In the matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Writ of Habeas Data in  On November 3, Rodriguez and
, Rodriguez and his girlfriend notices that several
favor of Noriel H. Rodriguez
G.R. 191805
November 15, 2011
Topic: Writ of Amparo & Writ of Habeas Data
Petitioners: Noriel H. Rodriguez
Respondents: Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
Ponente: J. Sereno
DOCTRINE: The failure to conduct a fair and effect investigation amounted to a
violation of or threat to Rodriguez's rights to life, liberty and security. The Rule on
the Writ of Amparo explicitly states that the violation of or threat to the right to
life, liberty and security may be caused by either an act or an omission of a public
official
FACTS
 Noriel Rodriguez (petitioner) is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti
Cagayan, a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng
Pilipinas (KMP).
 Under the Oplan Bantay Laya, the military tagged KMP members as an
enemy of the state, making its members an easy target of extra-judicial
killings and enforced disappearances.
 On September 6, 2009, Rodriguez just alighted from a tricycle driven by
Hermie Antonio Carlos in Brgy. Tapel, Cagayan, when 4 men forcibly took
him and forced him to get inside a car where more men in civilian
clothing were waiting (1 was holding a .45 caliber pistol).
 The men started punching Rodriguez inside the car, and forced him to
confess that he is a member of the New People’s Army (NPA). Rodriguez
remained silent until they reached a military camp belonging to the 17th
Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.
 Rodriguez was then subjected to beatings and torture by members of the
Philippine Army. Members of the army wanted him to admit that he is an
NPA member and then pinpoint other NPA members and camp locations.
Since Rodriguez cannot answer, he is repeatedly beaten and tortured.
Rodriguez was also coerced to sign several documents to declare that he
is a surenderree.
 On September 17, 2009, Rodriguez’s mother and brother came to see
him (accompanied by members of the CHR – Pasicolan, Cruz and
Callagan). They insisted to take Rodriguez home with them to Manila.
 Rodriguez arrived in Manila on September 18. Callagan and 2 military
members went inside their house and took pictures for around 30
minutes despite Rodriguez’s effort to stop them.
suspicious-looking men are following them on the streets, jeepney and
MRT.
 On December 7, Rodriguez filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and
Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders,
Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal
Properties dated 2 December 2009.
 The petition was filed against former President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG.
Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa,
P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Calog,
George Palacpac, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.
 Respondents contend that Rodriguez is a double agent, and had been
working as their informant/infiltrator in the fight against NPA rebels.
 Then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, through the solicitor-general,
insisted on her immunity from suits (by virtue of her position as
president).
 Supreme Court granted the writs after finding that the petition
sufficiently alleged the abduction and torture of Rodriguez by members
of the Philippine Army. SC directed the Court of Appeals to hear the
petition.
 CA ruled in favor of Rodriguez and found Ibrado, Versoza, Bangit, Ochoa,
Tolentino, Santos, De Vera and Matutina liable for his abduction and
torture. As to Calog and Palacpac, the case was dismissed for lack of
merit.
 On President Arroyo, the case was dismissed on account of her immunity
from suits.
ISSUE
1. Whether the interim reliefs prayed for by Rodriguez may be granted after
the writs of amparo and habeas data have already been issued in his
favor.
2. Whether former President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent on
the basis of the presidential immunity from suit.
3. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo
and habeas data cases.
4. Whether the rights to life, liberty and property of Rodriguez were
violated or threatened by respondents
HELD & RATIO
First issue: Grant of interim reliefs
No! Rodriguez prays for the issuance of a temporary protection order. It must be
underscored that this interim relief is only available before final judgment. The
Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extend
temporary protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of
the immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it shall issue.
The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and
conditions that may be imposed by the court, justice or judge. We held in Yano v.
Sanchez that these provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it
arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition." Being interim reliefs,
they can only be granted before a final adjudication of the case is made. In any
case, it must be underscored that the privilege of the writ of amparo, once granted,
necessarily entails the protection of the aggrieved party.
Thus, since we grant petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo, there is no need
to issue a temporary protection order independently of the former. The order
restricting respondents from going near Rodriguez is subsumed under the privilege
of the writ.
Second issue: Presidential immunity from suit
No! In Estrada v. Desierto, we clarified the doctrine that a non-sitting President
does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the latter's
tenure. We emphasize our ruling therein that courts should look with disfavor upon
the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for
truth or impairs the vindication of a right.
This is in accord with our ruling in In Re: Saturnino Bermudez that "incumbent
Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period
of their incumbency and tenure" but not beyond. It will be anomalous to hold that
immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions.
The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the
officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any
other trespasser. Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on executive
immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to expand the privilege especially when
it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right.
Further, in our Resolution in Estrada v. Desierto, we reiterated that the presidential
immunity from suit exists only in concurrence with the president's incumbency
Applying the foregoing rationale to the case at bar, it is clear that former President
Arroyo cannot use the presidential immunity from suit to shield herself from
judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context of amparo
proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.
Third issue: Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings
Yes! To attribute responsibility or accountability to former President Arroyo,
Rodriguez contends that the doctrine of command responsibility may be applied.
As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo, command responsibility pertains to the
"responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of
the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or
domestic conflict." Although originally used for ascertaining criminal complicity, the
command responsibility doctrine has also found application in civil cases for human
rights abuses.
Thus, it is our view that command responsibility may likewise find application in
proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ of amparo. As we held in Rubrico:
“It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold
military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances,
or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the
command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or
customary international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the
Constitution.”
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it
should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is
accountable for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments
complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may be
appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo.
Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to
determine whether respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address
the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial
measures to protect his rights.
As earlier pointed out, amparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the
extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have
participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance,
and (b) accountability, or the measure of remedies that should be addressed to
those (i) who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without
bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or
(ii) who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and
who carry the burden of disclosure; or (iii) those who carry, but have failed to
discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the
enforced disappearance.
Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative
liabilities, the doctrine of command responsibility may nevertheless be applied to
ascertain responsibility and accountability.
Fourth issue: Responsibility or Accountability of Respondents (FOCUS HERE)
Yes! The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence
adduced in their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible
under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible
evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of
reason i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency
with all other pieces of adduced evidence.
In the case at bar, we find no reason to depart from the factual findings of the
Court of Appeals, the same being supported by substantial evidence. A careful
examination of the records of this case reveals that the totality of the evidence
adduced by Rodriguez indubitably prove the responsibility and accountability of
some respondents in G.R. No. 191805 for violating his right to life, liberty and
security.
After a careful examination of the records of these cases, we are convinced that
the Court of Appeals correctly found sufficient evidence proving that the soldiers of
the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the military abducted Rodriguez
on 6 September 2009, and detained and tortured him until 17 September 2009.
In assessing the weight of the Certifications, the Court of Appeals correctly relied
on the medical finding that the injuries suffered by Rodriguez matched his account
of the maltreatment inflicted on him by the soldiers of the 17th Infantry Battalion,
5th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army. Further, the kind of injuries he
sustained showed that he could not have sustained them from merely falling, thus
making respondents' claim highly implausible.
The failure to conduct a fair and effect investigation amounted to a violation of or
threat to Rodriguez's rights to life, liberty and security. The Rule on the Writ of
Amparo explicitly states that the violation of or threat to the right to life, liberty
and security may be caused by either an act or an omission of a public official.
In this regard, we emphasize our ruling in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo
that the right to security of a person includes the positive obligation of the
government to ensure the observance of the duty to investigate. Protection
includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government
apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to
the bar of justice.
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the "right to
security" not only as prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but
imposing a positive duty on the State to afford protection of the right to liberty.
In the instant case, this Court rules that respondents in G.R. No. 191805 are
responsible or accountable for the violation of Rodriguez's right to life, liberty and
security on account of their abject failure to conduct a fair and effective official
investigation of his ordeal in the hands of the military. Respondents Gen. Ibrado,
PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Col. De Vera and Lt. Col. Mina only
conducted a perfunctory investigation, exerting no efforts to take Ramirez's
account of the events into consideration.
Clearly, the absence of a fair and effective official investigation into the claims of
Rodriguez violated his right to security, for which respondents in G.R. No. 191805
must be held responsible or accountable.
Nevertheless, it must be clarified that Rodriguez was unable to establish any
responsibility or accountability on the part of respondents P/CSupt. Tolentino,
P/SSupt. Santos, Calog and Palacpac. Respondent P/CSupt. Tolentino had already
retired when the abduction and torture of Rodriguez was perpetrated, while
P/SSupt. Santos had already been reassigned and transferred to the National
Capital Regional Police Office six months before the subject incident occurred.
Meanwhile, no sufficient allegations were maintained against respondents Calog
and
Palacpac. From all the foregoing, we rule that Rodriguez was successful in proving
through substantial evidence that respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen.
Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Brig. Gen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, and Lt. Col. Mina
were responsible and accountable for the violation of Rodriguez's rights to life,
liberty and security on the basis of (a) his abduction, detention and torture from 6
September to 17 September 2009, and (b) the lack of any fair and effective official
investigation as to his allegations. Thus, the privilege of the writs of amparo and
habeas data must be granted in his favor.
It is also clear from the above discussion that despite (a) maintaining former
President Arroyo in the list of respondents in G.R. No. 191805, and (b) allowing the
application of the command responsibility doctrine to amparo and habeas data
proceedings, Rodriguez failed to prove through substantial evidence that former
President Arroyo was responsible or accountable for the violation of his rights to
life, liberty and property.