G.R. No.
200334 July 30, 2014 La Union to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent-
Appellee,
vs.
VICTOR COGAED y ROMANA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The mantle of protection upon one's person and
one's effects through Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution is essential to allow citizens to evolve
their autonomy and, hence, to avail themselves of
their right to privacy. The alleged compromise with
the battle against dangerous drugs is more
apparent than real. Often, the compromise is there
because law enforcers neglect to perform what
could have been done to uphold the Constitution
as they pursue those who traffic this scourge of
society.
Squarely raised in· this appeal1 is the admissibility
of the evidence seized as a result of a warrantless
arrest. The police officers identified the alleged
perpetrator through facts that were not based on
their personal knowledge. The information as to
the accused’s whereabouts was sent through a text
message. The accusedwho never acted suspicious
was identified by a driver. The bag that allegedly
contained the contraband was required to be
opened under intimidating circumstances and
without the accused having been fully apprised of
his rights. This was not a reasonable search within
the meaning of the Constitution. There was no
reasonable suspicion that would allow a legitimate
"stop and frisk" action. The alleged waiver of rights
by the accused was not done intelligently,
knowingly, and without improper pressure or
coercion.
The evidence, therefore, used against the accused
should be excluded consistent with Article III,
Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. There being no
possible admissible evidence, the accused should
be acquitted.
I
According to the prosecution, at about 6:00 a.m. of
November 25, 2005, Police Senior Inspector
Sofronio Bayan (PSI Bayan) of the San Gabriel
Police Station in San Gabriel,La Union, "received a
text message from an unidentified civilian
informer"2 that one Marvin Buya (also known as
Marvin Bugat) "[would]be transporting
marijuana"3 from Barangay LunOy, San Gabriel,
Union.4
PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order "to
intercept the suspect."5 PSI Bayan ordered SPO1
Jaime Taracatac, Jr. (SPO1 Taracatac), a member
of the San Gabriel Police, to set up a checkpoint in
the waiting area of passengers from San Gabriel
bound for San Fernando City.6 A passenger
jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1
Taracatac’s checkpoint.7 The jeepney driver
disembarked and signalled to SPO1 Taracatac
indicating the two male passengers who were
carrying marijuana.8 SPO1 Taracatac approached
the two male passengers who were later identified
as Victor RomanaCogaed and Santiago Sacpa
Dayao.9 Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a
sack while Dayao was holding a yellow bag.10
SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about
the contents of their bags.11 Cogaed and Dayao
told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since
they were transporting the bags as a favor for their
barriomatenamed Marvin.12 After this exchange,
Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks
of what looked like marijuana. 13 Cogaed then
muttered, "nagloko daytoy nga Marvinen,
kastoymet gayam ti nagyanna,"which translates to
"Marvin is a fool, this is what [is] contained in the
bag."14 "SPO1 Taracatac arrested [Cogaed] and . . .
Dayao and brought them to the police
station."15 Cogaed and Dayao "were still carrying
their respective bags"16 inside the station.17
While at the police station, the Chief of Police and
Investigator PO3 Stanley Campit (PO3 Campit)
requested Cogaed and Dayao to empty their
bags.18 Inside Cogaed’s sack was "four (4) rolled
pieces of suspected marijuana fruiting tops," 19 and
inside Dayao’s yellow bag was a brick of suspected
marijuana.20
PO3 Campit prepared the suspected marijuana for
laboratory testing.21 PSI Bayan personally delivered
the suspected marijuana to the PNP Crime
Laboratory.22 Forensic Chemical Officer Police
Inspector Valeriano Panem Laya II performed the
tests and found that the objects obtained were
indeed marijuana.23 The marijuana collected from
Cogaed’s blue bag had a total weight of 8,091.5
grams.24 The marijuana from Cogaed’s sack
weighed 4,246.1 grams.25 The marijuana collected
from Dayao’s bag weighed 5,092 grams.26 A total of
17,429.6 grams werecollected from Cogaed’s and
Dayao’s bags.27
According to Cogaed’s testimony during trial, he
was at Balbalayan, La Union, "waiting for a jeepney
to take him"28 to the Poblacion of San Gabriel so he
could buy pesticide.29 He boarded a jeepney and
recognized Dayao, his younger brother’s
friend.30 Upon arrival at the Poblacion of San
Gabriel, Dayao and Cogaed alighted from the
jeepney.31 Dayao allegedly "asked for [Cogaed’s]
help in carrying his things, which included a
travelling bag and a sack."32 Cogaed agreed
because they were both going to the market. 33 This
was when SPO1 Taracatac approached them, and
when SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed what was
inside the bags, Cogaed replied that he did not
know.34 SPO1 Taracatac then talked to Dayao,
however, Cogaed was not privy to their
conversation.35 Thereafter, SPO1 Taracatac
arrested Dayao and Cogaed and brought them to
the police station.36 These facts were corroborated
by an eyewitness,Teodoro Nalpu-ot, who was
standing across the parking lot where Cogaed was
apprehended.37
At the police station, Cogaed said that "SPO1
Taracatac hit [him] on the head."38 The bags were
also opened, but Cogaed never knew what was
inside.39
It was only later when Cogaed learned that it was
marijuana when he and Dayao were charged with
illegal possession of dangerous drugs under
Republic Act No. 9165.40 The information against
them states:
That on or about the 25th day of November, 2005,
in the Municipality of San Gabriel, Province of La
Union, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused
VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA and SANTIAGO
DAYAO Y SACPA (who acted with discernment) and
JOHN DOE,conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did then there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly, without
being authorized by law, have in their control,
custody and possession dried marijuana, a
dangerous drug, with a total weight of seventeen
thousand,four hundred twenty-nine and sixtenths
(17, 429.6) grams.
CONTRARY TO Section 11 (Possession of
Dangerous Drugs), Article II, of Republic Act No.
9165 (otherwise known as the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002").41
The case was raffled to Regional Trial Court,
Branch 28 of San Fernando City, La
Union.42 Cogaed and Dayao pleaded not
guilty.43 The case was dismissed against Dayao
because he was only 14 years old at that time and
was exempt from criminal liability under the
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 or
Republic Act No. 9344.44 Trial against Cogaed
ensued. In a decision45 dated May 21, 2008, the
Regional Trial Court found Cogaed guilty. The
dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Victor
Cogaed y Romana GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt for Violation of Section 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002")
and sentences him to suffer life imprisonment, and
to pay a fine of one million pesos (Php
1,000,000.00).46
The trial court judge initiallyfound Cogaed’s arrest
illegal considering that "Cogaed at that time was
not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a
crime nor was shown that hewas about to do so or
that had just done so. He just alighted from the
passenger jeepney and there was no outward
indication that called for his arrest."47 Since the
arrest was illegal, the warrantless search should
also be considered illegal.48 However, the trial court
stated that notwithstanding the illegality of the
arrest, Cogaed "waived his right to object to such
irregularity"49 when "he did not protest when SPO1
Taracatac, after identifying himself, asked him to
open his bag."50
Cogaed appealed51 the trial court’s
decision.However, the Court of Appeals denied his
appeal and affirmed the trial court’s decision.52 The
Court of Appeals found that Cogaed waived his
right against warrantless searches when "[w]ithout
any prompting from SPO1 Taracatac, [he]
voluntarily opened his bag."53 Hence, this appeal
was filed.
The following errors were assigned by Cogaed in
his appellant’s brief:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
ADMITTING THE SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS
AS EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT DESPITE BEING THE RESULT OF AN
UNLAWFUL WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND
SEIZURE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICER’S NON-
COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE PROPER CUSTODY OF SEIZED DANGEROUS
DRUGS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICER’S FAILURE
TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY AND
EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE SEIZED
DANGEROUS DRUGS.54
For our consideration are the following issues: (1)
whether there was a valid search and seizure of
marijuana as against the appellant; (2) whether the
evidence obtained through the search should be
admitted; and (3) whether there was enough
evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused.
In view of the disposition of this case, we deem that
a discussion with respect to the requirements on
the chain of custody of dangerous drugs
unnecessary.55
We find for the accused.
II
The right to privacy is a fundamental right
enshrined by implication in our Constitution. It
has many dimensions. One of its dimensions is its
protection through the prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures in Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be
determinedpersonally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This provision requires that the court examine with
care and diligence whether searches and seizures
are "reasonable." As a general rule, searches
conducted with a warrant that meets all the
requirements of this provision are reasonable. This
warrant requires the existence of probable cause
that can only be determined by a judge.56 The
existence of probable cause must be established by
the judge after asking searching questions and
answers.57 Probable cause at this stage can only
exist if there is an offense alleged to be committed.
Also, the warrant frames the searches done by the
law enforcers. There must be a particular
description of the place and the things to be
searched.58
However, there are instances when searches are
reasonable even when warrantless.59 In the Rules
of Court, searchesincidental to lawful arrests are
allowed even without a separate warrant.60 This
court has taken into account the "uniqueness of
circumstances involved including the purpose of
the search or seizure, the presence or absence of
probable cause, the manner in which the search
and seizure was made, the place or thing searched,
and the character of the articles procured."61 The
known jurisprudential instances of reasonable
warrantless searches and seizures are:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest. . . ;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," . . . ;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly
regulated by the government, the vehicle’s
inherent mobility reduces expectation of
privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to
probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;
4. Consentedwarrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency
circumstances.62 (Citations omitted)
III
One of these jurisprudential exceptionsto search
warrants is "stop and frisk". "Stop and frisk"
searches are often confused with searches
incidental to lawful arrests under the Rules of
Court.63 Searches incidental to a lawful arrest
require that a crime be committed in flagrante
delicto, and the search conducted within the
vicinity and withinreach by the person arrested is
done to ensure that there are no weapons, as well
as to preserve the evidence.64
On the other hand, "stop and frisk"searches are
conducted to prevent the occurrence of a crime.
For instance, the search in Posadas v. Court of
Appeals65 was similar "to a ‘stop and frisk’
situation whose object is either to determine the
identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain
the status quomomentarily while the police officer
seeks to obtain more information."66 This court
stated that the "stop and frisk" search should be
used "[w]hen dealing with a rapidly unfolding and
potentially criminal situation in the city streets
where unarguably there is no time to secure . . . a
search warrant."67
The search involved in this case was initially a
"stop and frisk" search, but it did not comply with
all the requirements of reasonability required by
the Constitution.
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as
Terrysearches68) are necessary for law
enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given
the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of
offenses. However, this should be balanced with
the need to protect the privacy of citizens in
accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution.
The balance lies in the concept of"suspiciousness"
present in the situation where the police officer
finds himself or herself in. This may be
undoubtedly based on the experience ofthe police
officer. Experienced police officers have personal
experience dealing with criminals and criminal
behavior. Hence, they should have the ability to
discern — based on facts that they themselves
observe — whether an individual is acting in a
suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would
be that the police officer, with his or her personal
knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the
suspicion of an illicit act.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals, 69 the police officers
were initially informed about a place frequented by
people abusing drugs.70 When they arrived, one of
the police officers saw a man with "reddish eyes
and [who was] walking in a swaying
manner."71 The suspicion increased when the man
avoided the police officers.72 These observations led
the police officers to conclude that the man was
high on drugs.73 These were sufficient facts
observed by the police officers "to stop[the]
petitioner [and] investigate."74
In People v. Solayao,75 police officers noticed a man
who appeared drunk.76 This man was also
"wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle
suit."77 Upon seeing the police, the man fled.78 His
flight added to the suspicion.79 After stopping him,
the police officers found an unlicensed "homemade
firearm"80 in his possession.81 This court ruled that
"[u]nder the circumstances, the government agents
could not possibly have procured a search warrant
first."82 This was also a valid search.
In these cases, the police officers using their
senses observed facts that led to the suspicion.
Seeing a man with reddish eyes and walking in a
swaying manner, based on their experience, is
indicative of a person who uses dangerous and
illicit drugs. A drunk civilian in guerrilla wear is
probably hiding something as well.
The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a
passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboarda
jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover,
criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag.
The assessment of suspicion was not made by the
police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the
driver who signalled to the police that Cogaed was
"suspicious."
This is supported by the testimony of SPO1
Taracatac himself:
COURT:
Q So you don’t know what was the content while it
was still being carried by him in the passenger
jeep?
WITNESS:
A Not yet, Your Honor.83
SPO1 Taracatac likewise stated:
COURT:
Q If the driver did not make a gesture pointing to
the accused, did you have reason to believe that
the accused were carrying marijuana?
WITNESS:
A No, Your Honor.84
The jeepney driver had to point toCogaed. He
would not have been identified by the police
officers otherwise.
It is the police officer who should observe facts that
would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a
person. The police officer should not adopt the
suspicion initiated by another person. This is
necessary to justify that the person suspected be
stopped and reasonably searched.85 Anything less
than this would be an infringementupon one’s
basic right to security of one’s person and effects.
IV
Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the
law enforcer an opportunity to confer with a judge
to determine probable cause. In Posadas v. Court
of Appeals,86 one of the earliest cases adopting the
"stop and frisk" doctrine in Philippine
jurisprudence, this court approximatedthe
suspicious circumstances as probable cause:
The probable causeis that when the petitioner
acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the
buri bag there was a probable cause that he was
concealing something illegal in the bag and it was
the right and duty of the police officers to inspect
the same.87 (Emphasis supplied)
For warrantless searches, probable cause was
defined as "a reasonable ground of
suspicionsupported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to
believe that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged."88
Malacat v. Court of Appeals89 clarifies the
requirement further. It does not have to be
probable cause,but it cannot be mere
suspicion.90 It has to be a "genuine reason"91 to
serve the purposes of the "stop and frisk"
exception:92
Other notable points of Terryare that while
probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop
and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere
suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and
frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the
police officer’s experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
detained has weapons concealed about
him.93 (Emphasis supplied, footnotes omitted)
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People,94 Justice
Bersamin reminds us that police officers must not
rely on a single suspicious circumstance.95 There
should be "presence of more than oneseemingly
innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted
a reasonable inference of criminal activity."96 The
Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and
seizures."97 Certainly, reliance on only one
suspicious circumstance or none at all will not
result in a reasonable search.98
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in
this case, and there was no approximation for the
probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest.
The person searched was noteven the person
mentioned by the informant. The informant gave
the name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched
was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed
responded by saying that he was transporting the
bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one
circumstance. This should not have been enough
reason to search Cogaed and his belongings
without a valid search warrant.
V boat.116 Like in the case at bar, the NBI inspected
Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches
and be shielded by this exception, unless there is
compliance with the "genuine reason" requirement
and that the search serves the purpose of
protecting the public. As stated in Malacat:
[A] "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1)
the general interest of effective crime prevention
and detection, which underlies the recognition that
a police officer may, under appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without probable
cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety
and self-preservationwhich permit the police officer
to take steps to assure himself that the person
with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be
used against the police officer.99 (Emphasis
supplied)
The "stop and frisk" searchwas originally limited to
outer clothing and for the purpose of detecting
dangerous weapons.100 As in
Manalili,101 jurisprudence also allows "stop and
frisk" for cases involving dangerous drugs.
The circumstances of thiscase are analogous to
People v. Aruta.102 In that case, an informant told
the police that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be
bringing in drugs from Baguio City by bus. 103 At
the bus terminal, the police officers prepared
themselves.104 The informant pointed at a woman
crossing the street105 and identified her as "Aling
Rosa."106 The police apprehended "Aling Rosa," and
they alleged that she allowed them to look inside
her bag.107 The bag contained marijuana leaves.108
In Aruta, this court found that the search and
seizure conducted was illegal.109 There were no
suspicious circumstances that preceded Aruta’s
arrest and the subsequent search and seizure.110 It
was only the informant that prompted the police to
apprehend her.111 The evidence obtained was not
admissible because of the illegal
search.112 Consequently, Aruta was acquitted.113
Arutais almost identical to this case, except that it
was the jeepney driver, not the police’s informant,
who informed the police that Cogaed was
"suspicious."
The facts in Arutaare also similar to the facts in
People v. Aminnudin.114 Here, the National Bureau
ofInvestigation (NBI) acted upon a tip, naming
Aminnudin as somebody possessing drugs.115 The
NBI waited for the vessel to arrive and accosted
Aminnudin while he was disembarking from a
Aminnudin’s bag and found bundles of what
turnedout to be marijuana leaves.117 The court
declared that the searchand seizure was
illegal.118 Aminnudin was acquitted.119
People v. Chua120 also presents almost the same
circumstances. In this case, the police had been
receiving information that the accused was
distributing drugs in "different karaoke bars in
Angeles City."121 One night, the police received
information that thisdrug dealer would be dealing
drugs at the Thunder Inn Hotel so they conducted
a stakeout.122 A car "arrived and parked"123 at the
hotel.124The informant told the police that the man
parked at the hotel was dealing drugs. 125 The man
alighted from his car.126 He was carrying a juice
box.127 The police immediately apprehended him
and discovered live ammunition and drugs in his
person and in the juice box he was holding. 128
Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything
unusual or suspicious about Chua’s situation
when the police apprehended him and ruled that
"[t]here was no valid‘stop-and-frisk’."129
VI
None of the other exceptions to warrantless
searches exist to allow the evidence to be
admissible.The facts of this case do not qualify as a
search incidental to a lawful arrest.
Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows
for searches incidental to a lawful arrest. For there
to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a
warrant of arrest or a lawful warrantless arrest as
enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A
peace officer or a private person may, withouta
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has just been
committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with
a warrant of arrest. None of the instances
enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court were present whenthe arrest was made. At
the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not
committed, was not committing, or was about to
commit a crime. As in People v. Chua, for a
warrantless arrest of in flagrante delictoto be
affected, "two elements must concur: (1) the person
to bearrested must execute anovert act indicating
that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done inthe presence or within the view
of the arresting officer."130 Both elements were
missing when Cogaed was arrested.131 There were
no overt acts within plain view of the police officers
that suggested that Cogaed was in possession of
drugs at that time.
Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that
time; hence, he could not have qualified for the last
allowable warrantless arrest.
VII
There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s
constitutional rights even if we assume that he did
not object when the police asked him to open his
bags. As this court previously stated:
Appellant’s silence should not be lightly taken as
consent to such search. The implied acquiescence
to the search, if there was any, could not have
been more than mere passive conformity given
under intimidating or coercive circumstances and
is thus considered no consent at all within the
purview of the constitutional
guarantee.132 (Citations omitted) Cogaed’s silence
or lack of aggressive objection was a natural
reaction to a coercive environment brought about
by the police officer’s excessive intrusion into his
private space. The prosecution and the police carry
the burden of showing that the waiver of a
constitutional right is one which is knowing,
intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all cases,
such waivers are not to be presumed.
The coercive atmosphere created by the presence of
the police officer can be discerned again from the
testimony of SPO1 Taracatac during cross-
examination:
ATTY. BINWAG:
Q Now, Mr. witness, you claimed that you only
asked them what are the contents of their bags, is
it not?
WITNESS:
A Yes, ma’am.
Q And then without hesitation and voluntarily they
just opened their bags, is it not?
A Yes, ma’am.
Q So that there was not any order from you for
them to open the bags?
A None, ma’am.
Q Now, Mr. witness when you went near them and
asked them what were the contents ofthe bag, you
have not seen any signs of hesitation or fright from
them, is it not?
A It seems they were frightened, ma’am.
Q But you actually [claimed] that there was not
any hesitation from them in opening the bags, is it
not?
A Yes, ma’am but when I went near them it seems
that they were surprised.133 (Emphasis supplied)
The state of mind of Cogaed was further clarified
with SPO1 Taracatac’s responses to Judge
Florendo’s questions:
COURT:
....
Q Did you have eye contact with Cogaed?
A When I [sic] was alighting from the jeepney, Your
Honor I observed that he was somewhat
frightened.1âwphi1 He was a little apprehensive
and when he was already stepping down and he
put down the bag I asked him, "what’s that," and
he answered, "I don’t know because Marvin only
asked me to carry."134
For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her
constitutional right, it is not sufficient that the
police officerintroduce himself or herself, or be
known as a police officer.1âwphi1 The police officer
must also inform the person to be searched that
any inaction on his orher part will amount to a
waiver of any of his or her objections that the
circumstances do not amount to a reasonable
search. The police officer must communicate this
clearly and in a language known to the person who
is about to waive his or her constitutional rights.
There must be anassurance given to the police
officer that the accused fully understands his or
her rights. The fundamental nature of a person’s
constitutional right to privacy requires no less.
VIII
The Constitution provides:
Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures] shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.135
Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this
constitutional provision originated from Stonehill v.
Diokno.136 This rule prohibits the issuance of
general warrants that encourage law enforcers to
go on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained
through unlawful seizures should be excluded as
evidence because it is "the only practical means of
enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures."137 It ensures
that the fundamental rights to one’s person,
houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed
upon and are upheld.
Considering that the prosecution and conviction of
Cogaed were founded on the search of his bags, a
pronouncement of the illegality of that search
means that there is no evidence left to convict
Cogaed.
Drugs and its illegal traffic are a scourgeto our
society. In the fight to eradicate this menace, law
enforcers should be equipped with the resources to
be able to perform their duties better. However, we
cannot, in any way, compromise our society’s
fundamental values enshrined in our Constitution.
Otherwise, we will be seen as slowlydismantling
the very foundations of the society that we seek to
protect.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 28, San Fernando City, La Union
and of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
03394 are hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. For
lack of evidence to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, accused-appellant VICTOR
COGAED Y ROMANA is hereby ACQUITTED and
ordered RELEASED from confinement unless he is
being heldfor some other legal grounds. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 89139 August 2, 1990
ROMEO POSADAS y ZAMORA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Rudy G. Agravate for petitioner.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The validity of a warrantless search on the person
of petitioner is put into issue in this case.
On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in the
morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra
Umpar, both members of the Integrated National
Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned
with the Intelligence Task Force, were conducting a
surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City.
While they were within the premises of the Rizal
Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying
a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting
suspiciously.
They approached the petitioner and identified
themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner
attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was
thwarted by the two notwithstanding his
resistance.
They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner
where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith &
Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196 1 two (2)
rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun 2 a
smoke (tear gas) grenade,3 and two (2) live
ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. 4 They brought
the petitioner to the police station for further
investigation. In the course of the same, the
petitioner was asked to show the necessary license
or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions
found in his possession but he failed to do so. He
was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office
and the prohibited articles recovered from him
were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on
duty. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City wherein after a plea of not
guilty and trial on the merits a decision was
rendered on October 8, 1987 finding petitioner
guilty of the offense charged as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the
foregoing, this Court , finds the
accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense charged.
It appearing that the accuse d was
below eighteen (18) years old at the
time of the commission of the
offense (Art. 68, par. 2), he is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from TEN (10)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor to TWELVE (12) Years, FIVE
(5) months and Eleven (11) days
of Reclusion Temporal, and to pay
the costs.
The firearm, ammunitions and
smoke grenade are forfeited in favor
of the government and the Branch
Clerk of Court is hereby directed to
turn over said items to the Chief,
Davao Metrodiscom, Davao City. 5
Not satisfied therewith the petitioner interposed an
appeal to the Court of Appeals wherein in due
course a decision was rendered on February 23,
1989 affirming in toto the appealed decision with
costs against the petitioner. 6
Hence, the herein petition for review, the main
thrust of which is that there being no lawful arrest
or search and seizure, the items which were
confiscated from the possession of the petitioner
are inadmissible in evidence against him.
The Solicitor General, in justifying the warrantless
search of the buri bag then carried by the
petitioner, argues that under Section 12, Rule 136
of the Rules of Court a person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything used as proof of a commission of an
offense without a search warrant. It is further
alleged that the arrest without a warrant of the
petitioner was lawful under the circumstances.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides as follows:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant;
when lawful — A peace officer or a
private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person
to be arrested has committed is
actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just
been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
 (c) When the person to be arrested is
a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a)
and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police
station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance
with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a, 17a)
From the foregoing provision of law it is clear that
an arrest without a warrant may be effected by a
peace officer or private person, among others,
when in his presence the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense; or when an offense has in
fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of the facts indicating that the person
arrested has committed it.
The Solicitor General argues that when the two
policemen approached the petitioner, he was
actually committing or had just committed the
offense of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions in the presence of the police officers
and consequently the search and seizure of the
contraband was incidental to the lawful arrest in
accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure. We disagree.
At the time the peace officers in this case identified
themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he
attempted to flee they did not know that he had
committed, or was actually committing the offense
of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions.
They just suspected that he was hiding something
in the buri bag. They did now know what its
contents were. The said circumstances did not
justify an arrest without a warrant.
However, there are many instances where a
warrant and seizure can be effected without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest, foremost
of which is the "stop and search" without a search
warrant at military or police checkpoints, the
constitutionality or validity of which has been
upheld by this Court in Valmonte vs. de Villa, 7 as
follows:
Petitioner Valmonte's general
allegation to the effect that he had
been stopped and searched without
a search warrant by the military
manning the checkpoints, without
more, i.e., without stating the
details of the incidents which
amount to a violation of his light
against unlawful search and
seizure, is not sufficient to enable
the Court to determine whether
there was a violation of Valmonte's
right against unlawful search and
seizure. Not all searches and
seizures are prohibited. Those which
are reasonable are not forbidden. A
reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but
is to be resolved according to the
facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer
merely draws aside the curtain of a
vacant vehicle which is parked on
the public fair grounds, or simply
looks into a vehicle or flashes a light
therein, these do not constitute
unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned
checkpoints in Valenzuela (and
probably in other areas) may be
considered as a security measure to
enable the NCRDC to pursue its
mission of establishing effective
territorial defense and maintaining
peace and order for the benefit of
the public. Checkpoints may also be
regarded as measures to thwart
plots to destabilize the government
in the interest of public security. In
this connection, the Court may take
judicial notice of the shift to urban
centers and their suburbs of the
insurgency movement, so clearly
reflected in the increased killings in
cities of police and military men by
NPA "sparrow units," not to mention
the abundance of unlicensed
firearms and the alarming rise in
lawlessness and violence in such
urban centers, not all of which are
reported in media, most likely
brought about by deteriorating
economic conditions — which all
sum up to what one can rightly
consider, at the very least, as
abnormal times. Between the
inherent right of the state to protect
its existence and promote public
welfare and an individual's right
against a warrantless search which
is however reasonably conducted,
the former should prevail.
 True, the manning of checkpoints by
the military is susceptible of abuse
by the men in uniform in the same
manner that all governmental power
is susceptible of abuse. But, at the
cost of occasional inconvenience,
discomfort and even irritation to the
citizen, the checkpoints during
these abnormal times, when
conducted within reasonable limits,
are part of the price we pay for an
orderly society and a peaceful
community. (Emphasis supplied).
Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure
conducted at military or police checkpoints and the
search thereat in the case at bar, there is no
question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable
considering that unlike in the former, it was
effected on the basis of a probable cause. The
probable cause is that when the petitioner acted
suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri
bag there was a probable cause that he was
concealing something illegal in the bag and it was
the right and duty of the police officers to inspect
the same.
It is too much indeed to require the police officers
to search the bag in the possession of the
petitioner only after they shall have obtained a
search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise
may prove to be useless, futile and much too late.
In People vs. CFI of Rizal, 8 this Court held as
follows:
. . . In the ordinary cases where
warrant is indispensably necessary,
the mechanics prescribed by the
Constitution and reiterated in the
Rules of Court must be followed and
satisfied. But We need not argue
that there are exceptions. Thus in
the extraordinary events where
warrant is not necessary to effect a
valid search or seizure, or when the
latter cannot be performed except
without warrant, what constitutes a
reasonable or unreasonable search
or seizure becomes purely a judicial
question, determinable from the
uniqueness of the circumstances
involved, including the purpose of
the search or seizure, the presence
or absence of probable cause, the
manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing
searched and the character of the
articles procured.
The Court reproduces with approval the following
disquisition of the Solicitor General:
The assailed search and seizure may
still be justified as akin to a "stop
and frisk" situation whose object is
either to determine the identity of a
suspicious individual or to maintain
the status quo momentarily while
the police officer seeks to obtain
more information. This is illustrated
in the case of Terry vs. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968). In this case, two men
repeatedly walked past a store
window and returned to a spot
where they apparently conferred
with a third man. This aroused the
suspicion of a police officer. To the
experienced officer, the behaviour of
the men indicated that they were
sizing up the store for an armed
robbery. When the police officer
approached the men and asked
them for their names, they mumbled
a reply. Whereupon, the officer
grabbed one of them, spun him
around and frisked him. Finding a
concealed weapon in one, he did the
same to the other two and found
another weapon. In the prosecution
for the offense of carrying a
concealed weapon, the defense of
illegal search and seizure was put
up. The United States Supreme
Court held that "a police officer may
in appropriate circumstances and in
an appropriate manner approach a
person for the purpose of
investigating possible criminal
behaviour even though there is no
probable cause to make an arrest."
In such a situation, it is reasonable
for an officer rather than simply to
shrug his shoulder and allow a
crime to occur, to stop a suspicious
individual briefly in order to
determine his identity or maintain
the status quo while obtaining more
information. . . .
Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be
sustained under the exceptions heretofore
discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures has
not been violated. 9
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED with costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Facts: Members of the Integrated National Police petitioner only after they shall have obtained a
(INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise
Intelligence Task Force, Pat. Ursicio Ungab and may prove to be useless, futile and much too late.
Pat. Umbra Umpar conducted surveillance along
Magallanes Street, Davao City. While in the vicinity Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be
of Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner sustained under theexceptions heretofore
carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee
acting suspiciously. They approached the against unreasonable searches and seizures has
petitioner and identified themselves as members of not been violated.
the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his
attempt to get away was unsuccessful. They then
checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they
found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver
with SerialNo. 770196, two (2) rounds of live
ammunition for a .38 caliber gun, a smoke (tear
gas) grenade, and two (2) live ammunitions for a
.22 calibergun. They brought the petitioner to the
police station for further investigation. In the
course of the same, the petitioner was asked to
show the necessary license or authority to possess
firearms and ammunitions found in his possession
but he failed to do so. He was then taken to the
Davao Metrodiscom office and the prohibited
articles recovered from him were indorsed to
M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. He was
prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City.

Issue: Whether or Not the warantless search is

valid. G.R. No. 190846, February 03, 2016

TOMAS P. TAN, JR., Petitioner, v. JOSE G.

Held: In justifying the warrantless search of the
buri bag then carried by the petitioner, argues that
under Section 12, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court a
person lawfully arrested may be searched
for dangerous weapons or anything used as proof
of a commission of an offense without a search
warrant. It is further alleged that the arrest
without a warrant of the petitioner was lawful
under the circumstances.
in the case at bar, there is no question that,
indeed, it is reasonable considering that it was
effected on the basis of a probable cause. The
probable cause is that when the petitioner acted
suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri
bag there was a probable cause that he was
concealing something illegal in the bag and it was
the right and duty of the police officers
to inspect the same.
It is too much indeed to require the police officers
to search the bag in the possession of the
HOSANA, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is a petition for review
on certiorari1 challenging the August 28, 2009
decision2 and November 17, 2009 resolution 3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
88645.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Facts
The respondent Jose G. Hosana (Jose) married
Milagros C. Hosana (Milagros) on January 14,
1979.4 During their marriage, Jose and Milagros
bought a house and lot located at Tinago, Naga
City, which lot was covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No.
21229.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On January 13, 1998, Milagros sold to the
petitioner Tomas P. Tan, Jr. (Tomas) the subject
property, as evidenced by a deed of sale executed
by Milagros herself and as attorney-in-fact of Jose,
by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
executed by Jose in her favor.6 The Deed of Sale
stated that the purchase price for the lot was
P200,000.00.7 After the sale, TCT No. 21229 was
cancelled and TCT No. 32568 was issued in the
name of Tomas.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On October 19, 2001, Jose filed a Complaint for
Annulment of Sale/Cancellation of
Title/Reconveyance and Damages against Milagros,
Tomas, and the Register of Deeds of Naga
City.9 The complaint was filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 62, Naga City. In the
complaint, Jose averred that while he was working
in Japan, Milagros, without his consent and
knowledge, conspired with Tomas to execute the
SPA by forging Jose's signature making it appear
that Jose had authorized Milagros to sell the
subject property to
Tomas.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In his Answer, Tomas maintained that he was a
buyer in good faith and for value.11 Before he paid
the full consideration of the sale, Tomas claimed he
sought advice from his lawyer-friend who told him
that the title of the subject lot was authentic and
in order.12 Furthermore, he alleged that the SPA
authorizing Milagros to sell the property was
annotated at the back of the
title.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Tomas filed a cross-claim against Milagros and
claimed compensatory and moral damages,
attorney's fees, and expenses, for litigation, in the
event that judgment be rendered in favor of
Jose.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The RTC declared Milagros in default for her failure
to file her answer to Jose's complaint and Tomas'
cross-claim.15 On the other hand, it dismissed
Tomas' complaint against the Register of Deeds
since it was only a nominal
party.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits
ensued.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Jose presented his brother, Bonifacio Hosana
(Bonifacio), as sole witness. Bonifacio testified that
he learned of the sale of the subject property from
Milagros' son.18 When Bonifacio confronted
Milagros that Jose would get angry because of the
sale, Milagros retorted that she sold the property
because she needed the money. Bonifacio
immediately informed Jose, who was then in
Japan, of the sale.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Jose was furious when he learned of the sale and
went back to the Philippines. Jose and Bonifacio
verified with the Register of Deeds and discovered
that the title covering the disputed property had
been transferred to
Tomas.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Bonifacio further testified that Jose's signature in
the SPA was forged.21 Bonifacio presented
documents containing the signature of Jose for
comparison: Philippine passport, complaint-
affidavit, duplicate original of SPA dated 16
February 2002, notice of lis pendens, community
tax certificate, voter's affidavit, specimen
signatures, and a handwritten
letter.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On the other hand, Tomas submitted his own
account of events as corroborated by Rosana
Robles (Rosana), his goddaughter. Sometime in
December 1997, Tomas directed Rosana to go to
the house of Milagros to confirm if Jose knew
about the sale transaction. Through a phone call
by Milagros to Jose, Rosana was able to talk to
Jose who confirmed that he was aware of the sale
and had given his wife authority to proceed with
the sale. Rosana informed Tomas of Jose's
confirmation.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
With the assurance that all the documents were in
order, Tomas made a partial payment of
P350,000.00 and another P350,000.00 upon the
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale (Deed of
Sale). Tomas noticed that the consideration written
by Milagros on the Deed of Sale was only
P200,000.00; he inquired why the written
consideration was lower than the actual
consideration paid. Milagros explained that it was
done to save on taxes. Tomas also learned from
Milagros that she needed money badly and had to
sell the house because Jose had stopped sending
her money.24chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The RTC Ruling
In its decision dated December 27, 2006, 25 the RTC
decided in favor of Jose and nullified the sale of the
subject property to Tomas. The RTC held that the
SPA dated June 10, 1996, wherein Jose
supposedly appointed Milagros as his attorney-in-
fact, was actually null and void.
Tomas and Milagros were ordered to jointly and
severally indemnify Jose the amount of P20,000.00
as temperate
damages.26chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The CA Ruling

Tomas appealed the RTC's ruling to the CA.
In a decision dated August 28, 2009,27 the CA
affirmed the RTC ruling that the deed of sale and
the SPA were void. However, the CA modified the
judgment of the RTC: first, by deleting the award of
temperate damages; and second, by directing Jose
and Milagros to reimburse Tomas the purchase
price of P200,000.00, with interest, under the
principle of unjust enrichment. Despite Tomas'
allegation that he paid P700,000.00 for the subject
lot, the CA found that there was no convincing
evidence that established this
claim.28chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Tomas filed a motion for the reconsideration of the
CA decision on the ground that the amount of
P200,000.00 as reimbursement for the purchase
price of the house and lot was insufficient and not
supported by the evidence formally offered before
and admitted by the RTC. Tomas contended that
the actual amount he paid as consideration for the
sale was P700,000.00, as supported by his
testimony before the
RTC.29chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The C A denied the motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit" in a resolution dated November 17,
2009.30chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Petition
Tomas filed the present petition for review
on certiorari to challenge the CA ruling which
ordered the reimbursement of P200,000.00 only,
instead of the actual purchase price he paid in the
amount of
P700,000.00.31chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Tomas argues that, first, all matters contained in
the deed of sale, including the consideration
stated, cannot be used as evidence since it was
declared null and void; second, the deed of sale
was not specifically offered to prove the actual
consideration of the sale;32third, his testimony
establishing the actual purchase price of
P700,000.00 paid was
uncontroverted;33 and, fourth, Jose must return
the full amount actually paid under the principle
of solutio indebiti.34chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Jose, on the other hand, argues that first, Jose is
estopped from questioning the purchase price
indicated in the deed of dale for failing to
immediately raise this question; and second, the
terms of an agreement reduced into writing are
deemed to include all the terms agreed upon and
no other evidence can be admitted other than the
terms of the agreement
itself.35chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Issues
The core issues are (1) whether the deed of sale
can be used as the basis for the amount of
consideration paid; and (2) whether the testimony
of Tomas is sufficient to establish the actual
purchase price of the
sale.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
OUR RULING
We affirm the CA ruling and deny the petition.
Whether Tomas paid the purchase price of
P700,000.00 is a question of fact not proper in a
petition for review on certiorari. Appreciation of
evidence and inquiry on the correctness of the
appellate court's factual findings are not the
functions of this Court, as we are not a trier of
facts.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This Court does not address questions of fact
which require us to rule on "the truth or falsehood
of alleged facts,"37 except in the following
cases:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd,
or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on
misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of
fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings,
the same are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of
fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record.38chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The present case does not fall under any of these
exceptions.
Whether Tomas sufficiently proved that he paid
P700,000.00 for the subject property is a factual
question that the CA had already resolved in the
negative.39 The CA found Tomas' claim of paying
P700,000.00 for the subject property to be
unsubstantiated as he failed to tender any
convincing evidence to establish his claim.
We uphold the CA's finding.
In civil cases, the basic rule is that the party
making allegations has the burden of proving them
by a preponderance of evidence.40 Moreover, the
parties must rely on the strength of their own
evidence, not upon the weakness of the defense
offered by their
opponent.41chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit,
and value of the aggregate evidence on either side
and is usually considered to be synonymous with
the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater
weight of the credible evidence."42 Preponderance
of evidence is a phrase that, in the last analysis,
means probability of the truth. It is evidence that is
more convincing to the court as it is worthier of
belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto.43chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We agree with the CA that Tomas' bare allegation
that he paid Milagros the sum of P700,000.00
cannot be considered as proof of payment, without
any other convincing evidence to establish this
claim. Tomas' bare allegation, while
uncontroverted, does not automatically entitle it to
be given weight and credence.
It is settled in jurisprudence that one who pleads
payment has the burden of proving it;44 the burden
rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather
than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment.45 A
mere allegation is not evidence,46 and the person
who alleges has the burden of proving his or her
allegation with the requisite quantum of evidence,
which in civil cases is preponderance of evidence.
The force and effect of a void contract is
distinguished from its admissibility as
evidence.
The next question to be resolved is whether the CA
correctly ordered the reimbursement of
P200,000.00, which is the consideration stated in
the Deed of Sale, based on the principle of unjust
enrichment.
The petitioner argues that the CA erred in relying
on the consideration stated in the deed of sale as
basis for the reimbursable amount because a null
and void document cannot be used as evidence.
We find no merit in the petitioner's argument.
A void or inexistent contract has no force and effect
from the very beginning.47 This rule applies to
contracts that are declared void by positive
provision of law, as in the case of a sale of conjugal
property without the other spouse's written
consent.48 A void contract is equivalent to nothing
and is absolutely wanting in civil effects.49 It
cannot be validated either by ratification or
prescription.50 When, however, any of the terms of
a void contract have been performed, an action to
declare its inexistence is necessary to allow
restitution of what has been given under
it.51chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is basic that if a void contract has already "been
performed, the restoration of what has been given
is in order."52 This principle springs from Article 22
of the New Civil Code which states that "every
person who through an act of performance by
another, or any other means, acquires or comes
into possession of something at the expense of the
latter without just or legal ground, shall return the
same." Hence, the restitution of what each party
has given is a consequence of a void and inexistent
contract.
While the terms and provisions of a void contract
cannot be enforced since it is deemed inexistent, it
does not preclude the admissibility of the contract
as evidence to prove matters that occurred in the
course of executing the contract, i.e., what each
party has given in the execution of the contract.
Evidence is the means of ascertaining in a judicial
proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact,
sanctioned by the Rules of Court.53 The purpose of
introducing documentary evidence is to ascertain
the truthfulness of a matter at issue, which can be
the entire content or a specific provision/term in
the document.
The deed of sale as documentary evidence may be
used as a means to ascertain the truthfulness of
the consideration stated and its actual payment.
The purpose of introducing the deed of sale as
evidence is not to enforce the terms written in the
contract, which is an obligatory force and effect of
a valid contract. The deed of sale, rather, is used
as a means to determine matters that occurred in
the execution of such contract, i.e., the
determination of what each party has given under
the void contract to allow restitution and prevent
unjust enrichment.
Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the
issue and is not excluded by the law of these
rules.54 There is no provision in the Rules of
Evidence which excludes the admissibility of a void
document. The Rules only require that the
evidence is relevant and not excluded by the Rules
for its admissibility.55chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Hence, a void document is admissible as evidence
because the purpose of introducing it as evidence
is to ascertain the truth respecting a matter of fact,
not to enforce the terms of the document itself.
It is also settled in jurisprudence that with respect
to evidence which appears to be
of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or
admissibility, the safer policy is to be liberal and
not reject them on doubtful or technical grounds,
but admit them unless plainly irrelevant,
immaterial, or incompetent; for the reason that
their rejection places them beyond the
consideration of the court, if they are thereafter
found relevant or competent. On the other hand,
their admission, if they turn out later to be
irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied
by completely discarding them or ignoring
them.56chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the present case, the deed of sale was declared
null and void by positive provision of the law
prohibiting the sale of conjugal property without
the spouse's consent. It does not, however,
preclude the possibility that Tomas paid the
consideration stated therein. The admission of the
deed of sale as evidence is consistent with the
liberal policy of the court to admit the evidence:
which appears to be relevant in resolving an issue
before the courts.
An offer to prove the regular execution of the
deed of sale is basis for the court to determine
the presence of the essential elements of the
sale, including the consideration paid.
Tomas argues that the Deed of Sale was not
specifically offered to prove the actual
consideration of the sale and, hence, cannot be
considered by the court. Tomas is incorrect.
The deed of sale in the present case was formally
offered by both parties as evidence. 57 Tomas, in
fact, formally offered it for the purpose of proving
its execution and the regularity of the
sale.58chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The offer of the deed of sale to prove its regularity
necessarily allowed the; lower courts to consider
the terms written therein to determine whether all
the essential elements59 for a valid contract of sale
are present, including the consideration of the sale.
The fact that the sale was declared null and void
does not prevent the court from relying on
consideration stated in the deed of sale to
determine the actual amount paid by the petitioner
for the purpose of preventing unjust enrichment.
Hence, the specific offer of the Deed of Sale to
prove the actual consideration of the sale is not
necessary since it is necessarily included in
determining the regular execution of the sale.
The consideration stated in the notarized Deed
of Sale is prima facie evidence of the amount
paid by the petitioner.
The notarized deed of sale is a public document
and is prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts
stated therein.60chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Prima facie evidence is defined as evidence good
and sufficient on its face. Such evidence as, in the
judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a
given fact, or the group or chain of facts
constituting the party's claim or defense and which
if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain
sufficient.61chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the present case, the consideration stated in the
deed of sale constitutes prima facie evidence of the
amount paid by Tomas for the transfer of the
property to his name. Tomas failed to adduce
satisfactory evidence to rebut or contradict the
consideration stated as the actual consideration
and amount paid to Milagros and Jose.
The deed of sale was declared null and void by a
positive provision of law requiring the consent of
both spouses for the sale of conjugal property.
There is, however, no question on the presence of
the consideration of the sale, except with respect to
the actual amount paid. While the deed of sale has
no force and effect as a contract, it remains prima
facie evidence of the actual consideration paid.
As earlier discussed, Tomas failed to substantiate
his claim that he paid to Milagros the amount of
P700,000.00, instead of the amount of
P200,000.00 stated in the deed of sale. No
documentary or testimonial evidence to prove
payment of the higher amount was presented,
apart from Tomas' sole testimony. Tomas' sole
testimony of payment is self-serving and
insufficient to unequivocally prove that Milagros
received P700,000.00 for the subject property.
Hence, the consideration stated in the deed of sale
remains sufficient evidence of the actual amount
the petitioner paid and the same amount which
should be returned under the principle of unjust
enrichment.
Unjust enrichment exists "when a person unjustly
retains a benefit at the loss of another, or when a
person retains money or property of another
against the fundamental principles of justice,
equity, and good conscience."62 The prevention of
unjust enrichment is a recognized public policy of
the State and is based on Article 22 of the Civil
Code.63chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The principle of unjust enrichment requires Jose to
return what he or Milagros received under the void
contract which presumably benefitted their
conjugal partnership.
Accordingly, the CA correctly ordered Jose to
return the amount of P200,000.00 since this the
consideration stated in the Deed of Sale and given
credence by the lower court. Indeed, even Jose
expressly stated in his comment that Tomas is
entitled to recover the money paid by him in the
amount of P200,000.00 as appearing in the
contract.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for
review on certiorari. The decision dated August 28,
2009 and the resolution dated November 17, 2009,
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88645
is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
G.R. No. 177407 February 9, 2011
RICO ROMMEL ATIENZA, Petitioner,
vs.
BOARD OF MEDICINE and EDITHA
SIOSON, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision1 dated September 22, 2006 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87755. The CA
dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by
petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza (Atienza), which, in
turn, assailed the Orders2 issued by public
respondent Board of Medicine (BOM) in
Administrative Case No. 1882.
The facts, fairly summarized by the appellate
court, follow.
Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent
Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical Center (RMC)
for check-up on February 4, 1995. Sometime in
1999, due to the same problem, she was referred
to Dr. Pedro Lantin III of RMC who, accordingly,
ordered several diagnostic laboratory tests. The
tests revealed that her right kidney is normal. It
was ascertained, however, that her left kidney is
non-functioning and non-visualizing. Thus, she
underwent kidney operation in September, 1999.
On February 18, 2000, private respondent’s
husband, Romeo Sioson (as complainant), filed a
complaint for gross negligence and/or
incompetence before the [BOM] against the doctors
who allegedly participated in the fateful kidney
operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr. Pedro
Lantin, III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio Florendo and
petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza.
It was alleged in the complaint that the gross
negligence and/or incompetence committed by the
said doctors, including petitioner, consists of the
removal of private respondent’s fully functional
right kidney, instead of the left non-functioning
and non-visualizing kidney.
The complaint was heard by the [BOM]. After
complainant Romeo Sioson presented his evidence,
private respondent Editha Sioson, also named as
complainant there, filed her formal offer of
documentary evidence. Attached to the formal offer
of documentary evidence are her Exhibits "A" to
"D," which she offered for the purpose of proving
that her kidneys were both in their proper
anatomical locations at the time she was operated.
She described her exhibits, as follows:
"EXHIBIT ‘A’ – the certified photocopy of the
X-ray Request form dated December 12,
1996, which is also marked as Annex ‘2’ as
it was actually originally the Annex to x x x
Dr. Pedro Lantin, III’s counter affidavit filed
with the City Prosecutor of Pasig City in
connection with the criminal complaint filed
by [Romeo Sioson] with the said office, on
which are handwritten entries which are
the interpretation of the results of the
ultrasound examination. Incidentally, this
exhibit happens to be the same as or
identical to the certified photocopy of the
document marked as Annex ‘2’ to the
Counter-Affidavit dated March 15, 2000,
filed by x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, on May
4, 2000, with this Honorable Board in
answer to this complaint;
"EXHIBIT ‘B’ – the certified photo copy of
the X-ray request form dated January 30,
1997, which is also marked as Annex ‘3’ as
it was actually likewise originally an Annex
to x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, III’s counter-
affidavit filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Pasig City in connection with
the criminal complaint filed by the herein
complainant with the said office, on which
are handwritten entries which are the
 interpretation of the results of the
examination. Incidentally, this exhibit
happens to be also the same as or identical
to the certified photo copy of the document
marked as Annex ‘3’ which is likewise dated
January 30, 1997, which is appended as
such Annex ‘3’ to the counter-affidavit
dated March 15, 2000, filed by x x x Dr.
Pedro Lantin, III on May 4, 2000, with this
Honorable Board in answer to this
complaint.
"EXHIBIT ‘C’ – the certified photocopy of the
X-ray request form dated March 16, 1996,
which is also marked as Annex ‘4,’ on
which are handwritten entries which are
the interpretation of the results of the
examination.
"EXHIBIT ‘D’ – the certified photocopy of the
X-ray request form dated May 20, 1999,
which is also marked as Annex ‘16,’ on
which are handwritten entries which are
the interpretation of the results of the
examination. Incidentally, this exhibit
appears to be the draft of the typewritten
final report of the same examination which
is the document appended as Annexes ‘4’
and ‘1’ respectively to the counter-affidavits
filed by x x x Dr. Judd dela Vega and Dr.
Pedro Lantin, III in answer to the
complaint. In the case of Dr. dela Vega
however, the document which is marked as
Annex ‘4’ is not a certified photocopy, while
in the case of Dr. Lantin, the document
marked as Annex ‘1’ is a certified
photocopy. Both documents are of the same
date and typewritten contents are the same
as that which are written on Exhibit ‘D.’
Petitioner filed his comments/objections to private
respondent’s [Editha Sioson’s] formal offer of
exhibits. He alleged that said exhibits are
inadmissible because the same are mere
photocopies, not properly identified and
authenticated, and intended to establish matters
which are hearsay. He added that the exhibits are
incompetent to prove the purpose for which they
are offered.
Dispositions of the Board of Medicine
The formal offer of documentary exhibits of private
respondent [Editha Sioson] was admitted by the
[BOM] per its Order dated May 26, 2004. It reads:
"The Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence of
[Romeo Sioson], the Comments/Objections of
[herein petitioner] Atienza, [therein respondents]
De la Vega and Lantin, and the Manifestation of
[therein] respondent Florendo are hereby
ADMITTED by the [BOM] for whatever purpose
they may serve in the resolution of this case.
"Let the hearing be set on July 19, 2004 all at 1:30
p.m. for the reception of the evidence of the
respondents.
"SO ORDERED."
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the
abovementioned Order basically on the same
reasons stated in his comment/objections to the
formal offer of exhibits.
The [BOM] denied the motion for reconsideration of
petitioner in its Order dated October 8, 2004. It
concluded that it should first admit the evidence
being offered so that it can determine its probative
value when it decides the case. According to the
Board, it can determine whether the evidence is
relevant or not if it will take a look at it through the
process of admission. x x x.3
Disagreeing with the BOM, and as previously
adverted to, Atienza filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA, assailing the BOM’s Orders which
admitted Editha Sioson’s (Editha’s) Formal Offer of
Documentary Evidence. The CA dismissed the
petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
Hence, this recourse positing the following issues:
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE:
WHETHER PETITIONER ATIENZA AVAILED
OF THE PROPER REMEDY WHEN HE
FILED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
DATED 06 DECEMBER 2004 WITH THE
COURT OF APPEALS UNDER RULE 65 OF
THE RULES OF COURT TO ASSAIL THE
ORDERS DATED 26 MAY 2004 AND 08
OCTOBER 2004 OF RESPONDENT BOARD.
II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR
AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE
HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT UPHELD
THE ADMISSION OF INCOMPETENT AND
INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE BY
RESPONDENT BOARD, WHICH CAN
RESULT IN THE DEPRIVATION OF
PROFESSIONAL LICENSE – A PROPERTY
RIGHT OR ONE’S LIVELIHOOD.4
We find no reason to depart from the ruling of the
CA.
Petitioner is correct when he asserts that a petition
for certiorari is the proper remedy to assail the
Orders of the BOM, admitting in evidence the
exhibits of Editha. As the assailed Orders were
interlocutory, these cannot be the subject of an
appeal separate from the judgment that completely
or finally disposes of the case. 5 At that stage,
where there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
only and remaining remedy left to petitioner is a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
However, the writ of certiorari will not issue absent
a showing that the BOM has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. Embedded in the CA’s finding that the
BOM did not exceed its jurisdiction or act in grave
abuse of discretion is the issue of whether the
exhibits of Editha contained in her Formal Offer of
Documentary Evidence are inadmissible.
Petitioner argues that the exhibits formally offered
in evidence by Editha: (1) violate the best evidence
rule; (2) have not been properly identified and
authenticated; (3) are completely hearsay; and (4)
are incompetent to prove their purpose. Thus,
petitioner contends that the exhibits are
inadmissible evidence.
We disagree.
To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of
evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings
before administrative bodies such as the
BOM.6 Although trial courts are enjoined to
observe strict enforcement of the rules of
evidence,7 in connection with evidence which may
appear to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency,
or admissibility, we have held that:
[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting
them on doubtful or technical grounds, but
admitting them unless plainly irrelevant,
immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that
their rejection places them beyond the
consideration of the court, if they are thereafter
found relevant or competent; on the other hand,
their admission, if they turn out later to be
irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied
by completely discarding them or ignoring them. 8
From the foregoing, we emphasize the distinction
between the admissibility of evidence and the
probative weight to be accorded the same pieces of
evidence. PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation v. Court of Appeals9 teaches:
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of
whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to
be considered at all. On the other hand, the
probative value of evidence refers to the question of
whether or not it proves an issue.
Second, petitioner’s insistence that the admission
of Editha’s exhibits violated his substantive rights
leading to the loss of his medical license is
misplaced. Petitioner mistakenly relies on Section
20, Article I of the Professional Regulation
Commission Rules of Procedure, which reads:
Section 20. Administrative investigation shall be
conducted in accordance with these Rules. The
Rules of Court shall only apply in these
proceedings by analogy or on a suppletory
character and whenever practicable and
convenient. Technical errors in the admission of
evidence which do not prejudice the substantive
rights of either party shall not vitiate the
proceedings.10
As pointed out by the appellate court, the
admission of the exhibits did not prejudice the
substantive rights of petitioner because, at any
rate, the fact sought to be proved thereby, that the
two kidneys of Editha were in their proper
anatomical locations at the time she was operated
on, is presumed under Section 3, Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. – The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted,
but may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence:
xxxx
(y) That things have happened according to the
ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits
of life.
The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray
Request Forms dated December 12, 1996, January
30, 1997, March 16, 1996, and May 20, 1999, filed
in connection with Editha’s medical case. The
documents contain handwritten entries
interpreting the results of the examination. These
exhibits were actually attached as annexes to Dr.
Pedro Lantin III’s counter affidavit filed with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City, which
was investigating the criminal complaint for
negligence filed by Editha against the doctors of
Rizal Medical Center (RMC) who handled her
surgical procedure. To lay the predicate for her
case, Editha offered the exhibits in evidence to
prove that her "kidneys were both in their proper
anatomical locations at the time" of her operation.
The fact sought to be established by the admission
of Editha’s exhibits, that her "kidneys were both in
their proper anatomical locations at the time" of
her operation, need not be proved as it is covered
by mandatory judicial notice.11
Unquestionably, the rules of evidence are merely
the means for ascertaining the truth respecting a
matter of fact.12 Thus, they likewise provide for
some facts which are established and need not be
proved, such as those covered by judicial notice,
both mandatory and discretionary.13 Laws of
nature involving the physical sciences, specifically
biology,14 include the structural make-up and
composition of living things such as human beings.
In this case, we may take judicial notice that
Editha’s kidneys before, and at the time of, her
operation, as with most human beings, were in
their proper anatomical locations.
Third, contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the
best evidence rule is inapplicable.1awphil Section
3 of Rule 130 provides:
1. Best Evidence Rule
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced;
exceptions. – When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or
under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter
fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous
accounts or other documents which cannot
be examined in court without great loss of
time and the fact sought to be established
from them is only the general result of the
whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in
the custody of a public officer or is recorded
in a public office.
The subject of inquiry in this case is whether
respondent doctors before the BOM are liable for
gross negligence in removing the right functioning
kidney of Editha instead of the left non-functioning
kidney, not the proper anatomical locations of
Editha’s kidneys. As previously discussed, the
proper anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys at
the time of her operation at the RMC may be
established not only through the exhibits offered in
evidence.
Finally, these exhibits do not constitute hearsay
evidence of the anatomical locations of Editha’s
kidneys. To further drive home the point, the
anatomical positions, whether left or right, of
Editha’s kidneys, and the removal of one or both,
may still be established through a belated
ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area.
In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence,
such as copies of the exhibits, is allowed. 15 Witness
Dr. Nancy Aquino testified that the Records Office
of RMC no longer had the originals of the exhibits
"because [it] transferred from the previous
building, x x x to the new building."16 Ultimately,
since the originals cannot be produced, the BOM
properly admitted Editha’s formal offer of evidence
and, thereafter, the BOM shall determine the
probative value thereof when it decides the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
87755 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL MARTIN S.
CASTILLO* VILLARAMA, JR.**
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division
FACTS:
Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent
Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical Center for
check-up. The tests revealed that her right kidney
is normal. It was ascertained, however, that her left
kidney is non-functioning and non-visualizing.
Thus, she underwent kidney operation.
On February 18, 2000, private respondent’s
husband, filed a complaint for gross negligence
and/or incompetence before the BOM against the
doctors who allegedly participated in the fateful
kidney operation and petitioner Atienza.
It was alleged in the complaint that the gross
negligence and/or incompetence committed by the
said doctors, including petitioner, consists of the
removal of private respondent’s fully functional
right kidney, instead of the left non-functioning
and non-visualizing kidney.
After complainant presented his evidence, private
respondent Editha Sioson, filed her formal offer of
documentary evidence. Attached to the formal offer
of documentary evidence are her Exhibits “A” to
“D,” which were all photocopies, which she offered
for the purpose of proving that her kidneys were
both in their proper anatomical locations at the
time she was operated.
Petitioner argues that the exhibits formally offered
in evidence by Editha: (1) violate the best evidence
rule; (2) have not been properly identified and
authenticated; (3) are completely hearsay; and (4)
are incompetent to prove their purpose.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the exhibits are admissible
evidence.
RULING:
To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of
evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings
before administrative bodies such as the BOM.
Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict
enforcement of the rules of evidence, in connection
with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful
relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have
held that:
From the foregoing, we emphasize the distinction
between the admissibility of evidence and the
probative weight to be accorded the same pieces of
evidence. PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation v. Court of Appeals teach:
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of
whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to
be considered at all. On the other hand, the
probative value of evidence refers to the question of
whether or not it proves an issue.
Second, petitioner’s insistence that the admission
of Editha’s exhibits violated his substantive rights
leading to the loss of his medical license is
misplaced. Petitioner mistakenly relies on Section
20, Article I of the Professional Regulation
Commission Rules of Procedure, which reads:
Section 20. Administrative investigation shall be
conducted in accordance with these Rules. The
Rules of Court shall only apply in these
proceedings by analogy or on a suppletory
character and whenever practicable and
convenient. Technical errors in the admission of
evidence which do not prejudice the substantive
rights of either party shall not vitiate the
proceedings.
The subject of inquiry in this case is whether
respondent doctors are liable for gross negligence
in removing the right functioning kidney of Editha
instead of the left non-functioning kidney, not its
proper anatomical locations. As previously
discussed, the proper anatomical locations of
Editha’s kidneys at the time of her operation at the
RMC may be established not only through the
exhibits offered in evidence.

Finally, these exhibits do not constitute hearsay
evidence of the anatomical locations of Editha’s
kidneys. In fact, the introduction of secondary
evidence, such as copies of the exhibits, is allowed.
Ultimately, since the originals cannot be produced,
the BOM properly admitted Editha’s formal offer of
evidence and, thereafter, the BOM shall determine
the probative value thereof when it decides the
case.
G.R. No. 208567 November 26, 2014
JEANETTE V. MANALO, VILMA P. BARRIOS,
LOURDES LYNN MICHELLE FERNANDEZ and
LEILA B. TAINO, Petitioners,
vs.
TNS PHILIPPINES INC., and GARY
OCAMPO, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court assails the January 29, 2013
Decision1 and the August 7, 2013 Resolution 2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No.
117637, which set aside the July 23, 2010
Decision3 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) and its October 28, 2010
Resolution4 and reinstated the May 29, 2009
Decision5 of the Labor Arbiter's finding that
petitioners were project employees.
Respondent TNS Philippines Inc. (TNS), with Gary
Ocampo as its president and general manager, was
engaged primarily in the business of marketing
research and information, as well as research
consultancy and other value-added services to a
widebase of clients, both local and
international.6 As a market research facility, TNS
conducted public surveys about consumer goods,
products, merchandise and/or services of its
clients.7 TNS hired several field personnel on a
project-to-project basis whose functions were the
following: a) to gather data on consumer goods,
commodities, merchandise, and such other
products as requested by clients, through personal
interviews, telephone interviews and/or such other
modes akin to the foregoing; and b) to submit the
gathered data to the company for evaluation
and/or analysis.8
Petitioners Jeanette V. Manalo, Vilma P. Barrios,
Lourdes Lynn Michelle Fernandez, and Leila B.
Taiño (petitioners) were hired by TNS as field
personnel on various dates starting 1996 for
several projects. They were made to sign a project-
to-project employment contract. Thereafter, TNS
would file the corresponding termination report
with the Department of Labor and Employment
Regional Office (DOLE-RO).9
Petitioners were likewise assigned office-based
tasks for which they were required to be in the
office from 9:00 o’clock in the morning to 6:00
o’clock in the evening, but most of the time, they
worked beyond 6:00 o’clock without receiving the
corresponding overtime pay. These office based
tasks were not on a per project basis and
petitioners did not sign any contract for these jobs.
These assignments were not reported to the DOLE
either.10
Later in August 2008, a meeting among the Field
Interviewers (FIs) was called by TNS’ field manager.
They were told that all old FIs assigned in the
"tracking" projects would be pulled out eventually
and replaced by new FIs contracted from an
agency. Old FIs would be assigned only to "ad hoc"
projects which were seasonal. This prompted
petitioners to file a consolidated complaint for
regularization before the LA.11
On October 20, 2008, petitioners and TNS were
required to file their respective position papers. On
October 21, 2008, petitioners were advised by TNS
not to report for work anymore because they were
being pulled out from their current assignments
and that they were not being lined up for any
continuing or incoming projects becauseit no
longer needed their services. They were also asked
to surrender their company IDs.12 Petitioners,
thereafter, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal,
overtime pay, damages, and attorney’s fees against
TNS. Later, the labor cases for regularization and
illegal dismissal were consolidated.
On May 29, 2009, the LA rendered a
decision,13 dismissing the complaint on the ground
that petitioners were found to be project employees
who knew the nature of their positions as such at
the time of their employment and who agreed with
full understanding that the contracts would lapse
upon completion of the project stated in their
respective contracts.14 The LA further ruled that
even if petitioners were continuously rehired for
several and different projects, the determining
factor was whether, at the time of hiring, the
employment was fixed for a specific project or
undertaking and its completion was
predetermined.15
The LA was also of the view that petitioners were
not illegally dismissed because as project
employees, the employer-employee relationship
was terminated upon completion of the project or
phase for which they were hired. The term of their
employment was coterminus with the duration and
until the accomplishment of the project.16
As to the claim for overtime pay and damages, the
LA held that petitioners were not entitled to them.
Field personnel were excluded from the coverage of
the minimum requirements on hours of work and
overtime pay.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed anappeal before the
NLRC. Consequently, the NLRC rendered its
judgment17 in favor of petitioners and reversed the
LA ruling. Thus:
We note that, initially, complainants used to be
project employees as shown by the samples of
project-to-project employment contracts, project
clearance slips, and the establishment termination
reports adduced in evidence. Case records,
however, show that the last time respondent
company filed an establishment termination report
was in November 2007 indicating project
completion on November 30, 2007. What is clear
though is that complainants were allowed to
continue working after November 30, 2007.
Respondent company did not adduce in evidence
employment contracts relating to the latest
employment of the complainants. In the absence of
proof that the subsequent employment of the
complainants continued to be on a project-to-
project basis under a contract of employment,
complainants are considered to have become
regular employees after November 30, 2007. The
failure to present contract of project employment
means that the employees are regular.18
[Emphases supplied]
The NLRC further ruled that, being regular
employees, petitioners were illegally dismissed
because TNS, who had the burden of proving
legality in dismissal cases, failed to show how and
why the employment of petitioners was terminated
on October 21, 2008.19 Thus, the NLRC set aside
the LA decision and held TNS liable for illegal
dismissal, ordering the latter to pay petitioners
their respective backwages and separation pay. 20
TNS moved for reconsideration, butits motion was
denied. Thus, it filed a petition for certiorariwith
prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order before the CA. On January 29,
2013, the CA ruled in favor of TNS and opined that
the projects assigned to petitioners were distinct
and separate from the other undertakings of TNS;
that they wererequired to sign project-to-project
employment contracts; and that a corresponding
termination report was made to DOLE for every
accomplished project. Further, it stated that the
repeated re-hiring of petitioners for at least one (1)
year did not ipso facto convert their status to
regular employees. According to the CA, the mere
fact that a project employee had worked on a
specific project for more than one (1) year did not
necessarily change his status from project
employee to regular or permanent employee.21
As to the issue of grave abuse of discretion, the CA
held that the NLRC committed such abuse when it
refused to consider the pieces of evidence
submitted by TNS during its determination of the
merits of the latter’s motion for reconsideration. It
stressed that the technical rules of evidence were
not binding in labor cases,22 that even if the
evidence was not submitted to the LA, the fact that
it was duly introduced on appeal before the NLRC
was enough basis for it to admit them.23
Not in conformity, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was eventually denied.
Hence, this petition presenting the following
ARGUMENTS:
I. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE PETITIONERS ARE NOT
REGULAR EMPLOYEES OF THE
RESPONDENT COMPANY.
II. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE HONORABLE NLRC
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION.24
Petitioners assert that the factual circumstances of
the case undoubtedly show their regular
employment status and that the NLRC correctly
exercised its discretion. The respondents argue
otherwise insisting that the decision of the CA was
correct.
The Court’s Ruling
At the outset, it must be stressed that the Court is
not a trier of facts. In petitions for review under
Rule 45, the Court only resolves pure questions of
law and is precluded from reviewing factual
findings of the lower tribunals, subject to certain
exceptions. This case is an exception as "this Court
may review factual conclusions of the CA when
they are contrary to those of the NLRC or of the
Labor Arbiter."25
Upon review of the records, the evidence failed to
clearly, accurately, consistently, and convincingly
show that petitioners were still project employees
of TNS.
Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, clearly
defined a project employee as one whose
employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination of
which has been determined at the time of the
engagement of the employee or where the work or
service to be performed is seasonal in nature and
the employment is for the duration of the season.
Additionally, a project employee is one whose
termination of his employment contract is reported
to the DOLE everytime the project for which he was
engaged has been completed.
In their Comment,26 the respondents stressed that
the NLRC decision was mainly anchored upon the
supposed lack of compliance with the termination
report requirement under the applicable DOLE
Department Orders. The NLRC ruled that
petitioners were regular employees for having been
allowed to continue working after the last
submitted termination report. Thus, TNS
submitted, albeit belatedly, the termination reports
from November 2007 up to the last termination
report filed on November 18, 2008, by attaching it
to the motion for reconsideration filed before the
NLRC.27
Although TNS belatedly submitted the supposed
lacking termination reports, it failed to show the
corresponding project employment contracts of
petitioners covering the period indicated in the said
termination reports. TNS itself stated in its motion
for reconsideration28 before the NLRC that the
project employee status of the employee could be
proved by the employment contracts signed
voluntarily by the employees and by the
termination report filed with the DOLE after the
completion of every project.29 Yet, no project
employment contracts were shown. It is well-
settled that rules of evidence shall be liberally
applied in labor cases, but this does not detract
from the principle that piecemeal presentation of
evidence is simply not in accord with orderly
justice.30 The NLRC was correct in saying that in
the absence of proof that the subsequent
employment of petitioners continued to be on a
project-to-project basis under a contract of
employment, petitioners were considered to have
become regular employees.31
TNS contended that the repeated and successive
rehiring of project employees does not qualify
petitioners asregular employees, as length of
service is not the controlling determinant of the
employment tenure of a project employee, but
whether the employment has been fixed for a
specific project or undertaking and its completion
has been determined at the time of the engagement
of the employee. The repeated rehiring was only a
natural consequence of the experience gained from
past service rendered in other projects.32
In Maraguinot, Jr. v. NLRC,33 the Court held that
once a project or work pool employee has been: (1)
continuously, as opposed to intermittently, rehired
by the same employer for the same tasks or nature
of tasks; and (2) these tasks are vital, necessary
and indispensable to the usual business or trade of
the employer, then the employee must be deemed a
regular employee. Although it is true that the
length of time of the employee’s service is not a
controlling determinant of project employment, it is
vital in determining whether he was hired for a
specific undertaking or in fact tasked to perform
functions vital, necessary and indispensable to the
usual business or trade of the
employer.34 Petitioners’ successive re-engagement
in order to perform the same kind of work firmly
manifested the necessity and desirability of their
work in the usual business of TNS as a market
research facility.35 Undisputed also is the fact that
the petitioners were assigned office-based tasks
from 9:00 o’clock in the morning up to 6:00 o’clock
in the evening, at the earliest, without any
corresponding remuneration.
The project employment scheme used by TNS
easily circumvented the law and precluded its
employees from attaining regular employment
status in the subtlest way possible. Petitioners
were rehired not intermittently, but continuously,
contract after contract, month after month,
involving the very same tasks. They practically
performed exactly the same functions over several
years. Ultimately, without a doubt, the functions
they performed were indeed vital and necessary to
the very business or trade of TNS.
Granting arguendothat petitioners were rehired
intermittently, a careful review of the project
employment contracts of petitioners reveals some
other vague provisions. Oddly, one of the terms
and conditions in the said contract stated that:
1. The need for your services being
determinable and for a specific project
starting ____________ your employment will
be for the duration of said project of the
Company, namely Project ___________ which
is expected to be finished on _____________.
The Company shall have the option of
renewing or extending the period ofthis
agreement for such time as it may be
necessary to complete the project or
 because we need further time to determine
your competence on the job.
To the Court, the phrase "because we need
further time to determine your competence
on the job" would refer to a probationary
employment. Such phrase changes the
tenor of the contract and runs counter to
the very nature of a project employment.
TNS can, therefore, extend the contract
which was already fixed when it deemed it
necessary to determine whether or not the
employee was qualified and fit for the job.
Corollarily, TNS can likewise pre-terminate
the contract not because the specific project
was completed ahead of time, but because
of failure to qualify for the job. Consistently,
the terms and conditions of the contract,
reads:
4. It is expressly agreed and understood
that the Company may terminate your
employment after compliance with
procedural requirements of law, without
benefit of termination pay and without any
obligation on the part of the Company, in
the event of any breach of any conditions
hereof: a) If the project is completed or
cancelled before the expected date of
completion as specified in paragraph 1
hereof;
b) If we should find that you are not qualified,
competent or efficient in the above-stated positions
for which you are hired in accordance with the
company standards made known to you at the
start of your employment;
xxx
For said reason, at the outset, the supposed
project employment contract was highly doubtful.
In determining the true nature of an employment,
the entirety of the contract, not merely its
designation or by which it was denominated, is
controlling. Though there is a rule that conflicting
provisions in a contract should be harmonized to
give effect to all,36 in this case, however,
harmonization is impossible because project
employment and probationary employment are
distinct from one another and cannot co-exist with
each other. Hence, should there be ambiguity in
the provisions of the contract, the ruleis that all
doubts, uncertainties, ambiguities and
insufficiencies should be resolved in favor of
labor.37 This is in consonance with the
constitutional policy of providing full protection to
labor.
In sum, petitioners are deemed to have become
regular employees. As such, the burden of proving
the legality of their dismissal rests upon TNS.
Having failed to discharge such burden ofproving a
just or authorized cause, TNS is liable for illegal
dismissal.
Accordingly, as correctly ruled by the NLRC, each
petitioner is entitled to backwages from the time of
their dismissal up to the finality or this decision
plus separation pay, following their prayer for such
relief in lieu of reinstatement, computed as follows
as of May 29, 2009:
a) Back.wages:
October 21, 2008 to May 29,
7.27 mos.
2009 =
₱72,
₱382.00 x 26 days x 7.27 mos. =
205.64
b) Separation Pay:
December 1, 2008 to May 29,
2009 =
5.93 mos.
₱382.00 x 26 days x 5.03
₱4,908.10
mps./12 =
₱77,113.80
Finally, nowhere in the NLRC resolution denying
TNS' motion for reconsideration can it be found it
outrightly denied the said motion for belatedly
submitting the lacking termination reports. In
resolving the motion, the NLRC also took into
consideration the records of the case, meaning,
including those belatedly submitted, and despite
review of these records, it still found the evidence
insufficient to overturn its decision against TNS.
To reiterate, the technical rules of evidence are not
binding on labor tribunals.1avvphi1 Such a rule,
however, is not a license for parties to a case to be
remiss in their duty to present every and all proofs,
at the earliest opportunity, that will best support
their claim and help the courts to fully,
exhaustively and speedily resolve the controversy.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
January 29, 2013 Decision and the August 7, 2013
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 117637 are SET ASIDE. The July 23, 2010
Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission is hereby RE INSTATED.
SO ORDERED.