YNOT V IAC
148 SCRA 659, CRUZ, J.
Facts:
President Marcos issued E.O. 626-A amending E.O. 626,
which prohibits the transport of carabaos or carabeef’s
from one province to another for the purpose of
preventing indiscriminate slaughter of these animals. The
petitioner had transported six carabaos from Masbate to
Iloilo where they were confiscated for violation of the
said order. He sued for recovery and challenges the
constitutionality of the said order. The lower court
sustained the confiscation of the carabaos. He appealed
the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court which
upheld the lower court. Hence this petition for review on
certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the purpose of E.O. 626-A
is a valid exercise of police power.
Held:
No. We do not see how the prohibition of the
interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be
killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province
than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one
province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more
than moving them to another province will make it easier
to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is
made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order,
it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the
animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live
animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter
cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no
reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be
flippant, dead meat.
Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the
end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon
with the sanction that the measure applies for violation
of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of
the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted
out by the executive authorities, usually the police only.
In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because
the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be
imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the
accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no
such trial is prescribed, and the property being
transported is immediately impounded by the police and
declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the
government.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily
confiscated by the police station commander, were
returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a
complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of
P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his
failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial
court. The executive order defined the prohibition,
convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed
punishment, which was carried out forthright. The
measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner
without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying
him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
In the instant case, the challenged measure is an invalid
exercise of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably
necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Moreover, there was no such pressure of
time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory
treatment. The properties involved were not even
inimical per se as to require their instant destruction.
Thus, the Court cannot say with equal certainty that it
complies with the second requirement, that there be a
lawful method. The reasonable connection between the
means employed and the purpose sought to be
achieved by the questioned measure is missing.
Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared
unconstitutional.
CITY OF MANILA V CHINESE COMMUNITY
40 PHIL 349, JOHNSON, J.
Facts:
The plaintiff prayed that certain lands be expropriated
for the purpose of constructing a public improvement
into an extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila which is
necessary for the plaintiff to exercise in fee simple of
certain parcels of land. The defendant on the other hand,
contends that the expropriation was not necessary as a
public improvement and that the plaintiff has no right to
expropriate the said cemetery or any part or portion
thereof for street purposes. The lower court declared
that there was no necessity for the said expropriation.
Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the Courts can inquire into the necessity
of expropriation of delegate, such as the City of Manila?
Held:
The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a
municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the
right some law must exist conferring the power upon it.
The general power to exercise the right of eminent
domain must not be confused with the right to exercise
it in a particular case. The power of the legislature to
confer, upon municipal corporations and other entities
within the State, general authority to exercise the right of
eminent domain cannot be questioned by courts, but the
general authority of municipalities or entities must not
be confused with the right to exercise it in particular
instances. The moment the municipal corporation or
entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred; it
must comply with the conditions accompanying the
authority. The necessity for conferring the authority
upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of
eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the
legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation
or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under
the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a
question which the courts have the right to inquire into.
When the courts come to determine the question, they
must only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the
exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that
the right or authority is being exercised in accordance
with the law. In the present case there are two conditions
imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of
Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the
purpose must be public. The authority of the city of
Manila to expropriate private lands for public purposes,
is not denied as provided in its Charter. However, if the
court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions
exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it cannot
be contended that the right is being exercised in
accordance with law. In the instant case, the record does
not show conclusively that the plaintiff has definitely
decided that there exists a necessity for expropriation.
The decision of the lower court is affirmed.
PEOPLE V. FAJARDO
GR 12172, AUG. 29 1958
Facts:
The municipal council of Baao, Camarines Sur stating
among others that construction of a building, which will
destroy the view of the plaza, shall not be allowed and
therefore be destroyed at the expense of the owner,
enacted an ordinance. Herein appellant filed a written
request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit
to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station
on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located
along the national highway and separated from the
public plaza by a creek. The request was denied, for the
reason among others that the proposed building would
destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza.
Defendants reiterated their request for a building permit,
but again the mayor turned down the request.
Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction
of the building without a permit, because they needed a
place of residence very badly, their former house having
been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had
been living on leased property. Thereafter, defendants
were charged in violation of the ordinance and
subsequently convicted. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the ordinance is a valid
exercise of police power.
Held:
No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The
ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it
operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right
to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds
of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellant’s
property without just compensation. We do not overlook
that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification
of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and
happiness of residents. As the case now stands, every
structure that may be erected on appellants' land,
regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under
the ordinance in question, because it would interfere
with the view of the public plaza from the highway. The
appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their
land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for
which it is best suited, being urban in character. To
legally achieve that result, the municipality must give
appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be
heard.
REPUBLIC V. VDA. DE CASTELLVI
GR NO. 20620, AUG.15, 1974
Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines occupied the land of
Carmen M. vda. de Castellvi from 1 July 1947, by virtue of
a contract of lease, on a year to year basis (from July 1 of
each year to June 30 of the succeeding year). The
Republic sought to renew the same but Castellvi refused.
The AFP refused to vacate the leased premises after the
termination of the contract because it would difficult for
the army to vacate the premises in view of the
permanent installations and other facilities worth almost
P500,000.00 that were erected and already established
on the property. Castellvi then brought suit to eject the
Philippine Air Force from the land. While this ejectment
case was pending, the Republic filed on 26 June 1959
complaints for eminent domain against the respondents
over the 3 parcels of land. In its complaint, the Republic
alleged, among other things, that the fair market value
of the above-mentioned lands, according to the
Committee on Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga,
was not more than P2,000 per hectare.The court
authorizes the Republic to take immediate possession of
the lands upon deposit of that amount with the
Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga.In 1961, the trial court,
rendered its decision in the ejectment case, finding that
the unanimous recommendation of the commissioners
of P10.00 per square meter for the 3 lots subject of the
action is fair and just; and required the Republic to pay
interests.
Issue:
Whether the taking of Castellvi‘s property occurred in
1947 or in 1959.
Held:
The Republic urges that the "taking " of Castellvi's
property should be deemed as of the year 1947 by virtue
of afore-quoted lease agreement. In American
Jurisprudence, Vol. 26, 2nd edition, Section 157, on the
subject of "Eminent Domain, we read the definition of
"taking" (in eminent domain) as follows:
"Taking‖under the power of eminent domain may be
defined generally as entering upon private property for
more than a momentary period, and, under the warrant
or color of legal authority, devoting it to a public use, or
otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously
affecting it in such a way as substantially to oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment
thereof."
Pursuant to the aforecited authority, a number of
circumstances must be present in the "taking" of
property for purposes of eminent domain.
First, the expropriator must enter a private property. This
circumstance is present in the instant case, when by
virtue of the lease agreement the Republic, through the
AFP, took possession of the property of Castellvi.
Second, the entrance into private property must be for
more than a momentary period. "Momentary" means,
"lasting but a moment; of but a moment's duration" (The
Oxford English Dictionary, Volume VI, page 596); "lasting
a very short time; transitory; having a very brief life;
operative or recurring at every moment" (Webster's
Third International Dictionary, 1963 edition.) The word
"momentary" when applied to possession or occupancy
of (real) property should be construed to mean "a limited
period" not indefinite or permanent. The aforecited lease
contract was for a period of one year, renewable from
year to year. The entry on the property, under the lease,
is temporary, and considered transitory. The fact that the
Republic, through the AFP, constructed some
installations of a permanent nature does not alter the
fact that the entry into the land was transitory, or
intended to last a year, although renewable from year to
year by consent of the owner of the land. By express
provision of the lease agreement the Republic, as lessee,
undertook to return the premises in substantially the
same condition as at the time the property was first
occupied by the AFP. It is claimed that the
―INTENTION‖ of the lessee was to occupy the land
permanently, as may be inferred from the construction
of permanent improvements. But this "INTENTION"
cannot prevail over the clear and express terms of the
lease contract. Intent is to be deduced from the
language employed by the parties, and the terms of the
contract, when unambiguous, as in the instant case, are
conclusive in the absence of averment and proof of
mistake or fraud the question being not what the
intention wag, but what is expressed in the language
used. Moreover, in order to judge the intention of the
contracting parties, their contemporaneous and
subsequent acts shall be principally considered (Art. 1371,
Civil Code). If the intention of the lessee (Republic) in
1947 was really to occupy permanently Castellvi's
property, why was the contract of lease entered into on
year to year basis? Why was the lease agreement
renewed from year to year? Why did not the Republic
expropriate this land of Castellvi in 1949 when, according
to the Republic itself, it expropriated the other parcels of
land that it occupied at the same time as the Castellvi
land, for the purpose of converting them into a jet air
base?" It might really have been the intention of the
Republic to expropriate the lands in question at some
future time, but certainly mere notice much less an
implied notice of such intention on the part of the
Republic to expropriate the lands in the future did not,
and could not, bind the landowner, nor bind the land
itself. The expropriation must be actually commenced in
court.
Third, the entry into the property should be under
warrant or color of legal authority. This circumstance in
the "taking" may be considered as present in the instant
case, because the Republic entered the Castellvi
property as lessee.
Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or
otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected.
It may be conceded that the circumstance of the
property being devoted to public use is present because
the property was used by the air force of the AFP.
Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must
be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him
of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. In the instant
case, the entry of the Republic into the property and its
utilization of the same for public use did not oust
Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of
the property. Castellvi remained as owner, and was
continuously recognized as owner by the Republic, as
shown by the renewal of the lease contract from year to
year, and by the provision in the lease contract whereby
the Republic undertook to return the property to
Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither was
Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the
property, because the Republic was bound to pay, and
had been paying, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals
until the time when it filed the complaint for eminent
domain on June 26, 1959.
It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Castellvi's
property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be
considered to have taken place in 1947 when the
Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee
thereof. We find merit in the contention of Castellvi that
two essential elements in the "taking" of property under
the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the
entrance and occupation by the condemnor must be for
a permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that in
devoting the property to public use the owner was
ousted from the property and deprived of its beneficial
use, were not present when the Republic entered and
occupied the Castellvi property in 1947.
Untenable also is the Republic's contention that
although the contract between the parties was one of
lease on a year to year basis, it was "in reality a more or
less permanent right to occupy the premises under the
guise of lease with the 'right and privilege' to buy the
property should the lessor wish to terminate the lease,"
and "the right to buy the property is merged as an
integral part of the lease relationship so much so that the
fair market value has been agreed upon, not as of the
time of purchase, but as of the time of occupancy". 15
We cannot accept the Republic's contention that a lease
on a year to year basis can give rise to a permanent right
to occupy, since by express legal provision a lease made
for a determinate time, as was the lease of Castellvi's land
in the instant case, ceases upon the day fixed, without
need of a demand (Article 1669, Civil Code). Neither can
it be said that the right of eminent domain may be
exercised by simply leasing the premises to be
expropriated (Rule 67, Section 1, Rules of Court). Nor can
it be accepted that the Republic would enter into a
contract of lease where its real intention was to buy, or
why the Republic should enter into a simulated contract
of lease ("under the guise of lease", as expressed by
counsel for the Republic) when all the time the Republic
had the right of eminent domain, and could expropriate
Castellvi's land if it wanted to without resorting to any
guise whatsoever. Neither can we see how a right to buy
could be merged in a contract of lease in the absence of
any agreement between the parties to that effect. To
sustain the contention of the Republic is to sanction a
practice whereby in order to secure a low price for a land
which the government intends to expropriate (or would
eventually expropriate) it would first negotiate with the
owner of the land to lease the land (for say ten or twenty
years) then expropriate the same when the lease is about
to terminate, then claim that the "taking" of the property
for the purposes of the expropriation be reckoned as of
the date when the Government started to occupy the
property under the lease, and then assert that the value
of the property being expropriated be reckoned as of the
start of the lease, in spite of the fact that the value of the
property, for many good reasons, had in the meantime
increased during the period of the lease. This would be
sanctioning what obviously is a deceptive scheme, which
would have the effect of depriving the owner of the
property of its true and fair market value at the time
when the expropriation proceedings were actually
instituted in court. The Republic's claim that it had the
"right and privilege" to buy the property at the value that
it had at the time when it first occupied the property as
lessee nowhere appears in the lease contract. What was
agreed expressly in paragraph No. 5 of the lease
agreement was that, should the lessor require the lessee
to return the premises in the same condition as at the
time the same was first occupied by the AFP, the lessee
would have the "right and privilege" (or option) of paying
the lessor what it would fairly cost to put the premises in
the same condition as it was at the commencement of
the lease, in lieu of the lessee's performance of the
undertaking to put the land in said condition. The "fair
value" at the time of occupancy, mentioned in the lease
agreement, does not refer to the value of the property if
bought by the lessee, but refers to the cost of restoring
the property in the same condition as of the time when
the lessee took possession of the property. Such fair
value cannot refer to the purchase price, for purchase
was never intended by the parties to the lease contract.
It is a rule in the interpretation of contracts that
"However general the terms of a contract may be, they
shall not be understood to comprehend things that are
distinct and cases that are different from those upon
which the parties intended to agree" (Art. 1372, Civil
Code).
(A number of circumstances must be present in the
―taking‖ of property for purposes of eminent domain.
First, the expropriator must enter a private property.
Second, the entrance into private property must be for
more than a momentary period. Third, the entry into the
property should be under warrant or color of legal
authority. Fourth, the property must be devoted to a
public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected. Fifth, the utilization of the property
for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner
and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property.
It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Castellvi's
property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be
considered to have taken place in 1947 when the
Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee
thereof. We find merit in the contention of Castellvi that
two essential elements in the "taking" of property under
the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the
entrance and occupation by the condemnor must be for
a permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that in
devoting the property to public use the owner was
ousted from the property and deprived of its beneficial
use, were not present when the Republic entered and
occupied the Castellvi property in 1947.
Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the
―just compensation‖ is to be determined as of the date
of the filing of the complaint. This Court has ruled that
when the taking of the property sought to be
expropriated coincides with the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to
the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just
compensation should be determined as of the date of
the filing of the complaint. Herein, it is undisputed that
the Republic was placed in possession of the Castellvi
property, by authority of the court, on 10 August 1959.
The ―taking‖ of the Castellvi property for the purposes
of determining the just compensation to be paid must,
therefore, be reckoned as of 26 June 1959 when the
complaint for eminent domain was filed.)
PASCUAL VS. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
COMMUNICATIONS G.R. NO. L10405, 29 DECEMBER
1960
Facts:
On August 31, 1954, petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, as
Provincial Governor of Rizal, instituted this action for
declaratory relief, with injunction, upon the ground that
Republic Act No. 920, entitled "An Act Appropriating
Funds for Public Works", approved on June 20, 1953,
contained, in section 1-C (a) thereof, an item (43[h]) of
P85,000.00 "for the construction, reconstruction, repair,
extension and improvement" of Pasig feeder road
terminals, that, at the time of the passage and approval
of said Act, the said feeder roads were "nothing but
projected and planned subdivision roads within the
Antonio Subdivision situated at Pasig, Rizal" near Shaw
Boulevard, not far away from the intersection between
the latter and EDSA, which projected feeder roads "do
not connect any government property or any important
premises to the main highway"; that the aforementioned
Antonio Subdivision (as well as the lands on which said
feeder roads were to be construed) were private
properties of respondent Jose C. Zulueta, who, at the
time of the passage and approval of said Act, was a
member of the Senate of the Philippines; that on May,
1953, respondent Zulueta, addressed a letter to the
Municipal Council of Pasig, Rizal, offering to donate said
projected feeder roads to the municipality of Pasig, Rizal;
that, on June 13, 1953, the offer was accepted by the
council, subject to the condition "that the donor would
submit a plan of the said roads and agree to change the
names of two of them"; that no deed of donation in favor
of the municipality of Pasig was, however, executed; that
on July 10, 1953, respondent Zulueta wrote another letter
to said council, calling attention to the approval of
Republic Act. No. 920, and the sum of P85,000.00
appropriated therein for the construction of the
projected feeder roads in question; that the municipal
council of Pasig endorsed said letter of respondent
Zulueta to the District Engineer of Rizal, who, up to the
present "has not made any endorsement thereon" that
inasmuch as the projected feeder roads in question were
private property at the time of the passage and approval
of Republic Act No. 920, the appropriation of P85,000.00
therein made, for the construction, reconstruction,
repair, extension and improvement of said projected
feeder roads, was illegal and, therefore, void ab initio";
that said appropriation of P85,000.00 was made by
Congress because its members were made to believe
that the projected feeder roads in question were "public
roads and not private streets of a private subdivision"';
that, "in order to give a semblance of legality, when there
is absolutely none, to the aforementioned
appropriation", respondents Zulueta executed on
December 12, 1953, while he was a member of the Senate
of the Philippines, an alleged deed of donation of the
four (4) parcels of land constituting said projected feeder
roads, in favor of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines; that said alleged deed of donation was, on
the same date, accepted by the then Executive Secretary;
that being subject to an onerous condition, said
donation partook of the nature of a contract; that, such,
said donation violated the provision of our fundamental
law prohibiting members of Congress from being
directly or indirectly financially interested in any contract
with the Government, and, hence, is unconstitutional, as
well as null and voidab initio, for the construction of the
projected feeder roads in question with public funds
would greatly enhance or increase the value of the
aforementioned subdivision of respondent Zulueta,
Issue:
Whether the contested item of Republic Act No. 920
unconstitutional and, therefore, illegal?
Held:
No. The P85,000.00 appropriation for the projected
feeder roads in question, the legality thereof depended
upon whether said roads were public or private property
when the bill, which, later on, became Republic Act 920,
was passed by Congress, or, when said bill was approved
by the President and the disbursement of said sum
became effective, or on June 20, 1953 (see section 13 of
said Act). Inasmuch as the land on which the projected
feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to
respondent Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation
sought a private purpose, and hence, was null and void.
The donation to the Government, over five (5) months
after the approval and effectivity of said Act, made,
according to the petition, for the purpose of giving a
"semblance of legality", or legalizing, the appropriation
in question, did not cure its aforementioned basic defect.
Consequently, a judicial nullification of said donation
need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality
of said appropriation.
Again, it is well-stated that the validity of a statute may
be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury
in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many
decisions nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws
providing for the disbursement of public funds, upon the
theory that "the expenditure of public funds by an officer
of the State for the purpose of administering an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such
funds," which may be enjoined at the request of a
taxpayer.
Republic Act No. 920 is unconstitutional, since the
legislature is without power to appropriate public
revenue for anything but a public purpose and the
project feeder roads are at the time private properties.
The right of the legislature to appropriate funds is
correlative with its right to tax, and, under constitutional
provisions against taxation except for public purposes
and prohibiting the collection of a tax for one purpose
and the devotion thereof to another purpose, no
appropriation of state funds can be made for other than
for a public purpose.
LLADOC V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
GR L-19201, 16 JUNE 1965
Facts:
Issue:
Whether a donee‘s gift tax may be assessed against the
Catholic Church.
Held:
Yes. The phrase ―exempt from taxation, as employed in
the Constitution should not be interpreted to mean
exemption from all kinds of taxes. Section 22(3), Art. VI
of the Constitution of the Philippines, exempts from
taxation cemeteries, churches and personages or
convents, appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings,
and improvements used exclusively for religious
purposes. The exemption is only from the payment of
taxes assessed on such properties enumerated, as
property taxes, as contra-distinguished from excise
taxes. A donee ‘s gift tax is not a property tax but an
excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of
gift inter vivos. Its assessment was not on the property
themselves. It does not rest upon general ownership, but
an excise upon the use made of the properties, upon the
exercise of the privilege of receiving the properties. The
imposition of such excise tax on property used for
religious purposes do not constitute an impairment of
the Constitution.

In 1957, the MB Estate Inc., of Bacolod City, donated

P10,000.00 in cash to Fr. Crispin Ruiz then parish priest of
Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of Fr.
Casimiro Lladoc, for the construction of a new Catholic
Church in the locality. The total samount was actually
spent for the purpose intended. On 3 March 1958, MB
Estate filed the donor ‘s gift tax return. Under date of 29
April 1960, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued
as assessment for donee‘s gift tax against the Catholic
Parish of Victorias, Negros Occidental, of which
petitioner was the priest. The tax amounted to P1,370.00
including surcharges, interest of 1% monthly from 15 May
1958 to 15 June 1960, and the compromise for the late
filing of the return. Petitioner lodged a protest to the
assessment and requested the withdrawal thereof. The
protest and the motion for reconsideration presented to
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue were denied. The
petitioner appealed to the CTA on 2 November 1960.
After hearing, the CTA affirmed the decision of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue except the imposition
of compromise penalty of P20. Fr. Lladoc appealed to the
Supreme Court.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT
ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO,
PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON,
ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA,
BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO
MUNSOD, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING
MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, respondents.
Facts:
Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO)
decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of
Malacañang to express their grievances against the
alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.
After learning about the planned mass demonstration,
Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting
with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the
planned demonstration was confirmed by the union. But
it was stressed out that the demonstration was not a
strike against the company but was in fact an exercise of
the laborers' inalienable constitutional right to freedom
of expression, freedom of speech and freedom for
petition for redress of grievances.
The company asked them to cancel the demonstration
for it would interrupt the normal course of their business
which may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed
up with the threat of the possibility that the workers
would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the
rally.
Issue:
Whether or not the workers who joined the strike
violated the CBA?
Held:
No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights,
the primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society"
and the "threat of sanctions may deter their
exercise almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive,"
permitting government regulation only "with narrow
specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru
prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. In the
hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights to freedom of
expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position
as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of
our civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives
these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not
permitting dubious intrusions."
The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of
peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances are absolute when directed against public
officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to
choose the men and women by whom we shall be
governed.”

A second meeting took place where the company

reiterated their appeal that while the workers may be
allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular
shifts should not absent themselves to participate,
otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late
to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of
the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of
the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause of their Collective
Bargaining Agreement.

The lower court decided in favor of the company and the

officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in
bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations
for being filed two days late.
BUCK VS BELL MMDA VS BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION
274 US 200
March 27, 2000
Facts:

The State of Virginia had a statute that authorized the Facts:

forced sexual sterilization of certain mentally ill people in
Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with
certain mental institutions. The purpose of the law was
the delivery of basic services in Metro
to promote the “health of the patient and the welfare of
Manila. Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.
society.” The sterilization only took place after a hearing
(BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose
on the propriety of such action.
members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private
subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the
Carrie Buck was a “feeble minded” woman who was
registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-
committed to a mental health facility. Both Buck’s
Air Village.
mother and daughter were feeble minded. It was
believed that the mental affliction was
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from
hereditary. Accordingly, the superintendent of the
petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated
mental health facility recommended sterilization of Buck.
December 22, 1995 requesting respondent to open
Buck challenged the Virginia statute, arguing that it is a
Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January
violation of due process and equal protection under the
2, 1996.
Fourteenth Amendment.

Actions Filed:
Issue:

1. BAVA – applied for injunction; trial court issued

WON Virginia’s forced sterilization law deny Buck her
temporary restraining order but after due hearing, trial
right to due process and equal protection under the
court denied the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
Fourteenth Amendment?
2. BAVA – appealed to CA which issued preliminary
injunction and later ruled that MMDA has no authority
Held:
to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private
subdivision road and cause the demolition of its
No. In order for society not to be “swamped with
perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the
incompetence,” having the sterilization of some mentally
City Council of Makati by ordinance.
incompetent persons is permitted. Further, the
MMDA – filed motion for reconsideration but was denied
sterilization process cannot occur until after a long
by CA; hence the current recourse.
hearing process. Justice Holmes, writing for the majority,
noted that “three generations of imbeciles are enough.”
Issues:
With regard to equal protection, there is no equal
protection problem by the statute focusing only on
1. Has the MMDA the mandate to open Neptune
people in certain mental institutions rather than the
Street to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and
public at large. The “law does all that is needed when it
police powers?
does all that it can,” as it assumes most mentally deficient
people are in the relevant institutions.
Held:
The decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal of Virginia is No. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself,
affirmed. "development authority." All its functions are
administrative in nature.

The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following

acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring,
setting of policies, installation of a system and RULING:
administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that
grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative No. Respondents are not obligated to provide for free
power. parking to the people.

The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the
welfare of the community. It is the local government
units, acting through their respective legislative councils
that possess legislative power and police power. In the
case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City
did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the
opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening
by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court
of Appeals did not err in so ruling.
The MMDA was created to put some order in the
metropolitan transportation system but unfortunately
the powers granted by its charter are limited. Its good
intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of a
private street in a private subdivision without any legal
warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is not
antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law.
Article 1158 of the Civil Code provides that “Obligations
derived from law are not presumed. Only those expressly
determined in this Code or in special laws are
demandable, and shall be regulated by the precepts of the
law which establishes them; and as to what has not been
foreseen, by the provisions of this Book”.
The court does not agree to the petitioner’s reliance on
the National Building Code as the same does not
expressly provide that respondents are required to
provide free parking to the public. Moreover, the court
holds that the code regulates buildings and not traffic
congestion. Police power is a power to regulate but not
to confiscate. The OSG’s contention is a deprivation of
private property and falls under eminent domain which
requires just compensation. Thus, the RTC decision is
affirmed and petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

OSG v. Ayala Land Inc.

GR No. 177056 – Sept 18, 2009

FACTS:

Respondents operate or lease out shopping malls that

have parking facilities. The people that use said facilities
are required to pay parking fees by the respondents.
Senate committees conducted an investigation to
determine the legality of said practice which the same
found to be against the National Building Code.
Respondents then received an information from various
government agencies enjoining them from collecting
parking fees and later a civil case against them.
Respondents argued that the same constitutes undue
taking of private property. OSG argues that the same is
implemented in view of public welfare more specifically
to ease traffic congestion. The RTC ruled in favor of the
respondents. Hence petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondents are obligated to provide

for free parking to its consumers and the public.