member Martinez not only took away fundamental
rights granted to Mr. Martinez, but it also destroyed rights’ of the citizens of Leon Valley,
including the ability to participate in genuine elections that form our democratic republic
government. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly in 1948, declares that all people in the world should be granted basic,
fundamental rights. Among others, Article 21 dictates that all humans have “the right to
take part in their government”, that “everyone has the right to equal access to public
service” in their government, and also that “The will of the people shall be the basis of the
authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by
equivalent free voting procedures” (Exhibit A13, Page 44). Ms. Kuenstler, though she does
not live in or represent the people of Leon Valley, took it upon her own initiative to
orchestrate with two (2) city council members and all of her subordinates to 1.) overthrow
the rights of citizens in Leon Valley to participate in fair, free, elections in which the
citizenry chooses the public servants (through genuine elections), and 2.) take away one of
Mr. Martinez’s basic human rights, that the United Nations unanimously determined
should be afforded to all humans in the world. In order to be successful in the
orchestration and carry-out of events, Ms. Kuenstler committed many ethical violations
and many criminal violations. In the process, she had a complete disregard for the will of
the people (citizens) living within the corporate limits of Leon Valley, and she had
complete disregard for the basic human rights of Mr. Martinez.

Over the days following the initial filing of the complaints by Councilor Rodriguez
and Attorney Frederick, the word of the carefully orchestrated plan would spread like
wildfire throughout the Leon Valley City Hall. It didn’t take long for Ms. Kuenstler to get

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the word out to all department directors and city staff members- to see if they, too, would
like to prepare a written complaint against Mr. Martinez. Additionally, Ms. Kuenstler was
already beginning to make sure that she forwarded any other possible examples of
Martinez’s behaviors she disliked, even though complaints were never filed for most of the
events. Complainants did not exist, subjects of the complaints were never interviewed,
document validity was never proven, and though these documents were provided to smear
Mr. Martinez in his formal administrative hearing, they would have been immediately
rejected as evidence in a real court of law. Most importantly, by examining the behaviors,
effort, involvement, evidence, and willingness to destroy Mr. Martinez, it’s apparent Kelly
Kuenstler’s carefully orchestrated scheme started on December 18, 2018 to take out a duly
elected leader, well before her official complaint and her bogus “victim” status was alleged
against Martinez on April 16, 2019. This was following multiple unsuccessful attempts to
takeout Mr. Martinez by alleging various actions, that did not constitute crimes and
would never be prosecuted as such, were criminal in nature. An example of this is when
Ms. Kuenstler attempted to get Mr. Martinez and Mr. Yarnell charged with crimes in
December of 2018, to which the Bexar County District Attorney informed the city that
there was no criminal actions to pursue (Exhibit D21).

On December 18, 2018, Ms. Kuenstler emailed Ryan Henry a letter from an
employee who resigned from Leon Valley almost a year before, immediately after
discussion with Mr. Ryan Henry including a verbal agreement to retain him as a conflict
attorney (Exhibit D13). The timing of this action by Ms. Kuenstler is crucial, as it proves
that Ms. Kuenstler was exerting large amounts of energy to begin the process of
manufacturing the case against Mr. Martinez, though no complaint given to Ms.
Kuenstler existed relating to “giving orders” thus far. Also, no complainant existed for the
forwarded “complaint”, which was a resignation letter yielding evidence of employee
dissatisfaction and informing the City Manager that the former employee had received a
new job in a different city. In fact, this email sent to Mr. Henry was not a complaint; the
former employee did not ever file a complaint against Mr. Martinez. However, Ms.
Kuenstler seemed to know that this email would help with portraying Mr. Martinez’
behaviors as hostile or that they would later fit the subjective narrative of “giving orders”
to staff. The letter, dated February 12, 2018, was from a former staff member, Nina
Nixon-Mendez (Exhibit D13). Ms. Nixon Mendez was never listed as a complainant, she

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was never interviewed by Ryan Henry, she never testified against Martinez, and the
validity of the letter submitted by Kuenstler was never verified as a real document.
However, that didn’t impact the letter, from 309 days before Kuenstler forwarded it to
Ryan Henry, from being submitted for potential weaponization against Mr. Martinez by
Kuenstler on December 18, 2018 (Exhibit D13). This was the first example of Kuenstler
introducing anything and everything that possibly can be used to smear Martinez, or any
event, document, or circumstance that possibly might appear like it could constitute a
Charter violation, to help in the attempt to destroy Mr. Martinez. This would not be the
last time Ms. Kuenstler interjected herself to direct the investigation of Martinez. From
December 18, 2018, Ms. Kuenstler began throwing spaghetti at the wall, hoping that some
of it would stick. The main pattern of behavior evident throughout the next months was
this: Kelly Kuenstler acting as the main complainant (that would later turn prosecutor)
against Mr. Martinez, while influencing citizens of Leon Valley and city staff to turn
against Mr. Martinez. Ms. Kuenstler directed almost every single step in the process over
the months that followed. In the evening of December 18, 2018, Councilor Rodriguez sent
another complaint to Ms. Kuenstler about Martinez’s behavior toward Mr. Melland during
the council meeting that evening (Exhibit D14). Councilor Rodriguez, aware of Kelly
Kuenstler’s orchestrated plan, was very willing to help Kuenstler build the case against
Martinez to destroy him.

Though Ryan Henry had sent Kuenstler the terms of provision of legal services to
Kuenstler on December 18, 2018, she did not respond with her agreement to the terms
until 12:47PM on December 19, 2018. According to Mayor Riley, she was first notified of
the complaints against Martinez by email at 2:05PM on December 19, 2018 from Kelly
Kuenstler (Exhibit D15), though she actually never discussed the complaints with Kelly
Kuenstler until December 20, 2019. Ms. Kuenstler’s email, sent to both Councilor
Martinez and Mayor Riley, simply stated that she received complaints from Councilor
Rodriguez and Attorney Frederick, and to avoid contact with them (Exhibit D15).
Additionally, Ms. Kuenstler stated she had reached out to the TML Risk Pool and retained
another lawyer. According to Mayor Riley, Catherine Rodriguez did not notify the Mayor
of her complaints against Martinez, though she had submitted her complaints to the city
Manager 7 days prior. Also, it would seem reasonable that immediately after receiving
Rodriguez’s complaint on December 12, 2018, Ms. Kuenstler would have informed the

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Mayor. She did not – and it would seem reasonable to be suspicious about the reason Ms.
Kuenstler did not tell the Mayor for another 7 days. Ms. Kuenstler, with an end goal to
destroy Martinez, wanted to make sure that she was able to carefully execute her plan. If
she told the Mayor too early, the Mayor may derail the orchestrated events Kuenstler is
about to unveil - which is the plethora of complaints from city staff that would be filed in
coming weeks. Additionally, it should be noted that by the time that Ms. Kuenstler
emailed Mr. Martinez and Mayor Riley, she had already forwarded Nina Nixon-Mendez’s
letter of resignation, which was later weaponized against Martinez in his administrative
hearing. It’s obvious that when Kuenstler sent the email to Mayor Riley and Councilor
Martinez, she was already coordinating, notifying, and encouraging other city staff to
jump in on the bandwagon.

Brandon Melland, planning and zoning director, couldn’t wait to submit his own
complaints against Mr. Martinez – his formal complaint against Mr. Martinez was filed
with Ms. Kuenstler two days later, on December 20, 2018 (Exhibit D16). Also, in the
afternoon of December 20, 2018, Police Chief Joseph Salvaggio became engaged with
assisting Ms. Kuenstler produce enough evidence to destroy Councilor Martinez. In an
email sent at 4:18PM on December 20, 2018 to Mayor Riley and Kelly Kuenstler, Mr.
Salvaggio stated, “Mayor and Manager, This is why I believe the entire presentation
should be presented at Council. Very Respectfully, Joseph Salvaggio” (Exhibit D17).
Forwarded as an attachment to Mr. Salvaggio’s email was an email from September 20,
2018 sent by Councilor Martinez (Exhibit D17). If Mr. Salvaggio believed it was crucial for
a presentation on security policies during a council meeting (as the forwarded email
showed), including the necessity that City Council pass certain security policies, why did
he wait 91 days to address the concerns Councilor Martinez expressed in his email? In the
email from September 20, 2018, Councilor Martinez expressed his opinion that a policy for
increased security at City Hall should be brought before the City Council. It’s intriguing
that Mr. Salvaggio waited for 91 days to bring up the concerns in this email, though it
would seem that a competent police chief would know that concerns related to security at
governmental meetings and events should be considered a top priority. However, after
careful examination and evaluation of the timeline of later events, it appears Mr.
Salvaggio was engaged with trying to get some of his subordinate officers to write up
complaints regarding this specific issue related to security checks at City Hall.

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 After Joseph Salvaggio, the Leon Valley Police Chief, was likely informed of the
necessity to build a list of complaints to destroy Mr. Martinez by Ms. Kuenstler, he came
up with an idea: Email former city Attorney, Roxann Cotroneo, about an potentially
incorrect statement that Mr. Martinez made 76 days previously, on October 5, 2019. Mr.
Salvaggio sent an email to Ms. Kuenstler on December 20, 2018, requesting Ms. Kuenstler
to ask the former city attorney to invalidate the correspondence and statement made by
Councilor Martinez, months before (Exhibit D18, Page 2). If the issue was of high
importance, it would appear negligent for the police chief to wait 76 days to resolve,
rectify, or clarify the issue. It’s obvious that Mr. Salvaggio became actively engaged in
“building the case” against Mr. Martinez by requesting Ms. Kuenstler reach out to Ms.
Controneo, so that she would be able to provide a statement that would later be
weaponized against Mr. Martinez. Ms. Kuenstler forwarded Joseph Salvaggio’s request for
Ms. Controneo’s statement on December 22, 2018 (Exhibit D18, Page 2). Ms. Controneo,
who was likely enjoying her Christmas holidays, didn’t respond fast enough to Kelly
Kuenstler’s message – she was eager to build the case to destroy Mr. Martinez. She
followed up on December 30, 2018 to Ms. Controneo: “I never got a response from you for
my police chief on this […]”. Ms. Kuenstler knew that Police Chief Salvaggio, who now
was conspiring with his subordinate officers to file complaints, was in a rush to address
Mr. Martinez’s correspondence sent 86 days prior (Exhibit D18, Page 2). On December 31,
2018, Ms. Controneo finally responded to Ms. Kuenstler. Her response included a
summary of events from a January 19, 2016 council meeting, which occurred 1,077 days
prior to the date she sent the email. This was well before the Home Rule Charter in Leon
Valley was drafted or approved by voters yet was weaponized against Mr. Martinez
during his administration hearing, as further proof of Charter violations he committed.
Why is an event pulled from 1,077 days previously, incorporated into charges against Mr.
Martinez, and allowed to be used in the takeout of Martinez from office?

When employees came back to work following Christmas and the New Years
holiday, Ms. Acuna emailed her complaint to Ms. Kuenstler to assist with the takedown
and destruction of duly elected council member, Mr. Martinez. On January 2, 2019, Ms.
Acuna emailed Ms. Kuenstler stating that, “Per our phone conversation earlier…” and
then detailed her complaints (Exhibit D19). What’s intriguing is that it proves that Ms.
Kuenstler was actively fishing for more complaints - from more city staff members and

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directors. According to Ms. Acuna’s testimony, she had previously expressed concerns to
her director, however apparently the complaints were not significant enough to gain the
attention of Kelly Kuenstler, until they needed extra complaints to help build the case to
destroy Mr. Martinez. In later testimony on July 2, 2019, Ms. Acuna’s supervisor, Melinda
Moritz, testified that she did not have Ms. Acuna write out her complaints (from months
before) until this time (City Council Meeting Video, July 2, 2019, 02:46:20).

Also, in the afternoon of January 2, 2019, Police Officer Jorge Breton, filed a
scanned complaint that was dated the same day, January 2, 2019 (Exhibit D20, Page 2).
His complaints were related to an incident that occurred on July 29, 2017, when Councilor
Martinez was tackled by officers who were responding to a domestic dispute nearby
Martinez’ residence. Why would Jorge Breton wait 522 days to file a written complaint
against Martinez for an incident that occurred? It’s understandable to believe this
contributed to the takedown of Councilor Martinez promulgated by Kelly Kuenstler and
then by Joseph Salvaggio to city staff and police officers, including Officer Breton. While
most of Breton’s complaint was related to this incident, he also briefly mentioned that
“Councilor Martinez continued expressing his disagreement with the safety procedure the
police department was conducting […]”. As Mr. Breton explained, the days which Mr.
Martinez expressed dissatisfaction with the unapproved security procedures in 2018 were,
“August 7 and 21; September 4, 17, 18, 25; October 1, 16, 20; November 6, 16, 27;
December 4” (Exhibit D20, Page 2). Why would Officer Breton wait 148 days to file a
written complaint for the alleged “incident” that occurred on August 7? The most recent
“incident” referenced in Breton’s complaint was on December 4, 2018. Why would Mr.
Breton wait 29 days to file his official complaint for the “incident” that took place on
December 4, 2018? It’s obvious that the timing of Mr. Salvaggio’s email to Ms. Kuenstler
requesting her to reach out to Ms. Cotroneo, combined with the timing of the complaint
lodged by police officer Breton are evidence of collusion of the orchestrated conspiracy to
takedown Councilor Martinez.

At 5:33 PM on January 2, 2019, Ms. Kuenstler sent an email to Ryan Henry with
an alarming statement. She wrote: “Ryan, Assistant Chief Ruben Saucedo brought me the
attached complaints regarding Councilman Martinez and he will bring DVD’s from the
officer’s body cameras by your office tomorrow. I have not heard from any other employees
so I assume I will get nothing else; however, word travels so I will let you know if I receive

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additional items. Sincerely, Kelly” (Exhibit D20, Page 1). The statement “I have not heard
from any other employees” proves that there was word circulating that Ms. Kuenstler was
fishing for, requesting, and spending energy attempting to gather complaints to assist her
with the prosecution of duly elected Councilor Martinez. It seems understandable that a
person “fishing” for and trying to collect complaints has motives that were more than
simply trying to “pass information” or “deal with” a complaint that routinely was
presented to them. Additionally, Ms. Kuenstler’s statement proves that she was using
intermediaries and directors/ associate directors, such as Assistant Chief Saucedo, to fish
for complaints that can be further assist with Kuenstler’s case against Councilor Martinez
(e.g., some more “spaghetti to stick to the wall”).

In addition to the previously discussed complaint submitted by Officer Breton, the

other complaint brought by Assistant Chief Saucedo to Ms. Kuenstler (referenced in her
email) was a complaint against Councilor Martinez by Officer JoAnn Azar. Filed on
January 2, 2019, Officer Azar’s complaint was solely related to Mr. Martinez’s complaints
regarding the security wanding at City Hall (Exhibit D20, Page 3). Azar described that
Mr. Martinez again voiced concerns regarding wanding, however the most recent day she
was at the checkpoint performing security checks, December 18, 2018, Mr. Martinez “did
not say anything” however “was getting annoyed by me asking if he had anything else
that would set off the wand”. Though the credibility of Azar’s statement could be
challenged (e.g. how did Azar know he was getting “annoyed” if Mr. Martinez didn’t say
anything?), and the next most recent date she included in her statement was July 21,
2018, 165 days before the complaint was filed. Similar to the pattern of other complaints,
if the extent of Mr. Martinez’s complaint was so extreme that it necessitated a formal
complaint, why would Officer Azar wait 165 days to file her complaint? This also appears
to be part of the bigger case being built – to destroy Mr. Martinez. After seeing the actions
and oppression by Chief Salvaggio during the 3.12 Hearing when he attempted to
prosecute and persecute Mr. Martinez, it can be understood that any reasonable person
working as a subordinate of Joseph Salvaggio, including Officer Azar, would immediately
provide a written complaint when suggested to do so by Chief Salvaggio. Officer Azar’s
performance evaluations, performance raises, and job security depend on following
lockstep with Chief Salvaggio.

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 Though Kelly Kuenstler could not persuade all city staff members to testify or file
complaints against Mr. Martinez, this didn’t impact her willingness to forward Ryan
Henry things that could be weaponized – and used to destroy Mr. Martinez. Over time, it
became obvious that Ms. Kuenstler, a person hired by the council and paid by the
taxpayers, wanted to maximize the amount of evidence weaponized during the
orchestrated takeout of a duly elected member of the governmental body she is hired by.
This appeared because Ms. Kuenstler, herself, disagreed with voters of Leon Valley and
wanted Mr. Martinez removed from City Council. In fact, she implied in her testimony
that she had wanted Mr. Martinez removed from City Council and had complained about
some of his actions since 2015 (City Council Meeting Video, July 18, 2019, 00:24:50). On
January 8, 2019, Ms. Kuenstler forwarded documents to the investigator she
independently hired, Ryan Henry, related to an incident that occurred on October 29,
2018, showing that Martinez attempted to inquire about and give suggestions relating to
some AV equipment wiring. If this incident was such a clear-cut Charter violation, as
Kuenstler claimed in the hearing of Mr. Martinez, why did she wait 71 days to address the
correspondence at all? Why did she not bring this alleged violation to the attention of Mr.
Martinez, the City Council, or the Mayor? If Crystal Caldera, the staff member that sent
the email, thought it was a Charter violation, why did she not write or file a complaint?
There’s no reason it should have been provided by Ms. Kuenstler to Mr. Henry – unless
Ms. Kuenstler had a preconceived bias and agenda and to ensure the takeout of Mr.
Martinez was successful. It’s obvious that she was orchestrating the events, conspiring
with city staff and helping them manufacture past events into complaints, collude with
department directors, and work around the clock to contribute other corroborating pieces
of email that could be weaponized against Mr. Martinez.

As time progressed, more evidence of collusion, collaboration, and orchestration of

the greater conspiracy to takeout Councilor Martinez appeared. An email sent to the
appointed later-termed “Designated Investigator”, Ryan Henry, on January 17, 2019
contained contact information requested by Ryan Henry. It includes the cell number and
home telephone number of Monica Alcocer – why was this included? Monica Alcocer, who
would later serve as a juror during the administrative hearing and be overheard on a live
mic tell Ryan Henry “I’m trying to mislead them”, did not file a complaint. She did not
have an interview with Ryan Henry. Also, though improperly redacted in violation of the

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Texas Public Information Act (as names cannot be redacted), it’s assumed that the other
name is another one of Kelly Kuenstler’s co-conspirators, potentially David Jordan or
Joseph Salvaggio. Another email, sent by Kelly Kuenstler to Ryan Henry on February 4,
2019, contained police officer David Gonzalez’s contact information. What prompted Ryan
Henry to request this information? Could a reasonable person assume that a previous
phone conversation between Kuenstler and Henry was Ms. Kuenstler continuing to “build
the case” against Mr. Martinez? Or was Ms. Kuenstler simply trying to allow Mr. Henry to
act as a “disinterested investigator” for the complaints from Ms. Rodriguez and Mr.
Melland, as the original retaining agreement stated?

On March 15, 2019, Ryan Henry released the final report of his investigation,
which contained the factual results and recommendations (Exhibit D22). The
complainants in Henry’s Report were Denise Frederick, Catherine Rodriguez, Brandon
Melland, Jo Ann Azar, Jorge Breton, and Yvonne Acuna. On page 21 of Henry’s report, he
wrote that, “Those filing the complaints asserted that at different times, factually,
Martinez gave them direct orders (or what they interpreted as orders) and violated §3.09
of the City Charter”. Further, Henry further explains that one of these “orders” was when
Martinez “Instructed Crystal Caldera to perform certain tasks regarding AV equipment
[…]” (Exhibit D22, Page 22). However, Crystal Caldera is never identified as a
complainant, and is never recorded or noted as having any discussions with Mr. Henry.
His determinations appear to be inferred from a single email chain sent to Mr. Henry by
Ms. Kuenstler – however, Mr. Henry does not appear to do any questioning of any
witnesses involved in the situation, including Martinez. Evident in this example, it
appears that Mr. Henry is trying to make something out of nothing, and morph various
interagency emails (which may contain gripes and complaints of staff, but not formal
complaints) into Charter violations. Another statement in Mr. Henry’s conclusion is “The
HR Policy specifically charges the City Manager with the responsibility for “[a]ppointing a
Designated Officer when a claim is generated” [..]”. Mr. Henry did not mention in his
“factual report” that the policy he referenced, located as part of the Personnel Policy A5, is
only regarding sexual harassment complaints by employees. As of the date Mr. Henry was
retained by Ms. Kuenstler, there were no sexual harassment complaints filed by
employees. This was Mr. Henry’s way of picking and choosing random quotes from
policies, use them out of context, and morph the quotes to make it appear that Ms.

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Kuenstler had authorities that she did not have. Also, in Mr. Henry’s conclusion, he states
“factually, Martinez gave [Ms. Caldera] direct orders” (Exhibit 22, Page 22). Again, this is
Mr. Henry’s attempt to deceive and mislead the readers of the factual report. Mr. Henry
did not ever see direct evidence, and the only reason he was aware of this situation was
because Ms. Kuenstler sent it to him. He never interviewed Ms. Caldera, Ms. Caldera did
not testify in the administrative hearing, Ms. Caldera never filed a formal complaint, Ms.
Caldera never discussed her complaint with Mr. Henry, and the authenticity of the email
from Ms. Kuenstler was never verified. Ms. Kuenstler was actively engaged in assisting
Mr. Henry, who was hired (and payments approved) by Ms. Kuenstler, to have anything
and everything possible that could be morphed into a Charter violation against Mr.
Martinez. However, no complainant, no victim, and no interview existed for this complaint
and alleged Charter violation. This shows Mr. Henry is not disinterested, and really calls
into question his overall credibility.

With regards to the City Manager, Henry writes that, “we must note, you did not
direct this investigation other than the initial instruction to investigate, report, and
provide advice to the City Council” (Exhibit 22, Pages 22-23). However, the evidence
proves Ms. Kuenstler was very engaged, very involved, and exerted large amounts of
effort to conduct and direct the investigation and submit supplementary evidence not
requested by Mr. Henry. In fact, Ms. Kuenstler frequently forwarded information that was
not even related to the original retaining agreement for Mr. Henry’s services, which
defined and limited his scope to “investigate and provide feedback in relation to the two
harassment complaints filed against councilmember Martinez and to also advise the city
regarding possible avenues to improve the City’s policies and processes, should such be
recommended” (Exhibit D3, Page 1). Mr. Henry was never retained to examine any other
complaints, including any complaints and/ or documentation from Crystal Caldera, Nina
Nixon-Mendez, Brandon Melland, Officer Breton, Office Azar, and Yvonne Acuna; he was
only requested to do-so by Ms. Kuenstler. Mr. Henry was never retained as the
“Designated Officer” per the newly passed 3.12 procedures and approved by the members
of the Council “who may deliberate and vote” (Exhibit A10 [A][2]). Mr. Henry was never
officially requested, or approved by Council, to investigate any complaints related to Mr.
Martinez “giving orders” to city staff members, which was the determining reason Mr.
Martinez was forced to forfeit his council seat.

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 Like Mr. Martinez alluded to during his presentation, Ms. Kuenstler, in her official
capacity as City Manager, had Mr. Henry under her close control, like a string puppet and
its’ master. Though there was never a retaining agreement or council vote/approval to
“destroy” Mr. Martinez through whatever investigatory methods necessary, Ms. Kuenstler
continued to email Mr. Henry documents and further investigatory leads. This was Ms.
Kuenstler’s concerted effort to destroy Mr. Martinez’s ability to serve as an elected official.
As a result, Mr. Henry’s investigation was increasingly broadened, and the “case” to
destroy Mr. Martinez was expanding to pull in anything and everything that could be
used to substantiate his removal to the public. Ms. Kuenstler, using her official capacity
as City Manager, hired Mr. Henry and controlled him by feeding him documents and
evidence, knowing that the more documents and complaints she submitted, the more
likely Mr. Henry would realize that his job was primarily to get Mr. Martinez removed
from office.

Ms. Kuenstler finally revealed that she herself was a complainant in an email sent
to City Council on April 16, 2019. She stated that she “did not file a complaint in the
interests of attempting to remain neutral; however that obviously did not work” (Exhibit
D4), implying that she wanted to file a complaint for a long duration of time. Also, the
complaint within this email was sent after Mr. Martinez “gave a copy of the complaint he
constructed against [Ms. Kuenstler] to the media”, which was also given to the Mayor per
Mr. Martinez’s testimony over the summer. However, because the primary subject of the
complaint filed by Ms. Kuenstler is a response to the complaint that Mr. Martinez
distributed to the media and the mayor, this would mean that the basis of Ms. Kuenstler’s
complaint is retaliatory in nature. Ms. Kuenstler’s complaint is due to Mr. Martinez’s
complaint, and his dissemination of his complaint. According to the Ethics Regulations,
“Anti-discrimination laws and this code prevents harassment against individuals in
retaliation for filing a complaint against a city official or employee, a discrimination
charge, testifying, or participating in any way in an investigation, proceedings, or lawsuit
under these laws” (Exhibit A2, Article II [11]). Mr. Martinez’s complaint against Ms.
Kuenstler was based on facts and circumstances surrounding events that had occurred
and escalated over a 3-year period that had nothing to do with discrimination; Mr.
Martinez’s complaint was later amended and added to in September 2019 (Exhibit D5).
The reasons in Mr. Martinez’s complaint included that Ms. Kuenstler allowed city staff to

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get involved in the 2018 election, Ms. Kuenstler closed Seneca Plaza and Lieberman’s
Corner without the prior notification of the City Council, that Ms. Kuenstler had abused
her authority related to investigation of the previous fire chief, and adding items to the
Council Meeting agenda without the approval of the Mayor, Chris Riley. The initial items
in Mr. Martinez’ complaint were related to Ms. Kuenstler’s abuse of power and authority –
they were not related to discrimination or retaliatory in nature. As the evidence proves,
the orchestration and significant collusion and coordination between Ms. Kuenstler and
city staff members starting on December 18, 2018 shows a concerning pattern of behavior
of Ms. Kuenstler continuing to abuse her authority as City Manager to “direct” the
investigation, though Mr. Henry attempted to falsely explain this was not the case (as
stated in Ryan Henry’s March 15, 2019 factual report). After Mr. Martinez attempted
filing his complaint against Ms. Kuenstler, she filed a retaliatory complaint, in direct
violation of the Leon Valley Ethics Regulations (Exhibit A2, Article II [11]).

Personnel Policy A5, which is signed by all employees upon employment and
adopted by the City Council per the Home Rule Charter (Exhibit A1, Section 5.03), states
that, “If a harassment complaint is against the City Manager or members of the Council,
the report shall go directly to the mayor. If the complaint is against the Mayor, the
complaint will go to the City Manager” (Exhibit A14 [D](2]). Kelly Kuenstler, as City
Manager, took it upon herself to disregard the Personnel Policy and request help from the
Texas Municipal League, though she herself had reviewed and approved the Personnel
Policy A5, and placed her signature indicating she reviewed this specific policy on
September 1, 2018, 3 months earlier (Exhibit A14, Page 1). In accordance with the policy,
Ms. Frederick and Ms. Kuenstler should have known that the complaint by Ms. Frederick
go directly to the Mayor. They both disregarded this policy. Brandon Melland signed
receipt and acknowledged understanding of the Personnel Policy on April 16, 2018 and
September 27, 2018 (Exhibit D6, Page 14, Page 2-3). Per the policies, Brandon Melland’s
complaint related to hostile work environment should have been given to the Mayor; it
was not. Though Councilor Rodriguez’s submission of her complaint against Martinez
could be understandable as she is not a city staff member required to abide by the
Personnel Policy, all subsequent complaints submitted to Ms. Kuenstler about Council
Member Martinez should have been submitted in accordance with the Personnel Policy.

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 Ms. Kuenstler, the Leon Valley City Manager, is located beneath the Mayor and
City Council according to the functional structure outlined in the City of Leon Valley
Organizational Chart (Exhibit A15). According the functional structure depicted in the
City of Leon Valley Organizational Chart, which depicts the hierarchy of the City of Leon
Valley, the City Manager reports to the Mayor and City Council, and department heads
report to the City Manager. Also, the inverse is true: the City Manager retains the
authority over department heads; the City Council and Mayor retain the authority over
the City Manager. In the event a complaint is lodged against an elected leader near the
top of the organizational chart (for example, “Mayor and City Council”) by a person toward
the bottom of the organizational chart (for example, “Police- Joseph Salvaggio” and below),
it is not in the purview or the responsibility of a person in the middle of the organizational
chart to reprimand someone above her in the organizational chart. The consistent over-
reach and disregard for existing policies by Kelly Kuenstler is alarming, concerning, and
is a threat to the democratic process of a governmental entity such as Leon Valley. The
dangerous precedent, if unchecked, is this: A city manager, who does not live in the city,
can use taxpayer dollars to takeout an elected leader she personally does not like, with
complete disregard for what the voters have chosen at the polls, so long as she makes it
appear as if a subjective wrongdoing occurred. This is a threat to the registered voters of
Leon Valley, who should have the ability to lawfully pick our elected leaders at the ballot
box. This is an undermining to the democratic republic form of government that has been
established by United States and Texas laws. If the City Manager and City Council were
considered “equals”, they would be on the same hierarchal level of the City of Leon Valley
Organizational Chart. They are not. Throughout the hearing of Mr. Martinez, the denial
of Lion’s Roar article publication by some Council members and not others, the allowance
of certain city Council Members to violate existing policies, and consistent attempts to
censor certain elected leaders she personally disagrees with (such as multiple emails
toward Mr. Bradshaw and Ms. Riley, which can be discussed in formal hearing), Ms.
Kuenstler has completely disregarded the hierarchy and organizational structure outlined
in the City of Leon Valley Organizational Chart.

The authority Ryan Henry described in his opinion-piece “memorandum” that Ms.
Kuenstler requested that he write, is inconsistent and excessive of any authorities granted
to Ms. Kuenstler by Home Rule Charter or Texas Law. As the person hired and paid by

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Ms. Kuenstler, Mr. Henry should have known it would appear to be a blatant conflict of
interest for him to write a letter authorizing the person that hired him - - to hire him. As a
person who financially benefitted from his own opinion-laced “memorandum” of
understanding of Ms. Kuenstler’s authority, it should appear obvious that the appearance
of impropriety related to an attorney authoring a memorandum that they would reap
financial benefits from, is not ethical.

Many of the elements that further show Ms. Kuenstler had carefully orchestrated
the events against Council Member Martinez can be understood by examining what Ms.
Kuenstler did not discuss in her sworn testimony. What Ms. Kuenstler did not tell the
TML attorneys on her phone call is that a personnel policy was already in place
mandating that such a complaint be submitted to the Mayor. Additionally, when testifying
in front of the Council in July and August, Ms. Kuenstler did not testify that she went to
the same college, New Mexico State University, as the “disinterested investigator” (the
Designated Officer) she independently hired. She did not testify that the newly passed
“3.12 Procedures”, which mandate that the members of the council vote to appoint the
“Designated Officer”, prohibit Mr. Ryan Henry from occupying that spot because he was
also retained by the City Council as the “conflict attorney”. Ms. Kuenstler did not testify
that she had had an ugly divorce proceeding when she lived in New Mexico against a man
with the last name, “Martinez” (Abe G. Martinez), and that she may have a preconceived
bias against those with the last name, “Martinez”. She did not testify that when working
for the District Attorney’s office in New Mexico, Kuenstler had been accused of awarding
contracts to her current husband’s company, Steel Dragons, which likely would have
impacted her credibility as a trustworthy witness, prosecutor, and complainant.

Ms. Kuenstler did not testify that she had been colluding with every other witness
the entire process, including to help them elaborate and substantiate their allegations
against Martinez, knowing that she would later join the bandwagon as a complainant. Ms.
Kuenstler did not testify that she allowed staff members to utilize city time, at the tax-
payers’ expense, to help her destroy Mr. Martinez. She did not testify that she persuaded
and influenced Mr. Salvaggio to get as many officers as possible show up to intimidate Mr.
Martinez during his court appearance at the Bexar County Courthouse related to the
temporary restraining order against the city. She did not testify to the Council that the
only reason Mr. Martinez’s lawsuit was necessary is that the City Council lacked a policy

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for conducting of a 3.12 Hearing, and until the policy was approved, Mr. Martinez
prevailed. Ms. Kuenstler did not testify that the authority memo composed by Ryan
Henry, dated February 4, 2019, itself would be a violation of Leon Valley’s ethics
ordinance – as Ryan Henry reaped a substantial economic benefit as a result of the
opinion offered in the memo (Would Henry’s office be paid for services rendered if he
didn’t morph phrases of the Charter making it appear Kuenstler had the authority to sign
a retention agreement?) .

Ms. Kuenstler did not testify that she would enable, encourage, and even assist all
complainants with producing documents that merely serve as a smear to Mr. Martinez’
character, such as allowing the production of Body cam videos from the Seneca incident
(in which Mr. Martinez was tackled by Leon Valley police; these videos would have been
thrown out of a real court of law, if it was a true impartial jury and impartial judge). She
did not testify that she was frequently sending documents to Mr. Henry in an effort to
make Mr. Martinez appear as if he had somehow conducting a wrongdoing. Ms. Kuenstler
did not testify or file any disclosure statements regarding the ethical conflicts she allowed
herself to engage in, or recuse herself from any of the unethical pretenses she allowed
herself to be a party to: These include being both the person that appointed the judge (by
hiring Ryan Henry), the person that met with the jury members before the political
hearing began as well as during the entire hearing (collusion between with Ms. Charles,
Ms. Rodriguez, and Ms. Alcocer), the person acting as the prosecutor (when she presented
binders stacked with information containing no apparent violations of the Home Rule
Charter), and as complainant sitting on the dais during the formal hearing passing notes
to one of the “jurors”, Ms. Charles.

Ms. Kuenstler did not testify the rationale Chief Salvaggio’s formal complaint was
filed within hours of the filing of her own ethics complaint, which was over 90 days after
the initial complaints were lodged against Mr. Martinez. Ms. Kuenstler did not testify
that she would be the person who was tasked with signing the paychecks of the judge/
“Designated Officer”/ “Conflict Attorney” (the checks paid to Mr. Henry’s Law firm), and
how that might influence the “disinterested” “Designated Investigator” into taking Ms.
Kuenstler’s side. Ms. Kuenstler did not testify what authority allowed her to be the
opening “prosecutor” during the Martinez hearing (unless a conspiracy between herself,
Alcocer, and Charles occurred), and then metaphorically change her shoes and act as a

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complainant against Martinez days later, and then sit on the dias for other days of the
formal proceeding while passing notes back and forth with Councilor Charles. She did not
testify that she had attempted filing bogus charges (weaponizing the criminal justice and
Bexar County District Attorney’s office) against Mr. Martinez dating as far back as
February of 2018. She did not testify that she had allowed Monica Alcocer and Donna
Charles the ability to freely communicate with the “Designated Investigator” and also
“conflict attorney”, before the 3.12 Hearing, throughout the hearing, and after the hearing
concluded via email and phone. Ms. Kuenstler did not testify that the damning videos of
Monica Alcocer colluding with Ryan Henry by stating “I’m trying to mislead them” and the
multiple video clips of Ms. Kuenstler passing noted to Donna Charles could possibly
constitute an ethical conflict or dilemma. She did not testify about the thousands of hours
of staff time that were used to takeout an elected council member. Ms. Kuenstler did not
testify that the reason that she despised Mr. Martinez was because he consistently
advocated for the constituents who elected him, he frequently asked many questions, and
he frequently expressed a dissenting opinion. However most important thing that Ms.
Kuenstler did not testify about at Mr. Martinez’ hearing was that getting Mr. Martinez off
city council would make it easier for Ms. Kuenstler to obtain an increase in her financial
compensation package, extend her contract four (4) years, increase her financial payout in
the event a future city council terminated her employment, and eliminate the occasional
dissenting opinion that Mr. Martinez expressed in council meetings regarding Ms.
Kuenstler’s policy propositions and performance. Ms. Kuenstler did not depict that the
achievement of getting Mr. Martinez kicked off the city council was only one “piece” of the
puzzle that created the quid pro quo relationship that had been established between
herself, Monica Alcocer, and Donna Charles.

Ms. Kuenstler’s Selective Refusal to Publish Articles in Lion’s Roar

For the following facts and complaints, it is recommended that the Ethics Committee
subpoena emails referenced, as we do not have access to all raw documents, and are
unable to obtain them in a reasonable timeframe. Additionally, due to the city’s consistent
attempts to prevent transparency with the public in response to open records requests, it
is expected that the city will play time “games” and falsely assert attorney client privilege
that must be challenged with the Texas Attorney General; this can require many months
to resolve. Information contained is from discussions and interview with city officials.

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 During the administrative hearing of Councilor Martinez, Mayor Chris Riley
submitted a document for publication in the Lion’s Roar on July 9, 2019. On July 10, 2019,
some suggestions of factual corrections and minor changes were made to Mayor Riley by
Kelly Kuenstler through email. Mayor Riley responded to Kelly Kuenstler that she would
make factual corrections and some suggested changes and resubmit. However, on July 12,
2019, despite the factual corrections and changes made by Mayor Riley, Kelly Kuenstler
informed Mayor Riley that she refused to include Mayor Riley’s Lion’s Roar article in the
publication. Ms. Kuenstler attempted to explain that she did not like the perspective
Mayor Riley was portraying regarding the 3.12 Hearing, and asserted that “the final
content is ultimately up to the city manager” and that “I want to assist you in ensuring a
quality read”. Kuenstler encouraged Mayor Riley to submit another article about the 3.12
Administrative Hearing after it had concluded, however remained unwilling to allow
Mayor Riley to publish any content regarding the administrative hearing until Ms.
Kuenstler’s goal was accomplished: successful takeout of Mr. Martinez and removal from
office. It was obvious in this chain of correspondence that Ms. Kuenstler wanted to
prevent transparency with the public regarding the facts and circumstances of the 3.12
Hearing of Council Member Benny Martinez, despite the willingness of Mayor Riley to
ensure that all information provided was factual and written in a non-biased perspective.
The underlying motive behind Ms. Kuenstler’s refusal to allow the Mayor to write about
the facts of the administrative hearing is simple: If the public gained awareness of the
promulgated orchestration of events to cancel the votes of Leon Valley voters (of Councilor
Benny Martinez’s 3 consecutive terms), it might enrage them and cause them to go to any
special meetings, reach out to the other elected leaders such as Monica Alcocer, Donna
Charles, and Will Bradshaw, and potentially influence the final outcome of the hearing.
Ms. Kuenstler did not want for the democratic process to undermine her efforts to takeout
Mr. Martinez.

Because of Kelly Kuenstler’s dual role in the administrative hearing against

Councilor Martinez as a complainant and also as a “prosecutor”, the attempt to censor and
prohibit Mayor Riley from being able to factually discuss the events occurring in the bi-
monthly publication of the “Lion’s Roar” newsletter is not only inappropriate, but
constitutes a violation of Leon Valley’s Ethics Regulations. Knowing Mayor Riley’s
“Mayor’s Message” portion of the “Lion’s Roar” can be influential to Leon Valley residents

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(as Mayor Riley’s electoral history proves that the voters have great admiration and
respect), the publication and dissemination of the Lion’s Roar would attract more public
attention, especially if Mayor Riley factually discussed the ongoing 3.12 Hearing. This
increased attention might increase citizen awareness and garnish more public scrutiny
and participation at the administrative hearings. Ms. Kuenstler might understand that
the fact-based publication of the factual details regarding the ongoing hearing to takeout
Mr. Martinez, a duly elected official, would likely hurt her ability to prevail as a
complainant and as a prosecutor to destroy Mr. Martinez. Ms. Kuenstler should have
refrained from prohibiting an elected leader to exercise the ability to publish the “Mayor’s
Message”, even if she claimed it was not a “quality read” or if she was concerned about the
Mayor having a questionable conflict of interest. (note: The irony is the only legal
“opinion” asserting Mayor Riley could possibly have an ethical conflict of interest is Mr.
Ryan Henry, who has many conflicts of interests regarding his own role in the events,
further was unable to detail how such conflict of interest even could exist – other
attorneys have expressed disagreement with his opinion. Though this will be discussed in
great detail in a formal grievance filed with the State Bar of Texas, the conflicts of
interest regarding Mr. Henry’s involvement and retainment in the events include: 1.) the
initial retaining agreement between Mr. Henry and the City of Leon Valley was signed by
Ms. Kuenstler, a primary complainant and prosecutor against Mr. Martinez in the formal
administrative hearing; 2.) Mr. Henry’s retaining agreement was to investigate only two
(2) complaints, though he went well beyond his scope upon the request and pressure by
complainant, Kelly Kuenstler; 3.) Mr. Henry also served as the “Disinterested
Investigator”, though he never was voted on by city council in accordance with the city’s
ordinance on 3.12 procedures; 4.) Mr. Henry was simultaneously serving as “conflict
counsel” during the administrative hearing; 5.) Mr. Henry was simultaneously
representing the City of Leon Valley in the lawsuit Benny Martinez v. City of Leon Valley;
and 6.) Mr. Henry’s firms’ payments for services provided was authorized by Ms.
Kuenstler, a complainant in the administrative hearing of Mr. Martinez). Though Ms.
Kuenstler cited that Mayor Riley’s publication of an article describing factual events
transpiring in the City of Leon Valley as a “violation of Ethics laws”, the only justification
provided by Ms. Kuenstler is that Mayor Riley’s article is not a “good read”. This assertion
by Mr. Kuenstler is not rational and reinforced by fact: it’s only reinforced by Ms.
Kuenstler’s bias and priority to destroy Mr. Martinez.

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 It did not end with this single incident: Ms. Kuenstler continued to prohibit Mayor
Riley’s contributions to the Lion’s Roar, even after the administrative hearing of Mr.
Martinez had concluded, and even though they were factual and were not in violation of
the Lion’s Roar Newsletter Contribution and Content Policy. After Mayor Riley submitted
her contributions for the October 2019/ November 2019 Lion’s Roar, on September 12,
2019, Ms. Kuenstler responded to Mayor Riley’s article that, “Your words are definitely
geared toward giving a specific impression. I do not believe the wording is neutral as you
leave out part of the factual events for a balanced report.” Though Ms. Kuenstler refused
to describe the “factual events” that were omitted in Mayor Riley’s submission, Mayor
Riley is not responsible for writing a “balanced” report - - in fact, it’s not a report at all
that is required for publication in the “Mayor’s Message”. The mayor is not constrained to
what Ms. Kuenstler personally likes and does not like, or what Ms. Kuenstler agrees with
or disagrees with: the city of Leon Valley’s organizational chart and the Home Rule
Charter do not give the authority to the city manager to censor content on the basis of
personal like and dislike. In fact, the organizational chart of Leon Valley displays that Ms.
Kuenstler is beneath, and subordinates in the hierarchal structure, of the Mayor and City
Council (Exhibit A15). Our Home Rule Charter does not authorize Ms. Kuenstler
subjective discretion to limit messages by the Mayor other than those imposed by law or
by the Lion’s Roar Newsletter Contribution and Content Policy. Also, of key importance is
that the Lion’s Roar Newsletter Contribution and Content Policy explicitly states that
“Editorial contribution to the newsletter May be submitted by the Mayor …” (Exhibit A15
[6]). According to the Cambridge Dictionary, editorials are, “a statement […] that
expresses the opinion of the editors or owners on a subject of particular interest” (Exhibit
D7). It’s blatantly obvious that Ms. Kuenstler’s attempts to prohibit Mayor Riley’s
contributions to the Lion’s Roar are not because of a violation of any policy or procedure: it
is simply because Ms. Kuenstler personally does not agree with the way that Mayor Riley
portrays her editorial styled message that is based from fact.

It’s obvious that Ms. Kuenstler’s efforts to censor Mayor Riley are to serve her self-
interests. Initially, Ms. Kuenstler’s priority was to prevail as a complainant and
prosecutor against Councilor Martinez when Ms. Riley submitted her Lion’s Roar
contributions in July. Mayor Riley’s article, which was fact based, may have derailed
Kuenstler’s attempt to participate in the “takeout” of Martinez - - and so it can be

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concluded that the censorship of Mayor Riley’s article is primarily to serve her own
interests (and takeout the person she was a complainant against, Mr. Martinez).
According to the Leon Valley Ethics Regulations, “In connection with the representation of
private interests before the city, a city official or employee shall not […] assert the
privilege of the official or employee’s city position for the purpose of advancing private
interests” (Exhibit A2, Article II [5][b][2]). By Ms. Kuenstler writing to Mayor Riley that
she will not publish the article, “because the final content is ultimately up to the City
Manager”, Ms. Kuenstler is using her power and authority, as City Manager, to suppress
the article authored by Mayor Riley. Ms. Kuenstler’s end goal was to serve her personal
interests: prevail in the takeout of Councilor Martinez, who she personally does not like.

Next, Ms. Kuenstler’s effort was guided by ensuring that the public was unable to
obtain information regarding the “takeout” of Mr. Martinez, including the summary of the
factual events that transpired over the summer, from the Mayor’s perspective. Knowing
that Mayor Riley is well respected by the Leon Valley community, Ms. Kuenstler knows
that Mayor Riley’s “Mayor’s Message” can be very influential. Ms. Kuenstler was
unwilling to allow Mayor Riley to write about the large waste of taxpayer dollars, the
ongoing litigation expenses, the waste of city employee and official time, and the removal
of Council Member Martinez by two (2) of the political opponents of Mr. Martinez. Ms.
Kuenstler’s attempts to prohibit transparency regarding the sequence of events was
obvious: she didn’t want Mayor Riley the ability to inform taxpayers about the sequence of
orchestrated events that she, herself, had promulgated starting in December of 2018 to
destroy the duly elected official sitting in a Council seat.

The Lion’s Roar Newsletter Contribution and Content Policy, which outlines
specific guidelines and rules regarding the publication of the bi-monthly Lion’s Roar
newsletter, states that the newsletter “may contain factual information about elections,
including the name of candidates and the text of measures”, however “shall not contain
any reference to political parties or political affiliations”. Additionally, the policy states
that “Express or implied support or opposition to candidates or measures shall be
prohibited” (Exhibit A8, Item 3). The mayor’s [unpublished] article did not contain any
political parties, political affiliations, and did not provide express or implied support or
opposition to candidates or measures. Instead, Mayor Riley’s article was rooted in facts
about the events unfolding in Leon Valley. The only reason Ms. Kuenstler did not allow

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for its’ publication is because she did not want to increase public awareness of the
administrative hearing, and potentially undermine her ability to takeout Mr. Martinez.

Ms. Kuenstler’s selective censoring of articles continued, but the underlying motive
of the intentional censorship changed. After successful submission of recall petitions for
removal of Councilors Donna Charles and Monica Alcocer from office, Ms. Kuenstler
prioritized protection of the two counselors. Ms. Kuenstler, who had just been given an
astronomical increase in her financial compensation by the Councilors, knew that as part
of the quid pro quo relationship that existed between Councilors Charles, Alcocer, and
herself, Ms. Kuenstler would need to do anything and everything to prevent the public
from knowing the truth about the recall efforts, motives, justification, and underlying
rationales.

On January 3, 2020, Councilor Will Bradshaw submitted an article via email for
publication in the Lion’s Roar. His article was primarily an informational piece to answer
ongoing questions he had received from citizens in Leon Valley regarding the recall
efforts, answering the “who”, “what”, “when”, “where” and “why” of the petitions. In his
article, Mr. Bradshaw responded factually to simple questions, including citing portions of
the recall petitions, themselves. These petitions had circulated in the city, and were also
available on www.changeleonvalley.com. On January 8, 2020, Kelly Kuenstler wrote an
email to Mr. Bradshaw stating that she was prohibiting publication of portions of his
article she did not personally like and agree with. In her email, Ms. Kuenstler stated that:
“the article you submitted gives your implied support to the recall petition when you start
with the “why” section of your article. This is a violation of the Lion’s Roar Newsletter
Policy”. However, the “why” section of Councilor Bradshaw’s article did not violate any
portion of Lion’s Roar Newsletter Contribution and Content Policy. The “Why” section of
Bradshaw’s article was from the primary source: the recall petitions, themselves (Exhibit
D8). Mr. Bradshaw cited the petitions, as presented by the petitioner’s committee. The
“Why?” section of Mr. Bradshaw’s article stated:

“Why? The recall petitions stated six reasons as grounds for removal from office. I have
summarized these six reasons below:

1. Abdicating responsibilities of constituent services by failing to allow “Citizens to be

Heard” AND voting to shorten, place excessive limitations, and censor constituent’s voices.

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 2. Voting to allow police to continue overly zealous practice of towing motor vehicles with
expired registrations only, including vehicles contained on private property.

3. Malfeasance during the administrative hearing of Councilor Benny Martinez, including

poor application of Leon Valley Home Rule Charter regarding allegations against accused
council member.

4. Failure to vote and appoint unbiased, disinterested, and qualified, “Designated Officer”
in accordance with Section 1.04.006 of the Leon Valley Code of Ordinances, Section (1)(A)(2)
during the months of April, May, June, July, or August 2019, deemed necessary to
“promote neutrality in the process” of the formal 3-12 administrative hearing.

5. Defiance of citizens’ ability to participate in fair democratic process as well as violation of

Home Rule Charter Section 3.08 (E)(4) and Section 3.09 (E) by attempting to forfeit the seat
of the duly elected official with only a total of three (3) members of City Council allowed to
vote, with blatant disregard of the requirement that 2/3 vote of City Council must vote to
forfeit the seat of a council member.

6. Spending over $100,000 of taxpayer money and wasting thousands of hours of city staff,
employee, and official’s time in effort to cancel the votes of the citizens of Leon Valley.”

The “Why” section of Mr. Bradshaw’s article made up more than 50% of the entire
submission for publication: 249 of the 485 total words. Additionally, Mr. Bradshaw
explicitly stated that the “Why” section in his article was [verbatim] from the “recall
petitions [which] stated six reasons as grounds for removal from office”. Though some of
the text of the “6 reasons” contained within the recall petitions was not included in Mr.
Bradshaw’s article, every reason listed in the article was the precise, verbatim words used
on the actual recall petitions (Exhibit C1, Exhibit D9). Some text contained within the
original petitions was not included in Mr. Bradshaw’s article, such as the specific “as
evidenced by” sections. This is likely because Mr. Bradshaw’s article was limited to 500
words in accordance with the Lion’s Roar Newsletter Contribution and Content Policy.

After Ms. Kuenstler’s refusal to publish the majority of Mr. Bradshaw’s Lion’s Roar
article, Mr. Bradshaw tried to understand the rationale and justification behind Ms.
Kuenstler’s decision to selectively prohibit publication of pieces she personally did not
like. In his response to Ms. Kuenstler, Mr. Bradshaw stated, “Please let me know which
part of the "why" section shows "implied support" of the removal of the 2 councilors. The

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wording of the six points under the "why" section came directly from the recall petitions.
They were not my words, but the words of the petitioner's committee…”

However, though Ms. Kuenstler may have personally disagreed with the petitions
themselves, Mr. Bradshaw was simply referencing (and almost quoting, verbatim) the
content contained within them. However, Ms. Kuenstler’s mind was made up: she must
continue to ensure the councilors that had just given her a large increase in financial
compensation were protected as much as possible. Ms. Kuenstler’s pattern of behavior,
including prohibition of things she personally does not like from being published, has not
only increased in occurrence but also expanded to those beyond just the Mayor, Chris
Riley. Though Mr. Bradshaw attempted to rationalize with Ms. Kuenstler, and justify the
fact-basis of his article, Ms. Kuenstler was unwilling to face the truth: she did not care
about the facts of the recall petitions. Her mind was made up: to protect those that had
recently voted to extend her contract four (4) years, appease those that had just voted to
give her a dramatic increase in financial compensation, and prohibit transparency with
the public regarding the true intent of the recall petitions that had been circulating within
the city. Also, as a complainant and active participant in the orchestrated series of events
to boot out duly elected Councilor Martinez, Ms. Kuenstler did not want the public to
become aware of the facts: that Mr. Martinez’ administrative hearing was a sham and
many procedures and policies were not followed (as described in the recall petitions).

What is intriguing is the comparison of City Manager Kelly Kuenstler’s prohibition

of Mayor Riley and Councilor Will Bradshaw’s article for publication several times, though
it adhered to all requirements of the Lion’s Roar Newsletter Contribution and Content
Policy, with Kuenstler’s selective allowance of publication by articles submitted by Monica
Alcocer and Donna Charles though both were in direct violation of the Lion’s Roar
Newsletter Contribution and Content Policy, as detailed in earlier sections of this
complaint. The publication of Alcocer and Charles’ factually incorrect and politically
motivated articles violated Leon Valley Ethics Regulations, Texas Election Laws, Texas
Penal Code, the Leon Valley Home Rule Charter, and Lion’s Roar Newsletter Contribution
and Content Policy. However, Ms. Kuenstler allowed it because she personally liked the
article’s contents and she shared intent of the author(s) to influence voters regarding
upcoming recall measures, primarily because she was grateful and owed favors to
Councilors Alcocer and Charles as part of the ongoing quid pro quo relationship. Ms.

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Kuenstler not only benefited because of Charles’ and Alcocer’s votes to remove Councilor
Martinez from City Council (after the administrative hearing, in which Kuenstler was a
complainant), but also because of the financial benefits Ms. Kuenstler received weeks
after Mr. Martinez was removed from office. Ms. Kuenstler chose to approve the articles
submitted by those council members who had just given her a compensation increase
valued at more than $20,000 annually. She benefitted, and she would benefit those that
“gave” her something by “giving” them a privilege in violation of Leon Valley policies as
well as Texas law.

On the Council Meeting of October 15, 2019, the City Council met in executive
session to “Conduct an Annual Performance Evaluation of City Manager Kelly Kuenstler
as Required by the City of Leon Valley’s Employment Contract” (Exhibit D10). Ms.
Kuenstler’s previous contract had expired months before, on August 15, 2019. Despite
this, she allowed herself to remain employed, on payroll, and with full benefits during the
ousting of Council Member Martinez. Did Ms. Kuenstler fear that if the City Council
formed a new employment contract while the formal administrative session was ongoing,
she might not get offered another contract? Did Ms. Kuenstler fear that if she was offered
a new contract, that Benny Martinez would negatively impact her ability to seal such a
lucrative contract? Was Ms. Kuenstler intentionally delaying the signing of a new
contract, knowing that Benny Martinez would soon be forced off the city Council? Was Ms.
Kuenstler aware that very soon a personal friend of Monica Alcocer, Matthew Hodde,
would be nominated to take Martinez’s spot? Did Ms. Kuenstler know that Matthew
Hodde would be happy and willing to “rubber stamp” a new employment contract with
many additional incentives?

Ms. Kuenstler’s previous 2-year contract agreement, signed by the City Secretary
and Mayor on August 15, 2017, was “for the term of two years”, meaning Ms. Kuenstler
should have been discharged of her duties as city manager on August 15, 2019 (Exhibit
C10, Page 6, Item 1). Ms. Kuenstler was working in her capacity as city manager for 2
months (60 days) without being under a valid, enforceable, accurate contract, and without
the authorization or approval of the legislative body. Throughout this time period, she
received at least $24,000 unapproved and unauthorized taxpayer dollars deposited to her
bank account. Additionally, Mr. Kuenstler’s new contract had a lucrative provision that
increased her ICMA-RC (retirement) contributions by $10,000 annually. This wire

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transfer of $28,398.50 occurred on October 30, 2019, just days after getting the new
lucrative contract signed (Exhibit D23, Page 6).

According to the Texas Comptroller’s office, fraud is defined as “an intentional

deception designed to obtain a benefit or advantage or to cause some benefit that is due to
be denied” (Exhibit D11). The State Comptroller’s office, as a part of the executive branch,
is the State of Texas’s chief tax collector, accountant, revenue estimator, and treasurer
and is also responsible for remission of taxes to municipalities, such as Leon Valley.
According to the terms of Ms. Kuenstler’s contract agreement from 2017, her employment
was only approved and authorized by the governmental body “for the term of two years”
(Exhibit C10, Page 6, Item 1). This means Ms. Kuenstler’s position of City Manager
ceased on August 15, 2019. This did not keep Ms. Kuenstler from utilizing her official
position as City Manager to ensure that she was still employed and paid after August 15,
2019, despite the fact that her contract had ended and the governmental body had not
authorized taxpayer funds for her salary or even to continue her employment after August
15, 2019.

According to more than one council member, on October 15, 2019, Ms. Kuenstler
walked into the meeting with her own contract, already written up. It was described
analogous to what a professional NBA basketball all-star might do during contract signing
with a professional agent representing him. Ms. Kuenstler’s self-drafted employment
contract contained an approximate 10% raise to a $160,000 base salary, increased her
ICMA retirement contributions by $10,000 annually, issued herself a city-issued cell
phone and city vehicle, increased her own severance package by more than 100% in value
(from 3 months pay to 6 months severance pay plus one month for every year worked),
and increased the contract term from two (2) years to four (4) years, making it impossible
for the next 3 City Councils to end her contract without obliging the city to an
astronomical financial payout (Exhibit C11). What’s also intriguing is that the only legal
counsel present was Ms. Denise Frederick, who was a subordinate (and subject to the
authority) of Ms. Kuenstler, as city manager. According to the Texas Rules of Disciplinary
Conduct, this would create a conflict of interest in which Ms. Frederick should have
recused herself because of her legal obligations to the entity (Exhibit D12, Pages 28-54);
she did not. According to the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Conduct, “a lawyer employed or
retained to represent an organization represents the organization as distinct from its

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directors, officers, employees, shareholders or other constituents” (Exhibit D12, Page 46).
However, the Leon Valley Home Rule Charter states that Ms. Frederick “shall be
appointed by the City Manager” and “shall report to the City Manager” (Exhibit A1,
Section 5.02 [B]). Because Ms. Frederick reports to the city manager, yet the ethical
obligations lie to the entity, Ms. Frederick likely should have recused herself from the
executive session in response to the conflict of interest.

After the approval of Ms. Kuenstler’s contract, Councilor Bradshaw expressed

disappointment regarding the things not discussed during the executive session. He
explained to citizens that he was not able to discuss the action sequence of events that
transpired, because under Leon Valley’s Ethics Regulations, everything discussed in
executive session is considered “confidential government information”. Because of this, he
stated the council members did not discuss what he assumed would be crucial to
deliberation of an employee’s performance review: past and future goals, performance
methods and metrics, specific achievements or accomplishments, or strengths and
weaknesses of Ms. Kuenstler as City Manager. He explained that the Council members
did not provide any valid reasons or justifications for an extreme 10% increase in
compensation. Mr. Bradshaw explained that Councilors Alcocer, Hodde, Charles, and
Rodriguez did not discuss making a single change to the contract Ms. Kuenstler drafted
herself. Mr. Bradshaw explained that when evaluating Ms. Kuenstler’s performance,
many seemingly pertinent issues were not discussed, such her detrimental impact on the
community, the great divide in the city she had created, or even citizen’s input into Ms.
Kuenstler continuing as the City Manager.

After citizens were able to analyze the new contract, it was noted that the new
contract had terms inconsistent with the Leon Valley Home Rule Charter, approved by
voters in 2017. For example, Ms. Kuenstler’s new contract required “not less than 75% of
the elected members of City Council” (Exhibit C11) for termination, though the Home
Rule Charter only requires a 2/3 vote of City Council to terminate the City Manager
(Exhibit A1, Section 5.01[B]). Also, a condition of the new contract was that in the event of
City Council failure to give a performance evaluation, Ms. Kuenstler receives an
automatic 10% annual raise in base compensation. This creates an environment where
Ms. Kuenstler is incentivized to create excuses and claim negligence when the time comes
for future performance evaluations. Though Ms. Kuenstler’s performance for the past

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annum had primarily consisted of the creation of a sharply divided city using taxpayer
dollars, Council Members Monica Alcocer and Donna Charles eagerly rubber stamped the
contract in the late-midnight executive session. The financial benefits given to Ms.
Kuenstler were approximately increased by $24,977 (Exhibit C12). The change in the
value of Ms. Kuenstler’s severance package was an increase of approximately $96,832
(Exhibit C12). Ms. Kuenstler reaped large economic benefits as a result of the ongoing
quid pro quo relationship between herself and City Council Members Monica Alcocer and
Donna Charles.

Defined by Texas law, Official Oppression occurs when a person “acting under color
of his office or employment commits an offense if he […] intentionally denies another in
the exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity, knowing his conduct
is unlawful” (Exhibit A5, Texas Penal Code § 39.03[a][2]). The ability to submit recall
petitions to the City Council of Leon Valley is a privilege obtained by Leon Valley citizens
as a result of the Home Rule Charter (Exhibit A1, Article VI, Section 6.01[C]). The ability
for Leon Valley citizens to use their personal funds and resources to advocate for such
recall measures is afforded by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
(Exhibit A9). Though Councilors Alcocer and Charles could have chosen to use her own
funds and resources to express discontent with the ongoing recall efforts in the same
manner as the citizens of Leon Valley, they did not. Ms. Kuenstler, using her official
authority as City Manager, granted the Councilors the ability to use taxpayer funds for
dissemination of an illegal political advertisement that was in blatant violation of Texas
Election Laws, the Texas Penal Code, the Leon Valley Home Rule Charter, Leon Valley’s
Ethics Regulations, and the Lion’s Roar Newsletter Contribution and Content Policy.
However, on the contrary was the use of Ms. Kuenstler’s official position, as city manager,
to prohibit Councilor Will Bradshaw and Mayor Riley’s article for publication in the Lion’s
Roar, despite that they complied with all Texas laws, Leon Valley Ordinances and
Charter, and Ethics regulations. Neither Councilor Bradshaw or Mayor Riley would have
personally benefitted, politically or financially, even if their articles were published in
their entirety. Such oppressive actions toward those with a dissenting opinion is
dangerous when employed in a democratic government by a person in an official position,
such as Ms. Kuenstler. In fact, because of the ongoing quid pro quo relationship between
Councilors Alcocer, Charles, and Ms. Kuenstler, the selective prohibition on blocking

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publication in a taxpayer funded newsletter is a direct violation of other Texas laws and
Ethics laws, which makes the action also constitute official oppression.

As discussed earlier, with Ms. Kuenstler’s direct assistance and approval, Ms.
Charles and Ms. Alcocer used taxpayer funds for political advertising, in violation of the
Texas Election Code § 255.003. Additionally, Ms. Kuenstler enabled them to use their
official City Council positions for submission of politically motivated documents, which
constitutes an abuse of power, including Abuse of Official Capacity, and Official
Oppression. Additionally, Ms. Kuenstler enabled Ms. Alcocer and Ms. Charles to violate
many sections of the Leon Valley Ethics Ordinance and the Leon Valley Home Rule
Charter, as well as the Lion’s Roar Newsletter Contribution and Content Policy.

Ms. Kuenstler’s active participation and assistance with Monica Alcocer and Donna
Charles’ illicit and improper activities is itself a violation of multiple sections of the Leon
Valley Ethics Regulations. According to the Leon Valley Ethics Regulations, “a city official
or employee may not use his or her official position to unfairly advance or impede private
interests, or to grant or secure, or attempt to grant or secure, for any person (including
himself or herself) any form of special consideration, treatment exemption, or advantage
beyond that which is lawfully available to other persons” (Exhibit A2, Ordinance No.
2019-10, Exhibit A, Article II [2][a]). As discussed earlier and shown in email
correspondence with Kelly Kuenstler, the ability to submit articles for publication in the
taxpayer funded Lion’s Roar is reserved to officials and employees. Because of this, the
use of official position allow publication of articles that intend to destroy the credibility of
a recall petition effort and influence voters is not something that a “normal” citizen can
do, making it an “official action”. As defined by the Ethics Regulations, an official action
includes, “any affirmative act (including the marking of a recommendation) within the
scope of, or in violation of, an official’s or employee’s duties” (Exhibit A2, Ordinance No.
2019-10, Exhibit A, Article I). The affirmative act of allowing and approving submission of
editorials for publication that contain a “marking of a recommendation” by Alcocer and
Charles constitute a violation of this section of the ethics regulations.

Explicit recommendations provided by Charles and Alcocer in their articles,

described earlier, include the statements: “by becoming fully informed, asking questions,
assuring that what is being told to you comes from a creditable source (not just Facebook,

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Nextdoor, Twitter, or Web Site postings), attend meetings, and join committees, boards
and commissions” and to “Please remember and share this message with others” (Exhibit
B1, Page 8). Implied inherent negative recommendations in the articles include that: “less
than factual messages placed on a website, mailed, and spoken at meetings” are meant “to
deceive and mislead the general public and citizens of this city” (Exhibit B1, Page 8); and
that the “allegations contained within the recall petition are crafted to omit the
foundation of the actions that the targeted councilors took” and do not tell the “whole
story” (Exhibit B1, Page 8); that the recall petitions “are a waste of taxpayer money when
they are used to carry out political battles” (Exhibit B1, Page 9); and that “[t]here’s no
need for a recall in Leon Valley” (Exhibit B1, Page 9).

Ms. Kuenstler, using her position as City Manager, “unfairly advance[s] or

impede[s] private interests”, which is a blatant violation of the Leon Valley Ethics
Regulations (Exhibit A2, Ordinance No. 2019-10, Exhibit A, Article II [2][a]). In emails to
Councilor Bradshaw, Mayor Riley, and to also a citizen, Ms. Kuenstler cites that she has
final say over what does and does not get published in the Lion’s Roar. Though this is
accurate, the Lion’s Roar Newsletter Contribution and Content Policy does not give Ms.
Kuenstler the ability to selectively allow other elected officials to violate policies or violate
Texas laws. Because of Ms. Kuenstler’s official position as City Manager, she abuses her
ability to censor and prohibit content that does not violate any rules or laws form
publication (because of personal and political motives as well as underlying quid pro quo
relationship), and abuses her authority to allow content that does blatantly violate the
Texas Penal Code, Texas Election Laws, and many other ethics laws and regulations, to
be published and disseminated to the community. Ms. Kuenstler’s use of official authority
and power to “unfairly advance[s] or impede[s] private interests” is a violation of the Leon
Valley Ethics Regulations (Exhibit A2, Ordinance No. 2019-10, Exhibit A, Article II
[2][a]). The monumental abuse of power by Ms. Kuenstler displays integrity inconsistent
with a person that should be working in the public service and public administration
sector.

Ms. Kuenstler also violated Leon Valley Ethics Regulations relating to allowing the
use of public resources for personal and political reasons. According to the regulations, “A
city official or employee shall not use, request, or permit the use of city facilities,
personnel, equipment or supplies for private purposes (including political purposes) except

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1.) Pursuant to duly adopted city policies; or 2.) To the extent and according to the terms
those resources are lawfully available to the public” (Exhibit A2, Ordinance No. 2019-10,
Exhibit A, Article II [6]). Ms. Kuenstler’s email states that the ability for citizens to
publish in the Lion’s Roar is limited to the “Mayor, City Council, City Manager, City
Secretary, and Leon Valley staff members” (Exhibit C9), meaning that the ability to use
the Lion’s Roar publication space is not “lawfully available to the public” (Exhibit A2,
Ordinance No. 2019-10, Exhibit A, Article II [6]). Currently, Lion’s Roar content
publication is regulated by the Lion’s Roar Newsletter Contribution and Content Policy.
Though Ms. Kuenstler is given the ability to issue a “final say”, this does not inherently
allow her to allow City Council members to violate other portions of the policy, Texas
Laws, and portions of the Ethics Ordinance. Ms. Kuenstler “permit[ted] the use of city […]
supplies for private purposes (including political purposes)” non-pursuant to “adopted city
policies”, which is a violation of the Leon Valley Ethics Regulations (Exhibit A2,
Ordinance No. 2019-10, Exhibit A, Article II [6]).

The reason Monica Alcocer and Donna Charles were able to be successful in their
illicit publication of prohibited materials in the Lion’s Roar in violation of local and Texas
laws is because Ms. Kuenstler directly assisted and enabled them. This is a violation of
the Leon Valley Ethics Regulations, which state that “A city official or employee shall not
knowingly assist or induce, or attempt to assist or induce, and person to violate any
provision of” the Ethics Ordinance (Exhibit A2, Ordinance No. 2019-10, Exhibit A, Article
II [8][a]). By knowingly assisting and inducing Ms. Alcocer and Ms. Charles to violate
sections of the Ethics Regulations as discussed earlier in this complaint, while
simultaneously blocking the Mayor and Councilor Bradshaw from publication of articles
that did not violate any portions of the Ethics Ordinance, Ms. Kuenstler violated the
Ethics Regulations.

Use of city resources for personal and political gain also constitutes a violation of
Leon Valley’s Ethics Regulations. According to the regulations, “a city official or employee
shall not use, request, or permit the use of city facilities, personnel, equipment, or supplies
for private purposes (including political purposes) except: (a) pursuant to duly adopted city
policies or (2) to the extent and according to the terms that those resources are lawfully
available to the public” (Exhibit A2, Ordinance No. 2019-10, Exhibit A, Article II [6]). As
previously discussed, the adopted city policy related to the publication of the newsletter,

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the Lion’s Roar Newsletter Contribution and Content Policy, was violated by both Donna
Charles and Monica Alcocer, and the occurrence of violations enabled by Kelly Kuenstler.
Additionally, the resources of free “real estate” space in the Lion’s Roar for publication by
members of the public is prohibited, as confirmed by Kelly Kuenstler’s email and outlined
in the Lion’s Roar Contribution and Content Policy. Because city policies were violated,
including a prohibition on the publication of political, self-serving articles in the Lion’s
Roar, the act of using city resources for personal and political gain is a violation of the
Ethics Regulations (Exhibit A2, Ordinance No. 2019-10, Exhibit A, Article II [6]).

In summary, we kindly request the Leon Valley Ethics Committee to investigate

the actions and violations we detailed regarding the conduct and behaviors of Councilor
Charles, Councilor Alcocer, and City Manager Kelly Kuenstler, including the specific
violations of the Leon Valley Ethics Regulations, Texas Election Laws, Texas Penal Codes,
Leon Valley Code of Ordinances, Leon Valley Home Rule Charter, and the Lion’s Roar
Contribution and Content Policy. While the ability to conduct a formal administrative
hearing is at the discretion of the Ethics Committee, we believe the significance of the
content, the severity of the violations, the detailed and complicated nature of the
violations, the number and positions of persons involved directly and indirectly to the
violations, and the extreme nature of the consequences that resulted from the illicit and
unethical behaviors outlined in this complaint, yield an absolute necessity for conduction
of a formal hearing of this complaint. A formal hearing is paramount to adequately
investigate, address, and deliberate the details within the complaint. We believe such
hearing should be conducted at a time and place that allows for maximum transparency
with constituents of Leon Valley, such as a place that can be livestreamed (i.e. City Hall
Council Chambers) on a weekday evening or on the weekend. Also, we believe that the
direct and indirect subjects of this complainant, including the City Manager, Kelly
Kuenstler, Joseph Salvaggio, Brandon Melland, Melinda Moritz, Denise Frederick,
Crystal Caldera, and/ or subordinates of the aforementioned, Councilor Charles and/ or
her appointees, and Councilor Alcocer and/or her appointees should recuse themselves
from any direct or indirect involvement with the handling of this complaint, as would be
necessary to ensure bias would not dictate the decisions and determinations of the Ethics
Committee. This would also apply to any legal counsel representation, if the counsel feels
that he/she must appease to the City Manager and would be conflicted of their duties to

Page 58 of 63
 LIST OF EXHIBITS

SECTION A ...............................................................................................................................................
EXHIBIT A1 (LEON VALLEY CITY CHARTER) ................................................................................................ A1
EXHIBIT A2 (CITY OF LEON VALLEY ORDINANCES NO. 2019-10 – ETHICS) ................................................... A2
EXHIBIT A3 (TEXAS PENAL CODE, CHAPTER 36 - BRIBERY AND CORRUPT INFLUENCE) .............................. A3
EXHIBIT A4 (TEXAS PENAL CODE, CHAPTER 37 - PERJURY AND OTHER FALSIFICATION) ............................ A4
EXHIBIT A5 (TEXAS PENAL CODE, CHAPTER 39 - ABUSE OF OFFICE) ......................................................... A5
EXHIBIT A6 (TEXAS ELECTION CODE, CHAPTER 255 - REGULATING POLITICAL ADVERTISING …) .............. A6
EXHIBIT A7 (TEXAS ETHICS COMMISSION – A GUIDE TO ETHICS LAWS) ..................................................... A7
EXHIBIT A8 (LION’S ROAR NEWSLETTER CONTRIBUTION AND CONTENT POLICY) ........................................ A8
EXHIBIT A9 (FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES) ...................................... A9
EXHIBIT A10 (§ 3.12 INVESTIGATION AND HEARING GUIDELINES, ORDINANCE 2019-26) .......................... A10
EXHIBIT A11 (TEXAS ETHICS COMMISSION – PAMPHLET, POLITICAL ADVERTISING) ................................. A11
EXHIBIT A12 (LEON VALLEY COUNCIL MEETING MINUTES – MARCH 1, 2011) ......................................... A12
EXHIBIT A13 (UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (UDHR) – UNITED NATIONS 1948) ............ A13
EXHIBIT A14 (LEON VALLEY PERSONNEL POLICY A5) .............................................................................. A14
EXHIBIT A15 (CITY OF LEON VALLEY ORGANIZATIONAL CHART) .............................................................. A15

SECTION B ...............................................................................................................................................
EXHIBIT B1 (LION’S ROAR VOLUME 17, ISSUE 1) ........................................................................................ B1
EXHIBIT B2 (EMAIL CORRESPONDENCE – KK STATING MA SUBMITTED ARTICLE) ....................................... B2
EXHIBIT B3 (EMAIL CORRESPONDENCE – SCOTT HUDDLESTON) ................................................................. B3
EXHIBIT B4 (ORR CHARGES 01/19/18) ..................................................................................................... B4
EXHIBIT B5 (LETTER FROM LV TO AG SEEKING TO WITHHOLD - JUNE 10, 2019) ........................................ B5
EXHIBIT B6 (LETTER FROM LV TO AG SEEKING TO WITHHOLD – JUNE 17, 2019) ..................................... B6
EXHIBIT B7 (BEXAR COUNTY DA – LV VIOLATED TX PIA – AUG. 8, 2019)............................................... B7
EXHIBIT B8 (BEXAR COUNTY DA – LV VIOLATED TX PIA – DEC. 21, 2018) ............................................... B8
EXHIBIT B9 (BEXAR COUNTY DA – LV VIOLATED TX PIA – DEC. 21, 2018 #2) .......................................... B9
EXHIBIT B10 (BEXAR COUNTY DA – LV VIOLATED TX PIA – JAN. 28, 2019) ......................................... B10
EXHIBIT B11 (TX ATTORNEY GENERAL – CITY MUST RELEASE INFORMATION) .......................................... B11
EXHIBIT B12 (TX ATTORNEY GENERAL – CITY’S ATTORNEY MUST RELEASE INFORMATION) .................... B12
EXHIBIT B13 (CITIZEN EXCHANGE WITH CITY SECRETARY – JUNE 20, 2019) .......................................... B13
EXHIBIT B14 (LION’S ROAR VOLUME 17, ISSUE 2) .................................................................................... B14

SECTION C ...............................................................................................................................................
EXHIBIT C1 (RECALL PETITION – DONNA CHARLES) .................................................................................. C1
EXHIBIT C2 (CHANGELEONVALLEY.COM WEBSITE SCREENSHOT) .............................................................. C2
EXHIBIT C3 (CHANGE LEON VALLEY PROJECT FACEBOOK PAGE SCREENSHOT) .......................................... C3
EXHIBIT C4 (POSTCARD) ........................................................................................................................... C4
EXHIBIT C5 (CHECK RECONCILIATION REGISTER – COUNCIL AGENDA PACKET SEPT. 17, 2019) ................. C5
EXHIBIT C6 (CHECK RECONCILIATION REGISTER – COUNCIL AGENDA PACKET OCT. 15, 2019)................. C6
EXHIBIT C7 (INFORMED DELIVERY EMAIL FROM USPS W/ LION’S ROAR – DECEMBER 16, 2019) .............. C7
EXHIBIT C8 (CITIZEN EMAIL TO KELLY KUENSTLER – LION’S ROAR QS – DECEMBER 5, 2019) .................... C8
EXHIBIT C9 (KELLY KUENSTLER RESPONSE TO CITIZEN – DECEMBER 10, 2019) ........................................ C9
EXHIBIT C10 (KELLY KUENSTLER EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS – 2015, 2017)........................................... C10
EXHIBIT C11 (KELLY KUENSTLER NEW EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT – OCTOBER 16, 2019) .......................... C11
EXHIBIT C12 (KELLY KUENSTLER EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT FINANCIAL IMPACT ANALYSIS)................... C12
EXHIBIT C13 (SCOTT HUDDLESTON, BIO, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS) ............................................... C13
EXHIBIT C14 (EMAIL FROM SCOTT HUDDLESTON TO KELLY KUENSTLER) .............................................. C14
EXHIBIT C15 (LEON VALLEY CITY COUNCIL MEETING MINUTES – FEBRUARY 21, 2017) ........................ C15
SECTION D ...............................................................................................................................................
EXHIBIT D1 (CATHERINE RODRIGUEZ EMAIL COMPLAINT TO KELLY KUENSTLER) ..................................... D1
EXHIBIT D2 (KELLY KUENSTLER RESPONSE TO CATHERINE RODRIGUEZ).................................................... D2
EXHIBIT D3 (RYAN HENRY’S RETAINING AGREEMENT – DECEMBER 18, 2018)............................................ D3
EXHIBIT D4 (KELLY KUENSTLER COMPLAINT AGAINST BENNY MARTINEZ – APRIL 16, 2019) ............... … D4
EXHIBIT D5 (BENNY MARTINEZ – 2019 REVISED COMPLAINT) .................................................................... D5
EXHIBIT D6 (BRANDON MELLAND - PERSONNEL FILE) ............................................................................ D6
EXHIBIT D7 (CAMBRIDGE ENGLISH DICTIONARY) .................................................................................... D7
EXHIBIT D8 (COUNCILOR WILL BRADSHAW’S SUBMISSION TO LION’S ROAR – JANUARY 3, 2020) ................ D8
EXHIBIT D9 (RECALL PETITION – MONICA ALCOCER) ................................................................................. D9
EXHIBIT D10 (CITY COUNCIL MEETING AGENDA – OCTOBER 15, 2019) ................................................. D10
EXHIBIT D11 (TEXAS COMPTROLLER – POLICY PROHIBITING FRAUD, THEFT, WASTE, OR ABUSE) ............. D11
EXHIBIT D12 (TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT) ............................................. D12
EXHIBIT D13 (NINA NIXON-MENDEZ RESIGNATION LETTER – FEBRUARY 12, 2018) .............................. D13
EXHIBIT D14 (EMAIL TO KELLY KUENSTLER FROM CATHERINE RODRIGUEZ – DEC 18, 2018) ................ D14
EXHIBIT D15 (KELLY KUENSTLER EMAIL TO MAYOR RILEY AND MARTINEZ – DEC 19, 2018) ................ D15
EXHIBIT D16 (EMAIL – BRANDON MELLAND GRIEVANCE) ..................................................................... D16
EXHIBIT D17 (SALVAGGIO EMAIL TO MAYOR RILEY AND KELLY KUENSTLER – DEC 20, 2018) ............... D17
EXHIBIT D18 (EMAIL EXCHANGE – ROXANN COTRONEO) ....................................................................... D18
EXHIBIT D19 (YVONNE ACUNA COMPLAINT – DECEMBER 2, 2019) ........................................................ D19
EXHIBIT D20 (EMAIL OF OFFICER BRETON AND AZAR COMPLAINTS – JANUARY 2, 2019) ....................... D20
EXHIBIT D21 (LETTER FROM DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE TO LV – MAY 14, 2018) ............................ D21
EXHIBIT D22 (RYAN HENRY’S FACTUAL REPORT – MARCH 15, 2019) .................................................... D22
EXHIBIT D23 (CHECK RECONCILIATION REGISTER – COUNCIL AGENDA PACKET NOV. 19, 2019) ........... D23
 Exhibit A1
Leon Valley City Charter
 Exhibit A2
City of Leon Valley Code of
Ordinances – Section 2019-10
Ethics
 Exhibit A3
Texas Penal Code Chapter 36
Bribery and Corrupt Influence
 PENAL CODE CHAPTER 36. BRIBERY AND CORRUPT INFLUENCE

PENAL CODE

TITLE 8. OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

CHAPTER 36. BRIBERY AND CORRUPT INFLUENCE

Sec. 36.01. DEFINITIONS. In this chapter:

(1) "Custody" means:
(A) detained or under arrest by a peace officer; or
(B) under restraint by a public servant pursuant to an order of a
court.
(2) "Party official" means a person who holds any position or office in a
political party, whether by election, appointment, or employment.
(3) "Benefit" means anything reasonably regarded as pecuniary gain or
pecuniary advantage, including benefit to any other person in whose welfare the
beneficiary has a direct and substantial interest.
(4) "Vote" means to cast a ballot in an election regulated by law.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts
1975, 64th Leg., p. 915, ch. 342, Sec. 11, eff. Sept. 1, 1975; Acts 1983, 68th Leg.,
p. 3237, ch. 558, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1983; Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 67, Sec. 2,
eff. Sept. 1, 1989; Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch. 304, Sec. 4.01, eff. Jan. 1, 1992;
Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch. 565, Sec. 3, eff. Sept. 1, 1991; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch.
900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 36.02. BRIBERY. (a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or

knowingly offers, confers, or agrees to confer on another, or solicits, accepts, or
agrees to accept from another:
(1) any benefit as consideration for the recipient's decision, opinion,
recommendation, vote, or other exercise of discretion as a public servant, party
official, or voter;
(2) any benefit as consideration for the recipient's decision, vote,
recommendation, or other exercise of official discretion in a judicial or
administrative proceeding;
(3) any benefit as consideration for a violation of a duty imposed by law
on a public servant or party official; or
(4) any benefit that is a political contribution as defined by Title 15,
Election Code, or that is an expenditure made and reported in accordance with Chapter
305, Government Code, if the benefit was offered, conferred, solicited, accepted, or
agreed to pursuant to an express agreement to take or withhold a specific exercise of
official discretion if such exercise of official discretion would not have been taken
or withheld but for the benefit; notwithstanding any rule of evidence or jury
instruction allowing factual inferences in the absence of certain evidence, direct
evidence of the express agreement shall be required in any prosecution under this
subdivision.

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 PENAL CODE CHAPTER 36. BRIBERY AND CORRUPT INFLUENCE

(b) It is no defense to prosecution under this section that a person whom the
actor sought to influence was not qualified to act in the desired way whether because
he had not yet assumed office or he lacked jurisdiction or for any other reason.
(c) It is no defense to prosecution under this section that the benefit is not
offered or conferred or that the benefit is not solicited or accepted until after:
(1) the decision, opinion, recommendation, vote, or other exercise of
discretion has occurred; or
(2) the public servant ceases to be a public servant.
(d) It is an exception to the application of Subdivisions (1), (2), and (3) of
Subsection (a) that the benefit is a political contribution as defined by Title 15,
Election Code, or an expenditure made and reported in accordance with Chapter 305,
Government Code.
(e) An offense under this section is a felony of the second degree.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts
1975, 64th Leg., p. 915, ch. 342, Sec. 11, eff. Sept. 1, 1975; Acts 1983, 68th Leg.,
p. 3237, ch. 558, Sec. 2, eff. Sept. 1, 1983; Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch. 304, Sec.
4.02, eff. Jan. 1, 1992; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,
1994.

Sec. 36.03. COERCION OF PUBLIC SERVANT OR VOTER. (a) A person commits an

offense if by means of coercion he:
(1) influences or attempts to influence a public servant in a specific
exercise of his official power or a specific performance of his official duty or
influences or attempts to influence a public servant to violate the public servant's
known legal duty; or
(2) influences or attempts to influence a voter not to vote or to vote in a
particular manner.
(b) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor unless the coercion
is a threat to commit a felony, in which event it is a felony of the third degree.
(c) It is an exception to the application of Subsection (a)(1) of this section
that the person who influences or attempts to influence the public servant is a
member of the governing body of a governmental entity, and that the action that
influences or attempts to influence the public servant is an official action taken by
the member of the governing body. For the purposes of this subsection, the term
"official action" includes deliberations by the governing body of a governmental
entity.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts
1989, 71st Leg., ch. 67, Sec. 1, 3, eff. Sept. 1, 1989; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch.
900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 36.04. IMPROPER INFLUENCE. (a) A person commits an offense if he

privately addresses a representation, entreaty, argument, or other communication to
any public servant who exercises or will exercise official discretion in an

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 PENAL CODE CHAPTER 36. BRIBERY AND CORRUPT INFLUENCE

adjudicatory proceeding with an intent to influence the outcome of the proceeding on

the basis of considerations other than those authorized by law.
(b) For purposes of this section, "adjudicatory proceeding" means any
proceeding before a court or any other agency of government in which the legal
rights, powers, duties, or privileges of specified parties are determined.
(c) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts
1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 36.05. TAMPERING WITH WITNESS. (a) A person commits an offense if, with
intent to influence the witness, he offers, confers, or agrees to confer any benefit
on a witness or prospective witness in an official proceeding, or he coerces a
witness or a prospective witness in an official proceeding:
(1) to testify falsely;
(2) to withhold any testimony, information, document, or thing;
(3) to elude legal process summoning him to testify or supply evidence;
(4) to absent himself from an official proceeding to which he has been
legally summoned; or
(5) to abstain from, discontinue, or delay the prosecution of another.
(b) A witness or prospective witness in an official proceeding commits an
offense if he knowingly solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit on the
representation or understanding that he will do any of the things specified in
Subsection (a).
(c) It is a defense to prosecution under Subsection (a)(5) that the benefit
received was:
(1) reasonable restitution for damages suffered by the complaining witness
as a result of the offense; and
(2) a result of an agreement negotiated with the assistance or acquiescence
of an attorney for the state who represented the state in the case.
(d) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree, except that
if the official proceeding is part of the prosecution of a criminal case, an offense
under this section is the same category of offense as the most serious offense
charged in that criminal case.
(e) Notwithstanding Subsection (d), if the most serious offense charged is a
capital felony, an offense under this section is a felony of the first degree.
(e-1) Notwithstanding Subsection (d), if the underlying official proceeding
involves family violence, as defined by Section 71.004, Family Code, an offense under
this section is the greater of:
(1) a felony of the third degree; or
(2) the most serious offense charged in the criminal case.
(e-2) Notwithstanding Subsections (d) and (e-1), if the underlying official
proceeding involves family violence, as defined by Section 71.004, Family Code, and
it is shown at the trial of the offense that the defendant has previously been
convicted of an offense involving family violence under the laws of this state or
another state, an offense under this section is the greater of:

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(1) a felony of the second degree; or

(2) the most serious offense charged in the criminal case.
(e-3) For purposes of Subsection (a), a person is considered to coerce a
witness or prospective witness if the person commits an act of family violence as
defined by Section 71.004, Family Code, that is perpetrated, in part, with the intent
to cause the witness's or prospective witness's unavailability or failure to comply
and the offense is punishable under Subsection (e-1) or (e-2), as applicable.
(f) If conduct that constitutes an offense under this section also constitutes
an offense under any other law, the actor may be prosecuted under this section, the
other law, or both.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts
1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994; Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch.
721, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1997.
Amended by:
Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 770 (H.B. 1856), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2011.
Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 165 (S.B. 1360), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2013.
Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 165 (S.B. 1360), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2013.

Sec. 36.06. OBSTRUCTION OR RETALIATION. (a) A person commits an offense if

the person intentionally or knowingly harms or threatens to harm another by an
unlawful act:
(1) in retaliation for or on account of the service or status of another as
a:
(A) public servant, witness, prospective witness, or informant; or
(B) person who has reported or who the actor knows intends to report
the occurrence of a crime; or
(2) to prevent or delay the service of another as a:
(A) public servant, witness, prospective witness, or informant; or
(B) person who has reported or who the actor knows intends to report
the occurrence of a crime.
(a-1) A person commits an offense if the person posts on a publicly accessible
website the residence address or telephone number of an individual the actor knows is
a public servant or a member of a public servant's family or household with the
intent to cause harm or a threat of harm to the individual or a member of the
individual's family or household in retaliation for or on account of the service or
status of the individual as a public servant.
(b) In this section:
(1) "Honorably retired peace officer" means a peace officer who:
(A) did not retire in lieu of any disciplinary action;
(B) was eligible to retire from a law enforcement agency or was
ineligible to retire only as a result of an injury received in the course of the
officer's employment with the agency; and
(C) is entitled to receive a pension or annuity for service as a law
enforcement officer or is not entitled to receive a pension or annuity only because

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the law enforcement agency that employed the officer does not offer a pension or
annuity to its employees.
(2) "Informant" means a person who has communicated information to the
government in connection with any governmental function.
(3) "Public servant" has the meaning assigned by Section 1.07, except that
the term also includes an honorably retired peace officer.
(c) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree, except that
the offense is a felony of the second degree if:
(1) the victim of the offense was harmed or threatened because of the
victim's service or status as a juror; or
(2) the actor's conduct is described by Subsection (a-1) and results in the
bodily injury of a public servant or a member of a public servant's family or
household.
(d) For purposes of Subsection (a-1), it is prima facie evidence of the intent
to cause harm or a threat of harm to an individual the person knows is a public
servant or a member of a public servant's family or household if the actor:
(1) receives a written demand from the individual to not disclose the
address or telephone number for reasons of safety; and
(2) either:
(A) fails to remove the address or telephone number from the publicly
accessible website within a period of 48 hours after receiving the demand; or
(B) reposts the address or telephone number on the same or a different
publicly accessible website, or makes the information publicly available through
another medium, within a period of four years after receiving the demand, regardless
of whether the individual is no longer a public servant.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts
1983, 68th Leg., p. 3238, ch. 558, Sec. 4, eff. Sept. 1, 1983; Acts 1989, 71st Leg.,
ch. 557, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1989; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff.
Sept. 1, 1994; Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 239, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1997; Acts
2001, 77th Leg., ch. 835, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2001; Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 246,
Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2003.
Amended by:
Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 848 (S.B. 923), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2015.

Sec. 36.07. ACCEPTANCE OF HONORARIUM. (a) A public servant commits an offense

if the public servant solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept an honorarium in
consideration for services that the public servant would not have been requested to
provide but for the public servant's official position or duties.
(b) This section does not prohibit a public servant from accepting
transportation and lodging expenses in connection with a conference or similar event
in which the public servant renders services, such as addressing an audience or
engaging in a seminar, to the extent that those services are more than merely
perfunctory, or from accepting meals in connection with such an event.
(b-1) Transportation, lodging, and meals described by Subsection (b) are not
political contributions as defined by Title 15, Election Code.

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 PENAL CODE CHAPTER 36. BRIBERY AND CORRUPT INFLUENCE

(c) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

Added by Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch. 304, Sec. 4.03, eff. Jan. 1, 1992. Amended by
Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.
Amended by:
Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 56 (S.B. 1269), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2011.

Sec. 36.08. GIFT TO PUBLIC SERVANT BY PERSON SUBJECT TO HIS JURISDICTION. (a)
A public servant in an agency performing regulatory functions or conducting
inspections or investigations commits an offense if he solicits, accepts, or agrees
to accept any benefit from a person the public servant knows to be subject to
regulation, inspection, or investigation by the public servant or his agency.
(b) A public servant in an agency having custody of prisoners commits an
offense if he solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit from a person the
public servant knows to be in his custody or the custody of his agency.
(c) A public servant in an agency carrying on civil or criminal litigation on
behalf of government commits an offense if he solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept
any benefit from a person against whom the public servant knows litigation is pending
or contemplated by the public servant or his agency.
(d) A public servant who exercises discretion in connection with contracts,
purchases, payments, claims, or other pecuniary transactions of government commits an
offense if he solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit from a person the
public servant knows is interested in or likely to become interested in any contract,
purchase, payment, claim, or transaction involving the exercise of his discretion.
(e) A public servant who has judicial or administrative authority, who is
employed by or in a tribunal having judicial or administrative authority, or who
participates in the enforcement of the tribunal's decision, commits an offense if he
solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit from a person the public servant
knows is interested in or likely to become interested in any matter before the public
servant or tribunal.
(f) A member of the legislature, the governor, the lieutenant governor, or a
person employed by a member of the legislature, the governor, the lieutenant
governor, or an agency of the legislature commits an offense if he solicits, accepts,
or agrees to accept any benefit from any person.
(g) A public servant who is a hearing examiner employed by an agency performing
regulatory functions and who conducts hearings in contested cases commits an offense
if the public servant solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit from any
person who is appearing before the agency in a contested case, who is doing business
with the agency, or who the public servant knows is interested in any matter before
the public servant. The exception provided by Sec. 36.10(b) does not apply to a
benefit under this subsection.
(h) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
(i) A public servant who receives an unsolicited benefit that the public
servant is prohibited from accepting under this section may donate the benefit to a
governmental entity that has the authority to accept the gift or may donate the

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 PENAL CODE CHAPTER 36. BRIBERY AND CORRUPT INFLUENCE

benefit to a recognized tax-exempt charitable organization formed for educational,

religious, or scientific purposes.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts
1975, 64th Leg., p. 915, ch. 342, Sec. 11, eff. Sept. 1, 1975; Acts 1983, 68th Leg.,
p. 3238, ch. 558, Sec. 5, eff. Sept. 1, 1983; Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch. 304, Sec.
4.04, eff. Jan. 1, 1992; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,
1994.

Sec. 36.09. OFFERING GIFT TO PUBLIC SERVANT. (a) A person commits an offense
if he offers, confers, or agrees to confer any benefit on a public servant that he
knows the public servant is prohibited by law from accepting.
(b) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts
1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 36.10. NON-APPLICABLE. (a) Sections 36.08 (Gift to Public Servant) and
36.09 (Offering Gift to Public Servant) do not apply to:
(1) a fee prescribed by law to be received by a public servant or any other
benefit to which the public servant is lawfully entitled or for which he gives
legitimate consideration in a capacity other than as a public servant;
(2) a gift or other benefit conferred on account of kinship or a personal,
professional, or business relationship independent of the official status of the
recipient;
(3) a benefit to a public servant required to file a statement under
Chapter 572, Government Code, or a report under Title 15, Election Code, that is
derived from a function in honor or appreciation of the recipient if:
(A) the benefit and the source of any benefit in excess of $50 is
reported in the statement; and
(B) the benefit is used solely to defray the expenses that accrue in
the performance of duties or activities in connection with the office which are
nonreimbursable by the state or political subdivision;
(4) a political contribution as defined by Title 15, Election Code;
(5) a gift, award, or memento to a member of the legislative or executive
branch that is required to be reported under Chapter 305, Government Code;
(6) an item with a value of less than $50, excluding cash or a negotiable
instrument as described by Section 3.104, Business & Commerce Code;
(7) an item issued by a governmental entity that allows the use of property
or facilities owned, leased, or operated by the governmental entity;
(8) transportation, lodging, and meals described by Section 36.07(b); or
(9) complimentary legal advice or legal services relating to a will, power
of attorney, advance directive, or other estate planning document rendered:
(A) to a public servant who is a first responder; and
(B) through a program or clinic that is:

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(i) operated by a local bar association or the State Bar of Texas;

and
(ii) approved by the head of the agency employing the public
servant, if the public servant is employed by an agency.
(b) Section 36.08 (Gift to Public Servant) does not apply to food, lodging,
transportation, or entertainment accepted as a guest and, if the donee is required by
law to report those items, reported by the donee in accordance with that law.
(c) Section 36.09 (Offering Gift to Public Servant) does not apply to food,
lodging, transportation, or entertainment accepted as a guest and, if the donor is
required by law to report those items, reported by the donor in accordance with that
law.
(d) Section 36.08 (Gift to Public Servant) does not apply to a gratuity
accepted and reported in accordance with Section 11.0262, Parks and Wildlife Code.
Section 36.09 (Offering Gift to Public Servant) does not apply to a gratuity that is
offered in accordance with Section 11.0262, Parks and Wildlife Code.
(e) In this section, "first responder" means:
(1) a peace officer whose duties include responding rapidly to an
emergency;
(2) fire protection personnel, as that term is defined by Section 419.021,
Government Code;
(3) a volunteer firefighter who performs firefighting duties on behalf of a
political subdivision and who is not serving as a member of the Texas Legislature or
holding a statewide elected office;
(4) an ambulance driver; or
(5) an individual certified as emergency medical services personnel by the
Department of State Health Services.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts
1975, 64th Leg., p. 915, ch. 342, Sec. 11, eff. Sept. 1, 1975; Acts 1981, 67th Leg.,
p. 2707, ch. 738, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1982; Acts 1983, 68th Leg., p. 3240, ch. 558,
Sec. 6, eff. Sept. 1, 1983; Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 472, Sec. 60, eff. Sept. 1,
1987; Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch. 304, Sec. 4.05, eff. Jan. 1, 1992; Acts 1993, 73rd
Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994; Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 76, Sec.
5.95(38), eff. Sept. 1, 1995.
Amended by:
Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch. 639 (H.B. 2685), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2005.
Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 56 (S.B. 1269), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2011.
Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1149 (S.B. 148), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2013.

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 Exhibit A4
Texas Penal Code Chapter 37
Perjury and Other Falsification
 PENAL CODE CHAPTER 37. PERJURY AND OTHER FALSIFICATION

PENAL CODE

TITLE 8. OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

CHAPTER 37. PERJURY AND OTHER FALSIFICATION

Sec. 37.01. DEFINITIONS. In this chapter:

(1) "Court record" means a decree, judgment, order, subpoena, warrant,
minutes, or other document issued by a court of:
(A) this state;
(B) another state;
(C) the United States;
(D) a foreign country recognized by an act of congress or a treaty or
other international convention to which the United States is a party;
(E) an Indian tribe recognized by the United States; or
(F) any other jurisdiction, territory, or protectorate entitled to full
faith and credit in this state under the United States Constitution.
(2) "Governmental record" means:
(A) anything belonging to, received by, or kept by government for
information, including a court record;
(B) anything required by law to be kept by others for information of
government;
(C) a license, certificate, permit, seal, title, letter of patent, or
similar document issued by government, by another state, or by the United States;
(D) a standard proof of motor vehicle liability insurance form
described by Section 601.081, Transportation Code, a certificate of an insurance
company described by Section 601.083 of that code, a document purporting to be such a
form or certificate that is not issued by an insurer authorized to write motor
vehicle liability insurance in this state, an electronic submission in a form
described by Section 502.046(i), Transportation Code, or an evidence of financial
responsibility described by Section 601.053 of that code;
(E) an official ballot or other election record; or
(F) the written documentation a mobile food unit is required to obtain
under Section 437.0074, Health and Safety Code.
(3) "Statement" means any representation of fact.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts
1991, 72nd Leg., ch. 113, Sec. 3, eff. Sept. 1, 1991; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900,
Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994; Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 189, Sec. 5, eff. May 21,
1997; Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 823, Sec. 3, eff. Sept. 1, 1997; Acts 1999, 76th
Leg., ch. 659, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1999; Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 393, Sec. 21,
eff. Sept. 1, 2003.
Amended by:
Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1276 (H.B. 3672), Sec. 2, eff. September 1,
2007.

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 PENAL CODE CHAPTER 37. PERJURY AND OTHER FALSIFICATION

Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 161 (S.B. 1093), Sec. 16.004, eff. September 1,
2013.

Sec. 37.02. PERJURY. (a) A person commits an offense if, with intent to
deceive and with knowledge of the statement's meaning:
(1) he makes a false statement under oath or swears to the truth of a false
statement previously made and the statement is required or authorized by law to be
made under oath; or
(2) he makes a false unsworn declaration under Chapter 132, Civil Practice
and Remedies Code.
(b) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts
1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 37.03. AGGRAVATED PERJURY. (a) A person commits an offense if he commits

perjury as defined in Section 37.02, and the false statement:
(1) is made during or in connection with an official proceeding; and
(2) is material.
(b) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts
1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 37.04. MATERIALITY. (a) A statement is material, regardless of the

admissibility of the statement under the rules of evidence, if it could have affected
the course or outcome of the official proceeding.
(b) It is no defense to prosecution under Section 37.03 (Aggravated Perjury)
that the declarant mistakenly believed the statement to be immaterial.
(c) Whether a statement is material in a given factual situation is a question
of law.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts
1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 37.05. RETRACTION. It is a defense to prosecution under Section 37.03

(Aggravated Perjury) that the actor retracted his false statement:
(1) before completion of the testimony at the official proceeding; and
(2) before it became manifest that the falsity of the statement would be
exposed.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts
1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 37.06. INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS. An information or indictment for perjury

under Section 37.02 or aggravated perjury under Section 37.03 that alleges that the

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 PENAL CODE CHAPTER 37. PERJURY AND OTHER FALSIFICATION

declarant has made statements under oath, both of which cannot be true, need not
allege which statement is false. At the trial the prosecution need not prove which
statement is false.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts
1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 37.07. IRREGULARITIES NO DEFENSE. (a) It is no defense to prosecution

under Section 37.02 (Perjury) or 37.03 (Aggravated Perjury) that the oath was
administered or taken in an irregular manner, or that there was some irregularity in
the appointment or qualification of the person who administered the oath.
(b) It is no defense to prosecution under Section 37.02 (Perjury) or 37.03
(Aggravated Perjury) that a document was not sworn to if the document contains a
recital that it was made under oath, the declarant was aware of the recital when he
signed the document, and the document contains the signed jurat of a public servant
authorized to administer oaths.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts
1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 37.08. FALSE REPORT TO PEACE OFFICER, FEDERAL SPECIAL INVESTIGATOR, LAW
ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEE, CORRECTIONS OFFICER, OR JAILER. (a) A person commits an
offense if, with intent to deceive, he knowingly makes a false statement that is
material to a criminal investigation and makes the statement to:
(1) a peace officer or federal special investigator conducting the
investigation;
(2) any employee of a law enforcement agency that is authorized by the
agency to conduct the investigation and that the actor knows is conducting the
investigation; or
(3) a corrections officer or jailer.
(b) In this section, "law enforcement agency" has the meaning assigned by
Article 59.01, Code of Criminal Procedure.
(c) An offense under this section is a Class B misdemeanor.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts
1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994; Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch.
925, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1997.
Amended by:
Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 839 (H.B. 3423), Sec. 3, eff. September 1, 2011.
Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 513 (S.B. 405), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2019.
Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 513 (S.B. 405), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2019.

Sec. 37.081. FALSE REPORT REGARDING MISSING CHILD OR MISSING PERSON. (a) A
person commits an offense if, with intent to deceive, the person knowingly:
(1) files a false report of a missing child or missing person with a law
enforcement officer or agency; or

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 PENAL CODE CHAPTER 37. PERJURY AND OTHER FALSIFICATION

(2) makes a false statement to a law enforcement officer or other employee

of a law enforcement agency relating to a missing child or missing person.
(b) An offense under this section is a Class C misdemeanor.

Added by Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 200, Sec. 3, eff. Sept. 1, 1999.

Sec. 37.082. MISREPRESENTING CHILD AS FAMILY MEMBER AT PORT OF ENTRY. (a) In

this section:
(1) "Child" means a person younger than 18 years of age.
(2) "Family member" means a person who is related to another person by
consanguinity or affinity.
(3) "Port of entry" means a place designated by executive order of the
president of the United States, by order of the United States secretary of the
treasury, or by act of the United States Congress at which a customs officer is
authorized to enforce customs laws.
(b) A person commits an offense if the person, with intent to commit an offense
under Section 20A.02, knowingly misrepresents a child as a family member of the
person to a peace officer or federal special investigator at a port of entry.
(c) An offense under this section is a Class B misdemeanor.
(d) If conduct that constitutes an offense under this section also constitutes
an offense under another law, the actor may be prosecuted under this section, the
other law, or both.

Added by Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1277 (H.B. 888), Sec. 1, eff. September 1,
2019.

Sec. 37.09. TAMPERING WITH OR FABRICATING PHYSICAL EVIDENCE. (a) A person

commits an offense if, knowing that an investigation or official proceeding is
pending or in progress, he:
(1) alters, destroys, or conceals any record, document, or thing with
intent to impair its verity, legibility, or availability as evidence in the
investigation or official proceeding; or
(2) makes, presents, or uses any record, document, or thing with knowledge
of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the investigation
or official proceeding.
(b) This section shall not apply if the record, document, or thing concealed is
privileged or is the work product of the parties to the investigation or official
proceeding.
(c) An offense under Subsection (a) or Subsection (d)(1) is a felony of the
third degree, unless the thing altered, destroyed, or concealed is a human corpse, in
which case the offense is a felony of the second degree. An offense under Subsection
(d)(2) is a Class A misdemeanor.
(c-1) It is a defense to prosecution under Subsection (a) or (d)(1) that the
record, document, or thing was visual material prohibited under Section 43.261 that
was destroyed as described by Subsection (f)(3)(B) of that section.
(d) A person commits an offense if the person:

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(1) knowing that an offense has been committed, alters, destroys, or

conceals any record, document, or thing with intent to impair its verity, legibility,
or availability as evidence in any subsequent investigation of or official proceeding
related to the offense; or
(2) observes a human corpse under circumstances in which a reasonable
person would believe that an offense had been committed, knows or reasonably should
know that a law enforcement agency is not aware of the existence of or location of
the corpse, and fails to report the existence of and location of the corpse to a law
enforcement agency.
(e) In this section, "human corpse" has the meaning assigned by Section 42.08.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts
1991, 72nd Leg., ch. 565, Sec. 4, eff. Sept. 1, 1991; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900,
Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994; Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 1284, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1,
1997.
Amended by:
Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 287 (H.B. 872), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2007.
Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1322 (S.B. 407), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2011.

Sec. 37.10. TAMPERING WITH GOVERNMENTAL RECORD. (a) A person commits an

offense if he:
(1) knowingly makes a false entry in, or false alteration of, a
governmental record;
(2) makes, presents, or uses any record, document, or thing with knowledge
of its falsity and with intent that it be taken as a genuine governmental record;
(3) intentionally destroys, conceals, removes, or otherwise impairs the
verity, legibility, or availability of a governmental record;
(4) possesses, sells, or offers to sell a governmental record or a blank
governmental record form with intent that it be used unlawfully;
(5) makes, presents, or uses a governmental record with knowledge of its
falsity; or
(6) possesses, sells, or offers to sell a governmental record or a blank
governmental record form with knowledge that it was obtained unlawfully.
(b) It is an exception to the application of Subsection (a)(3) that the
governmental record is destroyed pursuant to legal authorization or transferred under
Section 441.204, Government Code. With regard to the destruction of a local
government record, legal authorization includes compliance with the provisions of
Subtitle C, Title 6, Local Government Code.
(c)(1) Except as provided by Subdivisions (2), (3), and (4) and by Subsection
(d), an offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor unless the actor's intent
is to defraud or harm another, in which event the offense is a state jail felony.
(2) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree if it is
shown on the trial of the offense that the governmental record was:
(A) a public school record, report, or assessment instrument required
under Chapter 39, Education Code, data reported for a school district or open-
enrollment charter school to the Texas Education Agency through the Public Education

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Information Management System (PEIMS) described by Sections 48.008 and 48.009,

Education Code, under a law or rule requiring that reporting, or a license,
certificate, permit, seal, title, letter of patent, or similar document issued by
government, by another state, or by the United States, unless the actor's intent is
to defraud or harm another, in which event the offense is a felony of the second
degree;
(B) a written report of a medical, chemical, toxicological, ballistic,
or other expert examination or test performed on physical evidence for the purpose of
determining the connection or relevance of the evidence to a criminal action;
(C) a written report of the certification, inspection, or maintenance
record of an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, or other similar device used
in the course of an examination or test performed on physical evidence for the
purpose of determining the connection or relevance of the evidence to a criminal
action; or
(D) a search warrant issued by a magistrate.
(3) An offense under this section is a Class C misdemeanor if it is shown
on the trial of the offense that the governmental record is a governmental record
that is required for enrollment of a student in a school district and was used by the
actor to establish the residency of the student.
(4) An offense under this section is a Class B misdemeanor if it is shown
on the trial of the offense that the governmental record is a written appraisal filed
with an appraisal review board under Section 41.43(a-1), Tax Code, that was performed
by a person who had a contingency interest in the outcome of the appraisal review
board hearing.
(d) An offense under this section, if it is shown on the trial of the offense
that the governmental record is described by Section 37.01(2)(D), is:
(1) a Class B misdemeanor if the offense is committed under Subsection (a)
(2) or Subsection (a)(5) and the defendant is convicted of presenting or using the
record;
(2) a felony of the third degree if the offense is committed under:
(A) Subsection (a)(1), (3), (4), or (6); or
(B) Subsection (a)(2) or (5) and the defendant is convicted of making
the record; and
(3) a felony of the second degree, notwithstanding Subdivisions (1) and
(2), if the actor's intent in committing the offense was to defraud or harm another.
(e) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution for possession under Subsection
(a)(6) that the possession occurred in the actual discharge of official duties as a
public servant.
(f) It is a defense to prosecution under Subsection (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(5)
that the false entry or false information could have no effect on the government's
purpose for requiring the governmental record.
(g) A person is presumed to intend to defraud or harm another if the person
acts with respect to two or more of the same type of governmental records or blank
governmental record forms and if each governmental record or blank governmental
record form is a license, certificate, permit, seal, title, or similar document
issued by government.

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(h) If conduct that constitutes an offense under this section also constitutes
an offense under Section 32.48 or 37.13, the actor may be prosecuted under any of
those sections.
(i) With the consent of the appropriate local county or district attorney, the
attorney general has concurrent jurisdiction with that consenting local prosecutor to
prosecute an offense under this section that involves the state Medicaid program.
(j) It is not a defense to prosecution under Subsection (a)(2) that the record,
document, or thing made, presented, or used displays or contains the statement "NOT A
GOVERNMENT DOCUMENT" or another substantially similar statement intended to alert a
person to the falsity of the record, document, or thing, unless the record, document,
or thing displays the statement diagonally printed clearly and indelibly on both the
front and back of the record, document, or thing in solid red capital letters at
least one-fourth inch in height.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts
1989, 71st Leg., ch. 1248, Sec. 66, eff. Sept. 1, 1989; Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch.
113, Sec. 4, eff. Sept. 1, 1991; Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch. 565, Sec. 5, eff. Sept.
1, 1991; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994; Acts 1997,
75th Leg., ch. 189, Sec. 6, eff. May 21, 1997; Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 823, Sec.
4, eff. Sept. 1, 1997; Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 659, Sec. 2, eff. Sept. 1, 1999;
Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 718, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1999; Acts 2001, 77th Leg.,
ch. 771, Sec. 3, eff. June 13, 2001; Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 198, Sec. 2.139, eff.
Sept. 1, 2003; Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 257, Sec. 16, eff. Sept. 1, 2003.
Amended by:
Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch. 1364 (H.B. 126), Sec. 1, eff. June 18, 2005.
Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1085 (H.B. 3024), Sec. 2, eff. September 1,
2007.
Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 73 (H.B. 1813), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2009.
Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 1130 (H.B. 2086), Sec. 31, eff. September 1,
2009.
Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 510 (S.B. 124), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2013.
Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 690 (H.B. 644), Sec. 3, eff. September 1, 2015.
Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 943 (H.B. 3), Sec. 3.087, eff. September 1,
2019.

Sec. 37.101. FRAUDULENT FILING OF FINANCING STATEMENT. (a) A person commits

an offense if the person knowingly presents for filing or causes to be presented for
filing a financing statement that the person knows:
(1) is forged;
(2) contains a material false statement; or
(3) is groundless.
(b) An offense under Subsection (a)(1) is a felony of the third degree, unless
it is shown on the trial of the offense that the person had previously been convicted
under this section on two or more occasions, in which event the offense is a felony
of the second degree. An offense under Subsection (a)(2) or (a)(3) is a Class A

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(d) A person commits an offense if the person intentionally or knowingly

misrepresents an object, including a vehicle, as property belonging to a law
enforcement agency. For purposes of this subsection, intentionally or knowingly
misrepresenting an object as property belonging to a law enforcement agency includes
intentionally or knowingly displaying an item bearing an insignia of a law
enforcement agency in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to interpret the
item as property belonging to a law enforcement agency.
(e) An offense under this section is a Class B misdemeanor.

Added by Acts 1983, 68th Leg., p. 5672, ch. 1075, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1983.
Amended by Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 514, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1987; Acts 1993,
73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994; Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1420,
Sec. 14.831, eff. Sept. 1, 2001.
Amended by:
Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 982 (H.B. 683), Sec. 3, eff. September 1, 2017.

Sec. 37.13. RECORD OF A FRAUDULENT COURT. (a) A person commits an offense if

the person makes, presents, or uses any document or other record with:
(1) knowledge that the document or other record is not a record of a court
created under or established by the constitution or laws of this state or of the
United States; and
(2) the intent that the document or other record be given the same legal
effect as a record of a court created under or established by the constitution or
laws of this state or of the United States.
(b) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor, except that the
offense is a felony of the third degree if it is shown on the trial of the offense
that the defendant has previously been convicted under this section on two or more
occasions.
(c) If conduct that constitutes an offense under this section also constitutes
an offense under Section 32.48 or 37.10, the actor may be prosecuted under any of
those sections.

Added by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 189, Sec. 8, eff. May 21, 1997.

Sec. 37.14. FALSE STATEMENT REGARDING CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATION MADE IN

FOREIGN COUNTRY. (a) For purposes of this section, "child custody determination"
has the meaning assigned by Section 152.102, Family Code.
(b) A person commits an offense if the person knowingly makes or causes to be
made a false statement relating to a child custody determination made in a foreign
country during a hearing held under Chapter 152 or Subchapter I, Chapter 153, Family
Code.
(c) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree.

Added by Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 92 (S.B. 1490), Sec. 3, eff. September 1,
2011.

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 Exhibit A5
Texas Penal Code Chapter 39
Abuse of Office
 PENAL CODE CHAPTER 39. ABUSE OF OFFICE

PENAL CODE

TITLE 8. OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

CHAPTER 39. ABUSE OF OFFICE

Sec. 39.01. DEFINITIONS. In this chapter:

(1) "Law relating to a public servant's office or employment" means a law
that specifically applies to a person acting in the capacity of a public servant and
that directly or indirectly:
(A) imposes a duty on the public servant; or
(B) governs the conduct of the public servant.
(2) "Misuse" means to deal with property contrary to:
(A) an agreement under which the public servant holds the property;
(B) a contract of employment or oath of office of a public servant;
(C) a law, including provisions of the General Appropriations Act
specifically relating to government property, that prescribes the manner of custody
or disposition of the property; or
(D) a limited purpose for which the property is delivered or received.

Added by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 39.015. CONCURRENT JURISDICTION TO PROSECUTE OFFENSES UNDER THIS CHAPTER.

With the consent of the appropriate local county or district attorney, the attorney
general has concurrent jurisdiction with that consenting local prosecutor to
prosecute an offense under this chapter.

Added by Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 378 (S.B. 563), Sec. 2, eff. June 15, 2007.

Sec. 39.02. ABUSE OF OFFICIAL CAPACITY. (a) A public servant commits an

offense if, with intent to obtain a benefit or with intent to harm or defraud
another, he intentionally or knowingly:
(1) violates a law relating to the public servant's office or employment;
or
(2) misuses government property, services, personnel, or any other thing of
value belonging to the government that has come into the public servant's custody or
possession by virtue of the public servant's office or employment.
(b) An offense under Subsection (a)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor.
(c) An offense under Subsection (a)(2) is:
(1) a Class C misdemeanor if the value of the use of the thing misused is
less than $100;
(2) a Class B misdemeanor if the value of the use of the thing misused is
$100 or more but less than $750;
(3) a Class A misdemeanor if the value of the use of the thing misused is
$750 or more but less than $2,500;

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 PENAL CODE CHAPTER 39. ABUSE OF OFFICE

(4) a state jail felony if the value of the use of the thing misused is
$2,500 or more but less than $30,000;
(5) a felony of the third degree if the value of the use of the thing
misused is $30,000 or more but less than $150,000;
(6) a felony of the second degree if the value of the use of the thing
misused is $150,000 or more but less than $300,000; or
(7) a felony of the first degree if the value of the use of the thing
misused is $300,000 or more.
(d) A discount or award given for travel, such as frequent flyer miles, rental
car or hotel discounts, or food coupons, are not things of value belonging to the
government for purposes of this section due to the administrative difficulty and cost
involved in recapturing the discount or award for a governmental entity.
(e) If separate transactions that violate Subsection (a)(2) are conducted
pursuant to one scheme or continuing course of conduct, the conduct may be considered
as one offense and the value of the use of the things misused in the transactions may
be aggregated in determining the classification of the offense.
(f) The value of the use of a thing of value misused under Subsection (a)(2)
may not exceed:
(1) the fair market value of the thing at the time of the offense; or
(2) if the fair market value of the thing cannot be ascertained, the cost
of replacing the thing within a reasonable time after the offense.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts
1983, 68th Leg., p. 3241, ch. 558, Sec. 7, eff. Sept. 1, 1983. Renumbered from Penal
Code Sec. 39.01 and amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept.
1, 1994.
Amended by:
Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 82 (S.B. 828), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2009.
Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1251 (H.B. 1396), Sec. 28, eff. September 1,
2015.

Sec. 39.03. OFFICIAL OPPRESSION. (a) A public servant acting under color of
his office or employment commits an offense if he:
(1) intentionally subjects another to mistreatment or to arrest, detention,
search, seizure, dispossession, assessment, or lien that he knows is unlawful;
(2) intentionally denies or impedes another in the exercise or enjoyment of
any right, privilege, power, or immunity, knowing his conduct is unlawful; or
(3) intentionally subjects another to sexual harassment.
(b) For purposes of this section, a public servant acts under color of his
office or employment if he acts or purports to act in an official capacity or takes
advantage of such actual or purported capacity.
(c) In this section, "sexual harassment" means unwelcome sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature,
submission to which is made a term or condition of a person's exercise or enjoyment
of any right, privilege, power, or immunity, either explicitly or implicitly.

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 PENAL CODE CHAPTER 39. ABUSE OF OFFICE

(d) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor, except that an

offense is a felony of the third degree if the public servant acted with the intent
to impair the accuracy of data reported to the Texas Education Agency through the
Public Education Information Management System (PEIMS) described by Sections 48.008
and 48.009, Education Code, under a law requiring that reporting.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts
1989, 71st Leg., ch. 1217, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1989; Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch. 16,
Sec. 19.01(34), eff. Aug. 26, 1991. Renumbered from Penal Code Sec. 39.02 by Acts
1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.
Amended by:
Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 510 (S.B. 124), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2013.
Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 943 (H.B. 3), Sec. 3.088, eff. September 1,
2019.

Sec. 39.04. VIOLATIONS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF PERSON IN CUSTODY; IMPROPER

SEXUAL ACTIVITY WITH PERSON IN CUSTODY OR UNDER SUPERVISION. (a) An official of a
correctional facility or juvenile facility, an employee of a correctional facility or
juvenile facility, a person other than an employee who works for compensation at a
correctional facility or juvenile facility, a volunteer at a correctional facility or
juvenile facility, or a peace officer commits an offense if the person intentionally:
(1) denies or impedes a person in custody in the exercise or enjoyment of
any right, privilege, or immunity knowing his conduct is unlawful; or
(2) engages in sexual contact, sexual intercourse, or deviate sexual
intercourse with an individual in custody or, in the case of an individual in the
custody of the Texas Juvenile Justice Department or placed in a juvenile facility,
employs, authorizes, or induces the individual to engage in sexual conduct or a
sexual performance.
(b) An offense under Subsection (a)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor. An offense
under Subsection (a)(2) is a state jail felony, except that an offense under
Subsection (a)(2) is a felony of the second degree if the offense is committed
against:
(1) an individual in the custody of the Texas Juvenile Justice Department
or placed in a juvenile facility; or
(2) a juvenile offender detained in or committed to a correctional
facility.
(c) This section shall not preclude prosecution for any other offense set out
in this code.
(d) The Attorney General of Texas shall have concurrent jurisdiction with law
enforcement agencies to investigate violations of this statute involving serious
bodily injury or death.
(e) In this section:

Text of subdivision as amended by Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 216 (H.B. 511),
Sec. 1

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(1) "Correctional facility" means:

(A) any place described by Section 1.07(a)(14);
(B) any place or facility designated for the detention of a person
suspected of violating a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
Section 1101 et seq.); or
(C) a "secure correctional facility" or "secure detention facility" as
defined by Section 51.02, Family Code.

Text of subdivision as amended by Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1136 (S.B. 183),
Sec. 2

(1) "Correctional facility" means any place described by Section 1.07(a)

(14).
(2) "Custody" means the detention, arrest, or confinement of an adult
offender, the detention of a juvenile offender, or the commitment of a juvenile
offender to a correctional facility or juvenile facility.
(2-a) "Juvenile facility" means:
(A) a facility operated by the Texas Juvenile Justice Department or a
private vendor under a contract with the Texas Juvenile Justice Department; or
(B) a facility for the detention or placement of juveniles under
juvenile court jurisdiction and that is operated wholly or partly by a juvenile board
or another governmental unit or by a private vendor under a contract with the
juvenile board or governmental unit.
(3) "Sexual contact," "sexual intercourse," and "deviate sexual
intercourse" have the meanings assigned by Section 21.01.
(4) "Sexual conduct" and "performance" have the meanings assigned by
Section 43.25.
(5) "Sexual performance" means any performance or part thereof that
includes sexual conduct by an individual.
(f) An employee of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, the Texas Juvenile
Justice Department, a juvenile facility, a local juvenile probation department, or a
community supervision and corrections department established under Chapter 76,
Government Code, a person other than an employee who works for compensation at a
juvenile facility or local juvenile probation department, or a volunteer at a
juvenile facility or local juvenile probation department commits an offense if the
actor engages in sexual contact, sexual intercourse, or deviate sexual intercourse
with an individual who the actor knows is under the supervision of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, Texas Juvenile Justice Department, probation
department, or community supervision and corrections department but not in the
custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Texas Juvenile Justice
Department, probation department, or community supervision and corrections
department.
(g) An offense under Subsection (f) is a state jail felony.

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 PENAL CODE CHAPTER 39. ABUSE OF OFFICE

(h) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under Subsection (f) that the

actor was the spouse of the individual at the time of the offense.

Added by Acts 1979, 66th Leg., p. 1383, ch. 618, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended
by Acts 1983, 68th Leg., p. 3242, ch. 558, Sec. 8, eff. Sept. 1, 1983; Acts 1987,
70th Leg., ch. 18, Sec. 5, eff. April 15, 1987. Renumbered from Penal Code Sec.
39.021 and amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.
Amended by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 1406, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1997; Acts 1999,
76th Leg., ch. 158, Sec. 1 to 3, eff. Sept. 1, 1999; Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1070,
Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2001; Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1297, Sec. 69, eff. Sept. 1,
2001.
Amended by:
Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 263 (S.B. 103), Sec. 62, eff. June 8, 2007.
Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 263 (S.B. 103), Sec. 63, eff. June 8, 2007.
Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 378 (S.B. 563), Sec. 3, eff. June 15, 2007.
Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 908 (H.B. 2884), Sec. 43, eff. September 1,
2007.
Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 87 (S.B. 1969), Sec. 19.003, eff. September 1,
2009.
Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 260 (H.B. 549), Sec. 5, eff. September 1, 2009.
Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 216 (H.B. 511), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2015.
Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 734 (H.B. 1549), Sec. 144, eff. September 1,
2015.
Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 734 (H.B. 1549), Sec. 145, eff. September 1,
2015.
Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1136 (S.B. 183), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2015.
Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1136 (S.B. 183), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2015.
Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 540 (S.B. 343), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2017.
Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 540 (S.B. 343), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2017.
Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 540 (S.B. 343), Sec. 3, eff. September 1, 2017.

Sec. 39.05. FAILURE TO REPORT DEATH OF PRISONER. (a) A person commits an

offense if the person is required to conduct an investigation and file a report by
Article 49.18, Code of Criminal Procedure, and the person fails to investigate the
death, fails to file the report as required, or fails to include in a filed report
facts known or discovered in the investigation.
(b) A person commits an offense if the person is required by Section 501.055,
Government Code, to:
(1) give notice of the death of an inmate and the person fails to give the
notice; or
(2) conduct an investigation and file a report and the person:
(A) fails to conduct the investigation or file the report; or
(B) fails to include in the report facts known to the person or
discovered by the person in the investigation.
(c) An offense under this section is a Class B misdemeanor.

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 PENAL CODE CHAPTER 39. ABUSE OF OFFICE

Added by Acts 1983, 68th Leg., p. 2510, ch. 441, Sec. 2, eff. Sept. 1, 1983.
Renumbered from Penal Code Sec. 39.022 and amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900,
Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Amended by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 321, Sec. 1.104,
eff. Sept. 1, 1995.

Sec. 39.06. MISUSE OF OFFICIAL INFORMATION. (a) A public servant commits an

offense if, in reliance on information to which the public servant has access by
virtue of the person's office or employment and that has not been made public, the
person:
(1) acquires or aids another to acquire a pecuniary interest in any
property, transaction, or enterprise that may be affected by the information;
(2) speculates or aids another to speculate on the basis of the
information; or
(3) as a public servant, including as a school administrator, coerces
another into suppressing or failing to report that information to a law enforcement
agency.
(b) A public servant commits an offense if with intent to obtain a benefit or
with intent to harm or defraud another, he discloses or uses information for a
nongovernmental purpose that:
(1) he has access to by means of his office or employment; and
(2) has not been made public.
(c) A person commits an offense if, with intent to obtain a benefit or with
intent to harm or defraud another, he solicits or receives from a public servant
information that:
(1) the public servant has access to by means of his office or employment;
and
(2) has not been made public.
(d) In this section, "information that has not been made public" means any
information to which the public does not generally have access, and that is
prohibited from disclosure under Chapter 552, Government Code.
(e) Except as provided by Subsection (f), an offense under this section is a
felony of the third degree.
(f) An offense under Subsection (a)(3) is a Class C misdemeanor.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts
1983, 68th Leg., p. 3243, ch. 558, Sec. 9, eff. Sept. 1, 1983; Acts 1987, 70th Leg.,
ch. 30, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1987; Acts 1987, 70th Leg., 2nd C.S., ch. 43, Sec. 3,
eff. Oct. 20, 1987; Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 927, Sec. 1, eff. Aug. 28, 1989.
Renumbered from Penal Code Sec. 39.03 and amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900,
Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Amended by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 76, Sec.
5.95(90), eff. Sept. 1, 1995; Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 76, Sec. 14.52, eff. Sept.
1, 1995.
Amended by:
Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1043 (H.B. 1783), Sec. 5, eff. September 1,
2015.

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 PENAL CODE CHAPTER 39. ABUSE OF OFFICE

Sec. 39.07. FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH IMMIGRATION DETAINER REQUEST. (a) A person
who is a sheriff, chief of police, or constable or a person who otherwise has primary
authority for administering a jail commits an offense if the person:
(1) has custody of a person subject to an immigration detainer request
issued by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and
(2) knowingly fails to comply with the detainer request.
(b) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
(c) It is an exception to the application of this section that the person who
was subject to an immigration detainer request described by Subsection (a)(1) had
provided proof that the person is a citizen of the United States or that the person
has lawful immigration status in the United States, such as a Texas driver's license
or similar government-issued identification.

Added by Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 4 (S.B. 4), Sec. 5.02, eff. September 1,
2017.

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 Exhibit A6
Texas Election Code
Chapter 255
Regulating Political Advertising
 ELECTION CODE CHAPTER 255. REGULATING POLITICAL ADVERTISING AND CAMPAIGN COMMUNICATIONS

ELECTION CODE

TITLE 15. REGULATING POLITICAL FUNDS AND CAMPAIGNS

CHAPTER 255. REGULATING POLITICAL ADVERTISING AND CAMPAIGN COMMUNICATIONS

Sec. 255.001. REQUIRED DISCLOSURE ON POLITICAL ADVERTISING. (a) A person may

not knowingly cause to be published, distributed, or broadcast political advertising
containing express advocacy that does not indicate in the advertising:
(1) that it is political advertising; and
(2) the full name of:
(A) the person who paid for the political advertising;
(B) the political committee authorizing the political advertising; or
(C) the candidate or specific-purpose committee supporting the
candidate, if the political advertising is authorized by the candidate.
(b) Political advertising that is authorized by a candidate, an agent of a
candidate, or a political committee filing reports under this title shall be deemed
to contain express advocacy.
(c) A person may not knowingly use, cause or permit to be used, or continue to
use any published, distributed, or broadcast political advertising containing express
advocacy that the person knows does not include the disclosure required by Subsection
(a). A person is presumed to know that the use of political advertising is
prohibited by this subsection if the commission notifies the person in writing that
the use is prohibited. A person who learns that political advertising signs, as
defined by Section 259.001, that have been distributed do not include the disclosure
required by Subsection (a) or include a disclosure that does not comply with
Subsection (a) does not commit a continuing violation of this subsection if the
person makes a good faith attempt to remove or correct those signs. A person who
learns that printed political advertising other than a political advertising sign
that has been distributed does not include the disclosure required by Subsection (a)
or includes a disclosure that does not comply with Subsection (a) is not required to
attempt to recover the political advertising and does not commit a continuing
violation of this subsection as to any previously distributed political advertising.
(d) This section does not apply to:
(1) tickets or invitations to political fund-raising events;
(2) campaign buttons, pins, hats, or similar campaign materials; or
(3) circulars or flyers that cost in the aggregate less than $500 to
publish and distribute.
(e) A person who violates this section is liable to the state for a civil
penalty in an amount determined by the commission not to exceed $4,000.

Amended by Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 899, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1987; Acts 2003,
78th Leg., ch. 249, Sec. 2.23, eff. Sept. 1, 2003.
Amended by:
Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 824 (H.B. 2554), Sec. 5, eff. September 1, 2019.

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 ELECTION CODE CHAPTER 255. REGULATING POLITICAL ADVERTISING AND CAMPAIGN COMMUNICATIONS

Sec. 255.002. RATES FOR POLITICAL ADVERTISING. (a) The rate charged for
political advertising by a radio or television station may not exceed:
(1) during the 45 days preceding a general or runoff primary election and
during the 60 days preceding a general or special election, the broadcaster's lowest
unit charge for advertising of the same class, for the same time, and for the same
period; or
(2) at any time other than that specified by Subdivision (1), the amount
charged other users for comparable use of the station.
(b) The rate charged for political advertising that is printed or published may
not exceed the lowest charge made for comparable use of the space for any other
purposes.
(c) In determining amounts charged for comparable use, the amount and kind of
space or time used, number of times used, frequency of use, type of advertising copy
submitted, and any other relevant factors shall be considered.
(d) Discounts offered by a newspaper or magazine to its commercial advertisers
shall be offered on equal terms to purchasers of political advertising from the
newspaper or magazine.
(e) A person commits an offense if the person knowingly demands or receives or
knowingly pays or offers to pay for political advertising more consideration than
permitted by this section.
(f) An offense under this section is a Class C misdemeanor.

Amended by Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 899, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1987.

Sec. 255.003. UNLAWFUL USE OF PUBLIC FUNDS FOR POLITICAL ADVERTISING. (a) An
officer or employee of a political subdivision may not knowingly spend or authorize
the spending of public funds for political advertising.
(b) Subsection (a) does not apply to a communication that factually describes
the purposes of a measure if the communication does not advocate passage or defeat of
the measure.
(b-1) An officer or employee of a political subdivision may not spend or
authorize the spending of public funds for a communication describing a measure if
the communication contains information that:
(1) the officer or employee knows is false; and
(2) is sufficiently substantial and important as to be reasonably likely to
influence a voter to vote for or against the measure.
(c) A person who violates Subsection (a) or (b-1) commits an offense. An
offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
(d) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution for an offense under this
section or the imposition of a civil penalty for conduct under this section that an
officer or employee of a political subdivision reasonably relied on a court order or
an interpretation of this section in a written opinion issued by:
(1) a court of record;
(2) the attorney general; or
(3) the commission.

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 ELECTION CODE CHAPTER 255. REGULATING POLITICAL ADVERTISING AND CAMPAIGN COMMUNICATIONS

(e) On written request of the governing body of a political subdivision that

has ordered an election on a measure, the commission shall prepare an advance written
advisory opinion as to whether a particular communication relating to the measure
does or does not comply with this section.
(f) Subsections (d) and (e) do not apply to a port authority or navigation
district.

Amended by Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 899, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1987.
Amended by:
Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 644 (H.B. 1720), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2009.
Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 843 (S.B. 2085), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2009.

Sec. 255.0031. UNLAWFUL USE OF INTERNAL MAIL SYSTEM FOR POLITICAL ADVERTISING.
(a) An officer or employee of a state agency or political subdivision may not
knowingly use or authorize the use of an internal mail system for the distribution of
political advertising.
(b) Subsection (a) does not apply to:
(1) the use of an internal mail system to distribute political advertising
that is delivered to the premises of a state agency or political subdivision through
the United States Postal Service; or
(2) the use of an internal mail system by a state agency or municipality to
distribute political advertising that is the subject of or related to an
investigation, hearing, or other official proceeding of the agency or municipality.
(c) A person who violates this section commits an offense. An offense under
this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
(d) In this section:
(1) "Internal mail system" means a system operated by a state agency or
political subdivision to deliver written documents to officers or employees of the
agency or subdivision.
(2) "State agency" means:
(A) a department, commission, board, office, or other agency that is in
the legislative, executive, or judicial branch of state government;
(B) a university system or an institution of higher education as
defined by Section 61.003, Education Code; or
(C) a river authority created under the constitution or a statute of
this state.

Added by Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 229, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2003.

Sec. 255.004. TRUE SOURCE OF COMMUNICATION. (a) A person commits an offense

if, with intent to injure a candidate or influence the result of an election, the
person enters into a contract or other agreement to print, publish, or broadcast
political advertising that purports to emanate from a source other than its true
source.
(b) A person commits an offense if, with intent to injure a candidate or
influence the result of an election, the person knowingly represents in a campaign

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 ELECTION CODE CHAPTER 255. REGULATING POLITICAL ADVERTISING AND CAMPAIGN COMMUNICATIONS

communication that the communication emanates from a source other than its true
source.
(c) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
(d) A person commits an offense if the person, with intent to injure a
candidate or influence the result of an election:
(1) creates a deep fake video; and
(2) causes the deep fake video to be published or distributed within 30
days of an election.
(e) In this section, "deep fake video" means a video, created with the intent
to deceive, that appears to depict a real person performing an action that did not
occur in reality.

Amended by Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 899, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1987.
Amended by:
Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1339 (S.B. 751), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2019.

Sec. 255.005. MISREPRESENTATION OF IDENTITY. (a) A person commits an offense

if, with intent to injure a candidate or influence the result of an election, the
person misrepresents the person's identity or, if acting or purporting to act as an
agent, misrepresents the identity of the agent's principal, in political advertising
or a campaign communication.
(b) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

Amended by Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 899, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1987; Acts 1997,
75th Leg., ch. 864, Sec. 249, eff. Sept. 1, 1997.

Sec. 255.006. MISLEADING USE OF OFFICE TITLE. (a) A person commits an offense
if the person knowingly enters into a contract or other agreement to print, publish,
or broadcast political advertising with the intent to represent to an ordinary and
prudent person that a candidate holds a public office that the candidate does not
hold at the time the agreement is made.
(b) A person commits an offense if the person knowingly represents in a
campaign communication that a candidate holds a public office that the candidate does
not hold at the time the representation is made.
(c) For purposes of this section, a person represents that a candidate holds a
public office that the candidate does not hold if:
(1) the candidate does not hold the office that the candidate seeks; and
(2) the political advertising or campaign communication states the public
office sought but does not include the word "for" in a type size that is at least
one-half the type size used for the name of the office to clarify that the candidate
does not hold that office.
(d) A person other than an officeholder commits an offense if the person
knowingly uses a representation of the state seal in political advertising.
(e) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

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 ELECTION CODE CHAPTER 255. REGULATING POLITICAL ADVERTISING AND CAMPAIGN COMMUNICATIONS

Amended by Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 899, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1987; Acts 1993,
73rd Leg., ch. 300, Sec. 30, eff. Aug. 30, 1993; Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 864, Sec.
250, eff. Sept. 1, 1997; Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 1134, Sec. 9, eff. Sept. 1, 1997;
Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 62, Sec. 5.17, eff. Sept. 1, 1999; Acts 1999, 76th Leg.,
ch. 737, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1999.

Sec. 255.008. DISCLOSURE ON POLITICAL ADVERTISING FOR JUDICIAL OFFICE. (a)

This section applies only to a candidate or political committee covered by Subchapter
F, Chapter 253.
(b) Political advertising by a candidate who files a declaration of intent to
comply with the limits on expenditures under Subchapter F, Chapter 253, or a
specific-purpose committee for supporting such a candidate may include the following
statement: "Political advertising paid for by (name of candidate or committee) in
compliance with the voluntary limits of the Judicial Campaign Fairness Act."
(c) Political advertising by a candidate who files a declaration of intent to
comply with the limits on expenditures under Subchapter F, Chapter 253, or a
specific-purpose committee for supporting such a candidate that does not contain the
statement prescribed by Subsection (b) must comply with Section 255.001.
(d) Political advertising by a candidate who files a declaration of intent to
exceed the limits on expenditures under Subchapter F, Chapter 253, or a specific-
purpose committee for supporting such a candidate must include the following
statement: "Political advertising paid for by (name of candidate or committee), (who
or which) has rejected the voluntary limits of the Judicial Campaign Fairness Act."
(e) The commission shall adopt rules providing for:
(1) the minimum size of the disclosure required by this section in
political advertising that appears on television or in writing; and
(2) the minimum duration of the disclosure required by this section in
political advertising that appears on television or radio.
(f) A person who violates this section or a rule adopted under this section is
liable for a civil penalty not to exceed:
(1) $15,000, for a candidate for a statewide judicial office or a specific-
purpose committee for supporting such a candidate;
(2) $10,000, for a candidate for chief justice or justice, court of
appeals, or a specific-purpose committee for supporting such a candidate; or
(3) $5,000, for a candidate for any other judicial office covered by
Subchapter F, Chapter 253, or a specific-purpose committee for supporting such a
candidate.
(g) Section 253.176 applies to the imposition and disposition of a civil
penalty under this section.

Added by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 763, Sec. 6, eff. Sept. 1, 1995.

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 Exhibit A7
Texas Ethics Commission
A Guide to Ethics Laws
 TEXAS ETHICS COMMISSION

A GUIDE TO ETHICS LAWS

FOR STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES

Revised September 15, 2015

Texas Ethics Commission, P.O. Box 12070, Austin, Texas 78711

(512) 463-5800 FAX (512) 463-5777 TDD 1-800-735-2989
Visit us at http://www.ethics.state.tx.us on the Internet.
AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER
The Texas Ethics Commission does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, religion, age or disability in employment or the provision of services
 A GUIDE TO ETHICS LAWS
FOR STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................................1
Laws Interpreted by the Texas Ethics Commission .............................................................1
Advisory Opinions ...............................................................................................................1

PART I. STANDARDS OF CONDUCT AND CONFLICT OF INTEREST .........................2

The “Should Nots” ...............................................................................................................2
Private Interest in Measure or Decision ...............................................................................2

PART II. ACCEPTANCE OF BENEFITS.................................................................................3

Bribery .................................................................................................................................3
Honoraria .............................................................................................................................3
Prohibitions on Gifts ............................................................................................................3
Exceptions to Gift Prohibitions............................................................................................4
Gifts Prohibited by the Lobby Statute ..................................................................................5
Gifts to State Agencies.........................................................................................................5
Donation of Gifts to Charity ................................................................................................6

PART III. ABUSE OF OFFICE ..................................................................................................6

Misuse of Government Property ..........................................................................................6
Frequent Flyer Miles ............................................................................................................6
Political Campaigns .............................................................................................................6
Misuse of Official Information ............................................................................................6

PART IV. OTHER EMPLOYMENT .........................................................................................7

Concurrent Employment ......................................................................................................7
Future Employment..............................................................................................................7
Revolving Door #1 ...............................................................................................................7
Revolving Door #2 ...............................................................................................................8
Revolving Door #3………………………………………………………………………..…8

PART V. PERSONAL FINANCIAL STATEMENTS ..............................................................8

PART VI. LOBBYING BY STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES ...................................9

SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................................9

APPENDIX: Penal Code Provisions Regarding Gifts to a Public Servant............................10

§36.08. Gift to Public Servant by Person Subject to His Jurisdiction ...............................10
§36.09. Offering Gift to Public Servant .............................................................................11
§36.10. Non-Applicable .....................................................................................................11
 A Guide to Ethics Laws for State Officers and Employees

INTRODUCTION

As a public servant, you owe a responsibility to the people of Texas in the performance of your
official duties. This guide sets out laws that govern your conduct as a public servant. As you read
this guide, you should bear in mind that ethical conduct involves more than merely following these
laws. As a public servant, you should act fairly and honestly and should avoid creating even the
appearance of impropriety.

Laws Interpreted by the Texas Ethics Commission

The Texas Ethics Commission interprets various laws governing the conduct of state officers and
employees: the provisions in chapter 572 of the Government Code; the restrictions on benefits, gifts,
and honoraria in chapter 36 of the Penal Code and in the lobby law, chapter 305 of the Government
Code; and the restrictions on the use of government resources in chapter 39 of the Penal Code.

Some laws governing public servants, such as the nepotism law, are not under the jurisdiction of the
Ethics Commission. Also, officers and employees of particular state agencies may be subject to
statutes, rules, or personnel guidelines specifically applicable to that agency. Your general counsel
or the Office of the Attorney General are the appropriate sources for advice about such laws.

Advisory Opinions

If you are concerned about how any of the laws subject to interpretation by the Ethics Commission
apply to you, you may request an advisory opinion. The request must be about the application of one
or more of those laws to a specific factual situation, either existing or hypothetical. Gov’t Code §
571.091. Unless you waive confidentiality in writing, the Ethics Commission must keep your name
confidential.

The legal effect of an Ethics Commission advisory opinion is described in section 571.097 of the
Government Code as follows:

It is a defense to prosecution or to imposition of a civil penalty that the person reasonably

relied on a written advisory opinion of the commission relating to the provision of the law
the person is alleged to have violated or relating to a fact situation that is substantially
similar to the fact situation in which the person is involved.

Copies of Ethics Advisory Opinions are available from the Ethics Commission at (512) 463-5800 or
at http://www.ethics.state.tx.us on the Internet.

Texas Ethics Commission Page 1 Revised 09/15/2015

 A Guide to Ethics Laws for State Officers and Employees

PART I. STANDARDS OF CONDUCT

AND CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The “Should Nots”

The legislature has adopted the following standards of conduct for state employees:

A state officer or employee should not:

(1) accept or solicit any gift, favor, or service that might reasonably tend to influence
the officer or employee in the discharge of official duties or that the officer or
employee knows or should know is being offered with the intent to influence the
officer’s or employee’s official conduct;

(2) accept other employment or engage in a business or professional activity that the
officer or employee might reasonably expect would require or induce the officer
or employee to disclose confidential information acquired by reason of the
official position;

(3) accept other employment or compensation that could reasonably be expected to

impair the officer’s or employee’s independence of judgment in the performance
of the officer’s or employee’s official duties;

(4) make personal investments that could reasonably be expected to create a

substantial conflict between the officer’s or employee’s private interest and the
public interest; or

(5) intentionally or knowingly solicit, accept, or agree to accept any benefit for
having exercised the officer’s or employee’s official powers or performed the
officer’s or employee’s official duties in favor of another.

Gov’t Code § 572.051. A state agency may not use appropriated funds to compensate a state
employee who violates those standards. Gov’t Code § 2113.014. Also, in some cases failure to
follow the standards of conduct will violate one of the criminal statutes discussed in this guide.

Private Interest in Measure or Decision

If a board member has a private or personal interest in a measure, proposal, or decision pending
before the board, the board member must disclose that fact to the rest of the board in an open
meeting and must refrain from voting or otherwise participating in the matter. Gov’t Code §
572.058. The law specifies that a person does not have a “private or personal interest” in a matter if
the person is engaged in a profession, trade, or occupation, and the person’s interest in the matter is
the same as others similarly engaged.

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 A Guide to Ethics Laws for State Officers and Employees

Note: This guide addresses only the laws that the Ethics Commission interprets. Other laws may
contain additional “conflict of interest” provisions. In particular, state agency counsels should be
aware of the common-law rule restricting a contract between agencies and agency board members.
See Attorney General Opinion JM-671 (1987).

PART II. ACCEPTANCE OF BENEFITS

Chapter 36 of the Penal Code prohibits public servants from accepting certain gifts or benefits.
Violations of the laws in this chapter carry criminal penalties, and complaints alleging such
violations are handled by local prosecutors, not by the Texas Ethics Commission.

Bribery

As a public servant, you commit the offense of bribery if you solicit, offer, or accept a “benefit” in
exchange for your decision, opinion, recommendation, vote, or other exercise of official discretion.
Penal Code § 36.02. Common sense should tell you if something is a bribe. If it is, don’t take it.

Honoraria

You may not solicit, agree to accept, or accept an honorarium in consideration for services you
would not have been asked to provide but for your official position. Penal Code § 36.07. Thus, for
example, you may not take a speaker’s fee for speaking if your position with the state is one of the
reasons you were asked to speak. The honorarium law does not, however, prohibit acceptance of
food, transportation, and lodging in connection with a speech that is more than merely perfunctory.
If a state officer or the executive head of an agency accepts food, transportation, or lodging under
these circumstances, the officer must report it on Part XIII of the annual personal financial statement.
(A travel regulation provides that a state employee may not accept money for a travel expense
reimbursement from a person that the employee’s employing state agency intends to audit, examine,
or investigate or is auditing, examining, or investigating. Gov’t Code § 660.016.)

Prohibitions on Gifts

Most public servants are subject to one or more prohibitions on the acceptance of “benefits” from
persons subject to their jurisdiction. Penal Code § 36.08. For example, a public servant in an agency
performing regulatory functions or conducting inspections or investigations may not accept a benefit
from a person the public servant “knows to be subject to regulation, inspection, or investigation by
the public servant or his agency.” Id. § 36.08(a). Similarly, a public servant who “exercises
discretion in connection with contracts, purchases, payments, claims, or other pecuniary
transactions” of the agency may not accept a benefit from a person the public servant knows is
interested in or likely to become interested in such a transaction. Id. § 36.08(d). (The Appendix
contains the full text of section 36.08.) These prohibitions apply regardless of whether the donor is
asking for something in return.

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 A Guide to Ethics Laws for State Officers and Employees

The statutory definition of “benefit” is “anything reasonably regarded as pecuniary gain or pecuniary
advantage.” Penal Code § 36.01(3). In advisory opinions, the Ethics Commission has stated that the
following gifts are benefits: a $50 clock, a hotel room, a hunting trip, football tickets, a $160 rifle,
and a $60 restaurant meal. Ethics Advisory Opinion Nos. 97, 94, 90, 69, 60 (1992).

Exceptions to Gift Prohibitions

There are exceptions to the prohibitions set out in Penal Code section 36.08. These exceptions are
exceptions to criminal liability under that section. You should also make sure that the laws and rules
specifically applicable to your agency permit you to accept a benefit permitted under the Penal Code.
Even if the acceptance of a gift is legally permissible, you should consider whether the gift raises the
appearance of impropriety.

The following exceptions are most likely to be relevant to state officers or employees. (The
Appendix contains the full text of section 36.10, which sets out the exceptions to section 36.08.)

 You may accept non-cash items of less than $50 in value. Penal Code § 36.10(a)(6). If a
lobbyist provides you with food, beverages, entertainment, lodging, or transportation,
however, the lobbyist must be present at the event.

 You may accept benefits in the form of food, lodging, transportation, or entertainment in any
amount if you accept them as a “guest” and report them if there is an applicable reporting
requirement. Penal Code § 36.10(b). In order for you to accept something as a “guest,” the
donor must be present.

Lobbyists may provide you with transportation and lodging only in connection with a fact-
finding trip related to your official duties or in connection with an event, such as a
conference, at which you will be providing “more than perfunctory” services in your official
capacity.

State officers and agency heads: You will be required to report on your personal financial
statement the acceptance of gifts worth more than $250, except for gifts from a member of
your immediate family or from a lobbyist required to report the gift. You must also report on
your personal financial statement your acceptance of meals, transportation, or lodging
provided in connection with a speech or other services you provided in your official capacity.
(See above discussion on “Honoraria.”)

 You may accept a benefit from a person such as a friend, relative, or business associate with
whom you have a relationship independent of your official status if the benefit is given on
account of that relationship rather than your official status. Penal Code § 36.10(a)(2).

 You may accept a payment for which you give legitimate consideration in a capacity other
than as a public servant. Penal Code § 36.10(a)(1). The use of the term “legitimate
consideration” means that the payment you receive must reflect the actual value of the
services or goods you provide in exchange for the payment. Ethics Advisory Opinion No. 41
n.1 (1992).

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 You may accept certain gifts, awards, and mementos from persons required to register as
lobbyists. “Gift” in this context does not include food, entertainment, transportation, or
lodging, which are discussed above. Penal Code § 36.10(a)(5). (See discussion of “Gifts
Prohibited by the Lobby Statute” below.)

Gifts Prohibited by the Lobby Statute

The lobby law, chapter 305 of the Government Code, contains restrictions on gifts from a person
required to register under that chapter. For the most part, the lobby statute is stricter than the Penal
Code. For instance, you may not accept transportation and lodging in connection with a pleasure trip
from a lobbyist. There is, however, one exception to the general rule that the lobby law is stricter
than the Penal Code: Under section 36.10(a)(5) of the Penal Code, there is an exception from the
Penal Code prohibition on the acceptance of benefits for a gift, award, or memento that is required to
be reported by a lobbyist. Because of this exception, there are circumstances in which it is
permissible for you to accept a gift from a lobbyist that you could not accept from a non-lobbyist. If
you are thinking about relying on this exception, you should ask the Ethics Commission for advice
before you do so.

Gifts to State Agencies

The Ethics Commission has issued several opinions in response to questions about the acceptance of
gifts by a state agency. Ethics Advisory Opinion Nos. 118 (1993), 63, 62, 51, 31 (1992).
Chapter 305 of the Government Code, which regulates lobbying, and chapter 36 of the Penal Code,
which regulates gifts to public officers and employees, do not apply to gifts given to a state agency.
Ethics Advisory Opinion Nos. 62, 31 (1992). The statutes applicable to a specific state agency
determine whether the agency has authority to accept gifts. Id. Also, even if an agency has authority
to accept gifts, it may do so only in accordance with the provisions of Government Code chapter 575.

Although questions about the specific authority of a state agency to accept gifts are outside the Ethics
Commission’s advisory opinion authority, previous ethics advisory opinions have set out some
general guidelines about the acceptance of gifts by a state agency. First, the commission has noted
that even if a state agency has authority to accept gifts generally, the agency may accept gifts on
behalf of the agency only if the gifts can be used in carrying out the agency’s powers and duties. A
gift to a state agency becomes state property, and an officer or employee of the agency cannot be
permitted to use it for private purposes. Consequently, acceptance of gifts by a state agency is not a
permissible way of acquiring gifts for the personal enjoyment of individual state officers and
employees.

Gifts to state agencies, even if legally permissible, may raise questions about impropriety. If the
donor is subject to agency regulation or oversight, or engages in a business that can be affected by
agency action, then it may be that the donor hopes or expects to gain favor with the agency. Even if
that is not the case, it may appear to be so, especially to someone whose interests are different from
those of the donor and who may feel at a disadvantage because of the donor’s generosity.

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Donation of Gifts to Charity

What should you do if someone sends you an unsolicited gift that you may not accept? Often public
servants would prefer to donate such gifts to charity or to a governmental body, rather than returning
them to the donor. A provision of the Penal Code allows such donations in specified circumstances:

A public servant who receives an unsolicited benefit that the public servant is prohibited
from accepting under [section 36.08] may donate the benefit to a governmental entity that
has the authority to accept the gift or may donate the benefit to a recognized tax-exempt
charitable organization formed for educational, religious, or scientific purposes.

Penal Code § 36.08(i).

PART III. ABUSE OF OFFICE

Chapter 39 of the Penal Code contains several provisions prohibiting a public servant from using his
or her official position in various ways for non-governmental purposes.

Misuse of Government Property

As a public servant, you commit an offense if, with intent to obtain a benefit or harm another, you
misapply any thing of value belonging to the government that has come into your custody or
possession by virtue of your public office or employment. Penal Code § 39.02(a)(2). Simply stated,
this means that you are to use government property for governmental purposes, not for personal or
private purposes.

Frequent Flyer Miles: Penal Code section 39.02(d) specifically provides that travel discount awards
such as “frequent flyer” miles, hotel or rental car discounts, or food coupons are not things of value
belonging to the government for purposes of the criminal law prohibiting misapplication of a thing of
value belonging to the government. This means that personal or private use of travel awards accrued
on state business is not a crime. The law does not, however, prevent a particular agency from
adopting a policy requiring that such travel awards be used for agency purposes.

Political Campaigns: Do not use state time or state equipment to work on an individual’s political
campaign. See Ethics Advisory Opinion No. 172 (1993). Also, chapter 556 of the Government
Code prohibits a state agency from using appropriated funds in connection with a political campaign.
Further, it prohibits a state officer or employee from using official authority to interfere with or
attempt to influence the result of an election. Gov’t Code § 556.004. The Ethics Commission does
not have authority to interpret chapter 556 of the Government Code.

Misuse of Official Information

As a public servant, you may have access to information that has not been made public. Chapter 39
of the Penal Code restricts your use of such information in the following ways:

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 You may not use the information to acquire or help another person to acquire a pecuniary
interest in any property, transaction, or enterprise affected by the information. Penal Code §
39.06(a)(1).

 You may not speculate or aid another to speculate on the basis of the information. Penal
Code § 39.06(a)(2).

 You may not disclose or use the information with the intent to obtain a benefit or to harm
another. Penal Code § 39.06(b).

PART IV. OTHER EMPLOYMENT

Concurrent Employment

Some of the laws under the jurisdiction of the Ethics Commission are relevant to questions about
other employment by a state officer or employee. For example, under the bribery law, you may not
solicit or accept a “benefit” in exchange for your decision, opinion, recommendation, vote, or other
exercise of discretion as a public servant. Penal Code § 36.02. A salary is a benefit. See generally
Ethics Advisory Opinion No. 155 (1993). Therefore, the crime of bribery occurs if a state officer
accepts other employment in exchange for official action or inaction. In addition, under the
honorarium law a state officer may not accept an honorarium for performing services that he or she
would not have been asked to provide but for his or her official status. Other laws outside the Ethics
Commission’s jurisdiction may also restrict your employment. For information about such laws,
consult your general counsel or the Office of the Attorney General.

Future Employment

If you are about to leave your position with the state, you should be aware of laws that might restrict
your future employment. Chapter 572 of the Government Code contains three “revolving door”
provisions. Each provision applies to different groups of former officers and employees of state
agencies.

Note: If other law restricts you from representing a person before an agency after you leave your
position, that law prevails over the second and third Government Code provisions (in section
572.054) discussed below.

Revolving Door #1

The first revolving door provision will apply to you if you are a former state officer or employee of a
state agency. For two years after you cease to be a state officer or employee of an agency, you may
not accept employment from a person if you participated on behalf of the state agency in a
procurement or contract negotiation involving that person.

Note: The first revolving door provision only applies to a state officer or employee whose service or
employment with a state agency ceases on or after September 1, 2015.

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Revolving Door #2

The second revolving door provision will apply to you if you are a former board member or
executive director of a regulatory agency. For two years after you cease to be a member of the board,
you may not make any communication to or appearance before an officer or employee of the board
on behalf of any person with the intent to influence agency action in connection with any matter on
which that person seeks official action. The restriction applies even if the agency initiates the contact
and even if you are communicating on your own behalf (subject to your due process rights). It does
not, however, prevent you from merely providing information to the agency, as long as you are not
doing so with the intent to influence agency action on behalf of a person.

Revolving Door #3

The third revolving door provision applies to all former board members and executive directors of
regulatory agencies. It also applies to former employees who, at the time of leaving the agency, were
compensated at or above a certain salary level. The law applies to a former employee whose
compensation at the time of leaving state employment was at or above the level prescribed by the
general appropriations act for step 1, salary group A17, of the position classification salary schedule.
(The 2015 General Appropriations Act prescribed the minimum annual salary for salary group A17
to be $36,976 for fiscal years 2016 and 2017.)

A former board member or employee covered by the third provision may never represent a person or
receive compensation for services rendered on behalf of any person regarding a “particular matter” in
which he or she “participated” while serving with the agency. A “particular matter” is a specific
matter before the agency, such as an investigation, application, contract, rulemaking proceeding,
administrative proceeding, request for a ruling, etc. This revolving door provision prohibits you
from representing a person, or getting paid to help a person, regarding a specific matter in which you
were either personally involved or that was a matter within your official responsibility while a state
officer or employee. It does not prohibit you from working on the type of matters you worked on at
the agency. This restriction lasts forever.

Note: For purposes of the Government Code revolving door statutes, a “person” is an individual or
business entity. Gov’t Code § 572.002(7). The statutes do not restrict former state officers or
employees from representing or providing services on behalf of nonprofit or governmental entities.
Ethics Advisory Opinion No. 232 (1994).

Violation of either of the second or third revolving door provisions is a Class A misdemeanor. The
Texas Ethics Commission may assess a civil penalty for a violation of any of the three revolving
door laws.

PART V. PERSONAL FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

Board members and executive directors of most state agencies are required to file a personal
financial statement with the commission on or before April 30 each year if they served at any time

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beginning on January 1 and continuing through April 30 of that year. Gov’t Code § 572.026(a). If
your term as a board member is ending or if you plan to resign from a board, you should be aware of
the “holdover” provision of the Texas Constitution. Under this provision, a state officer “holds
over” in office until replaced. A person who no longer attends meetings may nonetheless “holdover”
as a board member. Thus, if you resign or your term expires before January 1 of a given year, you
will still be required to file a financial statement for that year if your successor was not appointed
before January 1.

However, if you are an appointed officer, as defined by section 572.002 of the Government Code,
you are not required to file a personal financial statement if the following criteria are met before
January 1 of the year the statement is due: (1) your term expired, you resigned, your agency was
abolished, or your agency functions were transferred to another agency; and (2) you ceased to
participate in the state agency’s functions. If your term expired or if you resigned, you are required
to provide written notice of your intent to not participate in the agency’s functions to the Office of
the Governor and to the Texas Ethics Commission.

Anyone who asks for extra time to file by April 30 is entitled to a one-time, 60-day extension. Call
the Ethics Commission legal staff at (512) 463-5800 if you have questions when completing the
form.

Note: New state law requires a personal financial statement filed with the Ethics Commission to be
filed electronically. Please visit the Ethics Commission website at www.ethics.state.tx.us for
information regarding the filing application and instructions.

Note: The commission imposes a civil penalty of $500 for late filings. The commission has the
authority to raise this penalty. There are criminal penalties for failing to file at all.

PART VI. LOBBYING BY STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES

The provisions of Government Code chapter 556 prohibit the use of appropriated funds to influence
legislation. Those provisions are not under the Ethics Commission’s jurisdiction. The lobby law,
chapter 305 of the Government Code, is not applicable in this context. Note, however, that a gift
from a state agency to a legislator may be prohibited under the Penal Code.

SUMMARY

This guide is intended to make you familiar with the laws interpreted by the Texas Ethics
Commission that govern your conduct as a state officer. For further guidance, you should consult
your agency’s ethics advisor or general counsel. Also, feel free to call the Ethics Commission at
(512) 463-5800 for advice or visit our Internet site at http://www.ethics.state.tx.us.

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APPENDIX
Penal Code Provisions Regarding Gifts to a Public Servant

§ 36.08. Gift to Public Servant by Person Subject to His Jurisdiction

(a) A public servant in an agency performing regulatory functions or conducting

inspections or investigations commits an offense if he solicits, accepts, or agrees to
accept any benefit from a person the public servant knows to be subject to regulation,
inspection, or investigation by the public servant or his agency.

(b) A public servant in an agency having custody of prisoners commits an offense if he

solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit from a person the public servant knows
to be in his custody or the custody of his agency.

(c) A public servant in an agency carrying on civil or criminal litigation on behalf of

government commits an offense if he solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit
from a person against whom the public servant knows litigation is pending or
contemplated by the public servant or his agency.

(d) A public servant who exercises discretion in connection with contracts, purchases,
payments, claims, or other pecuniary transactions of government commits an offense if
he solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit from a person the public servant
knows is interested in or likely to become interested in any contract, purchase, payment,
claim, or transaction involving the exercise of his discretion.

(e) A public servant who has judicial or administrative authority, who is employed by or in
a tribunal having judicial or administrative authority, or who participates in the
enforcement of the tribunal’s decision, commits an offense if he solicits, accepts, or
agrees to accept any benefit from a person the public servant knows is interested in or
likely to become interested in any matter before the public servant or tribunal.

(f) A member of the legislature, the governor, the lieutenant governor, or a person
employed by a member of the legislature, the governor, the lieutenant governor, or an
agency of the legislature commits an offense if he solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept
any benefit from any person.

(g) A public servant who is a hearing examiner employed by an agency performing

regulatory functions and who conducts hearings in contested cases commits an offense
if the public servant solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit from any person
who is appearing before the agency in a contested case, who is doing business with the
agency, or who the public servant knows is interested in any matter before the public
servant. The exception provided by Section 36.10(b) does not apply to a benefit under
this subsection.

(h) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

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(i) A public servant who receives an unsolicited benefit that the public servant is
prohibited from accepting under this section may donate the benefit to a governmental
entity that has the authority to accept the gift or may donate the benefit to a recognized
tax-exempt charitable organization formed for educational, religious, or scientific
purposes.

§ 36.09. Offering Gift to Public Servant

(a) A person commits an offense if he offers, confers, or agrees to confer any benefit on a
public servant that he knows the public servant is prohibited by law from accepting.

(b) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

§ 36.10. Non-Applicable

(a) Sections 36.08 (Gift to Public Servant) and 36.09 (Offering Gift to Public Servant) do
not apply to:

(1) a fee prescribed by law to be received by a public servant or any other benefit to
which the public servant is lawfully entitled or for which he gives legitimate
consideration in a capacity other than as a public servant;

(2) a gift or other benefit conferred on account of kinship or a personal, professional,

or business relationship independent of the official status of the recipient;

(3) a benefit to a public servant required to file a statement under Chapter 572,
Government Code, or a report under Title 15, Election Code, that is derived from
a function in honor or appreciation of the recipient if:

(A) the benefit and the source of any benefit in excess of $50 is reported in the
statement; and

(B) the benefit is used solely to defray the expenses that accrue in the
performance of duties or activities in connection with the office which are
nonreimbursable by the state or political subdivision;

(4) a political contribution as defined by Title 15, Election Code;

(5) a gift, award, or memento to a member of the legislative or executive branch that
is required to be reported under Chapter 305, Government Code;

(6) an item with a value less than $50, excluding cash or a negotiable instrument as
described by Section 3.104, Business & Commerce Code;

(7) an item issued by a governmental entity that allows the use of property or
facilities owned, leased, or operated by the governmental entity;

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(8) transportation, lodging, and meals described by Section 36.07(b); or

(9) complimentary legal advice or legal services relating to a will, power of attorney, advance
directive, or other estate planning document rendered:

(A) to a public servant who is a first responder; and

(B) through a program or clinic that is:

(i) operated by a local bar association or the State Bar of Texas; and

(ii) approved by the head of the agency employing the public servant, if the public
servant is employed by an agency.

(b) Section 36.08 (Gift to Public Servant) does not apply to food, lodging, transportation,
or entertainment accepted as a guest and, if the donee is required by law to report those
items, reported by the donee in accordance with that law.

(c) Section 36.09 (Offering Gift to Public Servant) does not apply to food, lodging,
transportation, or entertainment accepted as a guest and, if the donor is required by law
to report those items, reported by the donor in accordance with that law.

(d) Section 36.08 (Gift to Public Servant) does not apply to a gratuity accepted and reported in
accordance with Section 11.0262, Parks and Wildlife Code. Section 36.09 (Offering Gift to
Public Servant) does not apply to a gratuity that is offered in accordance with Section
11.0262, Parks and Wildlife Code.

(e) In this section, “first responder” means:

(1) a peace officer whose duties include responding rapidly to an emergency;

(2) fire protection personnel, as that term is defined by Section 419.021, Government Code;

(3) a volunteer firefighter who performs firefighting duties on behalf of a political

subdivision and who is not serving as a member of the Texas Legislature or holding a
statewide elected office;

(4) an ambulance driver; or

(5) an individual certified as emergency medical services personnel by the Department of

State Health Services.

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 Exhibit A8
Lion’s Roar Newsletter and
Contribution Policy
 Exhibit A9
First Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States
 Exhibit A10
3.12 Investigation and Hearing
Guidelines – Ordinance No. 2019-26
 ORDINANCE No. 2019-26

AN ORDINANCE AMENDING CHAPTER 1, ARTICLE 1.04 THE CITY OF LEON

VALLEY, TX. CODE OF ORDINANCES TO ADOPT SECTION 1.04.006 OF THE
CODE OF ORDINANCES; IMPOSING PROCEDURES PURSUANT TO SECTION 3.12
OF THE CITY CHARTER WHEN CONDUCTING A COUNCIL INVESTIGATION AND
HEARING; PROVIDING FOR REPEALER, SEVERABILITY AND SAVINGS
CLAUSES; AND PROVIDING FOR AN EFFECTIVE DATE.

Whereas the City Council finds it has previously adopted, by ordinance, general rules
applicable to a special meeting, such as a § 3.12 hearing, such rules provide only
general guidance;

Whereas the City Council finds that requiring specific procedures and protocols for the
§ 3.12 hearing set to consider complaints against respondents are in the best interest of
the complainants, the respondents, and the citizens;

Whereas the City Council finds the below procedures and protocols do not change or
alter the rules of procedure adopted by the City Council, but provide further guidance
consistent with such rules for the efficient and effective conduct during a hearing called
under §3.12 of the City Charter;

Whereas the City Council finds members of the City Council are entitled to have, at
their own expense, an attorney to provide them legal advice, if any members become
the subject of a complaint under the Charter. However, such attorney may not make a
presentation to the City Council at the §3.12 hearing but may advise the respondent
during the hearing;

Whereas the City Council finds each complainant is entitled to have, at his / her own
expense, an attorney to provide him / her legal advice, if he / she chooses to employ
one. However, such attorney may not make a presentation to the City Council at the
§3.12 hearing;

Whereas the City Council finds it shall not compensate any council members for
attorney’s fees incurred when the council member is the subject of a complaint under
the Charter.

Whereas the City Council finds the following procedures and protocols are reasonable
and necessary for the efficient operation of government.

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF

LEON VALLEY, TEXAS:

SECTION 1. Chapter 1, Article 1.04 of the City of Leon Valley Code of Ordinances is
hereby amended to adopt Section 1.04.006 City of Leon Valley’s Code of Ordinances,
and shall read as follows:
Section 1.04.006 - Procedures for City Council Meetings Under Section 3.12 of the City
Charter

A. Definitions: For purposes of a meeting held under §3.12 of the City Charter, the
following definitions of words and phrases controls.

1. Complainant shall mean a person who has filed an official complaint

against the official conduct of any department, agency, appointed boards,
office, officers, officials, employees or appointed board members of the
City and the City Council has determined it will conduct a §3.12 hearing
regarding the charges in the complaint. While an official complaint is not
necessary for the City Council to hold a §3.12 hearing, when a complaint
has been filed, the filer shall be known as the Complainant.

2. Designated Officer shall mean an individual designated by the City

Manager or City Council to examine any complaints filed against the
official conduct of any department, agency, appointed boards, office,
officers, officials, employees or appointed board members of the City. The
Designated Officer may also be referred to as the Investigating Officer. If
the Respondent is a member of the City Council as defined under the
Charter, then the Designated Officer shall be appointed by a majority vote
of those members of the City Council entitled to deliberate and vote under
the Charter. If the Respondent is the City Manager or a member of an
appointed board of the City, the City Council shall appoint the Designated
Officer. In the event the Respondent is a member of the City Council or
the City Manager, the Designated Officer shall be an attorney or law firm
which is not employed by the City and does not have any active
representation of the City in order to promote neutrality in the process and
a disinterested investigator. The City Council shall ensure the Designated
Officer has sufficient qualifications and experience in municipal or
employment matters to fulfill the obligations of the role. In all other
circumstances, the City Manager shall appoint the Designated Officer.

3. Majority Vote shall mean an affirmative vote of the majority of council

members present and voting during a §3.12 hearing. When a council
member is present but not deliberating or voting due to a restriction under
the Charter, such failure to vote constitutes an abstention.

4. Presiding Officer shall mean the officer charged with presiding over the
§3.12 hearing. Unless disqualified by the Charter or other law from acting
as the presiding officer, the Mayor shall be the presiding officer at all §3.12
hearings. If the Mayor is unwilling or unable to act as presiding officer, the
Mayor Pro Tempore shall act as the presiding officer. If no Mayor Pro
Tempore is appointed or if the appointed Mayor Pro Tempore is unable or
unwilling the act as presiding officer, then the council member with the
most seniority on the City Council who is able to deliberate and vote shall
be the presiding officer.
 5. Public Official shall mean a public officer of the City as defined by state
law or an individual appointed by the City Council to hold a specific
position, including a position on a City board, commission or committee.
For purposes of this section of the Code, it shall also be any individual in
any department, on any agency, appointed board, office, and any officers,
employees or appointed board members of the City. An individual may be
an employee, or public official or both, depending on the position held.
However, for purposes of this section, the municipal court judge shall not
be considered a public official or employee.

6. Quorum shall mean at least three (3) City Council members convened in
the same place at the same time pursuant to the Texas Open Meetings
Act.

7. Respondent shall mean a public employee, officer, or official of the City of

Leon Valley who is the subject of any investigation, disciplinary or referral
consideration by the City Council under §3.12 of the City Charter. The
term includes anyone the subject of any charges being investigated by the
City Council pursuant to §3.12.

B. General Process:

1. All hearings held under §3.12 of the City Charter shall be special
meetings.

2. All hearings held under §3.12 of the City Charter shall be conducted in
open session, except that the City Council may conduct a closed session
to get advice from its attorney pursuant to the Texas Open Meetings Act.

3. The City Council shall have the power to utilize a §3.12 hearing to inquire
into the official conduct of any department, agency, appointed boards,
office, officers, employees or appointed board members of the City. Such
includes the actions of any member of the City Council, including the
Mayor.

4. Part of the purpose of §3.12 of the City Charter is to allow the legislative
body of the City to investigate any matters relating to the City and its
employees and officials. As a result, all evidence and testimony shall be
submitted to the members of the City Council who may deliberate and
vote on the matters under investigation.

5. While the §3.12 hearing process is designed to be an investigation

authorization of the City Council, the Charter expressly allows the City
Council to utilize a §3.12 hearing to make findings, impose discipline or
make recommendations and referrals for disciplinary actions.

6. When the Respondent is not a member of the City Council or the Mayor,
references under this section to forfeiture shall not apply. Nothing in this
 section is intended to interfere with or alter the ability of the City Manager
to hire, discipline, or fire City employees and officials subordinate to the
City Manager. If the City Council investigates a City employee or an
official subordinate to the City Manager, the City Council may make a
recommendation to the City Manager about the employee/official but may
not otherwise take action against the employee/official.

7. A member of City Council or the Mayor who is a Complainant or

Respondent shall not sit at the dais and shall not participate in deliberation
or vote. However, such restrictions do not prevent the Complainant or
Respondent from counting towards a quorum or in placing items on an
agenda.

8. No public comment shall be allowed during a §3.12 hearing, unless

agreed upon by a majority vote of the members of the City Council who
may deliberate and vote during the §3.12 hearing.

9. For a §3.12 hearing, only those matters which are the subject of the
investigation, charges, discipline or referral may be on the agenda for
consideration and action.

C. Protocols for Conducting § 3.12 Hearing

1. Order. Call the meeting to order.

2. Roll Call. Acknowledge the presence of quorum. For purposes of the open
meeting, any council members who are prohibited from deliberating or voting
pursuant to §3.12(B)(4) of the City Charter shall still count, if physically present,
towards a quorum for purposes of the Texas Open Meetings Act.

3. Acknowledge Charter Imposed Limits: If either the Complainant or the

Respondent is a member of the City Council, including the Mayor, the presiding
officer shall state to the public that such council member or the Mayor cannot
assume the dais, deliberate, or vote on matters related to the complaint.
However, the Charter allows the Complainant and Respondent the ability to
provide evidence and information.

If the Complainant or Respondent is a public official other than a member of the

City Council, including the Mayor, the Presiding Officer shall simply identify the
nature of the public official’s involvement and that they are acting as a
complainant or respondent at the hearing.

4. Special Meeting: Acknowledge this is a special meeting called pursuant to §3.12

of the Leon Valley City Charter.

5. No Citizen Comments: No citizen comments or citizens to be heard is permitted

unless agreed upon by a majority vote of the members of the City Council who
may deliberate and vote during the §3.12 hearing.
6. Executive Session: If executive session is necessary, those members of the
City Council permitted to deliberate and vote shall convene into executive
session pursuant to Texas Government Code §551.071 (consultation with
attorney), if applicable. No other grounds for executive sessions shall be allowed
during a §3.12 hearing.

7. Open Session: Read the agenda item for a §3.12 hearing pursuant to the City
Charter against the Respondent(s).

8. Explanation of Purpose of Meeting: For the first hearing held regarding the
investigation or charges, the Presiding Officer shall read to the public a statement
regarding the nature of the investigation or charges and identifying the
Respondent and the Complainants, if any. If more than one hearing is held
regarding the investigation or charges, subsequent meetings are not required to
have an explanation to the public.

9. Call for Presentation of Charges: For the first hearing held where charges have
been filed or where they will be considered, the Presiding Officer shall call the
Designated Officer to publicly read a summary of the charges against each
Respondent. If more than one hearing is held regarding the charges, subsequent
meetings are not required to read the charges.

10. Presentation of Investigation Results: If any investigation has occurred prior to

the City Council convening a §3.12 hearing, the Designated Officer shall present
such investigation to the City Council along with evidence collected. This shall be
a summary of the factual findings, unresolved factual questions, and reference to
the evidence provided to the City Council regarding the read charges. At least
fourteen (14) calendar days prior to the holding of a § 3.12 hearing where
charges will be considered against a Respondent, the Respondent shall be
entitled to a copy of any documentary evidence which is anticipated to be
presented to the City Council at the §3.12 hearing which is not protected by the
attorney / client privilege.

11. Presentation by Complainants: If any Complainants exist and wish to speak to

the City Council about their complaints, such Complainants shall be given an
opportunity to present a sworn statement at the §3.12 hearing. Such statement
may be written or provided orally to the City Council while under oath. Each
Complainant must be put under oath and sworn before submitting any statement
or evidence during the hearing. Oaths may be administered by the City Secretary
or any person authorized to administer oaths in Texas. Those members of the
City Council who may deliberate and vote at the §3.12 hearing may question any
Complainant about their Complaint during this presentation.

12. Presentation by Called Witnesses: At the City Council’s discretion, it may call
any witnesses it wishes by majority vote of the members of the City Council who
may deliberate and vote at the §3.12 hearing and who are present. Such
witnesses must be put under oath in order to provide information or evidence at
 the hearing. Only the members of the City Council who may deliberate and vote
at the §3.12 hearing may question any witness.

13. Presentation by Respondent: The Respondent shall be given an opportunity to

respond to the charges and present any relevant evidence including testimony
from individuals on his / her behalf. However, the Respondent may not ask any
witness questions. Only the members of the City Council who may deliberate and
vote at the §3.12 hearing may ask witnesses questions. The Respondent may
only present information and evidence at the §3.12 hearing if the Respondent is
placed under oath. Only the members of the City Council who may deliberate
and vote at the §3.12 hearing may ask the Respondent any questions relating to
the complaints. All witnesses called by Respondent must be placed under oath.
Only the members of the City Council who may deliberate and vote at the §3.12
hearing may ask any witness questions or to provide any evidence it determines
is necessary.

14. Council Inquiry: The members of the City Council who may deliberate and vote
at the §3.12 hearing, may recall any witness one time by stating the relevant
reason for the recall, or inquire of any person or compel the production of any
documents or evidence they determine are necessary to investigate or to make a
determination on any complaint. Nothing precludes the members of the City
Council who may deliberate and vote at the §3.12 hearing from continuing to
seek information, evidence, and testimony, even after the Respondent has
provided his / her testimony. However, any new charges must be provided to the
Respondent prior to any §3.12 hearing where disciplinary action or referral will be
considered.

15. Compelling Documentation: For the purpose of investigations and hearings,

the members of the City Council who may deliberate and vote at the §3.12
hearing, by majority vote of those present and voting, shall have the power to
administer oaths, subpoena witnesses, and compel the production of books,
papers, and other evidence material to the inquiry.

16. Council Deliberation/Motion on Complaints: Any member of the City Council

permitted to deliberate and vote regarding the investigation, charges, disciplinary
action or referral action may make a motion to consider the merits of any
investigation, charges, disciplinary action or referral action. However, such
motion may not be made until after the Respondent has been provided notice
and an opportunity to be heard regarding the charges, disciplinary action or
referral action.

a. If the members of the City Council permitted to deliberate and vote at the
§3.12 hearing determine the Respondent who is a member of the City
Council, including the Mayor, violated §3.08 of the City Charter and is no
longer qualified for the Respondent’s position, they must make a motion to
declare the position forfeit and vacant.
 b. If the members of the City Council permitted to deliberate and vote at the
§3.12 hearing determine the Respondent who is a member of the City
Council, including the Mayor, violated §3.09 of the City Charter, they may
make a motion to impose a sanction or other penalty authorized by law.
While the members of the City Council permitted to deliberate and vote at
the §3.12 hearing can vote on forfeiture under §3.09, the forfeiture can
only be based on a violation of §3.09, not on any other Charter provision.

c. If the members of the City Council permitted to deliberate and vote at the
§3.12 hearing determine the Respondent did not commit the acts alleged
or that such acts do not constitute a violation of the Charter or City
ordinance, they can move to dismiss the charges or cease any
investigation.

d. If the members of the City Council permitted to deliberate and vote at the
§3.12 hearing determine further investigation is needed, they may also
move for further investigation.

e. The members of the City Council permitted to deliberate and vote at the
§3.12 hearing may act by a combination of any of the above. However, the
determination of forfeiture should occur first, if applicable. If the position is
considered forfeit under any complaint or charge, no further action is
required on any remaining charges against the same Respondent.

f. Any vote for forfeiture must be by a two-thirds (2/3) majority vote of those
council members present and permitted to vote. Any vote for a penalty
less than forfeiture or any vote to dismiss a complaint, requires an
affirmative vote of a majority of the council members present and
permitted to vote.

17. Council Deliberation/Motion on Penalty: If, and only if, the members of the
City Council permitted to deliberate and vote at the §3.12 hearing determine, by
affirmative vote of those members present and voting, that a violation of the
City’s Charter or ordinances has occurred such members may impose a penalty.
Penalties imposed must be voted on separately from the determination of
whether a Respondent committed a violation of Charter or ordinance. Only the
members of the City Council permitted to deliberate and vote at the §3.12
hearing may vote on any penalty at a §3.12 hearing. Penalties available to the
members permitted to vote include:

a. To declare the Respondent’s position forfeited under §3.08 or §3.09 of the

City Charter and it is therefore vacant;

b. To impose a lesser penalty, including but not limited to:

i. Letter of Reprimand;
ii. Censure;
iii. Impose restrictions designed to prevent future violations;
iv. Impose training;
 v. To enforce a penalty pursuant to §7.13 of this Charter;
1. Criminal misdemeanor referral to the appropriate criminal
prosecutor;
2. Impose a civil penalty (i.e. fine with max $500) (requires 2/3
vote);

c. To direct further investigation necessary to determine an appropriate

penalty, such as research into available trainings or other third-party
options.

18. Vacancy: If the Respondent is found by the City Council to have forfeited the
position held, the position cannot be filled by appointment during the §3.12
hearing where forfeiture is determined. The action of appointing a replacement
consistent with the Charter and state law shall occur at the next council meeting,
regular or special, to occur after the conclusion of the §3.12 which declared the
forfeiture.

19. Adjournment. Once all matters are resolved by the City Council, the Council
must adjourn.

D. Penalties As To Witnesses and Records: In addition to the penalties which may

be imposed upon a Respondent found to have violated the Charter or an ordinance,
the City Council may also impose a penalty upon any person, including
Complainant, Respondent, witness, citizen, corporation, or other entity, which the
City Council finds failed to properly and fully respond to its subpoena to appear,
provide testimony or produce documentation. It may also impose a penalty upon
anyone found to be disrupting the §3.12 hearing after such person has received a
warning regarding the disruption and persisted with any disruptive behavior. The City
Council, in imposing a criminal penalty, may refer the charge to the state’s attorney.
The City Council may impose a civil penalty for contempt or disruption after notifying
the person charged with contempt or disruption of the charge and allowing them the
opportunity to respond at a separate hearing. It is a criminal class C misdemeanor
offense, punishable by a fine between one dollar ($1.00) and five hundred dollars
($500.00) for any person to refuse or fail to obey a command or subpoena from the
City Council to properly and fully respond to its subpoena to appear, provide
testimony or produce documentation. It is also a criminal class C misdemeanor
punishable by the same fine range for a person to disrupt a §3.12 hearing. The City
Council may impose a civil penalty upon any individual under this section up to
$500.00 for each failure, refusal or disruption.

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF

LEON VALLEY, TEXAS:

SECTION 1. Chapter 1 of the City of Leon Valley Code of Ordinances is hereby

amended to add Section 1.04.006 City of Leon Valley’s Code of Ordinances.

SECTION 2. All provisions of the Code of Ordinances of the City of Leon Valley codified
or uncodified, in conflict with the provisions of this Ordinance are hereby repealed, and
all other provisions of the Code of Ordinances of the City of Leon Valley codified or
uncodified, not in conflict with the provisions of this Ordinance shall remain in full force
and effect.

SECTION 3. It is hereby declared to be the intention of the City Council that the
sections, paragraphs, sentences, clauses, and phrases of this Ordinance are severable,
and if any phrase, clause, sentence, or section of this Ordinance shall be declared
unconstitutional or invalid by any court of competent jurisdiction, such unconstitutionality
or invalidity shall not affect any other remaining phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph or
section of this Ordinance.

SECTION 4. The repeal of any Ordinance or part of Ordinances effectuated by the

enactment of this Ordinance shall not be construed as abandoning any action now
pending under or by virtue of such Ordinance or as discontinuing, abating, modifying or
altering any penalty accruing or to accrue, or as affecting any rights of the municipality
under any section or provisions at the time of passage of this Ordinance.

SECTION 5. This Ordinance shall become effective immediately upon its passage and
publication as required by law.

PASSED, ADOPTED AND APPROVED by the City Council of the City of Leon Valley
this the 4th day of June 2019.
APPROVED

______________________
CHRIS RILEY
MAYOR

Attest:

____________________________
SAUNDRA PASSAILAIGUE, TRMC
City Secretary

Approved as to Form:

____________________________
DENISE FREDERICK
City Attorney
 Exhibit A11
Texas Ethics Commission
Pamphlet – Political Advertising
 POLITICAL ADVERTISING
What You Need to Know

The Texas Election Code requires certain disclosures and notices on political advertising. The
law also prohibits certain types of misrepresentation in political advertising and campaign
communications. This brochure explains what you need to know to insure that your political
advertising and campaign communications comply with the law.

If you are not sure what the law requires, do the cautious thing. Use the political advertising
disclosure statement whenever you think it might be necessary, and do not use any possibly
misleading information in political advertising or a campaign communication. If you are using
political advertising or campaign communications from a prior campaign, you should check to
see if the law has changed since that campaign.

Candidates for federal office should check with the Federal Election Commission at (800) 424-
9530 for information on federal political advertising laws.

NOTICE: This guide is intended only as a general overview of the

disclosure statements that must appear on political advertising as required under
Chapter 255 of the Election Code, which is distinct from political reporting
requirements under Chapter 254 of the Election Code.

Texas Ethics Commission

P.O. Box 12070
Austin, Texas 78711-2070

(512) 463-5800
TDD (800) 735-2989
Visit us at www.ethics.state.tx.us.

Revised July 16, 2019

 Political Advertising—What You Need to Know

REQUIRED DISCLOSURE ON POLITICAL ADVERTISING

I. What Is Political Advertising?

The disclosure statement and notice requirements discussed in this section apply to “political
advertising.” In the law, “political advertising” is a specifically defined term. Do not confuse this
special term with your own common-sense understanding of advertising.

To figure out if a communication is political advertising, you must look at what it says and where
it appears. If a communication fits in one of the categories listed in Part A (below) and if it fits in
one of the categories listed in Part B (below), it is political advertising.

Part A. What Does It Say?

1. Political advertising includes communications supporting or opposing a candidate for

nomination or election to either a public office or an office of a political party (including
county and precinct chairs).

2. Political advertising includes communications supporting or opposing an officeholder, a

political party, or a measure (a ballot proposition).

Part B. Where Does It Appear?

1. Political advertising includes communications that appear in pamphlets, circulars, fliers,

billboards or other signs, bumper stickers, or similar forms of written communication.

2. Political advertising includes communications that are published in newspapers, magazines,

or other periodicals in return for consideration.

3. Political advertising includes communications that are broadcast by radio or television in

return for consideration.

4. Political advertising includes communications that appear on an Internet website.

II. When Is a Disclosure Statement Required?

The law provides that political advertising that contains express advocacy is required to include a
disclosure statement. The person who causes the political advertising to be published,
distributed, or broadcast is responsible for including the disclosure statement.

The law does not define the term “express advocacy.” However, the law does provide that
political advertising is deemed to contain express advocacy if it is authorized by a candidate, an
agent of a candidate, or a political committee filing campaign finance reports. Therefore, a
disclosure statement is required any time a candidate, a candidate’s agent, or a political
committee authorizes political advertising.

Texas Ethics Commission Page 1 Revised 07/16/2019

 Political Advertising—What You Need to Know

The precise language of political advertising authorized by someone other than a candidate, the
candidate’s agent, or a political committee will determine if the advertising contains express
advocacy and is therefore required to include a disclosure statement. Generally, the question is
whether the communication expressly advocates the election or defeat of an identified candidate,
or expressly advocates the passage or defeat of a measure, such as a bond election. The inclusion
of words such as “vote for,” “elect,” “support,” “defeat,” “reject,” or “Smith for Senate” would
clearly constitute express advocacy, but express advocacy is not limited to communications that
use those words. Similar phrases, such as “Cast your ballot for X,” would also constitute express
advocacy. Additionally, in 2007, the United States Supreme Court held that an advertisement
included express advocacy or its functional equivalent “if the ad is susceptible to no reasonable
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.” FEC v. Wis.
Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007). It is a question of fact whether a particular
communication constitutes express advocacy. If you are not sure whether political advertising
contains express advocacy, do the cautious thing and include the disclosure statement. That way,
there is no need to worry about whether you have violated the law.

Remember: The concept of “express advocacy” is relevant in determining whether political

advertising is required to include a disclosure statement. However, the political advertising laws
governing the right-of-way notice, misrepresentation, and use of public funds by political
subdivisions will apply to political advertising regardless of whether the advertising contains
express advocacy.

III. What Should the Disclosure Statement Say?

A disclosure statement must include the following:

1. the words “political advertising” or a recognizable abbreviation such as “pol. adv.”; and

2. the full name of one of the following: (a) the person who paid for the political advertising; (b) the
political committee authorizing the political advertising; or (c) the candidate or specific-purpose
committee supporting the candidate, if the political advertising is authorized by the candidate.

The disclosure statement must appear on the face of the political advertising or be clearly spoken
if the political advertising is audio only and does not include written text.

The advertising should not be attributed to entities such as “Committee to Elect John Doe” unless a
specific-purpose committee named “Committee to Elect John Doe” has filed a campaign treasurer
appointment with the Ethics Commission or a local filing authority.

IV. Are There Any Exceptions to the Disclosure Statement Requirement?

The following types of political advertising do not need the disclosure statement:

1. t-shirts, balloons, buttons, emery boards, hats, lapel stickers, small magnets, pencils, pens,
pins, wooden nickels, candy wrappers, and similar materials;

2. invitations or tickets to political fundraising events or to events held to establish support for a
candidate or officeholder;

Texas Ethics Commission Page 2 Revised 07/16/2019

 Political Advertising—What You Need to Know

3. an envelope that is used to transmit political advertising, provided that the political
advertising in the envelope includes the disclosure statement;

4. circulars or fliers that cost in the aggregate less than $500 to publish and distribute;

5. political advertising printed on letterhead stationery, if the letterhead includes the name of
one of the following: (a) the person who paid for the advertising, (b) the political committee
authorizing the advertising, or, (c) the candidate or specific-purpose committee supporting
the candidate, if the political advertising is authorized by the candidate. (Note: There is also
an exception for holiday greeting cards sent by an officeholder, provided that the
officeholder’s name and address appear on the card or the envelope.)

6. postings or re-postings on an Internet website if the person posting or re-posting is not an

officeholder, candidate, or political committee and did not make an expenditure exceeding
$100 in a reporting period for political advertising beyond the basic cost of hardware
messaging software and bandwidth;

7. an Internet social media profile webpage of a candidate or officeholder, if the webpage

clearly and conspicuously displays the full name of the candidate or officeholder; and

8. postings or re-postings on an Internet website if the advertising is posted with a link to a

publicly viewable Internet webpage that either contains the disclosure statement or is an
Internet social media profile webpage of a candidate or officeholder that clearly and
conspicuously displays the candidate’s or officeholder’s full name.

V. What Should I Do If I Discover That My Political Advertising Does Not Contain a

Disclosure Statement?

The law prohibits a person from using, causing or permitting to be used, or continuing to use
political advertising containing express advocacy if the person knows it does not include the
disclosure statement. A person is presumed to know that the use is prohibited if the Texas Ethics
Commission notifies the person in writing that the use is prohibited. If you receive notice from
the Texas Ethics Commission that your political advertising does not comply with the law, you
should stop using it immediately.

If you learn that a political advertising sign designed to be seen from the road does not contain a
disclosure statement or contains an inaccurate disclosure statement, you should make a good
faith attempt to remove or correct those signs that have been distributed. You are not required to
attempt to recover other types of political advertising that have been distributed with a missing or
inaccurate disclosure statement.

VI. The Fair Campaign Practices Act.

The Fair Campaign Practices Act sets out basic rules of decency, honesty, and fair play to be
followed by candidates and political committees during a campaign. A candidate or political
committee may choose to subscribe to the voluntary code by signing a copy of the code and
filing it with the authority with whom the candidate or committee is required to file its campaign

Texas Ethics Commission Page 3 Revised 07/16/2019

 Political Advertising—What You Need to Know

treasurer appointment. A person subscribing to the code may indicate that fact on political
advertising by including the following or a substantially similar statement:

(Name of the candidate or political committee, as appropriate) subscribes to the

Code of Fair Campaign Practices.

VII. Special Notice to Political Subdivisions and School Districts.

You may not use public funds or resources for political advertising. Please see our “Publications
and Guides” section of our website for more information.

ROAD SIGNS
I. When Is the “Right-Of-Way” Notice Required?

All written political advertising that is meant to be seen from a road must carry a “right-of-way”
notice. It is a criminal offense to omit the “right-of-way” notice in the following circumstances:

1. if you enter into a contract or agreement to print or make written political advertising meant
to be seen from a road; or

2. if you instruct another person to place the written political advertising meant to be seen from
a road.

II. What Should the “Right-Of-Way” Notice Say?

Section 259.001 of the Texas Election Code prescribes the exact language of the notice:

NOTICE: IT IS A VIOLATION OF STATE LAW (CHAPTERS 392 AND 393,

TRANSPORTATION CODE) TO PLACE THIS SIGN IN THE RIGHT-OF-
WAY OF A HIGHWAY.

III. Do Yard Signs Have to Have the “Right-Of-Way” Notice?

Yes. The “right-of-way” notice requirement applies to signs meant to be seen from any road. The
notice requirement assures that a person responsible for placing signs is aware of the restriction
on placing the sign in the right-of-way of a highway.

IV. What About Bumper Stickers?

Bumper stickers do not need the “right-of-way” notice. They do, however, need a political
advertising disclosure statement.

V. Where May I Place My Signs and How Long May Signs Be Posted?

For information about exactly where you may or may not place signs, or for information
regarding the length of time your signs may be posted, check with your city or county
government or your homeowner’s association. The Texas Ethics Commission does not have

Texas Ethics Commission Page 4 Revised 07/16/2019

 Political Advertising—What You Need to Know

jurisdiction over matters involving the location of signs, and the length of time that they may be
posted.

MISREPRESENTATION
I. Are There Restrictions on the Contents of Political Advertising?

Political advertising and campaign communications may not misrepresent a person’s identity or
official title, nor may they misrepresent the true source of the advertising or communication. The
election law does not address other types of misrepresentation in political advertising or
campaign communications.

Note that the misrepresentation rules apply to both political advertising and campaign
communications. “Campaign communication” is a broader term than “political advertising.”

A “campaign communication” means “a written or oral communication relating to a campaign

for nomination or election to public office or office of a political party or to a campaign on a
measure.”

II. Misrepresentation of Office Title.

A candidate may not represent that he or she holds an office that he or she does not hold at the
time of the representation. If you are not the incumbent in the office you are seeking, you
must make it clear that you are seeking election rather than reelection by using the word
“for” to clarify that you don’t hold that office. The word “for” must be at least one-half the
type size as the name of the office and should appear immediately before the name of the office.
For example, a non-incumbent may use the following formats:

John Doe
Vote John Doe
For
for Attorney General
Attorney General

A non-incumbent may not be allowed to use the following verbiage:

Elect John Doe John Doe

Attorney General Attorney General

Texas Ethics Commission Page 5 Revised 07/16/2019

 Political Advertising—What You Need to Know

III. Misrepresentation of Identity or Source.

A person violates the law if, with intent to injure a candidate or influence the result of an
election, the person misrepresents the source of political advertising or a campaign
communication or if the person misrepresents his or her own identity or the identity of his or her
agent in political advertising or in a campaign communication. (If someone else is doing
something for you, that person is your agent.) For example, you may not take out an ad in favor
of your opponent that purports to be sponsored by a notoriously unpopular group.

IV. Use of State Seal.

Only current officeholders may use the state seal in political advertising.

V. Criminal Offenses.

Be aware that many violations of the Election Code are criminal offenses. For example,
unlawfully using public funds for political advertising can be a Class A misdemeanor. So can
misrepresenting one’s identity or office title in political advertising. For more details on these
offenses and political advertising in general, see Chapter 255 of the Election Code.

Texas Ethics Commission Page 6 Revised 07/16/2019

 Exhibit A12
Leon Valley Council Meeting Minutes
March 1, 2011
 Exhibit A13
Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR)
United Nations – 1948
 © 2015 United Nations
All rights reserved worldwide

Illustrations by Yacine Ait Kaci (YAK)

This illustrated edition of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

(UDHR) is published by the United Nations in Arabic, Chinese, English,
French, Russian, and Spanish.

This illustrated edition of the UDHR was created and designed in a

partnership between the artist Yacine Ait Kaci (YAK) creator of Elyx,
the United Nations Regional information Centre (UNRIC), and the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights -
Regional Office for Europe (OHCHR).

This illustrated edition of the UDHR may be reproduced and/or trans-

lated in whole or in part without prior permission provided that it be
distributed at no cost (free distribution). Publishers are required to
remove the United Nations emblem from their edition and include
proper credits. Translations must bear the following disclaimer: “The
present work is an unofficial translation for which the publisher accepts
full responsibility.”

All requests to sell excerpts, photocopies, reprints, translations

of this illustrated edition of the UDHR should be addressed to
permissions@un.org.

The drawings by YAK included in this illustrated edition of the UDHR

are protected by copyright and can only be reproduced to illustrate the
text of the UDHR.
 Exhibit A14
Leon Valley Personnel Policy A5
 Exhibit A15
City of Leon Valley
Organizational Chart
 Exhibit B1
Lion’s Roar
Volume 17, Issue 1
 Mayor’s Message
By Mayor Chris Riley
” We in America do not have government by the majority, we have
government by the majority who participate.”
– Thomas Jefferson, 1787
COME TO THE
10TH ANNUAL TOWN
HALL MEETING
Saturday, January 25, 2020 at the
Conference Center – 8:30 am –
12:30 p.m.
The 10th Annual Town Hall Meet-
ing will take place on Saturday,
January 25th at the Conference
Center, beginning at 8:30 a.m.
Over the years, this annual meet-
ing has been a way of setting goals
and working together to get things
done. Some examples of projects
which were developed from this
annual planning meeting are:
1. We built a new fire station and
renovated the police and adminis-
tration buildings;
2. Added the Children’s Wing to
our library;
3. Developed a new brand for our
city (Leon Valley: Deep Roots, Big
Ideas);
4. Expanded the 4th of July festi-
val and adopted a Fall event;
5. Added new street signs;
6. Created and passed the Home
Rule Charter;
7. Discussed and implemented the
red-light camera policy;
8. Extended to 2025 El Verde by
2020 environmental policy to
reduce our emissions and plant
10,000 trees;
9. Gave input on the future of the
Bandera Road corridor.
All citizens are invited to attend
and will receive a postcard invita-
tion by mid-January, 2020. This is
important since one of the main
ways we determine consensus on
the items discussed at the Town
Hall is to poll participants. The
consensus obtained usually directs
the policy your city council ends
up taking. If you want your voice
to be heard, please attend!
Our tentative agenda (subject to
change), which city council mem-
bers approved, will include:
• City Manager’s update on goals
and projects met from the January,
2019 Town Hall Meeting;
• Update on the Peachtree lot de-
velopment at Poss and Peachtree;
• Further discussion of the animal
ordinance;
• Bandera Road Corridor update;
• Home Rule Charter Amendment
update;
• Census 2020 Education
• Public Swimming Pools for 2020
season;
• Follow up on El Verde by 2025;
• Water Main conditions;
• Citizens to Be Heard.
Hope to see you on January 25th
at 8:30 am for coffee and light
2
refreshments with the meeting
starting promptly at 8:45 a.m. We
expect to conclude this meeting
at 12:30 p.m. – lots to discuss. Dr.
Francine Romero, Associate Dean
at UTSA, will again serve as our
facilitator. Electronic clickers will
be used to gauge citizen opinions
on the topics listed above.
FY 2019 YEAR END
BUDGET HIGHLIGHTS
At the October 15, 2019 council
meeting, Finance Director Vickie
Wallace gave the financial report
for September which is the last
month of the fiscal year: however,
the numbers reported are not final
and they are unaudited. They will
change. The final numbers for FY
2019 will be available at the Feb-
ruary, 2020, City Council Meeting.
At that time, total revenue was
$13,199,224 and total expenditures
were $11,456,635, pending other
receivables and expenditures still
coming in. October 2019 sales
tax was up 2.58% compared to
October, 2018 numbers. The Im-
pound Lot ended with a surplus of
$108,594 (revenue minus expendi-
tures). The Red-Light Camera net
reserve available for spending on
traffic safety measures is estimated
at $234,000. The Economic/Com-
munity Development fund had a
projected balance of $736,490 (in-
cluding $394,593 refunded from
winning an appeal of prior litiga-
tion). This total does not include
November, 2019 sales tax receipts.
We also welcomed Floyd Messick
as the new Assistant Finance Di-
rector, replacing Ashley Wayman,
who moved on to become City
Secretary in the City of Rolling-
wood. Visit www.leonvalleytexas.
gov, go to Financial Transparency
for more information on the city’s
budget.
FOLLOWING UP
• BANDERA ROAD CORRI-
DOR public meeting has been set
for Wednesday, December 11,
2019 from 5 p.m.– 7 p.m. in the
Leon Valley Community Cen-
ter, sponsored by TXDOT and
Halff & Associates (contractor for
TXDOT). There will be a short
presentation to give an overview of
the goals and data collected in the
SH16 Corridor study, which will
be repeated during the two-hour
open house. This meeting will
focus on the existing conditions
assessment for both the TXDOT
and City of San Antonio studies.
No proposed concepts will be pro-
vided at this meeting. There will be
displays, handouts, informational
videos available. The open house
format will allow the public oppor-
tunities to provide comments, ask
questions and interact with TX-
DOT, the City of San Antonio and
Leon Valley staff who are working
on this project. Additionally, for-
mal comments can be submitted
in writing or taken down by a
court reporter in attendance that this project range from $800,000
evening. TXDOT will continue to - $1.346 million dollars. Depend-
accept public comments 15 days ing on which cost council chooses
after this meeting has concluded. (the $1.346 million fix will remove
• GOOGLE FIBER - Many citi- most of the 20 acres the city owns
zens have called or emailed out of the floodway/plain), the city
may need to pay engineering and
requesting status of when we can design costs, which range from
expect Google Fiber service in our 12-15% of construction costs. Ad-
community. As of October 22, ditionally, we will need to sign an
2019, there are no actual project Interlocal Agreement with Bexar
plans scheduled for Leon Valley. County allocating the money and
Assistant Community Develop- time frame for completing this
ment Director Xavier Antu has project. We are extremely grateful
requested Google Fiber to initiate to Commissioner Rodriguez and
steps necessary to bring Google Commissioner’s Court for their
Fiber to our community. Will keep help in supporting our city’s flood
you posted. control needs.
• SENECA WEST DRAINAGE
• HOLIDAY CLOSING OF CITY
PROJECT – Special thanks to OFFICES (except for police, fire
County Commissioner Justin and library) are December 23,
Rodriguez who contacted me in 2019 through January 1, 2020.
August wanting to help our city
On behalf of your city council and
with a needed drainage proj- staff, wishing everyone a joyful and
ect. The Seneca West project was
peaceful holiday season – be safe!
chosen and Commissioners Court
Sincerely, Chris
allocated $1.346 million dollars
for the project to benefit the City Cell: (210) 618-2092 – please leave
of Leon Valley. Cost estimates for a message)
A New Year, A New You!
Jump start your New Year’s resolution at the library! According to
a recent Inc. Magazine survey, the top 3 New Year’s resolutions
are eat healthier, exercise more, and lose weight. So, drop
that gym membership and join the Leon Valley Public Library.
Learn Tai Chi Chih every Saturday 8:00-9:00AM and then follow
up your new regiment with Introduction to Yoga on Sunday
at 3:00PM. Check our calendar for healthy eating classes. All
classes are FREE and open to the public. Please arrive early
because classes fill up fast! Priority attendance is given to Leon
Valley Residents! See you at the Library!
Leon Valley Public Library Hours:
Mon, Wed, Fri: 10am – 6pm
Tues, Thursday 10am – 8pm
Saturday 10am – 2pm
Sunday 2pm – 6pm
- Rosie Amaya, Library Director
3
Such rules shall be administered and enforced by the presiding officer of such City Council.
Such rules shall apply to all members of the public presenting information to the City Council.
Such rules may be suspended, for good cause, by the presiding officer during a meeting as long as the
presentation of information remains related to public business only.
The presiding officer may enforce these rules by any means or authority provided to the presiding officer
by law.
At the last meeting on October 15th, The Mayor clearly stated at the beginning of the meeting what would
not be tolerated, and that from that point on there would be zero tolerance for anyone who spoke out in
the audience without recognition from the presiding officer. The zero-tolerance policy would result in
anyone being removed from the council chamber. Although the Mayor as presiding officer administers
and enforces the rules during City Council meetings, this does not prevent any peace officer from
enforcing the Rules without order of the Mayor. Any peace officer who is present during a City Council
meeting, may assess a situation, due to his or her law enforcement training, to be disorderly in violation
of the law or dangerous. Said peace officer may take whatever action is necessary under the law, to bring
about peace and order.
Also, as stated in No. 8 of the Rules, Robert’s Rules of Order will take precedence for conduct not covered
by these Council meeting rules. Under parliamentary law and procedure no one but a member of the
governing body may call a point of order. The Duhaime's Law Dictionary definition of Point of Order
states that it is “a term of parliamentary law and procedure which refers to an interjection during a
meeting by a member, who does not have the floor, to call the attention of the chair to an alleged violation
or breach of the assembly's or meeting's rules of order.” If anyone from the audience during a City Council
meeting who yells or calls out, even for a point of order, will be subject to removal from the meeting.
The public should also be aware that the Open Meetings Act, nor the Texas Attorney General entitle the
public to choose items to be discussed. In fact, according to the Texas Attorney General, a governmental
body does not have to allow members of the public to speak during its meeting at all. However, it is the
policy of the City Council to allow citizens to address the body and speak on items on the agenda. The
Mayor may call order if a citizen gets off the topic of the agenda and request the speaker to remain on the
topic of the agenda. Any citizen wanting to address items not on the agenda, may address the body during
the “Citizens to be Heard” portions of the agenda.
A citizen has brought Texas House Bill 2840 to my attention, which allows the public to criticize any act
or omission, policy, procedure, program, or service. It has been said that the Mayor calling order and
preventing people from speaking on subject matters not on the topic of the item being addressed by the
body on the agenda, is prohibiting citizens from criticizing the governmental body. As before stated, City
Council may set policy on whether it allows public comment and when public comment on any topic
can be made. The bill does not allow citizens to personally attack and criticize anyone sitting on the dais,
including anyone in the audience or any employee of the government. It only allows citizens to criticize
any act or omission, policy, procedure, program, or service, which can be done on any subject matter
during the Citizens to be Heard portions of the meeting. Thus, the public is not being prohibited by the
governmental body from criticizing any act or omission, policy, procedure, program, or service during
the meeting. In fact, the law itself states that “A governmental body shall allow each member of the public
who desires to address the body regarding an item on an agenda for an open meeting of the body to
address the body regarding the item at the meeting before or during the body's consideration of the item.”
The key words here are “regarding the item”. It also states that “A governmental body may not prohibit
public criticism of the governmental body, including criticism of any act, omission, policy, procedure,
program, or service. This subsection does not apply to public criticism that is otherwise prohibited by
law.” The key words in this section is “criticism of the governmental body”. The governmental body does
not include City employees or anyone in the audience of the meeting or any particular member of the
governing body. It means the body as a whole. Therefore, the Rules of Conduct and Decorum for Public
Meetings and Hearings Held by the City Council shall be enforced.
-Denise Frederick, City Attorney

7

Each council member is sworn
in agreeing to uphold the oath
of office which reads “that I will
faithfully execute the duties of
(Council Place) of the State of
Texas; and will to the best of
my ability preserve, protect, and
defend the Constitution and laws
of the United States and of this
State, so help me God.”
Then the work begins. Council
members familiarize themselves
with the City of Leon Valley Home
Rule Charter, ordinances, and
the responsibilities and actions
that may be taken by each of
the Boards, Commissions, and
Committees in order to ask
questions and take action on the
issues brought before Council in
line with existing ordinances and
laws of the City. A councilor’s vote
must be carefully considered and
weighed as to impact on citizens
and the City. Councilors attend
workshops, training classes, and
seminars involving city official
expectations, ethical conduct, and
a variety of municipal functions.
In addition, council members
represent the City by welcoming
new businesses, attending City-
sponsored and public events, and
remaining available and responsive
to the citizens. The Council
proactively set an expected code of
conduct to be followed by Council
members and attendees at Council
meetings and Executive Sessions.
Other ethical standards are set
forth by the Ethics Ordinance
passed by the Council for dealing
with one another and the public.
Earlier this year, the Council
was placed in the position of
Elected as a City Councilor
- Now What?
addressing the complaints of
employees and another Council
member against one of their own,
an elected councilor, a first in
Leon Valley history. There have
been numerous negative, less
than factual messages placed on
a web site, mailed, and spoken at
meetings regarding this issue. The
messages contain information
which serves to deceive and
mislead the general public
and citizens of this City. The
allegations contained within the
recall petition are crafted to omit
the foundation of the actions that
the targeted councilors took. None
is the “whole story.”
The facts are that during the 3.12
hearing, the three councilors
left to hear and vote on the
testimony, witness statements, and
investigative evidence had one
course of action: to follow the City
Charter, approved by Leon Valley
citizens in 2017, and the Hearing
Protocol which was voted on by all
five councilors. Another important
responsibility was to follow the
legal advice of the Investigative
and Conflict Attorney contracted
by the City Manager on the advice
of Texas Municipal League. It is
important for the public to know
that two councilors and the City
Attorney were conflicted out due
to being involved as a complainant
or respondent. Because of these
conflicts, two councilors were
unable to vote. Leading up to the
hearing and at the regular Council
meetings during the months of
July and August, citizens were
given an opportunity at each
meeting to speak during “Citizens
8
to be Heard”. Many, including the
respondent, against the Attorney’s
advice, offered their opinions
regarding the hearing even
before any evidence was heard.
Individuals that were not sworn
were not allowed to submit live
statements during the hearing.
As a concerned citizen, you
may contribute to the positive
progression of the City of Leon
Valley by becoming fully informed,
asking questions, assuring that
what is being told to you comes
from a creditable source (not
just Facebook, Nextdoor, Twitter,
or Web Site postings), attend
meetings, and join committees,
boards and commissions.
In this year alone, there have
been many new businesses
established. I know that they
would welcome your support as
customers, assuring their success
and survival.
I am always available for your
questions and concerns and
may be contacted at Place1@
leonvalleytexas.gov. You may
also contact any of my fellow
councilors by emailing them at
their public email address found
on the City’s web site.
Thank you for your interest in the
continued growth and well-being
of this City!
Please remember this message and
share it with others:
“If you act or speak negatively,
you can’t expect a positive result.”
-Anonymous-
- Donna J. Charles, Councilor
Place 1
 Political dysfunction fallout is never good
Express-News Editorial Board Oct. 6, 2019
Recall elections are an important check on
government.
The ability to remove bad politicians without
having to wait until their terms expire is an
empowering tool for an electorate. When
dysfunction fever is running high within an
elected body, a recall can be the appropriate
medicine.
But it should only be prescribed in rare
circumstances and never to threaten elected
officials who might make sound, but unpopular,
decisions. Unhappy with those decisions? That’s
what elections are for. Not recalls.
This brings us to Leon Valley. Recently a group
of residents in this beleaguered suburban
municipality announced their intention to recall
two members of City Council. One of them,
Donna Charles, was elected in May and barely
meets the 90-day honeymoon period allowed in
the Leon Valley charter for newly elected officials
before they can be subject to recall. Proponents of
the recall include a former council member who
lost his re-election bid to Charles by one vote in
May. The other subject of the recall is Monica
Alcocer, who is in her third term.
High on the list of complaints against Charles
and Alcocer is they voted to oust one of their
colleagues, Benny Martinez, from the council
after a lengthy hearing about complaints alleging
abuse of power and sexual harassment.
Martinez and Catherine Rodriguez, the council
member who brought forth the allegation, were
not allowed to vote on the advice of the city’s
legal counsel. But the petitioners believe all the
elected members of council should have voted
— and if they had, it would have resulted in a
3-2 split, which would not meet a two-thirds
threshold to oust a council member.
How could Rodriguez or Martinez vote on this?
They are parties to the issue. They are conflicted.
It is impossible to fault Charles and Alcocer for
following the advice of the city’s lawyer on this
vote. In fact, it would have been troubling had
9
they gone against their lawyer’s advice. That
might be worth a recall. This? Not so much.
Petitioners in Leon Valley have until mid-
December to collect 500 signatures, and their
effort fits a larger trend.
There are 351 home rule cities in the state, 93
percent of which allow for recalls of elected
officials. This year there has been a successful
recall election in Rusk and failed attempts to get
recall measures on the ballot in Mineral Wells
and Edinburg. A recall petition is circulating in
Kyle.
Recall elections can be effective anti-corruption
campaigns, and they can give voice to a united
citizenry on a particular issue. But they are a
waste of taxpayer money when they are used
to carry out political battles, and they are a
distraction from the basics of governance. Set
aside the petty politics, and fill those potholes,
please.
Dysfunction among elected officials can carry
serious financial implications for taxpayers —
especially in smaller municipalities. Residents in
the San Antonio suburb of Castle Hills know this
all too well.
The political chaos over the summer in that
municipality interfered with plans to move
forward on a slight tax hike for much-needed
street improvements.
The point here is that when used judiciously,
recall elections offer a legitimate way for voters
to ensure their government is acting responsibly.
But when they become just another political
game piece, they lose their effectiveness and
exacerbate dysfunction at immense public cost.
There’s no need for a recall in Leon Valley.
https://www.expressnews.com/opinion/
editorials/article/Political-dysfunction-fallout-is-
never-good-14496838.php
-Republished article by Scott Huddleston,
Staff Writer, San Antonio Express-News
 Police Department
The holiday season is a wonderful time of the year.
It is a time when we get together with loved ones to
celebrate Thanksgiving, Mawlid el-Nabi, Christmas,
Hanukkah, Kwanzaa, Boxing Day, Omisoka, and
New Year’s. Unfortunately, many of these wonderful
celebrations can end up negatively due to simple
safety issues that can often be avoided. It is in the
spirit of these holidays that the City of Leon Valley
recommends you do the following to help ensure you
and your family stays safe this holiday season:
Be Prepare When Traveling: Prepare your car for
the trip. Tire pressures often go down with the cold
weather, and this alone can be deadly. Leave early, rest
often, and plan for the unknown when heading to
your loved ones. Remove any distractions, always use
hands-free phone electronic devices while driving,
buckle up everyone in your vehicle, and don’t drink
and drive!
Secure Your Valuables: American’s spend a lot of
their hard-earned money during the holiday season.
Unfortunately, the thieves know this, and it is a
lucrative time of year for their business! Always keep
your vehicle and home windows and doors locked.
Hide any valuables in your car, and never walk out to
your car to leave gifts then walk back into the store. At
10
bare minimum, place them into the trunk then drive
around to another parking area before exiting your
car. Better yet, take them home and keep them hidden
from view from someone looking in from the outside.
Also, don’t leave expensive holiday decorations
unsecured in the yard; it is an invitation for thieves.
If not at home when a delivery is expected, make sure
to coordinate with a friend or loved one to move the
package inside to a safe location.
Decorate and Give Safely: Each year thousands of
people are injured putting up or because of holiday
decorations. Make sure the artificial tree you use is fire
resistant, and the real one is maintained in water and
doesn’t dry out. Place the tree at least three feet away
from a fire source, and inspect all lights for bare wires
before hanging them. Never overload an electrical plug
with numerous strands of lights, and practice good
safety habits when on a ladder hanging them. Always
read the labels for the gifts before you give them to
ensure they are age appropriate to a child. Never give a
small child (usually under 3 years old) toys with small
parts that they can choke on.
The Leon Valley Police Department provides a free
service to keep an eye out on your home when away
for vacation or the holidays. Please feel free to contact
us at (210) 684-1391 so we can help watch over
your valuables while you are away. Happy Holidays
everyone!
- In Your Service, Chief Salvaggio
 Fire Department
The Leon Valley Fire Department would like to wish
everyone a Happy Holiday Season. Our department
along with the National Fire Protection Association
would like to provide you and your family with a few
holiday safety tips.
When picking a tree there are several different types
of trees to pick from. The fire department would
recommend picking an artificial tree versus a live tree
due to the potential fire hazard. If you and your family
decide to use a live tree for decoration, here are a few
tips to reduce the potential fire hazard in your home.
Also, a friendly reminder to all local businesses that
cut live trees are prohibited inside a building due to
the potential fire hazard.
o Choose a tree with fresh green needs that do not fall
off when touched
o Make sure the tree is at least three feet away from
any heat source like fireplaces, radiators, candles,
portable heaters, or heat producing lights.
o Make sure the tree is not blocking an exit.
o Add water to the tree stand daily.
o Use tree lighting that is for indoor use and has an
11
appropriated testing label on the box or cord.
o Replace broken or worn out cords.
o Never use candles near or to decorate trees.
o Always turn off lights on the tree before going to
bed or leaving the house.
After Christmas
o Get rid of the tree. The tree should be recycled as
soon as the holiday season is over or once the tree
begins to dry out. The tree should not be stored on the
garage or next to the exterior of the house outside.
o The City of Leon Valley provides a recycling
program for all Leon Valley residents at the end of
the holiday season. Drop off tree recycling will be
provided by the recycling center located near the front
of the City of Leon Valley Public Works gate. Contact
the public works department or look on the city
website to find more information about tree recycling.
o Bring outdoor electrical lights inside after the
holidays to prevent hazards and make them last
longer.
The Leon Valley Fire Department wishes you and your
family a safe holiday season. More information about
holiday safety can be found on our Facebook page or
in person at the Leon Valley Fire Department located
at 6300 El Verde St, Leon Valley Texas 78238.
- Assistant Fire Chief, Eric Burnside
 Exhibit B2
Email Correspondence
KK Stating MA Submitted Article
Questions about Lion's Roar
Kelly Kuenstler <k.kuenstler@leonvalleytexas.gov> Tue, Dec 10, 2019 at 3:37 PM
To:
Cc:

Good Afternoon

Page 9 was submitted by Councilor Alcocer as her submission for this edition of the Lion’s Roar. I received
written permission from Mr. Huddleston to publish – it is actually an editorial group that writes these.

All council members have the ability to publish an article in the Lion’s Roar regardless of the time of year that
it is submitted. I am responsible for the factual content and when I have questions about facts, I either go to
our legal counsel or to our directors.

As for your last question, an editorial contribution to the newsletter may be submitted by the Mayor, City
Council, City Manager, City Secretary and Leon Valley Staff members as long as the content only pertains to
City related business, programs, ordinances, events, news, surveys, informational alerts and safety practices,
the City mission and vision and all other relevant City related or sponsored business.

Respectfully,

Kelly

Kelly Kuenstler, MPA

Leon Valley City Manager

6400 El Verde Road

Leon Valley, TX 78238

(210) 684-1391 ext. 219

 Exhibit B3
Email Correspondence
Scott Huddleston
Lions Roar - PDF
Thu, Dec 5, 2019 at 2:10 PM
To:

FYI, see Scott Huddleston's response - he confirmed that he did not author the article and that he doesn't do
editorial work.

---------- Forwarded message ---------

From: Huddleston, Scott
Date: Thu, Dec 5, 2019 at 12:06 PM
Subject: RE: Lions Roar - PDF
To:

thanks for letting me know about this. There appears to be a misunderstanding. I did not write
that editorial. It was written by an editorial writer. I’m on the “news” side and not the “opinion” side of the
Express-News.

From:
Sent: Thursday, December 5, 2019 11:10 AM
To: Huddleston, Scott
Subject: Fwd: Lions Roar - PDF

Hi Mr. Huddleston,

Below is an email I sent out to several other concerned citizens regarding a publication that the taxpayers
fund, that gets disseminated to all residents of Leon Valley.

Your name and title are mentioned on Page 9, which I believe was written by Monica Alcocer and stolen from
the San Antonio Express News. She credits you with the news article published a couple months ago. Do you
have any comments about this? Are you the author?

I will be writing up an ethics complaint over the next week against Monica Alcocer (to utilize taxpayer dollars
to disseminate an opinion piece). The mayor tried to write a couple paragraphs in a previous "Lion's Roar"
about the 3.12, but the city manage prohibited her from publishing it.

Thanks much,
---------- Forwarded message ---------
From:
Date: Thu, Dec 5, 2019 at 11:03 AM
Subject: Lions Roar - PDF
To:

Hello

Attached is a PDF copy of the Lion's Roar we will be getting very soon. The most frustrating element are
pages 8-9, which the taxpayers funded.
 Exhibit B4
ORR Charges 01/19/18
 Exhibit B5
Letter from Leon Valley to Attorney
General Seeking to Withhold
June 10, 2019
 CITY OF LEON VALLEY
Office of the City Secretary

June 10, 2019

Office of the Attorney General

Open Records Division
P.O. Box 12548
Austin, Texas 78711-2548

Re: Open Record Request from to the City of Leon Valley, TX. (ORR #
052419-A)

Dear Texas Attorney General’s Office:

Please be advised that the City of Leon Valley observes skeleton crew days every
Friday of the month, not to be counted as business days for the purpose of calculating its
deadlines under the Public Information Act. The City also observed Memorial Day as a
City Holiday on Monday, May 27, 2019.

On May 24, 2019 the City of Leon Valley (City) received the following request:

“I would like copies of any and all correspondence between Ryan Henry and the
City of Leon Valley between the period of December 1, 2018 through May 24, 2019”

On 6/3/2019 I sought clarification of this request to which the requestor responded by

saying:

“This request is related to any correspondence received from or sent to Ryan

Henry and/ or his associates by any Leon Valley city officials, staff, employees, agents,
or persons acting on behalf of the city of Leon Valley, including but not limited to emails
from or to: the Leon Valley City attorney, city manager, city police chief, city accountant,
city secretary, city Human Resources employees, other city employees, city elected
officials (including council members and their staff members if applicable), and appointed
officials.”

6400 El Verde Road, Leon Valley, Texas 78238 ● (210) 684-1391 ext. 216 ● www.leonvalleytexas.gov
 Exhibit B6
Letter from Leon Valley to Attorney
General Seeking to Withhold
June 17, 2019
 CITY OF LEON VALLEY
Office of the City Secretary

June 17, 2019,

Office of the Attorney General

Open Records Division
P.O. Box 12548
Austin, Texas 78711-2548

Re: Open Record Request from to the City of Leon Valley, TX. (ORR #
052419-A) UPS # 1Z097AR50393112604

Dear Texas Attorney General’s Office:

Please be advised that the City of Leon Valley observes skeleton crew days every
Friday of the month, not to be counted as business days for the purpose of calculating its
deadlines under the Public Information Act. The City of Leon Valley also observed the
Memorial Day Holiday on Monday, May 27, 2019.

Error On May 08, 2019 at 5:32 p.m. the City of Leon Valley (City) received the following
request:

“I would like to request a copy of all of the documents that reside in the LV City
Manager’s office and a copy of all of the e mails that have been sent or received by Ms.
Kuenstler, and members of the LV City Council, Re: the investigation of LV City Council
Member Mr. Benny Martinez that is currently being conducted by Mr. Ryan Henry.”

Correction (same as on the 10-day letter that I included with the original letter) On May
24, 2019 the City of Leon Valley (City) received the following request:

“I would like copies of any and all correspondence between Ryan Henry and the
City of Leon Valley between the period of December 1, 2018 through May 24, 2019”

6400 El Verde Road, Leon Valley, Texas 78238 ● (210) 684-1391 ext. 216 ● www.leonvalleytexas.gov
On 6/3/2019 the City sought clarification of this request to which the requestor responded
the same day by saying:

“This request is related to any correspondence received from or sent to Ryan

Henry and/ or his associates by any Leon Valley city officials, staff, employees, agents,
or persons acting on behalf of the city of Leon Valley, including but not limited to emails
from or to: the Leon Valley City attorney, city manager, city police chief, city accountant,
city secretary, city Human Resources employees, other city employees, city elected
officials (including council members and their staff members if applicable), and appointed
officials.”
The City seeks to withhold the information based on the following exception:

Sec. 552.107. EXCEPTION: CERTAIN LEGAL MATTERS. Information is excepted

from the requirements of Section 552.021 if:

(1) it is information that the attorney general or an attorney of a political

subdivision is prohibited from disclosing because of a duty to the client
under the Texas Rules of Evidence or the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct.

Pursuant to Section 552.301 (e)(1)(A), the following is the City of Leon Valley’s legal brief
in support of the above exception, stating why the stated exception in the above
referenced submission should apply.

On or around December 18, 2018, the City of Leon Valley hired outside counsel while the
City Attorney was “conflicted out”, and requested and received a legal opinion from the
Law Offices of Ryan Henry, PLLC for legal advice and counsel regarding a pre-litigation
into allegations that surfaced against a sitting City Councilor, specifically Benny Martinez.
On or around April 25, 2019, the City of Leon Valley hired the same outside counsel in a
roll of litigation attorney for the purposes of defending a lawsuit filed by Councilor Benny
Martinez, styled Benny Martinez vs. the “City of Leon Valley”.

Exhibits “A” through Exhibit “I“ should be exempt from public disclosure because it is
communication between Investigating Attorney, Ryan Henry to the City of Leon Valley
City Council members, City Manager, Complainants and City Staff and legal advice as to
legal options. The documents as written communication, were presented as legal
services. Since then, the communication has been in the possession of the City and
remained confidential.

For the above reasons, the City of Leon Valley respectfully requests an opinion as to
whether Exhibits “A” through Exhibits “I “, attached hereto for all purposes, are exempt
from public disclosure.

6400 El Verde Road, Leon Valley, Texas 78238 ● (210) 684-1391 ext. 216 ● www.leonvalleytexas.gov
 Exhibit B7
Bexar County District Attorney:
“Leon Valley Violated Texas Public
Information Act”
August 8, 2019
 JOE D. GONZALES
BEXAR COUl\1TY CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY
PAUL ELIZONDO TOWER
.101 W. NUEVA ST.
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS i8205
WO) 335·2311

August 8, 2019

Re: PIA section 552.3215 complaint against City of Leon Valley

File No. 7657 - DA

The Bexar County Criminal District Attorney's Office received a complaint

from you alleging the City of Leon Valley ("City") failed to respond appropriately to
a 1·equest for information under the Public Information Act ("Act"). We received
your complaint on July 8, 2019, and it is enclosed with this determination letter.
See Exhibit A.

DETERMINATION

After our review, we determined that the City failed to comply with its
obligations under 552.301 of the Gove1·nment Code, which prescribes the procedures
a governmental body must follow in asking the AG to decide whether requested
information is excepted from public disclostu·e. See Gov't Code § 552.301. At the
time the complaint was filed, the City's deadline to seek an AG opinion bad lapsed.
In the interim, however, the City has mailed its letter asking the AG to evaluate the
public availability of the information at issue. See Exhibit B. Therefore, the DA's
Office determines that the City has cured its violation of the Texas Public
Information Act.
 Exhibit B8
Bexar County District Attorney:
“Leon Valley Violated Texas Public
Information Act”
December 21, 2018
For the reasons cited, the Texas Attorney General’s Office determines that the City is in violation
of the Texas Public Information Act. Pursuant to section 552.3215(f) of the PIA, an action may be
brought under this section only if the Texas Attorney General notifies the City of its determination
that the alleged violation was committed. The City is hereby so notified and has four days from
receipt of this correspondence to cure the violation or face the possibility of a suit for Declaratory
Judgement or Injunctive Relief filed by the State of Texas. These findings are subject to change
should the undersigned receive new, material, and persuasive information in the forthcoming four
day period referenced above.

Sincerely,
Charles Falck
/s/ Charles Falck
Charles Falck
Assistant Attorney General

Cc: Denise Frederick

d.frederick@leonvalleytexas.gov

Saundra Passailaigue
s.pass@leonvalleytexas.gov
 Exhibit B9
Bexar County District Attorney:
“Leon Valley Violated Texas Public
Information Act”
December 21, 2018 #2
with section 552.130(e) or else the information may be eligible for disclosure under Transportation
Code Chapter 730.

The City also indicated in its correspondence to the OAG that it would be disclosing social security
information that it had redacted. A social security number is likely prohibited from disclosure
under section 552.101 if it was obtained or maintained pursuant to any provision of law enacted
after October 1, 1990. See Tex. Atty. Gen. Op., ORD-622 (1994). Disclosure in this instance may
well subject the City to criminal liability under section 552.352 or other law.

For the reasons cited, the Texas Attorney General’s Office determines that the City is in violation
of the Texas Public Information Act. Pursuant to section 552.3215(f) of the PIA, an action may
be brought under this section only if the Texas Attorney General notifies the City of its
determination that the alleged violation was committed. The City is hereby so notified and has
four days from receipt of this correspondence to cure the violation or face the possibility of a suit
for Declaratory Judgement or Injunctive Relief filed by the State of Texas. These findings are
subject to change should the undersigned receive new, material, and persuasive information in the
forthcoming four day period referenced above.

Sincerely,
Charles Falck
/s/ Charles Falck
Charles Falck
Assistant Attorney General

Cc: Denise Frederick

d.frederick@leonvalleytexas.gov

Saundra Passailaigue
s.pass@leonvalleytexas.gov
 Exhibit B10
Bexar County District Attorney:
“Leon Valley Violated Texas Public
Information Act”
January 28, 2019
Division’s response to the City. However, the undersigned does not have access to the Exhibits
submitted by the City to the OAG Open Records Division and, for purposes of this determination,
will not be able to review them.

Accordingly, the undersigned has no means to determine whether the information submitted by
the City constituted a true “representative sample” of information requested. The undersigned
therefore stands by the ruling in OR2018-23725.

Please note, however, that OR2018-23725 indicates that its scope is limited to the facts before it,
and that the ruling “must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other
information or any other circumstances.” (OR2018-23725). Furthermore, OR2018-23725
indicates that any responsive information identical to information already voluntarily released by
the City, or responsive information previously marked for release by the OAG in rulings 2018-
21874 and 2018-21887, may not be withheld under the PIA. Failure to release such information
constitutes a violation under section 552.353(a).

The document produced by you on 01/09/19 labeled “ORR_101518-D_redacted” contains

information responsive to your request. Based on the evidence available to the undersigned, it
appears that the responsive information was released to another requestor and not to you, and that
the information was released sometime on or following 09/13/18. Such a release makes public the
responsive public information under section 552.007, and failure to promptly release such
information to you constitutes a violation under section 552.353(a).

For the reasons cited and based on the information before it to date, the Texas Attorney General’s
Office determines that the City did violate of the Texas Public Information Act.

However, the City’s release of documentation on 01/22/19 provided additional information

responsive to your request. Based on the evidence currently available to the undersigned, the search
for and release of information was made in good faith and does constitute a full and compliant
response to your request. Therefore, the Texas Attorney General’s Office determines that the City
has cured its violation of the Texas Public Information Act.

Sincerely,
Charles Falck
/s/ Charles Falck
Charles Falck
Assistant Attorney General
Cc: Denise Frederick
d.frederick@leonvalleytexas.gov

Saundra Passailaigue
s.pass@leonvalleytexas.gov
 Exhibit B11
Texas Attorney General:
“City Must Release Information”
 Exhibit B12
Texas Attorney General:
“City Attorney Must Release
Information”
Ms. Denise Frederick - Page 2

Tex. Farmers Ins. Exch., 990 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, orig.
proceeding) (attorney-client privilege does not apply if attorney acting in capacity other
than that of attorney). Governmental attorneys often act in capacities other than that of
professional legal counsel, such as administrators, investigators, or managers. Thus, the
mere fact that a communication involves an attorney for the government does not
demonstrate this element. Third, the privilege applies only to communications between or
among clients, client representatives, lawyers, and lawyer representatives. TEX. R. Ev10.
503(b)(l). Thus, a governmental body must inform this office of the identities and
capacities of the individuals to whom each communication at issue has been made. Lastly,
the attorney-client privilege applies only to a confidential communication, id. 503, meaning
it was "not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those: (A) to whom
disclosure is made to further the rendition of professional legal services to the client; or (B)
reasonably necessary to transmit the communication." Id. 503(a)(5). Whether a
communication meets this definition depends on the intent of the parties involved at the
time the information was communicated. See Osborne v. Johnson, 954 S.W.2d 180, 184
(Tex. App.-Waco 1997, orig. proceeding). Moreover, because the client may elect to
waive the privilege at any time, a governmental body must explain the confidentiality of a
communication has been maintained. Section 552.107( 1) generally excepts an entire
communication that is demonstrated to be protected by the attorney-client privilege unless
otherwise waived by the governmental body. See Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 923
(Tex. 1996) (privilege extends to entire communication, including facts contained therein).

You state the information you have marked Exhibit B consists of communications between
attorneys for the city, city employees and officials, and other privileged parties, that were
made for the purpose of providing legal services to the city. You state the communications
were intended to be confidential and have remained confidential. Based on your
representations and our review, we find the submitted information consists of privileged
attorney-client communications the city may generally withhold under section 552.107(1)
of the Government Code. We note, however, some of these otherwise privileged e-mail
strings include e-mails received from or sent to a non-privileged party. Furthermore, if the
e-mails received from or sent to the non-privileged party are removed from the otherwise
privileged e-mail strings in which they appear and stand alone, they are responsive to the
request for information. Therefore, if these non-privileged e-mails, which we have marked,
are maintained by the city separate and apart from the otherwise privileged e-mail strings
in which they appear, then the city may not withhold these non-privileged e-mails under
section 552.107(1), but instead must release them. 1

1
We note the information being released contains an e-mail address to which the requestor has a right of
access under section 552.137(b) of the Government Code. See Gov't Code § 552. I 37(b ). However, Open
Records Decision No. 684 (2009) is a previous determination authorizing all governmental bodies to withhold
specific categories ofinformation without the. necessity ofrequesting an attorney general decision, including
e-mail addresses of members ofthe public under section 552.137 of the Government Code. Thus, if the city
receives another request for this same information from a person who does not have a right of access to it,
Open Records Decision No. 684 authorizes the city to redact the requestor's e-mail address without the
necessity ofrequesting an attorney general decision.
 Exhibit B13
Citizen Email Exchange
With City Secretary
June 20, 2019
Open Record Request # 052419-A
9 messages

Saundra Passailaigue <s.pass@leonvalleytexas.gov> Thu, Jun 20, 2019 at 3:14 PM

To:

Good afternoon

You are receiving this email in response to your response to the cost estimate you received.

I just received you pre-payment of the production of the records based on the cost estimate. You state in your letter that you feel you are being overcharged. I would like to emphasize that this is an estimate. I would also like to let
you know that this took several staff and Council hours to go through their email accounts to provide the email to me. I personally had to work this past Saturday for 13 hours and all day Monday was spent on reviewing over
2000 pages of emails that were provided to me on flash drives just for your request alone. Then I had to print them and sort them by what was releasable to you now, and what had to go to the Attorney General due to attorney –
client privilege.

I already explained to you that some of the items were provided to you via email and at no charge because they were items I already had scanned and stored on my computer in files. This was done as a courtesy to you and to
anyone who asks for those records because we aim to be transparent and to serve. The cost estimate does not include the items that I sent to the Attorney General; it is only for the documents that are releasable to you now.

You make a comment about you not asking for paper copies and asking why I am “charging you for paper copies”. That is correct. You did not ask for “paper” copies but you did ask for copies so that is what I have prepared for
you. If you do not want paper copies you may modify your request and I will only be charging you for labor. Whatever you choose to do is up to you.

Lastly, I will say again, this is a cost estimate. Now that I have received your payment, I will have to scan in all of the releasable documents and review and make any necessary redactions that I am legally allowed to make without
seeking an opinion from the Attorney General and while I am doing that I will be removing any duplicates or blank pages to get an exact cost for you. The cost may be less than the amount provided to you in the estimate and if
that is the case you would receive a refund of whatever that amount due you would be.

I hope that clarifies things for you.

Saundra Passailaigue, TRMC

City Secretary

6400 El Verde Rd

Leon Valley, Texas 78238

Tele 210-684-1391 Ext. 216

Fax 210-684-4476

www.leonvalleytexas.gov

The information in this email may be confidential and/or privileged. This email is intended to be reviewed by only the individual or organization named above. If you are not the intended recipient or an
authorized representative of the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, dissemination or copying of this email and its attachments, if any, or the information contained herein is
prohibited. If you have received this email in error, please immediately notify the sender by return email and delete this email from your system.

Thu, Jun 20, 2019 at 4:51 PM

To: Saundra Passailaigue <s.pass@leonvalleytexas.gov>

Saundra,

Thank you for your response. Please know that you are not legally allowed to charge for the hours that council members spend, as they are not employees of the city. They aren't on payroll. Additionally, I do not believe you can
charge for time writing letters to me, consulting with Denise regarding legal opinions, or communicating/ gathering data/ submitting to the Texas AGs office.

I do understand that you are overwhelmed and overworked, and I empathize with you. I understand that many of the records requests are related to something that you are entirely unable to control and I know you are an
extremely hard working employee, and deserve to be rewarded for it. has relayed to me how hard working of an employee you are. If the manager, police chief, and others tried to stop playing dirty politics and acting ugly to
many members of our community, I imagine your work load would significantly diminish.

It was not clear in your letter that the $550.00 was solely for information you currently had that is "releasable", and that I will be charged more in the future when the attorney general offers their opinion. I was under the
impression this estimate was all-inclusive. Now it's especially hard to understand how there is 25 hours worth of work for only a small portion of my request - - maybe when I see the information with all of the redactions, I will
understand. But also, I do know (because people in our community talk) that other citizens have requested overlapping information. I hope you are not charging unfairly, or double charging for the same data. If many people
request it, I could see how it could be "for the public good" and maybe should just be posted on the website.

Unfortunately, I am a member of the community, and am legally allowed to request public documents. I don't mind paying the appropriate dollar amounts for the work that it takes to compile them. I also pay a significant amount
of taxes through my business (of which I have a small amount of warehouse property in Leon Valley city limits), through my own spending at businesses locally, and related to my mortgage in the form of property taxes. I expect
government to work for the people. (This principle is at the beginning of the Texas Constitution- "all political power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for their benefit".
If Kelly Kuenstler had everything the way she liked it, it would say "all political power is inherent in the city staff that is employed by the people". Unfortunately, it doesn't say that.

Also, please don't think that I request documents to "request them" or be an annoyance or anything. I hope that you know that I actually read every single document that you give to me, and analyze documents in their entirety.
Most of them I end up printing and highlighting all over them. I am spending literally hundreds of hours (unpaid) helping some other members of my community face-up against city staff and fellow council members that are
obviously on a vendetta to oust them. I may not have even voted for Benny and know that he doesn't have the most perfect demeanor. But that doesn't change the fact that much of what is occurring to him is completely unjust. I
don't just believe this - - - I KNOW this. Additionally, myself along with many other members of our community have a very comprehensive strategy for how we are (legally) going to make the government work "for the people"
instead of against them. I'm 100% confident you will be aware of many elements of the strategy in the weeks following when Benny is (likely) voted off council.
 City Secretary
6400 El Verde Rd
Leon Valley, Texas 78238
Tele:210-684-1391 Ext. 216
Fax: 210-684-4476
www.leonvalleytexas.gov

The information in this email may be confidential and/or privileged. This email is intended to be reviewed by only the individual or organization named above. If you are not the intended recipient or an authorized representative
of the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, dissemination or copying of this email and its attachments, if any, or the information contained herein is prohibited. If you have received this email in error,
please immediately notify the sender by return email and delete this email from your system.

From:
Sent: Sunday, June 23, 2019 3:58 PM

[Quoted text hidden]

[Quoted text hidden]

Sun, Jun 23, 2019 at 6:12 PM

To: Saundra Passailaigue <s.pass@leonvalleytexas.gov>

Saundra, I'm not attempting to threaten you. Applying pressure to you, so that you give me public records in accordance with Texas law, is not a threat. I'm simply informing you of my rights, let you know - that I know my rights,
and let you know what I will do if I can't obtain them "promptly" and get a definite date.

I mailed the check on the 19th (which is the day that the AGs office uses, not when you receive it). You had originally told me that you would respond to the open records request submitted on May 24, Part 3, by the 10th of June.
You did not give me this document, with the estimate of charges, until the 17th. You submitted half of the documents to the AGs office apparently, and could have sent me the estimate the same time. As a result of the one week
delay, it appears as a stall tactic.

I care deeply about an important member of our community losing his rights to liberty (through removing him from a duly elected position). Because I'm helping him prepare, I'm attempting to obtain documents "promptly" in
accordance with Texas Law. I submitted a request ONE MONTH ago, have an entire portion (containing the majority of documents) of the request not-fulfilled, and have provided payment.

Can I have simply have a definite date? That is what I want. As always. I prefer digital copies of everything. If that's not possible, let me know what documents would be contained in which forms.

Perhaps you should reach out to your boss, Kelly, and tell her that you are so overworked? I don't have a youtube account. You don't need to give me sarcastic remarks in an effort to dissuade me from trying to obtain
documents grated to me by Texas law. You have had the request for over 4 weeks.

Again, I'm only trying to get documents in accordance with Texas Law, and am only helping a council member that represents me - - whom the city is trying to remove liberty from.

I'm certain if someone was trying to take away the liberties of a person you cared about, you would understand.

Thanks for your work,

[Quoted text hidden]

 Exhibit B14
Lion’s Roar
Volume 17, Issue 2
 Exhibit C1
Recall Petition
Donna Charles
 Exhibit C2
CHANGELEONVALLEY.COM
Website Screenshot
 Exhibit C3
The Change Leon Valley Project
Facebook Page Screenshot
Exhibit C4
Postcard
 Exhibit C5
Check Reconciliation Register
Council Agenda Packet
September 17, 2019
 8/31/2019 1:36 PM CHECK RECONCILIATION REGISTER PAGE: 3
COMPANY: 999 - Pooled Cash CHECK DATE: 8/01/2019 THRU
2.2.a
ACCOUNT: 112010 Pooled Cash CLEAR DATE: 0/00/0000 THRU 9
TYPE: Check STATEMENT: 0/00/0000 THRU 99/99/9999
STATUS: All VOIDED DATE: 0/00/0000 THRU 99/99/999
FOLIO: A, B, C, F, G, H, I, J, L, M, N, O, R, S, T, U, W, Y AMOUNT: 0.00 THRU 999,999,999.9
CHECK NUMBER: 000000 THRU 99999

ACCOUNT --DATE-- --TYPE-- NUMBER ---------DESCRIPTION---------- ----AMOUNT--- STATUS FOLIO CLEAR DATE

CHECK: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
112010 8/08/2019 CHECK 086505 BETTY LOU SCHROEDER PHD C 200.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/08/2019 CHECK 086506 SHARP ELECTRONICS 42.91CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/08/2019 CHECK 086507 SURE-LOCK AND SAFE 270.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/08/2019 CHECK 086508 SYLVIA HERRERA 75.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/08/2019 CHECK 086509 TIME WARNER CABLE 975.12CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000

Attachment: August 2019 Check Register (Monthly Financial Report August 2019)
112010 8/08/2019 CHECK 086510 TOSA BLANKS & MORE INC 138.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/08/2019 CHECK 086511 TRACKER SOFTWARE CORP 3,000.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/08/2019 CHECK 086512 TYLER TECHNOLOGIES, INC 300.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/08/2019 CHECK 086513 VALLANCE SECURITY SYSTEMS, INC 31.50CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/08/2019 CHECK 086514 WELDERS SUPPLY CO INC 26.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/08/2019 CHECK 086515 DON GREEN 546.53CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
*** 112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086517 MICHAEL SHOEMAKER 90.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086518 ADRIAN REYNA 50.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086519 AIR SHELTERS USA, LLC 83.91CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086520 ALAMO TRUCK GEAR 17,522.83CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086521 ALTAWORX, LLC 3,501.37CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086522 ALTEX ELECTRONICS, INC 75.85CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086523 ANGEL FIRE & SAFETY, LLC 65.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086524 AT&T 462.24CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086525 VOID CHECK 0.00 OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086526 AUTOWORKS, INC. 114.75CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086527 BAKER & TAYLOR INC 195.49CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086528 VOID CHECK 0.00 OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086529 DONALD R BANIS 7,315.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086530 BEXAR CO. ELECTIONS ADMIN 15.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086531 BOUND TREE MEDICAL, LLC 2,128.21CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086532 CHRISTUS HEALTH SANTA ROSA HEA 800.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086533 CINTHYA BERNAL 400.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086534 CITYWIDE INVESTIGATIONS & SECU 337.50CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086535 CODE BLUE POLICE SUPPLY 70.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086536 CULLIGAN WATER CONDITIONING OF 130.70CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086537 DAILEY AND WELLS COMMUNICATION 241.25CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086538 DAVID EDWARDS, PhD 396.50CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086539 DAVID JORDAN 396.50CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086540 DIAMONDS OF DESTINY 250.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086541 DIANA VILLANUEVA 400.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086542 EBSCO INFORMATION SERVICES 1,128.05CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086543 ELLIOTT ELECTRIC SUPPLY 27.80CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086544 EMERGICON, LLC. 1,915.45CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086545 FARRWEST ENVIRONMENTAL SUPPLY 357.95CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086546 FEDEX OFFICE PRINT & SHIP SERV 11.03CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086547 GALLS, LLC 1,681.21CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086548 VOID CHECK 0.00 OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086549 GRAINGER INC 12.59CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000

Packet Pg. 19
 8/31/2019 1:36 PM CHECK RECONCILIATION REGISTER PAGE: 5
COMPANY: 999 - Pooled Cash CHECK DATE: 8/01/2019 THRU
2.2.a
ACCOUNT: 112010 Pooled Cash CLEAR DATE: 0/00/0000 THRU 9
TYPE: Check STATEMENT: 0/00/0000 THRU 99/99/9999
STATUS: All VOIDED DATE: 0/00/0000 THRU 99/99/999
FOLIO: A, B, C, F, G, H, I, J, L, M, N, O, R, S, T, U, W, Y AMOUNT: 0.00 THRU 999,999,999.9
CHECK NUMBER: 000000 THRU 99999

ACCOUNT --DATE-- --TYPE-- NUMBER ---------DESCRIPTION---------- ----AMOUNT--- STATUS FOLIO CLEAR DATE

CHECK: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086594 YP HOLDINGS 127.52CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086595 INGRAM LIBRARY SERVICES LLC 1,252.01CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086596 VOID CHECK 0.00 OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086597 VOID CHECK 0.00 OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086598 VOID CHECK 0.00 OUTSTND A 0/00/0000

Attachment: August 2019 Check Register (Monthly Financial Report August 2019)
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086599 VOID CHECK 0.00 OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086600 VOID CHECK 0.00 OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086601 VOID CHECK 0.00 OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086602 NAPA SAN ANTONIO AUTO & TRUCK 445.68CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/15/2019 CHECK 086603 VOID CHECK 0.00 OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/16/2019 CHECK 086604 ICMA RETIREMENT CORP #301977 3,473.50CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/16/2019 CHECK 086605 LEON VALLEY FD HOUSE FUND 210.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086606 GRANDE TRUCK CENTER 51,706.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/20/2019 CHECK 086607 REFUND: KYRISH, G MICHAEL 7.09CR OUTSTND U 0/00/0000
112010 8/20/2019 CHECK 086608 REFUND: KLIESING, ANNA 19.12CR OUTSTND U 0/00/0000
112010 8/20/2019 CHECK 086609 REFUND: BANZ, EDWARD 28.62CR OUTSTND U 0/00/0000
112010 8/20/2019 CHECK 086610 REFUND: SOPHUS PROPERTIES 40.63CR OUTSTND U 0/00/0000
112010 8/20/2019 CHECK 086611 REFUND: CHAMBERS, NANCY 32.13CR OUTSTND U 0/00/0000
112010 8/20/2019 CHECK 086612 REFUND: HENDRICKS PROPERTY MGM 23.52CR OUTSTND U 0/00/0000
112010 8/20/2019 CHECK 086613 REFUND: THACKER, BEN & KIM 10.34CR OUTSTND U 0/00/0000
112010 8/20/2019 CHECK 086614 REFUND: TANG-CHU, SHUI WAN 5.11CR OUTSTND U 0/00/0000
112010 8/20/2019 CHECK 086615 REFUND: SELECT PROPERTY MGMT 27.61CR OUTSTND U 0/00/0000
112010 8/20/2019 CHECK 086616 REFUND: GARCIA, MISTY 45.17CR OUTSTND U 0/00/0000
112010 8/20/2019 CHECK 086617 REFUND: CLARK, LAUREN 16.06CR OUTSTND U 0/00/0000
112010 8/20/2019 CHECK 086618 REFUND: MPS 19.99CR OUTSTND U 0/00/0000
112010 8/20/2019 CHECK 086619 REFUND: JACK BIEGGER REALTORS 32.92CR OUTSTND U 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086620 CARLIN, ERIC J 10.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086621 10 WEST TACTICAL 567.75CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086622 5.11 SATX1 220.49CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086623 HENRY LOPEZ 2,100.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086624 AARON'S GARAGE DOOR SERVICE LL 882.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086625 AGENCY 405 5.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086626 ALAMO AREA COUNCIL OF GVM 80.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086627 ALBERT URESTI, MPA, PCC 16.75CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086628 ARMANDO MONTOYA 175.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086629 AMERICAN HERITAGE LIFE INSURAN 2,438.06CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086630 ANDY GRIEGO 20.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086631 AT&T 36.81CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086632 AT&T MOBILITY 75.98CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086633 AT&T UVERSE 220.59CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086634 AUDIO VISUAL AIDS CO 125.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086635 AUTOWORKS, INC. 849.38CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086636 VOID CHECK 0.00 OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086637 AVESIS THIRD PARTY ADMIN, INC 666.96CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000

Packet Pg. 21
 8/31/2019 1:36 PM CHECK RECONCILIATION REGISTER PAGE: 6
COMPANY: 999 - Pooled Cash CHECK DATE: 8/01/2019 THRU
2.2.a
ACCOUNT: 112010 Pooled Cash CLEAR DATE: 0/00/0000 THRU 9
TYPE: Check STATEMENT: 0/00/0000 THRU 99/99/9999
STATUS: All VOIDED DATE: 0/00/0000 THRU 99/99/999
FOLIO: A, B, C, F, G, H, I, J, L, M, N, O, R, S, T, U, W, Y AMOUNT: 0.00 THRU 999,999,999.9
CHECK NUMBER: 000000 THRU 99999

ACCOUNT --DATE-- --TYPE-- NUMBER ---------DESCRIPTION---------- ----AMOUNT--- STATUS FOLIO CLEAR DATE

CHECK: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086638 BARCOM TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS 4,413.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086639 STEPHEN J BARSCEWSKI 905.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086640 BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF TX 79,538.13CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086641 VOID CHECK 0.00 OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086642 VOID CHECK 0.00 OUTSTND A 0/00/0000

Attachment: August 2019 Check Register (Monthly Financial Report August 2019)
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086643 BOUND TREE MEDICAL, LLC 1,779.90CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086644 BRAVO EXCAVATION AND CONSTRUCT 5,100.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086645 CARAHSOFT TECECHNOLOGY CORP 117.39CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086646 CINTAS CORPORATION NO. 2 461.54CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086647 CITY PUBLIC SERVICE BOARD 20,391.61CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086648 VOID CHECK 0.00 OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086649 CREDIT SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL I 71.50CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086650 DAILEY AND WELLS COMMUNICATION 1,031.53CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086651 DAVID DIMALINE 28.08CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086652 DISCOVERY BENEFITS, INC. 133.50CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086653 DSHS CENTRAL LAB MC1982 207.70CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086654 ELLIOTT ELECTRIC SUPPLY 55.60CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086655 EXPRESS EMPLOYMENT PROFESSIONA 3,735.15CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086656 VOID CHECK 0.00 OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086657 FEDEX OFFICE PRINT & SHIP SERV 12.50CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086658 GALLS, LLC 1,077.92CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086659 VOID CHECK 0.00 OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086660 GRAINGER INC 397.22CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086661 HEALTH CARE SERVICE CORP 70.79CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086662 HELOTES ECHO 530.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086663 HOME DEPOT CREDIT SERVICES 2,548.12CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086664 VOID CHECK 0.00 OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086665 VOID CHECK 0.00 OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086666 VOID CHECK 0.00 OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086667 VOID CHECK 0.00 OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086668 VOID CHECK 0.00 OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086669 VOID CHECK 0.00 OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086670 VOID CHECK 0.00 OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086671 VOID CHECK 0.00 OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086672 JOHN ROBERT KUEHL 48.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086673 INTERSTATE ALL BATTERY CENTER 1,348.60CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086674 JIM ORTIZ 174.34CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086675 JRO ELECTRICAL SERVICES LLC. 2,895.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086676 LAW OFFICE OF ISRAEL GARCIA 1.15CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086677 LOGICAL MGMT SOLUTIONS, INC. 357.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086678 VOID CHECK 0.00 OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086679 VOID CHECK 0.00 OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086680 MARTIN MARIETTA MATERIALS 160.38CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/22/2019 CHECK 086681 METROLPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE C 1,115.80CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000

Packet Pg. 22
 8/31/2019 1:36 PM CHECK RECONCILIATION REGISTER PAGE: 8
COMPANY: 999 - Pooled Cash CHECK DATE: 8/01/2019 THRU
2.2.a
ACCOUNT: 112010 Pooled Cash CLEAR DATE: 0/00/0000 THRU 9
TYPE: Check STATEMENT: 0/00/0000 THRU 99/99/9999
STATUS: All VOIDED DATE: 0/00/0000 THRU 99/99/999
FOLIO: A, B, C, F, G, H, I, J, L, M, N, O, R, S, T, U, W, Y AMOUNT: 0.00 THRU 999,999,999.9
CHECK NUMBER: 000000 THRU 99999

ACCOUNT --DATE-- --TYPE-- NUMBER ---------DESCRIPTION---------- ----AMOUNT--- STATUS FOLIO CLEAR DATE

CHECK: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
112010 8/29/2019 CHECK 086726 LESLIE ANN KASSAHN 1,500.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/29/2019 CHECK 086727 LINEBARGER GOGGAN BLAIR & SAMP 15,476.84CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/29/2019 CHECK 086728 LNV, INC. 51,450.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/29/2019 CHECK 086729 DRAGO INVESTMENTS LTD 29.75CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/29/2019 CHECK 086730 LAWRENCE G MORALES 1,350.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000

Attachment: August 2019 Check Register (Monthly Financial Report August 2019)
112010 8/29/2019 CHECK 086731 ROSEMARY OPARA 75.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/29/2019 CHECK 086732 SAN ANTONIO POOL MANAGEMENT, I 892.59CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/29/2019 CHECK 086733 SETH GARCIA 25.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/29/2019 CHECK 086734 STONE & SOIL DEPOT, INC 265.65CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/29/2019 CHECK 086735 T-MOBILE USA 1,185.27CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/29/2019 CHECK 086736 TMC PROVIDER GROUP, PLLC 232.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/29/2019 CHECK 086737 TIME WARNER CABLE 135.65CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/29/2019 CHECK 086738 VALLANCE SECURITY SYSTEMS, INC 126.50CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/30/2019 CHECK 086739 ICMA RETIREMENT CORP #301977 3,473.50CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/30/2019 CHECK 086740 LEON VALLEY FD HOUSE FUND 210.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 8/30/2019 CHECK 086741 Leon Valley Professional Fire 495.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000

TOTALS FOR ACCOUNT 112010 CHECK TOTAL: 756,318.89CR

DEPOSIT TOTAL: 0.00
INTEREST TOTAL: 0.00
MISCELLANEOUS TOTAL: 0.00
SERVICE CHARGE TOTAL: 0.00
EFT TOTAL: 0.00
BANK-DRAFT TOTAL: 0.00

TOTALS FOR Pooled Cash CHECK TOTAL: 756,318.89CR

DEPOSIT TOTAL: 0.00
INTEREST TOTAL: 0.00
MISCELLANEOUS TOTAL: 0.00
SERVICE CHARGE TOTAL: 0.00
EFT TOTAL: 0.00
BANK-DRAFT TOTAL: 0.00

Packet Pg. 24
 Exhibit C6
Check Reconciliation Register
Council Agenda Packet
October 15, 2019
10/10/2019 11:42 AM CHECK RECONCILIATION REGISTER PAGE: 2
COMPANY: 999 - Pooled Cash CHECK DATE: 9/01/2019 THRU
2.3.a
ACCOUNT: 112010 Pooled Cash CLEAR DATE: 0/00/0000 THRU 9
TYPE: Check STATEMENT: 0/00/0000 THRU 99/99/9999
STATUS: All VOIDED DATE: 0/00/0000 THRU 99/99/999
FOLIO: A AMOUNT: 0.00 THRU 999,999,999.9
CHECK NUMBER: 000000 THRU 99999

ACCOUNT --DATE-- --TYPE-- NUMBER ---------DESCRIPTION---------- ----AMOUNT--- STATUS FOLIO CLEAR DATE

CHECK: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Attachment: CR Check Reconciliation Register - 8371 (Monthly Financial Report Ending September 30, 2019)
112010 9/05/2019 CHECK 086786 TIME WARNER CABLE 975.12CR POSTED A 9/16/2019
112010 9/05/2019 CHECK 086787 TIREHUB LLC 1,041.36CR POSTED A 9/16/2019
112010 9/05/2019 CHECK 086788 TODD MORGAN 42.00CR POSTED A 9/16/2019
112010 9/05/2019 CHECK 086789 TOYOTA OF BOERNE 75.00CR POSTED A 9/16/2019
112010 9/05/2019 CHECK 086790 VALLANCE SECURITY SYSTEMS, INC 41.50CR POSTED A 9/16/2019
112010 9/05/2019 CHECK 086791 VOSS LIGHTING 120.00CR POSTED A 9/16/2019
112010 9/05/2019 CHECK 086792 WELDERS SUPPLY CO INC 79.04CR POSTED A 9/16/2019
112010 9/05/2019 CHECK 086793 YU CHEN 75.00CR POSTED A 9/20/2019
112010 9/05/2019 CHECK 086794 Z BEST CARPET & TILE CLEANING 338.00CR POSTED A 9/16/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086795 PARK PLACE RECREATION DESIGNS, 152,097.00CR CLEARED A 10/10/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086796 ADVANCE AUTO PARTS INC 198.94CR POSTED A 9/17/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086797 VOID CHECK 0.00 POSTED A 9/16/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086798 ALAMO AREA COUNCIL OF GVM 95.00CR POSTED A 9/24/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086799 ALAMO DOOR SYSTEMS OF TEXAS, I 120.00CR POSTED A 9/19/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086800 ALAMO TRUCK GEAR 1,079.66CR POSTED A 9/17/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086801 ALBERT URESTI, MPA, PCC 15.00CR POSTED A 10/01/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086802 ELIZABETH LONGORIA 258.96CR POSTED A 9/21/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086803 ANGEL FIRE & SAFETY, LLC 65.00CR POSTED A 9/18/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086804 AT&T MOBILITY 1,040.99CR POSTED A 9/19/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086805 AUTOWORKS, INC. 447.71CR POSTED A 9/20/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086806 VOID CHECK 0.00 POSTED A 9/16/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086807 DONALD R BANIS 7,580.00CR POSTED A 9/16/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086808 BARCOM TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS 7,375.00CR POSTED A 9/17/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086809 BB INSPECTION SERVICES, LLC 10,285.00CR POSTED A 9/17/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086810 BEXAR APPRAISAL DISTRICT 5,613.00CR POSTED A 9/19/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086811 BLUETARP FINANCIAL 84.99CR POSTED A 9/17/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086812 CINTAS CORPORATION NO. 2 461.54CR POSTED A 9/20/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086813 CORE & MAIN LP 14,408.32CR POSTED A 9/19/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086814 CULLIGAN WATER CONDITIONING OF 95.80CR POSTED A 9/17/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086815 DE LA GARZA FENCE CO INC 350.00CR POSTED A 9/20/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086816 DIAMOND SHINE LLC 930.00CR POSTED A 9/19/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086817 ERIKA HOLGUIN 75.00CR POSTED A 9/17/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086818 EXPRESS EMPLOYMENT PROFESSIONA 3,374.40CR POSTED A 9/17/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086819 VOID CHECK 0.00 POSTED A 9/16/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086820 GALLS, LLC 1,266.03CR POSTED A 9/19/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086821 GILBERT'S UTILITY AND CONCRETE 60,873.20CR POSTED A 9/17/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086822 GRAINGER INC 20.92CR POSTED A 9/18/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086823 GRANICUS, LLC. 458.33CR POSTED A 9/18/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086824 HELOTES ECHO 735.00CR POSTED A 9/17/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086825 JOHN H SOROLA INC 61.65CR POSTED A 9/17/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086826 JOSE ORTIZ 2,205.95CR POSTED A 9/17/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086827 JRO ELECTRICAL SERVICES LLC. 1,050.00CR POSTED A 9/16/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086828 LNV, INC. 7,575.85CR POSTED A 9/17/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086829 VOID CHECK 0.00 POSTED A 9/16/2019

Packet Pg. 17
10/10/2019 11:42 AM CHECK RECONCILIATION REGISTER PAGE: 3
COMPANY: 999 - Pooled Cash CHECK DATE: 9/01/2019 THRU
2.3.a
ACCOUNT: 112010 Pooled Cash CLEAR DATE: 0/00/0000 THRU 9
TYPE: Check STATEMENT: 0/00/0000 THRU 99/99/9999
STATUS: All VOIDED DATE: 0/00/0000 THRU 99/99/999
FOLIO: A AMOUNT: 0.00 THRU 999,999,999.9
CHECK NUMBER: 000000 THRU 99999

ACCOUNT --DATE-- --TYPE-- NUMBER ---------DESCRIPTION---------- ----AMOUNT--- STATUS FOLIO CLEAR DATE

CHECK: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Attachment: CR Check Reconciliation Register - 8371 (Monthly Financial Report Ending September 30, 2019)
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086830 NAPA SAN ANTONIO AUTO & TRUCK 464.63CR POSTED A 9/20/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086831 VOID CHECK 0.00 POSTED A 9/16/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086832 NARDIS PUBLIC SAFETY 1,125.77CR POSTED A 9/18/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086833 NORTHWEST CLEANING SERVICES 1,461.00CR POSTED A 9/17/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086834 OFFICE DEPOT BUSINESS SVC 221.94CR POSTED A 9/20/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086835 PEDIATRIC DENTISTRY 50.00CR POSTED A 9/18/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086836 POLLARDWATER 2,769.08CR POSTED A 9/17/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086837 RANDY RAMIREZ 75.00CR POSTED A 9/17/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086838 SAFESITE, INC 191.25CR POSTED A 9/18/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086839 SAMS CLUB BRC PLCC 314.07CR POSTED A 9/20/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086840 SAN ANTONIO BRAKE & CLUTCH SVC 41.34CR POSTED A 9/19/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086841 SAWS 133,171.26CR POSTED A 9/17/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086842 SHARP ELECTRONICS 220.75CR POSTED A 9/19/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086843 STAPLES BUSINESS CREDIT 777.00CR POSTED A 9/17/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086844 STONE & SOIL DEPOT, INC 392.00CR POSTED A 9/17/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086845 TEN400, LLC 6,300.00CR CLEARED A 10/08/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086846 TMC PROVIDER GROUP, PLLC 521.00CR POSTED A 9/17/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086847 TEXAS MUNICIPAL EQUIPMENT LLC 2,263.18CR POSTED A 9/17/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086848 TIME WARNER CABLE 218.44CR POSTED A 9/25/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086849 TOSA BLANKS & MORE INC 480.00CR POSTED A 9/21/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086850 TRANSUNION RISK & ALTERNATIVE 159.20CR POSTED A 9/17/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086851 TYLER TECHNOLOGIES, INC 2,928.17CR POSTED A 9/17/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086852 VULCAN CONSTUCTION MATERIALS, 232.10CR POSTED A 9/17/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086853 WELDERS SUPPLY CO INC 26.00CR POSTED A 9/21/2019
112010 9/12/2019 CHECK 086854 WILL FIX IT 100.00CR POSTED A 9/18/2019
*** 112010 9/13/2019 CHECK 086858 ICMA RETIREMENT CORP #301977 3,473.50CR POSTED A 9/19/2019
112010 9/13/2019 CHECK 086859 LEON VALLEY FD HOUSE FUND 210.00CR POSTED A 9/25/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086860 ALAMO AREA COUNCIL OF GVM 100.00CR POSTED A 10/01/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086861 ALAMO TRUCK GEAR 12,240.32CR POSTED A 9/21/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086862 VOID CHECK 0.00 POSTED A 9/18/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086863 ALTAWORX, LLC 3,505.00CR POSTED A 9/25/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086864 ALTEX ELECTRONICS, INC 164.60CR POSTED A 9/25/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086865 AMERICAN HERITAGE LIFE INSURAN 1,219.03CR POSTED A 9/25/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086866 AT&T 501.52CR POSTED A 9/25/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086867 VOID CHECK 0.00 POSTED A 9/18/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086868 AT&T MOBILITY 173.47CR POSTED A 9/24/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086869 AUTOWORKS, INC. 53.78CR POSTED A 9/26/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086870 AVESIS THIRD PARTY ADMIN, INC 691.61CR POSTED A 9/24/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086871 AXON ENTERPRISE, INC. 189,932.40CR POSTED A 9/25/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086872 BARCOM TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS 25.00CR POSTED A 9/24/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086873 BATTERIES + BULBS SA 44.95CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086874 BEXAR COUNTY CLERK: CRIME LAB 2,161.00CR POSTED A 9/26/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086875 BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF TX 82,135.28CR POSTED A 9/24/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086876 VOID CHECK 0.00 POSTED A 9/18/2019

Packet Pg. 18
10/10/2019 11:42 AM CHECK RECONCILIATION REGISTER PAGE: 4
COMPANY: 999 - Pooled Cash CHECK DATE: 9/01/2019 THRU
2.3.a
ACCOUNT: 112010 Pooled Cash CLEAR DATE: 0/00/0000 THRU 9
TYPE: Check STATEMENT: 0/00/0000 THRU 99/99/9999
STATUS: All VOIDED DATE: 0/00/0000 THRU 99/99/999
FOLIO: A AMOUNT: 0.00 THRU 999,999,999.9
CHECK NUMBER: 000000 THRU 99999

ACCOUNT --DATE-- --TYPE-- NUMBER ---------DESCRIPTION---------- ----AMOUNT--- STATUS FOLIO CLEAR DATE

CHECK: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Attachment: CR Check Reconciliation Register - 8371 (Monthly Financial Report Ending September 30, 2019)
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086877 VOID CHECK 0.00 POSTED A 9/18/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086878 BLUETARP FINANCIAL 52.99CR POSTED A 9/24/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086879 BOUND TREE MEDICAL, LLC 3,764.62CR POSTED A 9/28/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086880 BRAVO EXCAVATION AND CONSTRUCT 11,000.00CR POSTED A 9/25/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086881 C&M LOCKSMITH & RIMFIRE SECURI 1,998.30CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086882 CARA HARRISON 50.00CR CLEARED A 10/05/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086883 CINTAS CORPORATION NO. 2 230.77CR POSTED A 9/28/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086884 CITIBANK 7,856.40CR POSTED A 9/24/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086885 VOID CHECK 0.00 POSTED A 9/18/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086886 VOID CHECK 0.00 POSTED A 9/18/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086887 CORE & MAIN LP 381.20CR POSTED A 9/26/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086888 DAVID K YOUNG CONSULTING, LLC 418.00CR POSTED A 9/25/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086889 VOID CHECK 0.00 POSTED A 9/18/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086890 VOID CHECK 0.00 POSTED A 9/18/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086891 VOID CHECK 0.00 POSTED A 9/18/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086892 DAVIDSON TROILO REAM & GARZA 729.00CR POSTED A 9/24/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086893 DE LA GARZA FENCE CO INC 150.00CR POSTED A 10/01/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086894 DENTON NAVARRO ROCHA BERNAL & 1,086.03CR POSTED A 9/24/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086895 DEWINNE EQUIPMENT CO, INC 314.95CR CLEARED A 10/03/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086896 DISCOVERY BENEFITS, INC. 66.75CR POSTED A 9/25/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086897 EMERGICON, LLC. 1,641.00CR POSTED A 9/26/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086898 GALLS, LLC 1,207.43CR POSTED A 9/24/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086899 GRAINGER INC 47.28CR POSTED A 9/25/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086900 GRANDE TRUCK CENTER 650.00CR POSTED A 9/21/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086901 GULF COAST PAPER CO INC 24.00CR POSTED A 9/24/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086902 HEALTH CARE SERVICE CORP 70.79CR POSTED A 9/24/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086903 HOME DEPOT CREDIT SERVICES 3,156.79CR POSTED A 9/24/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086904 VOID CHECK 0.00 POSTED A 9/18/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086905 VOID CHECK 0.00 POSTED A 9/18/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086906 VOID CHECK 0.00 POSTED A 9/18/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086907 VOID CHECK 0.00 POSTED A 9/18/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086908 VOID CHECK 0.00 POSTED A 9/18/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086909 VOID CHECK 0.00 POSTED A 9/18/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086910 JOHN ROBERT KUEHL 48.00CR POSTED A 9/25/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086911 IIMC-INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE 170.00CR POSTED A 9/28/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086912 IMAGE 360 SAN ANTONIO WEST 551.70CR POSTED A 9/26/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086913 JOEL URDIALES 164.46CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086914 KENDALL COUNTY 100.00CR CLEARED A 10/05/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086915 LEROY MARTINEZ 25.00CR POSTED A 9/25/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086916 MARIA ELENA ELIZONDO 1,000.00CR POSTED A 9/24/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086917 MARTIN MARIETTA MATERIALS 118.50CR POSTED A 9/24/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086918 MATPRINT LP 190.00CR CLEARED A 10/05/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086919 MATPRINT LP 295.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086920 MEDPRO WASTE DISPOSAL, LLC. 65.75CR POSTED A 9/25/2019

Packet Pg. 19
10/10/2019 11:42 AM CHECK RECONCILIATION REGISTER PAGE: 5
COMPANY: 999 - Pooled Cash CHECK DATE: 9/01/2019 THRU
2.3.a
ACCOUNT: 112010 Pooled Cash CLEAR DATE: 0/00/0000 THRU 9
TYPE: Check STATEMENT: 0/00/0000 THRU 99/99/9999
STATUS: All VOIDED DATE: 0/00/0000 THRU 99/99/999
FOLIO: A AMOUNT: 0.00 THRU 999,999,999.9
CHECK NUMBER: 000000 THRU 99999

ACCOUNT --DATE-- --TYPE-- NUMBER ---------DESCRIPTION---------- ----AMOUNT--- STATUS FOLIO CLEAR DATE

CHECK: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Attachment: CR Check Reconciliation Register - 8371 (Monthly Financial Report Ending September 30, 2019)
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086921 METROLPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE C 1,125.60CR POSTED A 9/25/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086922 VOID CHECK 0.00 POSTED A 9/18/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086923 VOID CHECK 0.00 POSTED A 9/18/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086924 LAWRENCE G MORALES 1,750.00CR POSTED A 9/24/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086925 NAFECO INC 2,893.20CR POSTED A 9/24/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086926 OFFICE DEPOT BUSINESS SVC 435.88CR POSTED A 9/28/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086927 OVERDRIVE, INC. 3,000.00CR POSTED A 9/27/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086928 PETROLEUM TRADERS 1,693.14CR POSTED A 9/25/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086929 WALLGREN ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICE 338.00CR POSTED A 9/24/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086930 RIDGEMONT COMMERCIAL 1,065.00CR POSTED A 9/24/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086931 SAN ANTONIO WATER SYSTEM 2,163.13CR POSTED A 9/21/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086932 SERVICE UNIFORM RENTAL 441.69CR POSTED A 9/26/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086933 SITEONE LANDSCAPE SUPPLY, LLC 270.46CR POSTED A 9/27/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086934 SPOK, INC 9.50CR POSTED A 9/24/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086935 T & W TIRE 2,422.00CR POSTED A 9/25/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086936 TEN400, LLC 32,050.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086937 TMC PROVIDER GROUP, PLLC 204.00CR POSTED A 9/24/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086938 TEXAS MUNICIPAL EQUIPMENT LLC 323.00CR POSTED A 9/24/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086939 TYLER TECHNOLOGIES, INC 450.00CR POSTED A 9/24/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086940 UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC 26.22CR POSTED A 9/24/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086941 VALERO MARKETING & SUPPLY 7,150.84CR POSTED A 9/25/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086942 VULCAN CONSTUCTION MATERIALS, 1,048.85CR POSTED A 9/24/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086943 WELDERS SUPPLY CO INC 52.00CR POSTED A 9/27/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086944 WILLIAM COX 1,768.73CR POSTED A 9/20/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086945 YAJAIRA RENOVATO 25.00CR POSTED A 9/24/2019
112010 9/19/2019 CHECK 086946 Z-RIDERS INC 48.36CR POSTED A 9/28/2019
112010 9/18/2019 CHECK 086947 BEXAR COUNTY DISTRICT CLERK 4.00CR POSTED A 9/27/2019
*** 112010 9/26/2019 CHECK 086954 JOHNSON, VICTORIA REY 400.00CR POSTED A 9/28/2019
112010 9/26/2019 CHECK 086955 5.11 SATX1 197.96CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 9/26/2019 CHECK 086956 ADIOS PEST CONTROL, LLC 149.00CR CLEARED A 10/03/2019
112010 9/26/2019 CHECK 086957 ADRIAN QUEVEDO 4.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 9/26/2019 CHECK 086958 AACOG 140.00CR POSTED A 10/01/2019
112010 9/26/2019 CHECK 086959 ELIZABETH LONGORIA 100.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 9/26/2019 CHECK 086960 ALVARO BOSQUE 400.00CR POSTED A 10/01/2019
112010 9/26/2019 CHECK 086961 AMAZON.COM LLC 439.21CR CLEARED A 10/02/2019
112010 9/26/2019 CHECK 086962 VOID CHECK 0.00 POSTED A 9/25/2019
112010 9/26/2019 CHECK 086963 AMERICAN SIGNAL EQUIPMENT, INC 11,260.00CR CLEARED A 10/05/2019
112010 9/26/2019 CHECK 086964 AMERICAN TRAFFIC SOLUTIONS, IN 199,500.00CR CLEARED A 10/05/2019
112010 9/26/2019 CHECK 086965 ASCO 586.13CR CLEARED A 10/03/2019
112010 9/26/2019 CHECK 086966 AT&T 183.37CR CLEARED A 10/02/2019
112010 9/26/2019 CHECK 086967 AT&T UVERSE 372.39CR CLEARED A 10/02/2019
112010 9/26/2019 CHECK 086968 AUTOWORKS, INC. 49.00CR CLEARED A 10/05/2019
112010 9/26/2019 CHECK 086969 VOID CHECK 0.00 POSTED A 9/25/2019
112010 9/26/2019 CHECK 086970 STEPHEN J BARSCEWSKI 948.00CR CLEARED A 10/02/2019

Packet Pg. 20
10/10/2019 11:42 AM CHECK RECONCILIATION REGISTER PAGE: 7
COMPANY: 999 - Pooled Cash CHECK DATE: 9/01/2019 THRU
2.3.a
ACCOUNT: 112010 Pooled Cash CLEAR DATE: 0/00/0000 THRU 9
TYPE: Check STATEMENT: 0/00/0000 THRU 99/99/9999
STATUS: All VOIDED DATE: 0/00/0000 THRU 99/99/999
FOLIO: A AMOUNT: 0.00 THRU 999,999,999.9
CHECK NUMBER: 000000 THRU 99999

ACCOUNT --DATE-- --TYPE-- NUMBER ---------DESCRIPTION---------- ----AMOUNT--- STATUS FOLIO CLEAR DATE

CHECK: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Attachment: CR Check Reconciliation Register - 8371 (Monthly Financial Report Ending September 30, 2019)
112010 9/26/2019 CHECK 087015 T-MOBILE USA 1,010.45CR CLEARED A 10/03/2019
112010 9/26/2019 CHECK 087016 THE AMERICAN LEGION POST #336 400.00CR POSTED A 9/28/2019
112010 9/26/2019 CHECK 087017 TIME WARNER CABLE 129.18CR CLEARED A 10/03/2019
112010 9/26/2019 CHECK 087018 TIREHUB LLC 135.79CR POSTED A 10/01/2019
112010 9/26/2019 CHECK 087019 TOSA BLANKS & MORE INC 420.00CR POSTED A 10/01/2019
112010 9/26/2019 CHECK 087020 VIRGINIA BEIERLY 25.00CR CLEARED A 10/08/2019
112010 9/26/2019 CHECK 087021 YP HOLDINGS 131.00CR POSTED A 10/01/2019
*** 112010 9/27/2019 CHECK 087024 ICMA RETIREMENT CORP #301977 3,473.50CR CLEARED A 10/02/2019
112010 9/27/2019 CHECK 087025 LEON VALLEY FD HOUSE FUND 210.00CR CLEARED A 10/05/2019
112010 9/27/2019 CHECK 087026 Leon Valley Professional Fire 330.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000

TOTALS FOR ACCOUNT 112010 CHECK TOTAL: 1,466,321.37CR

DEPOSIT TOTAL: 0.00
INTEREST TOTAL: 0.00
MISCELLANEOUS TOTAL: 0.00
SERVICE CHARGE TOTAL: 0.00
EFT TOTAL: 0.00
BANK-DRAFT TOTAL: 0.00

TOTALS FOR Pooled Cash CHECK TOTAL: 1,466,321.37CR

DEPOSIT TOTAL: 0.00
INTEREST TOTAL: 0.00
MISCELLANEOUS TOTAL: 0.00
SERVICE CHARGE TOTAL: 0.00
EFT TOTAL: 0.00
BANK-DRAFT TOTAL: 0.00

Packet Pg. 22
 Exhibit C7
Informed Delivery Email from
USPS w/ Lion’s Roar
December 16, 2019
 Exhibit C8
Citizen Email to Kelly Kuenstler
Lion’s Roar Questions
December 5, 2019
 Exhibit C9
Kelly Kuenstler Response to Citizen
December 10, 2019
 Exhibit C10
Kelly Kuenstler
Employment Contracts
2015, 2017
 Exhibit C11
Kelly Kuenstler
New Employment Contract
October 16, 2019
 Exhibit C12
Kelly Kuenstler
New Employment Contract
Financial Impact Analysis
 Exhibit C13
Scott Huddleston, Bio
San Antonio Express News
 Exhibit C14
Email from Scott Huddleston
to Kelly Kuenstler
 Exhibit C15
Leon Valley City Council
Meeting Minutes
February 21, 2017
 CITY OF LEON VALLEY
CITY COUNCIL REGULAR MEETING
Leon Valley City Council Chambers
6400 El Verde Road, Leon Valley, TX 78238
Tuesday, February 21, 2017

MINUTES

1. 7:00 PM Call to Order, Determine a Quorum is Present.

Attendee Name Title Status Arrived
Chris Riley Mayor Present
David Jordan Mayor Pro Tem Excused
David Edwards Council Place 1 Present
Belinda Ealy Council Place 2 Present
Monica Alcocer Council Place 3 Present
Benny Martinez Council Place 4 Present

Citizens to Be Heard and Time for Objections to the Consent Agenda

Mayor Riley asked if any of the Council Members wished to pull any item from the Consent
Agenda for discussion.

Council Member Benny Martinez asked to pull Item 4.1 to be discussed in the Regular
Agenda.

There were no citizens to speak.

Presentations

Presentation of award and recognition of successful resuscitation of EMS patient by

Leon Valley Fire Department C-shift. - Mayor Chris Riley and Mr. Charles Malouff.
Mayor Riley, Fire Chief Luis, and Leon Valley resident Mr. Charles Malouff expressed
their sincere appreciation to Leon Valley Firefighters Todd Morgan, Michael Murphy and
Captain Wade Clapper for their successful resuscitation of EMS patient, Mr. Charles
Malouff. Firefighter Andy Patterson was also on duty and on responded to this scene
but was unable to be present this evening.

Recognition of Leon Valley 1st Responders Tower Climb Team 2017 for the Cystic
Fibrosis Foundation, and presentation of award. - Mayor Chris Riley and Anjanette
Valdez of Cystic Fibrosis Foundation.
Fire Chief Luis Valdez introduced Leon Valley Daniel Cano, Jimmy Garcia, Matt Sudell,
Eric Burnside, Ramiro Cano, Jaaron Thomas, Bryan Peterson, Julian Mendoza, Eli
 Leon Valley Regular Meeting Minutes February 21, 2017

Garcia, Andy Patterson, Mike Murphy, Joseph Valadez, Eddie Gonzales, Rick Guerra,
Ruben Saucedo and Luis Valdez participated in the 2017 Tower Climb and for the
second time in a row, took the championship! The winner of the climb was LVFD
Ramiro Cano who completed the climb in 9 minutes 40 seconds which is a new record
for the Tower Climb event. LVFD raised $4,800 for Cystic Fibrosis. Annette Valdez of
the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation was present to show her appreciation as well.

Presentation of Certificates of Achievement to Members of the Leon Valley Police

Department. - Mayor Chris Riley and Police Chief Joseph Salvaggio.
Mayor Riley and Police Chief Joseph Salvaggio presented a Certificate of Achievement
to Corporal Louis Farias, Lieutenant David Gonzalez and Captain Ruben Saucedo.
Numerous family and friends were present to support these men.

Mayor Riley called for a recess at 7:37 p.m. for a reception in the celebration of these
promotions.

Mayor Riley reconvened the meeting at 7:50 p.m.

Presentation of the 2016 Achievement of Library Award from the TX Municipal

Library Directors Association. - Mayor Chris Riley
Mayor Riley presented the Achievement of Library Excellence Award to Leon Valley
Public Library Director, Sandy Underwood. Assistant Director Theresa Brader and
Library Aid Rosemary Tijerina were also present to accept the award.

Presentation of the Forest Oaks Pool Deed Transfer to the City of Leon Valley. -
Mayor Chris Riley and Mr. and Mrs. Tom Kelley.
Mayor Riley and City Manager Kelly Kuenstler presented Mr. and Mrs. Tom Kelly on
behalf of the Forest Oaks Pool Association one dollar bill in exchange for the Forest
Oaks Pool Deed.

CONSENT AGENDA

Item 4.1 Pulled from Consent

Consider approval of a resolution and authorize the City Manager to enter into a
Local Advanced Funding Agreement (LPAFA) between the City of Leon Valley and
the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) for the funding of the Evers Road
Bridge reconstruction. (M&C #2017-02-21-01 M. Moritz)
A motion was made by Council Member Monica Alcocer and seconded by Council Member
David Edwards, to approve Consent Agenda Item #4.2 as presented.

REGULAR AGENDA

City Council - Regular Meeting - Jan 17, 2017 7:00 PM

Council Member Benny Martinez requested that in reference to the sign variance that was

City of Leon Valley Page 2 Updated 4/14/2017 4:17 PM

 Leon Valley Regular Meeting Minutes February 21, 2017

passed, there is no mention of the modification he made to the original ordinance requiring
the property owner to remove the Jerky World sign and to have the numbers painted on the
outside pole that supports the existing signage.

A motion was made by Council Member Benny Martinez and seconded by Council Member
Belinda Ealy, to approve the January 17, 2017 Regular City Council Minutes as amended.

RESULT: ACCEPTED AS AMENDED [UNANIMOUS]

MOVER: Monica Alcocer, Council Place 3
SECONDER: Belinda Ealy, Council Place 2
AYES: Edwards, Ealy, Alcocer, Martinez

Discussion and possible action regarding a Jazz Festival in June or month with
Anthony Tobias leading and running the 3 day event in the Park. Friday, Saturday
and Sunday. - As requested by Council Members Benny Martinez and David Jordan.
Council Member Benny Martinez introduced Mr. Anthony Tobias who gave a presentation
on a proposed Jazz Festival which he would like to hold in June. The proposed event would
run for three (3) days, Friday, Saturday and Sunday at Raymond Rimkus Park. Mr. Tobias
is looking for sponsorship from the City of Leon Valley.

The presentation was followed by a brief discussion.

A motion was made by Council Member Benny Martinez to accept the proposed event
pending approval of funds by the Leon Valley Economic Development Corporation
(LVEDC) noting that if the LVEDC rejects the funding, the request would be cancelled.
There being no second to the motion, the motion died.

Council Member David Edwards said he would like to study the event a little more.

Council Member Monica Alcocer agreed with Council Member Edwards and added that she
would like input from the LVEDC Director as well as the committee. Council Member
Edwards added to also obtain feedback from staff next time this is proposed.

A motion was made by Council Member Monica Alcocer and seconded by Council Member
David Edwards, to table the item to date uncertain pending further information.

City of Leon Valley Page 3 Updated 4/14/2017 4:17 PM

 Leon Valley Regular Meeting Minutes February 21, 2017

RESULT: TABLED [UNANIMOUS]

MOVER: Monica Alcocer, Benny Martinez
SECONDER: David Edwards, Council Place 1
AYES: Edwards, Ealy, Alcocer, Martinez

Discuss and consider possible action on an In Kind Grant request by AARP for use
of the Leon Valley Community Center at 6427 Evers Road for free tax preparation
services. (M&C # 2017-02-21-02 K. Flores)
Community Development Director Kristie Flores presented the item on behalf of American
Association of Retired Persons (AARP) who is requesting the use of the Leon Valley
Community Center at 6427 Evers Road for free tax preparation services through a grant
they receive from the IRS. AARP provides this service free to all interested participants
both in Leon Valley and other local cities.

AARP is requesting use of the Leon Valley Community Center every Tuesday and
Thursday, between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. beginning March 7 th, 2017 and
ending April 13, 2017.

The grant request includes a waiver of the deposit, facility usage fee, and the cleaning fee.
There are no other fee waiver considerations as the AARP is proposing to share the space
with the Northwest Seniors during regular business hours. The In Kind Grant Committee
reviewed the request and is forwarding an affirmative recommendation. The points
required are a minimum of 20 and the request scored an average of 23.75 out of 30. The
total amount waived would be $5,650.00.

Community Development Director Kristie Flores concluded the presentation saying that the
Committee forwards a recommendation of Approval to Council with an average score of
23.75 out of 30.

A motion was made by Council Member Monica Alcocer and seconded by Council Member
Belinda Ealy, to grant the In Kind Grant request by AARP for use of the Leon Valley
Community Center at 6427 Evers Road for free tax preparation services as presented.

RESULT: APPROVED [UNANIMOUS]

MOVER: Monica Alcocer, Council Place 3
SECONDER: Belinda Ealy, Council Place 2
AYES: Edwards, Ealy, Alcocer, Martinez

Discuss and possible action on the New City Council City Council
Agendas/Packets/Minutes Platform Citizen Sign-In Feature. (M&C # 2017-02-21-03 S.
Passailaigue)

City of Leon Valley Page 4 Updated 4/14/2017 4:17 PM

 Leon Valley Regular Meeting Minutes February 21, 2017

City Secretary Saundra Passailaigue gave a demonstration of the new Sign-in and
comment feature of the new City Council Accela/MinuteTraq program. City Secretary
Passailaigue demonstrated how citizens are able to preview the City Council agenda and
meeting packet online. If the viewer so wanted to comment on a particular item they would
be able to do so from any location. The viewer could then choose whether or not their
comment would go to City Council alone or to City Council and Administration. The
comments then could be incorporated into the meeting minutes with ease.

The other feature is a Sign-In which City Secretary Passailaigue stressed was not
mandatory to speak and is no way required by the City to be able to speak. This is simply a
feature for one to put their information and/or comments into the program for the record.
This would be especially beneficial to those who are unable to attend the meeting for
whatever reason.

The demonstration was followed by a brief presentation.

There was a consensus among the members of City Council to remove the Sign-In feature
but to leave the Comment feature.

RESULT: PRESENTED

Discuss and consider possible action on an ordinance authorizing a Settlement

Agreement in a state lawsuit styled WM. Rancher Estates Joint Venture, et al. vs. City
of Leon Valley, Texas, et al. in the 225th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas,
Cause No. 2013-CI-03399 to purchase privately owned real property in the amount of
$500,000; authorizing the acquisition of privately owned real property containing
approximately 23.071 acres located along the west side of William Rancher Road,
including two parcels on the south side of Grasshill Drive and three contiguous
parcels at the corner of Aids and Samaritan in Leon Valley, Bexar County, Texas, in
connection with the Settlement Agreement; and authorizing a budget adjustment in
the amount of $500,000 in the General Fund for the acquistion of said property.
(M&C # 2017-02-21-04 K.Kuenstler)
City Manager Kelly Kuenstler presented this item first by giving a brief background saying
that on February 28, 2013, William Rancher Estates Joint Venture, et al. filed a lawsuit
against the City of Leon Valley, Texas, et al., regarding privately owned real property
containing approximately 23.017 acres located along the west side of William Rancher
Road, including two parcels on the south side of Grasshill Drive and three contiguous
parcels at the corner of Aids and Samaritan in Leon Valley, Bexar County, Texas, alleging
several causes of action against the City. At mediation, the parties reached settlement
agreement for the City to purchase 12 parcels of privately owned real property in the
amount of $500,000, contingent upon City Council approval. In order to finalize settlement
of the case, and purchase said property, a budget adjustment of the General Fund in the
amount of $500,000 is necessary.

City of Leon Valley Page 5 Updated 4/14/2017 4:17 PM

 Leon Valley Regular Meeting Minutes February 21, 2017

City Manager Kelly Kuenstler concluded saying staff recommends settlement of this case. If
this settlement agreement is not approved by the City Council, the case will proceed to trial.
It is in the best interest of the City to settle this matter to avoid the uncertainty and risks
associated with litigation.

Council Member Monica Alcocer announced that she would recuse herself from any
discussion or vote due to a possible conflict of interest.

A motion was made by Council Member Benny Martinez and seconded by Council Member
David Edwards, to approve an ordinance authorizing a Settlement Agreement in a state
lawsuit styled WM. Rancher Estates Joint Venture, et al. vs. City of Leon Valley, Texas,
et al. in the 225th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, Cause No. 2013-CI-
03399 to purchase privately owned real property in the amount of $500,000; authorizing
the acquisition of privately owned real property containing approximately 23.071 acres
located along the west side of William Rancher Road, including two parcels on the south
side of Grasshill Drive and three contiguous parcels at the corner of Aids and Samaritan in
Leon Valley, Bexar County, Texas, in connection with the Settlement Agreement; and
authorizing a budget adjustment in the amount of $500,000 in the General Fund for the
acquisition of said property as presented.

RESULT: ADOPTED [3 TO 0]
MOVER: Benny Martinez, Council Place 4
SECONDER: David Edwards, Council Place 1
AYES: Edwards, Ealy, Martinez
RECUSED: Alcocer

Discuss, consider and possible action on a Resolution of the City of Leon Valley, a
member of the Greater Bexar County Council of Cities, in opposition to state-
mandated revenue caps and other anticipated legislative actions intended to
contribute to the general diminution of the role of the people of this state gathered
together in local governments. (M&C # 2017-02-21-05 K. Kuenstler)
City Manager Kelly Kuenstler presented this resolution which would allow for the City of
Leon Valley to join other municipalities in opposing any imposition by the Legislature of
local revenue caps and any legislation that otherwise further abridges the right of the
People of this State to join together in cities, towns, and counties to manage their affairs
and exercise, together, their right of self-government. The bill will require a rollback election
anytime a City adopts a tax rate that exceeds the calculated rollback tax rate. Currently, if a
City exceeds the calculated rollback tax rate, the citizens would have to petition the City for
a rollback election. The City of Leon Valley has exceeded the rollback rate in the past 17
years (as many cities have) and the citizens have never asked for a rollback election. For
the 2016 tax year, the City adopted the current rollback tax rate which is 8%. The fiscal
impact of this legislation could be detrimental to Leon Valley depending on the amount of
the revenue cap imposed by the legislature. Furthermore, if a tax rate was adopted that
exceeded the calculated rollback tax rate; this would cost the taxpayer every time because

City of Leon Valley Page 6 Updated 4/14/2017 4:17 PM

 Leon Valley Regular Meeting Minutes February 21, 2017

a special election would have to be held.

City Manager Kuenstler concluded by saying that the Finance Director also estimated the
impact if the cap was set at 4% vs the current 8%. She estimated this would reduce the
M&O tax rate by $.0175785 or an estimated reduction in M & O revenue of $150,000.00.
This does not affect the I & S whatsoever.

A motion was made by Council Member Monica Alcocer and seconded by Council Member
Benny Martinez, to approve a resolution of the City of Leon Valley, a member of the
Greater Bexar County Council of Cities, in opposition to state-mandated revenue caps and
other anticipated legislative actions intended to contribute to the general diminution of
the role of the people of this state gathered together in local governments as
presented.

RESULT: ADOPTED [UNANIMOUS]

MOVER: Monica Alcocer, Council Place 3
SECONDER: Benny Martinez, Council Place 4
AYES: Edwards, Ealy, Alcocer, Martinez

Discuss and consider possible action on a Resolution to authorize the submission of

an application for a Reporting Technology Expansion Body Camera Grant to the
Office of the Governor, Criminal Justice Division to purchase additional body
cameras and support equipment as prescribed by the Body Camera Grant
Solicitation; and authorizing the acceptance of said Grant upon award. (M&C # 2017-
02-21-06 J.Salvaggio)
Police Chief Joseph Salvaggio presented this item to submit a resolution seeking
authorization for the submission of an application for a Reporting Technology Expansion
Body Camera Grant to the Office of the Governor, Criminal Justice Division to purchase
additional body cameras and support equipment as prescribed by the Body Camera Grant
Solicitation; and authorizing the acceptance of said Grant upon award. This grant does
require any City matching funds. This grant would provide $36,920.00 to purchase 25
FOCUS Body Cameras, 3-Year New Technology Replacement Package, Onsite, Back
Office Setup. All funding for the equipment will come from the grant. No matching funds are
required.

The City Manager and Chief of Police recommend the City Council approve this resolution,
providing the Leon Valley Police Department with additional resources to serve the citizens
of our community.

A motion was made by Council Member Monica Alcocer and seconded by Council Member
David Edwards, to approve of a resolution to authorize the submission of an application for
a Reporting Technology Expansion Body Camera Grant to the Office of the Governor,

City of Leon Valley Page 7 Updated 4/14/2017 4:17 PM

 Leon Valley Regular Meeting Minutes February 21, 2017

Criminal Justice Division to purchase additional body cameras and support equipment as
prescribed by the Body Camera Grant Solicitation; and authorizing the acceptance of said
Grant upon award as presented.

RESULT: ADOPTED [UNANIMOUS]

MOVER: Monica Alcocer, Council Place 3
SECONDER: David Edwards, Council Place 1
AYES: Edwards, Ealy, Alcocer, Martinez

Discuss and consider possible action on a Resolution authorizing the submission of

an application for a Reporting Technology Expansion Grant to the Office of the
Governor, Criminal Justice Division to purchase equipment as prescribed by the
NB17 National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS); and authorizing the
acceptance of said Grant upon award. (M&C # 2017-02-21-07 J.Salvaggio)
Police Chief Joseph Salvaggio presented this item to submit a resolution for City Council
approval to submit an application for a grant to obtain funding for equipment to become
compliant for the NB17 National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) and
acceptance of the grant upon award. This grant does not require any City matching funds.
This grant will provide $36,194.50 to purchase Badge MobileLink TLETS Server Software
and Field Reporting, TLETS Laptop/Desktop Client Software, MobileLink Terminal Services
Integration. All the funding will come from the grant. The City has no matching fund
requirements for this grant.

The City Manager and Chief of Police recommend the City Council approve this resolution,
providing the Leon Valley Police Department with additional resources to serve the citizens
of our community.

A motion was made by Council Member Monica Alcocer and seconded by Council Member
Belinda Ealy, to approve a resolution authorizing the submission of an application for a
Reporting Technology Expansion Grant to the Office of the Governor, Criminal Justice
Division to purchase equipment as prescribed by the NB17 National Incident-Based
Reporting System (NIBRS); and authorizing the acceptance of said Grant upon award as
presented.

RESULT: ADOPTED [UNANIMOUS]

MOVER: Monica Alcocer, Council Place 3
SECONDER: Belinda Ealy, Council Place 2
AYES: Edwards, Ealy, Alcocer, Martinez

City Manager's Report

Approved Minutes from Boards, Commissions and Committees.

Upcoming Important Events

City of Leon Valley Page 8 Updated 4/14/2017 4:17 PM

 Leon Valley Regular Meeting Minutes February 21, 2017

 Neighborhood Renewal Project, February 25, 2017 from 8:00 a.m. - noon.
 March 4, 2017, 9 am - 1 pm, Community Conference Center, Earthwise
Living.
 Next City Council Meeting, March 7, 2017
 March 11, 2017, at 10:30 am, a gardener and author, Judy Barrett will be
speaking at the Library. This is an event co-sponsored by the library and the
Earthwise Living Committee.
 Volunteer Appreciation Dinner, April 12, 2017 at 6:00 p.m. at the Conference
Center.
 May 06, 2017 General Election - Candidate filing period is Wednesday,
January 18, 2017 - Friday, February 17, 2017.

City Manager Kelly Kuenstler thanked everyone that volunteered for Basura Bash last
Saturday; thanked Council Member Benny Martinez for all of his help with the audio
system at the Conference Center; informed everyone that the Leon Valley Café opened
on February 11th and had a full house; spoke about the outcome of the Court’s decision
exactly twelve years to the day of the Heather Wilms case; and asked that City Council
begin consideration of who they choose as Grand Marshal for the July 4 th parade.

Mayor Riley mentioned Los Leones event is coming up and will be held at John
Marshall High School. Mayor Riley also asked if anyone had heard when there might be
a candidate forum. No staff or audience member had heard anything.

Council Member Belinda Ealy asked if there was any storm damage caused from the
recent storm. Fire Chief Valdez gave a quick response.

Council Member Benny Martinez asked about the light outage on Bandera Road today.
Police Chief Salvaggio gave a quick response.

Citizens to be Heard
None

Announcements by the Mayor and Council Members

All of the Council Members thanked everyone for coming to tonight’s meeting.

Adjournment
Mayor Riley announced that the meeting adjourned at 9:46 PM.

These minutes approved by the Leon Valley City Council on the 14th of April, 2017.

APPROVED

_______________________

City of Leon Valley Page 9 Updated 4/14/2017 4:17 PM

 Leon Valley Regular Meeting Minutes February 21, 2017

CHRIS RILEY
MAYOR

ATTEST:
SAUNDRA PASSAILAIGUE, TRMC
CITY SECRETARY

City of Leon Valley Page 10 Updated 4/14/2017 4:17 PM

 Exhibit D1
Catherine Rodriguez Email Complaint
to Kelly Kuenstler
 Exhibit D2
Kelly Kuenstler Response
To Catherine Rodriguez
 Exhibit D3
Ryan Henry’s Retaining Agreement
December 18, 2018
 Exhibit D4
Kelly Kuenstler Complaint
Against Benny Martinez
April 16, 2019
 Exhibit D5
Benny Martinez
2019 Revised Complaint
 Benny Martinez
6319 Rue Sophie
Leon Valley, Texas 78238
210-521-1522

September 12, 2019 Revised Complaint

April 2, 2019 original date of complaint

Mayor Riley:

Formal complaint against the City Manager Kelly Kuenstler

1. Violation of Leon Valley Home Rule Charter

2. Violation of Leon Valley Personal Manual

3. Abuse of Power

It is my belief that since the Home Rule Charter was passed in 2017 that
Kelly Kuenstler has used this instrument as a means of control and power.

This is demonstrated by Kelly Kuenstlers letter to James Wheat, Bexar

Criminal District Attorney dated February 15, 2018. Two months after
effective date of the charter. Kelly Kuenstler sent a copy of the charter
along with a request to have me charged with a misdemeanor. In May 2018
James Wheat responded there is no crime. See complaint 15.

Section 1.04.006 - Procedures for City Council Meetings Under Section 3.12
of the City Charter

A. Definitions: For purposes of a meeting held under §3.12 of the City

Charter, the following definitions of words and phrases controls.

1. Complainant shall mean a person who has filed an official complaint

against the official conduct of any department, agency, appointed
boards, office, officers, officials, employees or appointed board
members of the City and the City Council has determined it will
conduct a §3.12 hearing regarding the charges in the complaint. While
an official complaint is not necessary for the City Council to hold a
§3.12 hearing, when a complaint has been filed, the filer shall be
known as the Complainant.
 2. 2. Designated Officer shall mean an individual designated by the
City Manager or City Council to examine any complaints filed against
the official conduct of any department, agency, appointed boards,
office, officers, officials, employees or appointed board members of the
City.

If the Respondent is the City Manager or a member of an appointed

board of the City, the City Council shall appoint the Designated
Officer. In the event the Respondent is a member of the City Council
or the City Manager, the Designated Officer shall be an attorney or law
firm which is not employed by the City and does not have any active
representation of the City in order to promote neutrality in the process
and a disinterested investigator.

The attorney hired to investigate all of my complaints and determine if these

items are in violation of the personal manual and/or ethics manual.
Recommend to the full City Council possible action against her.

a. Violation of Article 1 Section 1.01 B. Usurping the Mayor and City

Council in making policy decisions.
b. Violation of Section 3.06 A. Mayor. Bypassing Mayor Riley authority
with regard to the 3.12 hearing.
c. Violation of Section 3.06 b. Agreeing with Ryan Henry restricting
Mayor Riley ability to debate and discuss any matters before the City
Council.

ARTICLE FOUR
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT
Section I - Employees' Code of Ethics
1. Employees of the City of Leon Valley are entrusted by the citizens to
provide quality services. This level of trust creates a special responsibility for
the employees. Therefore, employees are expected to maintain a high level
of ethical standards, to act with integrity in all public relationships and to
always conduct themselves in a manner which maintains public confidence.
This is accomplished by following the City of Leon Valley Code of Ethics.

2. Employees of the City of Leon Valley shall strive to always uphold the
Constitution, laws and ordinances of the United States, State of Texas, and
the City Leon Valley, and shall also strive to:
Be honest and trustworthy in verbal and written communications and in
all professional relationships;
Be dedicated to providing quality services by being cooperative and
constructive, and by making the best and most efficient use of available
resources;
 Be fair and considerate in the treatment of fellow employees and citizens,
addressing concerns and needs with equity;
Be committed to accomplishing all tasks in a superior way, and abstain
from all job behaviors that may tarnish the image of the City;
Recognize that policy decisions are the responsibility of the City Council,
and;
Provide the best services to improve the quality of life in the City of Leon
Valley.

3. This Code of Ethics requires hard work, courage and choices. Employees
and citizens will always be better served when a standard Code of Ethics is
followed.

4. Although the standards set forth increase the responsibilities of the

Department Directors in supervising their teams, the standards are not
intended to define the limit of departmental responsibility in this area, nor
do they limit the circumstances under which a Department Director may act
to remove, demote, reassign, or otherwise discipline any employee whose
conduct is unacceptable.

a. Allowing Brandon Melland to belittle and defame Mayor Riley in

the 3.12 hearing. Article 4 Section 1 1. Section 2 6a, 6b, 6c.
b. Allowing Joe Salvagio to belittle and defame Mayor Riley in the
3.12 hearing. Article 4 Section 1 1. Section 2 6a, 6b, 6c.

Section I - Employees' Code of Ethics

2. Employees of the City of Leon Valley shall strive to always uphold the Constitution, laws
and ordinances of the United States, State of Texas, and the City Leon Valley, and shall
also strive to:
Be honest and trustworthy in verbal and written communications and in all
professional relationships;

19. Review of all employees terminated by Kelly Kuenstler, City

Manager to verify official reasons of leaving employment with
statements from the individuals.- Possibly falsifying reasons for
termination.

I believe Kelly Kuenstler has mislead City Council with regard to the reason
the following city employees were terminated. Per our charter and
ordinances, City Council shall hire an attorney (not Mr. Henry) to
investigate the reasons the following employees were terminated
and compare the findings with the individuals personal file.
Christi Flores. Community Development Director was director for several
years and quit due to a disagreement with the Former City manager. Kelly
brought her back and she worked for about 8 months. Kelly removed duties
and cut her pay drastically. Christie quit and went back to work for San
Antonio.

One of the first “firings” was Christie Flores. The report Kelly Kuenstler gave
council and my wife and I seeing her at HEB a few months later were like
day and night. I believe Kelly cut her pay by $20,000.00 a year and made
her life miserable. Christie had a change to take a job with the city of San
Antonio.

Megan McCloud. Appears to be very good at her job. She was taking
classes in community development. Initially told that she was fired. Kelly
Kuenstler states she had resigned. She believes she was fired.

Amber Anthony. Amber was hired by the former Economic Development

Corporation. When this corporation was dissolved, she became a city
employee. Kelly determined she could not do her job and was made to quit.
She believes she was fired.

Roxanne Conejo. She was hired as the City Attorney. When hired she
stated she could only work part time and had 2 other cities she represented.
After a short time Kelly demanded she work full time. She stated she could
not and ended up quitting.

Felicia Novan. was emplpyee that let the 1st amendment people enter the
hallway in front of the City Council chambers. Shortly afterward she was
gone. No further information is known.

Below are the rest of my complaints

City Council summarily dismissed all complains except for items 1, 2, 3 and
19. This should not have happened and the full complaint should be
presented to the attorney hired to do the investigation of Kelly Kuenstler.

4. “Witch Hunt” of former Zoning Chairman Olen Yarnell for

Disagreeing with her and unitization of a criminal investigation.

5. Closing Seneca plaza and Lieberman’s Corner without informing City

Council, in advance.
 6. Hiring and authorizing an investigation on Fire Chief Valdez, and
Asst. Chief Wade without informing City Council, in advance. Spending
$20,000 without City Council approval. Informing City Council after
the report was completed, (by presenting an invoice with a request for
payment). Refusing to release report, even thought it had already
been released to the media, and a copy had been sent at least one
local Citizen

7. Usurping the Mayor’s Position. Leon Valley Home Rule Charter item
3.06 Mayor is presiding officer of the City Council. Section 3.12 The
City Council shall have the power to inquire into official
conduct… Kelly Kuenstler’s email dated 3/15/2019. “Please provide
me (Kelly) direction as to what the City Council wishes to do moving
forward.

8. January 2018 adding 6 new ordinances to agenda without Mayor

Riley’s approval. While the Mayor or the City Manager may place an
item on the agenda, It has been a long time tradition the Mayor has
final approval of the agenda. This was done 1 month after Charter was
in force.

9. Staff involvement in the 2018 City election

Police Chief involving himself into politics. Selectively moving or

removing Mayor Riley’s and my signs. Leaving Mariana Sanchez signs
illegally placed for over 2 weeks. Mariana Sanchez sign at Valero.
Police chief conversation with Larry Prophit asking if he was going to
run for city council and mentioning we have a good council except for
one bad apple.

10. Kelly Kuenstler created a “witch Hunt” to have an elected official

removed from office, by organizing some members of the City Staff,
and a setting Member of the City Council, to submit complaints against
a setting City Council Member all within the same time frame, with 2
of the complaints from LVPD Officers, being filed on the same date.

The following complaints were added in September.

11. Signing the extension of the Red Light Contract without City
Council approval. Having the city attorney and the police chief argue it
was permissible for her to sign the extension since City Council
approved her signing the original agreement 2 years ago. Recently
the police chief came before city council and asked for approval to add
 3 more camera’s. Why did Kelly Kuenstler need authorization to add 3
more camera’s but not need authorization to extend the contract?

12. Attorney Ryan Henry extension contract on April 30. City

Council should have approved this with Mayor Riley signing the
agreement.

13. Hiring attorney Ryan Henry without City Council approval on

April 30, 2019. City Council as a body should have retained Ryan
Henry.

14. Exceeding purchasing limit of $ 50,000.00 in hiring attorney

Ryan Henry. This is a criminal offense.

15. February 15, 2018, 2 months after the Charter was in effect,
Contacted Jim Wheat, Bexar Criminal District Attorney asking if I
(Benny Martinez) could be charged with a misdemeanor for violating
the Charter.

16. Numerous emails and telephone conversations with Ryan Henry

after his final report to City Council on April 2, 2019. All
communications after April 2, 2019 should have been between the City
Council as a body and not individual members or the City Manager.

17. Allow Staff to belittle and defame Mayor Riley during the 3.12
hearing.

In conclusion, there was great harm to Leon Valley’s reputation during the
3.12 hearing. This was demonstrated by the bad faith efforts by 2 city
council members and the attorney.

City Council needs follow the Charter and Ordinance 1.06 and hire an
attorney to fully investigate the above complaints.

Benny Martinez
benny@nu5p.com
210-269-1402
 Exhibit D6
Brandon Melland
Personnel File
CERTIFICATE of COURSE COMPLETION

Open Meetings Act

I, Brandon Melland, certify that I have

completed a course of training on the Texas Open Meetings Act that satisfies the
legal requirements of Government Code, Section 551.005.

Certificate is issued effective this 26th day of April, 2018.

NOTICE TO CERTIFICATE HOLDER: You are responsible for the safekeeping of this document as evidence that you have completed
this open government training course. The Office of the Attorney General does not maintain a record of course completion for you
and is unable to issue duplicate certificates. Government Code Section 551.005(c) requires the governmental body with which
you serve to maintain this Certificate of Course Completion and make it available for public inspection.
Certificate No.: 18-247050M
 Exhibit D7
Cambridge English Dictionary
Definition: “editorial”
 Exhibit D8
Counselor Will Bradshaw’s
Submission to Lion’s Roar
January 3, 2020
 Why Recall? Why Now?

You may have heard the news that a recall petition has been circulated in Leon Valley. Many questions have been
asked regarding this recall effort. I have attempted to answer some of the most common questions below:

Who? The recall petitions were filed against City Councilors Monica Alcocer and Donna Charles. The recall
petitioner’s committee and many volunteers include a former Mayor of Leon Valley, former City Council Members,
attorneys, small business owners, business professionals, teachers, and veterans who are all citizens of Leon
Valley.

What? The petitioners had 90 days to gather signatures of at least 500 registered voters for each of the two recall
petitions. The committee ended up collecting over 1,600 signatures in just 60 days.

When? The affidavits for recall were submitted 9/19/19 and were presented to the City Secretary on 11/18/19.
The recall measures are expected to appear on the ballot of the May 2020 regular election.

Where? The recall petitions were circulated throughout Leon Valley via a door-to-door campaign. Citizens were
also able to sign up on-line or via phone to have someone come to their home so they could sign the petitions.

Why? The recall petitions stated six reasons as grounds for removal from office. I have summarized these six
reasons below:

1. Abdicating responsibilities of constituent services by failing to allow “Citizens to be Heard” AND voting to
shorten, place excessive limitations, and censor constituent’s voices.

2. Voting to allow police to continue overly zealous practice of towing motor vehicles with expired registrations
only, including vehicles contained on private property.

3. Malfeasance during the administrative hearing of Councilor Benny Martinez, including poor application of Leon
Valley Home Rule Charter regarding allegations against accused council member.

4. Failure to vote and appoint unbiased, disinterested, and qualified, “Designated Officer” in accordance with
Section 1.04.006 of the Leon Valley Code of Ordinances, Section (1)(A)(2) during the months of April, May, June,
July, or August 2019, deemed necessary to “promote neutrality in the process” of the formal 3-12 administrative
hearing.

5. Defiance of citizens’ ability to participate in fair democratic process as well as violation of Home Rule Charter
Section 3.08 (E)(4) and Section 3.09 (E) by attempting to forfeit the seat of the duly elected official with only a total
of three (3) members of City Council allowed to vote, with blatant disregard of the requirement that 2/3 vote of
City Council must vote to forfeit the seat of a council member.

6. Spending over $100,000 of taxpayer money and wasting thousands of hours of city staff, employee, and official’s
time in effort to cancel the votes of the citizens of Leon Valley.

I hope I have been able to answer some of your questions about the recall petitions and process. If you have any
other questions or comments, please feel free to reach out to me via email at Place5@leonvalleytexas.gov.

-Will Bradshaw, Councilor Place 5

 Exhibit D9
Recall Petition
Monica Alcocer
 Exhibit D10
City Council Meeting Agenda
October 15, 2019
 CITY OF LEON VALLEY
CITY COUNCIL REGULAR MEETING
Leon Valley City Council Chambers
6400 El Verde Road, Leon Valley, TX 78238
Tuesday, October 15, 2019

AGENDA

1. 6:00 PM Call to Order, Determine a Quorum is Present, Pledge of Allegiance.

2. Presentations

1. Presentation of the Good Neighbor Award to Mr. Craig Ferrell (Mayor Chris
Riley)

2. Hike & Bike Trail Advisory Committee 2019 Annual Report (Henry Diecker, Vice
Chairman)

3. Monthly Financial Report Ending September 30, 2019 (Vickie Wallace, Finance
Director)

4. Presentation and Discussion on the Options for Legal Service Providers to the
City of Leon Valley.

3. City Manager's Report

1. Upcoming Important Events:

• Next Regular City Council Meeting Tuesday, November 5, 2019, at 6:00 p.m. in
Council Chambers
• Halloween Party October 26, 2019, at the Leon Valley Community Center and
Leon Valley Library from 9:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.
• Arbor Day Tree Adoption October 26, 2019, on the Community Center Porch,
from 9:00 a.m. -12:00 p.m.
• Trash to Treasure Sale October 26, 2019, at the Community Center by
Northwest Seniors, from 9:00 a.m. - 2:00 p.m.
• Pet Costume Contest October 26, 2019 on the Grass area in front of the
Community Center, from 10:00 a.m. - 11:00 a.m.
• Library Halloween Fall Festival October 26, 2019, from 10:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.
• Coffee with the Mayor and City Council, Saturday, October 19, 2019, from 9:00
a.m. until 11:00 a.m. at the Conference Center.
• City offices will be closed on Monday, November 11, 2019, in observance of
Veterans’ Day
 Leon Valley Regular Meeting Agenda October 15, 2019

• Neighborhood Heroes Boots & Badges Event, November 12, 2019, at

Whataburger, 7016 Bandera Road from 5:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m.
• Annual Christmas Tree Lighting December 2, 2019, at 5:30 p.m. at the Leon
Valley Conference Center.
• Annual Breakfast with Santa on December 7, 2019, at the Community Center
Sponsored by the Friends of the Leon Valley Public Library and the Leon Valley
Public Library from 8:00 a.m. - 10:30 a.m.
• Annual Town Hall Meeting, Saturday, January 25, 2020, from 8:30 a.m. to 12:30
p.m. at the Leon Valley Conference Center.
• Miscellaneous other events and announcements

4. Citizens to Be Heard

5. Announcements by the Mayor and Council Members. At this time, reports about
items of community interest, which no action will be taken may be given to the public
as per Chapter 551.0415 of the Government Code, such as: expressions of thanks,
congratulations or condolence, information regarding holiday schedules, reminders
of social, ceremonial, or community events organized or sponsored by the governing
body or that was or will be attended by a member of the Leon Valley City Council or
a City official.

6. Regular Agenda

1. Presentation, Discussion, Public Hearing and Possible Action on a Resolution of

Intent to Establish the Property Assessed Clean Energy Act, (the “PACE Act”)
Program Within the City of Leon Valley, TX. (John Clamp, CFO, AACOG) (M&C
# 2019-10-15-01 K. Kuenstler)

2. Presentation, Discussion, Public Hearing and Possible Action on a Resolution

Establishing The City of Leon Valley, Texas PACE Program (John Clamp, CFO,
AACOG) (M&C # 2019-10-15-02 K. Kuenstler)

7. Consent Agenda

1. Consideration of the Following City Council Minutes:

a. Special Meeting for Executive Session- June 18, 2019 5:30 PM
b. Regular Meeting- June 18, 2019 6:00 PM
c. Special Meeting- August 13, 2019 5:30 PM
d. Special Meeting- August 13, 2019 5:45 PM
e. Special Meeting- September 30, 2019 6:00 PM

2. Annual Investment Report for the Period of October 1, 2018-September 30, 2019
(M&C # 2019-10-15-03 V. Wallace)

3. Discussion and Possible Action of the Quarterly Investment Report for the
Quarter Ended September 30, 2019 (M&C # 2019-10-15-04 V. Wallace)

City of Leon Valley Page 2 Updated 10/15/2019 8:25 AM

 Leon Valley Regular Meeting Agenda October 15, 2019

4. Annual Review and Adoption of a Resolution Approving the Investment Policy

for the City of Leon Valley With Changes to Section VI, B3 Types of Collateral
(M&C # 2019-10-15-05 V. Wallace)

5. Acceptance of Committee Minutes:

• 06-17-2019 Economic and Community Development Advisory Committee
Meeting Minutes
• 09-09-2019 Ethics Review Board Minutes
• 09-16-2019 Charter Review Committee Minutes
• 09-23-2019 Charter Review Committee Minutes

6. Discussion and Possible Action to Approve the Leon Valley Economic

Development Corporation's Last Board Minutes Winding up the Affairs of the
Board (M&C # 2019-10-15-06 S. Passailaigue)

7. Discussion and Possible Action on a Resolution of The City of Leon Valley, TX.,
City Council Appointing Members to The Leon Valley Police Department Citizens
Police Advisory Committee; Beautification Committee; And Earthwise Living Day
Committee (M&C # 2019-10-15-07 S. Passailaigue)

8. Ordinance

1. Discussion and Possible Action of an Ordinance Authorizing Budget

Adjustments, in a Total Amount of $880,128, with 15% for Contingencies, for
Capital Projects from the FY '19 to the FY '20 Enterprise, General, Red Light
Camera, and Stormwater Fund Budgets (1st Read was Held on 09-30-2019)
(M&C #2019-10-15-08 M. Moritz)

2. Discussion and Possible Action on an Ordinance, granting a Specific Use Permit

on a request by Marc Shilling, for Entertainment Indoor Use, at 6504 Bandera
Road; Generally Located on the West Side of Bandera Road Approximately 200
feet North of Seneca Drive; and a Public Hearing on Said Request (1st Reading
was Held on 09-30-2019) (M&C # 2019-10-15-09 B. Melland)

3. Discussion and Possible Action on an Ordinance Amending Chapter 2 Animal

Control of the Leon Valley Code of Ordinances and Appendix A Fee Schedule
(First Reading was Held on 09-30-2019) (M&C # 2019-10-15-10 J. Salvaggio)

9. Regular Agenda Continued

1. Discussion and Possible Action on an Ordinance Amending Section 13.02.074 of

the City's Tree Preservation Ordinance regarding Maximum Mitigation of Existing
Trees (1st Reading as Required by City Charter) (M&C # 2019-10-15-11 B.
Melland)

City of Leon Valley Page 3 Updated 10/15/2019 8:25 AM

 Leon Valley Regular Meeting Agenda October 15, 2019

2. Presentation, Discussion, and Public Hearing to Consider Approval of an

Ordinance Reserving a 2.054 Acre Area at the Huebner-Onion Natural Area Park
for Future Public Improvements (1st Read as Required by City Charter) (M&C #
2019-10-15-12 M. Moritz)

3. Presentation and Discussion of an Ordinance Authorizing a Budget Adjustment

for the 2020 fiscal year in the Amount of $310,000 From the General Fund
Reserves to Allow for the Purchase of a New Ambulance, with required
equipment, for the Fire Department. (1st Reading as Required by the City
Charter) (M&C # 2019-10-15-13 M. Naughton)

4. Presentation and Discussion of an Ordinance Granting a Park Variance Request

from CJC Life Church to Allow a 5K Run Event at Raymond Rimkus Park (1st
Read as Required by City Charter) (M&C # 2019-10-15-14 M. Moritz)

5. Discussion and Possible Action on the Items for Discussion at the 2020 Town
Hall Meeting (M&C # 2019-10-15-15 K. Kuenstler)

6. Discussion and Possible Action on the conduct of Councilor Will Bradshaw as a

sitting City Council member. (Requested by Councilor Catherine Rodriguez and
Councilor Monica Alcocer) (M&C # 2019-10-15-16 S. Passailaigue)

7. The City Council shall meet in Executive Session to discuss the following: Under
the Texas Local Government Code §551.074 Personnel Matters to Discuss and
Conduct an Annual Performance Evaluation of City Manager Kelly Kuenstler as
Required by the City of Leon Valley’s Employment Contract

8. Reconvene into Regular Session and Take Action on Issues Discussed in

Executive Session if Necessary

10. Citizens to be Heard

11. Adjournment
Executive Session. The City Council of the City of Leon Valley reserves the right to adjourn into Executive Session at
any time during the course of this meeting to discuss any of the matters listed on the posted agenda, above, as authorized
by the Texas Government Code, Sections 551.071 (consultation with attorney), 551.072 (deliberations about real
property), 551.073 (deliberations about gifts and donations), 551.074 (personnel matters), 551.076 (deliberations about
security devices), and 551.087 (economic development).

Attendance by Other Elected or Appointed Officials: It is anticipated that members other City boards, commissions
and/or committees may attend the open meeting in numbers that may constitute a quorum. Notice is hereby given that the
meeting, to the extent required by law, is also noticed as a meeting of any other boards, commissions and/or committees
of the City, whose members may be in attendance in numbers constituting a quorum. These members of other City
boards, commissions, and/or committees may not deliberate or take action on items listed on the agenda. [Attorney
General Opinion – No. GA-0957 (2012)].

I hereby certify that the above NOTICE OF PUBLIC MEETING(S) AND AGENDA OF THE LEON VALLEY CITY
COUNCIL was posted at the Leon Valley City Hall, 6400 El Verde Road, Leon Valley, Texas, and remained posted until
after the meeting(s) hereby posted concluded. This notice is posted on the City website at www.leonvalleytexas.gov. This
building is wheelchair accessible. Any request for sign interpretive or other services must be made 48 hours in advance of
the meeting. To make arrangements, call (210) 684-1391, Extension 216.

City of Leon Valley Page 4 Updated 10/15/2019 8:25 AM

 Leon Valley Regular Meeting Agenda October 15, 2019

SAUNDRA PASSAILAIGUE, TRMC

City Secretary
October 10th, 2019 6:10 PM

City of Leon Valley Page 5 Updated 10/15/2019 8:25 AM

 Exhibit D11
Texas Comptroller
Policy Prohibiting Fraud, Theft,
Waste, or Abuse
 Exhibit D12
Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct
TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
(Including Amendments Effective May 1, 2018, June 1, 2018 and February 26, 2019)
 Table of Contents
Page

Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities 4

Preamble: Scope 5
Terminology 8

I. CLIENT-LAWYER RELATIONSHIP 9

Rule 1.01. Competent and Diligent Representation 9

Rule 1.02. Scope and Objectives of Representation 11
Rule 1.03. Communication 14
Rule 1.04. Fees 16
Rule 1.05. Confidentiality of Information 22
Rule 1.06. Conflict of Interest: General Rule 28
Rule 1.07. Conflict of Interest: Intermediary 33
Rule 1.08. Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions 35
Rule 1.09. Conflict of Interest: Former Client 38
Rule 1.10. Successive Government and Private Employment 41
Rule 1.11. Adjudicatory Official or Law Clerk 44
Rule 1.12. Organization as a Client 45
Rule 1.13. Conflicts: Public Interests Activities 49
Rule 1.14. Safekeeping Property 50
Rule 1.15. Declining or Terminating Representation 51

II. COUNSELOR 54

Rule 2.01. Advisor 54

Rule 2.02. Evaluation for Use by Third Persons 55

III. ADVOCATE 57

Rule 3.01. Meritorious Claims and Contentions 57

Rule 3.02. Minimizing the Burdens and Delays of Litigation 57
Rule 3.03. Candor Toward the Tribunal 59
Rule 3.04. Fairness in Adjudicatory Proceedings 63
Rule 3.05. Maintaining Impartiality of Tribunal 65
Rule 3.06. Maintaining Integrity of Jury System 66
Rule 3.07. Trial Publicity 68
Rule 3.08. Lawyer as Witness 70
Rule 3.09. Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor 72
Rule 3.10. Advocate in Nonadjudicative Proceedings 74

2
IV. NON-CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS 75

Rule 4.01. Truthfulness in Statements to Others 75

Rule 4.02. Communication with One Represented by Counsel 76
Rule 4.03. Dealing With Unrepresented Person 78
Rule 4.04. Respect for Rights of Third Persons 78

V. LAW FIRMS AND ASSOCIATIONS 79

Rule 5.01. Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory Lawyer 79

Rule 5.02. Responsibilities of a Supervised Lawyer 80
Rule 5.03. Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants 81
Rule 5.04. Professional Independence of a Lawyer 82
Rule 5.05. Unauthorized Practice of Law 85
Rule 5.06. Restrictions on Right to Practice 86
Rule 5.07. [Blank] 86
Rule 5.08. Prohibited Discriminatory Activities 86

VI. PUBLIC SERVICE 88

Rule 6.01. Accepting Appointments by a Tribunal 88

VII. INFORMATION ABOUT LEGAL SERVICES 89

Rule 7.01. Firm Names and Letterhead 89

Rule 7.02. Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services 91
Rule 7.03. Prohibited Solicitations and Payments 94
Rule 7.04. Advertisements in the Public Media 97
Rule 7.05. Prohibited Written, Electronic, Or Digital Solicitations 104
Rule 7.06. Prohibited Employment 107
Rule 7.07. Filing Requirements for Public Advertisements and Written, Recorded,
Electronic, or Other Digital Solicitations 108

VIII. MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF THE PROFESSION 114

Rule 8.01. Bar Admission, Reinstatement, and Disciplinary Matters 114

Rule 8.02. Judicial and Legal Officials 115
Rule 8.03. Reporting Professional Misconduct 115
Rule 8.04. Misconduct 117
Rule 8.05. Jurisdiction 119

IX. SEVERABILITY OF RULES 120

Rule 9.01. Severability 120

3
 TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities

1. A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special
responsibility for the quality of justice. Lawyers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in the preservation
of society. The fulfillment of this role requires an understanding by lawyers of their relationship with and
function in our legal system. A consequent obligation of lawyers is to maintain the highest standards of
ethical conduct.

2. As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various functions. As advisor, a lawyer provides a

client with an informed understanding of the client's legal rights and obligations and explains their
practical implications. As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the
adversary system. As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent with
requirements of honest dealing with others. As intermediary between clients, a lawyer seeks to reconcile
their divergent interests as an advisor and, to a limited extent, as a spokesperson for each client. A lawyer
acts as evaluator by examining a client's affairs and reporting about them to the client or to others.

3. In all professional functions, a lawyer should zealously pursue clients' interests within the bounds of
the law. In doing so, a lawyer should be competent, prompt and diligent. A lawyer should maintain
communication with a client concerning the representation. A lawyer should keep in confidence
information relating to representation of a client except so far as disclosure is required or permitted by
the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.

4. A lawyer's conduct should conform to the requirements of the law, both in professional service to
clients and in the lawyer's business and personal affairs. A lawyer should use the law's procedures only
for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate respect for
the legal system and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public officials. While it
is a lawyer's duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyer's duty to
uphold legal process.

5. As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, the administration of justice and the
quality of service rendered by the legal profession. As a member of a learned profession, a lawyer should
cultivate knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in reform of the law and
work to strengthen legal education. A lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies in the administration of
justice and of the fact that the poor, and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot afford adequate
legal assistance, and should therefore devote professional time and civic influence in their behalf. A
lawyer should aid the legal profession in pursuing these objectives and should help the bar regulate itself
in the public interest.

6. A lawyer should render public interest legal service. The basic responsibility for providing legal services
for those unable to pay ultimately rests upon the individual lawyer, and personal involvement in the
problems of the disadvantaged can be one of the most rewarding experiences in the life of a lawyer. Every
4
lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, should find time to participate
in or otherwise support the provision of legal services to the disadvantaged. The provision of free legal
services to those unable to pay reasonable fees is a moral obligation of each lawyer as well as the
profession generally. A lawyer may discharge this basic responsibility by providing public interest legal
services without fee, or at a substantially reduced fee, in one or more of the following areas: poverty law,
civil rights law, public rights law, charitable organization representation, the administration of justice, and
by financial support for organizations that provide legal services to persons of limited means.

7. In the nature of law practice, conflicting responsibilities are encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical
problems arise from apparent conflict between a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system
and to the lawyer's own interests. The Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct prescribe terms
for resolving such tensions. They do so by stating minimum standards of conduct below which no lawyer
can fall without being subject to disciplinary action. Within the framework of these Rules many difficult
issues of professional discretion can arise. The Rules and their Comments constitute a body of principles
upon which the lawyer can rely for guidance in resolving such issues through the exercise of sensitive
professional and moral judgment. In applying these rules, lawyers may find interpretive guidance in the
principles developed in the Comments.

8. The legal profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulation is undertaken in the public interest
rather than in furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns of the bar, and to insist that every
lawyer both comply with its minimum disciplinary standards and aid in securing their observance by
other lawyers. Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the independence of the profession and the
public interest which it serves.

9. Each lawyer's own conscience is the touchstone against which to test the extent to which his actions
may rise above the disciplinary standards prescribed by these rules. The desire for the respect and
confidence of the members of the profession and of the society which it serves provides the lawyer the
incentive to attain the highest possible degree of ethical conduct. The possible loss of that respect and
confidence is the ultimate sanction. So long as its practitioners are guided by these principles, the law will
continue to be a noble profession. This is its greatness and its strength, which permit of no compromise.

Preamble: Scope

10. The Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of reason. The Texas Rules of
Professional Conduct define proper conduct for purposes of professional discipline. They are
imperatives, cast in the terms “shall” or “shall not.” The Comments are cast often in the terms of “may”
or “should” and are permissive, defining areas in which the lawyer has professional discretion. When a
lawyer exercises such discretion, whether by acting or not acting, no disciplinary action may be taken.
The Comments also frequently illustrate or explain applications of the rules, in order to provide guidance
for interpreting the rules and for practicing in compliance with the spirit of the rules. The Comments do
not, however, add obligations to the rules and no disciplinary action may be taken for failure to conform
to the Comments.

5
11. The rules presuppose a larger legal context shaping the lawyer's role. That context includes court
rules and statutes relating to matters of licensure, laws defining specific obligations of lawyers and
substantive and procedural law in general. Compliance with the rules, as with all law in an open society,
depends primarily upon understanding and voluntary compliance, secondarily upon reinforcement by
peer and public opinion and finally, when necessary, upon enforcement through disciplinary
proceedings. The rules and Comments do not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical considerations
that should guide a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal rules.

12. Most of the duties flowing from the client-lawyer relationship attach only after the client has requested
the lawyer to render legal services and the lawyer has agreed to do so. For purposes of determining the
lawyer's authority and responsibility, individual circumstances and principles of substantive law external
to these rules determine whether a client-lawyer relationship may be found to exist. But there are some
duties, such as of that of confidentiality, that may attach before a client-lawyer relationship has been
established.

13. The responsibilities of government lawyers, under various legal provisions, including constitutional,
statutory and common law, may include authority concerning legal matters that ordinarily reposes in the
client in private client-lawyer relationships. For example, a lawyer for a government agency may have
authority on behalf of the government to decide upon settlement or whether to appeal from an adverse
judgment. Such authority in various respects is generally vested in the attorney general and the state's
attorney in state government, and their federal counterparts, and the same may be true of other
government law officers. Also, lawyers under the supervision of these officers may be authorized to
represent several government agencies in intragovernmental legal controversies in circumstances where
a private lawyer could not represent multiple private clients. They also may have authority to represent
the “public interest” in circumstances where a private lawyer would not be authorized to do so. These
rules do not abrogate any such authority.

14. These rules make no attempt to prescribe either disciplinary procedures or penalties for violation of
a rule.

15. These rules do not undertake to define standards of civil liability of lawyers for professional conduct.
Violation of a rule does not give rise to a private cause of action nor does it create any presumption that
a legal duty to a client has been breached. Likewise, these rules are not designed to be standards for
procedural decisions. Furthermore, the purpose of these rules can be abused when they are invoked by
opposing parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment,
or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority, does not imply that an
antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the rule.
Accordingly, nothing in the rules should be deemed to augment any substantive legal duty of lawyers or
the extra-disciplinary consequences of violating such a duty.

16. Moreover, these rules are not intended to govern or affect judicial application of either the attorney-
client or work product privilege. The fact that in exceptional situations the lawyer under the Rules has a
limited discretion to disclose a client confidence does not vitiate the proposition that, as a general matter,
6
the client has a reasonable expectation that information relating to the client will not be voluntarily
disclosed and that disclosure of such information may be judicially compelled only in accordance with
recognized exceptions to the attorney-client and work product privileges.

7
Terminology

“Adjudicatory Official” denotes a person who serves on a Tribunal.

“Adjudicatory Proceeding” denotes the consideration of a matter by a Tribunal.

“Belief” or “Believes” denotes that the person involved actually supposed the fact in question to be true.
A person's belief may be inferred from circumstances.

“Competent” or “Competence” denotes possession or the ability to timely acquire the legal knowledge,
skill, and training reasonably necessary for the representation of the client.

“Consult” or “Consultation” denotes communication of information and advice reasonably sufficient to

permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question.

“Firm” or “Law firm” denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a private firm; or a lawyer or lawyers employed in
the legal department of a corporation, legal services organization, or other organization, or in a unit of
government.

“Fitness” denotes those qualities of physical, mental and psychological health that enable a person to
discharge a lawyer's responsibilities to clients in conformity with the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct. Normally a lack of fitness is indicated most clearly by a persistent inability to
discharge, or unreliability in carrying out, significant obligations.

“Fraud” or “Fraudulent” denotes conduct having a purpose to deceive and not merely negligent
misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information.

“Knowingly,” “Known,” or “Knows” denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's
knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.

“Law firm”: see “Firm.”

“Partner” denotes an individual or corporate member of a partnership or a shareholder in a law firm

organized as a professional corporation.

“Person” includes a legal entity as well as an individual.

“Reasonable” or “Reasonably” when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct of a
reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.

“Reasonable belief” or “Reasonably believes” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer
believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.

8
“Should know” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that a reasonable lawyer under the same or
similar circumstances would know the matter in question.

“Substantial” when used in reference to degree or extent denotes a matter of meaningful significance or
involvement.

“Tribunal” denotes any governmental body or official or any other person engaged in a process of
resolving a particular dispute or controversy. “Tribunal” includes such institutions as courts and
administrative agencies when engaging in adjudicatory or licensing activities as defined by applicable law
or rules of practice or procedure, as well as judges, magistrates, special masters, referees, arbitrators,
mediators, hearing officers and comparable persons empowered to resolve or to recommend a
resolution of a particular matter; but it does not include jurors, prospective jurors, legislative bodies or
their committees, members or staffs, nor does it include other governmental bodies when acting in a
legislative or rule-making capacity.

I. CLIENT-LAWYER RELATIONSHIP

Rule 1.01. Competent and Diligent Representation

(a) A lawyer shall not accept or continue employment in a legal matter which the lawyer knows or should
know is beyond the lawyer's competence, unless:

(1) another lawyer who is competent to handle the matter is, with the prior informed consent of
the client, associated in the matter; or

(2) the advice or assistance of the lawyer is reasonably required in an emergency and the lawyer
limits the advice and assistance to that which is reasonably necessary in the circumstances.

(b) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not:

(1) neglect a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer; or

(2) frequently fail to carry out completely the obligations that the lawyer owes to a client or clients.

(c) As used in this Rule, “neglect” signifies inattentiveness involving a conscious disregard for the
responsibilities owed to a client or clients.

Comment:

Accepting Employment

1. A lawyer generally should not accept or continue employment in any area of the law in which the
lawyer is not and will not be prepared to render competent legal services. “Competence” is defined in
9
Terminology as possession of the legal knowledge, skill, and training reasonably necessary for the
representation. Competent representation contemplates appropriate application by the lawyer of that
legal knowledge, skill and training, reasonable thoroughness in the study and analysis of the law and facts,
and reasonable attentiveness to the responsibilities owed to the client.

2. In determining whether a matter is beyond a lawyer's competence, relevant factors include the relative
complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer's general experience in the field in question,
the preparation and study the lawyer will be able to give the matter, and whether it is feasible either to
refer the matter to or associate a lawyer of established competence in the field in question. The required
attention and preparation are determined in part by what is at stake; major litigation and complex
transactions ordinarily require more elaborate treatment than matters of lesser consequences.

3. A lawyer may not need to have special training or prior experience to accept employment to handle
legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. Although expertise in a particular field of
law may be useful in some circumstances, the appropriate proficiency in many instances is that of a
general practitioner. A newly admitted lawyer can be as competent in some matters as a practitioner with
long experience. Some important legal skills, such as the analysis of precedent, the evaluation of evidence
and legal drafting, are required in all legal problems. Perhaps the most fundamental legal skill consists of
determining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve, a skill that necessarily transcends any
particular specialized knowledge.

4. A lawyer possessing the normal skill and training reasonably necessary for the representation of a client
in an area of law is not subject to discipline for accepting employment in a matter in which, in order to
represent the client properly, the lawyer must become more competent in regard to relevant legal
knowledge by additional study and investigation. If the additional study and preparation will result in
unusual delay or expense to the client, the lawyer should not accept employment except with the
informed consent of the client.

5. A lawyer offered employment or employed in a matter beyond the lawyer's competence generally
must decline or withdraw from the employment or, with the prior informed consent of the client,
associate a lawyer who is competent in the matter. Paragraph (a)(2) permits a lawyer, however, to give
advice or assistance in an emergency in a matter even though the lawyer does not have the skill ordinarily
required if referral to or consultation with another lawyer would be impractical and if the assistance is
limited to that which is reasonably necessary in the circumstances.

Competent and Diligent Representation

6. Having accepted employment, a lawyer should act with competence, commitment and dedication to
the interest of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf. A lawyer should feel a moral
or professional obligation to pursue a matter on behalf of a client with reasonable diligence and
promptness despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer. A lawyer's
workload should be controlled so that each matter can be handled with diligence and competence. As
provided in paragraph (a), an incompetent lawyer is subject to discipline.
10
Neglect

7. Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented than procrastination. A client's interests
often can be adversely affected by the passage of time or the change of conditions; in extreme instances,
as when a lawyer overlooks a statute of limitations, the client's legal position may be destroyed. Under
paragraph (b), a lawyer is subject to professional discipline for neglecting a particular legal matter as well
as for frequent failures to carry out fully the obligations owed to one or more clients. A lawyer who acts
in good faith is not subject to discipline, under those provisions for an isolated inadvertent or unskilled
act or omission, tactical error, or error of judgment. Because delay can cause a client needless anxiety
and undermine confidence in the lawyer's trustworthiness, there is a duty to communicate reasonably
with clients; see Rule 1.03.

Maintaining Competence

8. Because of the vital role of lawyers in the legal process, each lawyer should strive to become and
remain proficient and competent in the practice of law, including the benefits and risks associated with
relevant technology. To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill of a competent practitioner, a lawyer
should engage in continuing study and education. If a system of peer review has been established, the
lawyer should consider making use of it in appropriate circumstances. Isolated instances of faulty conduct
or decision should be identified for purposes of additional study or instruction.

Rule 1.02. Scope and Objectives of Representation

(a) Subject to paragraphs (b), (c), (d), and (e), (f), and (g), a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions:

(1) concerning the objectives and general methods of representation;

(2) whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter, except as otherwise authorized by law;

(3) In a criminal case, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to
waive jury trial, and whether the client will testify.

(b) A lawyer may limit the scope, objectives and general methods of the representation if the client
consents after consultation.

(c) A lawyer shall not assist or counsel a client to engage in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent. A lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client
and may counsel and represent a client in connection with the making of a good faith effort to determine
the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.

(d) When a lawyer has confidential information clearly establishing that a client is likely to commit a
criminal or fraudulent act that is likely to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property
of another, the lawyer shall promptly make reasonable efforts under the circumstances to dissuade the
11
client from committing the crime or fraud.

(e) When a lawyer has confidential information clearly establishing that the lawyer's client has committed
a criminal or fraudulent act in the commission of which the lawyer's services have been used, the lawyer
shall make reasonable efforts under the circumstances to persuade the client to take corrective action.

(f) When a lawyer knows that a client expects representation not permitted by the rules of professional
conduct or other law, the lawyer shall consult with the client regarding the relevant limitations on the
lawyer's conduct.

(g) A lawyer shall take reasonable action to secure the appointment of a guardian or other legal
representative for, or seek other protective orders with respect to, a client whenever the lawyer reasonably
believes that the client lacks legal competence and that such action should be taken to protect the client.

Comment:

Scope of Representation

1. Both lawyer and client have authority and responsibility in the objectives and means of representation.
The client has ultimate authority to determine the objectives to be served by legal representation, within
the limits imposed by law, the lawyer's professional obligations, and the agreed scope of representation.
Within those limits, a client also has a right to consult with the lawyer about the general methods to be
used in pursuing those objectives. The lawyer should assume responsibility for the means by which the
client's objectives are best achieved. Thus, a lawyer has very broad discretion to determine technical and
legal tactics, subject to the client's wishes regarding such matters as the expense to be incurred and
concern for third persons who might be adversely affected.

2. Except where prior communications have made it clear that a particular proposal would be
unacceptable to the client, a lawyer is obligated to communicate any settlement offer to the client in a
civil case; and a lawyer has a comparable responsibility with respect to a proposed plea bargain in a
criminal case.

3. A lawyer should consult with the client concerning any such proposal, and generally it is for the client
to decide whether or not to accept it. This principle is subject to several exceptions or qualifications.
First, in class actions a lawyer may recommend a settlement of the matter to the court over the objections
of named plaintiffs in the case. Second, in insurance defense cases a lawyer's ability to implement an
insured client's wishes with respect to settlement may be qualified by the contractual rights of the insurer
under its policy. Finally, a lawyer's normal deference to a client's wishes concerning settlement may be
abrogated if the client has validly relinquished to a third party any rights to pass upon settlement offers.
Whether any such waiver is enforceable is a question largely beyond the scope of these rules. But see
comment 5 below. A lawyer reasonably relying on any of these exceptions in not implementing a client's
desires concerning settlement is, however, not subject to discipline under this Rule.

12
Limited Scope of Representation

4. The scope of representation provided by a lawyer may be limited by agreement with the client or by
the terms under which the lawyer's services are made available to the client. For example, a retainer may
be for a specifically defined objective. Likewise, representation provided through a legal aid agency may
be subject to limitations on the types of cases the agency handles. Similarly, when a lawyer has been
retained by an insurer to represent an insured, the representation may be limited to matters related to
the insurance coverage. The scope within which the representation is undertaken also may exclude
specific objectives or means, such as those that the lawyer or client regards as repugnant or imprudent.

5. An agreement concerning the scope of representation must accord with the Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct and other law. Thus, the client may not be asked to agree to representation so
limited in scope as to violate Rule 1.01, or to surrender the right to terminate the lawyer's services or the
right to settle or continue litigation that the lawyer might wish to handle differently.

6. Unless the representation is terminated as provided in Rule 1.15, a lawyer should carry through to
conclusion all matters undertaken for a client. If a lawyer's representation is limited to a specific matter
or matters, the relationship terminates when the matter has been resolved. If a lawyer has represented a
client over a substantial period in a variety of matters, the client may sometimes assume that the lawyer
will continue to serve on a continuing basis unless the lawyer gives notice to the contrary. Doubt about
whether a client-lawyer relationship still exists should be clarified by the lawyer, preferably in writing, so
that the client will not mistakenly suppose the lawyer is looking after the client's affairs when the lawyer
has ceased to do so. For example, if a lawyer has handled a judicial or administrative proceeding that
produced a result adverse to the client but has not been specifically instructed concerning pursuit of an
appeal, the lawyer should advise the client of the possibility of appeal before relinquishing responsibility
for the matter.

Criminal, Fraudulent and Prohibited Transactions

7. A lawyer is required to give an honest opinion about the actual consequences that appear likely to
result from a client's conduct. The fact that a client uses advice in a course of action that is criminal or
fraudulent does not, of itself, make a lawyer a party to the course of action. However, a lawyer may not
knowingly assist a client in criminal or fraudulent conduct. There is a critical distinction between
presenting an analysis of legal aspects of questionable conduct and recommending the means by which
a crime or fraud might be committed with impunity.

8. When a client's course of action has already begun and is continuing, the lawyer's responsibility is
especially delicate. The lawyer may not reveal the client's wrongdoing, except as permitted or required
by Rule 1.05. However, the lawyer also must avoid furthering the client's unlawful purpose, for example,
by suggesting how it might be concealed. A lawyer may not continue assisting a client in conduct that the
lawyer originally supposes is legally proper but then discovers is criminal or fraudulent. Withdrawal from
the representation, therefore, may be required. See Rule 1.15(a)(1).

13
9. Paragraph (c) is violated when a lawyer accepts a general retainer for legal services to an enterprise
known to be unlawful. Paragraph (c) does not, however, preclude undertaking a criminal defense incident
to a general retainer for legal services to a lawful enterprise.

10. The last clause of paragraph (c) recognizes that determining the validity or interpretation of a statute
or regulation may require a course of action involving disobedience of the statute or regulation or of the
interpretation placed upon it by governmental authorities.

11. Paragraph (d) requires a lawyer in certain instances to use reasonable efforts to dissuade a client from
committing a crime or fraud. If the services of the lawyer were used by the client in committing a crime
or fraud, paragraph (e) requires the lawyer to use reasonable efforts to persuade the client to take
corrective action.

Client Under a Disability

12. Paragraph (a) assumes that the lawyer is legally authorized to represent the client. The usual attorney-
client relationship is established and maintained by consenting adults who possess the legal capacity to
agree to the relationship. Sometimes the relationship can be established only by a legally effective
appointment of the lawyer to represent a person. Unless the lawyer is legally authorized to act for a
person under a disability, an attorney-client relationship does not exist for the purpose of this rule.

13. If a legal representative has already been appointed for the client, the lawyer should ordinarily look
to the representative for decisions on behalf of the client. If a legal representative has not been appointed,
paragraph (g) requires a lawyer in some situations to take protective steps, such as initiating the
appointment of a guardian. The lawyer should see to such appointment or take other protective steps
when it reasonably appears advisable to do so in order to serve the client's best interests. See Rule
1.05(c)(4), d(1) and (d)(2)(i) in regard to the lawyer's right to reveal to the court the facts reasonably
necessary to secure the guardianship or other protective order.

Rule 1.03. Communication

(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply
with reasonable requests for information.

(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make
informed decisions regarding the representation.

Comment:

1. The client should have sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the
objectives of the representation and the means by which they are to be pursued to the extent the client
is willing and able to do so. For example, a lawyer negotiating on behalf of a client should provide the
client with facts relevant to the matter, inform the client of communications from another party and take
14
other reasonable steps to permit the client to make a decision regarding a serious offer from another
party. A lawyer who receives from opposing counsel either an offer of settlement in a civil controversy
or a proffered plea bargain in a criminal case should promptly inform the client of its substance unless
prior discussions with the client have left it clear that the proposal will be unacceptable. See Comment 2
to Rule 1.02.

2. Adequacy of communication depends in part on the kind of advice or assistance involved. For
example, in negotiations where there is time to explain a proposal the lawyer should review all important
provisions with the client before proceeding to an agreement. In litigation a lawyer should explain the
general strategy and prospects of success and ordinarily should consult the client on tactics that might
injure or coerce others. On the other hand a lawyer ordinarily cannot be expected to describe trial or
negotiation strategy in detail. Moreover, in certain situations practical exigency may require a lawyer to
act for a client without prior consultation. The guiding principle is that the lawyer should reasonably
fulfill client expectations for information consistent with the duty to act in the client's best interests, and
the client's overall requirements as to the character of representation.

3. Ordinarily, the information to be provided is that appropriate for a client who is a comprehending
and responsible adult. However, fully informing the client according to this standard may be impractical,
as for example, where the client is a child or suffers from mental disability; see paragraph 5. When the
client is an organization or group, it is often impossible or inappropriate to inform every one of its
members about its legal affairs; ordinarily, the lawyer should address communications to the appropriate
officials of the organization. See Rule 1.13. Where many routine matters are involved, a system of limited
or occasional reporting may be arranged with the client.

Withholding Information

4. In some circumstances, a lawyer may be justified in delaying transmission of information when the
lawyer reasonably believes the client would be likely to react imprudently to an immediate
communication. Thus, a lawyer might withhold a psychiatric diagnosis of a client when the examining
psychiatrist indicates that disclosure would harm the client. Similarly, rules or court orders governing
litigation may provide that information supplied to a lawyer may not be disclosed to the client. Rule
3.04(d) sets forth the lawyer's obligations with respect to such rules or orders. A lawyer may not, however,
withhold information to serve the lawyer's own interest or convenience.

Client Under a Disability

5. In addition to communicating with any legal representative, a lawyer should seek to maintain
reasonable communication with a client under a disability, insofar as possible. When a lawyer reasonably
believes a client suffers a mental disability or is not legally competent, it may not be possible to maintain
the usual attorney-client relationship. Nevertheless, the client may have the ability to understand,
deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about some matters affecting the client's own well-being.
Furthermore, to an increasing extent the law recognizes intermediate degrees of competence. For
example, children's opinions regarding their own custody are given some weight. The fact that a client
15
suffers a disability does not diminish the desirability of treating the client with attention and respect. See
also Rule 1.02(e) and Rule 1.05, Comment 17.

Rule 1.04. Fees

(a) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect an illegal fee or unconscionable
fee. A fee is unconscionable if a competent lawyer could not form a reasonable belief that the fee is
reasonable.

(b) Factors that may be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include, but not to the
exclusion of other relevant factors, the following:

(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill
requisite to perform the legal service properly;

(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will
preclude other employment by the lawyer;

(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;

(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;

(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;

(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;

(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and

(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncertainty of collection before
the legal services have been rendered.

(c) When the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the basis or rate of the fee shall be
communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing
the representation.

(d) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a
matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (e) or other law. A contingent fee agreement
shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined. If there is to be a
differentiation in the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement,
trial or appeal, the percentage for each shall be stated. The agreement shall state the litigation and other
expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or
after the contingent fee is calculated. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide
the client with a written statement describing the outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing
16
the remittance to the client and the method of its determination.

(e) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect a contingent fee for representing
a defendant in a criminal case.

(f) A division or arrangement for division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be
made only if:

(1) the division is:

(i) in proportion to the professional services performed by each lawyer; or

(ii) made between lawyers who assume joint responsibility for the representation; and

(2) the client consents in writing to the terms of the arrangement prior to the time of the
association or referral proposed, including:

(i) the identity of all lawyers or law firms who will participate in the fee-sharing agreement,
and

(ii) whether fees will be divided based on the proportion of services performed or by
lawyers agreeing to assume joint responsibility for the representation, and

(iii) the share of the fee that each lawyer or law firm will receive or, if the division is based
on the proportion of services performed, the basis on which the division will be made;
and

(3) the aggregate fee does not violate paragraph (a).

(g) Every agreement that allows a lawyer or law firm to associate other counsel in the representation of a
person, or to refer the person to other counsel for such representation, and that results in such an
association with or referral to a different law firm or a lawyer in such a different firm, shall be confirmed
by an arrangement conforming to paragraph (f). Consent by a client or a prospective client without
knowledge of the information specified in subparagraph (f)(2) does not constitute a confirmation within
the meaning of this rule. No attorney shall collect or seek to collect fees or expenses in connection with
any such agreement that is not confirmed in that way, except for:

(1) the reasonable value of legal services provided to that person; and

(2) the reasonable and necessary expenses actually incurred on behalf of that person.

(h) Paragraph (f) of this rule does not apply to payment to a former partner or associate pursuant to a
separation or retirement agreement, or to a lawyer referral program certified by the State Bar of Texas
17
in accordance with the Texas Lawyer Referral Service Quality Act, Tex. Occ. Code 952.001 et seq., or
any amendments or recodifications thereof.

Comment:

1. A lawyer in good conscience should not charge or collect more than a reasonable fee, although he
may charge less or no fee at all. The determination of the reasonableness of a fee, or of the range of
reasonableness, can be a difficult question, and a standard of “reasonableness” is too vague and uncertain
to be an appropriate standard in a disciplinary action. For this reason, paragraph (a) adopts, for
disciplinary purposes only, a clearer standard: the lawyer is subject to discipline for an illegal fee or an
unconscionable fee. Paragraph (a) defines an unconscionable fee in terms of the reasonableness of the
fee but in a way to eliminate factual disputes as to the fee's reasonableness. The Rule's “unconscionable”
standard, however, does not preclude use of the “reasonableness” standard of paragraph (b) in other
settings.

Basis or Rate of Fee

2. When the lawyer has regularly represented a client, they ordinarily will have evolved an understanding
concerning the basis or rate of the fee. If, however, the basis or rate of fee being charged to a regularly
represented client differs from the understanding that has evolved, the lawyer should so advise the client.
In a new client-lawyer relationship, an understanding as to the fee should be promptly established. It is
not necessary to recite all the factors that underlie the basis of the fee, but only those that are directly
involved in its computation. It is sufficient, for example, to state that the basic rate is an hourly charge or
a fixed amount or an estimated amount, in order to identity the factors that may be taken into account
in finally fixing the fee. When developments occur during the representation that render an earlier
estimate substantially inaccurate, a revised estimate should be provided to the client. A written statement
concerning the fee reduces the possibility of misunderstanding, and when the lawyer has not regularly
represented the client it is preferable for the basis or rate of the fee to be communicated to the client in
writing. Furnishing the client with a simple memorandum or a copy of the lawyer's customary fee
schedule is sufficient if the basis or rate of the fee is set forth. In the case of a contingent fee, a written
agreement is mandatory.

Types of Fees

3. Historically lawyers have determined what fees to charge by a variety of methods. Commonly
employed are percentage fees and contingent fees (which may vary in accordance with the amount at
stake or recovered), hourly rates, and flat fee arrangements, or combinations thereof.

4. The determination of a proper fee requires consideration of the interests of both client and lawyer.
The determination of reasonableness requires consideration of all relevant circumstances, including
those stated in paragraph (b). Obviously, in a particular situation not all of the factors listed in paragraph
(b) may be relevant and factors not listed could be relevant. The fees of a lawyer will vary according to
many factors, including the time required, the lawyer's experience, ability and reputation, the nature of
18
the employment, the responsibility involved, and the results obtained.

5. When there is a doubt whether a particular fee arrangement is consistent with the client's best interest,
the lawyer should discuss with the client alternative bases for the fee and explain their implications.

6. Once a fee arrangement is agreed to, a lawyer should not handle the matter so as to further the lawyer's
financial interests to the detriment of the client. For example, a lawyer should not abuse a fee
arrangement based primarily on hourly charges by using wasteful procedures.

Unconscionable Fees

7. Two principal circumstances combine to make it difficult to determine whether a particular fee is
unconscionable within the disciplinary test provided by paragraph (a) of this Rule. The first is the
subjectivity of a number of the factors relied on to determine the reasonableness of fees under paragraph
(b). Because those factors do not permit more than an approximation of a range of fees that might be
found reasonable in any given case, there is a corresponding degree of uncertainty in determining
whether a given fee is unconscionable. Secondly, fee arrangements normally are made at the outset of
representation, a time when many uncertainties and contingencies exist, while claims of unconscionability
are made in hindsight when the contingencies have been resolved. The “unconscionability” standard
adopts that difference in perspective and requires that a lawyer be given the benefit of any such
uncertainties for disciplinary purposes only. Except in very unusual situations, therefore, the
circumstances at the time a fee arrangement is made should control in determining a question of
unconscionability.

8. Two factors in otherwise borderline cases might indicate a fee may be unconscionable. The first is
overreaching by a lawyer, particularly of a client who was unusually susceptible to such overreaching. The
second is a failure of the lawyer to give at the outset a clear and accurate explanation of how a fee was to
be calculated. For example, a fee arrangement negotiated at arm's length with an experienced business
client would rarely be subject to question. On the other hand, a fee arrangement with an uneducated or
unsophisticated individual having no prior experience in such matters should be more carefully
scrutinized for overreaching. While the fact that a client was at a marked disadvantage in bargaining with
a lawyer over fees will not make a fee unconscionable, application of the disciplinary test may require
some consideration of the personal circumstances of the individuals involved.

Fees in Family Law Matters

9. Contingent and percentage fees in family law matters may tend to promote divorce and may be
inconsistent with a lawyer's obligation to encourage reconciliation. Such fee arrangements also may tend
to create a conflict of interest between lawyer and client regarding the appraisal of assets obtained for
client. See also Rule 1.08(h). In certain family law matters, such as child custody and adoption, no res is
created to fund a fee. Because of the human relationships involved and the unique character of the
proceedings, contingent fee arrangements in domestic relations cases are rarely justified.

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Division of Fees

10. A division of fees is a single billing to a client covering the fee of two or more lawyers who are not in
the same firm. A division of fees facilitates association of more than one lawyer in a matter in which
neither alone could serve the client as well, and most often is used when the fee is contingent and the
division is between a referring or associating lawyer initially retained by the client and a trial specialist,
but it applies in all cases in which two or more lawyers are representing a single client in the same matter,
and without regard to whether litigation is involved. Paragraph (f) permits the lawyers to divide a fee
either on the basis of the proportion of services they render or if each lawyer assumes joint responsibility
for the representation.

11. Contingent fee agreements must be in a writing signed by the client and must otherwise comply with
paragraph (d) of this Rule.

12. A division of a fee based on the proportion of services rendered by two or more lawyers contemplates
that each lawyer is performing substantial legal services on behalf of the client with respect to the matter.
In particular, it requires that each lawyer who participates in the fee have performed services beyond
those involved in initially seeking to acquire and being engaged by the client. There must be a reasonable
correlation between the amount or value of services rendered and responsibility assumed, and the share
of the fee to be received. However, if each participating lawyer performs substantial legal services on
behalf of the client, the agreed division should control even though the division is not directly
proportional to actual work performed. If a division of fee is to be based on the proportion of services
rendered, the arrangement may provide that the allocation not be made until the end of the
representation. When the allocation is deferred until the end of the representation, the terms of the
arrangement must include the basis by which the division will be made.

13. Joint responsibility for the representation entails ethical and perhaps financial responsibility for the
representation. The ethical responsibility assumed requires that a referring or associating lawyer make
reasonable efforts to assure adequacy of representation and to provide adequate client communication.
Adequacy of representation requires that the referring or associating lawyer conduct a reasonable
investigation of the client's legal matter and refer the matter to a lawyer whom the referring or associating
lawyer reasonably believes is competent to handle it. See Rule 1.01. Adequate attorney-client
communication requires that a referring or associating lawyer monitor the matter throughout the
representation and ensure that the client is informed of those matters that come to that lawyer's attention
and that a reasonable lawyer would believe the client should be aware. See Rule 1.03. Attending all
depositions and hearings or requiring that copies of all pleadings and correspondence be provided a
referring or associating lawyer is not necessary in order to meet the monitoring requirement proposed
by this rule. These types of activities may increase the transactional costs, which ultimately the client will
bear and unless some benefit will be derived by the client, they should be avoided. The monitoring
requirement is only that the referring lawyer be reasonably informed of the matter, respond to client
questions, and assist the handling lawyer when necessary. Any referral or association of other counsel
should be made based solely on the client's best interest.

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14. In the aggregate, the minimum activities that must be undertaken by referring or associating lawyers
pursuant to an arrangement for a division of fees are substantially greater than those assumed by a lawyer
who forwarded a matter to other counsel, undertook no ongoing obligations with respect to it, and yet
received a portion of the handling lawyer's fee once the matter was concluded, as was permitted under
the prior version of this rule. Whether such activities, or any additional activities that a lawyer might agree
to undertake, suffice to make one lawyer participating in such an arrangement responsible for the
professional misconduct of another lawyer who is participating in it and, if so, to what extent, are intended
to be resolved by Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, ch. 33, or other applicable law.

15. A client must consent in writing to the terms of the arrangement prior to the time of the association
or referral proposed. For this consent to be effective, the client must have been advised of at least the
key features of that arrangement. Those essential terms, which are specified in subparagraph (f)(2), are
1) the identity of all lawyers or law firms who will participate in the fee-sharing agreement, 2) whether
fees will be divided based on the proportion of services performed or by lawyers agreeing to assume joint
responsibility for the representation, and 3) the share of the fee that each lawyer or law firm will receive
or the basis on which the division will be made if the division is based on proportion of service
performed. Consent by a client or prospective client to the referral to or association of other counsel,
made prior to any actual such referral or association, but without knowledge of the information specified
in subparagraph (f)(2) does not constitute sufficient client confirmation within the meaning of this rule.
The referring or associating lawyer or any other lawyer who employs another lawyer to assist in the
representation has the primary duty to ensure full disclosure and compliance with this rule.

16. Paragraph (g) facilitates the enforcement of the requirements of paragraph (f). It does so by providing
that agreements that authorize an attorney either to refer a person's case to another lawyer, or to associate
other counsel in the handling of a client's case, and that actually result in such a referral or association
with counsel in a different law firm from the one entering into the agreement, must be confirmed by an
arrangement between the person and the lawyers involved that conforms to paragraph (f). As noted there,
that arrangement must be presented to and agreed to by the person before the referral or association
between the lawyers involved occurs. See subparagraph (f)(2). Because paragraph (g) refers to the party
whose matter is involved as a “person” rather than as a “client,” it is not possible to evade its requirements
by having a referring lawyer not formally enter into an attorney-client relationship with the person
involved before referring that person's matter to other counsel. Paragraph (g) does provide, however, for
recovery in quantum meruit in instances where its requirements are not met. See subparagraphs (g)(1)
and (g)(2).P

17. What should be done with any otherwise agreed-to fee that is forfeited in whole or in part due to a
lawyer's failure to comply with paragraph (g) is not resolved by these rules.

18. Subparagraph (f)(3) requires that the aggregate fee charged to clients in connection with a given matter
by all of the lawyers involved meet the standards of paragraph (a)--that is, not be unconscionable.

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Fee Disputes and Determinations

19. If a procedure has been established for resolution of fee disputes, such as an arbitration or mediation
procedure established by a bar association, the lawyer should conscientiously consider submitting to it.
Law may prescribe a procedure for determining a lawyer's fee, for example, in representation of an
executor or administrator, or when a class or a person is entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fee
as part of the measure of damages. All involved lawyers should comply with any prescribed procedures.

Rule 1.05. Confidentiality of Information

(a) “Confidential information” includes both “privileged information” and “unprivileged client
information.” “Privileged information” refers to the information of a client protected by the lawyer-client
privilege of Rule 503 of the Texas Rules of Evidence or of Rule 503 of the Texas Rules of Criminal
Evidence or by the principles of attorney-client privilege governed by Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates. “Unprivileged client information” means all
information relating to a client or furnished by the client, other than privileged information, acquired by
the lawyer during the course of or by reason of the representation of the client.

(b) Except as permitted by paragraphs (c) and (d), or as required by paragraphs (e) and (f), a lawyer shall
not knowingly:

(1) Reveal confidential information of a client or a former client to:

(i) a person that the client has instructed is not to receive the information; or

(ii) anyone else, other than the client, the client's representatives, or the members,
associates, or employees of the lawyer's law firm.

(2) Use confidential information of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client
consents after consultation.

(3) Use confidential information of a former client to the disadvantage of the former client after
the representation is concluded unless the former client consents after consultation or the
confidential information has become generally known.

(4) Use privileged information of a client for the advantage of the lawyer or of a third person,
unless the client consents after consultation.

(c) A lawyer may reveal confidential information:

(1) When the lawyer has been expressly authorized to do so in order to carry out the
representation.

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 (2) When the client consents after consultation.

(3) To the client, the client's representatives, or the members, associates, and employees of the
lawyer's firm, except when otherwise instructed by the client.

(4) When the lawyer has reason to believe it is necessary to do so in order to comply with a court
order, a Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, or other law.

(5) To the extent reasonably necessary to enforce a claim or establish a defense on behalf of the
lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client.

(6) To establish a defense to a criminal charge, civil claim or disciplinary complaint against the
lawyer or the lawyer's associates based upon conduct involving the client or the representation of
the client.

(7) When the lawyer has reason to believe it is necessary to do so in order to prevent the client
from committing a criminal or fraudulent act.

(8) To the extent revelation reasonably appears necessary to rectify the consequences of a client's
criminal or fraudulent act in the commission of which the lawyer's services had been used.

(d) A lawyer also may reveal unprivileged client information:

(1) When impliedly authorized to do so in order to carry out the representation.

(2) When the lawyer has reason to believe it is necessary to do so in order to:

(i) carry out the representation effectively;

(ii) defend the lawyer or the lawyer's employees or associates against a claim of wrongful
conduct;

(iii) respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the
client; or

(iv) prove the services rendered to a client, or the reasonable value thereof, or both, in an
action against another person or organization responsible for the payment of the fee for
services rendered to the client.

(e) When a lawyer has confidential information clearly establishing that a client is likely to commit a
criminal or fraudulent act that is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm to a person, the lawyer
shall reveal confidential information to the extent revelation reasonably appears necessary to prevent the
client from committing the criminal or fraudulent act.
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(f) A lawyer shall reveal confidential information when required to do so by Rule 3.03(a)(2), 3.03(b), or
by Rule 4.01(b).

Comment:

Confidentiality Generally

1. Both the fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and client and the proper functioning of the
legal system require the preservation by the lawyer of confidential information of one who has employed
or sought to employ the lawyer. Free discussion should prevail between lawyer and client in order for
the lawyer to be fully informed and for the client to obtain the full benefit of the legal system. The ethical
obligation of the lawyer to protect the confidential information of the client not only facilitates the proper
representation of the client but also encourages potential clients to seek early legal assistance.

2. Subject to the mandatory disclosure requirements of paragraphs (e) and (f) the lawyer generally should
be required to maintain confidentiality of information acquired by the lawyer during the course of or by
reason of the representation of the client. This principle involves an ethical obligation not to use the
information to the detriment of the client or for the benefit of the lawyer or a third person. In regard to
an evaluation of a matter affecting a client for use by a third person, see Rule 2.02.

3. The principle of confidentiality is given effect not only in the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional
Conduct but also in the law of evidence regarding the attorney-client privilege and in the law of agency.
The attorney-client privilege, developed through many decades, provides the client a right to prevent
certain confidential communications from being revealed by compulsion of law. Several sound
exceptions to confidentiality have been developed in the evidence law of privilege. Exceptions exist in
evidence law where the services of the lawyer were sought or used by a client in planning or committing
a crime or fraud as well as where issues have arisen as to breach of duty by the lawyer or by the client to
the other.

4. Rule 1.05 reinforces the principles of evidence law relating to the attorney-client privilege. Rule 1.05
also furnishes considerable protection to other information falling outside the scope of the privilege. Rule
1.05 extends ethical protection generally to unprivileged information relating to the client or furnished
by the client during the course of or by reason of the representation of the client. In this respect Rule
1.05 accords with general fiduciary principles of agency.

5. The requirement of confidentiality applies to government lawyers who may disagree with the policy
goals that their representation is designed to advance.

Disclosure for Benefit of Client

6. A lawyer may be expressly authorized to make disclosures to carry out the representation and generally
is recognized as having implied-in-fact authority to make disclosures about a client when appropriate in
24
carrying out the representation to the extent that the client's instructions do not limit that authority. In
litigation, for example, a lawyer may disclose information by admitting a fact that cannot properly be
disputed, or in negotiation by making a disclosure that facilitates a satisfactory conclusion. The effect of
Rule 1.05 is to require the lawyer to invoke, for the client, the attorney-client privilege when applicable;
but if the court improperly denies the privilege, under paragraph (c)(4) the lawyer may testify as ordered
by the court or may test the ruling as permitted by Rule 3.04(d).

7. In the course of a firm's practice, lawyers may disclose to each other and to appropriate employees
information relating to a client, unless the client has instructed that particular information be confined to
specified lawyers. Sub-paragraphs (b)(1) and (c)(3) continue these practices concerning disclosure of
confidential information within the firm.

Use of Information

8. Following sound principles of agency law, subparagraphs (b)(2) and (4) subject a lawyer to discipline
for using information relating to the representation in a manner disadvantageous to the client or beneficial
to the lawyer or a third person, absent the informed consent of the client. The duty not to misuse client
information continues after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated. Therefore, the lawyer is
forbidden by subparagraph (b)(3) to use, in absence of the client's informed consent, confidential
information of the former client to the client's disadvantage, unless the information is generally known.

Discretionary Disclosure Adverse to Client

9. In becoming privy to information about a client, a lawyer may foresee that the client intends serious
and perhaps irreparable harm. To the extent a lawyer is prohibited from making disclosure, the interests
of the potential victim are sacrificed in favor of preserving the client's information--usually unprivileged
information--even though the client's purpose is wrongful. On the other hand, a client who knows or
believes that a lawyer is required or permitted to disclose a client's wrongful purposes may be inhibited
from revealing facts which would enable the lawyer to counsel effectively against wrongful action. Rule
1.05 thus involves balancing the interests of one group of potential victims against those of another. The
criteria provided by the Rule are discussed below.

10. Rule 503(d)(1), Texas Rules of Civil Evidence (Tex.R.Civ.Evid.), and Rule 503(d)(1), Texas Rules
of Criminal Evidence (Tex.R.Crim.Evid.), indicate the underlying public policy of furnishing no
protection to client information where the client seeks or uses the services of the lawyer to aid in the
commission of a crime or fraud. That public policy governs the dictates of Rule 1.05. Where the client
is planning or engaging in criminal or fraudulent conduct or where the culpability of the lawyer's conduct
is involved, full protection of client information is not justified.

11. Several other situations must be distinguished. First, the lawyer may not counsel or assist a client in
conduct that is criminal or fraudulent. See Rule 1.02(c). As noted in the Comment to that Rule, there
can be situations where the lawyer may have to reveal information relating to the representation in order
to avoid assisting a client's criminal or fraudulent conduct, and sub-paragraph (c)(4) permits doing so. A
25
lawyer's duty under Rule 3.03(a) not to use false or fabricated evidence is a special instance of the duty
prescribed in Rule 1.02(c) to avoid assisting a client in criminal or fraudulent conduct, and sub-paragraph
(c)(4) permits revealing information necessary to comply with Rule 3.03(a) or (b). The same is true of
compliance with Rule 4.01. See also paragraph (f).

12. Second, the lawyer may have been innocently involved in past conduct by the client that was criminal
or fraudulent. In such a situation the lawyer has not violated Rule 1.02(c), because to “counsel or assist”
criminal or fraudulent conduct requires knowing that the conduct is of that character. Since the lawyer's
services were made an instrument of the client's crime or fraud, the lawyer has a legitimate interest both
in rectifying the consequences of such conduct and in avoiding charges that the lawyer's participation was
culpable. Sub-paragraph (c)(6) and (8) give the lawyer professional discretion to reveal both unprivileged
and privileged information in order to serve those interests. See paragraph (g). In view of Tex.R.Civ.Evid.
Rule 503(d)(1), and Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 503(d)(1), however, rarely will such information be privileged.

13. Third, the lawyer may learn that a client intends prospective conduct that is criminal or fraudulent.
The lawyer's knowledge of the client's purpose may enable the lawyer to prevent commission of the
prospective crime or fraud. When the threatened injury is grave, the lawyer's interest in preventing the
harm may be more compelling than the interest in preserving confidentiality of information. As stated in
sub-paragraph (c)(7), the lawyer has professional discretion, based on reasonable appearances, to reveal
both privileged and unprivileged information in order to prevent the client's commission of any criminal
or fraudulent act. In some situations of this sort, disclosure is mandatory. See paragraph (e) and
Comments 18-20.

14. The lawyer's exercise of discretion under paragraphs (c) and (d) involves consideration of such factors
as the magnitude, proximity, and likelihood of the contemplated wrong, the nature of the lawyer's
relationship with the client and with those who might be injured by the client, the lawyer's own
involvement in the transaction, and factors that may extenuate the client's conduct in question. In any
case, a disclosure adverse to the client's interest should be no greater than the lawyer believes necessary
to the purpose. Although preventive action is permitted by paragraphs (c) and (d), failure to take
preventive action does not violate those paragraphs. But see paragraphs (e) and (f). Because these rules
do not define standards of civil liability of lawyers for professional conduct, paragraphs (c) and (d) do not
create a duty on the lawyer to make any disclosure and no civil liability is intended to arise from the
failure to make such disclosure.

15. A lawyer entitled to a fee necessarily must be permitted to prove the services rendered in an action
to collect it, and this necessity is recognized by sub-paragraphs (c)(5) and (d)(2)(iv). This aspect of the
rule, in regard to privileged information, expresses the principle that the beneficiary of a fiduciary
relationship may not exploit the relationship to the detriment of the fiduciary. Any disclosure by the
lawyer, however, should be as protective of the client's interests as possible.

16. If the client is an organization, a lawyer also should refer to Rule 1.12 in order to determine the
appropriate conduct in connection with this Rule.

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Client Under a Disability

17. In some situations, Rule 1.02(g) requires a lawyer representing a client under a disability to seek the
appointment of a legal representative for the client or to seek other orders for the protection of the client.
The client may or may not, in a particular matter, effectively consent to the lawyer's revealing to the court
confidential information and facts reasonably necessary to secure the desired appointment or order.
Nevertheless, the lawyer is authorized by paragraph (c)(4) to reveal such information in order to comply
with Rule 1.02(g). See also paragraph 5, Comment to Rule 1.03.

Mandatory Disclosure Adverse to Client

18. Rule 1.05(e) and (f) place upon a lawyer professional obligations in certain situations to make
disclosure in order to prevent certain serious crimes by a client or to prevent involvement by the lawyer
in a client's crimes or frauds. Except when death or serious bodily harm is likely to result, a lawyer's initial
obligation is to attempt to dissuade the client from committing the crime or fraud or to persuade the
client to take corrective action; see Rule 1.02(d) and (e).

19. Because it is very difficult for a lawyer to know when a client's criminal or fraudulent purpose actually
will be carried out, the lawyer is required by paragraph (e) to act only if the lawyer has information “clearly
establishing” the likelihood of such acts and consequences. If the information shows clearly that the
client's contemplated crime or fraud is likely to result in death or serious injury, the lawyer must seek to
avoid those lamentable results by revealing information necessary to prevent the criminal or fraudulent
act. When the threatened crime or fraud is likely to have the less serious result of substantial injury to
the financial interests or property of another, the lawyer is not required to reveal preventive information
but may do so in conformity to paragraph (c)(7). See also paragraph (f); Rule 1.02(d) and (e); and Rule
3.03(b) and (c).

20. Although a violation of paragraph (e) will subject a lawyer to disciplinary action, the lawyer's decisions
whether or how to act should not constitute grounds for discipline unless the lawyer's conduct in the light
of those decisions was unreasonable under all existing circumstances as they reasonably appeared to the
lawyer. This construction necessarily follows from the fact that paragraph (e) bases the lawyer's affirmative
duty to act on how the situation “reasonably appears” to the lawyer, while that imposed by paragraph (f)
arises only when a lawyer “knows” that the lawyer's services have been misused by the client. See also
Rule 3.03(b).

Withdrawal

21. If the lawyer's services will be used by the client in materially furthering a course of criminal or
fraudulent conduct, the lawyer must withdraw, as stated in Rule 1.15(a)(1). After withdrawal, a lawyer's
conduct continues to be governed by Rule 1.05. The lawyer's duties of mandatory disclosure under
paragraph (e) are not affected by termination of the relationship. If disclosure during the relationship was
permissive, disclosure thereafter remains permissive under paragraphs (6), (7), and (8) if the further
requirements of such paragraph are met. Neither this Rule nor Rule 1.15 prevents the lawyer from giving
27
notice of the fact of withdrawal, and no rule forbids the lawyer to withdraw or disaffirm any opinion,
document, affirmation, or the like.

Other Rules

22. Various other Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct permit or require a lawyer to
disclose information relating to the representation. See Rules 1.07, 1.12, 2.02, 3.03 and 4.01. In addition
to these provisions, a lawyer may be obligated by other provisions of statutes or other law to give
information about a client. Whether another provision of law supersedes Rule 1.05 is a matter of
interpretation beyond the scope of these Rules, but sub-paragraph (c)(4) protects the lawyer from
discipline who acts on reasonable belief as to the effect of such laws.

Rule 1.06. Conflict of Interest: General Rule

(a) A lawyer shall not represent opposing parties to the same litigation.

(b) In other situations and except to the extent permitted by paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a
person if the representation of that person:

(1) involves a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially and directly
adverse to the interests of another client of the lawyer or the lawyer's firm; or

(2) reasonably appears to be or become adversely limited by the lawyer's or law firm's
responsibilities to another client or to a third person or by the lawyer's or law firm's own interests.

(c) A lawyer may represent a client in the circumstances described in (b) if:

(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation of each client will not be materially affected;
and

(2) each affected or potentially affected client consents to such representation after full disclosure
of the existence, nature, implications, and possible adverse consequences of the common
representation and the advantages involved, if any.

(d) A lawyer who has represented multiple parties in a matter shall not thereafter represent any of such
parties in a dispute among the parties arising out of the matter, unless prior consent is obtained from all
such parties to the dispute.

(e) If a lawyer has accepted representation in violation of this Rule, or if multiple representation properly
accepted becomes improper under this Rule, the lawyer shall promptly withdraw from one or more
representations to the extent necessary for any remaining representation not to be in violation of these
Rules.

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(f) If a lawyer would be prohibited by this Rule from engaging in particular conduct, no other lawyer
while a member or associated with that lawyer's firm may engage in that conduct.

Comment:

Loyalty to a Client

1. Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a client. An impermissible conflict of

interest may exist before representation is undertaken, in which event the representation should be
declined. If such a conflict arises after representation has been undertaken, the lawyer must take effective
action to eliminate the conflict, including withdrawal if necessary to rectify the situation. See also Rule
1.15. When more than one client is involved and the lawyer withdraws because a conflict arises after
representation, whether the lawyer may continue to represent any of the clients is determined by this
Rule and Rules 1.05 and 1.09. See also Rule 1.07(c). Under this Rule, any conflict that prevents a
particular lawyer from undertaking or continuing a representation of a client also prevents any other
lawyer who is or becomes a member of or an associate with that lawyer's firm from doing so. See
paragraph (f).

2. A fundamental principle recognized by paragraph (a) is that a lawyer may not represent opposing
parties in litigation. The term “opposing parties” as used in this Rule contemplates a situation where a
judgment favorable to one of the parties will directly impact unfavorably upon the other party. Moreover,
as a general proposition loyalty to a client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to the
representation of that client in a substantially related matter unless that client's fully informed consent is
obtained and unless the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer's representation will be reasonably
protective of that client's interests. Paragraphs (b) and (c) express that general concept.

Conflicts in Litigation

3. Paragraph (a) prohibits representation of opposing parties in litigation. Simultaneous representation

of parties whose interests in litigation are not actually directly adverse but where the potential for conflict
exists, such as co-plaintiffs or co-defendants, is governed by paragraph (b). An impermissible conflict
may exist or develop by reason of substantial discrepancy in the parties' testimony, incompatibility in
positions in relation to an opposing party or the fact that there are substantially different possibilities of
settlement of the claims or liabilities in question. Such conflicts can arise in criminal cases as well as civil.
The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave
that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one co-defendant. On the other hand,
common representation of persons having similar interests is proper if the risk of adverse effect is
minimal and the requirements of paragraph (b) are met. Compare Rule 1.07 involving intermediation
between clients.

Conflict with Lawyer's Own Interests

4. Loyalty to a client is impaired not only by the representation of opposing parties in situations within
29
paragraphs (a) and (b)(1) but also in any situation when a lawyer may not be able to consider, recommend
or carry out an appropriate course of action for one client because of the lawyer's own interests or
responsibilities to others. The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available
to the client. Paragraph (b)(2) addresses such situations. A potential possible conflict does not itself
necessarily preclude the representation. The critical questions are the likelihood that a conflict exists or
will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially and adversely affect the lawyer's independent
professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should
be pursued on behalf of the client. It is for the client to decide whether the client wishes to accommodate
the other interest involved. However, the client's consent to the representation by the lawyer of another
whose interests are directly adverse is insufficient unless the lawyer also believes that there will be no
materially adverse effect upon the interests of either client. See paragraph (c).

5. The lawyer's own interests should not be permitted to have adverse effect on representation of a client,
even where paragraph (b)(2) is not violated. For example, a lawyer's need for income should not lead the
lawyer to undertake matters that cannot be handled competently and at a reasonable fee. See Rules 1.01
and 1.04. If the probity of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in question, it may be difficult for
the lawyer to give a client detached advice. A lawyer should not allow related business interests to affect
representation, for example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed
interest.

Meaning of Directly Adverse

6. Within the meaning of Rule 1.06(b), the representation of one client is “directly adverse” to the
representation of another client if the lawyer's independent judgment on behalf of a client or the lawyer's
ability or willingness to consider, recommend or carry out a course of action will be or is reasonably
likely to be adversely affected by the lawyer's representation of, or responsibilities to, the other client.
The dual representation also is directly adverse if the lawyer reasonably appears to be called upon to
espouse adverse positions in the same matter or a related matter. On the other hand, simultaneous
representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only generally adverse, such as
competing economic enterprises, does not constitute the representation of directly adverse interests.
Even when neither paragraph (a) nor (b) is applicable, a lawyer should realize that a business rivalry or
personal differences between two clients or potential clients may be so important to one or both that one
or the other would consider it contrary to its interests to have the same lawyer as its rival even in unrelated
matters; and in those situations a wise lawyer would forego the dual representation.

Full Disclosure and Informed Consent

7. A client under some circumstances may consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict or

potential conflict. However, as indicated in paragraph (c)(1), when a disinterested lawyer would conclude
that the client should not agree to the representation under the circumstances, the lawyer involved should
not ask for such agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's consent. When more
than one client is involved, the question of conflict must be resolved as to each client. Moreover, there
may be circumstances where it is impossible to make the full disclosure necessary to obtain informed
30
consent. For example, when the lawyer represents different clients in related matters and one of the
clients refuses to consent to the disclosure necessary to permit the other client to make an informed
decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to consent.

8. Disclosure and consent are not formalities. Disclosure sufficient for sophisticated clients may not be
sufficient to permit less sophisticated clients to provide fully informed consent. While it is not required
that the disclosure and consent be in writing, it would be prudent for the lawyer to provide potential dual
clients with at least a written summary of the considerations disclosed.

9. In certain situations, such as in the preparation of loan papers or the preparation of a partnership
agreement, a lawyer might have properly undertaken multiple representation and be confronted
subsequently by a dispute among those clients in regard to that matter. Paragraph (d) forbids the
representation of any of those parties in regard to that dispute unless informed consent is obtained from
all of the parties to the dispute who had been represented by the lawyer in that matter.

10. A lawyer may represent parties having antagonistic positions on a legal question that has arisen in
different cases, unless representation of either client would be adversely affected. Thus, it is ordinarily not
improper to assert such positions in cases pending in different trial courts, but it may be improper to do
so in cases pending at the same time in an appellate court.

11. Ordinarily, it is not advisable for a lawyer to act as advocate against a client the lawyer represents in
some other matter, even if the other matter is wholly unrelated and even if paragraphs (a), (b), and (d) are
not applicable. However, there are circumstances in which a lawyer may act as advocate against a client,
for a lawyer is free to do so unless this Rule or another rule of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional
Conduct would be violated. For example, a lawyer representing an enterprise with diverse operations may
accept employment as an advocate against the enterprise in a matter unrelated to any matter being handled
for the enterprise if the representation of one client is not directly adverse to the representation of the
other client. The propriety of concurrent representation can depend on the nature of the litigation. For
example, a suit charging fraud entails conflict to a degree not involved in a suit for declaratory judgment
concerning statutory interpretation.

Interest of Person Paying for a Lawyer's Service

12. A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, if the client is informed of that fact and
consents and the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client. See Rule
1.08(e). For example, when an insurer and its insured have conflicting interests in a matter arising from a
liability insurance agreement, and the insurer is required to provide special counsel for the insured, the
arrangement should assure the special counsel's professional independence. So also, when a corporation
and its directors or employees are involved in a controversy in which they have conflicting interests, the
corporation may provide funds for separate legal representation of the directors or employees, if the
clients consent after consultation and the arrangement ensures the lawyer's professional independence.

31
Non-litigation Conflict Situations

13. Conflicts of interest in contexts other than litigation sometimes may be difficult to assess. Relevant
factors in determining whether there is potential for adverse effect include the duration and intimacy of
the lawyer's relationship with the client or clients involved, the functions being performed by the lawyer,
the likelihood that actual conflict will arise and the likely prejudice to the client from the conflict if it does
arise. The question is often one of proximity and degree.

14. For example, a lawyer may not represent multiple parties to a negotiation whose interests are
fundamentally antagonistic to each other, but common representation may be permissible where the
clients are generally aligned in interest even though there is some difference of interest among them.

15. Conflict questions may also arise in estate planning and estate administration. A lawyer may be called
upon to prepare wills for several family members, such as husband and wife, and, depending upon the
circumstances, a conflict of interest may arise. In estate administration it may be unclear whether the
client is the fiduciary or is the estate or trust, including its beneficiaries. The lawyer should make clear
the relationship to the parties involved.

16. A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also a member of its board of directors should
determine whether the responsibilities of the two roles may conflict. The lawyer may be called on to
advise the corporation in matters involving actions of the directors. Consideration should be given to the
frequency with which such situations may arise, the potential intensity of the conflict, the effect of the
lawyer's resignation from the board and the possibility of the corporation's obtaining legal advice from
another lawyer in such situations. If there is material risk that the dual role will compromise the lawyer's
independence of professional judgment, the lawyer should not serve as a director.

Conflict Charged by an Opposing Party

17. Raising questions of conflict of interest is primarily the responsibility of the lawyer undertaking the
representation. In litigation, a court may raise the question when there is reason to infer that the lawyer
has neglected the responsibility. In a criminal case, inquiry by the court is generally required when a
lawyer represents multiple defendants. Where the conflict is such as clearly to call in question the fair or
efficient administration of justice, opposing counsel may properly raise the question. Such an objection
should be viewed with great caution, however, for it can be misused as a technique of harassment. See
Preamble: Scope.

18. Except when the absolute prohibition of this rule applies or in litigation when a court passes upon
issues of conflicting interests in determining a question of disqualification of counsel, resolving questions
of conflict of interests may require decisions by all affected clients as well as by the lawyer.

32
Imputed Conflicts, Nonlawyer Employees, and Lawyers Formerly Employed in a Nonlawyer
Role

19. A law firm is not prohibited from representing a client under paragraph (f) merely because a
nonlawyer employee of the firm, such as a paralegal or legal secretary, has a conflict of interest arising
from prior employment or some other source. Nor is a firm prohibited from representing a client merely
because a lawyer of the firm has a conflict of interest arising from events that occurred before the person
became a lawyer, such as work that the person did as a law clerk or intern. But the firm must ordinarily
screen the person with the conflict from any personal participation in the matter to prevent the person’s
communicating to others in the firm confidential information that the person and the firm have a legal
duty to protect. See Rule 5.03; see also MODEL RULES PROF’ L CONDUCT r. 1.10 cmt. 4 (AM.
BAR ASS’N 1983); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 123
cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 2000).

Rule 1.07. Conflict of Interest: Intermediary

(a) A lawyer shall not act as intermediary between clients unless:

(1) the lawyer consults with each client concerning the implications of the common
representation, including the advantages and risks involved, and the effect on the attorney-client
privileges, and obtains each client's written consent to the common representation;

(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the matter can be resolved without the necessity of
contested litigation on terms compatible with the clients' best interests, that each client will be able
to make adequately informed decisions in the matter and that there is little risk of material
prejudice to the interests of any of the clients if the contemplated resolution is unsuccessful; and

(3) the lawyer reasonably believes that the common representation can be undertaken impartially
and without improper effect on other responsibilities the lawyer has to any of the clients.

(b) While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall consult with each client concerning the decision to be
made and the considerations relevant in making them, so that each client can make adequately informed
decisions.

(c) A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so requests, or if any of the conditions
stated in paragraph (a) is no longer satisfied. Upon withdrawal, the lawyer shall not continue to represent
any of the clients in the matter that was the subject of the intermediation.

(d) Within the meaning of this Rule, a lawyer acts as intermediary if the lawyer represents two or more
parties with potentially conflicting interests.

(e) If a lawyer would be prohibited by this Rule from engaging in particular conduct, no other lawyer
while a member of or associated with that lawyer's firm may engage in that conduct.
33
Comment:

1. A lawyer acting as intermediary may seek to establish or adjust a relationship between clients on an
amicable and mutually advantageous basis. For example, the lawyer may assist in organizing a business
in which two or more clients are entrepreneurs, in working out the financial reorganization of an
enterprise in which two or more clients have an interest, in arranging a property distribution in settlement
of an estate or in mediating a dispute between clients. The lawyer seeks to resolve potentially conflicting
interests by developing the parties' mutual interests. The alternative can be that each party may have to
obtain separate representation, with the possibility in some situations of incurring additional cost,
complication or even litigation. Given these and other relevant factors, all the clients may prefer that the
lawyer act as intermediary.

2. Because confusion can arise as to the lawyer's role where each party is not separately represented, it is
important that the lawyer make clear the relationship; hence, the requirement of written consent.
Moreover, a lawyer should not permit his personal interests to influence his advice relative to a suggestion
by his client that additional counsel be employed. See also Rule 1.06(b).

3. The Rule does not apply to a lawyer acting as arbitrator or mediator between or among parties who
are not clients of the lawyer, even where the lawyer has been appointed with the concurrence of the
parties. In performing such a role the lawyer may be subject to applicable codes of ethics, such as the
Code of Ethics for Arbitration in Commercial Disputes prepared by a joint Committee of the American
Bar Association and the American Arbitration Association.

4. In considering whether to act as intermediary between clients, a lawyer should be mindful that if the
intermediation fails the result can be additional cost, embarrassment and recrimination. In some
situations, the risk of failure is so great that intermediation is plainly impossible. Moreover, a lawyer
cannot undertake common representation of clients between whom contested litigation is reasonably
expected or who contemplate contentious negotiations. More generally, if the relationship between the
parties has already assumed definite antagonism, the possibility that the clients' interests can be adjusted
by intermediation ordinarily is not very good.

5. The appropriateness of intermediation can depend on its form. Forms of intermediation range from
informal arbitration, where each client's case is presented by the respective client and the lawyer decides
the outcome, to mediation, to common representation where the clients' interests are substantially though
not entirely compatible. One form may be appropriate in circumstances where another would not. Other
relevant factors are whether the lawyer subsequently will represent both parties on a continuing basis and
whether the situation involves creating a relationship between the parties or terminating one.

Confidentiality and Privilege

6. A particularly important factor in determining the appropriateness of intermediation is the effect on

client-lawyer confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege. In a common representation, the lawyer is
still required both to keep each client adequately informed and to maintain confidentiality of information
34
relating to the representation, except as to such clients. See Rules 1.03 and 1.05. Complying with both
requirements while acting as intermediary requires a delicate balance. If the balance cannot be
maintained, the common representation is improper. With regard to the attorney-client privilege, the
general rule is that as between commonly represented clients the privilege does not attach. Hence, it
must be assumed that if litigation eventuates between the clients, the privilege will not protect any such
communications, and the clients should be so advised.

7. Since the lawyer is required to be impartial between commonly represented clients, intermediation is
improper when that impartiality cannot be maintained. For example, a lawyer who has represented one
of the clients for a long period and in a variety of matters might have difficulty being impartial between
that client and one to whom the lawyer has only recently been introduced.

Consultation

8. In acting as intermediary between clients, the lawyer should consult with the clients on the implications
of doing so, and proceed only upon informed consent based on such a consultation. The consultation
should make clear that the lawyer's role is not that of partisanship normally expected in other
circumstances.

9. Paragraph (b) is an application of the principle expressed in Rule 1.03. Where the lawyer is
intermediary, the clients ordinarily must assume greater responsibility for decisions than when each client
is independently represented.

10. Under this Rule, any condition or circumstance that prevents a particular lawyer either from acting
as intermediary between clients, or from representing those clients individually in connection with a
matter after an unsuccessful intermediation, also prevents any other lawyer who is or becomes a member
of or associates with that lawyer's firm from doing so. See paragraphs (c) and (e).

Withdrawal

11. In the event of withdrawal by one or more parties from the enterprise, the lawyer may continue to
act for the remaining parties and the enterprise. See also Rule 1.06(c)(2) which authorizes continuation
of the representation with consent.

Rule 1.08. Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions

(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client unless:

(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to
the client and are fully disclosed in a manner which can be reasonably understood by the client;

(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel in the
transaction; and
35
 (3) the client consents in writing thereto.

(b) A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as a
parent, child, sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, except
where the client is related to the donee.

(c) Prior to the conclusion of all aspects of the matter giving rise to the lawyer's employment, a lawyer
shall not make or negotiate an agreement with a client, prospective client, or former client giving the
lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or account based in substantial part on information relating
to the representation.

(d) A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated
litigation or administrative proceedings, except that:

(1) a lawyer may advance or guarantee court costs, expenses of litigation or administrative
proceedings, and reasonably necessary medical and living expenses, the repayment of which may
be contingent on the outcome of the matter; and

(2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and expenses of litigation on
behalf of the client.

(e) A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless:

(1) the client consents;

(2) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the
client-lawyer relationship; and

(3) information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by Rule 1.05.

(f) A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement
of the claims of or against the clients, or in a criminal case an aggregated agreement to guilty or nolo
contendere pleas, unless each client has consented after consultation, including disclosure of the
existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved and of the nature and extent of the participation
of each person in the settlement.

(g) A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for
malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is independently represented in making the
agreement, or settle a claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or former client without first
advising that person in writing that independent representation is appropriate in connection therewith.

(h) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation
36
the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:

(1) acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fee or expenses; and

(2) contract in a civil case with a client for a contingent fee that is permissible under Rule 1.04.

(i) If a lawyer would be prohibited by this Rule from engaging in particular conduct, no other lawyer
while a member of or associated with that lawyer's firm may engage in that conduct.

(j) As used in this Rule, “business transactions” does not include standard commercial transactions
between the lawyer and the client for products or services that the client generally markets to others.

Comment:

Transactions between Client and Lawyer

1. This rule deals with certain transactions that per se involve unacceptable conflicts of interests.

2. As a general principle, all transactions between client and lawyer should be fair and reasonable to the
client. In such transactions a review by independent counsel on behalf of the client is often advisable.
Paragraph (a) does not, however, apply to standard commercial transactions between the lawyer and the
client for products or services that the client generally markets to others such as banking or brokerage
services, medical services, products manufactured or distributed by the client, and utilities services. In
such transactions, the lawyer has no advantage in dealing with the client, and the restrictions in paragraph
(a) are unnecessary and impracticable.

3. A lawyer may accept a gift from a client, if the transaction meets general standards of fairness. For
example, a simple gift such as a present given at a holiday or as a token of appreciation is permitted. If
effectuation of a substantial gift requires preparing a legal instrument such as a will or conveyance,
however, the client should have the detached advice that another lawyer can provide. Paragraph (b)
recognizes an exception where the client is a relative of the donee or the gift is not substantial.

Literary Rights

4. An agreement by which a lawyer acquires literary or media rights concerning the conduct of
representation creates a conflict between the interests of the client and the personal interests of the
lawyer. Measures suitable in the representation of the client may detract from the publication value of an
account of the representation. Paragraph (c) does not prohibit a lawyer representing a client in a
transaction concerning literary property from agreeing that the lawyer's fee shall consist of a share in
ownership in the property, if the arrangement conforms to Rule 1.04 and to paragraph (h) of this Rule.

37
Person Paying for Lawyer's Services

5. Paragraph (e) requires disclosure to the client of the fact that the lawyer's services are being paid for
by a third party. Such an arrangement must also conform to the requirements of Rule 1.05 concerning
confidentiality and Rule 1.06 concerning conflict of interest. Where the client is a class, consent may be
obtained on behalf of the class by court-supervised procedure. Where an insurance company pays the
lawyer's fee for representing an insured, normally the insured has consented to the arrangement by the
terms of the insurance contract.

Prospectively Limiting Liability

6. Paragraph (g) is not intended to apply to customary qualification and limitations in legal opinions and
memoranda.

Acquisition of Interest in Litigation

7. This Rule embodies the traditional general precept that lawyers are prohibited from acquiring a
proprietary interest in the subject matter of litigation. This general precept, which has its basis in common
law champerty and maintenance, is subject to specific exceptions developed in decisional law and
continued in these Rules, such as the exception for contingent fees set forth in Rule 1.04 and the
exception for certain advances of the costs of litigation set forth in paragraph (d). A special instance arises
when a lawyer proposes to incur litigation or other expenses with an entity in which the lawyer has a
pecuniary interest. A lawyer should not incur such expenses unless the client has entered into a written
agreement complying with paragraph (a) that contains a full disclosure of the nature and amount of the
possible expenses and the relationship between the lawyer and the other entity involved.

Imputed Disqualifications

8. The prohibitions imposed on an individual lawyer by this Rule are imposed by paragraph (i) upon all
other lawyers while practicing with that lawyer's firm.

Rule 1.09. Conflict of Interest: Former Client

(a) Without prior consent, a lawyer who personally has formerly represented a client in a matter shall
not thereafter represent another person in a matter adverse to the former client:

(1) in which such other person questions the validity of the lawyer's services or work product for
the former client;

(2) if the representation in reasonable probability will involve a violation of Rule 1.05; or

(3) if it is the same or a substantially related matter.

38
(b) Except to the extent authorized by Rule 1.10, when lawyers are or have become members of or
associated with a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client if any one of them practicing alone
would be prohibited from doing so by paragraph (a).

(c) When the association of a lawyer with a firm has terminated, the lawyers who were then associated
with that lawyer shall not knowingly represent a client if the lawyer whose association with that firm has
terminated would be prohibited from doing so by paragraph (a)(1) or if the representation in reasonable
probability will involve a violation of Rule 1.05.

Comment:

1. Rule 1.09 addresses the circumstances in which a lawyer in private practice, and other lawyers who
were, are or become members of or associated with a firm in which that lawyer practiced or practices,
may represent a client against a former client of that lawyer or the lawyer's former firm. Whether a lawyer,
or that lawyer's present or former firm, is prohibited from representing a client in a matter by reason of
the lawyer's successive government and private employment is governed by Rule 1.10 rather than by this
Rule.

2. Paragraph (a) concerns the situation where a lawyer once personally represented a client and now
wishes to represent a second client against that former client. Whether such a personal attorney-client
relationship existed involves questions of both fact and law that are beyond the scope of these Rules. See
Preamble: Scope. Among the relevant factors, however, would be how the former representation actually
was conducted within the firm; the nature and scope of the former client's contacts with the firm
(including any restrictions the client may have placed on the dissemination of confidential information
within the firm); and the size of the firm.

3. Although paragraph (a) does not absolutely prohibit a lawyer from representing a client against a
former client, it does provide that the latter representation is improper if any of three circumstances
exists, except with prior consent. The first circumstance is that the lawyer may not represent a client who
questions the validity of the lawyer's services or work product for the former client. Thus, for example,
a lawyer who drew a will leaving a substantial portion of the testator's property to a designated beneficiary
would violate paragraph (a) by representing the testator's heirs at law in an action seeking to overturn the
will.

4. Paragraph (a)'s second limitation on undertaking a representation against a former client is that it may
not be done if there is a “reasonable probability” that the representation would cause the lawyer to violate
the obligations owed the former client under Rule 1.05. Thus, for example, if there were a reasonable
probability that the subsequent representation would involve either an unauthorized disclosure of
confidential information under Rule 1.05(b)(1) or an improper use of such information to the
disadvantage of the former client under Rule 1.05(b)(3), that representation would be improper under
paragraph (a). Whether such a reasonable probability exists in any given case will be a question of fact.

4A. The third situation where representation adverse to a former client is prohibited is where the
39
representation involved the same or a substantially related matter. The “same” matter aspect of this
prohibition prevents a lawyer from switching sides and representing a party whose interests are adverse
to a person who disclosed confidences to the lawyer while seeking in good faith to retain the lawyer. The
prohibition applies when an actual attorney-client relationship was established even if the lawyer withdrew
from the representation before the client had disclosed any confidential information. This aspect of the
prohibition includes, but is somewhat broader than, that contained in paragraph (a)(1) of this Rule.

4B. The “substantially related” aspect, on the other hand, has a different focus. Although that term is not
defined in the Rule, it primarily involves situations where a lawyer could have acquired confidential
information concerning a prior client that could be used either to that prior client's disadvantage or for
the advantage of the lawyer's current client or some other person. It thus largely overlaps the prohibition
contained in paragraph (a)(2) of this Rule.

5. Paragraph (b) extends paragraph (a)’s limitations on an individual lawyer’s freedom to undertake a
representation against that lawyer’s former client to all other lawyers who are or become members of or
associated with the firm in which that lawyer is practicing. Thus, for example, if a client severs the
attorney-client relationship with a lawyer who remains in a firm, the entitlement of that individual lawyer
to undertake a representation against that former client is governed by paragraph (a); and all other lawyers
who are or become members of or associated with that lawyer’s firm are treated in the same manner by
paragraph (b). Similarly, if a lawyer severs his or her association with a firm and that firm retains as a
client a person whom the lawyer personally represented while with the firm, that lawyer’s ability thereafter
to undertake a representation against that client is governed by paragraph (a); and all other lawyers who
are or become members of or associates with that lawyer’s new firm are treated in the same manner by
paragraph (b). See also paragraph 19 of the comment to Rule 1.06.

6. Paragraph (c) addresses the situation of former partners or associates of a lawyer who once had
represented a client when the relationship between the former partners or associates and the lawyer has
been terminated. In that situation, the former partners or associates are prohibited from questioning the
validity of such lawyer's work product and from undertaking representation which in reasonable
probability will involve a violation of Rule 1.05. Such a violation could occur, for example, when the
former partners or associates retained materials in their files from the earlier representation of the client
that, if disclosed or used in connection with the subsequent representation, would violate Rule 1.05(b)(1)
or (b)(3).

7. Thus, the effect of paragraph (b) is to extend any inability of a particular lawyer under paragraph (a)
to undertake a representation against a former client to all other lawyers who are or become members
of or associated with any firm in which that lawyer is practicing. If, on the other hand, a lawyer disqualified
by paragraph (a) should leave a firm, paragraph (c) prohibits lawyers remaining in that firm from
undertaking a representation that would be forbidden to the departed lawyer only if that representation
would violate subparagraphs (a)(1) or (a)(2). Finally, should those other lawyers cease to be members of
the same firm as the lawyer affected by paragraph (a) without personally coming within its restrictions,
they thereafter may undertake the representation against the lawyer's former client unless prevented from
doing so by some other of these Rules.
40
8. Although not required to do so by Rule 1.05 or this Rule, some courts, as a procedural decision,
disqualify a lawyer for representing a present client against a former client when the subject matter of the
present representation is so closely related to the subject matter of the prior representation that
confidences obtained from the former client might be useful in the representation of the present client.
See Comment 17 to Rule 1.06. This so-called “substantial relationship” test is defended by asserting that
to require a showing that confidences of the first client were in fact used for the benefit of the subsequent
client as a condition to procedural disqualification would cause disclosure of the confidences that the
court seeks to protect. A lawyer is not subject to discipline under Rule 1.05(b)(1), (3), or (4), however,
unless the protected information is actually used. Likewise, a lawyer is not subject to discipline under this
Rule unless the new representation by the lawyer in reasonable probability would result in a violation of
those provisions.

9. Whether the “substantial relationship” test will continue to be employed as a standard for procedural
disqualification is a matter beyond the scope of these Rules. See Preamble: Scope. The possibility that
such a disqualification might be sought by the former client or granted by a court, however, is a matter
that could be of substantial importance to the present client in deciding whether or not to retain or
continue to employ a particular lawyer or law firm as its counsel. Consequently, a lawyer should disclose
those possibilities, as well as their potential consequences for the representation, to the present client as
soon as the lawyer becomes aware of them; and the client then should be allowed to decide whether or
not to obtain new counsel. See Rules 1.03(b) and 1.06(b).

10. This Rule is primarily for the protection of clients and its protections can be waived by them. A
waiver is effective only if there is consent after disclosure of the relevant circumstances, including the
lawyer's past or intended role on behalf of each client, as appropriate. See Comments 7 and 8 to Rule
1.06.

Rule 1.10. Successive Government and Private Employment

(a) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer shall not represent a private client in
connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer
or employee, unless the appropriate government agency consents after consultation.

(b) No lawyer in a firm with which a lawyer subject to paragraph (a) is associated may knowingly undertake
or continue representation in such a matter unless:

(1) The lawyer subject to paragraph (a) is screened from any participation in the matter and is
apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and

(2) written notice is given with reasonable promptness to the appropriate government agency.

(c) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer having information that the lawyer knows or
should know is confidential government information about a person or other legal entity acquired when
41
the lawyer was a public officer or employee may not represent a private client whose interests are adverse
to that person or legal entity.

(d) After learning that a lawyer in the firm is subject to paragraph (c) with respect to a particular matter,
a firm may undertake or continue representation in that matter only if that disqualified lawyer is screened
from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom.

(e) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer serving as a public officer or employee shall
not:

(1) Participate in a matter involving a private client when the lawyer had represented that client in
the same matter while in private practice or nongovernmental employment, unless under
applicable law no one is, or by lawful delegation may be, authorized to act in the lawyer's stead in
the matter; or

(2) Negotiate for private employment with any person who is involved as a party or as attorney
for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially.

(f) As used in this rule, the term “matter” does not include regulation-making or rule-making proceedings
or assignments, but includes:

(1) Any adjudicatory proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination,
contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge accusation, arrest or other similar, particular
transaction involving a specific party or parties; and

(2) any other action or transaction covered by the conflict of interest rules of the appropriate
government agency.

(g) As used in this rule, the term “confidential government information” means information which has
been obtained under governmental authority and which, at the time this rule is applied, the government
is prohibited by law from disclosing to the public or has a legal privilege not to disclose, and which is not
otherwise available to the public.

(h) As used in this Rule, “Private Client” includes not only a private party but also a governmental agency
if the lawyer is not a public officer or employee of that agency.

(i) A lawyer who serves as a public officer or employee of one body politic after having served as a public
officer of another body politic shall comply with paragraphs (a) and (c) as if the second body politic were
a private client and with paragraph (e) as if the first body politic were a private client.

Comment:

1. This Rule prevents a lawyer from exploiting public office for the advantage of a private client.
42
2. A lawyer licensed or specially admitted in Texas and representing a government agency is subject to
the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, including the prohibition against representing
adverse interests stated in Rule 1.06 and the protections afforded former clients in Rule 1.09. In addition,
such a lawyer is subject to this Rule and to statutes and government regulations regarding conflict of
interest. Such statutes and regulations may circumscribe the extent to which the government agency may
give consent under paragraph (a) of this Rule.

3. Where a public agency and a private client are represented in succession by a lawyer, the risk exists
that power or discretion vested in public authority might be used for the special benefit of the private
client. A lawyer should not be in a position where benefit to a private client might affect performance of
the lawyer's professional functions on behalf of public authority. Also, unfair advantage could accrue to
the private client by reason of access to confidential government information about the client's adversary
obtainable only through the lawyer's government service. However, the rules governing lawyers presently
or formerly employed by a government agency should not be so restrictive as to inhibit transfer of
employment to and from the government. The government has a legitimate need to attract qualified
lawyers as well as to maintain high ethical standards. The provisions for screening and waiver are
necessary to avoid imposing too severe a deterrent against entering public service. Although “screening”
is not defined, the screening provisions contemplate that the screened lawyer has not furnished and will
not furnish other lawyers with information relating to the matter, will not have access to the files pertaining
to the matter, and will not participate in any way as a lawyer or adviser in the matter.

4. When the client of a lawyer in private practice is an agency of one government, that agency is a private
client for purposes of this Rule. See paragraph (h). If the lawyer thereafter becomes an officer or
employee of an agency of another government, as when a lawyer represents a city and subsequently is
employed by a federal agency, the lawyer is subject to paragraph (e). A lawyer who has been a public
officer or employee of one body politic and who becomes a public officer or employee of another body
politic is subject to paragraphs (a), (c) and (e). See paragraph (i). Thus, paragraph (i) protects a
governmental agency without regard to whether the lawyer was or becomes a private practitioner or a
public officer or employee.

5. Paragraphs (b)(1) and (d)(1) do not prohibit a lawyer from receiving a salary or partnership share
established by prior independent agreement. They prohibit directly relating the attorney's compensation
to the fee in the matter in which the lawyer is disqualified.

6. Paragraph (b)(2) does not require that a lawyer give notice to the governmental agency at a time when
premature disclosure would injure the client; a requirement for premature disclosure might preclude
engagement of the lawyer. Such notice is, however, required to be given as soon as practicable in order
that the government agency or affected person will have a reasonable opportunity to ascertain compliance
with Rule 1.10 and to take appropriate action if necessary.

7. Paragraph (c) operates only when the lawyer in question has actual as opposed to imputed knowledge
of the confidential government information.
43
8. Paragraphs (a) and (e) do not prohibit a lawyer from jointly representing a private party and a
government agency when doing so is permitted by Rule 1.06 and is not otherwise prohibited by law.

9. Paragraph (e)(1) does not disqualify other lawyers in the agency with which the lawyer in question has
become associated. Although the rule does not require that the lawyer in question be screened from
participation in the matter, the sound practice would be to screen the lawyer to the extent feasible. In
any event, the lawyer in question must comply with Rule 1.05.

10. As used in paragraph (i), “one body politic” refers to one unit or level of government such as the
federal government, a state government, a county, a city or a precinct. The term does not refer to different
agencies within the same body politic or unit of government.

Rule 1.11. Adjudicatory Official or Law Clerk

(a) A lawyer shall not represent anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer has passed upon
the merits or otherwise participated personally and substantially as an adjudicatory official or law clerk
to an adjudicatory official, unless all parties to the proceeding consent after disclosure.

(b) A lawyer who is an adjudicatory official shall not negotiate for employment with any person who is
involved as a party or as attorney for a party in a pending matter in which that official is participating
personally and substantially. A lawyer serving as a law clerk to an adjudicatory official may negotiate for
employment with a party or attorney involved in a matter in which the clerk is participating personally
and substantially, but only after the clerk has notified the adjudicatory official.

(c) If paragraph (a) is applicable to a lawyer, no other lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated
may knowingly undertake or continue representation in the matter unless:

(1) the lawyer who is subject to paragraph (a) is screened from participation in the matter and is
apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and

(2) written notice is promptly given to the other parties to the proceeding.

Comment:

1. This Rule generally parallels Rule 1.10. The term “personally and substantially” signifies that a judge
who was a member of a multi-member court and thereafter left judicial office to practice law is not
prohibited from representing a client in a matter pending in the court but in which the former judge did
not participate. So also the fact that a former judge exercised administrative responsibility in a court does
not prevent the former judge from acting as a lawyer in matters where the judge had previously exercised
remote or incidental administrative responsibility that did not affect the merits. Compare the Comments
to Rule 1.10.

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2. The term “Adjudicatory Official” includes not only judges but also comparable officials serving on
tribunals, such as judges pro tempore, referees, special masters, hearing officers and other parajudicial
officers, as well as lawyers who serve as part-time judges. Compliance provisions B(2) and C of the Texas
Code of Judicial Conduct provide that a part-time judge or judge pro tempore may not “act as a lawyer
in a proceeding in which he has served as a judge or in any other proceeding related thereto.” Although
phrased differently from this rule, those provisions correspond in meaning.

3. Some law clerks have not been licensed as lawyers at the time they commence service as law clerks.
Obviously, paragraph (b) cannot apply to a law clerk until the clerk has been licensed as a lawyer.
Paragraph (a) applies, however, to a lawyer without regard to whether the lawyer had been licensed at the
time of the service as a law clerk, and once that law clerk is licensed as a lawyer and joins a firm, paragraph
(c) applies to the firm.

4. Paragraph (c) does not prohibit a lawyer from receiving a salary or partnership share established by
prior independent agreement. It prohibits directly relating the lawyer's compensation to the fee in the
matter in which the lawyer is disqualified.

Rule 1.12. Organization as a Client

(a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the entity. While the lawyer in the
ordinary course of working relationships may report to, and accept direction from, an entity's duly
authorized constituents, in the situations described in paragraph (b) the lawyer shall proceed as
reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization without involving unreasonable risks of
disrupting the organization and of revealing information relating to the representation to persons outside
the organization.

(b) A lawyer representing an organization must take reasonable remedial actions whenever the lawyer
learns or knows that:

(1) an officer, employee, or other person associated with the organization has committed or
intends to commit a violation of a legal obligation to the organization or a violation of law which
reasonably might be imputed to the organization;

(2) the violation is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization; and

(3) the violation is related to a matter within the scope of the lawyer's representation of the
organization.

(c) Except where prior disclosure to persons outside the organization is required by law or other Rules,
a lawyer shall first attempt to resolve a violation by taking measures within the organization. In
determining the internal procedures, actions or measures that are reasonably necessary in order to
comply with paragraphs (a) and (b), a lawyer shall give due consideration to the seriousness of the
violation and its consequences, the scope and nature of the lawyer's representation, the responsibility in
45
the organization and the apparent motivation of the person involved, the policies of the organization
concerning such matters, and any other relevant considerations. Such procedures, actions and measures
may include, but are not limited to, the following:

(1) asking reconsideration of the matter;

(2) advising that a separate legal opinion on the matter be sought for presentation to appropriate
authority in the organization; and

(3) referring the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the
seriousness of the matter, referral to the highest authority that can act in behalf of the organization
as determined by applicable law.

(d) Upon a lawyer's resignation or termination of the relationship in compliance with Rule 1.15, a lawyer
is excused from further proceeding as required by paragraphs (a), (b) and (c), and any further obligations
of the lawyer are determined by Rule 1.05.

(e) In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other
constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when it is apparent that the organization's
interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing or when explanation
appears reasonably necessary to avoid misunderstanding on their part.

Comment:

The Entity as the Client

1. A lawyer employed or retained to represent an organization represents the organization as distinct

from its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents. Unlike individual
clients who can speak and decide finally and authoritatively for themselves, an organization can speak
and decide only through its agents or constituents such as its officers or employees. In effect, the lawyer-
client relationship must be maintained through a constituent who acts as an intermediary between the
organizational client and the lawyer. This fact requires the lawyer under certain conditions to be
concerned whether the intermediary legitimately represents the organizational client.

2. As used in this Rule, the constituents of an organizational client, whether incorporated or an

unincorporated association, include its directors, officers, employees, shareholders, members, and
others serving in capacities similar to those positions or capacities. This Rule applies not only to lawyers
representing corporations but to those representing an organization, such as an unincorporated
association, union, or other entity.

3. When one of the constituents of an organizational client communicates with the organization's lawyer
in that person's organizational capacity, the communication is protected by Rule 1.05. Thus, by way of
example, if an officer of an organizational client requests its lawyers to investigate allegations of
46
wrongdoing, interviews made in the course of that investigation between the lawyer and the client's
employees or other constituents are covered by Rule 1.05. The lawyer may not disclose to such
constituents information relating to the representation except for disclosures permitted by Rule 1.05.

Clarifying the Lawyer's Role

4. There are times when the organization's interest may be or become adverse to those of one or more
of its constituents. In such circumstances the lawyers should advise any constituent, whose interest the
lawyer finds adverse to that of the organization of the conflict or potential conflict of interest, that the
lawyer cannot represent such constituent, and that such person may wish to obtain independent
representation. Care should be taken to assure that the individual understands that, when there is such
adversity of interest, the lawyer for the organization cannot provide legal representation for that
constituent individual, and that discussions between the lawyer for the organization and the individual
may not be privileged insofar as that individual is concerned. Whether such a warning should be given
by the lawyer for the organization to any constituent individual may turn on the facts of each case.

5. A lawyer representing an organization may, of course, also represent any of its directors, officers,
employees, members, shareholders, or other constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.06. If the
organization's consent to the dual representation is required by Rule 1.06, the consent of the organization
should be given by the appropriate official or officials of the organization other than the individual who
is to be represented, or by the shareholders.

Decisions by Constituents

6. When constituents of the organization make decisions for it, the decisions ordinarily must be accepted
by the lawyer even if their utility or prudence is doubtful. Decisions concerning policy and operations,
including ones entailing serious risk, are not as such in the lawyer's province. However, different
considerations arise when the lawyer knows, in regard to a matter within the scope of the lawyer's
responsibility, that the organization is likely to be substantially injured by the action of a constituent that
is in violation of law or in violation of a legal obligation to the organization. In such circumstances, the
lawyer must take reasonable remedial measure. See paragraph (b). It may be reasonably necessary, for
example, for the lawyer to ask the constituent to reconsider the matter. If that fails, or if the matter is of
sufficient seriousness and importance to the organization, it may be reasonably necessary for the lawyer
to take steps to have the matter reviewed by a higher authority in the organization. The stated policy of
the organization may define circumstances and prescribe channels for such review, and a lawyer should
encourage the formulation of such a policy. Even in the absence of organization policy, however, the
lawyer may have an obligation to refer a matter to higher authority, depending on the seriousness of the
matter and whether the constituent in question has apparent motives to act at variance with the
organization's interest. At some point it may be useful or essential to obtain an independent legal opinion.

7. In some cases, it may be reasonably necessary for the lawyer to refer the matter to the organization's
highest responsible authority. See paragraph (c)(3). Ordinarily, that is the board of directors or similar
governing body. However, applicable law may prescribe that under certain conditions highest authority
47
reposes elsewhere, such as in the independent directors of a corporation. Even that step may be
unsuccessful. The ultimate and difficult ethical question is whether the lawyer should circumvent the
organization's highest authority when it persists in a course of action that is clearly violative of law or of a
legal obligation to the organization and is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization. These
situations are governed by Rule 1.05; see paragraph (d) of this Rule. If the lawyer does not violate a
provision of Rule 1.02 or Rule 1.05 by doing so, the lawyer's further remedial action, after exhausting
remedies within the organization, may include revealing information relating to the representation to
persons outside the organization. If the conduct of the constituent of the organization is likely to result
in death or serious bodily injury to another, the lawyer may have a duty of revelation under Rule 1.05(e).
The lawyer may resign, of course, in accordance with Rule 1.15, in which event the lawyer is excused
from further proceeding as required by paragraphs (a), (b), and (c), and any further obligations are
determined by Rule 1.05.

Relation to Other Rules

8. The authority and responsibility provided in this Rule are concurrent with the authority and
responsibility provided in other Rules. In particular, this Rule is consistent with the lawyer's responsibility
under Rules 1.05, 1.08, 1.15, 3.03, and 4.01. If the lawyer's services are being used by an organization to
further a crime or fraud by the organization, Rule 1.02(c) can be applicable.

Government Agency

9. The duty defined in this Rule applies to governmental organizations. However, when the client is a
governmental organization, a different balance may be appropriate between maintaining confidentiality
and assuring that the wrongful official act is prevented or rectified, for public business is involved. In
addition, duties of lawyers employed by the government or lawyers in military service may be defined by
statutes and regulations. Therefore, defining precisely the identity of the client and prescribing the
resulting obligations of such lawyers may be more difficult in the government context. Although in some
circumstances the client may be a specific agency, it is generally the government as a whole. For example,
if the action or failure to act involves the head of a bureau, either the department of which the bureau is
a part or the government as a whole may be the client for purpose of this Rule. Moreover, in a matter
involving the conduct of government officials, a government lawyer may have authority to question such
conduct more extensively than that of a lawyer for a private organization in similar circumstances. This
Rule does not limit that authority. See Preamble: Scope.

Derivative Actions

10. Under generally prevailing law, the shareholders or members of a corporation may bring suit to
compel the directors to perform their legal obligations in the supervision of the organization. Members
of unincorporated associations have essentially the same right. Such an action may be brought nominally
by the organization, but usually is, in fact, a legal controversy over management of the organization.

11. The question can arise whether counsel for the organization may defend such an action. The
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proposition that the organization is the lawyer's client does not alone resolve the issue. Most derivative
actions are a normal incident of an organization's affairs, to be defended by the organization's lawyer like
any other suit. However, if the claim involves serious charges of wrongdoing by those in control of the
organization, a conflict may arise between the lawyer's duty to the organization and the lawyer's
relationship with those managing or controlling its affairs.

Rule 1.13. Conflicts: Public Interests Activities

A lawyer serving as a director, officer or member of a legal services, civic, charitable or law reform
organization, apart from the law firm in which the lawyer practices, shall not knowingly participate in a
decision or action of the organization:

(a) if participating in the decision would violate the lawyer's obligations to a client under Rule 1.06; or

(b) where the decision could have a material adverse effect on the representation of any client of the
organization whose interests are adverse to a client of the lawyer.

Comment:

1. Lawyers are encouraged to serve as directors, officers or members of legal services, civic, charitable or
law reform organizations, and, with two exceptions, they may do so notwithstanding that the organization
either itself has interests adverse to a client of the lawyer or else serves persons having such adverse
interests.

2. When the lawyer is a director, officer or member of a legal services organization, further problems
can arise when a client served by the organization has interests adverse to those of a client served by the
lawyer. A lawyer-client relationship with persons served by the organization does not result solely from
the lawyer's service in those capacities. Nonetheless, if the lawyer were to participate in an action or
decision of the organization concerning that representation, a real danger of having this quality of the
organizational client's representation being dictated by its adversary would be presented. To avoid that
possibility, paragraph (b) prohibits a lawyer's participation in actions or decisions of the organization that
could have a material adverse effect on the representation of any client of the organization, if that client's
interests are adverse to those of a client of the lawyer.

3. Law reform organizations (like civic and charitable organizations) generally do not have clients, in
which event paragraph (b) does not apply. For reasons of public policy, it is not generally considered a
conflict of interest for a lawyer to engage in law reform activities even though such activities are adverse
to the interests of the lawyer's private clients. A lawyer's representation of a client does not constitute an
endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views, nor does he forego his own. When
the lawyer knows that the interests of a client may be materially benefitted by a law reform decision in
which the lawyer participates, the lawyer should disclose that fact but need not identify the client.

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Rule 1.14. Safekeeping Property

(a) A lawyer shall hold funds and other property belonging in whole or in part to clients or third persons
that are in a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own
property. Such funds shall be kept in a separate account, designated as a “trust” or “escrow” account,
maintained in the state where the lawyer's office is situated, or elsewhere with the consent of the client or
third person. Other client property shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete
records of such account funds and other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for
a period of five years after termination of the representation.

(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer
shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this rule or otherwise permitted by
law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds
or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or
third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.

(c) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of funds or other property in which
both the lawyer and another person claim interests, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer
until there is an accounting and severance of their interest. All funds in a trust or escrow account shall be
disbursed only to those persons entitled to receive them by virtue of the representation or by law. If a
dispute arises concerning their respective interests, the portion in dispute shall be kept separated by the
lawyer until the dispute is resolved, and the undisputed portion shall be distributed appropriately.

Comment:

1. A lawyer should hold property of others with the care required of a professional fiduciary. Securities
should be kept in a safe deposit box, except when some other form of safekeeping is warranted by special
circumstances. All property which is the property of clients or third persons should be kept separate
from the lawyer's business and personal property and, if monies, in one or more trust accounts. Separate
trust accounts may be warranted when administering estate monies or acting in similar fiduciary
capacities. Paragraph (a) requires that complete records of the funds and other property be maintained.

2. Lawyers often receive funds from third parties from which the lawyer's fee will be paid. These funds
should be deposited into a lawyer's trust account. If there is risk that the client may divert the funds
without paying the fee, the lawyer is not required to remit the portion from which the fee is to be paid.
However, a lawyer may not hold funds to coerce a client into accepting the lawyer's contention. The
disputed portion of the funds should be kept in trust and the lawyer should suggest means for prompt
resolution of the dispute, such as arbitration. The undisputed portion of the funds should be promptly
distributed to those entitled to receive them by virtue of the representation. A lawyer should not use even
that portion of trust account funds due to the lawyer to make direct payment to general creditors of the
lawyer of the lawyer's firm, because such a course of dealing increases the risk that all the assets of that
account will be viewed as the lawyer's property rather than that of clients, and thus as available to satisfy
the claims of such creditors. When a lawyer receives from a client monies that constitute a prepayment
50
of a fee and that belongs to the client until the services are rendered, the lawyer should handle the fund
in accordance with paragraph (c). After advising the client that the service has been rendered and the fee
earned, and in the absence of a dispute, the lawyer may withdraw the fund from the separate account.
Paragraph (c) does not prohibit participation in an IOLTA or similar program.

3. Third parties, such as client's creditors, may have just claims against funds or other property in a
lawyer's custody. A lawyer may have a duty under applicable law to protect such third-party claims against
wrongful interference by the client, and accordingly may refuse to surrender the property to the client.
However, a lawyer should not unilaterally assume to arbitrate a dispute between the client and the third
party.

4. The obligations of a lawyer under this Rule are independent of those arising from activity other than
rendering legal service. For example, a lawyer who serves as an escrow agent is governed by the applicable
law relating to fiduciaries even though the lawyer does not render legal services in the transaction.

5. The “client security fund” in Texas provides a means through the collective efforts of the bar to
reimburse persons who have lost money or property as a result of dishonest conduct of a lawyer.

Rule 1.15. Declining or Terminating Representation

(a) A lawyer shall decline to represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw,
except as stated in paragraph (c), from the representation of a client, if:

(1) the representation will result in violation of Rule 3.08, other applicable rules of professional
conduct or other law;

(2) the lawyer's physical, mental or psychological condition materially impairs the lawyer's fitness
to represent the client; or

(3) the lawyer is discharged, with or without good cause.

(b) Except as required by paragraph (a), a lawyer shall not withdraw from representing a client unless:

(1) withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client;

(2) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably
believes may be criminal or fraudulent;

(3) the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud;

(4) a client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent
or with which the lawyer has fundamental disagreement;

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 (5) the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer's services,
including an obligation to pay the lawyer's fee as agreed, and has been given reasonable warning
that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled;

(6) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer or has been
rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or

(7) other good cause for withdrawal exists.

(c) When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good
cause for terminating the representation.

(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to
protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment
of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any
advance payments of fee that has not been earned. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to
the extent permitted by other law only if such retention will not prejudice the client in the subject matter
of the representation.

Comment:

1. A lawyer should not accept representation in a matter unless it can be performed competently,
promptly, and without improper conflict of interest. See generally Rules 1.01, 1.06, 1.07, 1.08, and 1.09.
Having accepted the representation, a lawyer normally should endeavor to handle the matter to
completion. Nevertheless, in certain situations the lawyer must terminate the representation and in
certain other situations the lawyer is permitted to withdraw.

Mandatory Withdrawal

2. A lawyer ordinarily must decline employment if the employment will cause the lawyer to engage in
conduct that the lawyer knows is illegal or that violates the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional
Conduct. Rule 1.15(a)(1); cf. Rules 1.02(c), 3.01, 3.02, 3.03, 3.04, 3.08, 4.01, and 8.04. Similarly,
paragraph (a)(1) of this Rule requires a lawyer to withdraw from employment when the lawyer knows
that the employment will result in a violation of a rule of professional conduct or other law. The lawyer
is not obliged to decline or withdraw simply because the client suggests such a course of conduct; a client
may have made such a suggestion in the ill-founded hope that a lawyer will not be constrained by a
professional obligation. Cf. Rule 1.02(c) and (d).

3. When a lawyer has been appointed to represent a client and in certain other instances in litigation,
withdrawal ordinarily requires approval of the appointing authority or presiding judge. See also Rule
6.01. Difficulty may be encountered if withdrawal is based on the client's demand that the lawyer engage
in unprofessional conduct. The tribunal may wish an explanation for the withdrawal, while the lawyer
may be bound to keep confidential the facts that would constitute such an explanation. The lawyer's
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statement that professional considerations require termination of the representation ordinarily should be
accepted as sufficient. See also Rule 1.06(e).

Discharge

4. A client has the power to discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability for
payment for the lawyer's services, and paragraph (a) of this Rule requires that the discharged lawyer
withdraw. Where future dispute about the withdrawal may be anticipated, it may be advisable to prepare
a written statement reciting the circumstances.

5. Whether a client can discharge an appointed counsel depends on the applicable law. A client seeking
to do so should be given full explanation of the consequences. In some instances the consequences may
include a decision by the appointing authority or presiding judge that appointment of successor counsel
is unjustified, thus requiring the client to represent himself.

Mentally Incompetent Client

6. If the client is mentally incompetent, the client may lack the legal capacity to discharge the lawyer (see
paragraphs 11 and 12 of Comment to Rule 1.02), and in any event the discharge may be seriously adverse
to the client's interests. The lawyer should make special effort to help the incompetent client consider
the consequences (see paragraph 5 of Comment to Rule 1.03) and in some situations may initiate
proceedings for a conservatorship or similar protection of the client. See Rule 1.02(e).

Optional Withdrawal

7. Paragraph (b) supplements paragraph (a) by permitting a lawyer to withdraw from representation in
some certain additional circumstances. The lawyer has the option to withdraw if it can be accomplished
without material adverse effect on the client's interests. Withdrawal is also justified if the client persists in
a course of action that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent, for a lawyer is not required
to be associated with such conduct even if the lawyer does not further it. A lawyer is not required to
discontinue the representation until the lawyer knows the conduct will be illegal or in violation of these
rules, at which point the lawyer's withdrawal is mandated by paragraph (a)(1). Withdrawal is also
permitted if the lawyer's services were misused in the past. The lawyer also may withdraw where the client
insists on pursuing a repugnant or imprudent objective or one with which the lawyer has fundamental
disagreement. A lawyer may withdraw if the client refuses, after being duly warned, to abide by the terms
of an agreement relating to the representation, such as an agreement concerning fees or court costs or
an agreement limiting the objectives of the representation.

8. Withdrawal permitted by paragraph (b)(2) through (7) is optional with the lawyer even though the
withdrawal may have a material adverse effect upon the interests of the client.

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Assisting the Client Upon Withdrawal

9. In every instance of withdrawal and even if the lawyer has been unfairly discharged by the client, a
lawyer must take all reasonable steps to mitigate the consequences to the client. See paragraph (d). The
lawyer may retain papers as security for a fee only to the extent permitted by law.

10. Other rules, in addition to Rule 1.15, require or suggest withdrawal in certain situations. See Rules
1.01, 1.05 Comment 22, 1.06(e) and 1.07(c), 1.11(c), 1.12(d), and 3.08(a).

II. COUNSELOR

Rule 2.01. Advisor

In advising or otherwise representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment
and render candid advice.

Comment:

Scope of Advice

1. A client is entitled to straightforward advice expressing the lawyer's honest assessment. Legal advice
often involves unpleasant facts and alternatives that a client may be disinclined to confront. In presenting
advice, a lawyer endeavors to sustain the client's morale and may put advice in as acceptable a form as
honesty permits. However, a lawyer should not be deterred from giving candid advice by the prospect
that the advice will be unpalatable to the client.

2. Advice couched in narrow legal terms may be of little value to a client, especially where practical
considerations, such as costs or effects on other people, are predominant. Purely technical legal advice,
therefore, can sometimes be inadequate. It is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical
considerations in giving advice. Although a lawyer is not a moral advisor as such, moral and ethical
considerations impinge upon most legal questions and may decisively influence how the law will be
applied.

3. A client may expressly or impliedly ask the lawyer for purely technical advice. When such a request is
made by a client experienced in legal matters, the lawyer may accept it at face value. When such a request
is made by a client inexperienced in legal matters, however, the lawyer's responsibility as advisor may
include indicating that more may be involved than strictly legal considerations.

4. Matters that go beyond strictly legal questions may also be in the domain of another profession. Family
matters can involve problems within the professional competence of psychiatry, clinical psychology or
social work; business matters can involve problems within the competence of the accounting profession
or of financial specialists. Where consultation with a professional in another field is itself something a
competent lawyer would recommend, the lawyer should make such a recommendation. At the same
54
time, a lawyer's advice at its best often consists of recommending a course of action in the face of
conflicting recommendations of experts.

Offering Advice

5. In general, a lawyer is not expected to give advice until asked by the client. However, when a lawyer
knows that a client proposes a course of action that is likely to result in substantial adverse legal
consequences to the client, duty to the client may require that the lawyer act if the client's course of action
is related to the representation. A lawyer ordinarily has no duty to initiate investigation of a client's affairs
or to give advice that the client has indicated is unwanted, but a lawyer may initiate advice to a client when
doing so appears to be in the client's interest.

Intermediary

6. In regard to a lawyer serving as intermediary for clients with conflicting interests, see Rule 1.07.

Rule 2.02. Evaluation for Use by Third Persons

A lawyer shall not undertake an evaluation of a matter affecting a client for the use of someone other
than the client unless:

(a) the lawyer reasonably believes that making the evaluation is compatible with other aspects of the
lawyer's relationship with the client; and

(b) the client consents after consultation.

Comment:

Definition

1. An evaluation may be performed at the client's direction but for the primary purpose of establishing
information for the benefit of third parties; for example, an opinion concerning the title of property
rendered at the behest of a vendor for the information of a prospective purchaser, or at the behest of a
borrower for the information of a prospective lender. In some situations, the evaluation may be required
by a government agency; for example, an opinion concerning the legality of the securities registered for
sale under the securities laws. In other instances, the evaluation may be required by a third person, such
as a purchaser of a business.

2. Lawyers for the government may be called upon to serve as advisors or as evaluators. A lawyer for the
government serves as advisor when the lawyer is an advocate for a government agency or is a counselor
for a government agency. When serving as an advisor the rule of confidentiality of information applies.
See Rules 1.05 and 2.01.

55
3. A lawyer for the government serves as evaluator when the lawyer's official responsibility is to render
opinions establishing the limits on authorized government activity. In that situation this Rule applies.

4. In addition to serving as advisors or as evaluators, lawyers may be called upon to serve as investigators.
When serving as investigator, the identity of the client is critical, because only the client has a confidential
relationship with the lawyer. See Rule 1.05. Thus, a lawyer who makes an investigative contact with a
non-client in circumstances which might cause the non-client to believe that the lawyer is representing
him in the matter should make that non-client aware that rules concerning client loyalty and
confidentiality are not applicable. See Rule 1.05. See also Rule 1.12(e).

Third Persons

5. When the evaluation is intended for the information or use of a third person, the evaluation involves
a departure from the normal client-lawyer relationship. The lawyer must be satisfied as a matter of
professional judgment that making the evaluation is compatible with other functions undertaken in behalf
of the client. For example, if the lawyer is acting as advocate in defending the client against charges of
fraud, it would normally be incompatible with that responsibility for the lawyer to perform an evaluation
for others concerning the same or a related transaction. Assuming no such impediment is apparent,
however, the lawyer should advise the client of the implications of the evaluation, particularly the lawyer's
responsibilities to third persons and the duty to disseminate the findings.

Access to and Disclosure of Information

6. The quality of an evaluation depends on the freedom and extent of the investigation upon which it is
based. Ordinarily a lawyer should have whatever latitude of investigation seems necessary as a matter of
professional judgment. Under some circumstances, however, the terms of the evaluation may be limited.
See Rule 1.02. For example, certain issues or sources may be categorically excluded, or the scope of
search may be limited by time constraints or the noncooperation of persons having relevant information.
Any such limitations which are material to the evaluation should be described in the report. If after a
lawyer has commenced an evaluation, the client refused to comply with the terms upon which it was
understood the evaluation was to have been made, the lawyer's obligations are determined by law, having
reference to the terms of the client's agreement and the surrounding circumstances.

Financial Auditors' Requests for Information

7. When a question concerning the legal situation of a client arises at the instance of the client's financial
auditor and the question is referred to the lawyer, any response by the lawyer should be made in
accordance with procedures recognized in the legal profession.

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 III. ADVOCATE

Rule 3.01. Meritorious Claims and Contentions

A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless the lawyer
reasonably believes that there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous.

Comment:

1. The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client's cause, but also a
duty not to abuse legal procedure. The law, both procedural and substantive, affects the limits within
which an advocate may proceed. Likewise, these Rules impose limitations on the types of actions that a
lawyer may take on behalf of his client. See Rules 3.02-3.06, 4.01-4.04, and 8.04. However, the law is
not always clear and never is static. Accordingly, in determining the proper scope of advocacy, account
must be taken of the law's ambiguities and potential for change.

2. All judicial systems prohibit, at a minimum, the filing of frivolous or knowingly false pleadings, motions
or other papers with the court or the assertion in an adjudicatory proceeding of a knowingly false claim
or defense. A filing or assertion is frivolous if it is made primarily for the purpose of harassing or
maliciously injuring a person. It also is frivolous if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith
argument that the action taken is consistent with existing law or that it may be supported by a good faith
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.

3. A filing or contention is frivolous if it contains knowingly false statements of fact. It is not frivolous,
however, merely because the facts have not been first substantiated fully or because the lawyer expects
to develop vital evidence only by discovery. Neither is it frivolous even though the lawyer believes that
the client's position ultimately may not prevail. In addition, this Rule does not prohibit the use of a
general denial or other pleading to the extent authorized by applicable rules of practice or procedure.
Likewise, a lawyer for a defendant in any criminal proceeding or for the respondent in a proceeding that
could result in commitment may so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case
be established.

4. A lawyer should conform not only to this Rule's prohibition of frivolous filings or assertions but also
to any more stringent applicable rule of practice or procedure. For example, the duties imposed on a
lawyer by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure exceed those set out in this Rule. A lawyer
must prepare all filings subject to Rule 11 in accordance with its requirements. See Rule 3.04(c)(1).

Rule 3.02. Minimizing the Burdens and Delays of Litigation

In the course of litigation, a lawyer shall not take a position that unreasonably increases the costs or other
burdens of the case or that unreasonably delays resolution of the matter.

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Comment:

1. This Rule addresses those situations where a lawyer or the lawyer's client perceive the client's interests
as served by conduct that delays resolution of the matter or that increases the costs or other burdens of
a case. Because such tactics are frequently an appropriate way of achieving the legitimate interests of the
client that are at stake in the litigation, only those instances that are “unreasonable” are prohibited. As to
situations where such tactics are inconsistent with the client's interests, see Rule 1.01. As to those where
the lawyer's conduct is motivated primarily by his desire to receive a larger fee, see Rule 1.04 and
Comment, paragraph 6 thereto.

2. A lawyer's obligations under this Rule are substantially fulfilled by complying with Rules 3.01, 3.03,
and 3.04 as supplemented by applicable rules of practice or procedure. See paragraph 4 to the Comment
to Rule 3.01.

Unreasonable Delay

3. Dilatory practices indulged in merely for the convenience of lawyers bring the administration of justice
into disrepute and normally will be “unreasonable” within the meaning of this Rule. See also Rule 1.01(b)
and (c) and paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Comment thereto. This Rule, however, does not require a lawyer
to eliminate all conflicts between the demands placed on the lawyer's time by different clients and
proceedings. Consequently, it is not professional misconduct either to seek (or as a matter of professional
courtesy, to grant) reasonable delays in some matters in order to permit the competent discharge of a
lawyer's multiple obligations.

4. Frequently, a lawyer seeks a delay in some aspect of a proceeding in order to serve the legitimate
interests of the client rather than merely the lawyer's own interests. Seeking such delays is justifiable. For
example, in order to represent the legitimate interests of the client effectively, a diligent lawyer
representing a party named as a defendant in a complex civil or criminal action may need more time to
prepare a proper response than allowed by applicable rules of practice or procedure. Similar
considerations may pertain in preparing responses to extensive discovery requests. Seeking reasonable
delays in such circumstances is both the right and the duty of a lawyer.

5. On the other hand, a client may seek to have a lawyer delay a proceeding primarily for the purpose of
harassing or maliciously injuring another. Under this Rule, a lawyer is obliged not to take such an action.
See also Rule 3.01. It is not a justification that similar conduct is often tolerated by the bench and the
bar. The question is whether a competent lawyer acting in good faith would regard the course of action
as having some substantial purpose other than delay undertaken for the purpose of harassing or malicious
injuring. The fact that a client realizes a financial or other benefit from such otherwise unreasonable
delay does not make that delay reasonable.

Unreasonable Costs and Other Burdens of Litigation

6. Like delay, increases in the costs or other burdens of litigation may be viewed as serving a wide range
58
of interests of the client. Many of these interests are entirely legitimate and merit the most stringent
protection. Litigation by its very nature often is costly and burdensome. This Rule does not subject a
lawyer to discipline for taking any actions not otherwise prohibited by these Rules in order to fully and
effectively protect the legitimate interests of a client that are at stake in litigation.

7. Not all conduct that increases the costs or other burdens of litigation, however, can be justified in this
manner. One example of such impermissible conduct is a lawyer who counsels or assists a client in
seeking a multiplication of the costs or other burdens of litigation as the primary purpose, because the
client perceives himself as more readily able to bear those burdens than is the opponent, and so hopes
to gain an advantage in resolving the matter unrelated to the merits of the client's position.

Rule 3.03. Candor Toward the Tribunal

(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:

(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;

(2) fail to disclose a fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or
fraudulent act;

(3) in an ex parte proceeding, fail to disclose to the tribunal an unprivileged fact which the lawyer
reasonably believes should be known by that entity for it to make an informed decision;

(4) fail to disclose to the tribunal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to
be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or

(5) offer or use evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.

(b) If a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall make a
good faith effort to persuade the client to authorize the lawyer to correct or withdraw the false evidence.
If such efforts are unsuccessful, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including disclosure
of the true facts.

(c) The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) continue until remedial legal measures are no longer
reasonably possible.

Comment:

1. The advocate's task is to present the client's case with persuasive force. Performance of that duty while
maintaining confidences of the client is qualified by the advocate's duty of candor to the tribunal.

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Factual Representations by a Lawyer

2. An advocate is responsible for pleadings and other documents prepared for litigation, but is usually
not required to have personal knowledge of matters asserted therein, for litigation documents ordinarily
present assertions by the client, or by someone on the client's behalf, and not assertions by the lawyer.
Compare Rule 3.01. However, an assertion purporting to be on the lawyer's own knowledge, as in an
affidavit by the lawyer or a representation of fact in open court, may properly be made only when the
lawyer knows the assertion is true or believes it to be true on the basis of a reasonably diligent inquiry.
There are circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative
misrepresentation. The obligation prescribed in Rule 1.02(c) not to counsel a client to commit or assist
the client in committing a fraud applies in litigation. See the Comments to Rules 1.02(c) and 8.04(a).

Misleading Legal Argument

3. Legal argument based on a knowingly false representation of law constitutes dishonesty toward the
tribunal. A lawyer is not required to make a disinterested exposition of the law, but should recognize the
existence of pertinent legal authorities. Furthermore, as stated in paragraph (a)(4), an advocate has a duty
to disclose directly adverse authority in the controlling jurisdiction which has not been disclosed by the
opposing party. The underlying concept is that legal argument is a discussion seeking to determine the
legal premises properly applicable to the case.

Ex Parte Proceedings

4. Ordinarily, an advocate has the limited responsibility of presenting one side of the matters that a
tribunal should consider in reaching a decision; the conflicting position is expected to be presented by
the opposing party. However, in an ex parte proceeding, such as an application for a temporary
restraining order, there is no balance of presentation by opposing advocates. The object of an ex parte
proceeding is nevertheless to yield a substantially just result. The judge has an affirmative responsibility
to accord the absent party just consideration. The lawyer for the represented party has the correlative
duty to make disclosures of unprivileged material facts known to the lawyer if the lawyer reasonably
believes the tribunal will not reach a just decision unless informed of those facts.

Anticipated False Evidence

5. On occasion a lawyer may be asked to place into evidence testimony or other material that the lawyer
knows to be false. Initially in such situations, a lawyer should urge the client or other person involved to
not offer false or fabricated evidence. However, whether such evidence is provided by the client or by
another person, the lawyer must refuse to offer it, regardless of the client's wishes. As to a lawyer's right
to refuse to offer testimony or other evidence that the lawyer believes is false, see paragraph 15 of this
Comment.

6. If the request to place false testimony or other material into evidence came from the lawyer's client,
the lawyer also would be justified in seeking to withdraw from the case. See Rules 1.15(a)(1) and (b)(2),
60
(4). If withdrawal is allowed by the tribunal, the lawyer may be authorized under Rule 1.05(c)(7) to reveal
the reasons for that withdrawal to any other lawyer subsequently retained by the client in the matter; but
normally that rule would not allow the lawyer to reveal that information to another person or to the
tribunal. If the lawyer either chooses not to withdraw or is not allowed to do so by the tribunal, the lawyer
should again urge the client not to offer false testimony or other evidence and advise the client of the
steps the lawyer will take if such false evidence is offered. Even though the lawyer does not receive
satisfactory assurances that the client or other witness will testify truthfully as to a particular matter, the
lawyer may use that person as a witness as to other matters that the lawyer believes will not result in
perjured testimony.

Past False Evidence

7. It is possible, however, that a lawyer will place testimony or other material into evidence and only later
learn of its falsity. When such testimony or other evidence is offered by the client, problems arise
between the lawyer's duty to keep the client's revelations confidential and the lawyer's duty of candor to
the tribunal. Under this Rule, upon ascertaining that material testimony or other evidence is false, the
lawyer must first seek to persuade the client to correct the false testimony or to withdraw the false
evidence. If the persuasion is ineffective, the lawyer must take additional remedial measures.

8. When a lawyer learns that the lawyer's services have been improperly utilized in a civil case to place
false testimony or other material into evidence, the rule generally recognized is that the lawyer must
disclose the existence of the deception to the court or to the other party, if necessary rectify the deception.
See paragraph (b) and Rule 1.05(h). See also Rule 1.05(g). Such a disclosure can result in grave
consequences to the client, including not only a sense of betrayal by the lawyer but also loss of the case
and perhaps a prosecution for perjury. But the alternative is that the lawyer would be aiding in the
deception of the tribunal or jury, thereby subverting the truth-finding process which the adversary system
is designed to implement. See Rule 1.02(c). Furthermore, unless it is clearly understood that the lawyer
will act upon the duty to disclose the existence of false evidence, the client can simply reject the lawyer's
advice to reveal the false evidence and insist that the lawyer keep silent. Thus the client could in effect
coerce the lawyer into being a party to fraud on the court.

Perjury by a Criminal Defendant

9. Whether an advocate for a criminally accused has the same duty of disclosure has been intensely
debated. While it is agreed that in such cases, as in others, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client
to refrain from suborning or offering perjurious testimony or other false evidence, there has been dispute
concerning the lawyer's duty when that persuasion fails. If the confrontation with the client occurs before
trial, the lawyer ordinarily can withdraw. Withdrawal before trial may not be possible, however, either
because trial is imminent, or because the confrontation with the client does not take place until the trial
itself, or because no other counsel is available.

10. The proper resolution of the lawyer's dilemma in criminal cases is complicated by two considerations.
The first is the substantial penalties that a criminal accused will face upon conviction, and the lawyer's
61
resulting reluctance to impair any defenses the accused wishes to offer on his own behalf having any
possible basis in fact. The second is the right of a defendant to take the stand should he so desire, even
over the objections of the lawyer. Consequently, in any criminal case where the accused either insists on
testifying when the lawyer knows that the testimony is perjurious or else surprises the lawyer with such
testimony at trial, the lawyer's effort to rectify the situation can increase the likelihood of the client's being
convicted as well as opening the possibility of a prosecution for perjury. On the other hand, if the lawyer
does not exercise control over the proof, the lawyer participates, although in a merely passive way, in
deception of the court.

11. Three resolutions of this dilemma have been proposed. One is to permit the accused to testify by a
narrative without guidance through the lawyer's questioning. This compromises both contending
principles; it exempts the lawyer from the duty to disclose false evidence but subjects the client to an
implicit disclosure of information imparted to counsel. Another suggested resolution is that the advocate
be entirely excused from the duty to reveal perjury if the perjury is that of the client. This solution,
however, makes the advocate a knowing instrument of perjury.

12. The other resolution of the dilemma, and the one this Rule adopts, is that the lawyer must take
reasonable remedial measure which may include revealing the client's perjury. A criminal accused has a
right to the assistance of an advocate, a right to testify and a right of confidential communication with
counsel. However, an accused should not have a right to assistance of counsel in committing perjury.
Furthermore, an advocate has an obligation, not only in professional ethics but under the law as well, to
avoid implication in the commission of perjury or other falsification of evidence.

False Evidence Not Introduced by the Lawyer

13. A lawyer may have introduced the testimony of a client or other witness who testified truthfully under
direct examination but who offered false testimony or other evidence during examination by another
party. Although the lawyer should urge that the false evidence be corrected or withdrawn, the full range
of obligation imposed by paragraphs (a)(5) and (b) of this Rule do not apply to such situations. A
subsequent use of that false testimony or other evidence by the lawyer in support of the client's case,
however, would violate paragraph (a)(5).

Duration of Obligation

14. The time limit on the obligation to rectify the presentation of false testimony or other evidence varies
from case to case but continues as long as there is a reasonable possibility of taking corrective legal actions
before a tribunal.

Refusing to Offer Proof Believed to be False

15. A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is untrustworthy, even if
the lawyer does not know that the evidence is false. That discretion should be exercised cautiously,
however, in order not to impair the legitimate interests of the client. Where a client wishes to have such
62
suspect evidence introduced, generally the lawyer should do so and allow the finder of fact to assess its
probative value. A lawyer's obligations under paragraphs (a)(2), (a)(5) and (b) of this Rule are not triggered
by the introduction of testimony or other evidence that is believed by the lawyer to be false, but not
known to be so.

Rule 3.04. Fairness in Adjudicatory Proceedings

A lawyer shall not:

(a) unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence; in anticipation of a dispute unlawfully alter,
destroy or conceal a document or other material that a competent lawyer would believe has potential or
actual evidentiary value; or counsel or assist another person to do any such act.

(b) falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the
offer or payment of compensation to a witness or other entity contingent upon the content of the
testimony of the witness or the outcome of the case. But a lawyer may advance, guarantee, or acquiesce
in the payment of:

(1) expenses reasonably incurred by a witness in attending or testifying;

(2) reasonable compensation to a witness for his loss of time in attending or testifying; or

(3) a reasonable fee for the professional services of an expert witness.

(c) except as stated in paragraph (d), in representing a client before a tribunal:

(1) habitually violate an established rule of procedure or of evidence;

(2) state or allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant to such
proceeding or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, or assert personal knowledge of
facts in issue except when testifying as a witness;

(3) state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability
of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused, except that a lawyer may argue on his
analysis of the evidence and other permissible considerations for any position or conclusion with
respect to the matters stated herein;

(4) ask any question intended to degrade a witness or other person except where the lawyer
reasonably believes that the question will lead to relevant and admissible evidence; or

(5) engage in conduct intended to disrupt the proceedings.

(d) knowingly disobey, or advise the client to disobey, an obligation under the standing rules of or a ruling
63
by a tribunal except for an open refusal based either on an assertion that no valid obligation exists or on
the client's willingness to accept any sanctions arising from such disobedience.

(e) request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information to another
party unless:

(1) the person is a relative or an employee or other agent of a client; and

(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the person's interests will not be adversely affected by
refraining from giving such information.

Comment:

1. The procedure of the adversary system contemplates that the evidence in a case is to be marshalled
competitively by the contending parties. Fair competition in the adversary system is secured by
prohibitions against destruction or concealment of evidence, improperly influencing witnesses,
obstructive tactics in discovery procedures, and the like.

2. Documents and other evidence are often essential to establish a claim or defense. The right of a party,
including the government, to obtain evidence through discovery or subpoena is an important procedural
right. The exercise of that right can be frustrated if relevant material is altered, concealed or destroyed.
Applicable law in many jurisdictions, including Texas, makes it an offense to destroy material for the
purpose of impairing its availability in a pending proceeding or one whose commencement can be
foreseen. See Texas Penal Code, §§ 37.09(a)(1), 37.10(a)(3). See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1515. Falsifying
evidence is also generally a criminal offense. Id. §§ 37.09(a)(2), 37.10(a)(1), (2). Paragraph (a) of this
Rule applies to evidentiary material generally, including computerized information.

3. Paragraph (c)(1) subjects a lawyer to discipline only for habitual abuses of procedural or evidentiary
rules, including those relating to the discovery process. That position was adopted in order to employ
the superior ability of the presiding tribunal to assess the merits of such disputes and to avoid
inappropriate resort to disciplinary proceedings as a means of furthering tactical litigation objectives. A
lawyer in good conscience should not engage in even a single intentional violation of those rules, however,
and a lawyer may be subject to judicial sanctions for doing so.

4. Paragraph (c) restates the traditional Texas position regarding the proper role of argument and
comment in litigation. The obligations imposed by that paragraph to avoid seeking to influence the
outcome of a matter by introducing irrelevant or improper considerations into the deliberative process
are important aspects of a lawyer's duty to maintain the fairness and impartiality of adjudicatory
proceedings.

5. By the same token, the advocate's function is to present evidence and argument so that the cause may
be decided according to law. Refraining from abusive or disruptive conduct is a corollary of the advocate's
right to speak on behalf of litigants. A lawyer may stand firm against abuse by a tribunal but should avoid
64
reciprocation.

6. Paragraph (d) prohibits the practice of a lawyer not disclosing a client's actual or intended
noncompliance with a standing rule or particular ruling of an adjudicatory body or official to other
concerned entities. It provides instead that a lawyer must openly acknowledge the client's noncompliance.

7. Paragraph (d) also prohibits a lawyer from disobeying, or advising a client to disobey, any such
obligations unless either of two circumstances exists. The first is the lawyer's open refusal based on an
assertion that no valid obligation exists. In order to assure due regard for formal rulings and standing
rules of practice or procedure, the lawyer's assertion in this regard should be based on a reasonable
belief. The second circumstance is that a lawyer may acquiesce in a client's position that the sanctions
arising from noncompliance are preferable to the costs of compliance. This situation can arise in criminal
cases, for example, where the court orders disclosure of the identity of an informant to the defendant
and the government decides that it would prefer to allow the case to be dismissed rather than to make
that disclosure. A lawyer should consult with a client about the likely consequences of any such act of
disobedience should the client appear to be inclined to pursue that course; but the final decision in that
regard rests with the client.

Rule 3.05. Maintaining Impartiality of Tribunal

A lawyer shall not:

(a) seek to influence a tribunal concerning a pending matter by means prohibited by law or applicable
rules of practice or procedure;

(b) except as otherwise permitted by law and not prohibited by applicable rules of practice or procedure,
communicate or cause another to communicate ex parte with a tribunal for the purpose of influencing
that entity or person concerning a pending matter other than:

(1) in the course of official proceedings in the cause;

(2) in writing if he promptly delivers a copy of the writing to opposing counsel or the adverse party
if he is not represented by a lawyer;

(3) orally upon adequate notice to opposing counsel or to the adverse party if he is not represented
by a lawyer.

(c) For purposes of this rule:

(1) “Matter” has the meanings ascribed by it in Rule 1.10(f) of these Rules;

(2) A matter is “pending” before a particular tribunal either when that entity has been selected to
determine the matter or when it is reasonably foreseeable that that entity will be so selected.
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Comment:

Undue Influence
1. Many forms of improper influence upon tribunals are proscribed by criminal law or by applicable
rules of practice or procedure. Others are specified in the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct. A lawyer is
required to be familiar with, and to avoid contributing to a violation of, all such provisions. See also Rule
3.06.

2. In recent years, however, there has been an increase in alternative methods of dispute resolution, such
as arbitration, for which the standards governing a lawyer's conduct are not as well developed. In such
situations, as in more traditional settings, a lawyer should avoid any conduct that is or could reasonably
be construed as being intended to corrupt or to unfairly influence the decision-maker.

Ex Parte Contacts

3. Historically, ex parte contacts between a lawyer and a tribunal have been subjected to stringent control
because of the potential for abuse such contacts present. For example, Canon 3A(4) of the Texas Code
of Judicial Conduct prohibits many ex parte contacts with judicial officials. A lawyer in turn violates Rule
8.04(a)(6) by communicating with such an official in a manner that causes that official to violate Canon
3A(4). This rule maintains that traditional posture towards ex parte communications and extends it to
the new settings discussed in paragraph 2 of this Comment.

4. There are certain types of adjudicatory proceedings, however, which have permitted pending issues to
be discussed ex parte with a tribunal. Certain classes of zoning questions, for example, are frequently
handled in that way. As long as such contacts are not prohibited by law or applicable rules of practice
and procedure, and as long as paragraph (a) of this Rule is adhered to, such ex parte contacts will not
serve as a basis for discipline.

5. For limitations on the circumstances and the manner in which lawyers may communicate or cause
another to communicate with veniremen or jurors, see Rule 3.06.

Rule 3.06. Maintaining Integrity of Jury System

(a) A lawyer shall not:

(1) conduct or cause another, by financial support or otherwise, to conduct a vexatious or

harassing investigation of a venireman or juror; or

(2) seek to influence a venireman or juror concerning the merits of a pending matter by means
prohibited by law or applicable rules of practice or procedure.

(b) Prior to discharge of the jury from further consideration of a matter, a lawyer connected therewith
shall not communicate with or cause another to communicate with anyone he knows to be a member of
66
the venire from which the jury will be selected or any juror or alternate juror, except in the course of
official proceedings.

(c) During the trial of a case, a lawyer not connected therewith shall not communicate with or cause
another to communicate with a juror or alternate juror concerning the matter.

(d) After discharge of the jury from further consideration of a matter with which the lawyer was
connected, the lawyer shall not ask questions of or make comments to a member of that jury that are
calculated merely to harass or embarrass the juror or to influence his actions in future jury service.

(e) All restrictions imposed by this Rule upon a lawyer also apply to communications with or
investigations of members of a family of a venireman or a juror.

(f) A lawyer shall reveal promptly to the court improper conduct by a venireman or a juror, or by another
toward a venireman or a juror or a member of his family, of which the lawyer has knowledge.

(g) As used in this Rule, the terms “matter” and “pending” have the meanings specified in Rule 3.05(c).

Comment:

1. To safeguard the impartiality that is essential to the judicial process, veniremen and jurors should be
protected against extraneous influences. When impartiality is present, public confidence in the judicial
system is enhanced. There should be no extrajudicial communication with veniremen prior to trial or
with jurors during trial or on behalf of a lawyer connected with the case. Furthermore, a lawyer who is
not connected with the case should not communicate with or cause another to communicate with a
venireman or a juror about the case. After the trial, communication by a lawyer with jurors is not
prohibited by this Rule so long as he refrains from asking questions or making comments that tend to
harass or embarrass the juror or to influence actions of the juror in future cases. Contacts with discharged
jurors, however, are governed by procedural rules the violation of which could subject a lawyer to
discipline under Rule 3.04. When an extrajudicial communication by a lawyer with a juror is permitted
by law, it should be made considerately and with deference to the personal feelings of the juror.

2. Vexatious or harassing investigations of jurors seriously impair the effectiveness of our jury system.
For this reason, a lawyer or anyone on his behalf who conducts an investigation of veniremen or jurors
should act with circumspection and restraint.

3. Communications with or investigations of members of families of veniremen or jurors by a lawyer or

by anyone on his behalf are subject to the restrictions imposed upon the lawyer with respect to his
communications with or investigations of veniremen and jurors.

4. Because of the extremely serious nature of any actions that threaten the integrity of the jury system, a
lawyer who learns of improper conduct by or towards a venireman, a juror, or a member of the family
of either should make a prompt report to the court regarding such conduct. If such improper actions
67
were taken by or on behalf of a lawyer, either the reporting lawyer or the court normally should initiate
appropriate disciplinary proceedings. See Rules 1.05, 8.03, 8.04.

Rule 3.07. Trial Publicity

(a) In the course of representing a client, a lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a
reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an
adjudicatory proceeding. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to make such a statement.

(b) A lawyer ordinarily will violate paragraph (a), and the likelihood of a violation increases if the
adjudication is ongoing or imminent, by making an extrajudicial statement of the type referred to in that
paragraph when the statement refers to:

(1) the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a party, suspect in a criminal
investigation or witness; or the expected testimony of a party or witness;

(2) in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration, the possibility of a plea of
guilty to the offense; the existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given
by a defendant or suspect; or that person's refusal or failure to make a statement;

(3) the performance, refusal to perform, or results of any examination or test; the refusal or failure
of a person to allow or submit to an examination or test; or the identity or nature of physical
evidence expected to be presented;

(4) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case or
proceeding that could result in incarceration; or

(5) information the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be inadmissible as
evidence in a trial and would if disclosed create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial.

(c) A lawyer ordinarily will not violate paragraph (a) by making an extrajudicial statement of the type
referred to in that paragraph when the lawyer merely states:

(1) the general nature of the claim or defense;

(2) the information contained in a public record;

(3) that an investigation of the matter is in progress, including the general scope of the
investigation, the offense, claim or defense involved;

(4) except when prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved in the matter;

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 (5) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;

(6) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence, and information necessary thereto;

(7) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is a reason to
believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest;
and

(8) if a criminal case:

(i) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused;

(ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in
apprehension of that person;

(iii) the fact, time and place of arrest; and

(iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length of the
investigation.

Comment:

1. Paragraph (a) is premised on the idea that preserving the right to a fair trial necessarily entails some
curtailment of the information that may be disseminated about a party prior to trial. This is particularly
so where trial by jury or lay judge is involved. If there were no such limits, the results would be the
practical nullification of the protective effect of the rules of forensic decorum and the exclusionary rules
of evidence. Thus, paragraph (a) provides that in the course of representing a client, a lawyer's right to
free speech is subordinate to the constitutional requirements of a fair trial. On the other hand, there are
vital social interests served by the free dissemination of information about events having legal
consequences and about legal proceedings themselves. The public has a right to know about threats to
its safety and measures aimed at assuring its security. It also has a legitimate interest in the conduct of
judicial proceedings, particularly in matters of general public concern. Furthermore, the subject matter
of legal proceedings is often of direct significance in debate and deliberation over questions of public
policy.

2. Because no body of rules can simultaneously satisfy all interests of fair trial and all those of free
expression, some balancing of those interests is required. It is difficult to strike that balance. The formula
embodied in this Rule, prohibiting those extrajudicial statements that the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know have a reasonable likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding, is
intended to incorporate the degree of concern for the first amendment rights of lawyers, listeners, and
the media necessary to pass constitutional muster. The obligations imposed upon a lawyer by this Rule
are subordinate to those rights. If a particular statement would be inappropriate for a lawyer to make,
however, the lawyer is as readily subject to discipline for counseling or assisting another person to make
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it as he or she would be for doing so directly. See paragraph (a).

3. The existence of “material prejudice” normally depends on the circumstances in which a particular
statement is made. For example, an otherwise objectionable statement may be excusable if reasonably
calculated to counter the unfair prejudicial effect of another public statement. Applicable constitutional
principles require that the disciplinary standard in this area retain the flexibility needed to take such
unique considerations into account.

4. Although they are not standards of discipline, paragraphs (b) and (c) seek to give some guidance
concerning what types of statements are or are not apt to violate paragraph (a). Paragraph (b) sets forth
conditions under which statements of the types listed in subparagraphs (b)(1) through (5) would likely
violate paragraph (a) in the absence of exceptional extenuating circumstances. Paragraph (c), on the other
hand, describes statements that are unlikely to violate paragraph (a) in the absence of exceptional
aggravating circumstances. Neither paragraph (b) nor paragraph (c) is an exhaustive listing.

5. Special rules of confidentiality may validly govern proceedings in juvenile, domestic relations and
mental disability proceedings, and perhaps other types of litigation. Rule 3.04(c)(1) and (d) govern a
lawyer's duty with respect to such Rules. Frequently, a lawyer's obligations to the client under Rule 1.05
also will prevent the disclosure of confidential information.

Rule 3.08. Lawyer as Witness

(a) A lawyer shall not accept or continue employment as an advocate before a tribunal in a contemplated
or pending adjudicatory proceeding if the lawyer knows or believes that the lawyer is or may be a witness
necessary to establish an essential fact on behalf of the lawyer's client, unless:

(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;

(2) the testimony will relate solely to a matter of formality and there is no reason to believe that
substantial evidence will be offered in opposition to the testimony;

(3) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case;

(4) the lawyer is a party to the action and is appearing pro se; or

(5) the lawyer has promptly notified opposing counsel that the lawyer expects to testify in the
matter and disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client.

(b) A lawyer shall not continue as an advocate in a pending adjudicatory proceeding if the lawyer believes
that the lawyer will be compelled to furnish testimony that will be substantially adverse to the lawyer's
client, unless the client consents after full disclosure.

(c) Without the client's informed consent, a lawyer may not act as advocate in an adjudicatory proceeding
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in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is prohibited by paragraphs (a) or (b) from serving as
advocate. If the lawyer to be called as a witness could not also serve as an advocate under this Rule, that
lawyer shall not take an active role before the tribunal in the presentation of the matter.

Comment:

1. A lawyer who is considering accepting or continuing employment in a contemplated or pending

adjudicatory proceeding in which that lawyer knows or believes that he or she may be a necessary witness
is obligated by this Rule to consider the possible consequences of those dual roles for both the lawyer's
own client and for opposing parties.

2. One important variable in this context is the anticipated tenor of the lawyer's testimony. If that
testimony will be substantially adverse to the client, paragraphs (b) and (c) provide the governing standard.
In other situations, paragraphs (a) and (c) control.

3. A lawyer who is considering both representing a client in an adjudicatory proceeding and serving as a
witness in that proceeding may possess information pertinent to the representation that would be
substantially adverse to the client were it to be disclosed. A lawyer who believes that he or she will be
compelled to furnish testimony concerning such matters should not continue to act as an advocate for
his or her client except with the client's informed consent, because of the substantial likelihood that such
adverse testimony would damage the lawyer's ability to represent the client effectively.

4. In all other circumstances, the principal concern over allowing a lawyer to serve as both an advocate
and witness for a client is the possible confusion that those dual roles could create for the finder of fact.
Normally those dual roles are unlikely to create exceptional difficulties when the lawyer's testimony is
limited to the areas set out in sub-paragraphs (a)(1)-(4) of this Rule. If, however, the lawyer's testimony
concerns a controversial or contested matter, combining the roles of advocate and witness can unfairly
prejudice the opposing party. A witness is required to testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while
an advocate is expected to explain and comment on evidence given by others. It may not be clear whether
a statement by an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof.

5. Paragraph (a)(1) recognizes that if the testimony will be uncontested, the ambiguities in the dual role
are purely theoretical. Paragraph (a)(2) recognizes that similar considerations apply if a lawyer's testimony
relates solely to a matter of formality and there is no reason to believe that substantial opposing evidence
will be offered. In each of those situations requiring the involvement of another lawyer would be a costly
procedure that would serve no significant countervailing purpose.

6. Sub-paragraph (a)(3) recognizes that where the testimony concerns the extent and value of legal
services rendered in the action in which the testimony is offered, permitting the lawyers to testify avoids
the need for a second trial with new counsel to resolve that issue. Moreover, in such a situation the judge
has firsthand knowledge of the matter in issue; hence, there is less dependence on the adversary process
to test the credibility of the testimony. Sub-paragraph (a)(4) makes it clear that this Rule is not intended
to affect a lawyer's right to self representation.
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7. Apart from these four exceptions, sub-paragraph (a)(5) recognizes an additional exception based upon
a balancing of the interests of the client and those of the opposing party. In implementing this exception,
it is relevant that one or both parties could reasonably foresee that the lawyer would probably be a witness.
For example, sub-paragraph (a)(5) requires that a lawyer relying on that sub-paragraph as a basis for
serving as both an advocate and a witness for a party give timely notification of that fact to opposing
counsel. That requirement serves two purposes. First, it prevents the testifying lawyer from creating a
“substantial hardship,” where none once existed, by virtue of a lengthy representation of the client in the
matter at hand. Second, it puts opposing parties on notice of the situation, thus enabling them to make
any desired response at the earliest opportunity.

8. This rule does not prohibit the lawyer who may or will be a witness from participating in the
preparation of a matter for presentation to a tribunal. To minimize the possibility of unfair prejudice to
an opposing party, however, the Rule prohibits any testifying lawyer who could not serve as an advocate
from taking an active role before the tribunal in the presentation of the matter. See paragraph (c). Even
in those situations, however, another lawyer in the testifying lawyer's firm may act as an advocate,
provided the client's informed consent is obtained.

9. Rule 3.08 sets out a disciplinary standard and is not well suited to use as a standard for procedural
disqualification. As a disciplinary rule it serves two principal purposes. The first is to insure that a client's
case is not compromised by being represented by a lawyer who could be a more effective witness for the
client by not also serving as an advocate. See paragraph (a). The second is to insure that a client is not
burdened by counsel who may have to offer testimony that is substantially adverse to the client's cause.
See paragraph (b).

10. This Rule may furnish some guidance in those procedural disqualification disputes where the party
seeking disqualification can demonstrate actual prejudice to itself resulting from the opposing lawyer's
service in the dual roles. However, it should not be used as a tactical weapon to deprive the opposing
party of the right to be represented by the lawyer of his or her choice. For example, a lawyer should not
seek to disqualify an opposing lawyer under this Rule merely because the opposing lawyer's dual roles
may involve an improper conflict of interest with respect to the opposing lawyer's client, for that is a
matter to be resolved between lawyer and client or in a subsequent disciplinary proceeding. Likewise, a
lawyer should not seek to disqualify an opposing lawyer by unnecessarily calling that lawyer as a witness.
Such unintended applications of this Rule, if allowed, would subvert its true purpose by converting it into
a mere tactical weapon in litigation.

Rule 3.09. Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor

The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:

(a) refrain from prosecuting or threatening to prosecute a charge that the prosecutor knows is not
supported by probable cause;

72
(b) refrain from conducting or assisting in a custodial interrogation of an accused unless the prosecutor
has made reasonable efforts to be assured that the accused has been advised of any right to, and the
procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel;

(c) not initiate or encourage efforts to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pre-
trial, trial or post-trial rights;

(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that
tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing,
disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the
prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the
tribunal; and

(e) exercise reasonable care to prevent persons employed or controlled by the prosecutor in a criminal
case from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under
Rule 3.07.

Comment:

Source and Scope of Obligations

1. A prosecutor has the responsibility to see that justice is done, and not simply to be an advocate. This
responsibility carries with it a number of specific obligations. Among these is to see that no person is
threatened with or subjected to the rigors of a criminal prosecution without good cause. See paragraph
(a). In addition a prosecutor should not initiate or exploit any violation of a suspect's right to counsel,
nor should he initiate or encourage efforts to obtain waivers of important pretrial, trial or post-trial rights
from unrepresented persons. See paragraphs (b) and (c). In addition, a prosecutor is obliged to see that
the defendant is accorded procedural justice, that the defendant's guilt is decided upon the basis of
sufficient evidence, and that any sentence imposed is based on all unprivileged information known to
the prosecutor. See paragraph (d). Finally, a prosecutor is obliged by this rule to take reasonable
measures to see that persons employed or controlled by him refrain from making extrajudicial statements
that are prejudicial to the accused. See paragraph (e) and Rule 3.07. See also Rule 3.03(a)(3), governing
ex parte proceedings, among which grand jury proceedings are included. Applicable law may require
other measures by the prosecutor and knowing disregard of those obligations or a systematic abuse of
prosecutorial discretion could constitute a violation of Rule 8.04.

2. Paragraph (a) does not apply to situations where the prosecutor is using a grand jury to determine
whether any crime has been committed, nor does it prevent a prosecutor from presenting a matter to a
grand jury even though he has some doubt as to what charge, if any, the grand jury may decide is
appropriate, as long as he believes that the grand jury could reasonably conclude that some charge is
proper. A prosecutor's obligations under that paragraph are satisfied by the return of a true bill by a grand
jury, unless the prosecutor believes that material inculpatory information presented to the grand jury was
false.
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3. Paragraph (b) does not forbid the lawful questioning of any person who has knowingly, intelligently
and voluntarily waived the rights to counsel and to silence, nor does it forbid such questioning of any
unrepresented person who has not stated that he wishes to retain a lawyer and who is not entitled to
appointed counsel. See also Rule 4.03.

4. Paragraph (c) does not apply to any person who has knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived the
rights referred to therein in open court, nor does it apply to any person appearing pro se with the approval
of the tribunal. Finally, that paragraph does not forbid a prosecutor from advising an unrepresented
accused who has not stated he wishes to retain a lawyer and who is not entitled to appointed counsel and
who has indicated in open court that he wishes to plead guilty to charges against him of his pre-trial, trial
and post-trial rights, provided that the advice given is accurate; that it is undertaken with the knowledge
and approval of the court; and that such a practice is not otherwise prohibited by law or applicable rules
of practice or procedure.

5. The exception in paragraph (d) recognizes that a prosecutor may seek an appropriate protective order
from the tribunal if disclosure of information to the defense could result in substantial harm to an
individual or to the public interest.

6. Subparagraph (e) does not subject a prosecutor to discipline for failing to take measures to prevent
investigators, law enforcement personnel or other persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor, but
not in his employ or under his control, from making extrajudicial statements that the prosecutor would
be prohibited from making under Rule 3.07. To the extent feasible, however, the prosecutor should
make reasonable efforts to discourage such persons from making statements of that kind.

Rule 3.10. Advocate in Nonadjudicative Proceedings

A lawyer representing a client before a legislative or administrative body in a nonadjudicative proceeding

shall disclose that the appearance is in a representative capacity and shall conform to the provisions of
Rules 3.04(a) through (d), 3.05(a), and 4.01.

Comment:

1. In appearing before bodies such as legislatures, municipal councils, and executive and administrative
agencies acting in a rule-making or policy-making capacity, lawyers present facts, formulate issues and
advance argument in the matters under consideration. The decision-making body, like a court, should
be able to rely on the integrity of the submissions made to it. A lawyer appearing before such a body
should deal with the tribunal honestly and in conformity with applicable rules of procedure. A lawyer is
required to disclose whether a particular appearance is in a representative capacity. Although not
required to do so by Rule 3.10, a lawyer should reveal the identities of the lawyer's clients, unless
privileged or otherwise protected, so that the decision-making body can weigh the lawyer's presentation
more accurately. See Rule 4.01, Comment 1.

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2. Lawyers have no exclusive right to appear before nonadjudicative bodies, as they do before a court.
The requirements of this Rule therefore may subject lawyers to regulations inapplicable to advocates who
are not lawyers.

3. As to the representation of a client in a negotiation or other bilateral transaction with a governmental

agency, see Rules 4.01 through 4.04.

IV. NON-CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS

Rule 4.01. Truthfulness in Statements to Others

In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:

(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or

(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid making the
lawyer a party to a criminal act or knowingly assisting a fraudulent act perpetrated by a client.

Comment:

False Statements of Fact

1. Paragraph (a) of this Rule refers to statements of material fact. Whether a particular statement should
be regarded as one of material fact can depend on the circumstances. For example, certain types of
statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact because they are viewed as matters of
opinion or conjecture. Estimates of price or value placed on the subject of a transaction are in this
category. Similarly, under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, a party's supposed intentions as
to an acceptable settlement of a claim may be viewed merely as negotiating positions rather than as
accurate representation of material fact. Likewise, according to commercial conventions, the fact that a
particular transaction is being undertaken on behalf of an undisclosed principal need not be disclosed
except where non-disclosure of the principal would constitute fraud.

2. A lawyer violates paragraph (a) of this Rule either by making a false statement of law or material fact
or by incorporating or affirming such a statement made by another person. Such statements will violate
this Rule, however, only if the lawyer knows they are false and intends thereby to mislead. As to a lawyer's
duty to decline or terminate representation in such situations, see Rule 1.15.

Failure to Disclose a Material Fact

3. Paragraph (b) of this Rule also relates only to failures to disclose material facts. Generally, in the course
of representing a client a lawyer has no duty to inform a third person of relevant or material facts, except
as required by law or by applicable rules of practice or procedure, such as formal discovery. However, a
lawyer must not allow fidelity to a client to become a vehicle for a criminal act or a fraud being perpetrated
75
by that client. Consequently a lawyer must disclose a material fact to a third party if the lawyer knows that
the client is perpetrating a crime or a fraud and the lawyer knows that disclosure is necessary to prevent
the lawyer from becoming a party to that crime or fraud. Failure to disclose under such circumstances is
misconduct only if the lawyer intends thereby to mislead.

4. When a lawyer discovers that a client has committed a criminal or fraudulent act in the course of
which the lawyer's services have been used, or that the client is committing or intends to commit any
criminal or fraudulent act, other of these Rules require the lawyer to urge the client to take appropriate
action. See Rules 1.02(d), (e), (f); 3.03(b). Since the disclosures called for by paragraph (b) of this Rule
will be “necessary” only if the lawyer's attempts to counsel his client not to commit the crime or fraud
are unsuccessful, a lawyer is not authorized to make them without having first undertaken those other
remedial actions. See also Rule 1.05.

Fraud by a Client

5. A lawyer should never knowingly assist a client in the commission of a criminal act or a fraudulent act.
See Rule 1.02(c).

6. This rule governs a lawyer's conduct during “the course of representing a client.” If the lawyer has
terminated representation prior to learning of a client's intention to commit a criminal or fraudulent act,
paragraph (b) of this Rule does not apply. See “Fraud” under TERMINOLOGY.

Rule 4.02. Communication with One Represented by Counsel

(a) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate or cause or encourage another to
communicate about the subject of the representation with a person, organization or entity of government
the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer regarding that subject, unless the lawyer has the
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.

(b) In representing a client a lawyer shall not communicate or cause another to communicate about the
subject of representation with a person or organization a lawyer knows to be employed or retained for
the purpose of conferring with or advising another lawyer about the subject of the representation, unless
the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.

(c) For the purpose of this rule, “organization or entity of government” includes: (1) those persons
presently having a managerial responsibility with an organization or entity of government that relates to
the subject of the representation, or (2) those persons presently employed by such organization or entity
and whose act or omission in connection with the subject of representation may make the organization
or entity of government vicariously liable for such act or omission.

(d) When a person, organization, or entity of government that is represented by a lawyer in a matter
seeks advice regarding that matter from another lawyer, the second lawyer is not prohibited by paragraph
(a) from giving such advice without notifying or seeking consent of the first lawyer.
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Comment:

1. Paragraph (a) of this Rule is directed at efforts to circumvent the lawyer-client relationship existing
between other persons, organizations or entities of government and their respective counsel. It prohibits
communications that in form are between a lawyer's client and another person, organization or entity of
government represented by counsel where, because of the lawyer's involvement in devising and
controlling their content, such communication in substance are between the lawyer and the represented
person, organization or entity of government.

2. Paragraph (a) does not, however, prohibit communication between a lawyer's client and persons,
organizations, or entities of government represented by counsel, as long as the lawyer does not cause or
encourage the communication without the consent of the lawyer for the other party. Consent may be
implied as well as express, as, for example, where the communication occurs in the form of a private
placement memorandum or similar document that obviously is intended for multiple recipients and that
normally is furnished directly to persons, even if known to be represented by counsel. Similarly, that
paragraph does not impose a duty on a lawyer to affirmatively discourage communication between the
lawyer's client and other represented persons, organizations or entities of government. Furthermore, it
does not prohibit client communications concerning matters outside the subject of the representation
with any such person, organization, or entity of government. Finally, it does not prohibit a lawyer from
furnishing a “second opinion” in a matter to one requesting such opinion, nor from discussing
employment in the matter if requested to do so. But see Rule 7.02.

3. Paragraph (b) of this Rule provides that unless authorized by law, experts employed or retained by a
lawyer for a particular matter should not be contacted by opposing counsel regarding that matter without
the consent of the lawyer who retained them. However, certain governmental agents or employees such
as police may be contacted due to their obligations to the public at large.

4. In the case of an organization or entity of government, this Rule prohibits communications by a lawyer
for one party concerning the subject of the representation with persons having a managerial responsibility
on behalf of the organization that relates to the subject of the representation and with those persons
presently employed by such organization or entity whose act or omission may make the organization or
entity vicariously liable for the matter at issue, without the consent of the lawyer for the organization or
entity of government involved. This Rule is based on the presumption that such persons are so closely
identified with the interests of the organization or entity of government that its lawyers will represent
them as well. If, however, such an agent or employee is represented in the matter by his or her own
counsel that presumption is inapplicable. In such cases, the consent by that counsel to communicate will
be sufficient for purposes of this Rule. Compare Rule 3.04(f). Moreover, this Rule does not prohibit a
lawyer from contacting a former employee of a represented organization or entity of a government, nor
from contacting a person presently employed by such an organization or entity whose conduct is not a
matter at issue but who might possess knowledge concerning the matter at issue.

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Rule 4.03. Dealing With Unrepresented Person

In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state
or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the
unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable
efforts to correct the misunderstanding.

Comment:

An unrepresented person, particularly one not experienced in dealing with legal matters, might assume
that a lawyer is disinterested in loyalties or is a disinterested authority on the law even when the lawyer
represents a client. During the course of a lawyer's representation of a client, the lawyer should not give
advice to an unrepresented person other than the advice to obtain counsel. With regard to the special
responsibilities of a prosecutor, see Rule 3.09.

Rule 4.04. Respect for Rights of Third Persons

(a) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to
embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal
rights of such a person.

(b) A lawyer shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present:

(1) criminal or disciplinary charges solely to gain an advantage in a civil matter; or

(2) civil, criminal or disciplinary charges against a complainant, a witness, or a potential witness in
a bar disciplinary proceeding solely to prevent participation by the complainant, witness or
potential witness therein.

Comment:

1. Although in most cases a lawyer's responsibility to the interest of his client is paramount to the interest
of other persons, a lawyer should avoid the infliction of needless harm.

2. Using or threatening to use the criminal process solely to coerce a party in a private matter improperly
suggests that the criminal process can be manipulated by private interests for personal gain. However,
giving any notice required by law or applicable rules of practice or procedure as a prerequisite to
instituting criminal charges does not violate this Rule, unless the underlying criminal charges were made
without probable cause.

3. Using or threatening to use the civil, criminal, or disciplinary processes to coerce a complainant, a
witness, or a potential witness in a bar disciplinary proceeding is an implication that lawyers can
manipulate the legal system to their personal advantage. Creating such false impressions is an abuse of
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the legal system that diminishes public confidence in the legal profession and in the fairness of the legal
system as a whole.

V. LAW FIRMS AND ASSOCIATIONS

Rule 5.01. Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory Lawyer

A lawyer shall be subject to discipline because of another lawyer's violation of these rules of professional
conduct if:

(a) The lawyer is a partner or supervising lawyer and orders, encourages, or knowingly permits the
conduct involved; or

(b) The lawyer is a partner in the law firm in which the other lawyer practices, is the general counsel of a
government agency's legal department in which the other lawyer is employed, or has direct supervisory
authority over the other lawyer, and with knowledge of the other lawyer's violation of these rules
knowingly fails to take reasonable remedial action to avoid or mitigate the consequences of the other
lawyer's violation.

Comment:

1. Rule 5.01 conforms to the general principle that a lawyer is not vicariously subjected to discipline for
the misconduct of another person. Under Rule 8.04, a lawyer is subject to discipline if the lawyer
knowingly assists or induces another to violate these rules. Rule 5.01(a) additionally provides that a
partner or supervising lawyer is subject to discipline for ordering or encouraging another lawyer's violation
of these rules. Moreover, a partner or supervising lawyer is in a position of authority over the work of
other lawyers and the partner or supervising lawyer may be disciplined for permitting another lawyer to
violate these rules.

2. Rule 5.01(b) likewise is concerned with the lawyer who is in a position of authority over another lawyer
and who knows that the other lawyer has committed a violation of a rule of professional conduct. A
partner in a law firm, the general counsel of a government agency's legal department, or a lawyer having
direct supervisory authority over specific legal work by another lawyer, occupies the position of authority
contemplated by Rule 5.01(b).

3. Whether a lawyer has “direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer” in particular circumstances
is a question of fact. In some instances, a senior associate may be a supervising attorney.

4. The duty imposed upon the partner or other authoritative lawyer by Rule 5.01(b) is to take reasonable
remedial action to avoid or mitigate the consequences of the other lawyer's known violation. Appropriate
remedial action by a partner or other supervisory lawyer would depend on many factors, such as the
immediacy of the partner's or supervisory lawyer's knowledge and involvement, the nature of the action
that can reasonably be expected to avoid or mitigate injurious consequences, and the seriousness of the
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anticipated consequences. In some circumstances, it may be sufficient for a junior partner to refer the
ethical problem directly to a designated senior partner or a management committee. A lawyer supervising
a specific legal matter may be required to intervene more directly. For example if a supervising lawyer
knows that a supervised lawyer misrepresented a matter to an opposing party in negotiation, the
supervisor as well as the other lawyer may be required by Rule 5.01(b) to correct the resulting
misapprehension.

5. Thus, neither Rule 5.01(a) nor Rule 5.01(b) visits vicarious disciplinary liability upon the lawyer in a
position of authority. Rather, the lawyer in such authoritative position is exposed to discipline only for
his or her own knowing actions or failures to act. Whether a lawyer may be liable civilly or criminally for
another lawyer's conduct is a question of law beyond the scope of these rules.

6. Wholly aside from the dictates of these rules for discipline, a lawyer in a position of authority in a firm
or government agency or over another lawyer should feel a moral compunction to make reasonable
efforts to ensure that the office, firm, or agency has in effect appropriate procedural measures giving
reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the office conform to these rules. This moral obligation, although
not required by these rules, should fall also upon lawyers who have intermediate managerial
responsibilities in the law department of an organization or government agency.

7. The measures that should be undertaken to give such reasonable assurance may depend on the
structure of the firm or organization and upon the nature of the legal work performed. In a small firm,
informal supervision and an occasional admonition ordinarily will suffice. In a large firm, or in practice
situations where intensely difficult ethical problems frequently arise, more elaborate procedures may be
called for in order to give such assurance. Obviously, the ethical atmosphere of a firm influences the
conduct of all of its lawyers. Lawyers may rely also on continuing legal education in professional ethics
to guard against unintentional misconduct by members of their firm or organization.

Rule 5.02. Responsibilities of a Supervised Lawyer

A lawyer is bound by these rules notwithstanding that the lawyer acted under the supervision of another
person, except that a supervised lawyer does not violate these rules if that lawyer acts in accordance with
a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional conduct.

Comment:

1. Rule 5.02 embodies the fundamental concept that every lawyer is a trained, mature, licensed
professional who has sworn to uphold ethical standards and who is responsible for the lawyer's own
conduct. Accordingly, a lawyer is not relieved from compliance with these rules because the lawyer acted
under the supervision of an employer or other person. In some situations, the fact that a lawyer acted at
the direction or order of another person may be relevant in determining whether the lawyer had the
knowledge required to render the conduct a violation of these rules. The fact of supervision may also, of
course, be a circumstance to be considered by a grievance committee or court in mitigation of the penalty
to be imposed for violation of a rule.
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2. In many law firms and organizations, the relatively inexperienced lawyer works as an assistant to a
more experienced lawyer or is directed, supervised or given guidance by an experienced lawyer in the
firm. In the normal course of practice the senior lawyer has the responsibility for making the decisions
involving professional judgment as to procedures to be taken, the status of the law, and the propriety of
actions to be taken by the lawyers. Otherwise a consistent course of action could not be taken on behalf
of clients. The junior lawyer reasonably can be expected to acquiesce in the decisions made by the senior
lawyer unless the decision is clearly wrong.

3. Rule 5.02 take a realistic attitude toward those prevailing modes of practice by lawyers not engaged in
solo practice. Accordingly, Rule 5.02 provides the supervised lawyer with a special defense in a
disciplinary proceeding in which the lawyer is charged with having violated a rule of professional conduct.
The supervised lawyer is entitled to this defense only if it appears that an arguable question of
professional conduct was resolved by a supervising lawyer and that a resolution made by the supervising
lawyer was a reasonable resolution. The resolution is a reasonable one, even if it is ultimately found to
be officially unacceptable, provided it would have appeared reasonable to a disinterested, competent
lawyer based on the information reasonably available to the supervising lawyer at the time the resolution
was made. “Supervisory lawyer” as used in Rule 5.02 should be construed in conformity with prevailing
modes of practice in firms and other groups and, therefore, should include a senior lawyer who
undertakes to resolve the question of professional propriety as well as a lawyer who more directly
supervises the supervised lawyer.

4. By providing such a defense to the supervised lawyer, Rule. 5.02 recognizes that the inexperienced
lawyer working under the direction or supervision of an employer or senior attorney is not in a favorable
position to disagree with reasonable decisions made by the experienced lawyer. Often, the only choices
available to the supervised lawyer would be to accept the decision made by the senior lawyer or to resign
or otherwise lose the employment. This provision of Rule 5.02 also recognizes that it is not necessarily
improper for the inexperienced lawyer to rely, reasonably and in good faith, upon decisions made in
unclear matters by senior lawyers in the organization.

5. The defense provided by this Rule is available without regard to whether the conduct in question was
originally proposed by the supervised lawyer or another person. Nevertheless, the supervised lawyer is
not permitted to accept an unreasonable decision as to the propriety of professional conduct. The Rule
obviously provides no defense to the supervised lawyer who participates in clearly wrongful conduct.
Reliance can be placed only upon a reasonable resolution made by the supervisory lawyer.

6. The protection afforded by Rule 5.02 to a supervised lawyer relates only to professional disciplinary
proceedings. Whether a similar defense may exist in actions in tort or for breach of contract is a question
beyond the scope of the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct.

Rule 5.03. Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants

With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer:

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(a) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure
that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer; and

(b) a lawyer shall be subject to discipline for the conduct of such a person that would be a violation of
these rules if engaged in by a lawyer if:

(1) the lawyer orders, encourages, or permits the conduct involved; or

(2) the lawyer:

(i) is a partner in the law firm in which the person is employed, retained by, or associated
with; or is the general counsel of a government agency's legal department in which the
person is employed, retained by or associated with; or has direct supervisory authority
over such person; and

(ii) with knowledge of such misconduct by the nonlawyer knowingly fails to take
reasonable remedial action to avoid or mitigate the consequences of that person's
misconduct.

Comment:

1. Lawyers generally employ assistants in their practice, including secretaries, investigators, law student
interns, and paraprofessionals. Such assistants act for the lawyer in rendition of the lawyer's professional
services. A lawyer should give such assistants appropriate instruction and supervision concerning the
ethical aspects of their employment, particularly regarding the obligation not to disclose information
relating to representation of the client, and should be responsible for their work product. The measures
employed in supervising non-lawyers should take account of the fact that they do not have legal training
and are not subject to professional discipline.

2. Each lawyer in a position of authority in a law firm or in a government agency should make reasonable
efforts to ensure that the organization has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the conduct
of nonlawyers employed or retained by or associated with the firm or legal department is compatible
with the professional obligations of the lawyer. This ethical obligation includes lawyers having supervisory
authority or intermediate managerial responsibilities in the law department of any enterprise or
government agency.

Rule 5.04. Professional Independence of a Lawyer

(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share or promise to share legal fees with a non-lawyer, except that:

(1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or associate, or a lawful court order,
may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time, to the lawyer's estate
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 to or for the benefit of the lawyer's heirs or personal representatives, beneficiaries, or former
spouse, after the lawyer's death or as otherwise provided by law or court order.

(2) a lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer may pay
to the estate of the deceased lawyer that proportion of the total compensation which fairly
represents the services rendered by the deceased lawyer; and

(3) a lawyer or law firm may include non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan, even though the
plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement.

(b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a non-lawyer if any of the activities of the partnership
consist of the practice of law.

(c) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal
services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such legal
services.

(d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or association authorized
to practice law for a profit, if:

(1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary representative of the estate of a
lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a reasonable time during administration;

(2) a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof; or

(3) a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer.

Comment:

1. The provisions of Rule 5.04(a) express traditional limitations on sharing legal fees with nonlawyers.
The principal reasons for these limitations are to prevent solicitation by lay persons of clients for lawyers
and to avoid encouraging or assisting nonlawyers in the practice of law. See Rules 5.04(d), 5.05 and 7.03.
The same reasons support Rule 5.04(b).

2. The exceptions stated in Rule 5.04(a) involve situations where the sharing of legal fees with a nonlawyer
is not likely to encourage improper solicitation or unauthorized practice of law. For example, it is
appropriate for a law firm agreement to provide for the payment of money after the death of a lawyer,
or after the establishment of a guardianship for an incapacitated lawyer, to the estate of or to a trust
created by the lawyer. A court order, such as a divorce decree, may provide, when appropriate, for the
division of legal fees with a nonlawyer. Likewise, the inclusion of a secretary or nonlawyer office
administrator in a retirement plan to which the law firm contributes a portion of its profits or legal fees
is proper because this division of legal fees is unlikely to encourage improper solicitation or unauthorized
practice of law.
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3. Rule 5.04(a) forbids only the sharing of legal fees with a nonlawyer and does not necessarily mandate
that employees be paid only on the basis of a fixed salary. Thus, the payment of an annual or other bonus
does not constitute the sharing of legal fees if the bonus is neither based on a percentage of the law firm's
profits or on a percentage of particular legal fees nor is given as a reward for conduct forbidden to lawyers.
Similarly, the division between lawyer and client of the proceeds of a settlement judgment or other award
in which both damages and attorney fees have been included does not constitute an improper sharing of
legal fees with a nonlawyer. Reimbursement by a lawyer made to a bona fide or pro bono legal services
entity for its reasonable expenses in connection with the matter referred to or being handled by the lawyer
does not constitute a division of legal fees within the meaning of Rule 5.04.

4. Because the lawyer-client relationship is a personal relationship in which the client generally must trust
the lawyer to exercise appropriate professional judgment on the client's behalf, Rule 5.04(c) provides that
a lawyer shall not permit improper interference with the exercise of the lawyer's professional judgment
solely on behalf of the client. The lawyer's professional judgment should be exercised only for the benefit
of the client, free of compromising influences and loyalties. Therefore, under Rule 5.04(c) a person who
recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another cannot be permitted to
interfere with the lawyer's professional relationship with that client. Similarly, neither the lawyer's
personal interests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires of third persons should be permitted to
dilute the lawyer's loyalty to the client.

5. Because a lawyer must always be free to exercise professional judgment without regard to the interests
or motives of a third person, the lawyer who is employed or paid by one to represent another should
guard constantly against erosion of the lawyer's professional judgment. The lawyer should recognize that
a person or organization that pays or furnishes lawyers to represent others possesses a potential power
to exert strong pressures against the independent judgment of the lawyer. The lawyer should be watchful
that such persons or organizations are not seeking to further their own economic, political, or social goals
without regard to the lawyer's responsibility to the client. Moreover, a lawyer employed by an organization
is required by Rule 5.04(c) to decline to accept direction of the lawyer's professional judgment from any
nonlawyer in the organization.

6. Rule 5.04(d) forbids a lawyer to practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or association
in certain specific situations where erosion of the lawyer's professional independence may be threatened.
The danger of erosion of the lawyer's professional independence sometimes may exist when a lawyer
practices with associations or organizations not covered by Rule 5.04(d). For example, various types of
legal aid offices are administered by boards of directors composed of lawyers and nonlawyers, and a
lawyer should not accept or continue employment with such an organization unless the board sets only
broad policies and does not interfere in the relationship of the lawyer and the individual client that the
lawyer serves. See Rule 1.13. Whenever a lawyer is employed by an organization, a written agreement
that defines the relationship between the lawyer and the organization and that provides for the lawyer's
professional independence is desirable since it may serve to prevent misunderstanding as to their
respective roles.

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Rule 5.05. Unauthorized Practice of Law

A lawyer shall not:

(a) practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession in that
jurisdiction; or

(b) assist a person who is not a member of the bar in the performance of activity that constitutes the
unauthorized practice of law.

Comment:

1. Courts generally have prohibited the unauthorized practice of law because of a perceived need to
protect individuals and the public from the mistakes of the untrained and the schemes of the
unscrupulous, who are not subject to the judicially imposed disciplinary standards of competence,
responsibility and accountability.

2. Neither statutory nor judicial definitions offer clear guidelines as to what constitutes the practice of law
or the unauthorized practice of law. All too frequently, the definitions are so broad as to be meaningless
and amount to little more than the statement that “the practice of law” is merely whatever lawyers do or
are traditionally understood to do. The definition of the practice of law is established by law and varies
from one jurisdiction to another. Whatever the definition, limiting the practice of law to members of the
bar protects the public against rendition of legal services by unqualified persons.

3. Rule 5.05 does not attempt to define what constitutes the “unauthorized practice of law” but leaves the
definition to judicial development. Judicial development of the concept of “law practice” should
emphasize that the concept is broad enough--but only broad enough--to cover all situations where there
is rendition of services for others that call for the professional judgment of a lawyer and where the one
receiving the services generally will be unable to judge whether adequate services are being rendered and
is, therefore, in need of the protection afforded by the regulation of the legal profession.

Competent professional judgment is the product of a trained familiarity with law and legal processes, a
disciplined, analytical approach to legal problems, and a firm ethical commitment; and the essence of
the professional judgment of the lawyer is the lawyer's educated ability to relate the general body and
philosophy of law to a specific legal problem of a client.

4. Paragraph (b) of Rule 5.05 does not prohibit a lawyer from employing the services of paraprofessionals
and delegating functions to them. So long as the lawyer supervises the delegated work, and retains
responsibility for the work, and maintains a direct relationship with the client, the paraprofessional cannot
reasonably be said to have engaged in activity that constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. See Rule
5.03. Likewise, paragraph (b) does not prohibit lawyers from providing professional advice and
instructions to nonlawyers whose employment requires knowledge of law. For example, claims adjusters,
employees of financial institutions, social workers, abstracters, police officers, accountants, and persons
85
employed in government agencies are engaged in occupations requiring knowledge of law; and a lawyer
who assists them to carry out their proper functions is not assisting the unauthorized practice of law. In
addition, a lawyer may counsel nonlawyers who wish to proceed pro se, since a nonlawyer who represents
himself or herself is not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

5. Authority to engage in the practice of law conferred in any jurisdiction is not necessarily a grant of the
right to practice elsewhere, and it is improper for a lawyer to engage in practice where doing so violates
the regulation of the practice of law in that jurisdiction. However, the demands of business and the
mobility of our society pose distinct problems in the regulation of the practice of law by individual states.
In furtherance of the public interest, lawyers should discourage regulations that unreasonably impose
territorial limitations upon the right of a lawyer to handle the legal affairs of a client or upon the
opportunity of a client to obtain the services of a lawyer of his or her choice.

Rule 5.06. Restrictions on Right to Practice

A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making:

(a) a partnership or employment agreement that restricts the rights of a lawyer to practice after
termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement; or

(b) an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice is part of the settlement of a suit
or controversy, except that as part of the settlement of a disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer an
agreement may be made placing restrictions on the right of that lawyer to practice.

Comment:

1. An agreement restricting the rights of partners or associates to practice after leaving a firm not only
limits their professional autonomy but also limits the freedom of clients to choose a lawyer. Paragraph
(a) prohibits such agreements except for restrictions incident to provisions concerning retirement benefits
for service with the firm.

2. Paragraph (b) prohibits a lawyer from agreeing not to represent other persons in connection with
settling a claim on behalf of a client.

Rule 5.07. [Blank]

Rule 5.08. Prohibited Discriminatory Activities

(a) A lawyer shall not willfully, in connection with an adjudicatory proceeding, except as provided in
paragraph (b), manifest, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based on race, color, national origin,
religion, disability, age, sex, or sexual orientation towards any person involved in that proceeding in any
capacity.

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(b) Paragraph (a) does not apply to a lawyer's decision whether to represent a particular person in
connection with an adjudicatory proceeding, nor to the process of jury selection, nor to communications
protected as “confidential information” under these Rules. See Rule 1.05(a), (b). It also does not preclude
advocacy in connection with an adjudicatory proceeding involving any of the factors set out in paragraph
(a) if that advocacy:

(i) is necessary in order to address any substantive or procedural issues raised by the proceeding;
and

(ii) is conducted in conformity with applicable rulings and orders of a tribunal and applicable
rules of practice and procedure.

Comment:

1. Subject to certain exemptions, paragraph (a) of this Rule prohibits willful expressions of bias or
prejudice in connection with adjudicatory proceedings that are directed towards any persons involved
with those proceedings in any capacity. Because the prohibited conduct only must occur “in connection
with” an adjudicatory proceeding, it applies to misconduct transpiring outside of as well as in the presence
of the tribunal's presiding adjudicatory official. Moreover, the broad definition given to the term
“adjudicatory proceeding” under these Rules means that paragraph (a)'s prohibition applies to many
settings besides conventional litigation in federal or state courts. See Preamble: Terminology (definitions
of “Adjudicatory Proceeding” and “Tribunal”).

2. The Rule, however, contains several important limitations and exemptions. The first, found in
paragraph (a), is that a lawyer's allegedly improper words or conduct must be shown to have been “willful”
before the lawyer may be subjected to discipline.

3. In addition, paragraph (b) sets out four exemptions from the prohibition of paragraph (a). The first is
a lawyer's decision whether to represent a client. The second is any communication made by the lawyer
that is “confidential” under Rule 1.05(a) and (b). The third is a lawyer's communication that is necessary
to represent a client properly and that complies with applicable rulings and orders of the tribunal as well
as with applicable rules of practice or procedure.

4. The fourth exemption in paragraph (b) relates to the lawyer's words or conduct in selecting a jury. This
exemption ensures that a lawyer will be free to thoroughly probe the venire in an effort to identify
potential jurors having a bias or prejudice towards the lawyer's client, or in favor of the client's opponent,
based on, among other things, the factors enumerated in paragraph (a). A lawyer, should remember,
however, that the use of peremptory challenges to remove persons from juries based solely on some of
the factors listed in paragraph (a) raises separate constitutional issues.

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 VI. PUBLIC SERVICE

Rule 6.01. Accepting Appointments by a Tribunal

A lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent a person except for good cause,
such as:

(a) representing the client is likely to result in violation of law or rules of professional conduct;

(b) representing the client is likely to result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer; or

(c) the client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer
relationship or the lawyer's ability to represent the client.

Comment:

Appointment

1. A lawyer may be subject to appointment by a court to serve unpopular clients or persons unable to
afford legal services. For good cause a lawyer may seek to decline an appointment to represent a person
who cannot afford to retain counsel or whose cause is unpopular. Good cause exists if the lawyer could
not handle the matter competently, see Rule 1.01, or if undertaking the representation would result in
an improper conflict of interest, for example, when the client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer
as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship or the lawyer's ability to represent the client.
Compare Rules 1.06(b), 1.15(a)(2), 1.15(b)(4). A lawyer may also seek to decline an appointment if
acceptance would be unreasonably burdensome, for example, when it would impose a financial sacrifice
so great as to be unjust. Compare Rule 1.15(b)(6). However, a lawyer should not seek to decline an
appointment because of such factors as a distaste for the subject matter or the proceeding, the identity
or position of a person involved in the case, the lawyer's belief that a defendant in a criminal proceeding
is guilty, or the lawyer's belief regarding the merits of a civil case.

2. An appointed lawyer has the same obligations to the client as retained counsel, including the
obligations of loyalty and confidentiality, and is subject to the same limitations on the client-lawyer
relationship, such as the obligation to refrain from assisting the client in violation of the Rules.

Public Interest Service

3. The rights and responsibilities of individuals and organizations in Texas and throughout the United
States are increasingly defined in legal terms. As a consequence, legal assistance in coping with the web
of statutes, rules and regulations is imperative for all persons. Consequently, each lawyer engaged in the
practice of law should render public interest legal service. Personal involvement in the problems of the
disadvantaged can be one of the most rewarding experiences in the life of a lawyer.

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Unpopular Causes

4. A lawyer ordinarily is not obliged to accept a client whose character or cause the lawyer regards as
repugnant. Frequently, however, the needs of such a client for a lawyer's services are particularly pressing
and, in some cases, the client may have a right to legal representation. At the same time, either financial
considerations or the same qualities of the client or the client's cause that make a lawyer reluctant to
accept employment may severely limit the client's ability to obtain counsel. As a consequence, the lawyer's
freedom to reject clients is morally qualified. Legal representation should not be denied to people who
are unable to afford legal services, or whose cause is controversial or the subject of popular disapproval.
By the same token, a lawyer's representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does
not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities.

5. An individual lawyer may fulfill the ethical responsibility to provide public interest legal service by
accepting a fair share of unpopular matters or indigent or unpopular clients. History is replete with
instances of distinguished and sacrificial services by lawyers who have represented unpopular clients and
causes. Regardless of his personal feelings, a lawyer should not decline representation because a client
or a cause is unpopular or community reaction is adverse. Likewise, a lawyer should not reject tendered
employment because of the personal preference of a lawyer to avoid adversary alignment against judges,
other lawyers, public officials, or influential members of the community.

VII. INFORMATION ABOUT LEGAL SERVICES

Rule 7.01. Firm Names and Letterhead

(a) A lawyer in private practice shall not practice under a trade name, a name that is misleading as to the
identity of the lawyer or lawyers practicing under such name, or a firm name containing names other
than those of one or more of the lawyers in the firm, except that the names of a professional corporation,
professional association, limited liability partnership, or professional limited liability company may
contain “P.C.,” “L.L.P.,” “P.L.L.C.,” or similar symbols indicating the nature of the organization, and if
otherwise lawful a firm may use as, or continue to include in, its name the name or names of one or
more deceased or retired members of the firm or of a predecessor firm in a continuing line of succession.
Nothing herein shall prohibit a married woman from practicing under her maiden name.

(b) A firm with offices in more than one jurisdiction may use the same name in each jurisdiction, but
identification of the lawyers in an office of the firm shall indicate the jurisdictional limitations on those
not licensed to practice in the jurisdiction where the office is located.

(c) The name of a lawyer occupying a judicial, legislative, or public executive or administrative position
shall not be used in the name of a firm, or in communications on its behalf, during any substantial period
in which the lawyer is not actively and regularly practicing with the firm.

(d) A lawyer shall not hold himself or herself out as being a partner, shareholder, or associate with one
or more other lawyers unless they are in fact partners, shareholders, or associates.
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(e) A lawyer shall not advertise in the public media or seek professional employment by any
communication under a trade or fictitious name, except that a lawyer who practices under a firm name
as authorized by paragraph (a) of this Rule may use that name in such advertisement or communication
but only if that name is the firm name that appears on the lawyer's letterhead, business cards, office sign,
fee contracts, and with the lawyer's signature on pleadings and other legal documents.

(f) A lawyer shall not use a firm name, letterhead, or other professional designation that violates Rule
7.02(a).

Comment:

1. A lawyer or law firm may not practice law using a name that is misleading as to the identity of the
lawyers practicing under such name, but the continued use of the name of a deceased or retired member
of the firm or of a predecessor firm is not considered to be misleading. Trade names are generally
considered inherently misleading. Other types of firm names can be misleading as well, such as a firm
name that creates the appearance that lawyers are partners or employees of a single law firm when in fact
they are merely associated for the purpose of sharing expenses. In such cases, the lawyers involved may
not denominate themselves in any manner suggesting such an ongoing professional relationship as, for
example, “Smith and Jones” or “Smith and Jones Associates” or “Smith and Associates.” Such titles
create the false impression that the lawyers named have assumed a joint professional responsibility for
clients' legal affairs. See paragraph (d).

2. The practice of law firms having offices in more than one state is commonplace. Although it is not
necessary that the name of an interstate firm include Texas lawyers, a letterhead including the name of
any lawyer not licensed in Texas must indicate the lawyer is not licensed in Texas.

3. Paragraph (c) is designed to prevent the exploitation of a lawyer's public position for the benefit of the
lawyer's firm. Likewise, because it may be misleading under paragraph (a), a lawyer who occupies a
judicial, legislative, or public executive or administrative position should not indicate that fact on a
letterhead which identifies that person as an attorney in the private practice of law. However, a firm name
may include the name of a public official who is actively and regularly practicing law with the firm. But
see Rule 7.02(a)(5).

4. With certain limited exceptions, paragraph (a) forbids a lawyer from using a trade name or fictitious
name. Paragraph (e) sets out this same prohibition with respect to advertising in public media or
communications seeking professional employment and contains additional restrictions on the use of
trade names or fictitious names in those contexts. In a largely overlapping measure, paragraph (f) forbids
the use of any such name or designation if it would amount to a “false or misleading communication”
under Rule 7.02(a).

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Rule 7.02. Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services

(a) A lawyer shall not make or sponsor a false or misleading communication about the qualifications or
the services of any lawyer or firm. A communication is false or misleading if it:

(1) contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the
statement considered as a whole not materially misleading;

(2) contains any reference in a public media advertisement to past successes or results obtained
unless

(i) the communicating lawyer or member of the law firm served as lead counsel in the
matter giving rise to the recovery, or was primarily responsible for the settlement or
verdict.

(ii) the amount involved was actually received by the client,

(iii) the reference is accompanied by adequate information regarding the nature of the
case or matter, and the damages or injuries sustained by the client, and

(iv) if the gross amount received is stated, the attorney's fees and litigation expenses
withheld from the amount are stated as well;

(3) is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can achieve, or states or
implies that the lawyer can achieve results by means that violate these rules or other law;

(4) compares the lawyer's services with other lawyers' services, unless the comparison can be
substantiated by reference to verifiable, objective data;

(5) states or implies that the lawyer is able to influence improperly or upon irrelevant grounds any
tribunal, legislative body, or public official;

(6) designates one or more specific areas of practice in an advertisement in the public media or
in a solicitation communication unless the advertising or soliciting lawyer is competent to handle
legal matters in each such area of practice; or

(7) uses an actor or model to portray a client of the lawyer or law firm.

(b) Rule 7.02(a)(6) does not require that a lawyer be certified by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization
at the time of advertising in a specific area of practice, but such certification shall conclusively establish
that such lawyer satisfies the requirements of Rule 7.02(a)(6) with respect to the area(s) of practice in
which such lawyer is certified.

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(c) A lawyer shall not advertise in the public media or state in a solicitation communication that the lawyer
is a specialist except as permitted under Rule 7.04.

(d) Any statement or disclaimer required by these rules shall be made in each language used in the
advertisement or solicitation communication with respect to which such required statement or disclaimer
relates; provided however, the mere statement that a particular language is spoken or understood shall
not alone result in the need for a statement or disclaimer in that language.

Comment:

1. The Rules within Part VII are intended to regulate communications made for the purpose of obtaining
professional employment. They are not intended to affect other forms of speech by lawyers, such as
political advertisements or political commentary, except insofar as a lawyer's effort to obtain employment
is linked to a matter of current public debate.

2. This Rule governs all communications about a lawyer's services, including advertisements regulated by
Rule 7.04 and solicitation communications regulated by Rules 7.03 and 7.05. Whatever means are used
to make known a lawyer's services, statements about them must be truthful and nondeceptive.

3. Sub-paragraph (a)(1) recognizes that statements can be misleading both by what they contain and what
they leave out. Statements that are false or misleading for either reason are prohibited. A truthful
statement is misleading if it omits a fact necessary to make the lawyer's communication considered as a
whole not materially misleading. A truthful statement is also misleading if there is a substantial likelihood
that it will lead a reasonable person to formulate a specific conclusion about the lawyer or the lawyer's
services for which there is no reasonable factual foundation.

4. Sub-paragraphs (a)(2) and (3) recognize that truthful statements may create “unjustified expectations.”
For example, an advertisement that truthfully reports that a lawyer obtained a jury verdict of a certain
amount on behalf of a client would nonetheless be misleading if it were to turn out that the verdict was
overturned on appeal or later compromised for a substantially reduced amount, and the advertisement
did not disclose such facts as well. Even an advertisement that fully and accurately reports a lawyer's
achievements on behalf of clients or former clients may be misleading if presented so as to lead a
reasonable person to form an unjustified expectation that the same results could be obtained for other
clients in similar matters without reference to the specific factual and legal circumstances of each client's
case. Those unique circumstances would ordinarily preclude advertisements in the public media and
solicitation communications that discuss the results obtained on behalf of a client, such as the amount of
a damage award, the lawyer's record in obtaining favorable settlements or verdicts, as well as those that
contain client endorsements.

5. Sub-paragraph (a)(4) recognizes that comparisons of lawyer's services may also be misleading unless
those comparisons “can be substantiated by reference to verifiable objective data.” Similarly, an
unsubstantiated comparison of the lawyer's services or fees with the services or fees of other lawyers may
be misleading if presented with such specificity as would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the
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comparison can be substantiated. Statements comparing a lawyer's services with those of another where
the comparisons are not susceptible of precise measurement or verification, such as “we are the toughest
lawyers in town”, “we will get money for you when other lawyers can't”, or “we are the best law firm in
Texas if you want a large recovery,” can deceive or mislead prospective clients.

6. The inclusion of a disclaimer or qualifying language may preclude a finding that a statement is likely
to create unjustified expectations or otherwise mislead a prospective client, but it will not necessarily do
so. Unless any such qualifications and disclaimers are both sufficient and displayed with equal
prominence to the information to which they pertain, that information can still readily mislead
prospective clients into believing that similar results can be obtained for them without reference to their
specific factual and legal circumstances. Consequently, in order not to be false, misleading, or deceptive,
other of these Rules require that appropriate disclaimers or qualifying language must be presented in the
same manner as the communication and with equal prominence. See Rules 7.04 (q) and 7.05(a)(2).

7. On the other hand, a simple statement of a lawyer's own qualifications devoid of comparisons to other
lawyers does not pose the same risk of being misleading and so does not violate sub-paragraph (a)(4).
Similarly, a lawyer making a referral to another lawyer may express a good faith subjective opinion
regarding that other lawyer.

8. Thus, this Rule does not prohibit communication of information concerning a lawyer's name or firm
name, address, and telephone numbers; the basis on which the lawyer's fees are determined, including
prices for specific services and payment and credit arrangements; names of references and with their
consent, names of clients regularly represented; and other truthful information that might invite the
attention of those seeking legal assistance. When a communication permitted by Rule 7.02 is made in
the public media, the lawyer should consult Rule 7.04 for further guidance and restrictions. When a
communication permitted by Rule 7.02 is made by a lawyer through a solicitation communication, the
lawyer should consult Rules 7.03 and 7.05 for further guidance and restrictions.

9. Sub-paragraph (a)(5) prohibits a lawyer from stating or implying that the lawyer has an ability to
influence a tribunal, legislative body, or other public official through improper conduct or upon irrelevant
grounds. Such conduct brings the profession into disrepute, even though the improper or irrelevant
activities referred to are never carried out, and so are prohibited without regard to the lawyer's actual
intent to engage in such activities.

Communication of Fields of Practice

10. Paragraphs (a)(6), (b) and (c) of Rule 7.02 regulate communications concerning a lawyer's fields of
practice and should be construed together with Rule 7.04 or 7.05, as applicable. If a lawyer in a public
media advertisement or in a solicitation communication designates one or more specific areas of practice,
that designation is at least an implicit representation that the lawyer is qualified in the areas designated.
Accordingly, Rule 7.02(a)(6) prohibits the designation of a field of practice unless the communicating
lawyer is in fact competent in the area.

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11. Typically, one would expect competency to be measured by special education, training, or experience
in the particular area of law designated. Because certification by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization
involves special education, training, and experience, certification by the Texas Board of Legal
Specialization conclusively establishes that a lawyer meets the requirements of Rule 7.02(a)(6) in any area
in which the Board has certified the lawyer. However, competency may be established by means other
than certification by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization. See Rule 7.04(b).

12. Lawyers who wish to advertise in the public media that they specialize should refer to Rule 7.04.
Lawyers who wish to assert a specialty in a solicitation communication should refer to Rule 7.05.

Actor Portrayal Of Clients

13. Sub-paragraph (a)(7) further protects prospective clients from false, misleading, or deceptive
advertisements and solicitations by prohibiting the use of actors to portray clients of a lawyer or law firm.
Other rules prohibit the use of actors to portray lawyers in the advertising or soliciting lawyer's firm. See
Rules 7.04(g), 7.05(a). The truthfulness of such portrayals is extremely difficult to monitor, and almost
inevitably they involve actors whose apparent physical and mental attributes differ in a number of material
respects from those of the actual clients portrayed.

Communication in a Second Language

14. The ability of lawyers to communicate in a second language can facilitate the delivery and receipt of
legal services. Accordingly, it is in the best interest of the public that potential clients be made aware of a
lawyer's language ability. A lawyer may state an ability to communicate in a second language without any
further elaboration. However, if a lawyer chooses to communicate with potential clients in a second
language, all statements or disclaimers required by the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct
must also be made in that language. See paragraph (d). Communicating some information in one
language while communicating the rest in another is potentially misleading if the recipient understands
only one of the languages.

Rule 7.03. Prohibited Solicitations and Payments

(a) A lawyer shall not by in-person contact, or by regulated telephone or other electronic contact as
defined in paragraph (f) seek professional employment concerning a matter arising out of a particular
occurrence or event, or series of occurrences or events, from a prospective client or nonclient who has
not sought the lawyer's advice regarding employment or with whom the lawyer has no family or past or
present attorney-client relationship when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's
pecuniary gain. Notwithstanding the provisions of this paragraph, a lawyer for a qualified nonprofit
organization may communicate with the organization's members for the purpose of educating the
members to understand the law, to recognize legal problems, to make intelligent selection of counsel, or
to use legal services. In those situations where in-person or telephone or other electronic contact is
permitted by this paragraph, a lawyer shall not have such a contact with a prospective client if:

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 (1) the communication involves coercion, duress, fraud, overreaching, intimidation, undue
influence, or harassment;

(2) the communication contains information prohibited by Rule 7.02(a); or

(3) the communication contains a false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, or unfair statement or
claim.

(b) A lawyer shall not pay, give, or offer to pay or give anything of value to a person not licensed to
practice law for soliciting prospective clients for, or referring clients or prospective clients to, any lawyer
or firm, except that a lawyer may pay reasonable fees for advertising and public relations services
rendered in accordance with this Rule and may pay the usual charges of a lawyer referral service that
meets the requirements of Occupational Code Title 5, Subtitle B, Chapter 952.

(c) A lawyer, in order to solicit professional employment, shall not pay, give, advance, or offer to pay,
give, or advance anything of value, other than actual litigation expenses and other financial assistance as
permitted by Rule 1.08(d), to a prospective client or any other person; provided however, this provision
does not prohibit the payment of legitimate referral fees as permitted by Rule 1.04(f) or by paragraph (b)
of this Rule.

(d) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge for, or collect a fee for professional employment
obtained in violation of Rule 7.03(a), (b), or (c).

(e) A lawyer shall not participate with or accept referrals from a lawyer referral service unless the lawyer
knows or reasonably believes that the lawyer referral service meets the requirements of Occupational
Code Title 5, Subtitle B, Chapter 952.

(f) As used in paragraph (a), “regulated telephone or other electronic contact” means any electronic
communication initiated by a lawyer or by any person acting on behalf of a lawyer or law firm that will
result in the person contacted communicating in a live, interactive manner with any other person by
telephone or other electronic means. For purposes of this Rule a website for a lawyer or law firm is not
considered a communication initiated by or on behalf of that lawyer or firm.

Comment:

1. In many situations, in-person, telephone, or other prohibited electronic solicitations by lawyers involve
well-known opportunities for abuse of prospective clients. Traditionally, the principal concerns
presented by such contacts are that they can overbear the prospective client's will, lead to hasty and ill
advised decisions concerning choice of counsel, and be very difficult to police. The approach taken by
this Rule may be found in paragraph (f), which prohibits such communications if they are initiated by or
on behalf of a lawyer or law firm and will result in the person contacted communicating with any person
by telephone or other electronic means. Thus, forms of electronic communications are prohibited that
pose comparable dangers to face-to-face solicitations, such as soliciting business and “chat rooms” or
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transmitting an unsolicited, interactive communication to a prospective client that, when accessed, puts
the recipient in direct contact with another person. Those that do not present such opportunities for
abuse, such as pre-recorded telephone messages requiring a separate return call to speak to or retain an
attorney or websites that must be accessed by an interested person and that provide relevant and truthful
information concerning a lawyer or law firm, are permitted.

2. Nonetheless, paragraph (a) and (f) unconditionally prohibit those activities only when profit for the
lawyer is a significant motive and the solicitation concerns matters arising out of a particular occurrence,
event, or series of occurrences or events. The reason this outright ban is so limited is that there are
circumstances where the dangers of such contacts can be reduced by less restrictive means. As long as
the conditions of sub-paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(3) are not violated by a given contact, a lawyer may
engage in in-person, telephone, or other electronic solicitations when the solicitation is unrelated to a
specific occurrence, event, or series of occurrences or events. Similarly, subject to the same restrictions,
in-person, telephone, or other electronic solicitations are permitted where the prospective client either
has a family or past or present attorney-client relationship with the lawyer or where the potential client
had previously contacted the lawyer about possible employment in the matter.

3. In addition, Rule 7.03(a) does not prohibit a lawyer for a qualified non-profit organization from in-
person, telephone, or other electronic solicitation of prospective clients for purposes related to that
organization. Historically and by law, nonprofit legal aid agencies, unions, and other qualified nonprofit
organizations and their lawyers have been permitted to solicit clients in-person or by telephone, and
more modern electronic means of communication pose no additional threats to consumers justifying a
more restrictive treatment. Consequently, Rule 7.03(a) is not in derogation of those organizations'
constitutional rights to employ such methods. Attorneys for such nonprofit organizations, however,
remain subject to this Rule's general prohibitions against undue influence, intimidation, overreaching,
and the like.

Paying for Solicitation

4. Rule 7.03(b) does not prohibit a lawyer from paying standard commercial fees for advertising or public
relations services rendered in accordance with these Rules. In addition, a lawyer may pay the fees
required by a lawyer referral service that meet the requirements of Occupational Code Title 5, Subtitle
B, Chapter 952. However, paying, giving, or offering to pay or give anything of value to persons not
licensed to practice law who solicit prospective clients for lawyers has always been considered to be
against the best interest of both the public and the legal profession. Such actions circumvent these Rules
by having a non-lawyer do what a lawyer is ethically proscribed from doing. Accordingly, the practice is
forbidden by Rule 7.03(b). As to payments or gifts of value to licensed lawyers for soliciting prospective
clients, see Rule 1.04(f).

5. Rule 7.03(c) prohibits a lawyer from paying or giving value directly to a prospective client or any other
person as consideration for employment by that client except as permitted by Rule 1.08(d).

6. Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer from agreeing to or charging for professional employment obtained
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in violation of Rule 7.03. Paragraph (e) further requires a lawyer to decline business generated by a lawyer
referral service unless the lawyer knows or reasonably believes that service is operated in conformity with
statutory requirements.

7. References to “a lawyer” in this and other Rules include lawyers who practice in law firms. A lawyer
associated with a firm cannot circumvent these Rules by soliciting or advertising in the name of that firm
in a way that violates these Rules. See Rule 7.04(e).

Rule 7.04. Advertisements in the Public Media

(a) A lawyer shall not advertise in the public media by stating that the lawyer is a specialist, except as
permitted under Rule 7.04(b) or as follows:

(1) A lawyer admitted to practice before the United States Patent Office may use the designation
“Patents,” “Patent Attorney,” or “Patent Lawyer,” or any combination of those terms. A lawyer
engaged in the trademark practice may use the designation “Trademark,” “Trademark Attorney,”
or “Trademark Lawyer,” or any combination of those terms. A lawyer engaged in patent and
trademark practice may hold himself or herself out as specializing in “Intellectual Property Law,”
“Patent, Trademark, Copyright Law and Unfair Competition,” or any of those terms.

(2) A lawyer may permit his or her name to be listed in lawyer referral service offices that meet
the requirements of Occupational Code Title 5, Subtitle B, Chapter 952, according to the areas
of law in which the lawyer will accept referrals.

(3) A lawyer available to practice in a particular area of law or legal service may distribute to other
lawyers and publish in legal directories and legal newspapers (whether written or electronic) a
listing or an announcement of such availability. The listing shall not contain a false or misleading
representation of special competence or experience, but may contain the kind of information that
traditionally has been included in such publications.

(b) A lawyer who advertises in the public media:

(1) shall publish or broadcast the name of at least one lawyer who is responsible for the content
of such advertisement; and

(2) shall not include a statement that the lawyer has been certified or designated by an organization
as possessing special competence or a statement that the lawyer is a member of an organization
the name of which implies that its members possess special competence, except that:

(i) a lawyer who has been awarded a Certificate of Special Competence by the Texas
Board of Legal Specialization in the area so advertised, may state with respect to each such
area, “Board Certified, area of specialization -- Texas Board of Legal Specialization;” and

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 (ii) a lawyer who is a member of an organization the name of which implies that its
members possess special competence, or who has been certified or designated by an
organization as possessing special competence, may include a factually accurate statement
of such membership or may include a factually accurate statement, “Certified area of
specialization name of certifying organization,” but such statements may be made only if
that organization has been accredited by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization as a bona
fide organization that admits to membership or grants certification only on the basis of
objective, exacting, publicly available standards (including high standards of individual
character, conduct, and reputation) that are reasonably relevant to the special training or
special competence that is implied and that are in excess of the level of training and
competence generally required for admission to the Bar; and

(3) shall, in the case of infomercial or comparable presentation, state that the presentation is an
advertisement;

(i) both verbally and in writing at its outset, after any commercial interruption, and at its
conclusion; and

(ii) in writing during any portion of the presentation that explains how to contact a lawyer
or law firm.

(c) Separate and apart from any other statements, the statements referred to in paragraph (b) shall be
displayed conspicuously, and in language easily understood by an ordinary consumer.

(d) Subject to the requirements of Rules 7.02 and 7.03 and of paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this Rule, a
lawyer may, either directly or through a public relations or advertising representative, advertise services
in the public media, such as (but not limited to) a telephone directory, legal directory, newspaper or
other periodical, outdoor display, radio, television, the Internet, or electronic, or digital media.

(e) All advertisements in the public media for a lawyer or firm must be reviewed and approved in writing
by the lawyer or a lawyer in the firm.

(f) A copy or recording of each advertisement in the public media and relevant approval referred to in
paragraph (e), and a record of when and where the advertisement was used, shall be kept by the lawyer
or firm for four years after its last dissemination.

(g) In advertisements in the public media, any person who portrays a lawyer whose services or whose
firm's services are being advertised, or who narrates an advertisement as if he or she were such a lawyer,
shall be one or more of the lawyers whose services are being advertised.

(h) If an advertisement in the public media by a lawyer or firm discloses the willingness or potential
willingness of the lawyer or firm to render services on a contingent fee basis, the advertisement must state
whether the client will be obligated to pay all or any portion of the court costs and, if a client may be
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liable for other expenses, this fact must be disclosed. If specific percentage fees or fee ranges of
contingent fee work are disclosed in such advertisement, it must also disclose whether the percentage is
computed before or after expenses are deducted from the recovery.

(i) A lawyer who advertises in the public media a specific fee or range of fees for a particular service shall
conform to the advertised fee or range of fees for the period during which the advertisement is reasonably
expected to be in circulation or otherwise expected to be effective in attracting clients, unless the
advertisement specifies a shorter period; but in no instance is the lawyer bound to conform to the
advertised fee or range of fees for a period of more than one year after the date of publication.

(j) A lawyer or firm who advertises in the public media must disclose the geographic location, by city or
town, of the lawyer's or firm's principal office. A lawyer or firm shall not advertise the existence of any
office other than the principal office unless:

(1) that other office is staffed by a lawyer at least three days a week; or

(2) the advertisement states:

(i) the days and times during which a lawyer will be present at that office, or

(ii) that meetings with lawyers will be by appointment only.

(k) A lawyer may not, directly or indirectly, pay all or a part of the cost of an advertisement in the public
media for a lawyer not in the same firm unless such advertisement discloses the name and address of the
financing lawyer, the relationship between the advertising lawyer and the financing lawyer, and whether
the advertising lawyer is likely to refer cases received through the advertisement to the financing lawyer.

(l) If an advertising lawyer knows or should know at the time of an advertisement in the public media
that a case or matter will likely be referred to another lawyer or firm, a statement of such fact shall be
conspicuously included in such advertisement.

(m) No motto, slogan or jingle that is false or misleading may be used in any advertisement in the public
media.

(n) A lawyer shall not include in any advertisement in the public media the lawyer's association with a
lawyer referral service unless the lawyer knows or reasonably believes that the lawyer referral service
meets the requirements of Occupational Code Title 5, Subtitle B, Chapter 952.

(o) A lawyer may not advertise in the public media as part of an advertising cooperative or venture of two
or more lawyers not in the same firm unless each such advertisement:

(1) states that the advertisement is paid for by the cooperating lawyers;

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 (2) names each of the cooperating lawyers;

(3) sets forth conspicuously the special competency requirements required by Rule 7.04(b) of
lawyers who advertise in the public media;

(4) does not state or imply that the lawyers participating in the advertising cooperative or venture
possess professional superiority, are able to perform services in a superior manner, or possess
special competence in any area of law advertised, except that the advertisement may contain the
information permitted by Rule 7.04(b)(2); and

(5) does not otherwise violate the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.

(p) Each lawyer who advertises in the public media as part of an advertising cooperative or venture shall
be individually responsible for:

(1) ensuring that each advertisement does not violate this Rule; and

(2) complying with the filing requirements of Rule 7.07.

(q) If these rules require that specific qualifications, disclaimers or disclosures of information accompany
communications concerning a lawyer's services, the required qualifications, disclaimers or disclosures
must be presented in the same manner as the communication and with equal prominence.

(r) A lawyer who advertises on the Internet must display the statements and disclosures required by Rule
7.04.

Comment:

1. Neither Rule 7.04 nor Rule 7.05 prohibits communications authorized by law, such as notice to
members of a class in class action litigation.

Advertising Areas of Practice and Special Competence

2. Paragraphs (a) and (b) permit a lawyer, under the restrictions set forth, to indicate areas of practice in
advertisements about the lawyer's services. See also paragraph (d). The restrictions are designed primarily
to require that accurate information be conveyed. These restrictions recognize that a lawyer has a right
protected by the United States Constitution to advertise publicly, but that the right may be regulated by
reasonable restrictions designed to protect the public from false or misleading information. The
restrictions contained in Rule 7.04 are based on the experience of the legal profession in the State of
Texas and are designed to curtail what experience has shown to be misleading and deceptive advertising.
To ensure accountability, sub-paragraph (b)(1) requires identification of at least one lawyer responsible
for the content of the advertisement.

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3. Because of long-standing tradition a lawyer admitted to practice before the United States Patent Office
may use the designation “patents,” “patent attorney,” or “patent lawyer” or any combination of those
terms. As recognized by paragraph (a)(1), a lawyer engaged in patent and trademark practice may hold
himself out as concentrating in “intellectual property law,” “patents, or trademarks and related matters,”
or “patent, trademark, copyright law and unfair competition” or any combination of those terms.

4. Paragraph (a)(2) recognizes the propriety of listing a lawyer's name in legal directories according to the
areas of law in which the lawyer will accept new matters. The same right is given with respect to lawyer
referral service offices, but only if those services comply with statutory guidelines. The restriction in
paragraph (a)(2) does not prevent a legal aid agency or prepaid legal services plan from advertising legal
services provided under its auspices.

5. Paragraph (a)(3) continues the historical exception that permits advertisements by lawyers to other
lawyers in legal directories and legal newspapers (whether written or electronic), subject to the same
requirements of truthfulness that apply to all other forms of lawyer advertising. Such advertisements
traditionally contain information about the name, location, telephone numbers, and general availability
of a lawyer to work on particular legal matters. Other information may be included so long as it is not
false or misleading. Because advertisements in these publications are not available to the general public,
lawyers who list various areas of practice are not required to comply with paragraph (b).

6. Some advertisements, sometimes known as tombstone advertisements, mention only such matters as
the name of the lawyer or law firm, a listing of lawyers associated with the firm, office addresses and
telephone numbers, office and telephone service hours, dates of admission to bars, the acceptance of
credit cards, and fees. The content of such advertisements is not the kind of information intended to be
regulated by Rule 7.04 (b). However, if the advertisement in the public media mentions any area of the
law in which the lawyer practices, then, because of the likelihood of misleading material, the lawyer must
comply with paragraph (b).

7. Sometimes lawyers choose to advertise in the public media the fact that they have been certified or
designated by a particular organization or that they are members of a particular organization. Such
statements naturally lead the public to believe that the lawyer possesses special competence in the area
of law mentioned. Consequently, in order to ensure that the public will not be misled by such statements,
sub-paragraph (b)(2) and paragraph (c) place limited but necessary restrictions upon a lawyer's basic right
to advertise those affiliations.

8. Rule 7.04(b)(2) gives lawyers who possess certificates of specialization from the Texas Board of Legal
Specialization or other meritorious credentials from organizations approved by the Board the option of
stating that fact, provided that the restrictions set forth in subparagraphs (b)(2)(i) and (b)(2)(ii) are
followed.

9. Paragraph (c) is intended to ensure against misleading or material variations from the statements
required by paragraph (b).

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10. Paragraphs (e) and (f) provide the advertising lawyer, the Bar, and the public with requisite records
should questions arise regarding the propriety of a public media advertisement. Paragraph (e), like
paragraph (b)(1), ensures that a particular attorney accepts responsibility for the advertisement. It is in
the public interest and in the interest of the legal profession that the records of those advertisements and
approvals be maintained.

Examples of Prohibited Advertising

11. Paragraphs (g) through (o) regulate conduct that has been found to mislead or be likely to mislead
the public. Each paragraph is designed to protect the public and to guard the legal profession against
these documented misleading practices while at the same time respecting the constitutional rights of any
lawyer to advertise.

12. Paragraph (g) prohibits lawyers from misleading the public into believing a non-lawyer portrayor or
narrator in the advertisement is one of the lawyers prepared to perform services for the public. It does
not prohibit the narration of an advertisement in the third person by an actor, as long as it is clear to
those hearing or seeing the advertisement that the actor is not a lawyer prepared to perform services for
the public.

13. Contingent fee contracts present unusual opportunities for deception by lawyers or for
misunderstanding by the public. By requiring certain disclosures, paragraph (h) safeguards the public
from misleading or potentially misleading advertisements that involve representation on a contingent fee
basis. The affirmative requirements of paragraph (h) are not triggered solely by the expression of
“contingent fee” or “percentage fee” in the advertisement. To the contrary, they encompass
advertisements in the public media where the lawyer or firm expresses a mere willingness or potential
willingness to render services for a contingent fee. Therefore, statements in an advertisement such as “no
fee if no recovery” or “fees in the event of recovery only” are clearly included as a form of advertisement
subject to the disclosure requirements of paragraph (h).

14. Paragraphs (i), (j), (k) and (l) jointly address the problem of advertising that experience has shown
misleads the public concerning the fees that will be charged, the location where services will be provided,
or the attorney who will be performing these services. Together they prohibit the same sort of “bait and
switch” advertising tactics by lawyers that are universally condemned.

15. Paragraph (i) requires a lawyer who advertises a specific fee or range of fees in the public media to
honor those commitments for the period during which the advertisement is reasonably expected to be
in circulation or otherwise expected to be effective in attracting clients, unless the advertisement itself
specifies a shorter period. In no event, however, is a lawyer required to honor an advertised fee or range
of fees for more than one year after publication.

16. Paragraph (j) prohibits advertising the availability of a satellite office unless the requirements of
subparagraphs (1) or (2) are satisfied. Paragraph (j) does not require, however, that a lawyer or firm
specify which of several properly advertised offices is its “principal” one, as long as the principal office is
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among those advertised and the advertisement discloses the city or town in which that office is located.
Experience has shown that, in the absence of such regulation, members of the public have been misled
into employing a lawyer in a distant city who advertises that there is a nearby satellite office, only to learn
later that the lawyer is rarely available to the client because the nearby office is seldom open or is staffed
only by lay personnel. Paragraph (j) is not intended to restrict the ability of legal services programs to
advertise satellite offices in remote parts of the program's service area even if those satellite offices are
staffed irregularly by attorneys. Otherwise low-income individuals in and near such communities might
be denied access to the only legal services truly available to them.

17. When a lawyer or firm advertises, the public has a right to expect that lawyer or firm will perform the
legal services. Experience has shown that attorneys not in the same firm may create a relationship wherein
one will finance advertising for the other in return for referrals. Nondisclosure of such a referral
relationship is misleading to the public. Accordingly, paragraph (k) prohibits such a relationship between
an advertising lawyer and a lawyer who finances the advertising unless the advertisement discloses the
nature of the financial relationship between the two lawyers. Paragraph (l) addresses the same problem
from a different perspective, requiring a lawyer who advertises the availability of legal services and who
know or should know at the time that the advertisement is placed in the media that business will likely
be referred to another lawyer or firm, to include a conspicuous statement of that fact in any such
advertising. This requirement applies whether or not the lawyer to whom the business is referred is
financing the advertisements of the referring lawyer. It does not, however, require disclosure of all
possible scenarios under which a referral could occur, such as an unforeseen need to associate with a
specialist in accordance with Rule 1.01(a) or the possibility of a referral if a prospective client turns out
to have a conflict of interest precluding representation by the advertising lawyer. Lawyers participating in
any type of arrangement to refer cases must comply with Rule 1.04(f).

18. Paragraph (m) protects the public by forbidding mottos, slogans, and jingles that are false or
misleading. There are, however, mottos, slogans, and jingles that are informative rather than false or
misleading. Accordingly, paragraph (m) recognizes an advertising lawyer's constitutional right to include
appropriate mottos, slogans, and jingles in advertising.

19. Some lawyers choose to band together in a cooperative or joint venture to advertise. Although those
arrangements are lawful, the fact that several independent lawyers have joined together in a single
advertisement increases the risk of misrepresentation or other forms of inappropriate expression. Special
care must be taken to ensure that cooperative advertisements identify each cooperating lawyer, state that
each cooperating lawyer is paying for the advertisement, and accurately describe the professional
qualifications of each cooperating lawyer. See paragraph (o). Furthermore, each cooperating lawyer must
comply with the filing requirements of Rule 7.07. See paragraph (p).

20. The use of disclosures, disclaimers and qualifying information is necessary to inform the public about
various aspects of a lawyer or firm's practice in public media advertising and solicitation communications.
In order to ensure that disclaimers required by these rules are conspicuously displayed, paragraph (q)
requires that such statements be presented in the same manner as the communication and with
prominence equal to that of the matter to which it refers. For example, in a television advertisement that
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necessitates the use of a disclaimer, if a statement or claim is made verbally, the disclaimer should also
be included verbally in the commercial. When a statement or claim appears in print, the accompanying
disclaimer must also appear in print with equal prominence and legibility.

Rule 7.05. Prohibited Written, Electronic, Or Digital Solicitations

(a) A lawyer shall not send, deliver, or transmit or knowingly permit or knowingly cause another person
to send, deliver, or transmit a written, audio, audio-visual, digital media, recorded telephone message, or
other electronic communication to a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional
employment on behalf of any lawyer or law firm if:

(1) the communication involves coercion, duress, fraud, overreaching, intimidation, undue
influence, or harassment;

(2) the communication contains information prohibited by Rule 7.02 or fails to satisfy each of the
requirements of Rule 7.04(a) through (c), and (g) through (q) that would be applicable to the
communication if it were an advertisement in the public media; or

(3) the communication contains a false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, or unfair statement or
claim.

(b) Except as provided in paragraph (f) of this Rule, a written, electronic, or digital solicitation
communication to prospective clients for the purpose of obtaining professional employment:

(1) shall, in the case of a non-electronically transmitted written communication, be plainly marked
“ADVERTISEMENT” on its first page, and on the face of the envelope or other packaging used
to transmit the communication. If the written communication is in the form of a self-mailing
brochure or pamphlet, the word “ADVERTISEMENT” shall be:

(i) in a color that contrasts sharply with the background color; and

(ii) in a size of at least 3/8" vertically or three times the vertical height of the letters used in
the body of such communication, whichever is larger

(2) shall, in the case of an electronic mail message, be plainly marked “ADVERTISEMENT” in
the subject portion of the electronic mail and at the beginning of the message's text;

(3) shall not be made to resemble legal pleadings or other legal documents;

(4) shall not reveal on the envelope or other packaging or electronic mail subject line used to
transmit the communication, or on the outside of a self-mailing brochure or pamphlet, the nature
of the legal problem of the prospective client or non-client; and

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 (5) shall disclose how the lawyer obtained the information prompting the communication to solicit
professional employment if such contact was prompted by a specific occurrence involving the
recipient of the communication, or a family member of such person(s).

(c) Except as provided in paragraph (f) of this Rule, an audio, audio-visual, digital media, recorded
telephone message, or other electronic communication sent to prospective clients for the purpose of
obtaining professional employment:

(1) shall, in the case of any such communication delivered to the recipient by non-electronic
means, plainly and conspicuously state in writing on the outside of any envelope or other
packaging used to transmit the communication, that it is an “ADVERTISEMENT.”

(2) shall not reveal on any such envelope or other packaging the nature of the legal problem of
the prospective client or non-client;

(3) shall disclose, either in the communication itself or in accompanying transmittal message, how
the lawyer obtained the information prompting such audio, audio-visual, digital media, recorded
telephone message, or other electronic communication to solicit professional employment, if
such contact was prompted by a specific occurrence involving the recipient of the communication
or a family member of such person(s);

(4) shall, in the case of a recorded audio presentation or a recorded telephone message, plainly
state that it is an advertisement prior to any other words being spoken and again at the
presentation's or message's conclusion; and

(5) shall, in the case of an audio-visual or digital media presentation, plainly state that the
presentation is an advertisement;

(i) both verbally and in writing at the outset of the presentation and again at its conclusion;
and

(ii) in writing during any portion of the presentation that explains how to contact a lawyer
or law firm.

(d) All written, audio, audio-visual, digital media, recorded telephone message, or other electronic
communications made to a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional employment of
a lawyer or law firm must be reviewed and either signed by or approved in writing by the lawyer or a
lawyer in the firm.

(e) A copy of each written, audio, audio-visual, digital media, recorded telephone message, or other
electronic solicitation communication, the relevant approval thereof, and a record of the date of each
such communication; the name, address, telephone number, or electronic address to which each such
communication was sent; and the means by which each such communication was sent shall be kept by
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the lawyer or firm for four years after its dissemination.

(f) The provisions of paragraphs (b) and (c) of this Rule do not apply to a written, audio, audiovisual,
digital media, recorded telephone message, or other form, of electronic solicitation communication:

(1) directed to a family member or a person with whom the lawyer had or has an attorney client
relationship;

(2) that is not motivated by or concerned with a particular past occurrence or event or a particular
series of past occurrences or events, and also is not motivated by or concerned with the
prospective client's specific existing legal problem of which the lawyer is aware;

(3) if the lawyer's use of the communication to secure professional employment was not
significantly motivated by a desire for, or by the possibility of obtaining, pecuniary gain; or

(4) that is requested by the prospective client.

Comment:

1. Rule 7.03 deals with in-person, telephone, and other prohibited electronic contact between a lawyer
and a prospective client wherein the lawyer seeks professional employment. Rule 7.04 deals with
advertisements in the public media by a lawyer seeking professional employment. This Rule deals with
solicitations between a lawyer and a prospective client. Typical examples are letters or other forms of
correspondence (including those sent, delivered, or transmitted electronically), recorded telephone
messages, audiotapes, videotapes, digital media, and the like, addressed to a prospective client.

2. Written, audio, audio-visual, and other forms of electronic solicitations raise more concerns than do
comparable advertisements. Being private, they are more difficult to monitor, and for that reason
paragraph (e) requires retention for four years of certain information regarding all such solicitations. See
also Rule 7.07(a). Paragraph (a) addresses such concerns as well as problems stemming from
exceptionally outrageous communications such as solicitations involving fraud, intimidation, or deceptive
and misleading claims. Because receipt of multiple solicitations appears to be most pronounced and
vexatious in situations involving accident victims, paragraphs (b)(1), (b)(2), (c)(1), (c)(4) and (c)(5) require
that the envelope or other packaging used to transmit the communication, as well as the communication
itself, plainly disclose that the communication is an advertisement, while paragraphs (b)(5) and (c)(3)
require disclosure of the source of information if the solicitation was prompted by a specific occurrence.

3. Because experience has shown that many written, audio, audio-visual, electronic mail, and other forms
of electronic solicitations have been intrusive or misleading by reason of being personalized or being
disguised as some form of official communication, special prohibitions against such practices are
necessary. The requirements of paragraph (b) and (c) greatly lessen those dangers of deception and
harassment.

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4. Newsletters or other works published by a lawyer that are not circulated for the purpose of obtaining
professional employment are not within the ambit of paragraph (b) or (c).

5. This Rule also regulates audio, audio-visual, or other forms of electronic communications being used
to solicit business. It includes such formats as recorded telephone messages, movies, audio or audio-
visual recordings or tapes, digital media, the Internet, and other comparable forms of electronic
communications. It requires that such communications comply with all of the substantive requirements
applicable to written solicitations that are compatible with the different forms of media involved, as well
as with all requirements related to approval of the communications and retention of records concerning
them. See paragraphs (c), (d), and (e).

6. In addition to addressing these special problems posed by solicitations, Rule 7.05 regulates the content
of those communications. It does so by incorporating the standards of Rule 7.02 and those of Rule 7.04
that would apply to the solicitation were it instead a comparable form of advertisement in the public
media. See paragraphs (a)(2) and (3). In brief, this approach means that, except as provided in paragraph
(f), a lawyer may not include or omit anything from a solicitation unless the lawyer could do so were the
communication a comparable form of advertisement in the public media.

7. Paragraph (f) provides that the restrictions in paragraph (b) and (c) do not apply in certain situations
because the dangers of deception, harassment, vexation and overreaching are quite low. For example, a
written solicitation may be directed to a family member or a present or a former client, or in response to
a request by a prospective client without stating that it is an advertisement. Similarly, a written solicitation
may be used in seeking general employment in commercial matters from a bank or other corporation,
when there is neither concern with specific existing legal problems nor concern with a particular past
event or series of events. All such communications, however, remain subject to Rule 7.02 and paragraphs
(h) through (o) of Rule 7.04. See sub-paragraph (a)(2).

8. In addition, paragraph (f) allows such communications in situations not involving the lawyer's pecuniary
gain. For purposes of these rules, it is presumed that communications made on behalf of a nonprofit
legal aid agency, union, or other qualified nonprofit organization are not motivated by a desire for, or by
the possibility of obtaining, pecuniary gain, but that presumption may be rebutted.

Rule 7.06. Prohibited Employment

(a) A lawyer shall not accept or continue employment in a matter when that employment was procured
by conduct prohibited by any of Rules 7.01 through 7.05, 8.04(a)(2), or 8.04(a)(9), engaged in by that
lawyer personally or by any other person whom the lawyer ordered, encouraged, or knowingly permitted
to engage in such conduct.

(b) A lawyer shall not accept or continue employment in a matter when the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know that employment was procured by conduct prohibited by any of Rules 7.01 through 7.05,
8.04(a)(2), or 8.04(a)(9), engaged in by any other person or entity that is a shareholder, partner, or
member of, an associate in, or of counsel to that lawyer's firm; or by any other person whom any of the
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foregoing persons or entities ordered, encouraged, or knowingly permitted to engage in such conduct.

(c) A lawyer who has not violated paragraph (a) or (b) in accepting employment in a matter shall not
continue employment in that matter once the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person
procuring the lawyer's employment in the matter engaged in, or ordered, encouraged, or knowingly
permitted another to engage in, conduct prohibited by any of Rules 7.01 through 7.05, 8.04(a)(2), or
8.04(a)(9) in connection with the matter unless nothing of value is given thereafter in return for that
employment.

Comment:

Selection of a lawyer by a client often is a result of the advice and recommendation of third parties--
relatives, friends, acquaintances, business associates, and other lawyers. Although that method of referral
is perfectly legitimate, the client is best served if the recommendation is disinterested and informed. All
lawyers must guard against creating situations where referral from others is the consequence of some
form of prohibited compensation or from some form of false or misleading communication, or by virtue
of some other violation of any of Rules 7.01 through 7.05, 8.04(a)(2), or 8.04(a)(9). Paragraph (a) forbids
a lawyer who violated these rules in procuring employment in a matter from accepting or continuing
employment in that matter. This prohibition also applies if the lawyer ordered, encouraged, or knowingly
permitted another to violate these rules. Paragraph (b) also forbids a lawyer from accepting or continuing
employment in a matter if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that a member or employee of
his or her firm or any other person has procured employment in a matter as a result of conduct that
violates these rules. Paragraph (c) addresses the situation where the lawyer becomes aware that the matter
was procured in violation of these rules by an attorney or individual, but had no culpability. In such
circumstances, the lawyer may continue employment and collect a fee in the matter as long as nothing of
value is given to the attorney or individual involved in the violation of the rule(s). See also Rule 7.03(d),
forbidding a lawyer to charge or collect a fee where the misconduct involves violations of Rule 7.03(a),
(b), or (c).

Rule 7.07. Filing Requirements for Public Advertisements and Written, Recorded, Electronic, or
Other Digital Solicitations

(a) Except as provided in paragraphs (c) and (e) of this Rule, a lawyer shall file with the Advertising
Review Committee of the State Bar of Texas, no later than the mailing or sending by any means, including
electronic, of a written, audio, audio-visual, digital or other electronic solicitation communication:

(1) a copy of the written, audio, audio-visual, digital, or other electronic solicitation
communication being sent or to be sent to one or more prospective clients for the purpose of
obtaining professional employment, together with a representative sample of the envelopes or
other packaging in which the communications are enclosed;

(2) a completed lawyer advertising and solicitation communication application form; and

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 (3) a check or money order payable to the State Bar of Texas for the fee set by the Board of
Directors. Such fee shall be for the sole purpose of defraying the expense of enforcing the rules
related to such solicitations.

(b) Except as provided in paragraph (e) of this Rule, a lawyer shall file with the Advertising Review
Committee of the State Bar of Texas, no later than the first dissemination of an advertisement in the
public media, a copy of each of the lawyer's advertisements in the public media. The filing shall include:

(1) a copy of the advertisement in the form in which it appears or will appear upon dissemination,
such as a videotape, audiotape, DVD, CD, a print copy, or a photograph of outdoor advertising;

(2) a production script of the advertisement setting forth all words used and describing in detail
the actions, events, scenes, and background sounds used in such advertisement together with a
listing of the names and addresses of persons portrayed or heard to speak, if the advertisement is
in or will be in a form in which the advertised message is not fully revealed by a print copy or
photograph;

(3) a statement of when and where the advertisement has been, is, or will be used;

(4) a completed lawyer advertising and solicitation communication application form; and

(5) a check or money order payable to the State Bar of Texas for the fee set by the Board of
Directors. Such fee shall be for the sole purpose of defraying the expense of enforcing the rules
related to such advertisements.

(c) Except as provided in paragraph (e) of this Rule, a lawyer shall file with the Advertising Review
Committee of the State Bar of Texas no later than its first posting on the internet or other comparable
network of computers information concerning the lawyer's or lawyer's firm's website. As used in this Rule,
a “website” means a single or multiple page file, posted on a computer server, which describes a lawyer
or law firm's practice or qualifications, to which public access is provided through publication of a
uniform resource locator (URL). The filing shall include:

(1) the intended initial access page of a website;

(2) a completed lawyer advertising and solicitation communication application form; and

(3) a check or money order payable to the State Bar of Texas for the fee set by the Board of
Directors. Such fee shall be set for the sole purpose of defraying the expense of enforcing the
rules related to such websites,

(d) A lawyer who desires to secure an advance advisory opinion, referred to as a request for pre-approval,
concerning compliance of a contemplated solicitation communication or advertisement may submit to
the Advertising Review Committee, not less than thirty (30) days prior to the date of first dissemination,
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the material specified in paragraph (a) or (b), or the intended initial access page submitted pursuant to
paragraph (c), including the application form and required fee; provided however, it shall not be
necessary to submit a videotape or DVD if the videotape or DVD has not then been prepared and the
production script submitted reflects in detail and accurately the actions, events, scenes, and background
sounds that will be depicted or contained on such videotapes or DVDs, when prepared, as well as the
narrative transcript of the verbal and printed portions of such advertisement. If a lawyer submits an
advertisement or solicitation communication for pre-approval, a finding of noncompliance by the
Advertising Review Committee is not binding in a disciplinary proceeding or disciplinary action but a
finding of compliance is binding in favor of the submitting lawyer as to all materials actually submitted
for pre-approval if the representations, statements, materials, facts and written assurances received in
connection therewith are true and are not misleading. The finding of compliance constitutes admissible
evidence if offered by a party.

(e) The filing requirements of paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) do not extend to any of the following materials,
provided those materials comply with Rule 7.02(a) through (c) and, where applicable, Rule 7.04(a)
through (c):

(1) an advertisement in the public media that contains only part or all of the following information:

(i) the name of the lawyer or firm and lawyers associated with the firm, with office
addresses, electronic addresses, telephone numbers, office and telephone service hours,
telecopier numbers, and a designation of the profession such as “attorney”, “lawyer”, “law
office”, or “firm;”

(ii) the particular areas of law in which the lawyer or firm specializes or possesses special
competence;

(iii) the particular areas of law in which the lawyer or firm practices or concentrates or to
which it limits its practice;

(iv) the date of admission of the lawyer or lawyers to the State Bar of Texas, to particular
federal courts, and to the bars of other jurisdictions;

(v) technical and professional licenses granted by this state and other recognized licensing
authorities;

(vi) foreign language ability;

(vii) fields of law in which one or more lawyers are certified or designated, provided the
statement of this information is in compliance with Rule 7.02(a) through (c).

(viii) identification of prepaid or group legal service plans in which the lawyer participates;

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 (ix) the acceptance or nonacceptance of credit cards;

(x) any fee for initial consultation and fee schedule;

(xi) other publicly available information concerning legal issues, not prepared or paid for
by the firm or any of its lawyers, such as news articles, legal articles, editorial opinions, or
other legal developments or events, such as proposed or enacted rules, regulations, or
legislation;

(xii) in the case of a website, links to other websites;

(xiii) that the lawyer or firm is a sponsor of a charitable, civic, or community program or
event, or is a sponsor of a public service announcement;

(xiv) any disclosure or statement required by these rules; and

(xv) any other information specified from time to time in orders promulgated by the
Supreme Court of Texas;

(2) an advertisement in the public media that:

(i) identifies one or more lawyers or a firm as a contributor to a specified charity or as a

sponsor of a specified charitable, community, or public interest program, activity, or event;
and

(ii) contains no information about the lawyers or firm other than names of the lawyers or
firm or both, location of the law offices, and the fact of the sponsorship or contribution;

(3) a listing or entry in a regularly published law list;

(4) an announcement card stating new or changed associations, new offices, or similar changes
relating to a lawyer or firm, or a tombstone professional card;

(5) in the case of communications sent, delivered, or transmitted to, rather than accessed by,
intended recipients, a newsletter, whether written, digital, or electronic, provided that it is sent,
delivered, or transmitted only to:

(i) existing or former clients;

(ii) other lawyers or professionals; or

(iii) members of a nonprofit organization that meets the following conditions: the primary
purposes of the organization do not include the rendition of legal services; the
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 recommending, furnishing, paying for, or educating persons regarding legal services is
incidental and reasonably related to the primary purposes of the organization; the
organization does not derive a financial benefit from the rendition of legal services by a
lawyer; and the person for whom the legal services are rendered, and not the organization,
is recognized as the client of the lawyer who is recommended, furnished, or paid by the
organization;

(6) a solicitation communication that is not motivated by or concerned with a particular past
occurrence or event or a particular series of past occurrences or events, and also is not motivated
by or concerned with the prospective client's specific existing legal problem of which the lawyer
is aware;

(7) a solicitation communication if the lawyer's use of the communication to secure professional
employment was not significantly motivated by a desire for, or by the possibility of obtaining,
pecuniary gain; or

(8) a solicitation communication that is requested by the prospective client.

(f) if requested by the Advertising Review Committee, a lawyer shall promptly submit information to
substantiate statements or representations made or implied in any advertisement in the public media or
solicitation communication by which the lawyer seeks paid professional employment.

Comment:

1. Rule 7.07 covers the filing requirements for public media advertisements (see Rule 7.04) and written,
recorded, or other electronic solicitations (see Rule 7.05). Rule 7.07(a) deals with solicitation
communication sent by a lawyer to one or more specified prospective clients. Rule 7.07(b) deals with
advertisements in the public media. Rule 7.07(c) deals with websites. Although websites are a form of
advertisement in the public media, they require different treatment in some respects and so are dealt
with separately. Each provision allows the Bar to charge a fee for reviewing submitted materials, but
requires that fee be set solely to defray the expenses of enforcing those provisions.

2. Copies of non-exempt solicitations communication or advertisements in public media (including

websites) must be provided to the Advertising Review Committee of the State Bar of Texas either in
advance or concurrently with dissemination, together with the fee required by the State Bar of Texas
Board of Directors. Presumably, the Advertising Review Committee will report to the appropriate
grievance committee any lawyer whom it finds from the reviewed products has disseminated an
advertisement in the public media or solicitation communication that violates Rules 7.02, 7.03, 7.04, or
7.05, or, at a minimum, any lawyer whose violation raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects. See Rule 8.03(a).

3. Paragraph (a) does not require that a lawyer submit a copy of each and every written solicitation letter
a lawyer sends. If the same form letter is sent to several people, only a representative sample of each
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form letter, along with a representative sample of the envelopes used to mail the letters, need be filed.

4. A lawyer wishing to do so may secure an advisory opinion from the Advertising Review Committee
concerning any proposed advertisement in the public media (including a website) or any solicitation
communication in advance of its first use or dissemination by complying with Rule 7.07(d). This
procedure is intended as a service to those lawyers who want to resolve any possible doubts about their
proposed advertisements' or solicitations' compliance with these Rules before utilizing them. Its use is
purely optional. No lawyer is required to obtain advance clearance of any advertisement in the public
media (including a website) or any solicitation communication from the State Bar. Although a finding of
noncompliance by the Advertising Review Committee is not binding in a disciplinary proceeding, a
finding of compliance is binding in favor of the submitting lawyer as to all materials actually submitted
for review, as long as the lawyer's presentation to the Advertising Review Committee in connection with
that advisory opinion is true and not misleading.

5. Under its Internal Rules and Operating Procedures, the Advertising Review Committee is to complete
its evaluations no later than 25 days after the date of receipt of a filing. The only way that the Committee
can extend that review period is to: (1) determine that there is reasonable doubt whether the
advertisement or solicitation communication complies with these Rules; (2) conclude that further
examination is warranted but cannot be completed within the 25-day period; and (3) advise the lawyer of
those determinations in writing within that 25 day period. The Committee's Internal Rules and Operating
Procedures also provide that a failure to send such a communication to the lawyer within the 25-day
period constitutes approval of the advertisement or solicitation communication. Consequently, if an
attorney submits an advertisement in the public media (including a website) or a solicitation
communication to the Committee for advance approval not less than 30 days prior to the date of first
dissemination as required by these Rules, the attorney will receive an assessment of that advertisement
or communication before the date of its first intended use.

6. Consistent with the effort to protect the first amendment rights of lawyers while ensuring the right of
the public to be free from misleading advertising and the right of the Texas legal profession to maintain
its integrity, paragraph (e) exempts certain types of advertisements and solicitation communications
prepared for the purpose of seeking paid professional employment from the filing requirements of
paragraphs (a), (b), and (c). Those types of communications need not be filed at all if they were not
prepared to secure paid professional employment.

7. For the most part, the types of exempted advertising listed in sub-paragraphs (e)(1) to (e)(5) are
objective and less likely to result in false, misleading or fraudulent content. Similarly the types of
exempted solicitation communications listed in sub-paragraphs (e)(6) to (e)(8) are those found least likely
to result in harm to the public. See Rule 7.05(f), and comment 7 to Rule 7.05. The fact that a particular
advertisement or solicitation made by a lawyer is exempted from the filing requirements of this Rule does
not exempt a lawyer from the other applicable obligations of these Rules. See generally Rules 7.01
through 7.06.

8. Paragraph (f) does not empower the Advertising Review Committee to seek information from a lawyer
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to substantiate statements or representations made or implied in advertisements or written
communications that do not seek to obtain paid professional employment for that lawyer.

VIII. MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF THE PROFESSION

Rule 8.01. Bar Admission, Reinstatement, and Disciplinary Matters

An applicant for admission to the bar, a petitioner for reinstatement to the bar, or a lawyer in connection
with a bar admission application, a petition for reinstatement, or a disciplinary matter, shall not:

(a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or

(b) fail to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail
to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admission, reinstatement, or disciplinary
authority, except that this rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule
1.05.

Comment:

1. The duty imposed by this Rule extends to persons seeking admission or reinstatement to the bar as
well as to lawyers. Hence, if a person makes a material false statement in connection with an application
for admission or a petition for reinstatement, it may be the basis for subsequent disciplinary action if the
person is admitted or reinstated, and in any event may be relevant in any subsequent application for
admission or petition for reinstatement. The duty imposed by this Rule applies to a lawyer's own
admission, reinstatement or discipline as well as that of others. Thus, for example, it is a separate
professional offense for a lawyer to knowingly make a material misrepresentation or omission in
connection with a disciplinary investigation of the lawyer's own conduct. Likewise, it is a separate
professional offense for a lawyer to fail to respond to a lawful demand for information of a disciplinary
authority inquiring into that lawyer's professional activities or conduct. Cf. State Bar Rules, art. X, sec.
7(4). This Rule also requires affirmative clarification of any misunderstanding on the part of the
admissions, reinstatement or disciplinary authority of which the person involved becomes aware.

2. This Rule is subject to the provisions of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
corresponding provisions of Article 1, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution. A person relying on such a
provision in response to a specific question or more general demand for information, however, should
do so openly and not use the right of nondisclosure as an unasserted justification for failure to comply
with this Rule. Cf. State Bar Rules, art. X, sec. 7(4).

3. A lawyer representing an applicant for admission or petitioner for reinstatement to the bar, or
representing a lawyer who is the subject of a disciplinary inquiry or proceeding, is governed by the rules
applicable to the client-lawyer relationship, including those concerning the confidentiality of attorney-
client communications. If such communications are protected under Rule 1.05, the lawyer need not and
should not disclose them under this Rule. See also Rule 8.03(c).
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Rule 8.02. Judicial and Legal Officials

(a) A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to
its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory official or public legal
officer, or of a candidate for election or appointment to judicial or legal office.

(b) A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office shall comply with the applicable provisions of the Texas
Code of Judicial Conduct.

(c) A lawyer who is a candidate for an elective public office shall comply with the applicable provisions
of the Texas Election Code.

Comment:

1. Assessments by lawyers are relied on in evaluating the professional or personal fitness of persons being
considered for election or appointment to judicial office and to public legal offices, such as attorney
general, prosecuting attorney and public defender. Expressing honest and candid opinions on such
matters contributes to improving the administration of justice. Conversely, false statements by a lawyer
can unfairly undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

2. When a lawyer seeks judicial or other elective public office, the lawyer should be bound by applicable
limitations on political activity.

3. To maintain the fair and independent administration of justice, lawyers are encouraged to continue
traditional efforts to defend judges and courts unjustly criticized.

Rule 8.03. Reporting Professional Misconduct

(a) Except as permitted in paragraphs (c) or (d), a lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has
committed a violation of applicable rules of professional conduct that raises a substantial question
as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform
the appropriate disciplinary authority.

(b) Except as permitted in paragraphs (c) or (d), a lawyer having knowledge that a judge has
committed a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct that raises a substantial question as
to the judge’s fitness for office shall inform the appropriate authority.

(c) A lawyer having knowledge or suspecting that another lawyer or judge whose conduct the lawyer
is required to report pursuant to paragraphs (a) or (b) of this Rule is impaired by chemical
dependency on alcohol or drugs or by mental illness may report that person to an approved peer
assistance program rather than to an appropriate disciplinary authority. If a lawyer elects that
option, the lawyer’s report to the approved peer assistance program shall disclose any disciplinary
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 violations that the reporting lawyer would otherwise have to disclose to the authorities referred to
in paragraphs (a) and (b).

(d) This rule does not require disclosure of knowledge or information otherwise protected as
confidential information:

(1) by Rule 1.05 or

(2) by any statutory or regulatory provisions applicable to the counseling activities of the
approved peer assistance program.

(e) A lawyer who has been convicted or placed on probation, with or without an adjudication of guilt,
by any court for barratry, any felony, or for a misdemeanor involving theft, embezzlement, or
fraudulent or reckless misappropriation of money or other property—including a conviction or
sentence of probation for attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation—must notify the chief disciplinary
counsel within 30 days of the date of the order or judgment. The notice must include a copy of
the order or judgment.

(f) A lawyer who has been disciplined by the attorney-regulatory agency of another jurisdiction must
notify the chief disciplinary counsel within 30 days of the date of the order or judgment. The
notice must include a copy of the order or judgment.

Comment:

1. Self-regulation of the legal profession requires that members of the profession initiate disciplinary
investigations when they have knowledge not protected by Rule 1.05 that a violation of these rules
has occurred. Lawyers have a similar obligation with respect to judicial misconduct. Frequently,
the existence of a violation cannot be established with certainty until a disciplinary investigation
has been undertaken. Similarly, an apparently isolated violation may indicate a pattern of
misconduct that only a disciplinary investigation can uncover. Consequently, a lawyer should not
fail to report an apparent disciplinary violation merely because he cannot determine its existence
or scope with absolute certainty. Reporting a violation is especially important where the victim is
unlikely to discover the offense.

2. It should be noted that this Rule describes only those disciplinary violations that must be revealed
by the disclosing lawyer in order to avoid violating these rules himself. It is not intended to, nor
does it, limit those actual or suspected violations that a lawyer may report. However, if a lawyer
were obliged to report every violation of these rules, the failure to report any violation would itself
be a professional offense. Such a requirement existed in many jurisdictions but proved to be
unenforceable. This Rule limits the reporting obligation to those offenses that a self-regulating
profession must vigorously endeavor to prevent. A measure of judgment is, therefore, required
in complying with the provisions of this Rule. Similar considerations apply to the reporting of
judicial misconduct. The term “substantial” refers to the seriousness of the possible offense and
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 not the quantum of evidence of which the lawyer is aware. The term “fitness” has the meanings
ascribed to it in the Terminology provisions of these Rules.

3. A report of professional misconduct by a lawyer should be made and processed in accordance

with Article X of the State Bar Rules. A lawyer need not report misconduct where the report
would involve a violation of Rule 1.05. However, a lawyer should encourage a client to consent
to disclosure where prosecution of the violation would not substantially prejudice the client's
interests. Likewise, the duty to report professional misconduct does not apply to a lawyer retained
to represent a lawyer whose past professional conduct is in question. Such a situation is governed
by the rules applicable to the client-lawyer relationship.

4. Paragraphs (e) and (f) are added under section 81.081 of the Government Code.

Rule 8.04. Misconduct

(a) A lawyer shall not:

(1) violate these rules, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts
of another, whether or not the violation occurred in the course of a client-lawyer
relationship;

(2) commit a serious crime or commit any other criminal act that reflects adversely on the
lawyers honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;

(3) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;

(4) engage in conduct constituting obstruction of justice;

(5) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official;

(6) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules
of judicial conduct or other law;

(7) violate any disciplinary or disability order or judgment;

(8) fail to timely furnish to the Chief Disciplinary Counsels office or a district grievance
committee a response or other information as required by the Texas Rules of Disciplinary
Procedure, unless he or she in good faith timely asserts a privilege or other legal ground
for failure to do so;

(9) engage in conduct that constitutes barratry as defined by the law of this state;

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 (10) fail to comply with section 13.01 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure relating to
notification of an attorneys cessation of practice;

(11) engage in the practice of law when the lawyer is on inactive status, except as permitted by
section 81.053 of the Government Code and Article XIII of the State Bar Rules, or when
the lawyers right to practice has been suspended or terminated, including, but not limited
to, situations where a lawyer’s right to practice has been administratively suspended for
failure to timely pay required fees or assessments or for failure to comply with Article XII
of the State Bar Rules relating to Mandatory Continuing Legal Education; or

(12) violate any other laws of this state relating to the professional conduct of lawyers and to
the practice of law.

(b) As used in subsection (a)(2) of this Rule, “serious crime” means barratry; any felony involving
moral turpitude; any misdemeanor involving theft, embezzlement, or fraudulent or reckless
misappropriation of money or other property; or any attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation of another to
commit any of the foregoing crimes.

Comment:

1. There are four principal sources of professional obligations for lawyers in Texas: these rules, the
State Bar Act, the State Bar Rules, and the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure (TRDP). All
lawyers are presumed to know the requirements of these sources. Rule 8.04(a)(1) provides a
partial list of conduct that will subject a lawyer to discipline.

2. Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law. However, some kinds
of offenses carry no such implication. Traditionally in this state, the distinction has been drawn
in terms of those crimes subjecting a lawyer to compulsory discipline, criminal acts relevant to a
lawyer’s fitness for the practice of law, and other offenses. Crimes subject to compulsory discipline
are governed by TRDP, Part VIII. In addition, although a lawyer is personally answerable to the
entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for criminal acts that
indicate a lack of those characteristics relevant to the lawyer’s fitness for the practice of law. A
pattern of repeated criminal acts, even ones of minor significance when considered separately,
can indicate indifference to legal obligations that legitimately could call a lawyer’s overall fitness
to practice into question. See TRDP, Part VIII; Rule 8.04(a)(2).

3. A lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by law upon a good faith belief, openly
asserted, that no valid obligation exists. The provisions of Rule 1.02(c) concerning a good faith
challenge to the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law apply to challenges to legal
regulation of the practice of law.

118
4. Lawyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens.
A lawyer’s abuse of public office can suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of attorney.
The same is true of abuse of positions of private trust.

Rule 8.05. Jurisdiction

(a) A lawyer is subject to the disciplinary authority of this state, if admitted to practice in this state or if
specially admitted by a court of this state for a particular proceeding. In addition to being answerable for
his or her conduct occurring in this state, any such lawyer also may be disciplined here for conduct
occurring in another jurisdiction or resulting in lawyer discipline in another jurisdiction, if it is
professional misconduct under Rule 8.04.

(b) A lawyer admitted to practice in this state is also subject to the disciplinary authority for:

(1) an advertisement in the public media that does not comply with these rules and that is
broadcast or disseminated in another jurisdiction, even if the advertisement complies with the
rules governing lawyer advertisements in that jurisdiction, if the broadcast or dissemination of the
advertisement is intended to be received by prospective clients in this state and is intended to
secure employment to be performed in this state; and

(2) a written solicitation communication that does not comply with these rules and that is mailed
in another jurisdiction, even if the communication complies with the rules governing written
solicitation communications by lawyers in that jurisdiction, if the communication is mailed to an
addressee in this state or is intended to secure employment to be performed in this state.

Comment:

1. This Rule describes those lawyers who are subject to the disciplinary authority of this state. It includes
all lawyers licensed to practice here, as well as lawyers admitted specially for a particular proceeding. This
Rule is not intended to have any effect on the powers of a court to punish lawyers for contempt or for
other breaches of applicable rules of practice or procedure.

2. In modern practice lawyers licensed in Texas frequently act outside the territorial limits or judicial
system of this state. In doing so, they remain subject to the governing authority of this state. If their activity
in another jurisdiction is substantial and continuous, it may constitute the practice of law in that
jurisdiction. See Rule 5.05.

3. If the rules of professional conduct of this state and that other jurisdiction differ, principles of conflict
of laws may apply. Similar problems can arise when a lawyer is licensed to practice in more than one
jurisdiction and these jurisdictions impose conflicting obligations. A related problem arises with respect
to practice before a federal tribunal, where the general authority of the state to regulate the practice of
law must be reconciled with such authority as federal tribunals may have to regulate practice before them.
In such cases, this state will not impose discipline for conduct arising in connection with the practice of
119
law in another jurisdiction or resulting in lawyer discipline in another jurisdiction unless that conduct
constitutes professional misconduct under Rule 8.04.

4. Normally, discipline will not be imposed in this state for conduct occurring solely in another
jurisdiction or judicial system and authorized by the rules of professional conduct applicable thereto,
even if that conduct would violate these Rules.

IX. SEVERABILITY OF RULES

Rule 9.01. Severability

If any provision of these rules or any application of these rules to any person or circumstances is held
invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provision or application of these rules that can be given
effect without the invalid provision or application and, to this end, the provisions of these rules are
severable.

Comment:

The history of the regulation of American lawyers is replete with challenges to various rules on grounds
of unconstitutionality. Because many of these Rules, particularly those in Article VII, are interrelated to
an extent, the voiding of a particular rule or of a single provision in a rule could raise questions as to
whether other provisions should survive. Rule 9.01 makes it clear that these Rules should be construed
so as to minimize the effect of a determination that a particular application or provision of them is
unconstitutional. The process of amending the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct is
unusually difficult and time consuming and a decision invalidating one provision or application of a rule
should not be expanded unnecessarily so as to invalidate other provisions or applications. These
Disciplinary Rules have the specificity found in statutes, and it is appropriate for Rule 9.01 to contain a
provision, frequently found in legislation, that reasonably limits the effect of the invalidity of one
provision or one application of a rule.

120
 Exhibit D13
Nina Nixon-Mendez
Resignation Letter
February 12, 2018
 Exhibit D14
Email to Kelly Kuenstler from
Catherine Rodriguez
December 18, 2018
 Exhibit D15
Kelly Kuenstler Email to Mayor Riley
and Benny Martinez
December 19, 2018
 Exhibit D16
Email
Brandon Melland Grievance
 Exhibit D17
Salvaggio Email to
Mayor Riley and Kelly Kuenstler
December 20, 2018
 Exhibit D18
Email Exchange
Roxann Cotroneo
 Exhibit D19
Yvonne Acuna Complaint
December 2, 2019
 Exhibit D20
Email of Officer Breton and Azar
Complaints
January 2, 2019
 Exhibit D21
Letter from District Attorney’s Office
to Leon Valley
May 14, 2018
 Exhibit D22
Ryan Henry’s Factual Report
March 15, 2019
 Exhibit D23
Check Reconciliation Register
Council Agenda Packet
November 19, 2019
11/04/2019 9:32 AM CHECK RECONCILIATION REGISTER PAGE: 1
COMPANY: 999 - Pooled Cash CHECK DATE: 10/01/2019 THRU 1
2.2.b
ACCOUNT: 112010 Pooled Cash CLEAR DATE: 0/00/0000 THRU 9
TYPE: Check STATEMENT: 0/00/0000 THRU 99/99/9999
STATUS: All VOIDED DATE: 0/00/0000 THRU 99/99/999
FOLIO: A AMOUNT: 0.00 THRU 999,999,999.9
CHECK NUMBER: 000000 THRU 99999

ACCOUNT --DATE-- --TYPE-- NUMBER ---------DESCRIPTION---------- ----AMOUNT--- STATUS FOLIO CLEAR DATE

CHECK: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087027 HENRY LOPEZ 1,400.00CR CLEARED A 10/14/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087028 ALAMO TRUCK GEAR 812.50CR CLEARED A 10/05/2019

Attachment: October 2019 Check Register (Monthly Financial Report Ending October 31, 2019)
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087029 ALERT-ALL 574.00CR CLEARED A 10/08/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087030 AMIGOS LIBRARY SERVICES 1,938.20CR CLEARED A 10/08/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087031 AT&T LONG DISTANCE 3.06CR CLEARED A 10/09/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087032 AUTO DATA DIRECT FINANCIAL SER 3,500.00CR CLEARED A 10/10/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087033 AUTOWORKS, INC. 43.08CR CLEARED A 10/14/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087034 BOUND TREE MEDICAL, LLC 2,011.61CR CLEARED A 10/08/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087035 CASSANDRA PEREZ 75.00CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087036 CINTAS CORPORATION NO. 2 1,223.45CR CLEARED A 10/08/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087037 CLARK CONSTRUCTION OF TEXAS, I 191,224.80CR CLEARED A 10/08/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087038 CITY OF LEON VALLEY-PETTY 287.97CR CLEARED A 10/05/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087039 VOID CHECK 0.00 CLEARED A 10/03/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087040 CORE & MAIN LP 361.60CR CLEARED A 10/14/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087041 CRYSTAL MANN 250.00CR CLEARED A 10/08/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087042 DALE MANESS 1,500.00CR CLEARED A 10/14/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087043 DEWINNE EQUIPMENT CO, INC 225.00CR CLEARED A 10/09/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087044 DIGITAL COMBUSTION, INC. 973.00CR CLEARED A 10/10/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087045 GALLS, LLC 22.99CR CLEARED A 10/08/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087046 GEAR CLEANING SOLUTIONS, LLC 272.97CR CLEARED A 10/05/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087047 GRAINGER INC 111.29CR CLEARED A 10/09/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087048 HERITAGE-CRYSTAL CLEAN, INC 133.96CR CLEARED A 10/08/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087049 INGRAM LIBRARY SERVICES LLC 150.43CR CLEARED A 10/08/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087050 JOHNSTONE SUPPLY OF SAN ANTONI 26.42CR CLEARED A 10/05/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087051 JRO ELECTRICAL SERVICES LLC. 500.00CR CLEARED A 10/08/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087052 LEON VALLEY WATER SYSTEM 361.79CR CLEARED A 10/05/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087053 LESLIE ANN KASSAHN 1,200.00CR CLEARED A 10/21/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087054 LINEBARGER GOGGAN BLAIR & SAMP 7,887.76CR CLEARED A 10/05/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087055 MARTIN MARIETTA MATERIALS 168.17CR CLEARED A 10/08/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087056 PHYSIO-CONTROL, INC 1,753.80CR CLEARED A 10/08/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087057 WALLGREN ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICE 312.00CR CLEARED A 10/08/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087058 RHONDA HEWITT 280.70CR CLEARED A 10/05/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087059 RL JONES 30,630.60CR CLEARED A 10/14/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087060 SAN ANTONIO POOL MANAGEMENT, I 2,874.00CR CLEARED A 10/14/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087061 STAPLES BUSINESS CREDIT 12.00CR CLEARED A 10/09/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087062 STONE & SOIL DEPOT, INC 423.70CR CLEARED A 10/08/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087063 SWANK MOTION PICTURES INC DBA 609.00CR CLEARED A 10/08/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087064 TIME WARNER CABLE 1,236.08CR CLEARED A 10/10/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087065 TOSA BLANKS & MORE INC 480.00CR CLEARED A 10/09/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087066 VALLANCE SECURITY SYSTEMS, INC 126.50CR CLEARED A 10/08/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087067 VERONICA IBARRA 50.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087068 VULCAN CONSTUCTION MATERIALS, 439.45CR CLEARED A 10/08/2019
112010 10/03/2019 CHECK 087069 Z-RIDERS INC 2,799.00CR CLEARED A 10/14/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087070 BB INSPECTION SERVICES, LLC 6,435.00CR CLEARED A 10/24/2019

Packet Pg. 14
11/04/2019 9:32 AM CHECK RECONCILIATION REGISTER PAGE: 2
COMPANY: 999 - Pooled Cash CHECK DATE: 10/01/2019 THRU 1
2.2.b
ACCOUNT: 112010 Pooled Cash CLEAR DATE: 0/00/0000 THRU 9
TYPE: Check STATEMENT: 0/00/0000 THRU 99/99/9999
STATUS: All VOIDED DATE: 0/00/0000 THRU 99/99/999
FOLIO: A AMOUNT: 0.00 THRU 999,999,999.9
CHECK NUMBER: 000000 THRU 99999

ACCOUNT --DATE-- --TYPE-- NUMBER ---------DESCRIPTION---------- ----AMOUNT--- STATUS FOLIO CLEAR DATE

CHECK: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087071 BEST BUY BUSINESS ADVANTAGE AC 131.92CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087072 INGRAM LIBRARY SERVICES LLC 71.97CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019

Attachment: October 2019 Check Register (Monthly Financial Report Ending October 31, 2019)
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087073 KELLY KUENSTLER 171.63CR CLEARED A 10/05/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087074 SHI-GOVERNMENT SOLUTIONS 2,096.01CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087075 ST JOHN BAPTIST CHURCH 1,200.00CR CLEARED A 10/23/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087076 CHANCE BINAGANA 5.00CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087077 GULF COAST PAPER CO INC 517.53CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087078 NGHIA NGUYEN 75.00CR CLEARED A 10/24/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087079 5.11 SATX1 31.49CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087080 ADVANCE AUTO PARTS INC 258.66CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087081 AACOG 160.00CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087082 AT&T 39.28CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087083 AT&T MOBILITY 1,185.11CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087084 AXON ENTERPRISE, INC. 1,700.00CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087085 DONALD R BANIS 8,045.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087086 BARCOM TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS 1,665.00CR CLEARED A 10/14/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087087 BEXAR COUNTY CLERK: CRIME LAB 1,488.00CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087088 CORE & MAIN LP 2,700.00CR CLEARED A 10/21/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087089 DANA SAFETY SUPPLY, INC. 162.33CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087090 DELL MARKETING LP 1,346.99CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087091 DEWINNE EQUIPMENT CO, INC 98.29CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087092 EAGLE FORD GRAPHICS 1,925.00CR CLEARED A 10/14/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087093 EDDIE GONZALES 77.63CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087094 EXPRESS EMPLOYMENT PROFESSIONA 888.00CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087095 FULL FORCE OFF-ROAD 800.00CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087096 GALLS, LLC 10,010.30CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087097 VOID CHECK 0.00 CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087098 VOID CHECK 0.00 CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087099 VOID CHECK 0.00 CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087100 GRAINGER INC 60.10CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087101 ICM 880.00CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087102 JOSEPH SALVAGGIO 96.87CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087103 LAWMEN'S AND SHOOTER'S SUPPLY 1,017.52CR CLEARED A 10/21/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087104 LEA PARK & PLAY 4,848.20CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087105 LONE STAR EMERGENCY GROUP 1,100.00CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087106 MCKESSON MEDICAL-SURGICAL GOVT 1,645.27CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087107 METRO FIRE 2,355.00CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087108 MIKE TACQUARD 25.00CR CLEARED A 10/21/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087109 NAPA SAN ANTONIO AUTO & TRUCK 196.06CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087110 VOID CHECK 0.00 CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087111 NORTHWEST CLEANING SERVICES 1,461.00CR CLEARED A 10/14/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087112 NSTS LLC 68.00CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087113 OFFICE DEPOT BUSINESS SVC 964.60CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087114 PAWS RANCH RESCUE 400.00CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019

Packet Pg. 15
11/04/2019 9:32 AM CHECK RECONCILIATION REGISTER PAGE: 3
COMPANY: 999 - Pooled Cash CHECK DATE: 10/01/2019 THRU 1
2.2.b
ACCOUNT: 112010 Pooled Cash CLEAR DATE: 0/00/0000 THRU 9
TYPE: Check STATEMENT: 0/00/0000 THRU 99/99/9999
STATUS: All VOIDED DATE: 0/00/0000 THRU 99/99/999
FOLIO: A AMOUNT: 0.00 THRU 999,999,999.9
CHECK NUMBER: 000000 THRU 99999

ACCOUNT --DATE-- --TYPE-- NUMBER ---------DESCRIPTION---------- ----AMOUNT--- STATUS FOLIO CLEAR DATE

CHECK: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087115 PENA BROS UPHOLSTERY LLC 552.50CR CLEARED A 10/21/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087116 REALITY DEFENSE INC 400.00CR CLEARED A 10/22/2019

Attachment: October 2019 Check Register (Monthly Financial Report Ending October 31, 2019)
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087117 RED DOOR MULTIMEDIA 400.00CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087118 RUBEN SAUCEDO 3,206.10CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087119 SAWS 136,451.72CR CLEARED A 10/14/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087120 SERVICE UNIFORM RENTAL 282.92CR CLEARED A 10/14/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087121 SHARP ELECTRONICS 91.67CR CLEARED A 10/21/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087122 STEVIE MAC'S DANCE MACHINE 250.00CR CLEARED A 10/24/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087123 STONE & SOIL DEPOT, INC 180.00CR CLEARED A 10/14/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087124 SURE-LOCK AND SAFE 240.00CR CLEARED A 10/14/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087125 SYDNEY DYESS 103.00CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087126 T & W TIRE 2,145.00CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087127 TIME WARNER CABLE 135.65CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087128 TRANSUNION RISK & ALTERNATIVE 153.80CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087129 TRIPLE-S STEEL SUPPLY CO. 496.16CR CLEARED A 10/21/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087130 WELDERS SUPPLY CO INC 78.00CR CLEARED A 10/21/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087131 YP HOLDINGS 135.88CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087132 CULLIGAN WATER CONDITIONING OF 62.10CR CLEARED A 10/14/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087133 DEWINNE EQUIPMENT CO, INC 380.43CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087134 FREEDOM CHURCH 50.00CR CLEARED A 10/21/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087135 GRANICUS, LLC. 458.37CR CLEARED A 10/21/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087136 JOHN H SOROLA INC 19.74CR CLEARED A 10/14/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087137 JOHNSTONE SUPPLY OF SAN ANTONI 342.18CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087138 LAUREN CHAMBERLAIN 25.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087139 SAFESITE, INC 191.25CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/10/2019 CHECK 087140 SEAN GUADARRAMA 25.00CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
*** 112010 10/11/2019 CHECK 087145 ICMA RETIREMENT CORP #301977 3,473.50CR CLEARED A 10/21/2019
112010 10/11/2019 CHECK 087146 LEON VALLEY FD HOUSE FUND 210.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087147 AD-LITE ELECTRIC 200.00CR CLEARED A 10/29/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087148 AMERICAN SIGNAL EQUIPMENT, INC 2,920.00CR CLEARED A 10/28/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087149 ANGEL HERNANDEZ 56.49CR CLEARED A 10/21/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087150 BARCOM TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS 13,500.00CR CLEARED A 10/21/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087151 BLUETARP FINANCIAL 62.99CR CLEARED A 10/22/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087152 BOUND TREE MEDICAL, LLC 1,859.02CR CLEARED A 10/22/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087153 CHRISTINA MONCLOVA 91.50CR CLEARED A 10/21/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087154 CINTAS CORPORATION NO. 2 447.67CR CLEARED A 10/23/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087155 CITIBANK 33,815.55CR CLEARED A 10/22/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087156 VOID CHECK 0.00 CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087157 VOID CHECK 0.00 CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087158 VOID CHECK 0.00 CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087159 VOID CHECK 0.00 CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087160 CLARK CONSTRUCTION OF TEXAS, I 116,460.00CR CLEARED A 10/29/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087161 DENTON NAVARRO ROCHA BERNAL & 2,182.45CR CLEARED A 10/21/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087162 DSHS CENTRAL LAB MC1982 110.24CR CLEARED A 10/23/2019

Packet Pg. 16
11/04/2019 9:32 AM CHECK RECONCILIATION REGISTER PAGE: 4
COMPANY: 999 - Pooled Cash CHECK DATE: 10/01/2019 THRU 1
2.2.b
ACCOUNT: 112010 Pooled Cash CLEAR DATE: 0/00/0000 THRU 9
TYPE: Check STATEMENT: 0/00/0000 THRU 99/99/9999
STATUS: All VOIDED DATE: 0/00/0000 THRU 99/99/999
FOLIO: A AMOUNT: 0.00 THRU 999,999,999.9
CHECK NUMBER: 000000 THRU 99999

ACCOUNT --DATE-- --TYPE-- NUMBER ---------DESCRIPTION---------- ----AMOUNT--- STATUS FOLIO CLEAR DATE

CHECK: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087163 EMERGICON, LLC. 1,794.61CR CLEARED A 10/29/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087164 GALLS, LLC 130.41CR CLEARED A 10/22/2019

Attachment: October 2019 Check Register (Monthly Financial Report Ending October 31, 2019)
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087165 HELOTES ECHO 180.00CR CLEARED A 10/22/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087166 HOME DEPOT CREDIT SERVICES 5,245.43CR CLEARED A 10/23/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087167 VOID CHECK 0.00 CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087168 VOID CHECK 0.00 CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087169 VOID CHECK 0.00 CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087170 VOID CHECK 0.00 CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087171 VOID CHECK 0.00 CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087172 VOID CHECK 0.00 CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087173 VOID CHECK 0.00 CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087174 VOID CHECK 0.00 CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087175 KAREN SEIFFERT 264.65CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087176 KONCEPT SAFETY LLC 90.82CR CLEARED A 10/22/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087177 LAW OFFICES OF RYAN HENRY, PLL 779.00CR CLEARED A 10/30/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087178 LNV, INC. 17,920.00CR CLEARED A 10/22/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087179 VOID CHECK 0.00 CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087180 NEOFUNDS BY NEOPOST 500.00CR CLEARED A 10/28/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087181 NEOPOST INC 2,167.26CR CLEARED A 10/23/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087182 ORKIN COMMERCIAL SERVICES 2,106.00CR CLEARED A 10/30/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087183 RL JONES 30,579.50CR CLEARED A 10/23/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087184 SAN ANTONIO WATER SYSTEM 1,966.03CR CLEARED A 10/21/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087185 SAECO ELECTRIC & UTILITY, 449.35CR CLEARED A 10/28/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087186 SAMS CLUB BRC PLCC 220.12CR CLEARED A 10/24/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087187 VOID CHECK 0.00 CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087188 SAUNDRA PASSAILAIGUE 93.93CR CLEARED A 10/23/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087189 SHARP ELECTRONICS 606.05CR CLEARED A 10/24/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087190 TORMAX USA INC 155.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087191 TYLER TECHNOLOGIES, INC 137.50CR CLEARED A 10/21/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087192 UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC 11.15CR CLEARED A 10/22/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087193 VALERO MARKETING & SUPPLY 6,437.13CR CLEARED A 10/23/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087194 VANESSA DONOVAN 276.25CR CLEARED A 10/21/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087195 ELIZABETH LONGORIA 101.98CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087196 ALTAWORX, LLC 3,503.12CR CLEARED A 10/22/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087197 ANGEL C. HERNANDEZ 87.17CR CLEARED A 10/21/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087198 ANNA MORALES 11.52CR CLEARED A 10/24/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087199 AT&T 478.85CR CLEARED A 10/23/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087200 VOID CHECK 0.00 CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087201 BRAVO EXCAVATION AND CONSTRUCT 16,000.00CR CLEARED A 10/22/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087202 BUEL W. WARD, III 250.00CR CLEARED A 10/23/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087203 CAHTERINE RODRIGUEZ 30.00CR CLEARED A 10/17/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087204 CRYSTAL CALDERA 55.00CR CLEARED A 10/23/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087205 CE SOLUTIONS 1,240.00CR CLEARED A 10/30/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087206 CITIBANK 1,610.30CR CLEARED A 10/23/2019

Packet Pg. 17
11/04/2019 9:32 AM CHECK RECONCILIATION REGISTER PAGE: 5
COMPANY: 999 - Pooled Cash CHECK DATE: 10/01/2019 THRU 1
2.2.b
ACCOUNT: 112010 Pooled Cash CLEAR DATE: 0/00/0000 THRU 9
TYPE: Check STATEMENT: 0/00/0000 THRU 99/99/9999
STATUS: All VOIDED DATE: 0/00/0000 THRU 99/99/999
FOLIO: A AMOUNT: 0.00 THRU 999,999,999.9
CHECK NUMBER: 000000 THRU 99999

ACCOUNT --DATE-- --TYPE-- NUMBER ---------DESCRIPTION---------- ----AMOUNT--- STATUS FOLIO CLEAR DATE

CHECK: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087207 CORE & MAIN LP 3,745.77CR CLEARED A 10/24/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087208 DAVID WANN 75.00CR CLEARED A 10/23/2019

Attachment: October 2019 Check Register (Monthly Financial Report Ending October 31, 2019)
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087209 DEWINNE EQUIPMENT CO, INC 28.72CR CLEARED A 10/29/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087210 EDDIE GONZALES 320.70CR CLEARED A 10/21/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087211 EDWARDS AQUIFER AUTHORITY 1,932.00CR CLEARED A 10/21/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087212 EXPRESS EMPLOYMENT PROFESSIONA 888.00CR CLEARED A 10/22/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087213 GALLS, LLC 245.05CR CLEARED A 10/22/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087214 GRAINGER INC 98.84CR CLEARED A 10/23/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087215 GULF COAST PAPER CO INC 668.46CR CLEARED A 10/22/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087216 IMAGE 360 SAN ANTONIO WEST 173.18CR CLEARED A 10/21/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087217 JOHNSTONE SUPPLY OF SAN ANTONI 327.07CR CLEARED A 10/21/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087218 JRO ELECTRICAL SERVICES LLC. 3,516.00CR CLEARED A 10/22/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087219 KONCEPT SAFETY LLC 100.00CR CLEARED A 10/22/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087220 KELLY KUENSTLER 65.00CR CLEARED A 10/21/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087221 MEDPRO WASTE DISPOSAL, LLC. 65.75CR CLEARED A 10/23/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087222 NAPA SAN ANTONIO AUTO & TRUCK 82.57CR CLEARED A 10/24/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087223 ROBERT KILLEA-JUAREZ 12.00CR CLEARED A 10/28/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087224 SERVICE UNIFORM RENTAL 282.92CR CLEARED A 10/28/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087225 SITEONE LANDSCAPE SUPPLY, LLC 292.95CR CLEARED A 10/28/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087226 SPOK, INC 9.50CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087227 STAPLES BUSINESS CREDIT 1,155.90CR CLEARED A 10/22/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087228 STEPHANIE MERMEA-VERA 75.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087229 STEVEN R MERZ 185.00CR CLEARED A 10/22/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087230 SURE-LOCK AND SAFE 75.00CR CLEARED A 10/21/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087231 T & W TIRE 178.50CR CLEARED A 10/23/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087232 TEXAS REC & PARK SOCIETY 55.00CR CLEARED A 10/28/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087233 TIME WARNER CABLE 115.58CR CLEARED A 10/28/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087234 TIREHUB LLC 852.66CR CLEARED A 10/22/2019
112010 10/17/2019 CHECK 087235 TYLER TECHNOLOGIES, INC 300.00CR CLEARED A 10/21/2019
*** 112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087239 ADIOS PEST CONTROL, LLC 149.00CR CLEARED A 10/31/2019
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087240 ALBERT URESTI, MPA, PCC 7.50CR CLEARED A 11/04/2019
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087241 ANGEL FIRE & SAFETY, LLC 65.00CR CLEARED A 11/04/2019
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087242 ASCO 9.08CR CLEARED A 10/30/2019
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087243 AT&T UVERSE 115.27CR CLEARED A 10/31/2019
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087244 BATTERIES + BULBS SA 17.95CR CLEARED A 11/04/2019
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087245 CAMLER APS 650.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087246 CHRIS ELIZALDE 195.00CR CLEARED A 11/04/2019
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087247 CITYWIDE INVESTIGATIONS & SECU 837.00CR CLEARED A 10/30/2019
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087248 CODE BLUE POLICE SUPPLY 190.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087249 CORE & MAIN LP 2,623.29CR CLEARED A 10/31/2019
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087250 CORRPRO COMPANIES INC 1,065.00CR CLEARED A 10/29/2019
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087251 CITY PUBLIC SERVICE BOARD 22,137.90CR CLEARED A 11/04/2019
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087252 VOID CHECK 0.00 OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087253 DENTON NAVARRO ROCHA BERNAL & 113.34CR CLEARED A 10/30/2019

Packet Pg. 18
11/04/2019 9:32 AM CHECK RECONCILIATION REGISTER PAGE: 6
COMPANY: 999 - Pooled Cash CHECK DATE: 10/01/2019 THRU 1
2.2.b
ACCOUNT: 112010 Pooled Cash CLEAR DATE: 0/00/0000 THRU 9
TYPE: Check STATEMENT: 0/00/0000 THRU 99/99/9999
STATUS: All VOIDED DATE: 0/00/0000 THRU 99/99/999
FOLIO: A AMOUNT: 0.00 THRU 999,999,999.9
CHECK NUMBER: 000000 THRU 99999

ACCOUNT --DATE-- --TYPE-- NUMBER ---------DESCRIPTION---------- ----AMOUNT--- STATUS FOLIO CLEAR DATE

CHECK: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087254 DPC INDUSTRIES, INC 60.00CR CLEARED A 10/30/2019
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087255 ESQUIVEL, PEDRO DAVID II 20.00CR CLEARED A 10/31/2019

Attachment: October 2019 Check Register (Monthly Financial Report Ending October 31, 2019)
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087256 EXPRESS EMPLOYMENT PROFESSIONA 888.00CR CLEARED A 10/29/2019
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087257 GALLS, LLC 122.96CR CLEARED A 10/29/2019
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087258 GRAINGER INC 47.28CR CLEARED A 10/30/2019
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087259 GRANDE TRUCK CENTER 62,427.30CR CLEARED A 10/29/2019
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087260 HELOTES ECHO 55.00CR CLEARED A 10/29/2019
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087261 JOHN ROBERT KUEHL 144.00CR CLEARED A 10/30/2019
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087262 JASON'S DELI 70.03CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087263 LEON VALLEY WATER SYSTEM 1,228.19CR CLEARED A 10/28/2019
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087264 MARIBEL MENDOZA 294.50CR CLEARED A 10/28/2019
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087265 MCCOMBS FORD WEST, INC 100.00CR CLEARED A 10/29/2019
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087266 MEDINA VALLEY SECURITY, INC. 164.85CR CLEARED A 10/30/2019
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087267 MIRELES PARTY ICE 270.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087268 MUSTANG EQUIPMENT 496.27CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087269 NARDIS PUBLIC SAFETY 363.90CR CLEARED A 10/30/2019
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087270 NEARMAP US, INC. 5,000.00CR CLEARED A 10/30/2019
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087271 OFFICE DEPOT BUSINESS SVC 866.75CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087272 VOID CHECK 0.00 OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087273 OMNIBASE SERVICES OF TEXAS 2,463.00CR CLEARED A 10/30/2019
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087274 PETROLEUM TRADERS 1,693.78CR CLEARED A 10/29/2019
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087275 SAUNDRA PASSAILAIGUE 53.85CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087276 SAWS 328.36CR CLEARED A 10/29/2019
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087277 SERVICE UNIFORM RENTAL 271.33CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087278 SOUTHWEST WHEEL 6.52CR CLEARED A 10/30/2019
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087279 STATE COMPTROLLER 714,887.11CR CLEARED A 10/31/2019
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087280 STONE & SOIL DEPOT, INC 144.00CR CLEARED A 10/29/2019
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087281 T & W TIRE 967.95CR CLEARED A 10/31/2019
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087282 TMC PROVIDER GROUP, PLLC 232.00CR CLEARED A 10/30/2019
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087283 TIME WARNER CABLE 137.68CR CLEARED A 11/04/2019
112010 10/24/2019 CHECK 087284 TWC CONSTRUCTION 100.00CR CLEARED A 10/30/2019
112010 10/25/2019 CHECK 087285 ICMA RETIREMENT CORP #301977 28,398.50CR CLEARED A 10/30/2019
112010 10/25/2019 CHECK 087286 LEON VALLEY FD HOUSE FUND 230.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/25/2019 CHECK 087287 Leon Valley Professional Fire 330.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087288 MICHAEL SHOEMAKER 90.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087289 ADVANCE AUTO PARTS INC 89.77CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087290 ARMANDO MONTOYA 175.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087291 ANNA M. VALENZUELA 25.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087292 ASCO 97.35CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087293 AT&T 40.79CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087294 AT&T UVERSE 141.65CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087295 AUTOWORKS, INC. 446.98CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087296 VOID CHECK 0.00 OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087297 STEPHEN J BARSCEWSKI 775.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000

Packet Pg. 19
11/04/2019 9:32 AM CHECK RECONCILIATION REGISTER PAGE: 7
COMPANY: 999 - Pooled Cash CHECK DATE: 10/01/2019 THRU 1
2.2.b
ACCOUNT: 112010 Pooled Cash CLEAR DATE: 0/00/0000 THRU 9
TYPE: Check STATEMENT: 0/00/0000 THRU 99/99/9999
STATUS: All VOIDED DATE: 0/00/0000 THRU 99/99/999
FOLIO: A AMOUNT: 0.00 THRU 999,999,999.9
CHECK NUMBER: 000000 THRU 99999

ACCOUNT --DATE-- --TYPE-- NUMBER ---------DESCRIPTION---------- ----AMOUNT--- STATUS FOLIO CLEAR DATE

CHECK: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087298 BETHEL COVENANT ASMBLY OF GOD 50.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087299 BLUETARP FINANCIAL 1,906.40CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000

Attachment: October 2019 Check Register (Monthly Financial Report Ending October 31, 2019)
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087300 BOUND TREE MEDICAL, LLC 2,408.73CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087301 BRANDY DURAND 75.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087302 C.F. MCDONALD ELECTRIC, INC 18,696.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087303 CANDACE KINCAID 25.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087304 CITYWIDE INVESTIGATIONS & SECU 297.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087305 CORE & MAIN LP 345.84CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087306 ELIZABETH V GONZALEZ 400.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087307 EXPRESS EMPLOYMENT PROFESSIONA 666.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087308 FASTENAL COMPANY INC 17.31CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087309 GEAR CLEANING SOLUTIONS, LLC 34.94CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087310 GRAINGER INC 158.30CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087311 GULF COAST PAPER CO INC 469.51CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087312 HANK STORBECK GARAGE INC 302.50CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087313 HYDRAULIC SPECIALISTS INC 159.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087314 INGRAM LIBRARY SERVICES LLC 601.27CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087315 JRO ELECTRICAL SERVICES LLC. 1,934.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087316 JULIANNA AGUEROS 25.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087317 KONCEPT SAFETY LLC 1,432.08CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087318 VOID CHECK 0.00 OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087319 LEON VALLEY HISTORIC SOCIETY 400.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087320 LEON VALLEY WATER SYSTEM 1,731.70CR CLEARED A 11/04/2019
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087321 LESLIE ANN KASSAHN 1,500.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087322 METRO FIRE 136.70CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087323 MISSION RESTAURANT SUPPLY 368.52CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087324 DRAGO INVESTMENTS LTD 119.60CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087325 LAWRENCE G MORALES 1,950.00CR CLEARED A 11/04/2019
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087326 MOSTY BROS NURSERY INC 670.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087327 MYRNA AGUIRRE 400.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087328 NAPA SAN ANTONIO AUTO & TRUCK 373.95CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087329 NARDIS PUBLIC SAFETY 263.87CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087330 NELDA G RAMIREZ 400.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087331 OFFICE DEPOT BUSINESS SVC 849.44CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087332 VOID CHECK 0.00 OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087333 PENNYSTONE INVESTMENTS 853.13CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087334 RAYMOND FORD 75.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087335 ROMCO EQUIPMENT COMPANY 650.60CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087336 ROSIE C. PADILLA 400.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087337 SAN ANTONIO POOL MANAGEMENT, I 1,239.75CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087338 SERVICE UNIFORM RENTAL 271.33CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087339 SHREE RAMKABIR BHAKTA SAMAI 250.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087340 SOUTHWEST WHEEL 665.90CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087341 THE CREATIVE MANGO 60.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000

Packet Pg. 20
11/04/2019 9:32 AM CHECK RECONCILIATION REGISTER PAGE: 8
COMPANY: 999 - Pooled Cash CHECK DATE: 10/01/2019 THRU 1
2.2.b
ACCOUNT: 112010 Pooled Cash CLEAR DATE: 0/00/0000 THRU 9
TYPE: Check STATEMENT: 0/00/0000 THRU 99/99/9999
STATUS: All VOIDED DATE: 0/00/0000 THRU 99/99/999
FOLIO: A AMOUNT: 0.00 THRU 999,999,999.9
CHECK NUMBER: 000000 THRU 99999

ACCOUNT --DATE-- --TYPE-- NUMBER ---------DESCRIPTION---------- ----AMOUNT--- STATUS FOLIO CLEAR DATE

CHECK: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087342 TIME WARNER CABLE 1,236.08CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087343 TOSA BLANKS & MORE INC 700.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000

Attachment: October 2019 Check Register (Monthly Financial Report Ending October 31, 2019)
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087344 TRIPLE-S STEEL SUPPLY CO. 447.53CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087345 TYLER TECHNOLOGIES, INC 300.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087346 VALLANCE SECURITY SYSTEMS, INC 95.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000
112010 10/31/2019 CHECK 087347 RED DOOR MULTIMEDIA 400.00CR OUTSTND A 0/00/0000

TOTALS FOR ACCOUNT 112010 CHECK TOTAL: 1,651,046.73CR

DEPOSIT TOTAL: 0.00
INTEREST TOTAL: 0.00
MISCELLANEOUS TOTAL: 0.00
SERVICE CHARGE TOTAL: 0.00
EFT TOTAL: 0.00
BANK-DRAFT TOTAL: 0.00

TOTALS FOR Pooled Cash CHECK TOTAL: 1,651,046.73CR

DEPOSIT TOTAL: 0.00
INTEREST TOTAL: 0.00
MISCELLANEOUS TOTAL: 0.00
SERVICE CHARGE TOTAL: 0.00
EFT TOTAL: 0.00
BANK-DRAFT TOTAL: 0.00

Packet Pg. 21