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Introduction to Law
Atty. Almendral
Chapter III – Constitution
Case Digests Compilation
Pages: 10
Disclaimer: Read at your own risk
Table of Contents:
1. Manila Prince Hotel Vs GSIS
2. Nitafan vs. CIR
3. Government vs. Springer
4. Marcos vs. Manglapus
5. In re Cunanan
6. Angara vs. Electoral
Commission
7. Amores vs. HRET
8. Francisco vs. HRET
9. Civil Liberties Union vs.
Executive
10. Chiongbian vs. De Leon
11. Macalintal vs. COMELEC
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS.
GSIS
G.R. NO. 122156; February 3,
1997
FACTS:
The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the
1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering
the national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos, is invoked
by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of
the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
(MHC) which owns the historic Manila
Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain
that the provision is not self-executing but
requires an implementing legislation for its
enforcement. Corollary, they ask whether
the 51% shares form part of the national
economy and patrimony covered by the
protective mantle of the Constitution.
The Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) decided to sell through public
bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel
(MHC). In a close bidding, two bidders
participated: Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino corporation,
which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at
P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT Sheraton as its
hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or
P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard
as the winning bidder and the execution of
the contracts, the MPHC matched the bid
price in a letter to GSIS. MPHC sent a
manager’s check to the GSIS in a
subsequent letter, which GSIS refused to
accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps
apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded
the tender of the matching bid, MPHC came
to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.
Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par.,
Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and
submits that the Manila Hotel has been
identified with the Filipino nation and has
practically become a historical monument
which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine
heritage and culture. Respondents assert
that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987 Constitution is merely a statement of
principle and policy since it is not a self-
executing provision and requires
implementing legislation(s).
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not Article XII Sec. 10 of the
Constitution is self-executing
2. Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms
part of the national patrimony
HELD:
1. Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution is a self executing provision.
A provision which lays down a general
principle, such as those found in Article II
of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-
executing. But a provision that is complete
in itself and becomes operative without the
aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient
rule by means of which the right it grants
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may be enjoyed or protected, is self
executing. Section 10, second paragraph,
Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or
rules for its enforcement. From its very
words the provision does not require any
legislation to put it in operation.
2. Yes. In its plain and ordinary meaning,
the term patrimony pertains to heritage.
When the Constitution speaks of national
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural
resources of the Philippines, as the
Constitution could have very well used the
term natural resources, but also to the
cultural heritage of the Filipinos. Manila
Hotel has become a landmark - a living
testimonial o Philippine heritage. While it
was restrictively an American hotel when it
first opened in 1912, it immediately
evolved to be truly Filipino. Formerly a
concourse for the elite, it has since then
become the venue of various significant
event which have shaped Philippine
history. It was called the Cultural Center of
the 1930s. It was the site of the festivities
during the inauguration of the Philippine
Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official
Guest House of the Philippine
Government it plays host to dignitaries and
official visitors who are accorded the
traditional Philippine hospitality For more
than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has
bore mute witness to the triumphs and
failures, loves and frustrations of the
Filipinos; its existence is impressed with
public interest; its own historicity
associated with our struggle for
sovereignty, independence and
nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has
become part of our national economy and
patrimony.
Nitafan vs. CIR, G.R. No. 78780,
July 23, 1987
FACTS:
Petitioners are qualified judges of the
Regional Trial Court. They sought to
prohibit the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue and the Financial Officer of the
Supreme Court from making deductions of
withholding taxes from their salaries.
According to the petitioners, the tax
withheld from their compensation as
judicial officers is a violation of Section 10,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which
states that:
“The salary of the Chief Justice and of the
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court,
and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed
by law. During their continuance in office,
their salary shall not be decreased”.
In other words, by deducting withholding
taxes, the judges asserted that their
salaries are being decreased, citing
Perfecto vs. Meer and Dencia vs. David as
their legal basis.
In particular, since the 1987 Constitution
does not contain a provision similar to
Section 6, Article XV of the 1973
Constitution, petitioners claimed that the
intent of the framers was to revert to the
original concept of “non-diminution” of
salaries.
The Chief Justice had actually dealt with
this matter previously in response to
representations that the Court direct its
Finance Officer to discontinue the
withholding of taxes from salaries of
members of the Bench. While the question
has been resolved, the Court decided to
settle the legal issues through a judicial
pronouncement.
ISSUE/HELD:
Whether members of the judiciary are
subject to payment of income tax – YES
RATIO:
Members of the judiciary are subject to
payment of income tax
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This payment of income tax does not fall
within the constitutional protection against
decrease of their salaries during their
continuance in office. Further, the deletion
of the grant of exemption from payment of
income tax to members of the Judiciary
was a way of ensuring the equality of the
three branches of government.
Based on jurisprudence, it was concluded
that the true intent of the framers was to
make the salaries of members of the
Judiciary taxable, as is applicable to all
income earners.
The course of deliberations, debates, and
amendments on the draft proposal of
Section 10, Article VIII further clarified the
issue:
Commissioner Cirilo Rigos’s proposal, that
the term “diminished” be changed to
“decreased” and that the word “nor
subjected to income tax” be deleted, was
accepted.
Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas
announced that by putting a period after
“decreased”, it is with the understanding
that the salaries of justices are subject to
tax. He cited that this is based on the
understanding that there will be a provision
in the Constitution similar to Section 6 of
Article XV, the General Provisions of the
1973 Constitution, which states that no
salary of any public officer shall be exempt
from payment of income tax.
Due to these issues, Fr. Bernas stated that
the ruling in Perfecto vs Meer and Dencia
vs David were not applicable anymore.
GPI vs Spinger
50 Phil 259 G.R. No. L-26979 April 1 1927
[Appointing Power of the Chief Executive]
FACTS:
Spinger, Costas and Hilario were elected to
be the directors of the Nat'l Coal Company
by the legislative members (Senate
President and Speaker of the HoR) of the
committee created by Acts. No. 2705(Sec
4) and 2822 (Sec 2). The GPI instituted an
original action of quo warranto against the
newly appointed directors, assailing the
validity of the said acts which provide: "The
voting power of all such stock (in the
National Coal Company) owned by the
Government of the Philippine Islands shall
be vested exclusively in a committee
consisting of the Governor-General, the
President of the Senate, and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives."
Reference was made therein that the
provisions of the statutes passed by the
Phil. Legislature creating a voting
committee or board of control, and
enumerating the duties and powers thereof
with respect to certain corporation in which
the Philippine Gov is the owner of stock, are
nullities.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Phil Legislature has the
power to appoint officials.
RULING:
Sec. 22 of the Organic Act, "That all
executive functions of the government
must be directly under the Governor-
General or within one of the executive
departments under the supervision and
control of the Governor-General." At the
very least, the performance of duties
appurtenant to membership in the voting
committee is an executive function on the
Government, which the Organic Act
requires must be subject to the
unhampered control of the Government-
General. The administrative domination of
a governmentally organized and controlled
corporation is clearly not a duty germane
to the law-making power.
Marcos vs Manglapus
G.R. No. 88211 September 15 1989
FACTS:
Former President Marcos, after his and his
family spent three year exile in Hawaii,
USA, sought to return to the Philippines.
The call is about to request of Marcos family
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to order the respondents to issue travel
order to them and to enjoin the petition of
the President's decision to bar their return
to the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the
powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes
According to Section 1, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution: "The executive power
shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines." The phrase, however, does
not define what is meant by executive
power although the same article tackles on
exercises of certain powers by the
President such as appointing power during
recess of the Congress (S.16), control of all
the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices (Section 17), power to grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons,
and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment (Section 19),
treaty making power (Section 21),
borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary
power (Section 22), informing power
(Section 23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to
the President, it cannot be said to be
limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever
power inherent in the government that is
neither legislative nor judicial has to be
executive.
IN RE CUNANAN
94 PHIL. 534
FACTS:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what
is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952.
The title of the law was, “An Act to Fix the
Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from
1946 up to and including 1955.”
Section 1 provided the following passing
marks:
1946-1951………………70%
1952 …………………….71%
1953……………………..72%
1954……………………..73%
1955……………………..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall
have no grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar
candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in
any subject shall be deemed to have
already passed that subject and the
grade/grades shall be included in the
computation of the general average in
subsequent bar examinations.”
ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is
constitutional.
RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional
due to the fatal defect of not being
embraced in the title of the Act. As per its
title, the Act should affect only the bar
flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar
examinations. Section2 establishes a
permanent system for an indefinite
time. It was also struck down for allowing
partial passing, thus failing to take account
of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are
not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951
was declared unconstitutional, while that
for 1953 to 1955 was declared in force and
effect. The portion that was stricken down
was based under the following reasons:
1. The law itself admits that the
candidates for admission who
flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952
had inadequate preparation due to
the fact that this was very close to
the end of World War II;
2. The law is, in effect, a judgment
revoking the resolution of the court
on the petitions of the said
candidates;
3. The law is an encroachment on the
Court’s primary prerogative to
determine who may be admitted to
practice of law and, therefore, in
excess of legislative power to
repeal, alter and supplement the
Rules of Court. The rules laid down
by Congress under this power are
only minimum norms, not designed
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to substitute the judgment of the
court on who can practice law; and
4. The pretended classification is
arbitrary and amounts to class
legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and
effect, the Court could not muster enough
votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law
was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953.
Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme
Court resolutions denying admission to the
bar of an petitioner. The same may also
rationally fall within the power to Congress
to alter, supplement or modify rules of
admission to the practice of law.
Angara vs Electoral Commission
(G.R. No. L-45081)
Separation of Powers
FACTS: In the elections of September
1935, Jose Angara, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel
Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were
candidates voted for the position of
member of the National Assembly in the
first district of Tayabas. The petitioner was
proclaimed member-elect for the said
district for receiving the most number of
votes and thereafter took his oath in office.
A Motion of Protest was filed by Ynsua
against the election of the petitioner. The
petitioner countered this with a Motion to
Dismiss the Protest which was denied by
the Electoral Commission.
ISSUES: Whether the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission
and the subject matter of the controversy;
and
Whether the said Electoral Commission
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction
in assuming cognizance of the protest filed
over the election of herein petitioner.
HELD: The National Assembly operates as
a check on the Executive in the sense that
its consent through its Commission on
Appointments is necessary in the
appointments of certain officers; and the
concurrence of a majority of all its
members is essential to the conclusion of
treaties. Furthermore, its power to
determine what courts other than the
Supreme Court shall be established, to
define their jurisdiction and to appropriate
funds for their support, the National
Assembly controls the judicial department
to a certain extent. The Assembly also
exercises the judicial power of trying
impeachments. The Judiciary, in turn, with
the Supreme Court as the final arbiter
effectively checks the other departments in
the exercise of its power to determine the
law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution. This power of has been stated
in Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Section 4, Article VI of the Constitution
provides that “x x x The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly.” In view of the
deliberations of the framers of the
Constitution, it is held that the Electoral
Commission was acting within the
legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance
of the protest filed by the respondent
Ynsua. The petition of writ of prohibition
against the Electoral Commission is hereby
denied.
Milagros Amores vs. HRET and
Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva
G.R. No. 189600 June 29, 2010
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari challenging
the assumption of office of Emmanuel Joel
J. Villanueva (private respondent) as
representative of the party-list
organization Citizen’s Battle Against
Corruption (CIBAC) in the House of
Representatives. The petitioner alleges
that, among other things, private
respondent assumed office without a
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formal proclamation issued by the office on July 10, 2007, especially
Commission on Elections (COMELEC); he considering that he admitted receiving his
was disqualified to be a nominee of the own Certificate of Proclamation only on
youth sector of CIBAC since, at the time of December 13, 2007. Private respondent
the filing of his certificate of nomination avers in the main that petitioner has not
and acceptance, he was already 31 years substantiated her claims of grave abuse of
old or beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant discretion against public respondent; and
to Section 9 of RA No. 7941, otherwise that he became a member of the overseas
known as the Party-List System Act.; and Filipinos and their families sector years
his change of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth before the 2007 elections.
sector to its overseas Filipino workers and
their families sector was not effected at ISSUE: Whether or not Section 9 and 15 of
least six months prior to the May 2007 RA No. 7941 apply to private respondent.
elections so as to be qualified to represent
the new sector under Section 15 of RA No. HELD:
7941. HRET (public respondent) dismissed
petitioner’s petition, finding that CIBAC
The Court finds no textual support for
was among the party-list organizations
public respondent’s interpretation that
which the COMELEC had partially
Section 9 applied only to those nominated
proclaimed as entitled to at least one seat
during the first three congressional terms
in the House of Representatives through
after the ratification of the Constitution or
National Board of Canvassers (NBC)
until 1998, unless a sectoral party is
Resolution No. 07-60 dated July 9, 2007. It
thereafter registered exclusively as
also found the petition which was filed on
representing the youth sector. Respecting
October 17, 2007 to be out of time, the
Section 15 of RA No. 7941, the Court fails
reglementary period being 10 days from
to find even an iota of textual support for
private respondent’s proclamation.
public respondent’s ratiocination that the
Respecting the age qualification for youth
provision did not apply to private
sectoral nominees under Section 9 of RA
respondent’s shift of affiliation from
No. 7941, public respondent held that it
CIBAC’s youth sector to itsoverseas Filipino
applied only to those nominated as such
workers and their families sector as there
during the first three congressional terms
was no resultant change in party-list
after the ratification of the Constitution or
affiliation. What is clear is that the wording
until 1998, unless a sectoral party is
of Section 15 covers changes in both
thereafter registered exclusively as
political party and sectoral affiliation. And
representing the youth sector, which
the latter may occur within the same party
CIBAC, a multi-sectoral organization, is
since multi-sectoral party-list organizations
not. In the matter of private respondent’s
are qualified to participate in the Philippine
shift of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector
party-list system. Hence, a nominee who
to its overseas Filipino workers and their
changes his sectoral affiliation within the
families sector, public respondent held that
same party will only be eligible for
Section 15 of RA No. 7941 did not apply as
nomination under the new sectoral
there was no resultant change in party-list
affiliation if the change has been effected
affiliation. Petitioner contends that, among
at least six months before the elections.
other things, public respondent created
Again, since the statute is clear and free
distinctions in the application of Sections 9
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
and 15 of RA No. 7941 that are not found
meaning and applied without attempted
in the subject provisions, fostering
interpretation. This is the plain meaning
interpretations at war with equal protection
rule or verba legis, as expressed in the
of the laws; and NBC Resolution No. 07-60,
maxim index animi sermon or speech is the
which was a partial proclamation of winning
index of intention. A cardinal rule in
party-list organizations, was not enough
statutory construction is that when the law
basis for private respondent to assume
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is clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity, there is no room for
construction or interpretation. There is only
room for application. It is, therefore,
beyond cavil that Sections 9 and 15 of RA
No. 7941 apply to private respondent. The
Court finds that private respondent was not
qualified to be a nominee of either the
youth sector or the overseas Filipino
workers and their families sector in the
May, 2007 elections. The records disclose
that private respondent was already more
than 30 years of age in May, 2007, it being
stipulated that he was born in August,
1975. Moreover, he did not change his
sectoral affiliation at least six months
before May, 2007, public respondent itself
having found that he shifted to CIBAC’s
overseas Filipino workers and their families
sector only on March 17, 2007.
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs.
THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. No. 160261. November 10,
2003.
FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of
Representatives adopted a Resolution,
sponsored by Representative Felix William
D. Fuentebella, which directed the
Committee on Justice "to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the
manner of disbursements and expenditures
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph
E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr.
and seven Associate Justices of this Court
for "culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of the public trust and other high
crimes." The complaint was endorsed by
Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo
B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,
and was referred to the House Committee.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on
October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was "sufficient in
form," but voted to dismiss the same on
October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance. To date, the Committee Report
to this effect has not yet been sent to the
House in plenary in accordance with the
said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution. Four months and three weeks
since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first
complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day
after the House Committee on Justice
voted to dismiss it, the second
impeachment complaint was filed with the
Secretary General of the House by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.
and Felix William B. Fuentebella against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded
on the alleged results of the legislative
inquiry initiated by above-mentioned
House Resolution. This second
impeachment complaint was accompanied
by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at
least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of
the House of Representatives.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second
impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House
of Representatives falls within the one year
bar provided in the Constitution.
2. Whether the resolution thereof is a
political question – has resulted in a
political crisis.
HELD:
1. Having concluded that the initiation
takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the
House Committee on Justice, the initial
action taken thereon, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.
Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoing manner, another
may not be filed against the same official
within a one year period following Article
XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine,
considering that the first impeachment
complaint, was filed by former President
Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G.
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Davide, Jr., along with seven associate
justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and
referred to the House Committee on Justice
on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.
and Felix William Fuentebella against the
Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates
the constitutional prohibition against the
initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same impeachable officer
within a one-year period.
2.From the foregoing record of the
proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, it is clear that judicial power
is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty
which cannot be abdicated by the mere
specter of this creature called the political
question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion
hastened to clarify, however, that Section
1, Article VIII was not intended to do away
with "truly political questions." From this
clarification it is gathered that there are
two species of political questions: (1) "truly
political questions" and (2) those which
"are not truly political questions." Truly
political questions are thus beyond judicial
review, the reason for respect of the
doctrine of separation of powers to be
maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution,
courts can review questions which are not
truly political in nature.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
respondent
G.R. No. 83815 February 22, 1991
FACTS:
• The two petitions in this case sought
to declare unconstitutional
Executive Order No. 284 issued by
then President Corazon C. Aquino.
• The petitioners alleged that Section
1, 2 and 3 of EO 284 contravenes
the provision of Sec. 13, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution
• The assailed provisions of EO 284
are as follows:
Section 1: A cabinet member,
undersecretary or assistant secretary or
other appointive officials of the Executive
Department may in addition to his primary
position, hold not more than two positions
in the government and government
corporations and receive the corresponding
compensation therefor.
Section 2: If they hold more positions
more than what is required in section 1,
they must relinquish the excess position in
favor of the subordinate official who is next
in rank, but in no case shall any official hold
more than two positions other than his
primary position.
Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of
the boards of such corporation should
either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or
assistant secretary.
• 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, meanwhile, states
that:
Section 13. The President, Vice-President,
the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution,
hold any other office or employment during
their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any
other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special
privilege granted by the Government or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid
conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity
or affinity within the fourth civil degree of
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the President shall not, during his tenure,
be appointed as Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, or the Office
of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries,
Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of
bureaus or offices, including government-
owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries.
• PETITIONERS CONTENTION: EO
284 adds exceptions to Section 13
of Article VII other than those
provided in the constitution.
According to the petitioners, the
only exceptions against holding any
other office or employment in
government are those provided in
the Constitution namely: 1. The
Vice President (may be appointed
as a Member of the Cabinet under
Section 3 par.2 of Article VII: “The
Vice-President may be appointed as
a Member of the Cabinet. Such
appointment requires no
confirmation.”) and the secretary
of justice (as an ex-officio member
of the Judicial and Bar Council by
virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII: “A
Judicial and Bar Council is hereby
created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the
Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman,
the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as
ex officio Members, a Philippine registry.
representative of the Integrated
Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and
a representative of the private
sector.”)
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is
unconstitutional
HELD: Yes. EO 284 is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The court said, by allowing Cabinet
members, undersecretaries or assistant
secretaries to hold at least two positions in
the government and government
corporations, EO 284 actually allows them
to hold multiple offices or employment
which is a direct contravention of the
express mandate of Article VII, Section 13
of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
them from doing so, unless otherwise
provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
The explained that the phrase “unless
otherwise provided in this constitution”
must be given a literal interpretation to
refer only to those particular instances
cited in the constitution itself which are
Section 3 of Article VII (for VP) and Section
8 of Article VIII (for Secretary of Justice).
Thus, the PETITION is GRANTED.
CHIONGBIAN VS. DE LEON ET
AL,
82 Phil. 771 (1949) (Constitutional
Law – Citizenship)
FACTS: Herein petitioner is a son of a
Chinese citizen who has been elected into
office before the adoption of the
Constitution, wherein said petitioner was
still a minor. Respondents seeks to cancel
petitioner’s registration certificates of
vessels and rescind the sale of vessels from
the same on the ground that the latter is
allegedly not a Filipino citizen and therefore
not qualified to operate and own vessels of
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is a
Filipino citizen.
HELD: Yes, because the petitioner, aside
from the fact that he was a minor at the
time of the adoption of the
Constitution, follows the citizenship of his
father who having been elected to public
office before the adoption of the said
Constitution became a Filipino citizen as
provided by the same (Art. IV, 1987
Constitution).
Macalintal vs. COMELEC G.R. No.
157013. July 10, 2003 Suffrage,
Overseas Absentee Voting
UE CLAW: IT’S QUIETER HERE
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a
member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a
declaration that certain provisions of
Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from
constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he
has actual and material legal interest in the
subject matter of this case in seeing to it
that public funds are properly and lawfully
used and appropriated, petitioner filed the
instant petition as a taxpayer and as a
lawyer.
Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is
unconstitutional because it violates Section
1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which
requires that the voter must be a resident
in the Philippines for at least one year and
in the place where he proposes to vote for
at least six months immediately preceding
an election. Petitioner cites the ruling of the
Court in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals to
support his claim. In that case, the Court
held that a green card holder immigrant to
the United States is deemed to have
abandoned his domicile and residence in
the Philippines.
Petitioner further argues that Section 1,
Article V of the Constitution does not allow
provisional registration or a promise by a
voter to perform a condition to be qualified
to vote in a political exercise; that the
legislature should not be allowed to
circumvent the requirement of the
Constitution on the right of suffrage by
providing a condition thereon which in
effect amends or alters the aforesaid
residence requirement to qualify a Filipino
abroad to vote. He claims that the right of
suffrage should not be granted to anyone
who, on the date of the election, does not
possess the qualifications provided for by
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Is RA 9189 [Overseas Absentee Voting Act
of 2003], valid & constitutional?
RULING:
Contrary to petitioner’s claim that Section
5(d) circumvents the Constitution,
Congress enacted the law prescribing a
system of overseas absentee voting in
compliance with the constitutional
mandate. Such mandate expressly requires
that Congress provide a system of
absentee voting that necessarily
presupposes that the “qualified citizen of
the Philippines abroad” is not physically
present in the country. The petition was
partly GRANTED. The following portions of
R.A. No. 9189 are declared VOID for being
UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
17. a) The phrase in the first sentence
of the first paragraph of Section
17.1, to wit: “subject to the
approval of the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee;”
18. b) The portion of the last paragraph
of Section 17.1, to wit: “only upon
review and approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight
Committee;”
19. c) The second sentence of the first
paragraph of Section 19, to wit:
“The Implementing Rules and
Regulations shall be submitted to
the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created by virtue of this
Act for prior approval;” and
20. d) The second sentence in the
second paragraph of Section 25, to
wit: “It shall review, revise, amend
and approve the Implementing
Rules and Regulations promulgated
by the Commission” of the same
law;
for being repugnant to Section 1, Article IX-
A of the Constitution mandating the
independence of constitutional
commission, such as COMELEC. Pursuant
to Section 30 of R.A. No. 9189, the rest of
the provisions of said law continues to be
in full force and effect.