Caballes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163108, 23 February 2005.

On May 13, 2003, the court issued an Order11 declaring that the petition for bail was submitted for its
resolution and denying the petitioner’s motion for an earlier trial date. On June 16, 2003, the trial court
issued its Order12 denying the petition for bail, on its finding that the evidence of guilt against the
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by the petitioner for
petitioner was strong.
the nullification of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals1 which dismissed his petition for the issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus for his release from detention despite the pendency of People of the
Philippines v. Glenn Caballes2 for rape, and its resolution denying his motion for reconsideration thereof. During the trial of June 19, 2003, Dr. Marquez failed to appear before the court because, in the
meantime, he had been assigned to the Eastern Police District and failed to receive the subpoena issued
to him by the court. The prosecution prayed for continuance, but the petitioner objected and invoked his
The antecedents are as follows:
right to speedy trial. The court, nevertheless, granted the motion and reset the trial to July 17, 2003.

On November 19, 2001, petitioner Glenn Chua Caballes was charged with rape of a minor RTC Malabon
On June 27, 2003, the court issued a subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum to Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez
City. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 25756-MN and raffled to Branch 169, presided by Judge
requiring him to appear for the trial set on July 17, 2003.13
Emmanuel D. Laurea. Because the petitioner was charged with a non-bailable offense, he was detained.

On July 4, 2003, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the court’s Order dated June 16,
The petitioner was arraigned on February 7, 2002 and pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. The
2003 denying his petition for bail. His motion was set for hearing, also on July 17, 2003. However, the
prosecution presented two (2) witnesses, namely, Venice Vera Pio, the private complainant, and her
petitioner preempted the resolution of his motion for reconsideration and filed a Motion to Dismiss14 the
mother. The petitioner, through counsel, commenced his cross-examination of Pio, but failed to
case on July 11, 2003 on the ground that his right to speedy trial had been violated. He made the
complete the same. In January 2003, the petitioner engaged the services of a new counsel, Atty. Noel S.
following allegations:
Sorreda, who entered his appearance as defense counsel.

During the trial of February 26, 2003, the petitioner continued his cross-examination of Pio but still failed
to terminate the same. The trial was set on March 6, 2003 for the petitioner to terminate his cross-
examination of Pio. However, due to the illness of the private prosecutor, the trial on the said date did
not proceed. The trial was further reset to March 17, 2003 during which the petitioner continued with
his cross-examination of the private complainant. Thereafter, the continuation of trial was set on April 3,
21, and 30, 2003. On April 3, 2003, the petitioner concluded his cross-examination of Pio. The
prosecution declared that its next witness would be Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez, the Medico-Legal Officer of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, who had conducted a medico-legal examination of
the private complainant, but stated that he had not been subpoenad. The prosecution prayed for the
cancellation of the trial scheduled on April 21, 2003 to give the prosecution time to secure and cause the
service of a subpoena duces tecum on him. The petitioner conformed to the motion of the prosecution.
On April 28, 2003, the petitioner filed a petition for bail.4
1. The hearings in the instant case have more often than not been scheduled more than one
month apart;
2. In the hearing on April 30, 2003, in particular, the day before undersigned counsel had filed
a Manifestation stating inter alia that his available dates for the next hearing may be "any
Monday, Wednesday or Thursday for the whole of May 2003 and the first half of June 2003,
except on May 14 and 21" – yet Atty. Manalaysay asked for the next hearing on June 19 which
is already outside or beyond the dates mentioned in the manifestation, and which was more
than 1-1/2 months away, but which the Honorable Court nonetheless granted;
3. Atty. Manalaysay has never been able to present any "good cause" as to how come he was
not able to present Dr. Marquez on April 30, 2003, and then again on June 19, 2003; and as
aforesaid, his absence on March 6, 2003 has not been supported by any medical certificate;

The trial of April 30, 2003 did not proceed because the petitioner’s counsel filed a Manifestation5 that his
presence was required in an execution sale in Cavite. The said counsel manifested that he reserved his
right to cross-examine any witness the prosecution would present in case trial would proceed on that
date; on the other hand, in the event that the trial court would cancel the trial, he would be available in
May 2003 and during the first half of June 2003.
The trial court reset the hearing of the case to 8:30 a.m. of June 19, 2003 and gave the prosecution ten
(10) days to file its opposition6 to the petitioner’s petition for bail. It likewise ordered the issuance of
a subpoena to Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez to require him to attend the trial on the said date.
On May 5, 2003, the petitioner filed a motion7 seeking an earlier trial date, invoking his right to speedy
trial under the Speedy Trial Act of 1998. He also filed a motion for the urgent resolution of his petition
for bail.8
On May 12, 2003, the petitioner filed another motion 9 praying that the hearing scheduled on June 19,
2003 be moved to an earlier date, preferably on May 26, 28 or 29, 2003. In the meantime, the
prosecution filed its comment/opposition10 to the petitioner’s petition for bail.
4. The first hearing in the instant case was held on June 13, 2002, thus it has now been more
than one year, or close to 400 days ago since trial started; neither has there been any
authorization from the Supreme Court that the trial period may exceed 180 days;
5. There has been no statement by the Honorable Court in any of its orders granting
continuance that "the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest
of the public and the accused in a speedy trial;"
6. As above stated, it appears that the prosecution made a false statement before the
Honorable Court in claiming they had asked Dr. Marquez to testify in the June 19, 2003
hearing, when in fact they had not.15
Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez had apparently still not received the subpoena issued by the trial court, because
of which the prosecution again failed to present him as a witness during the trial of July 17, 2003. The
prosecution prayed for continuance, to which the petitioner vigorously objected. The court, however,
granted the motion and reset the trial to August 11, 2003.16
On July 24, 2003, Judge Laurea issued an Order17 inhibiting himself from hearing the case "to avoid being (e) a writ of habeas corpus may be issued with the writ of certiorari for the purpose of review. However,
misunderstood, to preserve his reputation for probity and objectivity and to live up to the ideal impartial the CA denied the petitioner’s motion for lack of merit.
administration of justice." The case was re-raffled to Branch 170, presided by Judge Benjamin T. Antonio,
who calendared the case for trial on September 8, 2003. Nevertheless, on August 11, 2003, the
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in this Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court reiterating
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 of Judge Laurea’s Order dated July 24, 2003, which the
the grounds contained in his motion for reconsideration of the CA decision. The petitioner averred that
latter denied, on the finding that no cogent reason was presented to reconsider the same.19
the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
rendering its resolution, as well as the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration thereof.
During the hearing on September 8, 2003, Judge Antonio granted the private prosecutor’s motion to be
given five (5) days within which to oppose the petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Judge Antonio also set the
OSG: a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to assail the trial court’s order
trial on September 18, 2003.20 On the latter date, the trial court issued an Omnibus Order21 denying the
denying his petition for bail, motion to dismiss the case, and Judge Laurea’s order of inhibition. The OSG
petitioner’s motion to dismiss. The trial court reasoned that there was no violation of the petitioner’s
posits that the petitioner was not deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case
right to speedy trial, considering that the apparent delays could not be attributed to the fault of the
as well as under the Speedy Trial Act.
prosecution alone. The trial court noted that the petitioner also sought Postponements of the trials.

I: (a) whether or not the decision of the CA is already final and executory;
Anent the motion for reconsideration of the court’s Order dated June 16, 2003 which denied the petition
(b) whether the proper remedy from the appellate court’s denial of a petitioner for a writ if habeas
for bail, the trial court considered the same as having been abandoned by the petitioner upon the filing
corpus is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and
of his motion to dismiss the case without waiting for the resolution of his motion for reconsideration on
(c) if in the affirmative, whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the issuance of the writ.
his petition for bail.

On the first issue, we find and so rule that the petitioner’s recourse to this Court via a petition for
The petitioner then filed with the CA a "Petition for Habeas Corpus and/or Certiorari and
certiorari from the decision of the CA dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus is inappropriate.
Prohibition."22 On October 2, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution requiring the petitioner to inform the
Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides that the period for appeal from the judgment of any
court of his choice of remedy within five (5) days from notice thereof. In compliance therewith, the
court in habeas corpus cases shall be forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the judgment appealed from.
petitioner filed a manifestation with the appellate court that he had chosen his petition to be treated as
While the said provision was not incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court approved
a petition for habeas corpus without prejudice "to the concomitant application of certiorari if the court
Administrative Matter No. 01-1-03-SC amending Section 3, Rule 41of the said Rules, which took effect on
considered the same necessary or appropriate to give effect to the writ of habeas corpus."
July 15, 2001, thus:

The petitioner averred that (a) he was deprived of his right to a speedy trial and his constitutional right to
a speedy disposition of the case; (b) Judge Laurea erred in inhibiting himself from the case; (c) the trial
court committed grave abuse of its discretion in denying his petition for bail; and (d) Judge Antonio had
prejudged the case against him.
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal; appeal in habeas corpus cases.—The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a
notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order. However, an
appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be taken within forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the judgment or final order
appealed from.

CA: dismissed the petition for habeas corpus on December 9, 2003.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of
time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
while the petitioner manifested his preference that his petition be treated as a petition for habeas
corpus, the same was not the proper remedy to review and examine the proceedings before the trial
Following the rule, the petitioner should have appealed to this Court from the CA decision denying his
court and as a relief from the petitioner’s perceived oppressive situation in the trial court. The CA further
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as well as the denial of his motion for reconsideration thereof;
emphasized that a writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of error; that it could not exercise its certiorari
instead, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The
jurisdiction over the acts or omission of the respondent judge as a concomitant remedy; and that the
well-settled rule is that certiorari is not available where the aggrieved party’s remedy of appeal is plain,
remedy for habeas corpus and certiorari are different in nature, scope and purpose. The appellate court
speedy and adequate in the ordinary course, the reason being that certiorari cannot co-exist with an
declared that the petitioner failed to present any evidence to prove that there was any intentional or
appeal or any other adequate remedy. The existence and availability of the right to appeal are
deliberate delay caused to prejudice him; nor was there any malice in the failure of the prosecution to
antithetical to the availment of the special civil action for certiorari. These two remedies are mutually
promptly serve the subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum to its witnesses. The court also noted that
exclusive.24 An appeal in this case would still have been a speedy and adequate remedy. Consequently,
the resetting of petitioner’s case may also be attributed to the voluminous work of the RTC involved.
when the petitioner filed his petition in this Court, the decision of the CA was already final and
executory.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision contending that (a) the congestion
of the trial court’s calendar is not a valid ground for continuance of the trial; (b) the trial court failed to
a decision in a habeas corpus action stands in no different position than with any other proceeding and if
secure an extension of time of the trial period from the Supreme Court; (c) the trial court should have
the appealed decision is to be reviewed by an appellate court, the remedy is by writ of error because the
given a precedence to the case, the charge therein being a heinous crime; (d) his petition for a writ
error committed by the court is an error of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction.
of habeas corpus was proper because his continued detention had become illegal, following the
prosecutor and the trial court’s violation of his right to a speedy trial, and the trial court’s denial of his
motion to dismiss the case and his petition for bail which was tainted with grave abuse of discretion; and
Besides, as correctly held by the CA, a writ of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to assail the trial
court’s denial of the petitioner’s motion to dismiss the case, the denial of the petition for bail, as well as
the voluntary inhibition of Judge Laurea.
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court, as amended. In Ex Parte Billings,26 it was held that habeas corpus is that of a civil
proceeding in character. It seeks the enforcement of civil rights. Resorting to the writ is not to inquire
into the criminal act of which the complaint is made, but into the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act
and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint. The rule applies even when
instituted to arrest a criminal prosecution and secure freedom. When a prisoner petitions for a writ
of habeas corpus, he thereby commences a suit and prosecutes a case in that court.
Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial court’s
function.28 It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to
investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or on the merits.
The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of whether the proceedings and
the assailed order are, for any reason, null and void.29 The writ is not ordinarily granted where the law
provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of exceptional circumstances.
Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial.30 The orderly course of trial must be
pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ where exceptional circumstances
are extant. In another case, it was held that habeas corpus cannot be issued as a writ of error or as a
means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities not involving the questions of jurisdiction occurring
during the course of the trial, subject to the caveat that constitutional safeguards of human life and
liberty must be preserved, and not destroyed.31 It has also been held that where restraint is under legal
process, mere errors and irregularities, which do not render the proceedings void, are not grounds for
relief by habeas corpus because in such cases, the restraint is not illegal.32
Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding in rem when instituted for the sole
purpose of having the person of restraint presented before the judge in order that the cause of his
detention may be inquired into and his statements final.33 The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon
the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be the unlawful
authority.34 Hence, the only parties before the court are the petitioner (prisoner) and the person holding
the petitioner in custody, and the only question to be resolved is whether the custodian has authority to
deprive the petitioner of his liberty.35 The writ may be denied if the petitioner fails to show facts that he
is entitled thereto ex merito justicias.36
A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a "palladium of liberty" is a prerogative writ which does not
issue as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court or judge. It, is, however, a writ of right
on proper formalities being made by proof.37 Resort to the writ is to inquire into the criminal act of which
a complaint is made but unto the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act, and the immediate purpose to
be served is relief from illegal restraint.38 The primary, if not the only object of the writ of habeas corpus
ad subjuciendum is to determine the legality of the restraint under which a person is held.39
Our review of the petitioner’s material averments in his petition before the CA reveals that it was a
"petition for habeas corpus or, in the alternative, a petition for a writ of certiorari" The petitioner
assailed therein the orders of the trial court denying his petition for bail and his motion to dismiss on the
ground that he was deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case against him, and questioned
Judge Laurea’s order of inhibition. We agree with the CA that a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus cannot be joined with the special civil action for certiorari because the two remedies are
governed by a different set of rules. Rule 2, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court mandates that the joinder
of causes of action shall not include special actions or actions governed by special rules, thus proscribing
the joinder of a special proceeding with a special civil action.
We also agree with the ruling of the CA that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a remedy different
from the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The writ
of habeas corpus is a collateral attack on the processes, orders, or judgment of the trial court, while
certiorari is a direct attack of said processes, orders, or judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari reaches only
jurisdictional errors. It has no other use, except to bring before the court a record material to be
considered in exercising jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari reaches the record. On the other hand, a writ
of habeas corpus reaches the body but not the record; it also reaches jurisdictional matters but does not
reach the record. However, when jurisdiction is obtained by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, to
bring the body of the person whose liberty is involved into court, and if it is necessary, to provide the
record upon which the detention is based, that may be accomplished by using a writ of certiorari as an
ancillary proceeding, i.e., it is subordinate to or in aid of the primary action for the purpose of
impeaching the record. When a writ of certiorari is issued as the foundation of jurisdiction to bring it and
direct upon the validity of a judicial determination by any body or officer, jurisdictional questions only
are reached, and such questions pertaining to the detention made by the officer or body particularly
complained of.40
The petitioner manifested to the appellate court that his petition should be treated as a petition
for habeas corpus. Even then, the CA rightly dismissed the petition because the petitioner failed to
establish his right to the writ. The records show that the petitioner was charged with rape punishable
by reclusion perpetua and was detained based on the said charge; hence, if the evidence of his guilt is
strong, he shall not be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.41 There is no
question that the trial court had jurisdiction over the offense charged and over the person of the
petitioner. The jail warden has the authority and, in fact, is mandated to detain the petitioner until
granted bail by the court, or the case against him dismissed, or until he is acquitted after trial. The
petitioner failed to establish that his incarceration pendente lite was illegal, and likewise failed to
establish exceptional circumstances warranting the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus by the appellate
court.1a\^/phi1.net
In Galvez v. Court of Appeals,42 the Court ruled that a petition for habeas corpus is not the proper remedy
to assail the denial thereof:
… The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for
petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per
se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial
court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not without first
applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.43
The remedy of the petitioner from the Order of the trial court denying his petition for bail was to file a
petition for certiorari in the CA if the trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the said order.44 If the petitioner had done so, his petition would
have been granted because as gleaned from the assailed order of the trial court, it failed to summarize
the testimonies of the private complainant and that of her mother. Hence, such order is invalid. 45 The
trial court would have had to issue another order containing the summary of the testimonies of the
private complainant and her mother, including its findings and conclusions. However, the petitioner
would still not be entitled to be released from detention in the meantime.
It bears stressing that under the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 13746 of the Rules of Court, the
voluntary inhibition of a Judge is addressed to his sound discretion for just or valid reasons, the primary
consideration being that the people’s faith in the courts of justice is not impaired.47 The petitioner should
have thus filed a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition in the CA, instead of a petition for habeas
corpus.
In cases where the right of the accused to a speedy trial is violated by the prosecution, the remedy lies in
the procedure provided for under Republic Act No. 8493, as implemented by Rule 119 of the 2000 Rules
of Criminal Procedure. Section 8 of the said Rule provides:
SEC. 8. Sanctions.— In any case in which private counsel for the accused, the public attorney, or the
prosecutor:
(a) Knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing that a necessary witness
would be unavailable for trial;
(b) Files a motion solely for delay which he knows is totally frivolous and without merit;
(c) Makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining continuance which he knows to be false
and which is material to the granting of a continuance; or
(d) Willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification consistent with the provisions hereof,
the court may punish such counsel, attorney, or prosecutor, as follows:
(1) By imposing on a counsel privately retained in connection with the defense of
an accused, a fine not exceeding twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00);
(2) By imposing on any appointed counsel de oficio, public attorney, or prosecutor
a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos (₱5,000.00); and
(3) By denying any defense counsel or prosecutor the right to practice before the
court trying the case for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days. The punishment
provided for by this section shall be without prejudice to any appropriate criminal
action or other sanction authorized under these Rules.
If the trial court acted with grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess of lack of jurisdiction in
granting the prosecution’s motion for the resetting of the trial over the petitioner’s objections, the more
appropriate remedy would have been to file a petition for certiorari and/or a petition for mandamus to
compel the trial court to comply with the timeline provided for by the said Rule for trial and termination
of the case.
It was inappropriate for the petitioner to file a petition for habeas corpus assailing the trial court’s order
denying his motion to dismiss the case for failure to comply with the timeline provided for by the said
Rules. Reading and evaluating the assailed Order of the trial court dated September 18, 2000, it cannot
be gainsaid that the court violated the right of the petitioner to speedy trial. Thus:
The instant motion is anchored on the alleged violation of and/or to enforce the right of the accused to
speedy trial. In invoking such right, the accused contends that the failure of the prosecution to present
the medico-legal officer who examined the victim on two (2) occasions, and the non-appearance of the
private prosecutor on one occasion caused undue delay in the proceedings of this case.
The prosecution vigorously opposed the Motion to Dismiss and claimed that since the prosecution has
not yet rested its case, the Court may not be able to appreciate the merits of the instant motion in the
light of the unfinished presentation of evidence for the prosecution and that the grounds relied by the
defense do not touch on the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, but rather on the alleged delay and failure to present Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez
of the PNP Crime Laboratory.
After due consideration, the Court finds the instant motion untenable.l^vvphi1.net The alleged delay and
failure to present the medico-legal officer cannot be attributed to the fault of the prosecution and/or the
Court. The prosecution and the Court cannot encroach on the right of the medico-legal officer to appear
inasmuch as his schedule conflicted with the hearings set for his appearance. Moreover, delays assailed
by defense counsel that violated accused’ right to speedy trial are not all at the instance of the
prosecution. In fact, the defense, contributed to the delay since the former defense counsel and even
the present defense counsel sought postponements of the hearings.
Be that as it may, despite the non-presentation of the medico-legal officer, the Court (Branch 169)
proceeded in resolving the Petition for Bail of the accused (albeit unfavorable to the cause of the
accused) on the basis of the sole testimony of the complainant, which is backed up by several
jurisprudence to this effect. The defense, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said denial after he has
filed a Motion to Dismiss. The filing of these pleadings adds to the delay until the Presiding Judge who
denied the Petition for Bail voluntarily inhibited himself from this case. Then when the Motion to Dismiss
was set for hearing, the Court, in an attempt to expedite the proceedings, suggested for the parties to
stipulate on the medical findings of the medico-legal officer so as to dispense with his presentation.
Defense counsel, however, would not want to enter into such a stipulation. Hence, another delay.48
We agree with the petitioner that a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus may be filed if
one is deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case under Article IV, Section 16 of the 1987
Constitution and of his right to due process.49 However, the petitioner never invoked in the trial court his
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the case against him. What he invoked was his right to a
speedy trial under Rule 119 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure. He invoked his constitutional right
to a speedy disposition of the case against him, for the first time, only in the Court of Appeals when he
filed his petition for habeas corpus.
Even then, the petitioner failed to establish his claim that he was deprived of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case. In Marilyn Corpuz, et al., v. Sandiganbayan,50 the Court had the occasion to state
–
The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was
designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him
for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to
proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy
disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such right is not
susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must
necessarily be a flexible concept.
While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not mere
speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift,
but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the
accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the
rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons; hence,
courts are to give meaning to that intent.
The Court emphasized in the same case that:
A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court
to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.
In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case
and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c)
the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice should be assessed in
the light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to
prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and
to limit the Possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because
the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. There
is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past.
Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty
and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources may be
drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy.
Delay is a two-edged sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving its case beyond
reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible for the government to carry its
burden. The Constitution and the Rules do not require impossibilities or extraordinary efforts, diligence
or exertion from courts or the prosecutor, nor contemplate that such right shall deprive the State of a
reasonable opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals. As held in Williams v. United States, for the
government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must show two things: (a) that the
accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay;
and (b) that there was no more delay than is reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.
Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such delay. Different
weights should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked by the State. For instance, a
deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper or prejudice the defense should be weighted
heavily against the State. Also, it is improper for the prosecutor to intentionally delay to gain some
tactical advantage over the defendant or to harass or prejudice him. On the other hand, the heavy case
load of the prosecution or a missing witness should be weighted less heavily against the State.
In this case, the petitioner was arraigned on February 7, 2002. In the meantime, he was able to present
only two witnesses. The petitioner failed to terminate the cross-examination of the private complainant
by the year 2002. The Court cannot determine the reason for the delay because the records of the RTC
are not before it. Neither of the parties made any explanation for the delay; nor is there any showing
that the counsel of the petitioner complained about the delay. Aside from the petitioner’s claim that the
private prosecutor failed to give good cause for his failure to present Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez during the
trial dates April 30, 2003 and June 19, 2003, as well as to substantiate his absence during the trial of
March 6, 2003 with a medical certificate, the petitioner failed to support his claim in his pleadings before
the CA and in this Court. On the other hand, the counsel of the petitioner was absent during the trial on
April 30, 2003 because he had to attend an execution sale in Cavite. The petitioner’s counsel gave
priority to the execution sale and asked for a resetting despite the fact that his client, the petitioner, was
detained for a quasi-heinous crime. While it is true that the trial was reset to June 19, 2003, or more
than one month from April 30, 2003, the petitioner’s counsel himself manifested that he was available
for trial during the first half of June 2003. There was a difference of only four (4) days from the trial date
set by the court and the available dates suggested by the petitioner’s counsel. It bears stressing that trial
dates cannot be set solely at the convenience of the petitioner’s counsel. The trial dates available in the
calendar of the court and of the prosecutor must also be taken into account.1ªvvphi1.nét
Hence, it cannot be said that the petitioner was deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case
simply because the private prosecutor failed to submit a medical certificate for his absence during the
trial of March 6, 2003. The petitioner could have asked the court to cite the private prosecutor in
contempt of court for his failure to submit the said certificate; he failed to do so. Moreover, the
petitioner failed to establish any serious prejudice by the delay of the trial, and that the State
deliberately delayed the trial to prejudice him
MR. ALEXANDER "LEX" ADONIS, represented by the CENTER FOR MEDIA FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY
(CMFR), through its Executive Director, MRS. MELINDA QUINTOS-DE JESUS; and the NATIONAL UNION
OF JOURNALISTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUJP), through its Chairperson, MR. JOSE TORRES, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
SUPERENTENDENT VENANCIO TESORO, DIRECTOR, DAVAO PRISONS AND PENAL FARM, PANABO CITY,
DIGOS DAVAO DEL NORTE, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This is a Petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus1 under Rule 102 of the 1997 Rules of
Court filed by petitioner Alexander Adonis (Adonis), praying that the Court directs respondent
Superintendent Venancio Tesoro (respondent), Director of the Davao Prisons and Penal Farm, to have
the body of the former brought before this Court and in the alternative, praying for the application of the
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 08-2008,2 which imposes the penalty of a fine instead of
imprisonment in Criminal Case No. 48679-2001.3
Antecedent Facts
In Criminal Case No. 48679-2001, Adonis was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City (RTC),
Branch 17 for Libel, filed against him by then Representative Prospero Nograles. He was sentenced to an
indeterminate sentence of five (5) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor maximum, as minimum
penalty, to four (4) years, six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional medium, as maximum
penalty.4 He began serving his sentence at the Davao Prisons and Penal Farm on February 20, 2007.5
A second libel case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 48719-2001 was likewise filed against Adonis by
Jeanette L. Leuterio, pending before the RTC of Davao City, Branch 14.6
On December 11, 2007, the Board of Pardons and Parole (BPP) issued an order for the Discharge on
Parole of seven (7) inmates in various jails in the country, which included Adonis. The said document was
received by the City Parole and Probation Office of Davao on May 2, 2008.7
Meanwhile, on January 25, 2008, this Court issued Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, the subject of
which is the "Guidelines in the Observance of a Rule of Preference in the Imposition of Penalties in Libel
Cases."
In view of these developments, Adonis, on April 18, 2008 filed with the RTC Branch 17 a Motion to
Reopen Case (With Leave of Court),8 praying for his immediate release from detention and for the
modification of his sentence to payment of fine pursuant to the said Circular.
On May 26, 2008, in Criminal Case No. 48719-2001 before the RTC Branch 14, Adonis moved for his
provisional release from detention. The motion was granted by Presiding Judge George Omelio in open
court and he was allowed to post bail in the amount of ₱5,000.9 Subsequently on even date and after
Adonis filed a cash bond and an undertaking,10 the trial court issued an Order directing the Chief of
Davao Penal Colony "to release the accused Alexis Adonis unless he is being held for some other crimes
or offenses."11 On the same date, the said order was served to the respondent,12 but the release of
Adonis was not effected.
On May 30, 2008, Adonis filed the instant petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus alleging
that his liberty was restrained by the respondent for no valid reason.13

The respondent consequently filed his Comment.14 Adonis then filed on October 27, 2008 an Urgent
Motion to Resolve15 and on November 7, 2008 a Manifestation and Motion,16 reiterating all his
previous prayers.
On February 11, 2009, the Court received the letter from the respondent, informing the Court that
Adonis had been released from confinement on December 23, 2008 after accepting the conditions set
forth in his parole and with the advise to report to the City Parole and Probation Officer of Davao.17
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is without merit.
The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint. The writ
exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and as an effective
defense of personal freedom. It is issued only for the lone purpose of obtaining relief for those illegally
confined or imprisoned without sufficient legal basis. It is not issued when the person is in custody
because of a judicial process or a valid judgment.
Section 4, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court provides when a writ must not be allowed or discharge
authorized, to wit:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.― If it appears that the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by
virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue
the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or
defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the
discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In the instant case, Adonis was convicted for libel by the RTC Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 48679-
2001.1âwphi1 Since his detention was by virtue of a final judgment, he is not entitled to the Writ of
Habeas Corpus. He was serving his sentence when the BPP granted him parole, along with six (6) others,
on December 11, 2007.19 While it is true that a convict may be released from prison on parole when he
had served the minimum period of his sentence; the pendency of another criminal case, however, is a
ground for the disqualification of such convict from being released on parole.20 Notably, at the time he
was granted the parole, the second libel case was pending before the RTC Branch 14.21 In fact, even
when the instant petition was filed, Criminal Case No. 48719-01 was still pending. The issuance of the
writ under such circumstance was, therefore, proscribed. There was basis for the respondent to deny his
immediate release at that time.
Further, Adonis seeks the retroactive application of Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, citing Fermin v.
People,22 where the Court preferred the imposition of the fine rather than imprisonment under the
circumstances of the case. Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, was issued on January 25, 2008 and
provides the "guidelines in the observance of a rule of preference in the imposition of penalties in libel
cases." The pertinent portions read as follows:
All courts and judges concerned should henceforth take note of the foregoing rule of preference set by
the Supreme Court on the matter of the imposition of penalties for the crime of libel bearing in mind the
following principles:
1. This Administrative Circular does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for the crime
libel under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code;
2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration the
peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of a fame alone would best serve
the interests of justice or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness
of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperative of justice;
3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to
the application of the Revised Penal Code provision on subsidiary imprisonment.23 (Emphasis ours)
A clear reading of the Administration Circular No. 08-2008 and considering the attendant circumstances
of the case, the benefits of the administrative circular can not be given retroactive effect in Criminal Case
No. 48679-2001. It is too late in the day for Adonis to raise such argument considering that Criminal Case
No. 48679-2001 has already become final and executory; and he had, in fact, already commenced
serving his sentence. Eventually, he was released from confinement on December 23, 2008 after
accepting the conditions of the parole granted to him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED
Boac, et al. v. Cadapan and Empeño, G.R. Nos. 184461-62, 31 May 2011
At 2:00 a.m. of June 26, 2006, armed men abducted Sherlyn Cadapan (Sherlyn), Karen Empeño (Karen)
and Manuel Merino (Merino) from a house in San Miguel, Hagonoy, Bulacan. The three were herded
onto a jeep bearing license plate RTF 597 that sped towards an undisclosed location.
Having thereafter heard nothing from Sherlyn, Karen and Merino, their respective families scoured
nearby police precincts and military camps in the hope of finding them but the same yielded nothing.
On July 17, 2006, spouses Asher and Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeño filed a petition for habeas
corpus1 before the Court, docketed as G.R. No. 173228, impleading then Generals Romeo Tolentino and
Jovito Palparan (Gen. Palparan), Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac (Lt. Col. Boac), Arnel Enriquez and Lt. Francis
Mirabelle Samson (Lt. Mirabelle) as respondents. By Resolution of July 19, 2006, 2 the Court issued a writ
of habeas corpus, returnable to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals.
The habeas corpus petition was docketed at the appellate court as CA-G.R. SP No. 95303.
By Return of the Writ dated July 21, 2006,3 the respondents in the habeas corpus petition denied that
Sherlyn, Karen and Merino are in the custody of the military. To the Return were attached affidavits from
the respondents, except Enriquez, who all attested that they do not know Sherlyn, Karen and Merino;
that they had inquired from their subordinates about the reported abduction and disappearance of the
three but their inquiry yielded nothing; and that the military does not own nor possess a stainless steel
jeep with plate number RTF 597. Also appended to the Return was a certification from the Land
Transportation Office (LTO) that plate number RTF 597 had not yet been manufactured as of July 26,
2006.
Trial thereupon ensued at the appellate court.
Witness Wilfredo Ramos, owner of the house where the three were abducted, recounted that on June
26, 2006, while he was inside his house in Hagonoy, he witnessed armed men wearing bonnets abduct
Sherlyn and Karen from his house and also abduct Merino on their way out; and that tied and
blindfolded, the three were boarded on a jeep and taken towards Iba in Hagonoy.4
Witness Alberto Ramirez (Ramirez) recalled that on June 28, 2006, while he was sleeping in his house, he means of obtaining evidence on the whereabouts of a person, or as a means of finding out who has
was awakened by Merino who, in the company of a group of unidentified armed men, repaired to his specifically abducted or caused the disappearance of a certain person. (emphasis and underscoring
house; that onboard a stainless jeep bearing plate number RTF 597, he (Ramirez) was taken to a place in supplied)
Mercado, Hagonoy and was asked by one Enriquez if he knew "Sierra," "Tanya," "Vincent" and "Lisa";
and that Enriquez described the appearance of two ladies which matched those of Sherlyn and Karen,
Thus the appellate court disposed:
whom he was familiar with as the two had previously slept in his house.5

WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED, there being no strong evidence that
Another witness, Oscar Leuterio, who was himself previously abducted by armed men and detained for
the missing persons are in the custody of the respondents.
five months, testified that when he was detained in Fort Magsaysay in Nueva Ecija, he saw two women
fitting the descriptions of Sherlyn and Karen, and also saw Merino, his kumpare.6
The Court, however, further resolves to refer the case to the Commission on Human Rights, the National
Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police for separate investigations and appropriate
Lt. Col. Boac, the then commander of Task Force Malolos, a special operations team tasked to neutralize
actions as may be warranted by their findings and to furnish the Court with their separate reports on the
the intelligence network of communists and other armed groups, declared that he conducted an inquiry
outcome of their investigations and the actions taken thereon.
on the abduction of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino but his subordinates denied knowledge thereof.7

While he denied having received any order from Gen. Palparan to investigate the disappearance of
Sherlyn, Karen and Merino, his assistance in locating the missing persons was sought by the mayor of
Hagonoy.
Major Dominador Dingle, the then division adjutant of the Philippine Army’s 7th Infantry Division in Fort
Magsaysay, denied that a certain Arnel Enriquez is a member of his infantry as in fact his name did not
appear in the roster of troops.8
Roberto Se, a supervisor of the Equipment, Plate Number and Supply Units of the LTO, denied that his
office manufactured and issued a plate number bearing number RTF 597.9
On rebuttal, Lt. Mirabelle, Lt. Col. Boac and Gen. Palparan took the witness stand as hostile witnesses.
Lt. Mirabelle testified that she did not receive any report on the abduction of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino
nor any order to investigate the matter. And she denied knowing anything about the abduction of
Ramirez nor who were Ka Tanya or Ka Lisa.10
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Commission on Human Rights, the National Bureau of
Investigation and the Philippine National Police for their appropriate actions.
SO ORDERED. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners in CA-G.R. SP No. 95303 moved for a reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision. They
also moved to present newly discovered evidence consisting of the testimonies of Adoracion Paulino,
Sherlyn’s mother-in-law who was allegedly threatened by soldiers; and Raymond Manalo who allegedly
met Sherlyn, Karen and Merino in the course of his detention at a military camp.
During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 95303, Erlinda Cadapan and
Concepcion Empeño filed before this Court a Petition for Writ of Amparo14 With Prayers for Inspection of
Place and Production of Documents dated October 24, 2007, docketed as G.R. No. 179994. The petition
impleaded the same respondents in the habeas corpus petition, with the addition of then President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, then Armed Forces of the Phil. (AFP) Chief of Staff Hermogenes Esperon Jr.,
then Phil. National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Avelino Razon (Gen. Razon), Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado (Lt. Col.
Anotado) and Donald Caigas.

Gen. Palparan testified that during a debate in a televised program, he mentioned the names of Ka Lisa Then President Arroyo was eventually dropped as respondent in light of her immunity from suit while in
and Ka Tanya as the ones involved in revolutionary tax activities; and that he ordered Lt. Col. Boac to office.
conduct an investigation on the disappearance of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.11 When pressed to
elaborate, he stated: "I said that I got the report that it stated that it was Ka Tanya and Ka Lisa that, I
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179994 also prayed that they be allowed to inspect the detention areas of the
mean, that incident happened in Hagonoy, Bulacan was the abduction of Ka Lisa and Ka Tanya, Your
following places:
Honor, and another one. That was the report coming from the people in the area."12

1. 7th Infantry Division at Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija

By Decision of March 29, 2007,13 the Court of Appeals dismissed the habeas corpus petition in this wise:

2. 24th Infantry Batallion at Limay, Bataan

As Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino are indeed missing, the present petition for
habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy since the main office or function of the habeas corpus is to
inquire into the legality of one’s detention which presupposes that respondents have actual custody of 3. Army Detachment inside Valmocina Farm, Pinaod, San Ildefonso, Bulacan
the persons subject of the petition. The reason therefor is that the courts have limited powers, means
and resources to conduct an investigation. x x x. 4. Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan

It being the situation, the proper remedy is not a habeas corpus proceeding but criminal proceedings by 5. The Resthouse of Donald Caigas alias Allan or Alvin of the 24th Infantry Batallion at
initiating criminal suit for abduction or kidnapping as a crime punishable by law. In the case of Martinez Barangay Banog, Bolinao, Pangasinan
v. Mendoza, supra, the Supreme Court restated the doctrine that habeas corpus may not be used as a
 6. 56th Infantry Batallion Headquarters at Iba, Hagonoy, Bulacan
7. Army Detachment at Barangay Mercado, Hagonoy, Bulacan
8. Beach House [at] Iba, Zambales used as a safehouse with a retired military personnel as a
caretaker;
By Resolution of October 25, 2007, the Court issued in G.R. No. 179994 a writ of amparo returnable to
the Special Former Eleventh Division of the appellate court, and ordered the consolidation of the amparo
petition with the pending habeas corpus petition.
Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 002, respondents in the amparo case, through the Solicitor General, filed
their Return of the Writ on November 6, 2007.15 In the Return, Gen. Palparan, Lt. Col. Boac and Lt.
Mirabelle reiterated their earlier narrations in the habeas corpus case.
Gen. Hermogenes Esperon Jr. stated in the Return that he immediately caused to investigate and verify
the identities of the missing persons and was aware of the earlier decision of the appellate court
ordering the police, the Commission on Human Rights and the National Bureau of Investigation to take
further action on the matter.16
Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado, the then battalion commander of the 24th Infantry Battalion based in Balanga
City, Bataan, denied any involvement in the abduction. While the 24th Infantry Battalion detachment
was reported to be a detention site of the missing persons, Lt. Col. Anotado claimed that he found no
untoward incident when he visited said detachment. He also claimed that there was no report of the
death of Merino per his inquiry with the local police.17
Police Director General Avelino Razon narrated that he ordered the compilation of pertinent records,
papers and other documents of the PNP on the abduction of the three, and that the police exhausted all
possible actions available under the circumstances.18
In addition to the witnesses already presented in the habeas corpus case, petitioners called on Adoracion
Paulino and Raymond Manalo to testify during the trial.
Adoracion Paulino recalled that her daughter-in-law Sherlyn showed up at home on April 11, 2007,
accompanied by two men and three women whom she believed were soldiers. She averred that she did
not report the incident to the police nor inform Sherlyn’s mother about the visit.19
Raymond Manalo (Manalo) claimed that he met the three abducted persons when he was illegally
detained by military men in Camp Tecson in San Miguel, Bulacan. His group was later taken to a camp in
Limay, Bataan. He recalled that Lt. Col. Anotado was the one who interrogated him while in detention.20
In his Sinumpaang Salaysay,21 Manalo recounted:
xxxx
59. Saan ka dinala mula sa Sapang?
Pagkalipas ng humigit kumulang 3 buwan sa Sapang, dinala ako sa Camp Tecson sa ilalim ng 24th IB.
xxxx
Sa loob ng barracks ko nakilala si Sherlyn Cadapan, isang estudyante ng UP.
Ipinapalinis din sa akin ang loob ng barracks. Sa isang kwarto sa loob ng barracks, may nakita akong
babae na nakakadena[.] Noong una, pinagbawalan akong makipag-usap sa kanya. Sa ikatlo o ikaapat na
araw, nakausap ko yung babaeng nagngangalang Sherlyn. Binigyan ko siya ng pagkain. Sinabi niya sa akin
na dinukot si[ya] sa Hagonoy, Bulacan at matindi ang tortyur na dinaranas niya. Sabi niya gusto niyang
umuwi at makasama ang kanyang magulang. Umiiyak siya. Sabi niya sa akin ang buong pangalan niya ay
Sherlyn Cadapan, mula sa Laguna. Sa araw tinatanggal ang kanyang kadena at inuutusan si Sherlyn na
maglaba.
x x x x.
61. Sino ang mga nakilala mo sa Camp Tecson?
Dito sa Camp Tecson naming nakilala si ‘Allan Alvin’ (maya-maya nalaman naming na siya pala si Donald
Caigas), ng 24th IB, na tinatawag na ‘master’ o ‘commander’ ng kanyang mga tauhan.
Pagkalipas ng 2 araw matapos dalhin si Reynaldo sa Camp Tecson dumating sina Karen
Empeño at Manuel Merino na mga bihag din. Inilagay si Karen at Manuel sa kwarto ni ‘Allan[.]’ Kami
naman ni Reynaldo ay nasa katabing kwarto, kasama si Sherlyn.
xxxx
62. x x x x
Kaming mga lalake (ako, si Reynaldo at si Manuel) ay ginawang utusan, habang sina Sherlyn at Karen ay
ginawang labandera.
Si Sherlyn ang pinahirapan nina Mickey, Donald at Billy. Sabi ni Sherlyn sa akin na siya’y ginahasa.
xxxx
63. x x x x
xxxx
Kaming lima (ako, si Reynaldo, si Sherlyn, si Karen at si [Merino]) ang dinala sa Limay. Sinakay ako, si
Reynaldo, si Sherlyn at si [Merino] sa isang stainless na jeep. Si Karen ay isinakay sa itim na sasakyan ni
Donald Caigas. x x x x
xxxx
66. Saan pa kayo dinala mula sa Limay, Bataan?
Mula sa Limay, kaming 5 (ako, si Reynaldo, si Sherlyn, Si Karen at si Manuel) ay dinala sa isang safehouse
sa Zambales, tabi ng dagat. x x x x (underscoring supplied; italics and emphasis in the original)
On rebuttal, Lt. Col. Anotado and Col. Eduardo Boyles Davalan were called to the witness stand.
Lt. Col. Anotado denied seeing or meeting Manalo. He posited that Manalo recognized him because he
was very active in conducting lectures in Bataan and even appeared on television regarding an incident
involving the 24th Infantry Batallion. He contended that it was impossible for Manalo, Sherlyn, Karen and
Merino to be detained in the Limay detachment which had no detention area.
Col. Eduardo Boyles Davalan, the then chief of staff of the First Scout Ranger Regiment in Camp Tecson,
testified that the camp is not a detention facility, nor does it conduct military operations as it only serves
as a training facility for scout rangers. He averred that his regiment does not have any command relation
with either the 7th Infantry Division or the 24th Infantry Battalion.22
By Decision of September 17, 2008,23 the appellate court granted the Motion for Reconsideration in CA-
G.R. SP No. 95303 (the habeas corpus case) and ordered the immediate release of Sherlyn, Karen and
Merino in CA-G.R. SP No. 00002 (the amparo case). Thus it disposed:
WHEREFORE, in CA-G.R. SP NO. 95303 (Habeas Corpus case), the Motion for Reconsideration is
GRANTED.
Accordingly, in both CA-G.R. SP NO. 95303 (Habeas Corpus case) and in CA-G.R. SP NO. 00002 (Amparo
case), the respondents are thereby ordered to immediately RELEASE, or cause the release, from
detention the persons of Sher[lyn] Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino.
Respondent Director General Avelino Razon is hereby ordered to resume [the] PNP’s unfinished
investigation so that the truth will be fully ascertained and appropriate charges filed against those truly
responsible.
SO ORDERED.
In reconsidering its earlier Decision in the habeas corpus case, the appellate court relied heavily on the
testimony of Manalo in this wise:
With the additional testimony of Raymond Manalo, the petitioners have been able to convincingly prove
the fact of their detention by some elements in the military. His testimony is a first hand account that
military and civilian personnel under the 7th Infantry Division were responsible for the abduction of
Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino. He also confirmed the claim of Oscar Leuterio that
the latter was detained in Fort Magsaysay. It was there where he (Leuterio) saw Manuel Merino.
His testimony that Leuterio saw Manuel Merino in Fort Magsaysay may be hearsay but not with respect
to his meeting with, and talking to, the three desaparecidos. His testimony on those points was no
hearsay. Raymond Manalo saw the three with his very own eyes as they were detained and tortured
together. In fact, he claimed to be a witness to the burning of Manuel Merino. In the absence of
confirmatory proof, however, the Court will presume that he is still alive.
The testimony of Raymond Manalo can no longer be ignored and brushed aside. His narration and those
of the earlier witnesses, taken together, constitute more than substantial evidence warranting an order
that the three be released from detention if they are not being held for a lawful cause. They may be
moved from place to place but still they are considered under detention and custody of the respondents.
His testimony was clear, consistent and convincing. x x x.
xxxx
The additional testimonies of Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado and Col. Eduardo Boyles Davalan were of no help
either. Again, their averments were the same negative ones which cannot prevail over those of Raymond
Manalo. Indeed, Camp Tecson has been utilized as a training camp for army scout rangers. Even
Raymond Manalo noticed it but the camp’s use for purposes other than training cannot be discounted.
xxxx
In view of the foregoing, there is now a clear and credible evidence that the three missing persons,
[Sherlyn, Karen and Merino], are being detained in military camps and bases under the 7th Infantry
Division. Being not held for a lawful cause, they should be immediately released from detention. (italic in
the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Meanwhile, in the amparo case, the appellate court deemed it a superfluity to issue any inspection order
or production order in light of the release order. As it earlier ruled in the habeas corpus case, it found
that the three detainees’ right to life, liberty and security was being violated, hence, the need to
immediately release them, or cause their release. The appellate court went on to direct the PNP to
proceed further with its investigation since there were enough leads as indicated in the records to
ascertain the truth and file the appropriate charges against those responsible for the abduction and
detention of the three.
Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac, et al. challenged before this Court, via petition for review, the September 17, 2008
Decision of the appellate court. This was docketed as G.R. Nos. 184461-62, the first above-captioned
case- subject of the present Decision.
Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeño, on the other hand, filed their own petition for review also
challenging the same September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court only insofar as the amparo
aspect is concerned. Their petition, docketed as G.R. No. 179994, was redocketed as G.R. No. 184495,
the second above-captioned case.
By Resolution of June 15, 2010, the Court ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 184495 with G.R. Nos.
1844461-62.24
Meanwhile, Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeño filed before the appellate court a Motion to Cite
Respondents in Contempt of Court for failure of the respondents in the amparo and habeas corpus cases
to comply with the directive of the appellate court to immediately release the three missing persons. By
Resolution of March 5, 2009,25 the appellate court denied the motion, ratiocinating thus:
While the Court, in the dispositive portion, ordered the respondents "to immediately RELEASE, or cause
the release, from detention the persons of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino," the
decision is not ipso facto executory. The use of the term "immediately" does not mean that that it is
automatically executory. There is nothing in the Rule on the Writ of Amparo which states that a decision
rendered is immediately executory. x x x.
Neither did the decision become final and executory considering that both parties questioned the In G.R. No. 184495, petitioners posit as follows:
Decision/Resolution before the Supreme Court. x x x.
5. The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief for Inspection of Places;
Besides, the Court has no basis. The petitioners did not file a motion for execution pending appeal under
Section 2 of Rule 39. There being no motion, the Court could not have issued, and did not issue, a writ of
6. The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief for Production of Documents;
execution. x x x. (underscoring supplied)

7. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Police Director Gen. Avelino Razon did
Via a petition for certiorari filed on March 30, 2009 before this Court, Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion
not make extraordinary diligence in investigating the enforced disappearance of the aggrieved
Empeño challenged the appellate court’s March 5, 2009 Resolution denying their motion to cite
parties…
respondents in contempt. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 187109, the last above-captioned case
subject of the present Decision.
8. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that this was not the command coming from the
highest echelon of powers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Philippine Army and the
Only Lt. Col. Anotado and Lt. Mirabelle remained of the original respondents in the amparo and habeas
Seventh Infantry Division of the Philippine Army to enforcibly disappear [sic] the aggrieved
corpus cases as the other respondents had retired from government service.26 The AFP has denied that
parties…
Arnel Enriquez was a member of the Philippine Army.27 The whereabouts of Donald Caigas remain
unknown.28
9. The Court of Appeals erred in dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party
respondent in this case;
In G.R. Nos. 184461-62, petitioners posit as follows:

10. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo had
I
command responsibility in the enforced disappearance and continued detention of the three
aggrieved parties…
…THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY MISAPPRECIATED THE VALUE OF THE TESTIMONY OF
RAYMOND MANALO.
11. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Armed Forces Chief of Staff then
Hermogenes Esperon and the Present Chief of Staff as having command responsibility in the
II enforced disappearance and continued detention of the three aggrieved parties…30

THE PETITION[S] FOR HABEAS CORPUS AND WRIT OF AMPARO SHOULD BE DISMISSED In G.R. No. 187109, petitioners raise the following issues:
BECAUSE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PROVE BY THE REQUIRED QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE THAT
PETITIONERS HAVE SHERLYN CADAPAN, KAREN EMPEñO AND MANUEL MERINO ARE IN THEIR
[1] Whether… the decision in the Court of Appeals has become final and executory[.]
CUSTODY.

[2] Whether…there is a need to file a motion for execution in a Habeas Corpus decision or in
III
an Amparo decision[.]

PETITIONERS’ DENIALS PER SE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN TAKEN AGAINST THEM BECAUSE
THEY DID NOT REALLY HAVE ANY INVOLVEMENT IN THE ALLEGED ABDUCTION; MOREOVER,
THE SUPPOSED INCONSISTENCIES IN THEIR TESTIMONIES ARE ON POINTS IRRELEVANT TO THE
PETITION.
IV
THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE ASSAILED DECISION IS VAGUE AND INCONGRUENT WITH
THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS.
V
THE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED AND FAILED TO RULE UPON THE FATAL PROCEDURAL
INFIRMITIES IN THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF AMPARO.29
[3] Whether…an appeal can stay the decision of a Habeas Corpus [case] [or] an Amparo
case[.]31
Essentially, the consolidated petitions present three primary issues, viz: a) whether the testimony of
Raymond Manalo is credible; b) whether the chief of the AFP, the commanding general of the Philippine
Army, as well as the heads of the concerned units had command responsibility over the abduction and
detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino; and c) whether there is a need to file a motion for execution to
cause the release of the aggrieved parties.
G.R. Nos. 184461-62
Petitioners Lt. Col. Boac, et al. contend that the appellate court erred in giving full credence to the
testimony of Manalo who could not even accurately describe the structures of Camp Tecson where he
claimed to have been detained along with Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. They underscore that Camp
Tecson is not under the jurisdiction of the 24th Infantry Batallion and that Manalo’s testimony is
incredible and full of inconsistencies.32
In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,33 an original petition for Prohibition, Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order which was treated as a petition under the Amparo Rule, said Rule having
taken effect during the pendency of the petition, the Court ruled on the truthfulness and veracity of the
personal account of Manalo which included his encounter with Sherlyn, Kara and Merino while on
detention. Thus it held:
We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent Raymond Manalo’s
affidavit and testimony, viz:
x x x x.
We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalo’s statements were not
corroborated by other independent and credible pieces of evidence. Raymond’s affidavit and testimony
were corroborated by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports
prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries
inflicted on respondents, also corroborate respondents’ accounts of the torture they endured while in
detention. Respondent Raymond Manalo’s familiarity with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the
"DTU," as shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the "Division Training Unit,"
firms up respondents’ story that they were detained for some time in said military facility. (citations
omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On Manalo’s having allegedly encountered Sherlyn, Karen and Merino while on detention, the Court in
the immediately cited case synthesized his tale as follows:
The next day, Raymond’s chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside the barracks. It was
then he learned that he was in a detachment of the Rangers. There were many soldiers, hundreds of
them were training. He was also ordered to clean inside the barracks. In one of the rooms therein, he
met Sherlyn Cadapan from Laguna. She told him that she was a student of the University of the
Philippines and was abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided that she had been subjected to severe
torture and raped. She was crying and longing to go home and be with her parents. During the day, her
chains were removed and she was made to do the laundry.
After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other captives,
Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room with "Allan" whose
name they later came to know as Donald Caigas, called "master" or "commander" by his men in the 24th
Infantry Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At times, Raymond and
Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up. In the daytime, their chains were removed, but
were put back on at night. They were threatened that if they escaped, their families would all be killed.
On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the detainees that they should be
thankful they were still alive and should continue along their "renewed life." Before the hearing of
November 6 or 8, 2006, respondents were brought to their parents to instruct them not to attend the
hearing. However, their parents had already left for Manila. Respondents were brought back to Camp
Tecson. They stayed in that camp from September 2006 to November 2006, and Raymond was
instructed to continue using the name "Oscar" and holding himself out as a military trainee. He got
acquainted with soldiers of the 24th Infantry Battalion whose names and descriptions he stated in his
affidavit.
On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel, were transferred to a
camp of the 24th Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There were many huts in the camp. They stayed in
that camp until May 8, 2007. Some soldiers of the battalion stayed with them. While there, battalion
soldiers whom Raymond knew as "Mar" and "Billy" beat him up and hit him in the stomach with their
guns. Sherlyn and Karen also suffered enormous torture in the camp. They were all made to clean, cook,
and help in raising livestock.
Raymond recalled that when "Operation Lubog" was launched, Caigas and some other soldiers brought
him and Manuel with them to take and kill all sympathizers of the NPA. They were brought to Barangay
Bayan-bayanan, Bataan where he witnessed the killing of an old man doing kaingin. The soldiers said he
was killed because he had a son who was a member of the NPA and he coddled NPA members in his
house. Another time, in another "Operation Lubog," Raymond was brought to Barangay Orion in a house
where NPA men stayed. When they arrived, only the old man of the house who was sick was there. They
spared him and killed only his son right before Raymond’s eyes.
From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred to Zambales, in a
safehouse near the sea. Caigas and some of his men stayed with them. A retired army soldier was in
charge of the house. Like in Limay, the five detainees were made to do errands and chores. They stayed
in Zambales from May 8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007.
In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and Manuel were
tasked to bring food to detainees brought to the camp. Raymond narrated what he witnessed and
experienced in the camp, viz:
x x x x.34 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Court takes judicial notice of its Decision in the just cited Secretary of National Defense v.
Manalo35 which assessed the account of Manalo to be a candid and forthright narrative of his and his
brother Reynaldo’s abduction by the military in 2006; and of the corroborative testimonies, in the same
case, of Manalo’s brother Reynaldo and a forensic specialist, as well as Manalo’s graphic description of
the detention area. There is thus no compelling reason for the Court, in the present case, to disturb its
appreciation in Manalo’s testimony. The outright denial of petitioners Lt. Col. Boac, et al. thus crumbles.
Petitioners go on to point out that the assailed Decision of the appellate court is "vague and incongruent
with [its] findings" for, so they contend, while the appellate court referred to the perpetrators as
"misguided and self-righteous civilian and military elements of the 7th Infantry Division," it failed to
identify who these perpetrators are. Moreover, petitioners assert that Donald Caigas and Arnel Enriquez
are not members of the AFP. They furthermore point out that their co-petitioners Generals Esperon,
Tolentino and Palparan have already retired from the service and thus have no more control of any
military camp or base in the country.36
There is nothing vague and/or incongruent about the categorical order of the appellate court for
petitioners to release Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. In its discourse, the appellate court merely referred to
"a few misguided self-righteous people who resort to the extrajudicial process of neutralizing those who
disagree with the country’s democratic system of government." Nowhere did it specifically refer to the
members of the 7th Infantry Division as the "misguided self-righteous" ones.
Petitioners finally point out that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen do not have the requisite standing to
file the amparo petition on behalf of Merino. They call attention to the fact that in the amparo petition,
the parents of Sherlyn and Karen merely indicated that they were "concerned with Manuel Merino" as
basis for filing the petition on his behalf.37
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo38 provides:
The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any qualified person or entity in the following
order:
(a) Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse, children and parents of the
aggrieved party;
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding
paragraph; or
(c) Any concerned citizen, organization, association or institution, if there is no known
member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party.
Indeed, the parents of Sherlyn and Karen failed to allege that there were no known members of the
immediate family or relatives of Merino. The exclusive and successive order mandated by the above-
quoted provision must be followed. The order of priority is not without reason—"to prevent the
indiscriminate and groundless filing of petitions for amparo which may even prejudice the right to life,
liberty or security of the aggrieved party."39
The Court notes that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen also filed the petition for habeas corpus on
Merino’s behalf. No objection was raised therein for, in a habeas corpus proceeding, any person may
apply for the writ on behalf of the aggrieved party.40
It is thus only with respect to the amparo petition that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen are precluded
from filing the application on Merino’s behalf as they are not authorized parties under the Rule.
G.R. No. 184495
Preliminarily, the Court finds the appellate court’s dismissal of the petitions against then President
Arroyo well-taken, owing to her immunity from suit at the time the habeas corpus and amparo petitions
were filed.41
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be
sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will
degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court
litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of
harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official
duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch
and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties
imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. x x x 42
Parenthetically, the petitions are bereft of any allegation that then President Arroyo permitted,
condoned or performed any wrongdoing against the three missing persons.
On the issue of whether a military commander may be held liable for the acts of his subordinates in an
amparo proceeding, a brief discussion of the concept of command responsibility and its application
insofar as amparo cases already decided by the Court is in order.
Rubrico v. Macapagal Arroyo43 expounded on the concept of command responsibility as follows:
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war
and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the
"responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or
other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict." In this sense, command
responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the
doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior
accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control
over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal
liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing
to prevent or punish the perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he ordered). (citations omitted; emphasis in
the original; underscoring supplied)44
It bears stressing that command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity,45 and thus a
substantive rule that points to criminal or administrative liability.
An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain the criminal liability of individuals or
entities involved. Neither does it partake of a civil or administrative suit.46 Rather, it is a remedial
measure designed to direct specified courses of action to government agencies to safeguard the
constitutional right to life, liberty and security of aggrieved individuals.47
Thus Razon Jr. v. Tagitis 48 enlightens:
[An amparo proceeding] does nor determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance
[threats thereof or extrajudicial killings]; it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the
enforced disappearance…for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance…49 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Further, Tagitis defines what constitutes "responsibility" and "accountability," viz:
x x x. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to
have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of
the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil
cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to
the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above;
or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of
disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is
justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved
and his liberty and security are restored.50 (emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Rubrico categorically denies the application of command responsibility in amparo cases to determine
criminal liability.51 The Court maintains its adherence to this pronouncement as far as amparo cases are
concerned.
Rubrico, however, recognizes a preliminary yet limited application of command responsibility in amparo
cases to instances of determining the responsible or accountable individuals or entities that are duty-
bound to abate any transgression on the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be
only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address,
the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial
measures that may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo.
As intimated earlier, however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on
respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary
proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if there be any.52 (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In fine, the appellate court erred in ruling that its directive to immediately release Sherlyn, Karen and
Merino was not automatically executory. For that would defeat the very purpose of having summary
proceedings56 in amparo petitions. Summary proceedings, it bears emphasis, are immediately executory
without prejudice to further appeals that may be taken therefrom.57
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing discussions, the Court renders the following judgment:

In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify
1. The Petitions in G.R. Nos. 184461-62 and G.R. No. 184495 are DISMISSED. The Decision of
those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an
the Court of Appeals dated September 17, 2008 is AFFIRMED with modification in that
amparo court would issue.53 In such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal
respondents in G.R. No. 184495, namely Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado, Lt. Francis Mirabelle Samson,
responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect the
Gen. Jovito Palparan, Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac, Arnel Enriquez and Donald Caigas are ordered to
rights of the aggrieved party.
immediately release Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino from detention.

Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a preliminary
The petitions against Generals Esperon, Razon and Tolentino are DISMISSED.
determination of criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further investigation by the
appropriate government agency.
2. The petition in G.R. No. 187109 is GRANTED. The named respondents are directed to
forthwith comply with the September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court. Owing to the
Relatedly, the legislature came up with Republic Act No. 985154 (RA 9851) to include command
retirement and/or reassignment to other places of assignment of some of the respondents
responsibility as a form of criminal complicity in crimes against international humanitarian law, genocide
herein and in G.R. No. 184495, the incumbent commanding general of the 7th Infantry
and other crimes.55 RA 9851 is thus the substantive law that definitively imputes criminal liability to
Division and the incumbent battalion commander of the 24th Infantry Battalion, both of the
those superiors who, despite their position, still fail to take all necessary and reasonable measures within
Philippine Army, are enjoined to fully ensure the release of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño
their power to prevent or repress the commission of illegal acts or to submit these matters to the
and Manuel Merino from detention.1awphi1
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.

Respondents Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado, Lt. Francis Mirabelle Samson, Gen. Jovito Palparan, Lt.
The Court finds that the appellate court erred when it did not specifically name the respondents that it
Col. Rogelio Boac, Arnel Enriquez and Donald Caigas shall remain personally impleaded in the
found to be responsible for the abduction and continued detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. For,
petitions to answer for any responsibilities and/or accountabilities they may have incurred
from the records, it appears that the responsible and accountable individuals are Lt. Col. Anotado, Lt.
during their incumbencies.
Mirabelle, Gen. Palparan, Lt. Col. Boac, Arnel Enriquez and Donald Caigas. They should thus be made to
comply with the September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court to IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Sherlyn,
Karen and Merino. Let copies of this Decision and the records of these cases be furnished the Department of Justice (DOJ),
the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for further
investigation to determine the respective criminal and administrative liabilities of respondents.
The petitions against Generals Esperon, Razon and Tolentino should be dismissed for lack of merit as
there is no showing that they were even remotely accountable and responsible for the abduction and
continued detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. All the present petitions are REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action, directed at
monitoring of the DOJ, PNP and AFP investigations and the validation of their results.
G.R. No. 187109.
Andal v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 138268, 26 May 1999
Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, there is no need to file a motion for execution for an
The power of judicial review is an aspect of judicial power that allows this Court every opportunity to
amparo or habeas corpus decision. Since the right to life, liberty and security of a person is at stake, the
review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may
proceedings should not be delayed and execution of any decision thereon must be expedited as soon as
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts and to determine whether or not there has been a
possible since any form of delay, even for a day, may jeopardize the very rights that these writs seek to
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
immediately protect.
instrumentality of the government. 1

The Solicitor General’s argument that the Rules of Court supplement the Rule on the Writ of Amparo is
misplaced. The Rules of Court only find suppletory application in an amparo proceeding if the Rules
strengthen, rather than weaken, the procedural efficacy of the writ. As it is, the Rule dispenses with
dilatory motions in view of the urgency in securing the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.
Suffice it to state that a motion for execution is inconsistent with the extraordinary and expeditious
remedy being offered by an amparo proceeding.
The case before us is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Jury Andal, Ricardo Andal and Dewing
Mendoza, all convicted of rape with homicide in Criminal Case No. 148-94 and 149-94, Regional Trial
Court, Batangas, Branch 05, Lemery, affirmed by this Court in a decision en banc promulgated on
September 25, 1997, and a resolution promulgated on February 17, 1998. They are scheduled for
execution on June 16, 17, and 18, 1999. Petitioners seek a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of a claim
of mistrial and/or that the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Batangas, Branch 05, Lemery, was void.
They pray for a temporary restraining order to stay their execution and/or a preliminary injunction
enjoining their execution.

The petitioners rely on the argument that the trial court was "ousted" of jurisdiction to try their case
since the pre-trial identification of the accused was made without the assistance of counsel and without
a valid waiver from the accused. The petitioners cite the case of Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 2
wherein in a separate opinion, Justice Claudio Teehankee stated that "Once a deprivation of a
constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of its
jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the detention."cralaw
virtua1aw library
We agree with petitioners that the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to
inquire into questions of violation of the petitioners’ constitutional rights and that this Court has
jurisdiction to entertain this review. Indeed, under the Constitution, the jurisdiction of this Court has
been expanded "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." 3
And under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, it is provided that "Except as otherwise
expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto."cralaw virtua1aw library
He may also avail himself of the writ where as a consequence of a judicial proceeding (a) there has been
a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no
jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is
void as to such excess. 4 reports of perceived irregular disposition of petitions for habeas corpus by the said court.
However, in this case, we find that there was no violation of the constitutional rights of the accused and
a resultant deprivation of liberty or due process of law. In fact, the petition may be viewed as an attempt
at a second motion for reconsideration of a final decision of the Court, disguised as one for habeas
corpus. The accused were sentenced to the supreme penalty of death as a result of a valid accusation,
trial, and judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, after a fair and equitable
trial.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The factual milieu does not show a mistrial or a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused. As
ruled by this Court, in its decision of September 25, 1997, "the constitutional infirmity cannot affect the
conclusion since accused-appellants did not make any confessions or admissions in regard to the crime
charged. Further the earring recovered from Jury Andal was not obtained in the course of the
investigation itself, but obtained through a search incident to a lawful arrest." 5
The Court has held in a long line of cases, that "any illegality attendant during the arrest is deemed cured
when the accused voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court by entering their
plea." 6 absence of copies of the judgment of conviction; (e) failure of the court stenographer to transcribe the
The trial court therefore had jurisdiction to try the case. The Court subsequently affirmed the decision
based on a careful consideration of the evidence presented both by the prosecution and the defense.
The absence of the testimony of Rufino Andal due to the failure of the defense counsel to present him as
a witness will not make the judgment of the lower court invalid or void. The case was decided on the
evidence presented, which this Court considered sufficient to support the judgment of conviction.
The issue of "DNA tests" as a more accurate and authoritative means of identification than eye-witness
identification need not be belabored. The accused were all properly and duly identified by the
prosecution’s principal witness, Olimpio Corrales, a brother in law of accused Jurry and Ricardo Andal.
DNA testing proposed by petitioners to have an objective and scientific basis of identification of "semen
samples to compare with those taken from the vagina of the victim" are thus unnecessary or are
forgotten evidence too late to consider now.
The trial court imposed and this Court affirmed the correct sentence.
The death penalty is what the law prescribes in cases involving rape with homicide. 7
We agree with the accused that they should be afforded every opportunity to prove their innocence,
especially in cases involving the death penalty; in this case, the Court can state categorically that every
opportunity was provided the accused. However painful the decision may be in this case, we have
conscientiously reviewed the case.
Four (4) Justices of the Court maintain their position as to the unconstitutionality of Republic Act No.
7659 in so far as it prescribes the death penalty for certain heinous crimes; nevertheless, they submit to
the ruling of the majority to the effect that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty may be
lawfully imposed in proper cases as the one at bar.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hereby resolve to DENY the petition for habeas corpus, and declare valid the
judgment rendered by the trial court and affirmed by this Court. This resolution is
final.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
OCA v. Perello, et al., A.M. No. RTJ-05-1952, 24 December 2008
The instant case stemmed from the judicial audit conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) in all seven (7) branches of the Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa City, including Branch 276 then
presided by herein respondent Judge Norma C. Perello (Judge Perello). The audit was prompted by
In its Memorandum1 dated January 25, 2004 and submitted to the OCA, the audit team reported that for
the period 1998-2004, a total of 219 petitions for habeas corpus were assigned to Branch 276, the
subject matters of which are classified into (a) hospitalization; (b) custody of minors; (c) illegal possession
of firearms; and (d) violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972. The records for 22 of these cases were not presented to the audit team, while the case
folders of about a hundred cases did not contain copies of the decisions of conviction. The audit team
also noted a huge disparity in the number of petitions for habeas corpus raffled in Branch 276 as against
those raffled in the other branches, which led the team to doubt if the raffle had been conducted with
strict regularity considering the fact that Judge Perello was the Executive Judge that time.
The audit team likewise reported several substantive and procedural lapses relative to the disposition of
habeas corpus cases in Branch 276, such as (a) failure of the branch clerk of court to present to the audit
team the case folders of 22 petitions and to send notices/summons to the Office of the Solicitor General
or the Office of the City Prosecutor; (b) lack of return of the writs issued to the officials of the Bureau of
Corrections; (c) absence of certificate of detention/confinement from the Bureau of Corrections; (d)
stenographic notes and attach the transcript to the records of each case; and (f) failure on the part of the
court interpreter to prepare the Minutes of the court sessions or hearings.
Finally, the audit team observed that in some of the petitions for habeas corpus, respondent Judge
Perello erred in ordering the release of the prisoners before they have served the full term of their
sentence.
Thus, the audit team recommended to the OCA to consider the judicial audit report as an administrative
complaint against (a) Judge Perello and Clerk of Court Atty. Luis Bucayon II for gross ignorance of the law,
grave abuse of discretion and grave misconduct; and (b) Court Stenographers Thelma Mangilit, Cecilio
Argame, Maricar Eugenio and Radigunda Laman, and Court Interpreter Paul Resurreccion for gross
inefficiency.
In its Resolution dated March 2, 2005, the Court adopted the aforesaid recommendation.2

The OCA, through its 1st Indorsement dated September 9, 2005, directed the herein respondents to
comment on the audit team's recommendations.3
In her Comment4 dated October 10, 2005, Judge Perello opined that "the Audit Team that evaluated
these Habeas corpus cases filed with this Court are probably not lawyers, hence, are not conversant with
the Constitution, with jurisprudence, and the Rules on the grant of the Writ of Habeas corpus and the
retroactivity of laws." She insisted that her decisions ordering the release of the prisoners who were
serving their sentence for illegal possession of firearms and violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act were in
accordance with law and jurisprudence. For those convicted of illegal possession of firearms under the
old law (Presidential Decree No. 1866), she applied retroactively the provisions of the amendatory law or
R.A. No. 8294,5 pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code which provides for the retroactive
application of laws that are favorable to the accused even to those already convicted and serving
sentence. Inasmuch as R.A. No. 8294 imposed the penalty of six (6) years only, it was incumbent upon
her to grant the writs to those prisoners who have been imprisoned for eight (8) years already. For those
convicted for violation of R.A. No. 6425, she applied the said law and not the amendatory law or R.A. No.
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, mainly because it
aggravated the penalty and is therefore not favorable to them.
To refute the accusations against her, Judge Perello enumerated her credentials and qualifications and
alleged that most of her decisions were upheld by the Court attesting to her competence in applying the
law. She claimed that in all the petitions she granted, the prisoners therein were all cleared by the
National Bureau of Investigation to have no pending cases. The Bureau of Corrections was always
directed to produce the records and reason for the confinement of the concerned prisoners. If from the
records, the prisoner was found to have already served more than the maximum of the imposable
penalty, then she would order the release of the prisoner in open court, without fear or favor. Judge
Perello asserted that she had served with utmost dedication and honesty in all her more than 40 years of
government service.
For his part, Atty. Luis Bucayon II, Branch Clerk of Court, explained in his Comment6 that while he failed
to present the case folders and records of 22 petitions to the audit team at the time the audit was
conducted at their branch, there was an agreement between him and the audit team that the latter
could pick up these folders and records before the end of their audit. However, the audit team failed to
return to get these case records. He claimed to be baffled as to how his alleged failure to make the
records available to the audit team could constitute gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion
and grave misconduct. Atty. Bucayon likewise manifested that he had transferred to the Public
Attorney's Office of the Department of Justice as of July 26, 2004 and was issued a clearance by the OCA.
On the other hand, Court Interpreter Paul Resurreccion averred in his Comment7 that all petitions for
habeas corpus have their corresponding Minutes but these were not attached to the records because
the Branch Clerk of Court refused to put his remarks and findings thereon. He further claims that he
always made it a point to prepare the Minutes and his co-employees could attest to this fact.
Finally, Thelma Mangilit, Cecilio Argame, Maricar Eugenio and Radigunda Laman, all Stenographers of
Branch 276, submitted their Joint Comment8 dated October 12, 2005 and Joint Supplemental Comment9
dated October 19, 2005. According to them, Branch 276 had the heaviest case load among all the
branches in Muntinlupa City. Despite this, they allegedly religiously attended the hearings and
transcribed their notes thereafter. With respect to the petitions for habeas corpus, they saw no need to
transcribe their stenographic notes as the proceedings therein were non-adversarial in nature. They
prioritized those cases which were adversarial and on appeal.
In the Agenda Report10 dated March 9, 2006, then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
submitted the following recommendations:
1. respondent Judge Norma C. Perello be FOUND GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE and be meted the penalty of SUSPENSION for three (3) months without salary and
benefit;
2. the complaint against Atty. Luis Bucayon be DISMISSED for being moot and academic;
3. respondents Court Stenographers Thelma Mangilit, Cecilio Argame, Maricar Eugenio and Radigunda
Laman and respondent Court Interpreter Paul Resurreccion be FOUND GUILTY of SIMPLE NEGLECT OF
DUTY and be FINED in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).11
The Court thereafter referred the administrative matter to Justice Conrado Molina, Consultant of OCA,
for investigation, report and recommendation.12
On August 1, 2007, the Court required the parties to manifest their willingness to submit the case for
decision on the basis of the pleadings filed.13 All the respondents manifested that they were submitting
the case for decision.
On November 21, 2007, Justice Molina submitted his report and adopted entirely the recommendations
of the Court Administrator.14
We agree with the findings of the Court Administrator as adopted by the Investigating Justice, but modify
the recommendation in regard to the penalty imposed upon Judge Perello.
It is the contention of Judge Perello that the prisoners she released were all convicted under the old law,
R.A. No. 6425, and not under the new law, R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 which imposes the penalty of life imprisonment to death regardless of the
quantity of the drug involved.15 She maintains that the provisions of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be given
retroactive effect insofar as these prisoners are concerned for the main reason that it would not be
favorable to them. Thus, according to Judge Perello, the provisions of R.A. No. 6425, as interpreted in the
case of People v. Simon,16 must be applied to the released prisoners. Citing the Simon case, she insisted
that the maximum imposable penalty for violation of R.A. No. 6425 where the quantity involved is 750
grams or less is six (6) months only, which was the reason why she ordered the immediate release of the
prisoners because they had already served two (2) years of imprisonment.
While we agree with respondent judge that R.A. No. 9165 cannot be retroactively applied to the
prisoners involved in the cases audited, we, however, are not impressed with Judge Perello's justification
in granting the writs. Such ratiocination on her part betrays a lack of understanding of the rule on
graduation of penalties. Nowhere in the cited case of Simon does it state that the maximum penalty shall
be six (6) months where the quantity is less than 750 grams. The Simon case clarified the penalty to be
imposed vis-à-vis the quantity of the drug involved, such that prision correccional shall be imposed if the
drug is below 250 grams; prision mayor if the quantity is from 250 to 499 grams; and reclusion temporal
if the drug is from 500 to 750 grams.17 The same case likewise declared that while modifying
circumstances may be appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even
reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable
penalty beyond or lower than prision correccional.18
The penalty of prision correccional is composed of three periods ─ the minimum which ranges from 6
months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months, the medium which is from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4
years and 2 months, and the maximum which ranges from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years. As
found by the audit team, Judge Perello considered only the minimum period of prision correccional in
granting the writs for habeas corpus such that when the prisoners had served imprisonment for a period
of two (2) years, she immediately ordered their release. This is clearly erroneous because the petition for
habeas corpus cannot be granted if the accused has only served the minimum of his sentence as he must
serve his sentence up to its maximum term.19 The maximum range of prision correccional is from 4
years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years. This is the period which the prisoners must have served before
their applications for writs of habeas corpus may be granted.
In obstinately granting the writs of habeas corpus even if the convicted prisoners had only served the
minimum period of their sentence, Judge Perello displayed a blatant disregard of the rule on graduation
of penalties as well as settled jurisprudence tantamount to gross ignorance of the law. As a trial judge,
respondent is the visible representation of law and justice. Under Canon 1.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, she is expected to be "the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence." Judges
are expected to keep abreast of developments in law and jurisprudence.20 He should strive for
excellence exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the personification of justice and
the Rule of Law. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it;
anything less than that would be gross ignorance of the law.21 Judge Perello must thereby have more
than a cursory knowledge of the law on graduation of penalties and the imposable penalty for violation
of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Indeed, the facts obtaining in this case speak of other dubious
circumstances affecting Judge Perello's integrity and competence too glaring to ignore.
Notably, the record shows that Judge Perello granted the writs of habeas corpus even without the
pertinent copies of detention and judgment of conviction.22 This is contrary to the provisions of Section
3(d) of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 3. Requisites of application therefor. - Application for the writ shall be by petition signed and verified
either by the party for whose relief it is intended, of by some person in his behalf, and shall set forth:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) A copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person, if it can be procured without
impairing the efficiency of the remedy; xxx.
The Rules clearly require that a copy of the commitment or cause of detention must accompany the
application for the writ of habeas corpus. Obviously, Judge Perello deviated from the guidelines laid
down in Section 3(d) of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. It must be emphasized that rules of procedure
have been formulated and promulgated by this Court to ensure the speedy and efficient administration
of justice. Failure to abide by these rules undermines the wisdom behind them and diminishes respect
for the rule of law. Judges should therefore administer their office with due regard to the integrity of the
system of law itself, remembering that they are not depositories of arbitrary power, but judges under
the sanction of law.23 Indeed, Judge Perello's stubborn unwillingness to act in accordance with the rules
and settled jurisprudence shows her refusal to reform herself and to correct a wrong, tantamount to
grave abuse of discretion.
Be that as it may, however, we agree with the Court Administrator that there is no merit in the charge of
grave misconduct leveled against Judge Perello. For grave misconduct to exist, the judicial act
complained of should be corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or a persistent disregard of
well-known legal rules.24 Here, it appears that she was not motivated by any corrupt or vicious motive.
As the Court Administrator puts it:
xxx. Except for the insinuation that there has been connivance among all court staff in railroading the
process of handling these cases, there was no showing that in releasing the petitioners prematurely,
respondent was motivated by corrupt motives. On the contrary, respondent vehemently denies this
accusation. In her comment, she stated that she protests with pain that she has always been viewed and
unjustly condemned as a wrongdoer on an erroneous impression that she had benefited and had reaped
riches for doing her job which she did with compassion, fairness and justice as the law and jurisprudence
dictates. Indeed, if respondent judge or a court employee should be disciplined for a grave offense, the
evidence against him should be competent and derived from direct knowledge. Charges based on mere
suspicion should not be given credence.25
At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that Judge Perello had been previously charged with and found
guilty of committing several administrative infractions, namely: (1) gross ignorance of the law for which
she was suspended for six (6) months;26 (2) undue delay in transmitting to the Court of Appeals the
records of a case for which she was fined P20,000.00;27 (3) dereliction of duty for which she was fined
P5,000.00;28 (4) conduct unbecoming a judge for which she was admonished;29 and most recently (5)
grave abuse of discretion, grave abuse of authority, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, gross
ignorance of the law and/or procedure for which she was fined in the amount of P10,000.00.30 It is
therefore evident that Judge Perello had a penchant for committing infractions during her tenure.
In sum, we find Judge Perello liable for ignorance of the law and jurisprudence and for abuse of
discretion. These are serious charges under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court. Section 11
of the same Rule provides that any of the following sanctions may be imposed upon Judge Perello:
Sec. 11. Sanctions. ─ A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may
be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned
and controlled corporations. Provided, however, that forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include
accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six
(6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
The OCA imposed the penalty of suspension for three (3) months on Judge Perello. In view, however, of
Judge Perello's compulsory retirement31 which makes suspension impossible to impose, the proper
action is to impose a fine on her in the maximum amount of P40,000.00, deductible from her retirement
pay.
With regard to Atty. Bucayon's liability, the charges against him all pertained to his duties as Branch Clerk
of Court. It must be noted that during the pendency of this administrative case against him, Atty.
Bucayon had transferred to the Public Attorney's Office of the Department of Justice on July 26, 2004
and was accordingly issued a clearance by the OCA. Thus, we accept the OCA's recommendation to
dismiss the charges against him for being moot.
On the liability of Court Stenographers Mangilit, Argame, Eugenio and Laman, Administrative Circular 24-
9032 imposes upon all court stenographers the duty to transcribe all stenographic notes and to attach
the transcripts of such notes to the records of each case not later than twenty (20) days from the time
the notes were taken. The records reveal that respondent stenographers failed to transcribe the
stenographic notes and attach them to the records of each case. By their own admission, they did not
bother to transcribe the notes as the proceedings were non-adversarial in nature. We find this
explanation unacceptable considering that the requirement under the Circular applies to all proceedings
whether adversarial or not.
For their shortcomings in the transcription of the stenographic notes, respondent stenographers have
shown their utter lack of dedication to the functions of their office. As trial court stenographers, they
know, or ought to know, that they perform an important role in running the machinery of our trial court
system and that transcripts of stenographic notes are vital for the speedy disposition of cases. Their
dereliction of duty which may jeopardize public faith and confidence in our judicial system should not be
countenanced. We, thus, find respondent stenographers guilty of simple neglect of duty. While said
offense carries a penalty of one month and one day to six months suspension under the Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,33 we deem it reasonable and sufficient to instead impose a
fine of P5,000.00, as recommended by the OCA, considering that it was their first offense. While this
Court is duty-bound to sternly wield a corrective hand to discipline its errant employees and to weed out
those who are undesirable, this Court also has the discretion to temper the harshness of its judgment
with mercy.
Finally, as to Court Interpreter Resurreccion, the record would show that he had been remiss in his duty
to prepare the Minutes of the sessions or hearings and attach them to the records of each case. He
cannot escape liability by passing on the blame to the Branch Clerk of Court whom he claimed refused to
put his remarks on the Minutes. Resurreccion's explanation is too flimsy to excuse him from
administrative liability. Among the duties of court interpreters is to prepare and sign "all Minutes of the
session."35 After every session they must prepare the Minutes and attach it. The Minutes is a very
important document because it gives a brief summary of the events that took place at the session or
hearing of a case. It is in fact a capsulized history of the case at a given session or hearing, for it states the
date and time of the session; the names of the judge, clerk of court, court stenographer, and court
interpreter who were present; the names of the counsel for the parties who appeared; the party
presenting evidence; the names of witnesses who testified; the documentary evidence marked; and the
date of the next hearing.36 Failure to prepare the Minutes and attach them to the records of a case
constitutes simple neglect of duty and warrants disciplinary action. Accordingly, Resurreccion is hereby
fined the same amount of P5,000.00 as recommended by the OCA.
We take this occasion once more to impress upon all respondents that the conduct of every person
connected with the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowest clerk, is
circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility. A public office is a public trust. Since public officers
are accountable to the people at all times, they must strictly perform their duties and responsibilities. As
the administration of justice is a sacred task, this Court condemns any omission or act that may diminish
the faith of the people in the judiciary.37
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds Judge Norma C. Perello GUILTY of gross ignorance of the
law and abuse of discretion, for which she is meted a fine of P40,000.00 to be deducted from her
retirement benefits. Court Stenographers Thelma Mangilit, Cecilio Argame, Maricar Eugenio and
Radigunda Laman, and Court Interpreter Paul Resurreccion are found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty,
for which they are each meted a fine of P5,000.00, and sternly warned that a repetition of the same shall
be dealt with more severely.
For being moot, the charges against Atty. Luis Bucayon II are hereby DISMISSED.
Arigo, et al. v. Swift, et al., G.R. No. 206510, 16 September 2014
Before us is a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) under Rule 7 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, otherwise known as the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (Rules), involving violations of environmental laws and
regulations in relation to the grounding of the US military ship USS Guardian over the Tubbataha Reefs.
Factual Background
The name "Tubbataha" came from the Samal (seafaring people of southern Philippines) language which
means "long reef exposed at low tide." Tubbataha is composed of two huge coral atolls - the north atoll
and the south atoll - and the Jessie Beazley Reef, a smaller coral structure about 20 kilometers north of
the atolls. The reefs of Tubbataha and Jessie Beazley are considered part of Cagayancillo, a remote island
municipality of Palawan.1
In 1988, Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by virtue of Proclamation No. 306 issued by
President Corazon C. Aquino on August 11, 1988. Located in the middle of Central Sulu Sea, 150
kilometers southeast of Puerto Princesa City, Tubbataha lies at the heart of the Coral Triangle, the global
center of marine biodiversity.
In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) as a World Heritage Site. It was recognized as one of the Philippines' oldest ecosystems,
containing excellent examples of pristine reefs and a high diversity of marine life. The 97,030-hectare
protected marine park is also an important habitat for internationally threatened and endangered
marine species. UNESCO cited Tubbataha's outstanding universal value as an important and significant
natural habitat for in situ conservation of biological diversity; an example representing significant on-
going ecological and biological processes; and an area of exceptional natural beauty and aesthetic
importance.2
On April 6, 2010, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067,3 otherwise known as the "Tubbataha
Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009" "to ensure the protection and conservation of the globally
significant economic, biological, sociocultural, educational and scientific values of the Tubbataha Reefs
into perpetuity for the enjoyment of present and future generations." Under the "no-take" policy, entry
into the waters of TRNP is strictly regulated and many human activities are prohibited and penalized or
fined, including fishing, gathering, destroying and disturbing the resources within the TRNP. The law
likewise created the Tubbataha Protected Area Management Board (TPAMB) which shall be the sole
policy-making and permit-granting body of the TRNP.
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December 2012, the
US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel "to enter and exit the
territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship
replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty."4 On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic
Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.1âwphi1
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar,
Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the
northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No
cine was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
On January 20, 2013, U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift, expressed regret for the
incident in a press statement.5 Likewise, US Ambassador to the Philippines Harry K. Thomas, Jr., in a
meeting at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on February 4, "reiterated his regrets over the
grounding incident and assured Foreign Affairs Secretazy Albert F. del Rosario that the United States will
provide appropriate compensation for damage to the reef caused by the ship."6 By March 30, 2013, the
US Navy-led salvage team had finished removing the last piece of the grounded ship from the coral reef.
On April 1 7, 2013, the above-named petitioners on their behalf and in representation of their respective
sector/organization and others, including minors or generations yet unborn, filed the present petition
agairtst Scott H. Swift in his capacity as Commander of the US 7th Fleet, Mark A. Rice in his capacity as
Commanding Officer of the USS Guardian and Lt. Gen. Terry G. Robling, US Marine Corps Forces, Pacific
and Balikatan 2013 Exercises Co-Director ("US respondents"); President Benigno S. Aquino III in his
capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), DF A Secretary Albert F.
Del Rosario, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr., Secretary Voltaire T. Gazmin (Department of
National Defense), Secretary Jesus P. Paje (Department of Environment and Natural Resources), Vice-
Admiral Jose Luis M. Alano (Philippine Navy Flag Officer in Command, AFP), Admiral Rodolfo D. Isorena
(Philippine Coast Guard Commandant), Commodore Enrico Efren Evangelista (Philippine Coast Guard-
Palawan), and Major General Virgilio 0. Domingo (AFP Commandant), collectively the "Philippine
respondents."
The Petition
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause
and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan,
Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu,
and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology. They
also seek a directive from this Court for the institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts
committed in violation of environmental laws and regulations in connection with the grounding incident.
Specifically, petitioners cite the following violations committed by US respondents under R.A. No. 10067:
unauthorized entry (Section 19); non-payment of conservation fees (Section 21 ); obstruction of law
enforcement officer (Section 30); damages to the reef (Section 20); and destroying and disturbing
resources (Section 26[g]). Furthermore, petitioners assail certain provisions of the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA) which they want this Court to nullify for being unconstitutional.
c. Declare that Philippine authorities may exercise primary and exclusive criminal jurisdiction
over erring U.S. personnel under the circumstances of this case;
d. Require Respondents to pay just and reasonable compensation in the settlement of all
meritorious claims for damages caused to the Tubbataha Reef on terms and conditions no
less severe than those applicable to other States, and damages for personal injury or death, if
such had been the case;
e. Direct Respondents to cooperate in providing for the attendance of witnesses and in the
collection and production of evidence, including seizure and delivery of objects connected
with the offenses related to the grounding of the Guardian;
f. Require the authorities of the Philippines and the United States to notify each other of the
disposition of all cases, wherever heard, related to the grounding of the Guardian;

The numerous reliefs sought in this case are set forth in the final prayer of the petition, to wit:
g. Restrain Respondents from proceeding with any purported restoration, repair, salvage or
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Petitioners respectfully pray that the Honorable Court: 1.
post salvage plan or plans, including cleanup plans covering the damaged area of the
Immediately issue upon the filing of this petition a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO)
Tubbataha Reef absent a just settlement approved by the Honorable Court;
and/or a Writ of Kalikasan, which shall, in particular,

h. Require Respondents to engage in stakeholder and LOU consultations in accordance with

a. Order Respondents and any person acting on their behalf, to cease and desist all operations
the Local Government Code and R.A. 10067;
over the Guardian grounding incident;

i. Require Respondent US officials and their representatives to place a deposit to the TRNP
b. Initially demarcating the metes and bounds of the damaged area as well as an additional
Trust Fund defined under Section 17 of RA 10067 as a bona .fide gesture towards full
buffer zone;
reparations;

c. Order Respondents to stop all port calls and war games under 'Balikatan' because of the
j. Direct Respondents to undertake measures to rehabilitate the areas affected by the
absence of clear guidelines, duties, and liability schemes for breaches of those duties, and
grounding of the Guardian in light of Respondents' experience in the Port Royale grounding in
require Respondents to assume responsibility for prior and future environmental damage in
2009, among other similar grounding incidents;
general, and environmental damage under the Visiting Forces Agreement in particular.

k. Require Respondents to regularly publish on a quarterly basis and in the name of

d. Temporarily define and describe allowable activities of ecotourism, diving, recreation, and
transparency and accountability such environmental damage assessment, valuation, and
limited commercial activities by fisherfolk and indigenous communities near or around the
valuation methods, in all stages of negotiation;
TRNP but away from the damaged site and an additional buffer zone;

l. Convene a multisectoral technical working group to provide scientific and technical support
2. After summary hearing, issue a Resolution extending the TEPO until further orders of the
to the TPAMB;
Court;

3. After due proceedings, render a Decision which shall include, without limitation:
a. Order Respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, following the dispositive portion of Nicolas
v. Romulo, "to forthwith negotiate with the United States representatives for the appropriate
agreement on [environmental guidelines and environmental accountability] under Philippine
authorities as provided in Art. V[] of the VFA ... "
b. Direct Respondents and appropriate agencies to commence administrative, civil, and
criminal proceedings against erring officers and individuals to the full extent of the law, and to
make such proceedings public;
m. Order the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of National Defense, and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources to review the Visiting Forces Agreement
and the Mutual Defense Treaty to consider whether their provisions allow for the exercise of
erga omnes rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and for damages which follow from
any violation of those rights;
n. Narrowly tailor the provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement for purposes of protecting
the damaged areas of TRNP;
o. Declare the grant of immunity found in Article V ("Criminal Jurisdiction") and Article VI of
the Visiting Forces Agreement unconstitutional for violating equal protection and/or for
violating the preemptory norm of nondiscrimination incorporated as part of the law of the
land under Section 2, Article II, of the Philippine Constitution;
 p. Allow for continuing discovery measures;
q. Supervise marine wildlife rehabilitation in the Tubbataha Reefs in all other respects; and
4. Provide just and equitable environmental rehabilitation measures and such other reliefs as
are just and equitable under the premises.7 (Underscoring supplied.)
Since only the Philippine respondents filed their comment8 to the petition, petitioners also filed a motion
for early resolution and motion to proceed ex parte against the US respondents.9
Respondents' Consolidated Comment
In their consolidated comment with opposition to the application for a TEPO and ocular inspection and
production orders, respondents assert that: ( 1) the grounds relied upon for the issuance of a TEPO or
writ of Kalikasan have become fait accompli as the salvage operations on the USS Guardian were already
completed; (2) the petition is defective in form and substance; (3) the petition improperly raises issues
involving the VFA between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America; and ( 4) the
determination of the extent of responsibility of the US Government as regards the damage to the
Tubbataha Reefs rests exdusively with the executive branch.
The Court's Ruling
As a preliminary matter, there is no dispute on the legal standing of petitioners to file the present
petition.
Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." 10 Specifically, it is "a
party's personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result" of the act being challenged, and "calls for more than just a generalized grievance."11 However, the
rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the subject
matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.12
In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,13 we recognized the "public right" of citizens to "a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law." We declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in
the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance
with intergenerational implications.1âwphi1 Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment.14
On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not
only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they
can do so in representation of their own and future generations. Thus:
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find
no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be
based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of
nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to
the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present a:: well
as future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that
rhythm and harmony for the full 1:njoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently,
the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to
come.15 (Emphasis supplied.)
The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet
unborn, is now enshrined in the Rules which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases. The
provision on citizen suits in the Rules "collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on
the principle that humans are stewards of nature."16
Having settled the issue of locus standi, we shall address the more fundamental question of whether this
Court has jurisdiction over the US respondents who did not submit any pleading or manifestation in this
case.
The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability
of the State,17 is expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution which states:
Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.
In United States of America v. Judge Guinto,18 we discussed the principle of state immunity from suit, as
follows:
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now · expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of
the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have
adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2. x x x.
Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of
international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of
states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and
consequence of its membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission to such society, the state is
automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with other states.
As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice
Holmes that ''there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right
depends." [Kawanakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349] There are other practical reasons for the enforcement
of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the
added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All states are sovereign
equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a
celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations." [De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 17 Q. B. 171]
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the
discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself
to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same,. such as the appropriation of the amount needed to
pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it
has not been formally impleaded. [Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120] In such a situation, the state may
move to dismiss the comp.taint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent. 19 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Under the American Constitution, the doctrine is expressed in the Eleventh Amendment which reads:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.
In the case of Minucher v. Court of Appeals,20 we further expounded on the immunity of foreign states
from the jurisdiction of local courts, as follows:
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of
customary international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign
from suit and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the
head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity. If the
acts giving rise to a suit arc those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not
necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by
the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is
believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an
individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim -par in parem, non habet imperium -
that all states are soverr~ign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication, in
broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official would rec 1uire the state itself to perform an
affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages
decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been
formally impleaded.21 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the same case we also mentioned that in the case of diplomatic immunity, the privilege is not an
immunity from the observance of the law of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is,
rather, an immunity from the exercise of territorial jurisdiction.22
In United States of America v. Judge Guinto,23 one of the consolidated cases therein involved a Filipino
employed at Clark Air Base who was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by two officers
of the US Air Force, and was eventually dismissed from his employment when he was charged in court
for violation of R.A. No. 6425. In a complaint for damages filed by the said employee against the military
officers, the latter moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the suit was against the US Government
which had not given its consent. The RTC denied the motion but on a petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed before this Court, we reversed the RTC and dismissed the complaint. We held that
petitioners US military officers were acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted
the buy-bust operation against the complainant and thereafter testified against him at his trial. It follows
that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for
acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.
This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another
State without the former's consent or waiver has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes
sovereign and governmental acts (Jure imperil") from private, commercial and proprietary acts (Jure
gestionis). Under the restrictive rule of State immunity, State immunity extends only to acts Jure imperii.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.24
In Shauf v. Court of Appeals,25 we discussed the limitations of the State immunity principle, thus:
It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts
contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by JustiGe Zaldivar in
Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al. : "Inasmuch as the State
authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts
of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or
violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of
immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity
against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for
the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an
unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against
the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent." The
rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice.
xxxx
The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will
not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal
capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the
government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually
arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a
well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for
whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope
of his authority or jurisdiction.26 (Emphasis supplied.) In this case, the US respondents were sued in their
official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS
Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS
Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they we:re performing official military duties. Considering
that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation
of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State
immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift,
Rice and Robling.
During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the conduct of
the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused
damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy
sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an
exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal
State regarding passage through the latter's internal waters and the territorial sea.
According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-
standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the "traditional uses of
the oceans" as codified in UNCLOS, as can be gleaned from previous declarations by former Presidents
Reagan and Clinton, and the US judiciary in the case of United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines,
Ltd.27
The international law of the sea is generally defined as "a body of treaty rules arid customary norms
governing the uses of the sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over
maritime regimes. It is a branch of public international law, regulating the relations of states with respect
to the uses of the oceans."28 The UNCLOS is a multilateral treaty which was opened for signature on
December 10, 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. It was ratified by the Philippines in 1984 but came into
force on November 16, 1994 upon the submission of the 60th ratification.
The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to balance State sovereignty (mare
clausum) and the principle of freedom of the high seas (mare liberum).29 The freedom to use the world's
marine waters is one of the oldest customary principles of international law.30 The UNCLOS gives to the
coastal State sovereign rights in varying degrees over the different zones of the sea which are: 1) internal
waters, 2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4) exclusive economic zone, and 5) the high seas. It also
gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction over foreign vessels depending on where the vessel is
located.31
Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal State exercises sovereignty,
subject to the UNCLOS and other rules of international law. Such sovereignty extends to the air space
over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil.32
In the case of warships,33 as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy sovereign immunity
subject to the following exceptions:
Article 30
Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage
through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the
coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.
Article 31
Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship
or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting
from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes
with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with
the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international law.
Article 32
Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes
With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in this
Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-
commercial purposes. (Emphasis supplied.) A foreign warship's unauthorized entry into our internal
waters with resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in which the above provisions may
apply. But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?
An overwhelming majority - over 80% -- of nation states are now members of UNCLOS, but despite this
the US, the world's leading maritime power, has not ratified it.
While the Reagan administration was instrumental in UNCLOS' negotiation and drafting, the U.S.
delegation ultimately voted against and refrained from signing it due to concerns over deep seabed
mining technology transfer provisions contained in Part XI. In a remarkable, multilateral effort to induce
U.S. membership, the bulk of UNCLOS member states cooperated over the succeeding decade to revise
the objection.able provisions. The revisions satisfied the Clinton administration, which signed the revised
Part XI implementing agreement in 1994. In the fall of 1994, President Clinton transmitted UNCLOS and
the Part XI implementing agreement to the Senate requesting its advice and consent. Despite consistent
support from President Clinton, each of his successors, and an ideologically diverse array of stakeholders,
the Senate has since withheld the consent required for the President to internationally bind the United
States to UNCLOS.
While UNCLOS cleared the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) during the 108th and 110th
Congresses, its progress continues to be hamstrung by significant pockets of political ambivalence over
U.S. participation in international institutions. Most recently, 111 th Congress SFRC Chairman Senator
John Kerry included "voting out" UNCLOS for full Senate consideration among his highest priorities. This
did not occur, and no Senate action has been taken on UNCLOS by the 112th Congress.34
Justice Carpio invited our attention to the policy statement given by President Reagan on March 10, 1983
that the US will "recognize the rights of the other , states in the waters off their coasts, as reflected in the
convention [UNCLOS], so long as the rights and freedom of the United States and others under
international law are recognized by such coastal states", and President Clinton's reiteration of the US
policy "to act in a manner consistent with its [UNCLOS] provisions relating to traditional uses of the
oceans and to encourage other countries to do likewise." Since Article 31 relates to the "traditional uses
of the oceans," and "if under its policy, the US 'recognize[s] the rights of the other states in the waters
off their coasts,"' Justice Carpio postulates that "there is more reason to expect it to recognize the rights
of other states in their internal waters, such as the Sulu Sea in this case."
As to the non-ratification by the US, Justice Carpio emphasizes that "the US' refusal to join the UN CLOS
was centered on its disagreement with UN CLOS' regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers
the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind," pointing out that such "has nothing to do
with its [the US'] acceptance of customary international rules on navigation."
It may be mentioned that even the US Navy Judge Advocate General's Corps publicly endorses the
ratification of the UNCLOS, as shown by the following statement posted on its official website:
The Convention is in the national interest of the United States because it establishes stable maritime
zones, including a maximum outer limit for territorial seas; codifies innocent passage, transit passage,
and archipelagic sea lanes passage rights; works against "jurisdictiomtl creep" by preventing coastal
nations from expanding their own maritime zones; and reaffirms sovereign immunity of warships,
auxiliaries anJ government aircraft.
xxxx
Economically, accession to the Convention would support our national interests by enhancing the ability
of the US to assert its sovereign rights over the resources of one of the largest continental shelves in the
world. Further, it is the Law of the Sea Convention that first established the concept of a maritime
Exclusive Economic Zone out to 200 nautical miles, and recognized the rights of coastal states to
conserve and manage the natural resources in this Zone.35
We fully concur with Justice Carpio's view that non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the
US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial
sea. We thus expect the US to bear "international responsibility" under Art. 31 in connection with the
USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine
that our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting the country's efforts to
preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its obligation to compensate the damage caused
by its warship while transiting our internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government
exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all
nations to cooperate in the global task to protect and preserve the marine environment as provided in
Article 197, viz:
Article 197
Cooperation on a global or regional basis
States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through
competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and
recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and
preservation of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features.
In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although the
said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating
the.latter's territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial '::;ea immediately if
they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages caused by
their warships or any other government vessel operated for non-commercial purposes under Article 31.
Petitioners argue that there is a waiver of immunity from suit found in the VFA. Likewise, they invoke
federal statutes in the US under which agencies of the US have statutorily waived their immunity to any
action. Even under the common law tort claims, petitioners asseverate that the US respondents are
liable for negligence, trespass and nuisance.
We are not persuaded.
The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel visiting the
Philippines to promote "common security interests" between the US and the Philippines in the region. It
provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of
the United States and the Philippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of
vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.36 The invocation
of US federal tort laws and even common law is thus improper considering that it is the VF A which
governs disputes involving US military ships and crew navigating Philippine waters in pursuance of the
objectives of the agreement.
As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to
special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be
inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a
violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately:
SEC. 17. Institution of separate actions.-The filing of a petition for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan
shall not preclude the filing of separate civil, criminal or administrative actions.
In any case, it is our considered view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal
jurisdiction provisions of the VF A to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of
the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan. We
also find it unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed
absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted from the violation of
environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative
fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action
charging the same violation of an environmental law.37
Section 15, Rule 7 enumerates the reliefs which may be granted in a petition for issuance of a writ of
Kalikasan, to wit:
SEC. 15. Judgment.-Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision, the court
shall render judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from committing acts or neglecting
the performance of a duty in violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental
destruction or damage;
(b) Directing the respondent public official, govemment agency, private person or entity to
protect, preserve, rehabilitate or restore the environment;
(c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to
monitor strict compliance with the decision and orders of the court;
(d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or private person or entity to
make periodic reports on the execution of the final judgment; and
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology or to the protection, preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment,
except the award of damages to individual petitioners. (Emphasis supplied.)
We agree with respondents (Philippine officials) in asserting that this petition has become moot in the
sense that the salvage operation sought to be enjoined or restrained had already been accomplished
when petitioners sought recourse from this Court. But insofar as the directives to Philippine respondents
to protect and rehabilitate the coral reef stn icture and marine habitat adversely affected by the
grounding incident are concerned, petitioners are entitled to these reliefs notwithstanding the
completion of the removal of the USS Guardian from the coral reef. However, we are mindful of the fact
that the US and Philippine governments both expressed readiness to negotiate and discuss the matter of
compensation for the damage caused by the USS Guardian. The US Embassy has also declared it is closely
coordinating with local scientists and experts in assessing the extent of the damage and appropriate
methods of rehabilitation.
Exploring avenues for settlement of environmental cases is not proscribed by the Rules. As can be
gleaned from the following provisions, mediation and settlement are available for the consideration of
the parties, and which dispute resolution methods are encouraged by the court, to wit:
RULE3
xxxx
SEC. 3. Referral to mediation.-At the start of the pre-trial conference, the court shall inquire from the
parties if they have settled the dispute; otherwise, the court shall immediately refer the parties or their
counsel, if authorized by their clients, to the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) unit for purposes of
mediation. If not available, the court shall refer the case to the clerk of court or legal researcher for
mediation.
Mediation must be conducted within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of violator, or to contribute to a special trust fund for that purpose subject to the control of the
referral to mediation. court.1âwphi1

The mediation report must be submitted within ten (10) days from the expiration of the 30-day period.
SEC. 4. Preliminary conference.-If mediation fails, the court will schedule the continuance of the pre-trial.
Before the scheduled date of continuance, the court may refer the case to the branch clerk of court for a
preliminary conference for the following purposes:
In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive Branch on the matter of compensation
and rehabilitation measures through diplomatic channels. Resolution of these issues impinges on our
relations with another State in the context of common security interests under the VFA. It is settled that
"[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the
executive and legislative-"the political" --departments of the government, and the propriety of what may
be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision."40

(a) To assist the parties in reaching a settlement;

xxxx
SEC. 5. Pre-trial conference; consent decree.-The judge shall put the parties and their counsels under
oath, and they shall remain under oath in all pre-trial conferences.
The judge shall exert best efforts to persuade the parties to arrive at a settlement of the dispute. The
judge may issue a consent decree approving the agreement between the parties in accordance with law,
morals, public order and public policy to protect the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology.
On the other hand, we cannot grant the additional reliefs prayed for in the petition to order a review of
the VFA and to nullify certain immunity provisions thereof.
As held in BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Exec. Sec. Zamora,41 the VFA was duly concurred in
by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and
certified by the duly authorized representative of the United States government. The VF A being a valid
and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter of international law to abide by its terms
and provisions.42 The present petition under the Rules is not the proper remedy to assail the
constitutionality of its provisions. WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ
of Kalikasan is hereby DENIED.

xxxx

SEC. 10. Efforts to settle.- The court shall endeavor to make the parties to agree to compromise or settle
in accordance with law at any stage of the proceedings before rendition of judgment. (Underscoring
supplied.)

The Court takes judicial notice of a similar incident in 2009 when a guided-missile cruiser, the USS Port
Royal, ran aground about half a mile off the Honolulu Airport Reef Runway and remained stuck for four
days. After spending $6.5 million restoring the coral reef, the US government was reported to have paid
the State of Hawaii $8.5 million in settlement over coral reef damage caused by the grounding.38

To underscore that the US government is prepared to pay appropriate compensation for the damage
caused by the USS Guardian grounding, the US Embassy in the Philippines has announced the formation
of a US interdisciplinary scientific team which will "initiate discussions with the Government of the
Philippines to review coral reef rehabilitation options in Tubbataha, based on assessments by Philippine-
based marine scientists." The US team intends to "help assess damage and remediation options, in
coordination with the Tubbataha Management Office, appropriate Philippine government entities, non-
governmental organizations, and scientific experts from Philippine universities."39

A rehabilitation or restoration program to be implemented at the cost of the violator is also a major
relief that may be obtained under a judgment rendered in a citizens' suit under the Rules, viz:

RULES

SECTION 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit.-If warranted, the court may grant to the plaintiff proper reliefs which
shall include the protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the environment and the payment of
attorney's fees, costs of suit and other litigation expenses. It may also require the violator to submit a
program of rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, the costs of which shall be borne by the