1. NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN vs. JUDGE VIRGILIO V.
PO1 Ampatuan has rendered the administrative case moot and
MACARAIG
G.R. No. 182497, 29 June 2010
FACTS:
Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department,
was killed at the corner of M. H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil Streets,
Ermita, Manila. Investigation conducted by the Manila Police District
Homicide Section yielded the identity of the male perpetrator as PO1
Ampatuan. Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was commanded to the
MPD District Director for proper disposition. Likewise, inquest
proceedings were conducted by the Manila Prosecutor’s Office.
On 18 April 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Guinto, rendered his
Pre-Charge Evaluation Report against PO1 Ampatuan, finding
probable cause to charge PO1 Ampatuan with Grave Misconduct
(Murder) and recommending that said PO1 Ampatuan be subjected to
summary hearing.
Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of Manila
recommended that the case against PO1 Ampatuan be set for further
investigation and that the latter be released from custody unless he is
being held for other charges/legal grounds.
Armed with the 21 April 2008 recommendation of the Manila City’s
Prosecution Office, petitioner, who is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed
a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the RTC
of Manila on 22 April 2008.
On 24 April 2008, RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
commanding therein respondents to produce the body of PO1
Ampatuan and directing said respondents to show cause why they are
withholding or restraining the liberty of PO1 Ampatuan.
Seeking the reversal of RTC, the respondents averred that the filing of
the administrative case against PO1 Ampatuan is a process done by the
PNP and this Court has no authority to order the release of the subject
police officer. The petitioner countered that the letter resignation of
academic. Respondent however stressed that the resignation has not
been acted by the appropriate police officials of the PNP, and that the
administrative case was filed while PO1 Ampatuan is still in the active
status of the PNP. The RTC reversed and dismissed the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent court gravely abused its discretion
when it failed to consider that the arrest and detention of Po1 Basser
B. Ampatuan was made without any warrant and therefore, illegal
HELD:
The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or
detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is
to be inquired into is the legality of a person's detention as of, at the
earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for
even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some
supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of
Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the
application.
In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive
Custody. Republic Act No. 6975 (also known as the Department of
Interior and Local Government Act of 1990), as amended by Republic
Act No. 8551 (also known as the Philippine National Police Reform
and Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly provides that members of the
police force are subject to the administrative disciplinary machinery
of the PNP.
Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody,
such constitutes a valid argument for his continued detention. This
Court has held that a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements
or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their
superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty.
Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the
ambit of habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor effective restraint that
would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible
precautionary measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police
officers concerned are always accounted for.
In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge the burden of showing that
she is entitled to the issuance of the writ prayed for in behalf of her
husband, PO1 Ampatuan. The petition fails to show on its face that the
latter is unlawfully deprived of his liberty guaranteed and enshrined
in the Constitution.
2. GO vs. LUIS T. RAMOS
FACTS:
These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit for deportation
initiated by Luis T. Ramos before the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go
alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. Luis alleged
that while Jimmy represents himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmy’s
personal circumstances and other records indicate that he is not
so. To prove his contention, Luis presented the birth certificate of
Jimmy, issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City, which
indicated Jimmy’s citizenship as “FChinese.” Luis argued that
although it appears from Jimmy’s birth certificate that his parents,
Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be
tampered, because only the citizenship of Carlos appears to be
handwritten while all the other entries were typewritten. He also
averred that in September 1989 or thereabout, Jimmy, through
stealth, machination and scheming managed to cover up his true
citizenship, and with the use of falsified documents and untruthful
declarations, was able to procure a Philippine passport from the
Department of Foreign Affairs.
Jimmy refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit, averring that
the complaint for deportation initiated by Luis was merely a
harassment case designed to oust him of his rightful share in their
business dealings. Jimmy maintained that there is no truth to the
allegation that he is an alien, and insisted that he is a natural-born
Filipino. Jimmy alleged that his father Carlos, who was the son of a
Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected Philippine citizenship in
accordance with Commonwealth Act 625.
In a resolution dated Feb. 14 2001, Associate Comm. Linda L. Malinab
Hornilla dismissed the complaint for deportation against Jimmy. On
March 8 2001, The Board of Commissioner reversed the decision.
Their contention is that Carlos’s election of citizenship was made out
of time. The board issued a decision dated April 17 2002 for
apprehension and deportation of Jimmy Go to China.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in RTC but was denied by
the said Court. They questioned the said decision and filed a Petition
for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The petition was granted. Their
Motion for Reconsideration was denied at the Bureau of Immigration.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed
RULING:
A petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus is a special
proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or
detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is
to be inquired into is the legality of a person’s detention as of, at the
earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for
even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some
supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of
Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application.
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer
question his detention through a petition for the issuance of a Writ of
Habeas Corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information
and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The Writ of Habeas Corpus
should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been
charged before any court. The term “court” in this context includes
quasi-judicial bodies of governmental agencies authorized to order the
person’s confinement, like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of
Immigration. Likewise, the cancellation of his bail cannot be assailed
via a petition for Habeas Corpus. When an alien is detained by the
Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of
deportation by the Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have
no power to release such alien on bail even in habeas corpus
proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.
Given that Jimmy has been duly charged before the Board, and in fact
ordered arrested pending his deportation, coupled by this Court’s
pronouncement that the Board was not ousted of its jurisdiction to
continue with the deportation proceedings, the petition for Habeas
Corpus is rendered moot and academic. This being so, we find it
unnecessary to touch on the other arguments advanced by
respondents regarding the same subject.
3. SUSAN GO VS. DIMAGIBA
FACTS:
Fernando Dimagiba issued to Susan Go thirteen checks with, when
presented to the drawee bank for encashment or payment on the due
dates were dishonored for the reason “account closed”. Subsequently,
Dimagiba was prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of BP 22 (An Act
Penalizing the Making or Drawing and Issuance of a Check Without
Sufficient Funds or Credit and for other Purposes, approved on April
3, 1979). He was found guilty by the MTCC, was sentenced three-
months imprisonment, and was ordered to pay the offended party the
amount he owed plus interest.
On February 27, 2001, Dimagiba filed a motion for reconsideration
and the Motion for Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution praying
for the recall of the order of arrest and the modification of the final
decision. Citing SC-AC No. 12-2000, he pointed out that the penalty
of fine only, instead of imprisonment also, should have been imposed
on him. The MTCC denied the motion for reconsideration; Dimagiba
was arrested and imprisoned for the service of his sentence.
On October 9, 2001, Dimagiba filed with the RTC of Baguio City
petition for writ of habeas corpus which was granted by the said court
after hearing the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas corpus is the proper
remedy
RULING:
No. In his Petition for habeas corpus, respondent raised the same
arguments that he had invoked in the said Motions. We believe that
his resort to this extraordinary remedy was a procedural infirmity. The
remedy should have been an appeal of the MTCC Order denying his
Motions, in which he should have prayed that the execution of the
judgment be stayed. But he effectively misused the action he had
chosen, obviously with the intent of finding a favorable court.
His Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was clearly an attempt to
reopen a case that had already become final and executory. Such an
action deplorably amounted to forum shopping. Respondent should
have resorted to the proper, available remedy instead of instituting a
different action in another forum.
4. IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR
REYNALDO DE VILLA (detained at the New Bilibid
Prisons, Muntinlupa City)
JUNE DE VILLA, petitioner-relator,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR, NEW BILIBID PRISONS, respondent.
G.R. No. 158802 November 17, 2004
FACTS:
This is a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Rule
102 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Reynaldo de Villa, joined by his
son, petitioner-relator June de Villa, seeks a two-fold relief: First, that
respondent Director of Prisons justify the basis for the imprisonment
of petitioner Reynaldo de Villa; and second, that petitioner be granted
a new trial. These reliefs are sought on the basis of purportedly
exculpatory evidence, gathered after performing deoxyribonucleic
acid (DNA) testing on samples allegedly collected from the petitioner
and a child born to the victim of the rape.
By final judgment, the trial court found petitioner guilty of the rape of
Aileen Mendoza when she was 12 years old, his niece by affinity and
was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusión perpetua; and ordered
him to pay the offended party civil indemnity, moral damages, costs of
the suit, and support for Leahlyn Corales Mendoza, the putative child
born of the rape. Petitioner is currently serving his sentence at the New
Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City. Petitioner’s defense, at the time of the
alleged rape, he was already 67 years old. Old age and sickness had
rendered him incapable of having an erection. On automatic
review, the court found that the date of birth of Aileen’s child was
medically consistent with the time of the rape.
Three years after the promulgation of the Decision, there was a
question of Reynaldo de Villa’s guilt or innocence. Petitioner-relator
in this case, June de Villa, is the son of Reynaldo. He alleges that
during the trial of the case, he was unaware that there was a scientific
test that could determine once and for all if Reynaldo was the father of
the victim’s child, Leahlyn. Petitioner-relator was only informed
during the pendency of the automatic review of petitioner’s case that
DNA testing could resolve the issue of paternity. This information was
apparently furnished by the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) Anti-
Death Penalty Task Force, which took over as counsel for petitioner.
Thus, petitioner’s brief in People v. de Villa sought the conduct of a
blood type test and DNA test in order to determine the paternity of the
child allegedly conceived as a result of the rape and the relief was
implicitly denied. Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration
of the Decision, wherein he once more prayed that DNA tests be
conducted and it was denied with finality in a Resolution.
Petitioner-relator was undaunted by these challenges, for having been
informed that DNA tests required a sample that could be extracted
from saliva, petitioner-relator asked Billy Joe de Villa, a grandson of
Reynaldo de Villa and a classmate of Leahlyn Mendoza, to ask Leahlyn
to spit into a new, sterile cup and used it as a sample. Petitioner-relator
then gathered samples from four grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa.
Petitioner-relator requested the NSRI to conduct DNA testing on the
sample given by Leahlyn Mendoza, those given by the grandchildren
of Reynaldo de Villa, and that given by Reynaldo de Villa himself. The
identities of the donors of the samples, save for the sample given by
Reynaldo de Villa, were not made known to the DNA Analysis
Laboratory.
After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report and
showed that Reynaldo de Villa could not have sired any of the children
whose samples were tested, due to the absence of a match between the
pertinent genetic markers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the DNA result is a valid basis for habeas corpus and
new trial
HELD:
No. The most criterion for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, is
that the individual seeking such relief be illegally deprived of his
freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint.
If an individual’s liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ
of habeas corpus is unavailing.
In the recent case of Feria v. CA, it was held that review of judgment
of conviction is allowed in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus only in very specific instances, such as when, as a consequence
of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court
had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty
has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess. This
court stated the general rule that the writ of habeas corpus is not a writ
of error, and should not be thus used.
A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be
granted only if the following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence
was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been
discovered and produced at the trail even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such
weight that, if admitted, it would probably change the judgment.
Petitioner-relator’s claim that he was “unaware” of the existence of
DNA testing until the trial was concluded carries no weight with this
court. Lack of knowledge of the existence of DNA testing speaks of
negligence, either on the part of petitioner, or on the part of
petitioner’s counsel. In either instance, however, this negligence is
binding upon petitioner.
5. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS ENGR. ASHRAF KUNTING, Petitioner.
FACTS:
Petitioner Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for violation of the
Malaysian Internal Security Act. The Royal Malaysian Police in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia, turned over Kunting to the PNP-IG and Task Force
Salinglahi pursuant to warrants for his arrest issued by the RTC of
Isabela City, Basilan. Kunting was charged with four counts of
Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention.
In a letter, Atty. Guillermo G. Danipog, Jr., Police Superintendent and
Chief of the Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, requested from the Court
for Kunting’s temporary detention at the PNP-IG, Camp Crame,
Quezon City due to the high security risks involved and prayed for the
issuance of a corresponding commitment order.
The Acting Clerk of Court of the RTC replied to the request of Atty.
Danipog in the affirmative. Petitioner may be temporarily detained by
virtue of the Alias Warrant of Arrest. However, considering that the
accused is a high security risk, he should be brought to Isabela,
Basilan.
On September 15, 2003, the RTC issued an Order directing the Police
Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to
immediately turn over Kunting to the trial court since Kunting filed an
Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation.
On November 5, 2003, PNP-IG Director Arturo C. Lomibao wrote a
letter to Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño, Department of
Justice (DOJ), requesting for representation and a motion to be filed
for the transfer of the venue of the trial from Isabela City, Basilan to
Pasig City for the reason that the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) exerted
utmost effort to recover the custody of Kunting and that if he will be
detained in Basilan, he might be recovered by the ASG due to
inadequate security facility.
On February 11, 2005, the RTC issued an Order denying Kunting’s
Motion to Set Case for Preliminary Investigation since the PNP-IG has
not turned over Kunting. The trial court reiterated its Order dated
September 15, 2003, directing the Police Superintendent and Chief,
Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to turn over Kunting to the court.
On March 15, 2005, Police Inspector Amado L. Barbasa, Jr., OIC,
Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, filed with the RTC a Motion to Defer
Implementation of the Order dated February 11, 2005, citing, among
other grounds, the existence of a pending motion for the transfer of
the venue of the trial against Kunting, which was allegedly filed by the
DOJ. Police Inspector Barbasa prayed that the Order of the RTC dated
February 11, 2005, directing the turnover of Kunting to the court, be
suspended until the motion for the transfer of venue is resolved.
On March 14, 2005, Kunting, by counsel, filed this petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Kunting stated that he has been
restrained of his liberty since June 12, 2003 by the PNP-IG led by
Police Chief Superintendent Ismael Rafanan and assisted by PNP
Intelligence Chief, General Robert Delfin. He alleged that he was never
informed of the charges filed against him.
Kunting asserted that he never participated in the kidnapping
incident, so he promptly filed an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation.
Having no further information on the status of his case, he filed a
Motion to Set Case for Preliminary Investigation on January 26, 2005.
He stated that since no action was taken by the trial court or the DOJ,
he filed this petition to put an end to his illegal detention classified in
the records as "for safekeeping purposes only."
ISSUE:
Whether not the petition for habeas corpus can prosper
RULING:
No. Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas
corpus extends to "all case of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."
The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the
cause of detention of a person, and if found illegal, the court orders the
release of the detainee. If, however, the detention is proven lawful,
then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate.
Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides when the writ is not
allowed:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears
that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody
of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by
virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court
or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or
make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by
reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or
order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the
discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense
in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under
lawful judgment.6
In this case, Kunting’s detention by the PNP-IG was under process
issued by the RTC. He was arrested by the PNP by virtue of the alias
order of arrest issued by the Judge of RTC Isabela City, Basilan. His
temporary detention at PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, was thus
authorized by the trial court.
Moreover, Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for
Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention in several Criminal Cases. In
accordance with the last sentence of Section 4 above, the writ cannot
be issued and Kunting cannot be discharged since he has been charged
with a criminal offense. Bernarte v. Court of Appeals holds that "once
the person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer
question his detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus."
Nevertheless, this Court notes that the RTC in its Order dated
February 11, 2005 reiterated its Order dated September 15, 2003,
directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division,
PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, to turn over Kunting to the court.
TThe trial court has been waiting for two years for the PNP-IG to turn
over the person of Kunting for the trial of his case. The PNP-IG has
delayed the turn over because it is waiting for the DOJ to request for
the transfer of venue of the trial of the case from Isabela City, Basilan
to Pasig City. In this regard, the Police Chief Superintendent is,
therefore, directed to take positive steps towards action on said
motion and comply with the Order of the trial courtto turn over the
body of petitioner Kunting to the trial court.