CASE #1

Datu Guimid Matalam vs. People of the Philippines; GR Nos. 221849-50, April
4, 2016.

Facts:
That sometime in 1997, in Cotabato City, Maguindanao, DATU GUIMID
MATALAM, Regional Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform-
Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (DAR-ARMM), together with
ANSARRY LAWI and NAIMAH B. UNTE, Cashier and Accountant, respectively, in
relation to their official duties, failed and/or refused to remit TWO MILLION
FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY-SEVEN
AND 33/100 PESOS (P2,418,577.33), representing employer's contribution of
[DAR Provincial Office]-Maguindanao for the period of January, 1997 to June
1998, to GSIS, it being due and demandable, without justifiable cause and
despite repeated demands made.
Petitioner claimed that Lawi and Unte were the officers involved in the
remittance for the GSIS and PAG-IBIG Funds and he’s only duty is to affix his
signature.

Issue:
Whether petitioner Datu Guimid P. Matalam is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of non-remittance of the employer's share of the GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund
premiums.

Held:
Yes, the act of non-remittance of the employer’s share of the GSIS and Pag-
IBIG Fund Premiums is a crime punishable under special penal laws, mala
prohibita. There is no need to provide a proof beyond reasonable doubt, or the
Petitioner’s claim to having a little role in the crime has no bearing. The mere
act of non-remittance of GSIS and Pag-IBIG fund Premiums is a crime, no matter
what level of involvement or intention he might have had.

CASE #2

Nicolas vs. Romulo, et.al.; GR No. 175888, February 11, 2009; Salonga, et.al. vs.
Smith, et.al.; GR No. 176051, February 11, 2009.

FACTS:
 On or about the First (1st) day of November 2005, inside the Subic Bay
Freeport Zone, Olongapo City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accuseds (sic), being then members of the United States
Marine Corps, sexually abuse and have sexual intercourse with or carnal
knowledge of one Suzette S. Nicolas, a 22-year old unmarried woman inside a
Starex Van and driven by accused Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr. Against the will and
consent of the said Suzette S. Nicolas, to her damage and prejudice.
Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of
the Philippines and the United States, entered into on February 10, 1998,
the United States, at its request, was granted custody of defendant Smith
pending the proceedings.
During the trial, which was transferred from the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Zambales to the RTC of Makati for security reasons, the United States
Government faithfully complied with its undertaking to bring defendant Smith
to the trial court every time his presence was required.
On December 4, 2006, the RTC of Makati, following the end of the trial,
rendered its Decision, finding defendant Smith guilty.
On December 29, 2006, however, defendant Smith was taken out of the
Makati jail by a contingent of Philippine law enforcement agents, purportedly
acting under orders of the Department of the Interior and Local Government,
and brought to a facility for detention under the control of the United States
government, provided for under new agreements between the Philippines and
the United States, referred to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 19,
2006.
The matter was brought before the Court of Appeals which was DISMISSED
on January 2, 2007, for having become moot.
Hence, the present actions.
The petitions were heard on oral arguments on September 19, 2008, after
which the parties submitted their memoranda.
Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody of defendant
L/CPL Smith because, first of all, the VFA is void and unconstitutional.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) is void and
unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) is self-executing.
RULING:
1. NO. The VFA is not void and not unconstitutional.
The provision of the Constitution is Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 which states:
“Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the
Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except
under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so
requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national
referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.”
The reason for this provision lies in history and the Philippine experience
in regard to the United States military bases in the country.
To prevent a recurrence of this experience, the provision in question was
adopted in the 1987 Constitution.
The provision is thus designed to ensure that any agreement allowing the
presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in Philippine territory shall
be equally binding on the Philippines and the foreign sovereign State
involved. The idea is to prevent a recurrence of the situation in which the terms
and conditions governing the presence of foreign armed forces in our territory
were binding upon us but not upon the foreign State.
The VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been
recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and certified by the duly
authorized representative of the United States government.
The relation between the VFA and the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty
of August 30, 1951. This earlier agreement was signed and duly ratified with the
concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and the United States Senate.

2. YES. The VFA is self-executing.

The VFA is a self-executing Agreement, as that term is defined
in Medellin itself, because the parties intend its provisions to be enforceable,
precisely because the Agreement is intended to carry out obligations and
undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As a matter of fact, the
VFA has been implemented and executed, with the US faithfully complying with
its obligation to produce L/CPL Smith before the court during the trial.
The VFA is covered by implementing legislation, namely, the Case-Zablocki Act,
USC Sec. 112(b), inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of the US Congress
that executive agreements registered under this Act within 60 days from their
ratification be immediately implemented. The parties to these present cases do not
question the fact that the VFA has been registered under the Case-Zablocki Act.
CASE #3

G.R. No. L-44896 July 31, 1936

RODOLFO SCHNECKENBURGER, petitioner

V.
MANUEL V. MORAN, respondent.

FACTS:
The petitioner, an honorary consul of Uruguay in the Philippines, was
charged with the crime of falsification of a private document before the CFI of
Manila. He objected to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that both under
the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the Philippines the
court below had no jurisdiction to try him. He filed this petition for a writ of
prohibition with a view to preventing the CFI from taking cognizance of the
criminal action filed against him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CFI of Manila has jurisdiction to try the petitioner.

RULING:
This case involves NO question of diplomatic immunity. It is well settled
that a consul is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of an ambassador
or minister but is subject to the laws and regulations of the country to which he
is accredited. A consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for violations of
the laws of the country where he resides.
In the exercise of its powers and jurisdiction, this court is bound by the
provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution provides that the original
jurisdiction of this court “shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers, and consuls.” In deciding the instant case this court cannot go
beyond this constitutional provision.
It remains to consider whether the original jurisdiction thus conferred upon this
court by the Constitution over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls, is exclusive.
The Constitution provides that the original jurisdiction of this court “shall
include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls.”
It results that the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme
Court at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was not exclusive of, but
concurrent with, that of the CFI. Inasmuch as this is the same original
jurisdiction vested in this court by the Constitution and made to include all cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, it follows that the
jurisdiction of this court over such cases is not exclusive.
Indeed, the CFI of Manila has jurisdiction to try the petitioner. Hence, the
petition for a writ of prohibition must be denied.
CASE #4

G.R. No. L-18924 October 19, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

V.
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), Defendant-Appellee.

Facts:

The Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the Wong Cheng who
is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant
vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila
Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city.

The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, which so
held and dismissed the case.

Issue:

Whether the court has or has no jurisdiction over said offense.

Held:

There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with
International Law:
1. the French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign
merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within
whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their commission
affects the peace and security of the territory; and the
2. English rule, based on the territorial principle and followed in the United
States, according to which, crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in
general triable in the courts of the country within territory they were committed.

Of this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at
present the theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this
matter are authority in the Philippines which is now a territory of the United
States.

The mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this
court not triable by or courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium
Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous effects
entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without
being used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory those effects
that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not
considered a disturbance of the public order.

But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign
merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here established, because
it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It
seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting
the aforesaid repressive statute.

The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court
of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings
as to costs.

CASE #5

Republic of the Philippines, et.al. vs. Rosemoor Mining and Development

Corporation, et.al.; GR No. 149927, March 30, 2004.

Facts: Petitioner Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation after having

been granted permission to prospect for marble deposits in the mountains of
Biak-na-Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan, succeeded in discovering marble deposits of
high quality and in commercial quantities in Mount Mabio which forms part of
the Biak-na-Bato mountain range.
The petitioner then applied with the Bureau of Mines, now Mines and
Geosciences Bureau, for the issuance of the corresponding license to exploit said
marble deposits.
License No. 33 was issued by the Bureau of Mines in favor of the herein
petitioners. Shortly thereafter, Respondent Ernesto Maceda cancelled the
petitioner’s license stating that their license had illegally been issued, because it
violated Section 69 of PD 463; and that there was no more public interest served
by the continued existence or renewal of the license. The latter reason was
confirmed by the language of Proclamation No. 84. According to this law, public
interest would be served by reverting the parcel of land that was excluded by
Proclamation No. 2204 to the former status of that land as part of the Biak-na-
Bato national park.
Issue: Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 84 is valid.
Held: Yes. We cannot sustain the argument that Proclamation No. 84 is a bill of
attainder; that is, a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial
trial.” Its declaration that QLP No. 33 is a patent nullity is certainly not a
declaration of guilt. Neither is the cancellation of the license a punishment within
the purview of the constitutional proscription against bills of attainder.
Too, there is no merit in the argument that the proclamation is an ex post facto
law. It is settled that an ex post facto law is limited in its scope only to matters
criminal in nature. Proclamation 84, which merely restored the area excluded
from the Biak-na-Bato national park by canceling respondents’ license, is clearly
not penal in character.
Also at the time President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 84 on March 9, 1987,
she was still validly exercising legislative powers under the Provisional
Constitution of 1986. Section 1 of Article II of Proclamation No. 3, which
promulgated the Provisional Constitution, granted her legislative power until a
legislature is elected and convened under a new Constitution. The grant of such
power is also explicitly recognized and provided for in Section 6 of Article XVII of
the 1987 Constitution.

CASE#6

United States vs. Conde; GR No. L-18208, February 14, 1922.

Facts:

On December 30, 1915, complainants Bartolome Oliveros and Engracia Lianco

entered into a contract with the defendants concerning a debt of P300. Oliveros
and co. were obligated to pay five percent interest per month within the first ten
days of every month. On May 6, 1921, Vicente Diaz Conde and Apolinaria R. De
Conde were charged with violating the Usury Law in the Court of First Instance
of the city of Manila. They were found guilty, sentenced to pay a fine of P120 and
in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in accordance with the
provisions of law. They took it to SC to plead.

Issues:
Whether the Usury Law has a retroactive effect in this case

Held and Ratio:

No. The Usury Law, a penal law, cannot become retroactive unless it is favorable
to the person accused. (Art. 21 and 22 Penal Code)
If a contract is legal at its inception, it cannot be rendered illegal by any
subsequent legislation.

Decision:
WHEREFORE, the acts complained of by the defendants did not constitute a
crime at the time they were committed, and therefore the sentence of the lower
court should be, and is hereby, revoked; and it is hereby ordered and decreed
that the complaint be dismissed, and that the defendants be discharged from
the custody of the law, with costs de oficio.
CASE#7

People of the Philippines vs. Apolonio Carlos; GR No. L-239, June 30, 1947.
Doctrine: Due process & equal protection

Facts:
1. The appellant was found guilty of treason by the People's Court and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of P7,000, and costs.

Background on Why: The lower court found that one day in July or August,
1944, about two or three o'clock in the morning, a truck pulled up to the
curb in front of a house on Constancia Street, Sampaloc, Manila, where one
Martin Mateo lived. From the truck the accused, a Japanese spy, alighted
together with members of the Japanese military police and pointed Martin
Mateo's house and Fermin Javier's house to his Japanese companions,
whereupon the Japanese soldiers broke into Martin Mateo's dwelling first
and Fermin Javier's afterwards. In those houses they seized Martin Mateo,
Ladislao Mateo and Fermin Javier, bound their hands, and put them in the
truck. Along with other persons who had been rounded up in the other places
and who had been kept in the truck while it was parked, they were taken to
Fort Santiago where the two Mateos and Fermin Javier were tortured and
from which they were released six days later. The reason for the arrest and
maltreatment of Martin and Ladislao Mateo was that they had refused to
divulge the whereabouts of their brother, Marcelino Mateo, who was a
guerrilla and who had escaped from the Japanese. And Fermin Javier was
arrested and tortured because he himself was a guerrilla, a fact which Carlos
knew or at least suspected.

2. Carlos alleged that the law creating the People's Court is unconstitutional;
that numerous provisions of the People's Court Act are singled out as
contrary to the Organic Law

Issue: Whether or not the People's Court Act (PCA) is unconstitutional.

Held: No. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed with costs against
appellant.

Ratio:
1. Carlos argued that The PCA contained provisions which deal on matters
entirely foreign to the subject matter expressed in its title, such as:

a) a provision which retains the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance;

b) a provision which adds to the disqualification of Justices of the Supreme
Court and provides a procedure for their substitution;
c) a provision which changed the existing Rules of Court on the subject of
bail, and
d) a provision which suspends

 Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code (Government of the Philippine

Islands vs. Municipality of Binalonan): The People's Court was intended to
be a full and complete scheme with its own machinery for the indictment,
trial and judgment of treason case. The various provisos mentioned, in
our opinion, are allied and germane to the subject matter and purposes
of the People's Court Act; they are subordinate to its end. The multitude
of matters which the legislation, by its nature, has to embrace would
make mention of all of them in the title of the act cumbersome. It is not
necessary, and the Congress is not expected, to make the title of an
enactment a complete index of its contents.
 SC: The constitutional rule is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the
subject expressed in its title.

2. Carlos also argued that PCA deprives persons similarly situated of the equal
protection of the laws inasmuch as:

a) Only those political offenders against whom cases are filed within six
months from the passage of the law are to be tried in the People's Court,
while others are to be tried in the Courts of First Instance;

 SC: The People's Court is a court of special and restricted jurisdiction

created under the stress of an emergency and national security. It was
devised to operate for a limited period only, a limitation imposed by
economic necessity and other factors of public policy. Obviously, the
main concerning the creation of a special court was the trial and and
disposition of the cases, numbering over 6,000, of accused who were
being held by the United States military authorities and who were to
be turned over to the Commonwealth Government.

b) Political offenders accused in the People's Court are denied preliminary

examination and/or investigation whereas the others who shall be
entitled thereto;
  SC: Section 22 in denying preliminary investigation to persons
accused before the People's Court is justified by the conditions
prevailing when the law was enacted. In view of the great number of
prisoners then under detention and the length of time and amount of
labor that would be consumed if so many prisoners were allowed the
right to have preliminary investigation, considered with the necessity
of disposing of these cases at the earliest possible dates in the interest
of the public and of the accused themselves, it was not an unwise
measure which dispensed with such investigation in such
cases. Preliminary investigation, it must be remembered, is not a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution.

c) Political offenders accused in the People's Court have limited right to

appeal, while those who may be accused of the same crimes in the Courts
of First Instance have absolute right of appeal inasmuch as under section
13 of the law, Rules 42 and 46 of the Rules of Court are made applicable
to the latter;

 SC: The People's Court is a collegiate court whereas the Court of First
Instance is presided over by a single judge. Appeal is not a
constitutional but statutory right. The admitted fact that there is no
discrimination among appeals from the same court or class of court
saves the provision objected to from being unconstitutional

d) Appeals in the case involving persons who held any office or position
under either or both the Philippine Executive Commission and the
Philippine Republic or any branch, instrumentality and/or agency
thereof are to heard and decided by a substantially different Supreme
Court, thus causing lack of informity in rulings over the same subject;

 SC: This objection does not seem to fall within the subject of
constitutional guarantee against deprivation of equal protection of the
laws. Be that as it may, we find no merit in the appellant's contention.
 SC: The disqualification under the People's Court Act of some or a
majority of the members of this Court and their substitution by
justices of the Court of Appeals or judges of the Courts of First
Instance do not make the Supreme Court, as thus constituted, a new
court in the eyes of the law.
 SC: A court is an entity possessing a personality separate and distinct
from the men who compose or sit on it. This objection is no more valid
than that of a party in an ordinary action who protests that his case
is heard by a Supreme Court which, by reason of disability of a
 majority of its regular members, is made up mostly of judges from
outside.
 SC: As to the "lack of uniformity in rulings over the same subject," it
need only be said that the Constitution does not insure uniformity of
judicial decisions; neither does it assure immunity from judicial error.

e) The first proviso of section 19 thereof prescribes a different rule as to the

granting of release on bail only with respect to the political offenders
detained by the United States Army and released to the Commonwealth
of the Philippines but not as to others political offenders accused or
accusable of the same crimes; and

f) The second proviso of section 19 thereof suspends article 125 of the

Revised Penal Code only as to those political detainees released by the
United States Army to the Commonwealth of the Philippines or, at most,
only to those accused or accusable of the crimes specified in the law and
not as to all persons accused or accusable of crimes against national
security committed during the second world war, much less to all
offenders, notwithstanding the fact that there is no reasonable and real
difference among said groups of offenders.

 SC: (5) and (6) The two provisos in section 19 do no constitute denial
of equal protection of the laws. The distinction made by these provisos
between two sets of accused in the "granting or release on bail" and
in the application of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code are not
arbitrary or fanciful calculated to favor or prejudice one or the other
class.
 Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil., 372): this Court explained the reasons which
necessitated the extension to six months of the authorized detention
of persons charged with treason before filing of information. The
provisos rest "on some real and substantial difference or distinction
bearing a just and fair relation to the legislation."

3. Carlos argued that (c) It is a bill of attainder in that it virtually imposes upon
specific, known and identified individuals or group of individual, the penalty
of detention and imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months without
any form of judicial trial or procedure

 Cummings vs. Missouri: The bill of attainder is a legislative act which

inflicts punishment without judicial trial."
SC: Detention of a prisoner for a period not exceeding six months pending
investigation or trial is not a punishment but a necessary extension of the well-
recognized power to hold the criminal suspected for investigation.
CASE 8

People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Basilio Gabo; GR No. 161083, August 3, 2010

FACTS:
On May 14, 2001, around 12:15 a.m., a fire broke out inside the
plant of Sanyoware Plastic Products Manufacturing Corporation (Sanyoware).
Investigations were conducted by the Philippine 3rd Regional Criminal
Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG) and the Inter Agency Anti-Arson Task
Force (IATF) of the Department of the Interior and Local Government and the
respondent were accused of destructive arson. In support of the accusation,
petitioner submitted the Sworn Statements of Richard Madrideo, Jaime Kalaw,
Raymund Dy, Chit Chua, Jennifer Chua Reyes, Shanda Amistad, SPO1
Valeriano Dizon and Inspector Allan N. Barredo, which contains the following:
* That the respondent was threatened to write a sworn statement against his will
wherein if anyone ask about the fire he would say that it did not break out
simultaneously and its cause was a defective wiring.
* That a week before the fire occurred, almost 300 unserviceable molds were
transferred to the burned Sanyoware warehouse. A day before the fire, expensive
finished products were loaded in delivery trucks and saw the respondent took a
rectangular shape object from his vehicle.
* That saleable products from the burned warehouse were transferred to the
Sanyo City Warehouse, while unusable components from the Sanyo City
warehouse were transferred to the burned warehouse which was ordered to
finish on May 12, 2001.
*That an employee at the Accounting Department claimed that the company was
indebted to a number of banks and corporation.
Respondent submitted a Counter-Affidavit to refute the allegations,
it states that the ocular inspection was not conducted and the Inter Agency Anti-
Arson Task Force (IATF) did not even conducted any investigation, except in
essence to ask the witnesses of complainant to identify under oath their sworn
statements executed before the complainant and to ask respondents to submit
their sworn statements and later to identify the same under oath.
Respondents filed a Motion to Conduct Hearing to Determine Probable Cause
and to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest Pending
Determination of Probable Cause.
Due to lack of probable cause, the RTC Dismissed the case which the Court of
Appeals affirmed. And it is now a petition for certiorari to set aside the previous
resolution.
Petitioner alleged that the respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction
or committed grave abuse of discretion in its resolution when it applies the
equipoise rule in dismissing the case.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction
or committed grave abuse of discretion.
RULING:
The basis of RTC in dismissing the case is that, the sworn
statements submitted by the petitioner and the sworn statements submitted by
the respondents contained contradictory positions.
This court finds that the RTC had in fact complied with the
requirement under the rules of personally evaluating the resolution of the
prosecutor and its supporting evidence and that the assailed Order was arrived
at after due consideration of the merits thereto. Based on the statement of
Marideo (one of the witnesses), it appears that the fire broke out in 2 places
which, presupposes or implies that some sort of incendiary or inflammable
substances ignited to start the fire. However, on the investigation conducted by
Bocaue Fire Station, it appears to have ruled out the use of incendiary or
inflammable substances and was found negative of any flammable substances.
This physical evidence puts the truth of the latter in grave doubt. Also
Investigation conducted point to the faulty wiring as the cause of origin.
Physical evidence is evidence of the highest order. It speaks more
eloquently than a hundred witnesses.
The conclusions of the RTC which led to the dismissal of the
information against respondents cannot, in any sense, be characterized as
outrageously wrong or manifestly mistaken, or whimsically or capriciously
arrived at. The worst that may perhaps be said of it is that it is fairly debatable,
and may even be possibly erroneous. But they cannot be declared to have been
made with grave abuse of discretion.
The judge is required to personally evaluate the resolution of the
prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if
the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. To this Court's
mind, the RTC had complied with its duty of personally evaluating the supporting
evidence of the prosecution before arriving at its decision of dismissing the case
against respondents.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED.

CASE 9

People of the Philippines vs. Larry Erguiza; GR No. 171348, November 26, 2008.

Facts:
Appellant Larry Erguiza was charged guilty of one count of rape and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua by the Regional Trial Court
of San Carlos City, Pangasinan.
The prosecution’s version is that on January 5, 2000, around 4:00pm,
AAA, a 13 year old, together with her friends, siblings Joy and Ricky Agbuya,
went to a mango orchard. On their way home, AAA’s short pants got hooked on
the fence while Joy and Ricky Ran away and left her. While AAA was trying to
unhook her short pants, Larry, armed with a kitchen knife, grabbed and did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have sexual intercourse with AAA
against her will and consent. The victim got pregnant and upon discovery, she
was compelled to tell the story to her parents. CCC (AAA’s father), testified that
on May 2, 2000, the family of Larry offered P50,000 and later P150,000.
The accused presented the alibi that he was at the house of the victim’s
family at around 5:00 in the afternoon doing repairs. When he arrived home, he
was requested to fetch the hilot Juanita Angeles to help with the delivery of his
child. Angeles testified that he never left the side of his wife when she gave birth
at 3:00 am the next day.
On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Aggrieved
by the decision, appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution’s evidence failed to establish the guilt
beyond reasonable doubt of Larry Erguiza.

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court finds that there is testimonial evidence that
contradicts the findings of the RTC and CA on the basis of which no conviction
beyond reasonable doubt could arise. It is the unrebutted testimony of a credible
defense witness Joy Agbuya. Her testimony makes it impossible for AAA to have
been raped because according to Joy, she never left the complainant at the
mango orchard even when AAA’s shorts got hooked to the fence, and both went
home together. The Court finds no reason for Joy to since she had nothing to
gain for lying under oath. The records does not show or claim that Joy was
related to or was a close friend of Larry or his family. On the contrary, Joy
considers herself the “best-friend” and playmate of AAA. The Supreme Court is
not unmindful of the doctrine that for alibi to succeed as a defense, appellant
must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his resence at another lace
at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) the physical impossibility of
his presence at the scene of the crime. The testimony of the hilot Juanita made
the appellant’s alibi substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.
What needs to be stressed is that conviction in a criminal case must be
supported by roof beyond reasonable doubt- moral certainty that the accused is
guilty. The conflicting testimonies of Joy and AAA, and the testimony of Juanita
preclude the Court from convicting appellant of rape with moral certainty.
Faced with two conflicting versions, the Court is guided by the equipoise
rule. It provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced,
the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the
accused.
Upon the prosecution’s failure to meet the test of moral certainty, acquittal
becomes the duty of the Court, lest its mind be tortured with the thought that it
has imprisoned an innocent man for the rest of his life. Larry Erguiza was
acquitted and ordered immediate release.
CASE 10

People of the Philippines vs. Anson Ong; GR No. 175940 (formerly GR Nos.
155361-62), February 6, 2008

FACTS:
In Criminal Case Nos. 97-0017 and 97-0018, the accused, Anson Ong was
charged with the illegal sale and delivery of 985.05 grams of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (shabu), a regulated drug, and the illegal possession of 988.85 of
the same drug without the corresponding license.
Sometime in April 1997, as narrated by prosecution witnesses comprised of the
members of the buy-bust team, Col. Zoila Lachica was tipped off that a group,
led by a Chinese national, was engaged in drug trafficking in Pasay City. On April
21, 1997, Lachica organized a twelve- man team and planned the conduct of a
buy-bust operation. After the confidential informant confirmed the meeting time
and venue with the drug dealer, and after said operation ensued, a red bag
containing white crystalline substance was found in the appellant’s possession.
Appellant, and his alleged accomplice, Cua, were then arrested.
Appellant on the other hand, denied the story of the prosecution. Accused Anson
Ong, a citizen of the People’s Republic of China who decided to start a clothing
business in the Philippines upon the suggestion of Lau Chan, narrated that in
the morning of April 21, 1997, Lau Chan asked appellant to meet up with him.
As he was walking along Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue, someone poked a gun
at him and was made to board a white car in which he met Cua for the first time.
They were then brought to Camp Crame for questioning where he learned that
he was being charged of possession and sale of shabu.
Finding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible as against the bare
and self-serving assertions of appellant, the trial court rendered a decision
finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) offenses for violations
of Section 15 and 16 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
On August 7, 2006, the case was directed to the Court of Appeals.
Appellant primarily questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. He
claims that their testimonies were tainted with inconsistencies which even the
trial court had noted in its decision. Appellant relies on said observation to
support his acquittal based on reasonable doubt. He asserts that his conviction
must rest on the strength of the prosecution's own evidence and not on the
weakness of the evidence for the defense. In finding appellant guilty, the
appellate court strongly relied on the testimonies of the police officers and
dismissed the imputed inconsistencies in their statements as being minor.
The Office of the Solicitor General insists that all the elements of sale and illegal
possession of shabu were duly established by the prosecution. Contending that
the trial court lent full faith and credence to the collective testimonies of the
police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in accordance
with law.
It has been held that it is the duty of the prosecution to present a complete
picture detailing the buy-bust operation from the initial contact between the
poseur-buyer and the pusher until the consummation of the sale by the delivery
of the illegal subject of sale.
In the case at bar, the evidence for the prosecution failed to prove all the material
details of the buy-bust operation. The details of the meeting with the informant,
the alleged source of the information on the sale of illegal drugs, appear hazy.
The witnesses' hesitation in answering questions on the stand, as aptly observed
by the trial court, only compounded their lack of credibility. Also, Lachica, who
was the Chief of the Criminal Investigation Division of the NCR-CIDG, cannot
seem to recall the vital parts of the buy-bust operation such as the composition
of the buy-bust team, the strategic location of the team members, the presence
of the name of the other accused, and how much of the boodle money was
recovered.
ISSUE:
The issue whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the guilt of the appellant.
HELD:
Anson Ong is acquitted of the crime of the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972 charged against him on the ground of reasonable doubt.
The basis of acquittal is reasonable doubt, the evidence for the prosecution not
being sufficient to sustain and prove the guilt of appellants with moral certainty.
Moreover, the failure to present vital pieces of these evidence, material
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the non-
presentation of the buy-bust money raised reasonable doubts on the occurrence
of a buy-bust operation.
It is indeed suspicious that vital pieces of evidence, such as the boodle money
and the driver's license were lost while in the custody of Coballes who
unfortunately passed away during trial. Another baffling point is the dismissal
of the criminal case against Cua, the alleged accomplice of appellant. The
prosecution witnesses testified that the boodle money was found in his
possession. This fact was confirmed by the presence of fluorescent powder on
Cua's hands.
The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. While appellant's defense
engenders suspicion that he probably perpetrated the crime charged, it is not
sufficient for a conviction that the evidence established a strong suspicion or
probability of guilt. It is the burden of the prosecution to overcome the
presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required.
By reasonable doubt is not meant that which of possibility may arise but it is
that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability,
after such an investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt.
An acquittal based on reasonable doubt will prosper even though the appellants'
innocence may be doubted, for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the
evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence of the
defense. Suffice it to say, a slightest doubt should be resolved in favor of the
accused.
With the failure of the prosecution to present a complete picture of the buy-bust
operation, as highlighted by the disharmony and incoherence in the testimonies
of its witnesses, acquittal becomes inevitable.

CASE 11

People of the Philippines vs. Richard Guinto; GR No. 198314, September 24,
2014.

Facts:
Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto (Rullepa), a houseboy, was charged with Rape before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City for allegedly having carnal knowledge with “AAA”, three (3) years of
age, a minor and against her will and without her consent.
“AAA” described her abuse under the hands of Rullepa in a plain and matter-of-fact manner in
her testimony. The victim and her mother testified that she was only three years old at the time
of the rape. However, the prosecution did not offer the victim‘s certificate of live birth or
similar authentic documents in evidence.
Finding for the prosecution, the RTC rendered judgment finding Rullepa guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape and accordingly sentenced him to death. The case was placed for
automatic review of the Supreme Court
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing the supreme penalty of death upon Rullepa
HELD:
A person‘s appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the same being
addressed to the senses of the court. As to the weight to accord such appearance, especially in
rape cases, the Court in People v. Pruna laid down the guideline.
Under the guideline, the testimony of a relative with respect to the age of the victim is
sufficient to constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt in cases (a) and (b) above. In such cases,
the disparity between the allegation and the proof of age is so great that the court can easily
determine from the appearance of the victim the veracity of the testimony. The appearance
corroborates the relative‘s testimony.
As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved, the person‘s appearance, as
object evidence of her age, loses probative value. Doubt as to her true age becomes greater
and, following United States v. Agadas, such doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.
Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the age sought to
be proved (below twelve years), the trial court would have had no difficulty ascertaining the
victim‘s age from her appearance. No reasonable doubt, therefore, exists that the
second element of statutory rape is present.
Whether the victim was below seven years old, however, is another matter. Here, reasonable
doubt exists. A mature three and a half-year old can easily be mistaken for an underdeveloped
seven-year old. The appearance of the victim, as object evidence, cannot be accorded much
weight and the testimony of the mother is, by itself, insufficient.
As it has not been established with moral certainty that “AAA” was below seven years old at the
time of the commission of the offense, Rullepa cannot be sentenced to suffer the death
penalty. Only the penalty of reclusion perpetua can be imposed upon him.

CASE 12

People of the Philippines vs. Beth Temporada; GR No. 173473.

Facts:
Accused Rosemarie Robles, Bernadette Miranda, Nenita Catacotan, Jojo Resco
and Beth Temporada are all employees of ATTC, a Travel and Tour Company,
recruited and promised overseas employment for a fee to Rogelio Legaspis Jr, as
a technician in Singapore, and other overseas workers. The accused were holding
office in Makati but eventually transferred to Manila. After paying placements
fees, none of the overseas recruits was able to leave or recover what they have
paid, thus they filed separate criminal complaints against accused in Manila.

The accused were then sentenced to life imprisonment for illegal recruitment and
estafa. Then the case was referred to the CA for intermediate review, CA affirmed
with modification on the penalty. The penalty was lowered for the lower court
due to insufficiency of evidence.
Issue: Whether the accused were guilty of 5 counts of estafa and illegal
recruitment, and be charged of the penalty of life imprisonment.

Ruling:
The Court affirms the modification of the CA, except for the penalty on the 5
counts of estafa.
Although Temporada is saying that she is not a principal to the illegal
recruitment and estafa because she is a mere employee of ATTC and that she
was just echoing the requirement of her employer, the Court believes that
Temporada actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment.
The Court agrees with the lower court that the accused were guilty of illegal
recruitment by a syndicate with the penalty of life imprisonment. The accused
were convicted separately also for 5 counts of estafa.

CASE #13

ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

Facts:

Seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of

Law underwent a three-day initiation rite as a requisite to join the Aquila Legis
Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity), including the deceased, Leonardo "Lenny"
Villa. On the second day, after their last session of physical beatings, Lenny
could no longer walk and he had to be carried. An hour of sleep passed when the
neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and incoherent
mumblings.1avvphi1 When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to
the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival. Consequently, a criminal
case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans. Twenty-six of the
accused Aquilans were jointly tried. On the other hand, the trial against the
remaining nine accused in was held in abeyance due to certain matters that had
to be resolved first.

The trial court rendered judgment, holding the 26 accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. A few weeks after, Criminal Case
against the remaining nine accused commenced anew. The Court of Appeals set
aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court in Criminal Case against the 26
accused and modified the criminal liability of each of the accused according to
individual participation.
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five consolidated Petitions were
individually brought.

Issues:

I. Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, et.al.
for violation of their right to speedy trial;
II. Whether or not the penalty imposed should have been equivalent to that
for deceit (dolo) pursuant to Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code.
III. Whether or not of slight physical injuries has already lapsed into finality
as a result of accused ailments of the probation program and their ultimate
discharge therefrom. Thus, they can no longer be convicted of the heavier offense
of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

Held:

I. No, petitioner’s arguments found no basis to rule that the CA gravely

abused its discretion in concluding that the right to speedy trial of the accused
was violated. The Court’s findings were sufficiently supported by the records of
the case and grounded in law. Thus, we deny the motion of petitioner Villa with
finality. In light of the finding of violation of the right of Escalona et al. to speedy
trial, the CA’s dismissal of the criminal case against them amounted to an
acquittal, and that any appeal or reconsideration thereof would result in a
violation of their right against double jeopardy. To consider that there has been
a grave abuse of discretion, it must be shown that the assailed judgment
constitutes "a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of
a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act
in contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and hostility; or a blatant abuse of authority to a
point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense
justice." Thus, grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply
because it allegedly mis appreciated the facts and the evidence.
II. No, the penalty imposed cannot be equivalent to that for deceit (dolo)
pursuant to Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. The presence of
an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in
establishing the commission of the intentional felony of homicide. Being mala in
se, the felony of homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo immediately
before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill – or animus
interficendi– cannot and should not be inferred, unless there is proof beyond
reasonable doubt of such intent. In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious
acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code, the employment of
physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala in
se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the
mental state of the wrongdoer – iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is
no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony.
Thus, in case of physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there must be
a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the
physical integrity or wellbeing of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the
victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries per se
merely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony.
The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his
intentions are. Since the accused were found to have committed a felony by
means of culpa, the court cannot agree with the argument of the OSG. Hence,
the imposable penalty is what is applicable to the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide as defined and penalized under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code.
III. Rule 120 of the Rules of Court speaks of the finality of a criminal judgment
once the accused applies for probation. It must be clarified, however, that the
finality of judgment evinced in Section 7 of Rule 120 does not confer blanket
invincibility on criminal judgments. We have already explained in our Decision
that the rule on double jeopardy is not absolute, and that this rule is inapplicable
to cases in which the state assails the very jurisdiction of the court that issued
the criminal judgment. As it is, the Court find no irregularity in the partial
annulment of the CA Decision in spite of its finality, as the judgment therein was
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

CASE 14

Medina vs. People of the Philippines; GR No. 182648, June 17, 2015.

Facts:
On April 27, 2002, Henry Lim (Lim), a resident of Calao West, Santiago City,
Isabela, brought his Sangyong Korando Jeep with Plate no. WPC 207 at the auto
repair shop owned by Herman Medina (Medina), a mechanic. When the jeep was
brought at the shop, it was still in running condition and its part were still
functioning.
However, after a some time, the jeep was still not repaired. So, in the morning of
September 4, 2002, Purita Lim (Purita), Lim’s sister, instructed Danilo Beltran
(Beltran), who also have an auto repair shop, to get the jeep from Medina’s shop.
However, Beltran was not able to retrieve it because some of its parts are missing.
When he asked about it, Medina told him that he took and installed those parts
on Lim’s other vehicle, an Isuzu pick-up, which was also being repaired there.
On the same day, Beltran went back in the afternoon and was able to get the
jeep, but without the missing parts. He reported it to Purita and brought it to his
own shop. Later, the jeep was fully repaired and put back in good running
condition. On September 12, 2002, a criminal complaint for simple theft was
filed by Purita, representing Lim. The City Prosecutor found probable cause to
indict Medina. In the arraignment, Medina pleaded not guilty. No settlement,
stipulation, or admission was made by the parties during the pre-trial. During
the trial proper, Beltran and Lim were presented as witnesses for the
prosecution, while Medina and a certain Angelina Tumamao, a former barangay
kagawad of Buenavista, testified for the defense. Eventually, the case was
submitted for decision, but without the formal offer of evidence by the defense.
On March 31, 2005, the trial court found Medina guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA), affirmed Medina’s conviction. The trial
court was not convinced with Medina’s justification that he installed the jeep’s
missing parts to the pick-up also owned by Lim, and the CA said that his excuse
is “so lame and flimsy.” The CA agreed to lower court’s findings.
When his motion for reconsideration was denied, Medina filed a petition for
certiorari.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred when it affirmed the
conviction of the petitioner despite the fact that the prosecution only presented
circumstantial evidence in their attempt to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Worst, it specifically advanced only the testimony of witness
Beltran, thus, not sufficient to sustain conviction in accordance with Section 4,
Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the conviction
of the petitioner despite the fact that the prosecution relied not on the strength
of its evidence but on the weakness of the defense contrary to the ruling of the
Honorable Court in Philippines vs. Alvario.

3. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred when it affirmed the
conviction of the petitioner despite the fact that there was no furtive taking or
unlawful asportation, in the criminal sense, considering that the taking, if at all,
was with the knowledge and consent of the private complainant pursuant to the
ruling of the Honorable Court in Abundo vs. Sandiganbayan, et al. and the
unrebutted evidence for the defense.
4. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in not considering the
receipt marked as exhibit "2" for the defense, likewise marked as exhibit "C" for
the prosecution (common evidence) not formally offered in evidence due to the
gross negligence of the former counsel for the petitioner in the greater interest of
justice, one of the exceptions provided for by the Honorable Court in Sarraga,
Sr. vs. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank.

Ruling:
The Court of the Appeals denied the petition.
1. Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain, but without
violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take
personal property of another without the latter’s consent. As defined and
penalized, the elements of the crime are: (1) there was taking of personal
property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking was done with intent
to gain; (4) the taking was without the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking
was accomplished without the use of violence against, or intimidation of persons
or force, upon things.
In this case, Medina acknowledged without hesitation the taking of the jeep’s
alternator, starter, battery, and two tires with mag wheels, but he put up the
defense that they were installed in the pick-up owned by Lim. With such
admission, the burden of evidence is shifted on him to prove that the missing
parts were indeed lawfully taken. Upon perusal of the transcript of stenographic
notes, the Court finds that Medina unsatisfactorily discharged the burden. Even
bearing in mind the testimony of Tumamao, he failed to substantiate, through
the presentation of supporting documentary evidence or corroborative testimony,
the claims that: (1) Lim was the owner of the pick-up; (2) the missing parts of
the jeep were exactly the same items that were placed in the pick-up; (3) Lim
consented, expressly or impliedly, to the transfer of auto parts; and (4)
Mendoza witnessed the removal of the spare parts from the jeep and their
placement to the pickup.
Neither did Medina presented any justifying or exempting circumstance to avoid
criminal liability.

2. On the contrary, Lim firmly testified that when he entrusted to Medina the
jeep’s repair it was still in running condition and complete with alternator,
starter, battery, and tires, which went missing by the time the vehicle was
recovered from the auto shop. Likewise, the testimony of Beltran is definite and
straightforward.

3. Abundo v. Sandiganbayan, which was relied upon by Medina, does not apply.
In said case, the element of lack of owner's consent to the taking of the junk
chassis was absent since the records showed that Abundo made a request in
writing to be allowed to use one old jeep chassis among the pile of junk motor
vehicles. His request was granted. A memorandum receipt was issued and
signed. Pursuant thereto, the chassis was taken out. There was no furtive taking
or unlawful asportation. The physical and juridical possession of the junk
chassis was transferred to Abundo at his request, with the consent or
acquiescence of the owner, the Government, represented by the public officials
who had legal and physical possession of it. We noted that the crime of theft
implies an invasion of possession; therefore, there can be no theft when the
owner voluntarily parted with the possession of the thing. The Court agreed with
the observation of the Solicitor
General that a thief does not ask for permission to steal. Indeed, a taking which
is done with the consent or acquiescence of the owner of the property is not
felonious.

4. Medina cannot acquit himself on the basis of a purported acknowledgment

receipt that he and Tumamao identified during their presentation as witnesses
for the defense. In Mato v. CA, which referred to People v. Napat-a, citing People
v. Mate, we relaxed the application of Section, Rule 13235 of the Rules of Court
by allowing the admission of evidence not formally offered. To be admissible;
however, two essential conditions must concur: first, the same must have been
duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must have
been incorporated in the records of the case. As regards this case, the
acknowledgment receipt was not considered by the trial court because it was not
formally offered in evidence. While it was duly identified by the defense testimony
that was duly recorded, the receipt itself was not incorporated in the case
records. For its part, the CA opined that nowhere from the case records does
Medina’s acknowledgment receipt appear. Yet, upon examination, it appears that
the July 25, 2002 acknowledgment receipt was attached as Annex "3" of Medina’s
Appellant’s Brief. Accordingly, the CA should have mulled over this piece of
document, especially so since the prosecution even prayed, and was granted,
during the trial proper that said receipt be marked as Exhibit "C."
Nevertheless, even if this Court admits in evidence the acknowledgment receipt,
the same would still not exonerate Medina. This is due to his admission that
Bardiaga, Pascual, and Bautista did not actually see him remove the alternator,
starter, battery, and tires with rims from the jeep and put the same to the pick-
up. Likewise, while Medina asserted that Mendoza came to his place and was
shown that the missing auto parts were transferred from the jeep to the pick-up,
the latter was not presented as a hostile witness to confirm such expedient claim.
As against the positive and categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
Medina’s mere denials cannot prevail for being self-serving and uncorroborated.
Denial is considered with suspicion and always received with caution because it
is inherently weak and unreliable, easily fabricated and concocted.
There being no compelling reason to disregard the same, the Court yields to the
factual findings of the trial court, which were affirmed by the CA. This is in line
with the precept that when the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the
appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon us. It is
only in exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked
material and relevant matters, that we will recalibrate and evaluate the factual
findings of the court below

Decision:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The January 7,
2008 Decision and April 21, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR. No. 29634,1 which affirmed in toto the March 31, 2005 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Santiago City, Isabela, in Criminal Case No. 35-
4021 convicting Herman Medina for the crime of simple theft, is hereby
AFFIRMED.

CASE 15
People of the Philippines vs. Sarino, et.al.; GR Nos. 94992-93, April 7, 1993.
CASE 16(ERROR IN PERSONAE & MISTAKE OF FACT)

United States vs. Ah Chong (15 Phil 488, March 19, 1910, GR No. L-5272)

Defendant Ah Chong was employed as a cook at Officers’ Quarters No. 27, Fort
McKinley, Rizal Province, while Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a
house boy or muchaho in the same place. The two jointly shared a small room
towards the rear of the building, and the door of the room was not furnished
with a permanent bolt or lock and the occupants, as a measure of security, had
attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door and by placing against
it a chair.

On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o’clock, Ah Chong was suddenly
awakened by someone trying to force open the door. When no answer was given
when he was asking who the person forcing open the door and failing to identify
the face of the intruder due to complete darkness inside the room, and believing
the intruder was a robber or thief, he immediately grabbed the kitchen knife he
was hiding under his pillow and struck out wildly at the intruder, who afterwards
turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he
called to his employers, and ran to his room to secure bandages to bind up
Pascual’s wounds, rushed him to the military hospital, but Pascual was declared
dead the following day from the effects of the wounds.

ISSUE:

Whether Ah Chong be exempted from criminal liability.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held:

A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us

that the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in
the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room
was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of
his property and of the property committed under his charge; that in view of all
circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the
time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that
he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that
had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt
from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have
been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his
mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from
the imminent danger which he believed threatened his person and his property
and the property committed under his charge.
 CASE 17 (ERROR IN PERSONAE & MISTAKE OF FACT)

People of the Philippines vs. Oanis and Galanta; GR No. L-47722, July 27, 1943.

FACTS:
Ø Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan,
Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor:
"Information received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene
in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain Monsod accordingly called for his
first sergeant and asked that he be given four men.
Ø The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise
called by the Provincial Inspector.
Ø Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a
man sleeping with his back towards the door where they were, simultaneously
or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened
by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the
door where the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked
by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and
killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and
innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour.
Ø According to Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the
house, the latter asked Brigida where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the
place, and upon further inquiry as to the whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, she
said that he too was sleeping in the same room.

ISSUE: W/N they may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus
caused to Tecson

HELD: appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the mitigating
circumstance
YES.
Ø ignorantia facti excusat (Ignorance of the fact is an excuse), but this applies only
when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness
Ø appellants found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to
immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had
ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to
themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to
that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed.
Ø "No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and
the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary
for his detention."
Ø a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses
unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest
Ø The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing
being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused
to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act
performed without malice.
Ø 2 requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one:
1. offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a
right-present
2. injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.-not
present
Ø According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by 1 or 2
degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.

CASE 18
Calderon vs. People of the Philippines and Court of Appeals; GR No. L-6189,
November 29, 1954.

CASE 19 (ERROR IN PERSONAE & ABERRATIO ICTUS)

People of the Philippines vs. Gemoya and Tionko; GR No. 132633, October 4,
2000

FACTS: The neighborhood of Barrio Malagamot, Panacan, Davao City were

awakened by a commotion. Armando Gemoya and Candelario Aliazar, together
with their relatives, Ronilo and Rolly Tionko, went towards the house of Irene
Lantapon. They were armed with pipe, wood, and an improvised bow and arrow
locally called “Indian Pana”. Addressing a group of people who were huddled
together, Ronilo stopped and demanded an explanation for what happened to his
brother-in-law. They replied that nothing happened to him and advised them to
go home. Ronilo ignored them and the four went to the house of the Alferezes.
They saw Wilfredo Alferez standing by the road waiting for a taxi. The four rushed
at him. Ronilo beat him with a cylindrical wood, Rolly with a pipe, while
Candelario held his arms behind him. Armando aimed his “Indian pana” at
Wilfredo and the latter was hit on his left chest. Edgardo and his daughter,
Rosalie Jimenez rushed to his aid. But Rosalie was hit on the left ear by
Armando. Then the four ran away. Wilfredo was brought to the hospital but he
died upon arrival. Rosalie, on the other hand, was declared out of danger. The
RTC found Armando and Ronilo guilty of murder and frustrated homicide.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in convicting Armando and Ronilo of the
crime of frustrated homicide for the wounding of Jimenez??? -- YES
RULING: The hitting of Rosalie was accidental as the second “Indian pana” was
meant for Wilfredo. The intent to kill Rosalie is absent. However, they are
still liable for the consequences of their felonious act. Mistake in the
identity of the victim, which may either be “error in personae”
(mistake of the person), or “aberratio ictus” (mistake in the blow), is
neither exempting nor mitigating. They cannot therefore escape the
criminal liability resulting from the injury suffered by Rosalie.
NOTE: Gemoya is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

CASE 20(ABERRATIO ICTUS & ERROR IN PERSONAE)

People of the Philippins vs. Sabalones, et.al.; GR No. 123485, August 31, 1998.

FACTS:
On June 1, 1985 at 11:45 PM, respondents including Rolusape Sabalones,
armed with firearms, attacked and ambushed individuals riding in two vehicles
resulting to the death of two persons and injury to three others.

According to a witness presented, Sabalones was implicated

in the killing of Nabing Velez because of the slapping incident involving her
father-in-law, Federico Sabalones, Sr. and Nabing Velez, which took place prior
to the death of Junior Sabalones (whose wake was during time of the commission
of the crime).

The conclusion of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the appellants
killed the wrong persons was based on the extrajudicial statement of Appellant
Beronga and the testimony of Jennifer Binghoy. These pieces of evidence
sufficiently show that appellants believed that they were suspected of having
killed the recently slain Nabing Velez, and that they expected his group to
retaliate against them.

The Trial Court observed that “they went to their grisly destination amidst the
dark and positioned themselves in defense of his turf against the invasion of a
revengeful gang of supporters of the recently slain Nabing Velez.”

ISSUE: W/N the case is „one of aberratio ictus‟

HELD:
NO. The case is not one of aberration ictus but one of error in personae or
mistake in identity, as observed by the OSG.

Transferred intent is used when a defendant intends to harm one victim, but
then unintentionally harms a second victim instead. In this case, the defendant's
intent transfers from the intended victim to the actual victim and can be used to
satisfy the mens rea element of the crime that the defendant is being charged
with. The transferred intentdoctrine is only used for completed crimes, and is
not used for attempted crimes.

Aberratio ictus means mistake in the blow, characterized by aiming at one but
hitting the other due to imprecision of the blow. In the case at bar, the appellants
opened fire because they mistook the vehicles to be carrying the avenging men
of Nabing Velez. The fact that they were mistaken does not diminish their
culpability. The Court has held that “mistake in identity of the victim carries the
same gravity as when the accused zeroes in on his intended victim.”

CASE 21(ABERRATIO ICTUS)

People of the Philippines vs. Adriano, et.al., GR No. 205228, July 15, 2015.

Subject: Criminal Law 1- Aberratio Ictus (Accidental Harm)

Doctrine: One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the
consequences which may naturally or logically result therefrom, whether
foreseen or intended or not. The rationale of the rule is found in the
doctrine, ‘el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado’, or he
who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
FACTS: In March of 2007 in Nueva Ecija, Rolly Adriano, with his three others,
overtook a policecar and Honda CRV. With intent to killd, treachery, and abuse
of superior stregth, willfully shot Danilo Cabiedes, the driver of CRV, resulting
from his instant death.
The shooting incident caused a bystander, Ofelia Bulanan, to be hit by a stray
bullet and eventually die.

Two policemen was able to trace the car used in the incident and ended up
arresting Adriano. RTC found accused ROLLY ADRIANO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder, as charged, for the death of Danilo Cabiedes, and
also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide, as charged, for the death of
Ofelia Bulana.

CA affrimed the decision of RTC.

ISSUES: (1) WON Adriano is responsible for the death of Bulanan.

(2) WON treachery can be appreciated in aberratio ictus?

RULING: (1) YES. Evidently, Adriano’s original intent was to kill Cabiedes.
However, during the commission of the crime of murder, a stray bullet hit and
killed Bulanan. Adriano is responsible for the consequences of his act of shooting
Cabiedes. This is the import of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code. As held
in People v. Herrera citing People v. Ural:
Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the
wrongful act be different from that which is intended. One who commits an
intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may naturally or
logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. The rationale of
the rule is found in the doctrine, ‘el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal
causado‘, or he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.

(2) YES. The accused was convicted of two separate counts of murder: for the
killing of two victims, Emerita, the intended victim, and Ireneo, the victim killed
by a stray bullet. The Court, due to the presence of the aggravating circumstance
of treachery, qualified both killings to murder. The material facts in Flora are
similar in the case at bar. Thus, we follow the Flora doctrine.

CASE 22 (IMPOSSIBLE CRIME)

Jacinto vs. People of the Philippines; GR No. 162540, July 13, 2009.

FACTS: In June 1997, Baby Aquino, handed petitioner -collector of Mega Foam,
a post dated checked worth P10,000 as payment for Baby’s purchases from Mega
Foam International, Inc. The said check was deposited to the account of
Jacqueline Capitle’s husband-Generoso. Rowena Recablanca, another employee
of Mega Foam, received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank, who was
looking for Generoso to inform Capitle that the BDO check deposited had been
dishonored. Thereafter, Joseph Dyhenga talked to Baby to tell that the BDO
Check bounced. However, Baby said that she had already paid Mega Foam
P10,000 cash in August 1997 as replacement for the dishonored check.
Dyhengco filed a compliant with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and
worked out an entrapment operation with its agents. Thereafter, petitioner and
Valencia were arrested. The NBI filed a criminal case for qualified theft against
the two (2) and Jacqueline Capitle.

RTC rendered a decision that Gemma, Anita and Jacqueline GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT and each of the sentenced
to suffer imprisonment of Five (5) years, Five (5) months and Eleven (11) days to
Six (6) years, Eight (8) months and Twenty (20) days.

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime committed falls the definition of Impossible
Crime.
HELD: Yes, Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner’s act
of receiving the cash replacement should not be considered as continuation of
the Theft.
The requisites of an impossible crime are:

1. That the Act performed would be an offer against persons or property;

2. That the act was alone with evil intent; and
3. That the accomplishment was inherently impossible or the means employed
was either inadequate or ineffectual.
The time that petitioner took a possession of the check meant for Mega Foam,
she had performed all the acts to consummate that crime of theft had it not been
impossible of accomplishment in this case.

Therefore, the Supreme Court held that petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is

found GUILTY of an impossible crime and suffer the penalty of Six (6) months
of arresto mayor and pay courts.

CASE 23

Abrogar and Abrogar vs. Cosmos Bottling Company; GR No. 164749, March 15,
2017.

Facts:
[T]o promote the sales of "Pop Cola", defendant Cosmos, jointly with Intergames,
organized an endurance running contest billed as the "1st Pop Cola Junior
Marathon" scheduled to be held on June 15, 1980. The organizers plotted a 10-
kilometer course starting from the premises of the Interim Batasang Pambansa
(IBP for brevity), through public roads and streets, to end at the Quezon
Memorial Circle. Plaintiffs' son Rommel applied with the defendants to be allowed
to participate in the contest and after complying with defendants' requirements,
his application was accepted and he was given an official number. Consequently,
on June 15, 1980 at the designated time of the marathon, Rommel joined the
other participants and ran the course plotted by the defendants. As it turned
out, the plaintiffs' (sic) further alleged, the defendants failed to provide adequate
safety and precautionary measures and to exercise the diligence required of them
by the nature of their undertaking, in that they failed to insulate and protect the
participants of the marathon from the vehicular and other dangers along the
marathon route. Rommel was bumped by a jeepney that was then running along
the route of the marathon on Don Mariano Marcos Avenue (DMMA for brevity),
and in spite of medical treatment given to him at the Ospital ng Bagong Lipunan,
he died later that same day due to severe head injuries.
Issues:
whether the doctrine of assumption of risk was applicable to the fatality
Ruling:
This Court also finds the doctrine of assumption of risk applicable in the case at
bar.
The general principle underlying the defense of assumption of risk is that a
plaintiff who voluntarily assumes a risk of harm arising from the negligent or
reckless conduct of the defendant cannot recover for such harm.
"Assumption of the risk in its primary sense arises by assuming through
contract, which may be implied, the risk of a known danger.
It implies intentional exposure to a known danger; It embraces a mental state of
willingness; It pertains to the preliminary conduct of getting into a dangerous
employment or relationship, it means voluntary incurring the risk of an accident,
which may or may not occur, and which the person assuming the risk may be
careful to avoid; and it defeats recovery because it is a previous abandonment of
the right to complain if an accident occurs.
In this case, appellant Romulo Abrogar himself admitted that his son, Rommel
Abrogar, surveyed the route of the marathon and even attended a briefing before
the race. Consequently, he was aware that the marathon would pass through a
national road and that the said road would not be blocked off from traffic.
And considering that he was already eighteen years of age, had voluntarily
participated in the marathon, with his parents' consent, and was well aware of
the traffic hazards along the route, he thereby assumed all the risks of the race.
This is precisely why permission from the participant's parents, submission of a
medical certificate and a waiver of all rights and causes of action arising from
the participation in the marathon which the participant or his heirs may have
against appellant Intergames were required as conditions in joining the
marathon.
With respect to voluntary participation in a sport, the doctrine of assumption of
risk applies to any facet of the activity inherent in it and to any open and obvious
condition of the place where it is carried on... where a person voluntarily
participates in a lawful game or contest, he assumes the ordinary risks of such
game or contest so as to preclude recovery from the promoter or operator of the
game or contest for injury or death resulting therefrom.
Proprietors of amusements or of places where sports and games are played are
not insurers of safety of the public nor of their patrons.
Principles:
The defense of assumption of risk presupposes: (1) that the plaintiff had actual
knowledge of the danger; (2) that he understood and appreciated the risk from
the danger; and (3) that he voluntarily exposed himself to such risk.
Thus, Rommel Abrogar having voluntarily participated in the race, with his
parents' consent, assumed all the risks of the race.

CASE 24

Fantastico and Villanueva vs. Malicse, Jr.; GR No. 190912, January 12, 2015.

FACTS:
On or about June 27, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines. Elpidio
Malicse Sr. became a victim of felonious acts where he suffered injuries and was
beaten up to death by a group of men. The accused were identified as, Salvador
Iguiron, Titus Iguiron, Saligan Iguiron, Gary Fantastico Rolando Villanueva,
Tommy Ballesteros, Nestor Ballesteros and Eugene Surigao. These identified
men confederated willfully, unlawfully and feloniously applying irresistible force,
mauled Elipidio, hitting his head with a piece of rattan, axe, pipe and a piece of
wood. The accused, with intent to kill and with treachery and taking advantage
of superior strength, directly by overt acts commenced the commission of the
crime of murder.
As a result, a case for Attempted Murder was filed against the accused
whose names are stated above.
However, the defendant pleaded “not guilty” by reason that the accused
did not perform all acts of execution which should have produced the crime of
murder, as a consequence, by reason of causes other than their own
spontaneous desistance and that the injuries caused were not necessarily
mortal.
A petition for review on certiorari was filed before the Supreme Court by
the accused, stating the following arguments:
1. The conclusions drawn by the court of appeals and the trial court from
the facts of the case are incorrect.
2. The information itself in this case does not allege all the elements and
the necessary ingredients of the specific crime attempted murder.
3. Not all of the elements attempted murder are present in this case.
4. There is no treachery or any other qualifying circumstance to speak of
in this case.
5. The lower court and the court of appeals failed to consider the presence
of mitigating circumstances.
6. There are manifest mistakes in the findings of facts by the court of
appeals and the trial court.
7. The conviction of the petitioners was based on the weakness of the
defense evidence, not on the strength of the prosecution evidence.
 8. The testimony of the respondent that it was the petitioners who
attacked him is indeed uncorroborated and thus self-serving.
9. Clearly, there are so much reversible errors in the decision of the court
of appeals and the lower court that injuriously affected the substantial
right of the petitioners and these should be corrected by this honorable
court.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the petitioners in their issues and arguments presented
involved questions of facts.
2. Whether or not the case is subject to dismissal for failure to be in
accordance with the rules on Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court
that petitions should only raise questions of law.
RULING:
1. Yes.
The distinction between a “question of law” and a “question of fact” is
settled. There is a “question of law” when the doubt or difference arises as to
what the law is on a certain facts and which does not call for examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the parties- litigants. On the other
hand, there is a “question of fact” when the doubt or controversy arises as to the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to
fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct,
is a question of law.
2. Yes.
The petitioners presented an argument involving questions of facts, implicating
a failure to be in accordance with the requirement of Rule 45, of the Rules of
Court.

CASE 25

Cruz vs. People of the Philippines; GR No. 166441, October 8, 2014.

FACTS:
The petitioner Norberto Cruz was charged with attempted rape and acts of
lasciviousness involving different victims. The Regional Trial Court and the Court
of Appeals found Cruz guilty of both crimes charged, hence, this appeal.

Norberto and his wife employed AAA and BBB to help them in selling their plastic
wares and glass wares in La Union. Upon reaching the place, they set up their
tents to have a place to sleep. Petitioner’s wife and their driver went back to
Manila to get more goods. While sleeping, AAA felt that somebody was on top of
her mashing her breast and touching her private part. Norberto ordered her not
to scream or she will be killed. AAA fought back and Norberto was not able to
pursue his lustful desires. AA left the tent to seek for help. When she returned
to their tent, she saw Norberto touching the private parts of BBB. This prompted
Norberto to leave the tent.

Norberto denies the commission of the crime alleging that he could not possibly
do the acts imputed out in the open as there were many people preparing for the
“simbang gabi”. He further assails the credibility AAA for the crime of rape,
alleging that the complaints were filed only for the purpose of extorting money
from him.

ISSUE:
Is petitioner guilty of attempted rape against AAA?

HELD:
NO, Cruz is guilty only of acts of lasciviousness. The basic element of rape is
carnal knowledge of a female. Carnal knowledge is defined simply as “the act of
a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman,” in other words, rape is
consummated once the penis capable of consummating the sexual act touches
the external genitalia of the female. There must be sufficient and convincing
proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and
not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted
of consummated rape.

Rape in its frustrated stage is a physical impossibility. Nonetheless, rape admits

of an attempted stage. In attempted rape, the concrete felony is rape, but the
offender does not perform all the acts of execution of having carnal knowledge.
If the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates rape, and rape
in its attempted stage requires the commencement of the commission of the
felony directly by overt acts without the offender performing all the acts of
execution that should produce the felony, the only means by which the overt
acts performed by the accused can be shown to have a causal relation to rape as
the intended crime is to make a clear showing of his intent to lie with the female.

The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim and was already touching her
genitalia with his hands and mashing her breasts when she freed herself from
his clutches and effectively ended his designs on her. Yet, inferring from such
circumstances that rape, and no other, was his intended felony would be highly
unwarranted. Such circumstances remained equivocal, or “susceptible of double
interpretation,” such that it was not permissible to directly infer from them the
intention to cause rape as the particular injury.

The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis capable
of consummating the sexual act of touching the external genitalia of the female.
Without such showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed.
Petitioner’s embracing and touching the victim’s vagina and breasts did not
directly manifest his intent to lie with her. The lack of evidence showing his
erectile penis being in the position to penetrate her when he was on top of her
deterred any inference about his intent to lie with her. At most, his acts reflected
lewdness and lust for her. The intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred
against the petitioner, even from his own declaration of it, if any, unless he
committed overt acts leading to rape.

Hence, Cruz is guilty only of acts of lasciviousness and not attempted rape.

CASE #28

GR No. 129433, March 30, 2000

People of the Philippines, plaintiff,

vs.
Campuhan, defendant

FACTS:

April 25, 1996 4 PM. Ma. Corazon P. Pamintan, mother of 4 – year old
Crysthel Pamintuan, went to the ground floor of their house to prepare Milo
chocolate drinks for her 2 children. There she met Primo Campuhan, helper of
Conrado Plata Jr., brother of Corazon, who was then busy filing small plastic
bags with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer located at the second floor.
Then she heard Crysthel cry “Ayoko, ayoko!” so she went upstairs and saw Primo
Campuhan insde her children’s room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas
or “joggin pants” and panty were already removed while his short pants were
down to his knees and his hands holding his penis with his right hand.

Horrified, she rushed “P-t-ng ina mo, anak ko iyan” and boxed him several
times. He evaded her blows and pulled up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside
who she tried to block his path. Corazon then ran out and shouted for help thus
prompting Vicente, her brother, a cousin and an uncle who were living within
their compound to chase Campuhan who was apprehended. They called the
barangay officials who detained him.
Physical examination yielded negative results as Crysthel’s hymen was intact.
CAMPUHAN: Chrystel was in a playing mood and wanted to ride on his back
when she suddenly pulled him down causing both of them to fall down on the
floor.
RTC: Guilty of statutory rape, sentenced him to the extreme penalty of death.
Thus, subject to automatic review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not it was a consummated statutory rape.
HELD:

NO. Guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an indeterminate

prison term of eight years four months and ten days of prison mayor medium as
minimum, to fourteen years ten months and twenty days of reckon temporal
medium as minimum. Costs de oficio. According to the Supreme Court, cited the
case of people v. De la Pena, it is stated that labia majora must be entered for
rape to be consummated. Here, Primo’s kneeling position rendered an unbridled
observation impossible. Also, Crysthel made a categorical statement denying
penetration but her vocabulary is yet as underdeveloped. Though, Corzazon
narrated that Primo had to hold his penis with his right hand, thus showing that
he had yet to attain an erection to be able to penetrate his victim, the possibility
of Primo’s penis having breached Crysthel’s vagina is belied by the child’s own
assertion that she resisted Primo’s advances by putting her legs close together
and that she did not feel any intense pain but just felt “not happy” about what
Primo did to her. Thus, she only shouted “Ayoko, ayoko!” not “Aray ko, aray”.
Moreover, no medical basis to hold that there was sexual contact between the
accused and the victim.

G.R. No. 200026, October 4, 2017

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.
ARMANDO DELECTOR

Facts:

The late Vicente Delector was talking with his brother, Antolin, when the
accused, another brother, shot him twice. Vicente's son, Amel attested that the
accused had fired his gun at his father from their mother's house, and had hit
his father who was then talking with Antolin. Hence, the accused was charged
with murder.
In his defense, the accused insisted that the shooting of Vicente had been by
accident when Vicente followed him to their mother's house and dared him to
come out, compelling Antolin to intervene and attempt to pacify Vicente. Instead,
Vicente attacked Antolin, which forced the accused to go out of their mother's
house. Seeing Vicente to be carrying his gun, he tried to wrest the gun from
Vicente, and they then grappled with each other for control of the gun. At that
point, the gun accidentally fired, and Vicente was hit.

Issue:

Whether or not the exempting circumstance of accident is present.

Ruling:
 No, accident could not be appreciated in favor of the accused. Article 12,
paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code exempts from criminal liability provided
that the elements of this exempting circumstance are, present: (1) that the
accused is performing a lawful act; (2) with due care; (3) causes injury to another
by mere accident; and (4) without fault or intention of causing it.

Accident could not be appreciated herein as an exempting circumstance

simply because the accused grappled with the victim for control of the gun which
is utterly inconsistent with the ordinary and normal behavior of one who is facing
imminent danger to one's life. The assertion of accident could have been
accorded greater credence had there been only a single shot fired, for such a
happenstance could have been attributed to the unintentional pulling of the
hammer during the forceful grappling for control of the gun. Yet, the revolver
fired twice, which we think eliminated accident.

Ratio Decidendi: It is unlikely that the accused-appellant would purposely

set out and grapple with the victim who was already armed with a gun while
accused-appellant was totally unarmed. Such actuation is utterly inconsistent
with the ordinary and normal behavior of one who is facing imminent danger to
one's life, considering the primary instinct of self-preservation.
Gist: This case involves a brother fatally shooting his own brother. In his defense,
the accused pleaded accident as an exempting circumstance. The trial and
intermediate appellate courts rejected his plea and found him guilty of murder
qualified by treachery. Hence, he has come to us to air his final appeal for
absolution.

CASE #53

G.R. No. 193134, March 02, 2016

RAFAEL NADYAHAN, Petitioner,

VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts:

For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals finding petitioner Rafael
Nadyahan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide.
In an Information filed by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, petitioner was
charged with homicide. When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the
charge. The defense manifested at pre-trial that while petitioner indeed stabbed
the victim, he did so in self-defense. For this reason, a reverse trial, upon
agreement of the parties, was conducted with the defense presenting its evidence
first.
The trial court lent credence to the version of the defense that petitioner is not
the aggressor. However, the trial court found that there is an incomplete self-
defense on the part of petitioner. Particularly, the trial court ruled that based on
the wounds sustained by the victim, the means used by petitioner to prevent or
repel the attack was not reasonable. In the imposition of penalty, the trial court
considered incomplete self-defense as a privileged mitigating circumstance and
voluntary surrender as an ordinary mitigating circumstance. The appellate court
rendered its decision affirming petitioner's conviction.

Issue:

Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in ruling that there is an
incomplete self-defense.

Held:

No, the court a quo did not err in ruling that there is an incomplete self-
defense.

Case law has established that in invoking self-defense, whether complete

or incomplete, the onus probandi is shifted to the accused to prove by clear and
convincing evidence all the elements of the justifying circumstance, namely: (a)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) the reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself.
The Court agree with the trial court that there was unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of petitioner.
However, the circumstances, as cited by the appellate court, negate the presence
of a reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it:

First, there is intrinsic disproportion between a knife and a belt buckle;

Second, physical evidence shows that the accused-appellant suffered only a
lacerated wound on the forehead, he could not have been a defender reeling from
successive blows inflicted by the victim and company; Third, the victim and his
companions were already drunk before the fatal fight. This state of intoxication,
while not critically material to the stabbing that transpired, is still material for
purposes of defining its surrounding circumstances; Fourth, and as the trial
court aptly observed, the knife wounds were all aimed at vital parts of the body.
The depth of these wounds shows the force exerted in the accused-appellant's
thrusts while the locations are indicative that the thrusts were all meant to kill,
not merely disable the victim, and thereby avoid his drunken thrusts.
In sum, the court do not find any error in the Court of Appeals' ruling with
respect to incomplete-self defense to warrant its reversal. However, we find the
need to modify the penalty it imposed which is four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional medium, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor
minimum, as maximum.
CASE #67

G.R. No. 218945, December 13, 2017

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPIPNES, plaintiff

v.
LORETO DAGSIL, defendant.

FACTS:

The accused in this case was charged with murder. Evidence for the
prosecution showed that he stabbed the victim which caused her eventual death.
The defense of the accused was that he was in a state of insanity at the time of
the killing. He claimed that he was confused, lost hist mind, and could not
remember the events that transpired. The RTC convicted the accused, and the
CA affirmed this ruling

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused can avail of the exempting circumstance of

insanity.

RULING:

Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the

burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. Under Article 800 of the
Civil Code, the presumption is that every human is sane.

In this case, the court was not convinced that the accused was insane. His
answers to the questions propounded to him by his counsel were intelligent,
responsive, and straightforward; they were not the answers of an unintelligent
person or nitwit that he says he is. In fact, his testimony was filled with vivid
details and he clearly remembers the events that happened before and after the
commission of the crime. Against this factual backdrop, which convincingly
showed that he is an intelligent, cognitive, rational and thinking person at the
time of the stabbing, the plea of insanity must be rejected because it has no leg
to stand on.