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San Diego Response To Joe Collins REDACTED
San Diego Response To Joe Collins REDACTED
San Diego Response To Joe Collins REDACTED
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1 The motion will be based upon this notice, the accompanying memorandum of
2 points and authorities and the declaration of Joshua M. Heinlein in support thereof, and
3 upon all papers and pleadings on file in this action.
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5 DATED: February 13, 2018 THOMAS E. MONTGOMERY, County Counsel
6 By: /s/JOSHUA M. HEINLEIN, Senior Deputy
7 Attorneys for Defendant County of San Diego
E-mail: joshua.heinlein@sdcounty.ca.gov
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1 Rule 12(b)(1) motions may challenge jurisdiction facially or factually. Safe Air for
2 Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). “In a facial attack, the
3 challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their
4 face to invoke federal jurisdiction. By contrast, in a factual attack, the challenger
5 disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal
6 jurisdiction.” Id.
7 Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against the County should be dismissed under Rule
8 12(b)(1) as lacking subject matter jurisdiction, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine2 and
9 the Younger abstention doctrine3, in light of:
10 (a) The state court’s child support order/judgment in San Diego Superior Court
11 Case No. DF260832, which Plaintiff has the right to challenge by direct appeal; and
12 (b) Plaintiff’s claims in this action being dependent on his argument that the
13 state-court child support orders/judgment are invalid.
14 A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
15 The Rooker–Feldman doctrine applies to “cases brought by state-court losers
16 complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
17 proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those
18 judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
19 “The purpose of the doctrine is to protect state judgments from collateral attack in federal
20 courts. Because district courts lack power to hear direct appeals from state court
21 decisions, they must decline jurisdiction whenever they are ‘in essence being called upon
22 to review the state court decision.’” Doe & Assocs. Law Offices v. Napolitano
23 (“Napolitano”), 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Feldman, supra, 460 U.S.
24 at 482 n. 16). As a result, a district court must decline to hear “a forbidden de facto
25 appeal from a judicial decision of a state court” as well as any claims that are
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Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); Dist. of Columbia Ct. of App.
27 v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
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Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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1 “inextricably intertwined” with state court determinations. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148,
2 1158 (9th Cir. 2003).
3 “It is a forbidden de facto appeal under Rooker-Feldman when the plaintiff in
4 federal district court complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court,
5 and seeks relief from the judgment of that court.” Id. at 1163. Claims are “inextricably
6 intertwined” if “the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling or
7 require the district court to interpret the application of state laws or procedural rules.”
8 Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
9 marks and citation omitted); see also Napolitano, supra, 252 F.3d at 1030 (“Where the
10 district court must hold that the state court was wrong in order to find in favor of the
11 plaintiff, the issues presented to both courts are inextricably intertwined.”).
12 “It is well-established that when a plaintiff brings a claim to federal court that
13 challenges the outcome of proceedings in family court, such a claim is barred by the
14 [Rooker-Feldman] doctrine.” Nadolski v. Winchester, No. 13-CV-2370-LAB-DHB, 2014
15 WL 3962473, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2014) (collecting authority); see also Moore v.
16 Cnty. of Butte, 547 F. App’x 826, 829 (9th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal on Rooker-
17 Feldman grounds a federal suit arising out of state court divorce and child custody
18 proceedings); Gomez v. San Diego Family Ct., 388 F. App’x 685 (9th Cir. 2010)
19 (affirming district court’s dismissal of action challenging state court child custody
20 decision under Rooker-Feldman); Sareen v. Sareen, 356 F. App’x 977 (9th Cir. 2009)
21 (affirming district court’s dismissal of action alleging constitutional violations in
22 plaintiff’s child custody proceedings under Rooker-Feldman).
23 In this action, Plaintiff asserts a claim against the County for the judgment and
24 enforcement of Plaintiff’s court-ordered child support obligations, on the grounds (as best
25 as the basis for Plaintiff’s Complaint can be ascertained) that, according to Plaintiff: (a)
26 the underlying support order/judgment is legally void or invalid; and (b) DCSS does not
27 comply with federal laws and regulations for child support agencies. (ECF No. 1, pp. 3-
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1 9.) Plaintiff’s Complaint thus gives rise to the exact problems that the Rooker-Feldman
2 doctrine was developed to avoid.
3 Specifically, in order for Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim to be adjudicated, this
4 Court would have to decide whether the Superior Court of California was correct to enter
5 judgment against Plaintiff and to order him to pay child support. “The purpose of the
6 [Rooker-Feldman] doctrine is to protect state judgments from collateral attack in federal
7 courts. Because district courts lack power to hear direct appeals from state court
8 decisions, they must decline jurisdiction whenever they are in essence being called upon
9 to review the state court decision.” Napolitano, supra, 252 F.3d at 1030 (internal citation
10 omitted). Plaintiff’s claims and allegations in this action collaterally attack the state child
11 support judgment and orders, and would necessarily require this Court to “in essence . . .
12 review the state court decision.” Id. This the Court cannot do.
13 Moreover, in this action Plaintiff attacks the state and local public entities’ means
14 and efforts to enforce and collect the state court child support judgment and orders. A
15 finding by this Court or a federal jury that the County cannot take action to collect from
16 Plaintiff his overdue child support payments without violating Section 1983 would
17 severely undermine the enforceability of the state-court child support judgment and
18 orders. Plaintiff’s claims in this case are “inextricably intertwined” with the state court
19 rulings and proceedings, as “the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the
20 state ruling or require the district court to interpret the application of state laws or
21 procedural rules.” Reusser, supra, 525 F.3d at 859.
22 Accordingly, this Court should find that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
23 Plaintiff’s claims based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and dismiss Plaintiff’s
24 Complaint under Rule 12(b)(1).
25 B. Younger Abstention
26 “The Supreme Court in Younger ‘espouse[d] a strong federal policy against federal
27 court interference with pending state judicial proceedings.’” H.C. ex rel. Gordon v.
28 Koppel, 203 F.3d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Koppel”), quoting Middlesex Cnty. Ethics
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1 Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982). “Absent extraordinary
2 circumstances, Younger abstention is required if the state proceedings are (1) ongoing,
3 (2) implicate important state interests, and (3) provide the plaintiff with an adequate
4 opportunity to litigate federal claims.” Koppel, 203 F.3d at 613.
5 The first requirement is satisfied, since Plaintiff’s Complaint admits that the state-
6 court proceedings are ongoing. Second, “[i]mportant state interests are also implicated.
7 ‘Family relations are a traditional area of state concern.’” Koppel, supra, 203 F.3d at
8 613, quoting Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979). The Superior Court of California
9 “has a vital interest in protecting ‘the authority of the judicial system, so that its orders
10 and judgments are not rendered nugatory.’” Id., quoting Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327,
11 336 n.12 (1977). “This is a particularly appropriate admonition in the field of domestic
12 relations, over which federal courts have no general jurisdiction, . . . and in which the
13 state courts have a special expertise and experience.” Id. (citations omitted). Third, since
14 the Superior Court of California is a state court of general jurisdiction, Plaintiff has an
15 adequate forum in which to pursue his federal claims. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458
16 (1990)(“[W]e have consistently held that state courts have inherent authority, and are
17 thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United
18 States”). Indeed, Plaintiff may directly appeal the judgment in the pending family court
19 case. Thus, Younger abstention is appropriate, and this Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s
20 Complaint under Rule 12(b)(1).
21 IV.
22 THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A
CLAIM ON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED
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24 Rule 12(b)(6) permits a party to move to dismiss a complaint on the grounds that it
25 “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” The Court reviews whether a
26 complaint states sufficient facts and a cognizable legal theory in light of Rule 8(a), which
27 requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
28 relief.” Although Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . it [does]
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1 federal statutes and supposed quotes from Black’s Law Dictionary. (ECF No. 1, pp. 3-5.)
2 Thereafter, without any factual allegations, Plaintiff asserts that the County “knowingly
3 and intentionally used deceit, fraud and negligently misrepresented their program, to
4 deprive the Injured Party of Due Process by failing to adhere to their own law governing
5 their child support program to default the Injured Party of into a personal responsibility
6 contract failing to address that this program is voluntary.” (ECF No. 1, p. 5, ll. 10-13.)
7 The Complaint goes on to assert, without alleging any facts, that the County committed
8 fraud to obtain federal funding (ECF No. 1, pp. 5-6), and that the County “trespassed”
9 against Plaintiff’s private property (ECF No. 1, p. 7.) The Complaint concludes with
10 more citations to various cases, statutes, and provisions of the California Constitution.
11 (Id. at pp. 8-9.)
12 In sum, the Complaint contains nothing but bare assertions without any factual
13 allegations showing that Plaintiff is entitled to relief. Therefore, should the Court decline
14 to dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as discussed above, the
15 Court should dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
16 V.
17 THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR
INSUFFICIENT SERVICE OF PROCESS
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19 Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5), a defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for
20 insufficient service of process. To properly serve a local government, a plaintiff must
21 either (a) deliver a copy of the summons and complaint to the local government’s chief
22 executive officer, or (b) serve a copy of the summons and complaint in compliance with
23 the state’s law for service of process on a local government. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(2). “A
24 summons may be served on a public entity by delivering a copy of the summons and of
25 the complaint to the clerk, secretary, president, presiding officer, or other head of its
26 governing body.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 416.50(a); see also, Weil and Brown,
27 California Practice Guide, Civil Procedure Before Trial, (Rutter Group 2016) 4:174-
28 4:176. The County of San Diego does not have a “president, presiding officer or other
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1 head.” However, pursuant to Government Code section 53051(c), the County has
2 identified its “clerk” or “secretary” on its Roster of Public Agencies Filing (which is filed
3 with the California Secretary of State) as the “Clerk of the Board of Supervisors.”
4 (Declaration of Joshua M. Heinlein (“Heinlein Decl.”), Ex. 1.) Therefore, service of
5 process on the County is properly effectuated by personally serving the Clerk of the
6 Board of Supervisors. A federal court may dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff fails to
7 properly serve it. See Ezell v. Dep't of Rehab., 530 F. App’x 626, 627 (9th Cir. 2013)
8 (trial court did not abuse discretion in dismissing action when plaintiff failed to properly
9 serve a public entity).
10 Here, rather than serving the Clerk of the Board for the County, Plaintiff mailed a
11 copy of the summons and complaint to the County DCSS. (ECF No. 7.) On February 5,
12 2018, the County notified Plaintiff that such mailing did not constitute proper service.
13 (Heinlein Decl., Ex. 2.) After receiving the County’s letter, Plaintiff simply mailed a
14 copy of the summons and Complaint to County Counsel. (Heinlein Decl., ¶ 4.) Plaintiff
15 never served the Clerk of the Board. Consequently, if the Court does not dismiss the
16 Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6), as discussed above, then it should
17 dismiss the Complaint for insufficient service of process under rule 12(b)(5).
18 VI.
19 CONCLUSION
20 For the foregoing reasons, the Court should dismiss the Complaint for lack of
21 subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). Should the Court decline to do so,
22 the Complaint should be dismissed for failure to failure to state claim on which relief can
23 be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Lastly, if the Court decides not to dismiss the
24 Complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6), the Court should dismiss it for
25 insufficient service of process pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5).
26 DATED: February 13, 2018 THOMAS E. MONTGOMERY, County Counsel
27 By: /s/JOSHUA M. HEINLEIN, Senior Deputy
Attorneys for Defendant County of San Diego
28 E-mail: joshua.heinlein@sdcounty.ca.gov
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1 3. On February 5, 2018, I sent Plaintiff a letter notifying him that he had not properly
2 served the Complaint in this case on the County of San Diego. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a
3 true and correct copy of my letter.
4 4. On February 13, 2018, my office received a pack from Plaintiff. In it was a
5 returned copy of my February 5 letter along with a copy of the summons and Complaint.
6 Plaintiff did not personally serve the summons and Complaint on the Clerk of the Board of
7 Supervisors.
8 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
9 foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 13th day of February, 2018, at San Diego,
10 California.
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JOSHUA M. HEINLEIN
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EXHIBIT 1
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EXHIBIT 2
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February 5, 2018
By/t€t
JOSHUA M. HEINLEIN, Senior Deputy
No. 17cv2467-MMA(KSC)
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