Nationalities Papers, Vol. 34, No.

1, March 2006

Contingent Nationalist Dominance:

Intra-Serb Challenges to the Serb Democratic Party
Nina Caspersen

‘Only unity saves the Serbs’ is the famous call for unity in the Serb nationalist
doctrine, but even though this doctrine enjoyed widespread ideological adherence, dis-
unity has been a dominant characteristic of Bosnian Serb politics since the first
multiparty elections in 1990. In this context of intra-Serb rivalry, the dominance of
the Serb Democratic Party (Sprska demokratska stranka, SDS) has nevertheless
been an almost constant feature. The SDS was founded in July 1990, under the leader-
ship of Radovan Karadžić, and in a nationalist landslide in the elections four months
later, the party secured around 85% of the Serb vote. Following the marginalisation of
the competing non-ethnic parties1 the SDS enjoyed a largely monolithic status in the
Serb community, but after the outbreak of war, and an initial closing of ranks, Serb
opposition parties soon emerged. Such competition intensified after the signing of
the Dayton Agreement, when the SDS’s ability to use repressive powers against com-
petitors was significantly reduced. Despite this persistent competition, the SDS has
remained the dominant political force among the Serbs in Bosnia and until 1997 its
control was close to being absolute. This dominance was decisive for the development
of conflict and war in Bosnia, but analysis of the conditions that allowed the SDS to
achieve and maintain its dominance is nevertheless lacking. In this article, the
dynamics of intra-Serb party competition in Bosnia will be analysed and the following
questions will be sought answered: What was the basis of the SDS’s continued dom-
inance? What resources were decisive in the party competition? How did the ethnifi-
cation of politics affect these dynamics? How did the existence of intra-ethnic
challengers affect the SDS’s position?2
Competition within national groups in situations of national or ethnic conflicts is
generally under-analysed in the theoretical literature, although its importance for
the latitude enjoyed by leaders in peace negotiations is often recognised. In the theo-
rising that does exist, intra-ethnic party competition is predominantly held to have a
radicalising effect. The proponents of this view contend that the most effective politi-
cal strategy in the competition will be to ‘play the ethnic card’, to take extreme pos-
itions that play into mass antagonisms.3 The argument is consequently based on the
general population being the primary audience to intra-ethnic party competition: the
dominant party is the one that most effectively mobilises the population through
the use of radicalising rhetoric. In addition to this competition between ethnic

ISSN 0090-5992 print; ISSN 1465-3923 online/06/010051-19 # 2006 Association for the Study of Nationalities
DOI: 10.1080/00905990500504855
N. CASPERSEN

parties, the early stages of conflict will often be characterised by intense competition
between ethnic and non-ethnic parties. Donald Horowitz, however, contends that,
once an ethnic mass party is created, other parties will have to imitate it, and hence
also define themselves in ethnic terms, in order to compete effectively. An ethnic
party system therefore results from what is primarily a voter-driven process.4 But
this process presupposes an already successful ethnic party; a party that has
managed to become a mass party.
In competition between ethnically defined parties, authenticity often plays a central
role: what defines a real Serb and who, by implication, has the legitimate right to speak
for the ethnic group?5 This struggle entails issues of representativeness, i.e. who has
the support of the community, but it also involves a struggle over political positions:
which interpretation is the ‘true’ representation of the interests of the ethnic group?
Hence not only effectiveness in voter appeals matters in the competition. Moreover,
the general population may not even be the most important audience for the
outcome of political competition: the competing parties can also make use of
resources supplied by their party organisation, linked organisations, the state appar-
atus, a possible kin-state or other external actors. The availability of such resources
will make popular support less significant for the outcome of the party competition,
since resources may, for example, be available for leaders to repress challengers. In
a situation of war, the constraints posed by popular attitudes are expected to be signifi-
cantly reduced. Thus, both the different audiences to which the parties owe their power
as well as the resources of importance in the competition must be included in an analy-
sis of party dominance. Finally, in the competition between ethnic and non-ethnic
parties, the victory of the ethnic party relies on the dominance of the ethnic cleavage,
and making this cleavage dominant forms part of ethnic parties’ competitive strategy.
Consequently the dominance of a nationalist party faced with intra-ethnic
competition is contingent on a number of factors: support from different audiences,
control of resources and the ethnification of political competition. The objective of
this article is to analyse these mechanisms of competition and its impact on the dom-
inance of parties in a situation of national or ethnic conflict. Intra-Serb party compe-
tition in Bosnia will be analysed in different phases of the conflict: just before the
outbreak of war, during the war and in the immediate post-war period.

Pre-war: Non-nationalist Parties Decimated

In the pre-war period, the SDS was not met with significant Serb competition and its
main rivals were the non-ethnic parties. Ethnification was not complete and the ethnic
or national cleavage was not the only politically salient cleavage. In competition with
non-ethnic parties, the nature of the political is at stake: the ethnic party needs to
possess sufficient resources to make the ethnic cleavage dominant and thereby
ensure its own dominance. In the first Bosnian multiparty elections in November

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1990, the SDS secured around 85% of the Serb vote and therefore clearly possessed
the necessary resources. However, what was the nature of these resources and why
were they heavily skewed in the SDS’s favour?

Competition with Non-ethnic Parties

The main party to compete with the SDS were the reformed Communists in the
League of Communists—Party for Democratic Change (Savez komunista BH—
Stranka demokratske promijene, SKBH-SDP). The SKBH-SDP was apparently con-
fident that it would win a comfortable majority in the elections, but this optimism
turned out to be severely misguided. The strength of the League of Communists of
Bosnia had been steadily declining since the Agrokomerc corruption scandal in
1987, which penetrated the highest echelons of the party. Almost all high-ranking
officials were replaced within a year and the party was left with a weak and inexperi-
enced leadership.6 The former director of Agrokomerc, Fikret Abdić, nevertheless
remained a very popular figure and received the highest number of votes in the
1990 presidential elections, which suggests that it was not the corruption scandal
itself that weakened the reformed Communists, but rather the way it was handled
and the resulting inexperienced leadership. The weakness of the Bosnian Communists
was one of the reasons for the SDS’s clear victory, but in the competition with the
SKBH-SDP it also mattered that the highest-ranking Serbs in the party were not
persons of great political favour among the Serbs.7 This made it more difficult for
the party to counter the nationalist claim that a non-ethnic party could not protect
Serb interests.
The SKBH-SDP was, however, not the only non-ethnic competitor to the SDS. The
Democratic Alliance of Socialists (Demokratski socijalistički savez, DSS) suffered
from similar problems as the SKBH-SDP: its roots were in the Socialist Alliance of
Working People and it was too closely associated with the old regime. But the
League of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia (Savez reformskih snaga Jugoslavije,
SRSJ), formed by then federal Prime Minister Ante Marković, was dangerous for
the SDS: it could not be directly identified with the previous regime, Marković’s econ-
omic programme was successful and he was very popular in Bosnia.8 Furthermore,
most of the party’s leaders in Bosnia were ethnic Serbs. But despite these factors of
strength, the Reformists had problems organising themselves. Most importantly, the
party lacked political determination: it covered an array of political opinions and
failed to take a clear position on the future of Yugoslavia.9 If these factors did not
weaken the non-ethnic parties sufficiently, their internal competition did, and the
parties thereby failed to present a strong alternative to the nationalist parties. Some
of the leaders were aware of this problem and shortly before the elections,
the leaders of the SKBH-SDP and the Reformists, Nijaz Duraković and Nenad
Kecmanović, signed a secret deal. However, when this became known to the Refor-
mists the most anti-Communist elements of the party rebelled and the deal was

53
N. CASPERSEN

called off.10 The SKBH-SDP and the DSS managed to form a pre-election coalition,
but the then leader of the DSS, Mirko Pejanović, argues that the Reformists were
ordered not to have anything to do with the two other parties.11
The failure of the non-ethnic parties owed much to their internal squabbles and the
erosion of faith in the League of Communists. But the main obstacle for the non-ethnic
parties was that the elections were fought on the ethnic cleavage. Through strategic
cooperation with the Croatian Democratic Community (Hrvatska demokratska Zajed-
nica, HDZ) and the Bosniak Party of Democratic Action (Stranka Demokratske akcije,
SDA), the SDS managed to ethnify politics before the elections.12 Although they fre-
quently used inflammatory rhetoric to heighten tensions, the three nationalist parties
simultaneously emphasised that their opponents were not the other ethnic parties,
but rather the representatives of the old system.13 At the founding assembly of the
SDS, the leader of the SDA, Alija Izetbegović, received standing ovations and he wel-
comed the new Serb party with the words: “we have been waiting for you for some
time—for this Bosnia needs you.”14 Their cooperation aided the ethnification of poli-
tics; it strengthened the parties’ attempt to define political competition in ethnic terms.
This may seem counterintuitive, since the cooperation could be taken to indicate that
anti-Communism was more important than ethnicity. However, the cleavage between
the reformed Communists and the anti-Communist ethnic parties was merely used to
justify their cooperation, and the need for ethnic representation was stressed.15 Further-
more, since they did not agree on the issue of the future status of Yugoslavia, with the
HDZ supporting a confederation, their cooperation prevented this issue from being the
most salient issue in the campaign. The initially relative moderate position of the ethnic
parties therefore paradoxically facilitated ethnification: they recognised each other as
legitimate representatives, and reinforced each other’s message of an ethnic definition
of politics. In their endeavour to ethnify politics the nationalist parties were, further-
more, strongly supported by the progressively tenser atmosphere in the Yugoslav fed-
eration. Politics had consequently become ethnicised prior to the elections.
Finally, the SDS was strengthened by having a well-organised party structure. The
SDS received significant assistance from both its sister-party in Croatia and from the
Belgrade regime and with their help it established a wide range of local branches. By
September 1990, the party claimed to have as many as 350,000 members.16 Further-
more, the SDS in October 1990 established a Serb National Council in Banja Luka and
shortly afterwards also in Tuzla and Trebinje.17 The party could therefore compete
effectively with the SKBH-SDP, which was the only party with an organised
network throughout the republic.18
Following their electoral victory, the three nationalist parties made sure to exclude
all other parties from influence, and Serb representatives from the non-ethnic parties
were increasingly pressured by the SDS to join their ranks.19 The pressure proved
effective: many non-SDS Serb deputies voted with the SDS on the issue of Bosnian
sovereignty20 and in late February 1992, when the constitution of the Serb Republic
was proclaimed, a significant number of these deputies were present.21 The near

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homogenisation of Serb politics in Bosnia which had been created by the electoral
victory was consequently strengthened.

Lack of Significant Nationalist Rival

In addition to the non-ethnic parties, the SDS was also faced with competition from
another Serb party: the Serb Renewal Movement (Srpski Pokret Obnove, SPO) led
in Serbia by Vuk Drašković. However, this party only won one seat in the Bosnian
parliament and was never a serious rival to the SDS.22 While the two parties espoused
similar policies, the SPO’s political programmes was more unashamedly Serb nation-
alist, and the SDS can consequently not be regarded as the more extreme party on the
Serb nationalist scene.23 But this changed in late 1991 when the SPO in Belgrade
began criticising the war in Croatia and accused the nationalist parties in Bosnia of
not trying hard enough to prevent war from also breaking out in Bosnia.24 Such cri-
tique did, however, not find resonance with the SPO deputy in Bosnia, who had all
along acted like a member of the SDS and finally chose to join the party.25 Once
the ethnic cleavage had become dominant, and non-ethnic forces were marginalised,
there was therefore no alternative to the SDS in the Serb community.

Popular Attitudes and SDS Dominance

In the 1990 elections, the SDS received overwhelming support from the Bosnian Serb
voters, but it is important to note that the party ran on a moderate platform and prom-
ised democracy, national equality and interethnic partnership.26 Outside the official
campaign the tone was, however, harsh. In Banja Luka, material was distributed
announcing: “We will not betray you—the League of Communists and the leftists
will betray you! The Ustasha knife awaits you again.”27 Through the resulting
vague position, the party broadened its appeal and could appeal to voters not
swayed by the nationalist discourse while at the same time increase tensions.
The massive support for the nationalist parties, nevertheless, came as a great sur-
prise, since none of the pre-election polls had pointed to such a landslide; they had
actually indicated victory for the reformed Communists. Thus, even in a poll con-
ducted only days before the elections, the SDS looked set to win just 14% of the
vote and a majority of the Serbs would vote for either the SKBH-SDP or the Refor-
mists.28 But the surveys did show a clear trend in increasing support for the SDS:
the party increased its share of the vote from 4.5% in late August to 10.2% in early
November.29 For the Serb respondents what was most important for their view of a
political party was its programme: whether it had a Yugoslav orientation or not. Inter-
estingly, the Serb respondents reported having very little knowledge of the SDS’s pro-
gramme. The resulting confusion over the SDS’s programme must have been
augmented by events pointing to possible greater radicalism in the party: the establish-
ing of the Serb National Council in October 1990 and the expressed militancy of at

55
N. CASPERSEN

least parts of the party. This uncertainty is reflected in the large proportion of Serb
respondents who in October 1990 said that they were still undecided as to their elec-
toral choice.30 Crucially for the electoral results, these many undecided Serb voters
decided to cast their vote to Serb nationalism. Since the SDS and the non-ethnic
parties differed little on their declared programmatic goal, this suggests that the
ethnic cleavage had become dominant among the population before the elections
and the SDS enjoyed genuine popular support. However, after the elections, the
SDS significantly radicalised its position and by then all alternatives were effectively
marginalised.
As a way of bolstering its radicalisation, the SDS in November 1991 organised a
referendum among the Serbs in Bosnia on staying in Yugoslavia. The majority’s pre-
ference for staying in Yugoslavia had already been made clear in surveys and the
outcome was therefore to be expected. However, the expressed support for joining
parts of Bosnia with what remained of Yugoslavia could be argued to signify a radi-
calisation, and the SDS could use this to argue that their position was indeed the
majority position in the Serb community. Nevertheless, there were significant irregu-
larities in the referendum and one cannot conclude from the result that the war option,
which the SDS increasingly championed, also enjoyed majority support in the Serb
community. The SDS could manipulate the expression of popular attitudes and its
control over the Bosnian Serbs was demonstrated by the near complete Serb
boycott of the Bosnian independence referendum in early 1992. Surveys, moreover,
demonstrate the existence of widespread dissatisfaction with nationalist rule31 and
peace rallies were organised in the big cities; the last of these was famously
stopped by SDS snipers shooting from the Holiday Inn in Sarajevo. Thus, even
though the SDS enjoyed overwhelming popular support at the time of elections,
popular attitudes do not appear to have been decisive in the ability of the party to
adopt a more extreme position. If a moderate Serb party had been formed, it could
therefore conceivably have been a rival to the SDS, but the SDS’s vague position in
the election campaign, the party’s subsequent control of resources and the unlikeli-
hood of new elections discouraged potential rivals.

Pre-war SDS Dominance

In the pre-war period, the SDS found itself in competition with non-ethnic parties that
rejected its ethnic definition of politics. The nature of the political was at stake in this
competition and the outcome depended on the distribution of resources and on the
interplay with interethnic relations. The ability of the SDS to attract Serb voters
was consequently augmented by the weakness of the non-ethnic parties and their
internal squabbles. Furthermore, the SDS managed in the short time from its foun-
dation to the elections to establish a well-functioning party structure and could
thereby effectively compete with its non-ethnic rivals. The party’s position was, more-
over, strengthened by its cooperation with the SDA and the HDZ and by the

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increasingly tense situation in the Yugoslav Federation. At the time of elections, the
ethnic cleavage had become dominant and as a result the non-ethnic parties found it
very hard to compete with the SDS for the Serb vote. The SDS’s victory over its
non-ethnic rivals does therefore not reflect the inherent appeal of an ethnic platform.
Rather it reflects the party’s advantage in terms of political resources, the weakness of
especially the reformed Communists and the SDS’s success in making the ethnic clea-
vage the most salient cleavage. The party did not secure support by adopting an
extreme position; it deliberately fostered a moderate, if rather vague, public profile.
The dominant Serb force in Bosnia was not met with more moderate, ethnically
defined alternatives and the population was, aside from a carefully orchestrated refer-
endum, not given a chance to express alternative views. Crucially, radicalisation took
place in a period between elections.

During the War: Opposition Emerges in Republika Srpska

After a period of unrivalled rule in the first year of the war, the SDS became increas-
ingly challenged by opposition parties. Moreover, internal divisions in the SDS were
deepening and relations with the military leaders became progressively more strenu-
ous. Finally, relations between the SDS leadership and Belgrade became frostier and
reached a breaking point over the Contact Group Plan in the summer of 1994. These
factors were not unrelated and when the different opposition forces began to coalesce,
the political dynamics in Republika Srpska (RS) underwent a change, and the SDS lea-
dership was forced to change position in order to retain its dominance. Despite the
pressure for homogenisation and the interethnic polarisation brought on by the war,
the lack of unity was pronounced and the SDS’s dominance was contingent on
control of especially non-political resources.

Non-parliamentary Multipartism
Notwithstanding the eventual significance of the opposition, competition to the SDS
was in the beginning of the war even more limited than in the pre-war period.
Almost all Serb representatives from non-ethnic parties joined the SDS after the out-
break of war—there were only seven exceptions in the RS parliament—and this
homogenisation of the Serb political scene greatly aided the SDS’s dominance. The
non-ethnic parties ceased to operate in the territory under RS control and the only
alternative to joining the SDS in this part of Bosnia was therefore to become an inde-
pendent. One of the prime examples of this nationalist conversion was Dragan Kalinić,
a former Communist leader, elected for the Reformists, who became very powerful in
the SDS. And if anyone in the party doubted Kalinić’s nationalist credentials, his
speech in the RS parliament in May 1992 proved them wrong: “Among all the
issues this assembly should decide on, the most important one is this: Have we

57
N. CASPERSEN

chosen the option of war or the option of negotiations? . . . I do not hesitate in selecting
the first option, the option of war.”32
Despite this homogenisation of Serb political representation, divisions soon
emerged and alternative political initiatives came underway. When the war started,
the work of political parties had been frozen by the RS government33 but in March
1993, following concerns that the Serb Radical Party (Srpska radikalna stranka,
SRS) was becoming too strong, the work of the SDS was reactivated and the ban
on political parties consequently lifted.34 The first party to be formed in the RS
after the war began was the Liberal Party (Liberalna stranka, LS), which was a
non-ethnic party that supported negotiations and an end to the war.35 This party illus-
trate the continued existence of non-ethnic, moderate voices in the RS, but its influ-
ence was marginal. A party of much greater concern to the ruling party was the
SRS, which challenged the SDS from an even more extreme opposition. Apparently
some members of the SDS were simultaneously members of the SRS, thereby
giving the leadership reasons to fear splits: in 1992, Radoslav Brdanin, a leading
SDS official in Banja Luka, reportedly said on a radio show that he had an SRS mem-
bership card signed personally by the SRS’s leader in Serbia, Vojislav Šešelj.36 The
Serb Radicals started working in Bosnia in 1992, but were formally founded in
Bosnia in March 1993 by university professor Nikola Poplašen. Poplašen lists two
reasons for founding the party: to increase the RS’s autonomy from Slobodan
Milošević and to fight against the crime and authoritarianism associated with the
SDS.37 Finally, there was the Socialist Party of Republika Srpska (Socijalistička
partija Republike Srpske, SPRS), which was founded in Banja Luka in June 1993
by Dragutin Ilić. Contrary to the SRS, the Socialist Party charted a more moderate
course and supported the different peace plans rejected by the RS leaders, and it
was consequently derided as a party of traitors in the RS media. The SPRS established
municipal organisations in most of the territory of RS,38 but its most important organ-
isational links were with Belgrade and by the other opposition parties it was seen as
little more than Milošević’s mouthpiece.39 One of the main issues of contention
between the SDS and the opposition parties was therefore the relations between the
RS leadership and Milošević, especially after the RS leadership rejected the
Contact Group Plan in the summer of 1994.
Consequently, by the second year of war, the SDS was faced with competition from
both more extreme and more moderate parties. The challenge to the SDS’s power was,
however, made difficult by the opposition’s lack of parliamentary representation: the
parties were formed after the first elections and no elections were held during the war.
But the SDS still feared the possible impact of increased competition and therefore
chose to harshly repress the opposition. Ognjen Tadić from the SRS argues that the
treatment of the opposition included “arrests, political liquidations, physical liquida-
tions.”40 The challenge from the LS was similarly sought eliminated by sending most
of its members to the first line of the front.41 Miodrag Živanović recalls that the LS
had to function semi-legally: “I was on the front, and I came to Banja Luka to

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 CONTINGENT NATIONALIST DOMINANCE

make press conferences, and then I went back to the front, to save my life . . . it was
safer there.”42
In the RS parliament, the only opposition to the SDS was made up by seven inde-
pendent deputies, but following the rejection of the Contact Group Plan they consti-
tuted themselves as a group, the “Club of Independent Deputies,” under the
leadership of Milorad Dodik, and began to act as an opposition to the SDS.43 They
issued a demand for a parliamentary session to achieve final peace and they blamed
Karadžić for the casualties in the period after the rejection of the Contact Group
Plan.44 Dodik coalesced with other opposition forces from Banja Luka and argued
that the RS leadership’s insistence on its right to Sarajevo “has resulted in the loss
of a large part of Bosnian Krajina.”45 The Club was taken very seriously by the
SDS leadership, and the speaker of the RS parliament, Momčilo Krajišnik, announced
greater discipline in the SDS.46 Due to the SDS’s strong hold on power, the party was
nevertheless not significantly threatened by the opposition parties. The leadership
could use its control of political and non-political resources to repress oppositional
challenges and their existence did therefore not force the party to change its position.
While the oppositional parties were not a significant threat on their own, the SDS lea-
dership feared that they would cooperate with other rival forces: with SDS factions,
with Belgrade and especially with the RS army.
The fear of such cooperation was well founded: Belgrade provided resources and
protection to its RS loyalists47 and in late 1994 several RS opposition forces including
some SDS deputies from Banja Luka met Milošević in Belgrade. Following this
meeting, Karadžić admitted that divisions in parliament were growing, saying that
15 out of 82 members were members of the “Left,” who seemed to be close to the
“Left” in Serbia.48 According to rumours at the time, Milošević estimated that he
already had 25 out of the 42 deputies necessary for a majority.49 In October 1995,
the opposition to Karadžić became even clearer when various political parties and
associations, including high-ranking SDS members, formed the Krajina Patriotic
Front (Krajina otadžbinski front) and demanded his resignation.

Opposition Coalescing with the Army

The most serious challenge to the SDS during the war, however, came from the RS
military. This deepening conflict was strongly affected by the personal rivalry
between Karadžić and the commander of the RS army, Ratko Mladić, but other
issues were also of importance: differing opinions over the degree of military auton-
omy and dissatisfaction with the endemic corruption and war profiteering among the
SDS leaders.50
The ambitions of Mladić to provide more than military leadership first became clear
during the debates over the Vance– Owen Peace Plan in the spring of 1993. When the
RS parliament debated the plan, Mladić’s vehement opposition and 35-minute-long
impassioned speech against acceptance was one of the decisive factors.51 In April

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N. CASPERSEN

1995, Mladić once again addressed the RS parliament but this time with bleak news.
He criticised the civilian authorities for interfering in the line of command, demanded
control of all economic facilities and told parliament, “if a political solution isn’t
found through negotiations, the war will be long and exhausting for the RS,” and
the proclamation of a state of war would therefore be required. But the deputies did
not accept his warning. On the contrary, Mladić’s report was rejected and there
were calls for his resignation.52 Finally, in August that year, Mladić’s autonomous
role became too much for Karadžić and, behind closed doors, the RS parliament
decided to remove Mladić from his post under emergency war conditions declared
a week earlier. Politika speculated that Karadžić wanted to remove Mladić to
prevent a military coup by the generals.53 If such an initiative had been underway,
it was averted but Karadžić had not yet won the battle with Mladić, since the next
day Mladić’s entire command signed a letter to the RS parliament, rejecting Kar-
adžić’s announcement and declaring Mladić commander of the RS army.54 Ulti-
mately, Karadžić backed down and on 11 August 1995 declared that the decision to
remove Mladić had been annulled. Shortly afterwards, he also backed down on the
issue of negotiations and agreed to give Milošević the deciding vote in a joint Serb
delegation.
The emerging cooperation between the opposition parties, the army and SDS fac-
tions greatly strengthened the opposition and forced the SDS leadership to alter its
position. Previously, the SDS leadership had chosen to repress opposition with
harsh means, but towards the end of the war the ruling party was gradually losing
control. What counted in the intra-Serb competition was the control of political and
especially non-political resources, while popular attitudes were of negligible import-
ance. As long as the war was ongoing, the opportunity to make use of popular discon-
tent was limited and other resources were of greater importance. Tim Judah argues that
by 1995 it was common for Serbs in Bosnia to privately whisper that Karadžić and the
other leaders were “all crooks,”55 but even if this were true for a majority of the popu-
lation, there were no channels through which it could affect the leadership, and the
opposition was unable to utilise such attitudes.

Competition During the War

As a change from the pre-war period, the war brought competition from other Serb
parties. This competition was affected by and in turn affected intra-party divisions:
when the SDS was reactivated, it feared competition from the Radicals, but legalising
the work of political parties opened up for increasing competition from other parties
and also helped foster divisions within the formerly so cohesive SDS. The SDS’s con-
tinued dominance during the war was based on its control of political and especially
non-political resources that it could use to repress any challengers, and throughout
most of the war the existence of an opposition did not alter the SDS’s position. The
SDS was mostly concerned with the extreme challengers who enjoyed the support

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of paramilitary forces, while the more moderate forces lacked this kind of resources
until the army sided with the opposition and the Banja Luka faction of the SDS.
This new alliance significantly weakened the SDS and it finally had to concede to
the opposition in order to avoid losing control of the statelet. Radicalisation is not
always a winning strategy and hence not the only possible outcome of intra-ethnic
party competition. In this elite competition, popular attitudes were of negligible
importance and the outcome was consequently not decided by playing the ethnic
card. The resources of importance in the competition were far removed from demo-
cratic resources: what mattered were links with Belgrade, support from (para)military
forces and the use of non-democratic means in the treatment of rivals.

Post-war: Opposition Temporarily Gains Power

With the end of the war, the new issue of political contention within the RS was the
implementation of the Dayton Agreement: to what extent should the RS authorities
be willing to cooperate with the international authorities and with the Bosniak and
Croat parties? The SDS, and especially Karadžić, had been significantly weakened
by the signing of the Dayton Agreement, which constituted a humiliating defeat
for the war-bent leaders, who were left completely without influence during the nego-
tiations. Karadžić initially kept a low profile and factions in the SDS therefore saw
both the need and the opportunity for changing the party from within.56 However,
when Karadžić re-emerged on the political scene, his position was a policy of
strict non-cooperation and in the spring of 1996 he stated, “the international commu-
nity is wasting its time looking for Serbs with moderate stands.”57 Within the SDS,
Karadžić made sure that this statement would hold true and he ousted the RS Prime
Minister, Rajko Kasagić, for being too willing to cooperate with the international
authorities.58

First Post-war Elections

Following this failed attempt to reform the party from within, the holding of elections
in September 1996 gave a stimulus for SDS factions to establish themselves as separ-
ate parties. This resulted in the creation of a number of smaller parties that joined
forces in the Democratic Patriotic Bloc (Demokratski patriotski blok, DPB). While
the parties in the DPB were against the SDS, they did not necessarily take a more mod-
erate position. They criticised compromised individuals in the party and the concen-
tration of power in Pale, but they did not argue for greater moderation on part of the RS
authorities. The leader of the DPB, Predrag Radić, argued that the main difference
between the SDS and the DPB were the people in the coalition rather than its pro-
gramme: “our common goal is to preserve what was won and defended with
blood.”59 In addition to the coalition of SDS splinter-parties, the SDS was faced

61
N. CASPERSEN

with the left opposition united in the People’s Union for Peace—Union for Peace and
Progress (Narodni savez za slobodan mir—Savez za mir i progres). This coalition was
made up by the Socialist Party, the Liberal Party, the Yugoslav United Left and the
newly formed Serb Independent Social Democrats (Srpski nezavisni socijaldemokrati,
SNSD), which was created on the basis of Dodik’s war-time Club of Independent
Deputies. Importantly, this coalition enjoyed Belgrade’s support and was even nick-
named the “Union for Slobodan [Milošević] and Mira [Marković].”60 Karadžić there-
fore had reason to fear that it might prove a significant rival in the elections, and
already in February 1996 he had stated, “The new enemies are people with left-
wing ideas.”61 In addition to these two coalitions, a number of smaller parties
formed by individuals formerly associated with the SDS or the SRS also contested
the elections. Finally, the SDS was faced with the Serb Radicals, who ran with a pro-
gramme almost indistinguishable from the SDS’s.62 Thus, the SDS was again met with
opposition from both sides. The moderation of the more moderate forces should,
however, be taken with a pinch of salt: most parties maintained that unification
with Serbia was a priority although the imagined timeframe for this unification dif-
fered significantly between the parties.63 The best organised of the opposition
parties were the Radicals and the Socialists, which were the only parties apart from
the SDS that had organised committees in all municipalities of the RS.64
The SDS could, however, make full use of the resources it controlled as the incum-
bent party and especially made sure that the opposition would lack media access.65 In
addition to this control of important resources, the SDS was also inadvertently aided
by the international authorities: the removal of Karadžić and the arrest of a general
and a colonel from the RS army strengthened the SDS and made the national issue
the dominant electoral issue. Finally, the immediate post-war climate was marked
by increased radicalisation of both the SDA and the HDZ,66 and this radicalisation
arguably helped the SDS regain some of its lost ground: it could argue that despite
problems of corruption and war profiteering and the setback in Dayton, there was
still a need for the SDS’s policies. Further ammunition for this claim was provided
by the exodus of Serbs from Sarajevo.67 While the opposition made significant
inroads into the SDS’s support, they consequently failed to wrest power from the
party that had dominated Republika Srpska since its creation: with 52% of the
votes, the SDS secured 45 seats and an absolute majority in the RS Assembly,
the Union for Peace and Progress won ten seats, the SRS six seats, the DPB two
seats, while two other Serb parties each won one seat. In addition, however,
non-Serb parties won 18 seats and the Bosniak SDA became the second-largest
party with 14 seats (Table 1).68
In the first elections after the war, the SDS therefore benefited from its established
nationalist credentials and from the uneven distribution of resources between the com-
peting parties. Despite the significant strengthening of the opposition, the result meant
that it would take a split in the SDS or new elections for the opposition to gain power
in the RS. Within little over a year, both were to happen.

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 CONTINGENT NATIONALIST DOMINANCE

TABLE 1 RS National Assembly elections, 1996 (vote percentage and number of mandates won)

Union for Peace

SDS SRS DPB and Progress SDA

52% (45) 7% (6) 3% (2) 12% (10) 16% (14)

Source: Tomić and Herceg, Izbori u Bosni i Hercegovini.

The SDS Splits

The catalyst for these events was the increasing conflict between the RS President,
Biljana Plavšić, who had taken over after Karadžić was forced to leave politics, and
the rest of the SDS. Strongly pressured by international authorities, Plavšić concluded
that greater pragmatism was the best way to preserve the RS, and in order to defeat the
SDS leadership she went public with documentation of corruption and other crimes
committed by the authorities. The resulting conflict left the RS sharply divided:
each side had part of the media, police and even army loyal to them.69 The competing
centres of power became formalised when Plavšić was expelled from the SDS and
formed the Serb National Alliance (Srpski narodni savez, SNS). As with the other
SDS splinter-parties, the differences between the SDS and the SNS were limited:
their political programmes were very similar and the vice-president of the SNS,
Ostoja Knežević, stated that they had left the SDS “because the programme of the
SDS was not implemented in practice.”70
In the post-war period, other players were, however, also of importance for the
outcome of the intra-Serb competition. International authorities had become an
important audience and played a decisive role by supporting Plavšić. The Belgrade
government was, on the other hand, less forthcoming. The mutual antipathy
between Milošević and Plavšić was solid, and the Serbian President was more than
hesitant to take the side of the RS President. In public Milošević maintained that
the power struggle was an internal matter for the RS71 and only when it became
clear that Plavšić would be victorious did Milošević come out in her favour.
Belgrade’s position had become reactive and it no longer had a significant effect on
the internal competition in the RS. The opposition parties, given their new parlia-
mentary basis, had on the other hand become better able to influence developments,
but they were initially also indecisive and when the conflict was at its most intense the
RS opposition organised a big rally in support of Plavšić’s ideas, but not in support of
her personally.72 Except for the Serb Radicals and the Liberal Party, the main
opposition parties, nevertheless, eventually chose to support Plavšić as RS president.
The first elections held after the conflict between Plavšić and the Pale leadership
boiled over were the September 1997 local elections. As expected, the SDS was
further weakened, but, contrary to expectations, the result was a great triumph for
the Serb Radicals, who won over 20% of the votes with almost no election

63
N. CASPERSEN

campaigning. Most commentators had expected the Socialist Party to strengthen its
position significantly: the party had a well-developed party organisation, experienced
leaders, financial support from Belgrade and a well-organised election campaign. But
despite these factors of strength the voters still chose the ultra-nationalist option.
Although the disinclination to support the more moderate option was partly caused
by conflicting signals from the Socialists in Banja Luka and in Belgrade, the results
still made clear that a new era of moderation was not sweeping over the RS.73
For the extraordinary elections to the RS Assembly two months later, Plavšić’s new
party had obtained registration and it received substantial support from the inter-
national community. In these elections, the SDS could not to the same extent as
previously make use of state resources to strengthen its position and, following the
seizure by the Stabilisation force in Bosnia and Herzogovina (SFOR) of the Pale
TV transmitters, the media were actually biased in Plavšić’s favour.74 As expected,
the results further eroded the SDS’s support, but again they did not give a landslide
victory to the more moderate parties: the SDS’s support fell to 26% of the votes,
but a considerable part of the loss was picked up by the Radicals with 16% of the
votes. The rest of the SDS’s former votes went to Plavšić’s SNS, also 16%, while
the remaining opposition did not make any inroads (Table 2).
But the results meant that the SDS, even with the Serb Radicals, did not have a
majority in the Assembly. Plavšić’s supporters did not, however, have a majority
either and in order to form a government the new prime minister also needed
support from Bosniak and Croat MPs. This proved difficult to swallow for the Socialist
Party as well as for leaders from other parties.75 Plavšić therefore faced a narrow
choice of options and in the end picked Dodik, leader of the SNSD, who accepted
the nomination. Dodik’s government was finally elected at a dramatic Assembly
session after the SDS and SRS MPs had adjourned for the night.76 The turnover of
power was significantly influenced by the international authorities, who had been
very eager for a split in the SDS to emerge. Popular opinion was, on the other
hand, still not the driving force in intra-Serb competition: the moderation of the domi-
nant position and the SDS’s loss of power were not the result of a significant change in
popular opinion. Control of non-political and non-democratic resources had decreased
in importance following the end of the war and decisive resources, such as media
access, were now skewed in the favour of the SDS’s opposition.

TABLE 2 RS National Assembly elections, 1997 (vote percentage and number of mandates won)

SDS SRS SNS SPRS SNSD KCD (SDA)a

26% (24) 16% (15) 16% (15) 10% (9) 3% (2) 17% (16)

Source: Tomić and Herceg, Izbori u Bosni i Hercegovini.

a
The SDA contested this election in a coalition with the Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(SBiH), and the Citizens’ Democratic Party (GDSBiH) and the Liberal Party (LS).

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 CONTINGENT NATIONALIST DOMINANCE

The moderation entailed by the SDS losing power should, however, not be exag-
gerated. Plavšić’s coalition also included parties that were anything but moderate,
such as the Serb Party of Krajina, which was banned in 1999 for violating the
Dayton Agreement. Some opposition politicians therefore question the significance
of the split and Živanović from the Liberal Party argues that the opposition was actu-
ally destroyed by the realignment.77 Nevertheless, these events showed that the more
radical option will not necessarily be victorious and that radicalisation is therefore not
the only possible outcome from intra-ethnic party competition. But the SDS was far
from defeated and made a strong comeback in 2000, albeit in a slightly more moder-
ate version. This comeback was facilitated by the weakness and infighting of the SDS
opposition, by the interplay with the radical positions of the SDA and the HDZ as well
as campaigning by the Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH) for a Bosnia without
entities, and finally by international calls for the banning of the SDS and the actual
banning of the Serb Radicals. Thus, the renewed dominance of the SDS was again
contingent on a number of factors and not merely mirroring fluctuations in popular
opinion.

Conclusion: Contingent Dominance

Apart from a few temporary setbacks, the SDS has managed to retain its dominance in
the Bosnian Serb community for 15 years, and in the first seven years the party was
strong enough to effectively pose as the monolithic ruler. However, the Serb commu-
nity was not monolithic; only in the first year of the war was there anything resembling
unity on the Serb political scene and challenges from other parties were at times
severe, even during the war when pressure for homogenisation was relentless.
The SDS’s dominance was not primarily a reflection of its effectiveness in playing
the ethnic card, its ability to tap into extreme mass sentiments; it was contingent on a
number of other factors, most importantly the party’s control of non-political
resources. In the pre-war period, ethnification was itself part of the political struggle
and the SDS’s dominance was aided by both the weakness and infighting of the non-
ethnic parties and by the cooperation between the nationalist parties. The SDS,
moreover, won popular backing from a moderate position, while its subsequent radi-
calisation does not appear to have been voter led.78 During the war, non-political
resources were decisive in the competition and secured the SDS’s dominance over
an emerging Serb opposition. However, towards the end of the war, the SDS was
losing control and the opposition gained access to decisive resources through
cooperation with Belgrade and with the RS army. In the post-war period, the inter-
national authorities became an important audience, which affected the distribution
of resources between the competing parties, and this proved decisive in the SDS’s
loss of power in 1997. Popular attitudes had, however, also become of greater import-
ance for the outcome of party competition, and the holding of elections caused a

65
N. CASPERSEN

significant drop in the SDS’s power, despite its continued control of important
resources in the 1996 elections. Moderation was, nevertheless, not sweeping over
the RS and the experience of war made extremism a potentially successful strategy.
Popular attitudes were at times adversely affected by two factors that helped the SDS
retain its dominance: intervention by international authorities and radical posturing
by the SDA and the HDZ.
One could therefore have expected that the High Representative’s decision in June
2004 to dismiss several key SDS officials, including the president of the party, and
block the party’s bank accounts would have caused a popular backlash. However,
in the local elections less than four months later, the SDS failed to gain political
mileage from its martyrdom and renewed nationalist rhetoric. Instead the SDS lost
decisively to the SNSD, which promised the voters better living standards.79 The
SDS has lost control of some of the resources it could previously use in the intra-
Serb competition, other parties have become better organised, the national issue is
no longer the only salient issue and international actions consequently cause less of
a backlash, at least on the local level.
The SDS’s year-long dominance was a consequence of its success in the compe-
tition with both ethnic and non-ethnic parties. This touches on two important issues
in conflict analysis: the ethnification of political competition and intra-ethnic compe-
tition. In order for an ethnic party to emerge victorious from political competition, the
ethnic cleavage has to become dominant, unless the ethnic party relies solely on non-
political means for its dominance. This ethnification is part of the political struggle and
far from an automatic outcome following the emergence of ethnically defined parties.
Furthermore, it need not reflect a voter-driven process. Intra-ethnic challenges to
ethnic parties is the rule rather than the exception in ethnic conflicts, and they signifi-
cantly influence the position and strategies adopted by the leaders. This issue is under-
analysed in theories of ethnic conflicts, which mostly reduce the issue of intra-ethnic
competition to one of ethnic outbidding. However, what I have argued in this article is
that the SDS’s dominance was not primarily dependent on its ability to play the ethnic
card. Other factors were more important than popular attitudes for the party’s year-
long dominance over Bosnian Serb politics. Crucial periods of radicalisation can
fall between elections and even when elections and referenda are held, popular atti-
tudes need not be the primary factor driving elite competition. The importance of
different resources is expected to vary considerably in different phases of a conflict
and the significance of popular attitudes is likely to be limited in a situation of
warfare. Party competition in ethnic conflicts—intra-ethnic competition and compe-
tition between ethnic and non-ethnic parties—should consequently be analysed in
terms of political competition, with a focus on politically relevant audiences and
resources in the competition. The dominance of an ethnic party can be based on
popular support, but it need not be and claims of both national unity and successful
popular mobilisation should therefore be critically scrutinised and not just accepted
prima facie.

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NOTES
 An earlier version of this article was presented at the 7th international seminar, “Democ-
racy and Human Rights in Multiethnic Societies”, Konjic, Bosnia, 12 –17 July 2004 and
published by Kakanien Revisited, November 2004. Thanks to Sumantra Bose and the two
anonymous referees for their very helpful comments.
1. “Non-ethnic parties” are defined as parties that do not compete on the ethnic cleavage and
direct their appeals to all ethnic groups. “Non-ethnic forces” include these parties as well
as intellectuals and party deputies who insist on retaining a non-ethnic definition of
politics.
2. In this article, the terms “national” and “ethnic” will be used interchangeably. In the
Yugoslav context, the most appropriate term to use would be “national” rather than
“ethnic,” but this presents some linguistic problems when referring to dynamics within
and between the national communities: “intra-ethnic” or “inter-ethnic” is less open to mis-
understanding than “intra-national” or especially “inter-national.”
3. See e.g. Brendan O’Leary, “The Limits to Coercive Consociationalism in Northern
Ireland,” Political Studies, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1989, pp. 695–714; Adriano Pappalardo,
“The Conditions for Consociational Democracy: A Logical and Empirical Critique,” Euro-
pean Journal of Political Research, Vol. 9, No. 4, 1981, pp. 365–390; Paul Mitchell,
“Competition in an Ethnic Dual Party System,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 18, No.
4, 1985, p. 779; Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1985), p. 359.
4. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, pp. 306–307, 318, 333.
5. V. P. Gagnon, Jr, “Ethnic Conflict as an Intra-group Phenomenon: A Preliminary Frame-
work,” Revija za sociologiju, Vol. 26, Nos 1 –2, 1995, p. 88.
6. Neven Andjelić, Bosnia-Herzegovina: The End of a Legacy (London: Frank Cass, 2003),
pp. 61, 69; Kemal Kurspahić, Prime Time Crime: Balkan Media in War and Peace
(Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2003), p. 89
7. Ibid., p. 131.
8. Ibid., p. 160.
9. Ibid., pp. 161–162.
10. Ibid., pp. 180–181; Mirko Pejanović, Through Bosnian Eyes: The Political Memories of a
Bosnian Serb (Sarajevo: TKD Šahinpašić, 2002), p. 30.
11. Pejanović, Through Bosnian Eyes, p. 30.
12. Andjelić, Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 213.
13. B. Banjac, “Stranka koja ukida strah,” Borba, 16 July 1990, p. 3
14. Xavier Bougarel, “Bosnia and Hercegovina: State and Communitarianism,” in David
Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda, eds, Yugoslavia and After (London and New York: Longman,
1996), p. 98.
15. See e.g. Milorag Vućelić, “Srbi se najsporije bude,” Borba, 23 July 1990, p. 5; HDZ BiH
programme, in Miroslav Prstojević, ed., BiH Izbori’90 (Sarajevo: Oslobodenje public,
1990), pp. 44– 45.
16. “Veliki skup SDS,” Borba, 1–2 September 1990, p. 12.
17. Andjelić, Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 178
18. Ibid., pp. 159, 174.
19. Author’s interview with Tatjana Ljujić-Mijatović, Serb member of the war-time Bosnian
presidency, Sarajevo, 2 July 2004.
20. Manoljo Tomić, “Istorijsko ‘Ne’ Bosni,” Slobodna Bosna, 7 November 1991, p. 3.
21. Pejanović, Through Bosnian Eyes, p. 50

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N. CASPERSEN

22. Andjelić, Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 167

23. Electoral programme, in Prstojević, BiH Izbori’90, pp. 118–120. See also Tanjug, “Srbi
prijete pripajenjem,” Vjesnik, 26 October 1990, p. 3.
24. Milan Milošević, “See You in the Next War,” Vreme News Digest, No. 10, 1991, <http://
www.scc.rutgers.edu/serbian%5Fdigest/>.
25. Author’s interview with Slobodan Nagradić, professor, Faculty of Political Science,
University of Banja Luka, Sarajevo, 19 November 2003.
26. Election programme, in Prstojević, BiH Izbori’90, pp. 113–115.
27. Pejanović, Through Bosnian Eyes, p. 37
28. Overview of polls, in Suad Arnautović, Izbori u Bosni i Hercegovini ’90: Analiza izbornog
procesa (Sarajevo: Promocult, 1996), p. 56.
29. Ibid., pp. 57 –58. The 10.2% translates into 14.3% if only decided voters are included.
30. Ibid., pp. 54 –56.
31. Vlatka Krsmanović, “National Parties in Bosnia: Memories of a Common Past,” Vreme
News Digest, No. 42, 1992, <http://www.scc.rutgers.edu/serbian%5Fdigest/>.
32. Testimony of Robert Donia, “Transcripts, Brdjanin and Zupljanin (IT-99-36),” ICTY, 30
January 2002, p. 1171.
33. See e.g. ICTY, “Judgement: Prosecutor vs. Blagoje Simić, Miroslav Tadić, Simo Zarić
(IT-95-9-T),” 17 October 2003, para. 467.
34. Author’s interview with Slobodan Nagradić, Sarajevo, 19 November 2003
35. Author’s interview with Miodrag Živanović, Founder of the Liberal Party, Banja Luka,
Bosnia, 22 October 2003.
36. Testimony of anonymous witness, “Transcripts, Dusko Tadic (IT-94-I-T),” ICTY, 4 June
1996, pp. 1807–1808.
37. Author’s interview with Nikola Poplašen, Founder of the SRS in Bosnia, Banja Luka,
Bosnia, 3 December 2003.
38. Author’s interview with Dragutin Ilić, Founder of the SPRS, Banja Luka, Bosnia, 23
October 2003.
39. Author’s interview with Miodrag Živanović, Banja Luka, Bosnia, 22 October 2003.
40. Author’s interview with Ognjen Tadić, Secretary general of the SRS, Banja Luka, Bosnia,
7 November 2003.
41. Author’s interview with Miodrag Živanović, Banja Luka, Bosnia, 22 October 2003.
42. Ibid.
43. Author’s interview with Igor Radojicić, spokesman for the SNSD, former spokesman for
the SPRS, Banja Luka, Bosnia, 1 December 2003.
44. Perica Vučinić and Pajo Rovac, “Playing on the Reformists Ticket,” Vreme News Digest,
No. 175, 1995, <http://www.scc.rutgers.edu/serbian%5Fdigest/>.
45. Perica Vučinić, “Capital’s Watchtower,” Vreme News Digest, No. 209, 1995.
46. Filip Švarm and Dragan Dimović, “Our Man in Pale,” Vreme News Digest, No. 172, 1995;
Vučinić and Rovac, “Playing on the Reformists Ticket.”
47. Author’s interview with Dragutin Ilić, Banja Luka, Bosnia, 23 October 2003.
48. Nenad Lj. Stefanović, “Buying Time,” Vreme News Digest, No. 168, 1994.
49. Miloš Vasić and Filip Švarm, “Storm over Bosnia,” Vreme News Digest, No. 163,
1994.
50. Author’s interview with Slobodan Nagradić, Sarajevo, 19 November 2003; Miloš Vasić,
“The President and His Generals,” Vreme News Digest, No. 202, 1995; Obrad Kesić, “Poli-
tics Power and Decision Making in the Serb Republic,” Problems of Post-Communism,
March/April 1996, p. 59.
51. Nenad Lj. Stefanović, “The Pugnacious Commander,” Vreme News Digest, No. 87, 1993.

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 CONTINGENT NATIONALIST DOMINANCE

52. Filip Švarm, “Civilian –Military Games,” Vreme News Digest, No. 186, 1995; Bougarel,
“Bosnia and Hercegovina,” pp. 111–112.
53. “Chronology 1995: August 1 through August 31,” Croatian International Relations
Review, Vol. 11, Nos 30 –31, 2002, p. 54.
54. “Generalni ne prihvataju Karadžića za vrhovnog komandanta,” Politika, 7 August 1995,
p. 1.
55. Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven and
London: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 29. See also Misha Glenny, The Fall of
Yugoslavia (London: Penguin Books, 1996), p. 263.
56. Dragan Todorović, “Radic in Center,” Vreme News Digest, No. 246, 1996.
57. Filip Švarm, “Kasagic Fired,” Vreme News Digest, No. 234, 1996.
58. Ibid.
59. Dragan Todorović, “I Won’t Keep Quiet,” Vreme News Digest, No. 246, 1996.
60. Mira Marković is Milošević’s wife.
61. John Pomfret, “Bosnia’s Serb’s Leader Stages Show of Defiance,” Washington Post, 10
February 1996, p. 1.
62. Perica Vučinić, “Conflicting Forces,” Vreme News Digest, No. 254, 1996.
63. Dragan Stavljanin, “Belgrade or Pale,” Vreme News Digest, No. 227, 1996.
64. Nemanja Stefanović, “What Do Serb Parties Have to Offer?” AIM Press, Banja Luka,
Bosnia, 6 July 1996.
65. Perica Vucinić, “Conflicting Forces,” Vreme News Digest, No. 254, 1996.
66. Carl Bildt, Peace Journey: The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia (London: Weidenfeld, 1998),
p. 189.
67. Ibid., p. 198.
68. Zoran Tomić and Nevenko Herceg, Izbori u Bosni I Hercegovini (Mostar, Bosnia: Sveu-
čilište u Mostaru, Centar za studije novinarstva, 1998). The seats won by non-Serb
parties were largely due to refugees and displaced people voting in their 1991 residence.
69. Tanja Topić, “Twillight Zone in Republika Srpska,” Vreme News Digest, No. 307, 1997.
70. Miladin Kostović, “Children of the Same Father,” AIM Press, Banja Luka, Bosnia, 14
November 1997.
71. Ibid., p. 363
72. Tanja Topić, “The Generals’ Flour,” Vreme News Digest, No. 301, 1997.
73. Branko Perić, “Rise of the Radicals, Decline of the Socialists,” AIM Press, Banja Luka,
Bosnia, 16 September 1997.
74. OSCE/ODIHR, “Republika Srpska National Assembly Elections, Warsaw, 22 –23
November 1997.”
75. Author’s interview with Igor Radojićić, Banja Luka, Bosnia, 1 December 2003.
76. David Chandler, Faking Democracy after Dayton (London: Pluto, 2000), p. 127.
77. Author’s interview with Miodrag Živanović, Banja Luka, Bosnia, 22 October 2003.
78. Similar factors seem to have been behind the dominance of nationalist parties in other
republics of the former Yugoslavia. For the use of moderate rhetoric at the time of elections
see V. P. Gagnon, Jr, The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 2004) and Eric Gordy, The Culture of Power in Serbia:
Nationalism and the Destruction of Alternatives (University Park: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1999).
79. Gordana Katana, “Bosnian Serbs Punish SDS at the Polls,” Balkan Crisis Report, No. 520,
2004, <http://www.iwpr.net>.

69