HADJI HASHIM ABDUL v.

HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH DIVISION)

and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 184496 | December 2, 2013
POLITICAL LAW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

DOCTRINE: Where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, and
adjudication thereof would be of no practical use or value as courts do not sit to satisfy scholarly interest,
however intellectually challenging.

FACTS:
 Abdul was first elected as municipal mayor of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur and re-elected for a
second term. It was while serving his second term as municipal mayor when the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao filed an information charging him and Domado, with falsification of
public documents, defined and penalized under Article 171(2) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
 That they made it appear that Engr. Murad as Municipal Engineer prepared and signed the Local
Budget Preparation Form Nos. 152, 153 and 154 known as the Program Appropriation and
Obligation by Object, Personnel Schedule and Functional Statement and General Objective,
respectively, when in truth and in fact, as the accused well knew that said Zubair F. Murad was
never employed as Municipal Engineer of the said Municipality, to the damage and prejudice of
public interest which led to their suspension pendente lite.

“Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. – Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title Seven, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any
offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as complex offense and in
whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.”

 Hence, he filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for TRO alleging that the suspension order
was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The suspension
order, however, was no longer implemented because it was superseded by the expiration of
Abdul’s second term as municipal mayor and his unsuccessful bid for re-election during the May
2004 election. During the May 2007 election, Abdul emerged as the winner in the mayoralty race
and again sat as Mayor of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur. Abdul called attention to Sandiganbayan’s
pronouncement in its Resolution that his defeat in the election has effectively rendered his
suspension moot and academic. Nonetheless, Sandiganbayan ordered anew the suspension of
Abdul from his present position for a period of 90 days. Abdul moved for reconsideration, but
the same was denied. Hence, a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in suspending him pendente lite from his position as mayor of Mulondo, Lanao del
Sur?

HELD: No. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for being moot and academic. In the present
case, the acquittal of Abdul operates as a supervening event that mooted the present Petition. Any
resolution on the validity or invalidity of the issuance of the order of suspension could no longer affect
his rights as a ranking public officer, for legally speaking he did not commit the offense charged.
Notwithstanding the mootness of the present Petition, he nevertheless implores us to make a clear and
categorical resolution on whether the offense of falsification of public documents under Article 171 of the
RPC is included in the term "fraud" as contemplated under Section 13 of RA 3019. As earlier quoted, to
warrant the suspension of a public officer under the said Section 13, he must be charged with an offense
(1) under RA 3019, or (2) under Title Seven, Book II of the RPC, or (3) involving fraud upon government
or public funds or property. Admittedly, Abdul in this case was not charged under RA 3019. Neither was
he charged under Title Seven, 25Book II of the RPC as the crime of falsification of public documents
under Article 171 of the RPC is covered by Title Four, 26 Book II thereof. Since vouchers are official
documents signifying a cash outflow from government coffers, falsification thereof invariably involves
fraud upon public funds. In fine, we reiterate that he issue on the validity or invalidity of petitioner’s
suspension had mooted considering his acquittal by the Sandiganbayan. As such, there is no justiciable
controversy for this Court to adjudicate.

MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC. AND LA FUNERARIA PAZ-SUCAT, INC.,

vs.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND
DEVELOPMENT and THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE
G.R. No. 175356 |December 3, 2013
POLITICAL LAW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

DOCTRINE: When a party challenges the constitutionality of a law, the burden of proof rests upon
him.

FACTS:

 In 1992, RA 7432 was passed into law, granting senior citizens the following privileges:

SECTION 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following:a)
the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to utilization of transportation
services, hotels and similar lodging establishment[s], restaurants and recreation centers and purchase of
medicine anywhere in the country: Provided, That private establishments may claim the cost as tax
credit;b) a minimum of twenty percent (20%) discount on admission fees charged by theaters, cinema
houses and concert halls, circuses, carnivals and other similar places of culture, leisure, and amusement;c)
exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: Provided, That their annual taxable income does
not exceed the property level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority
(NEDA) for that year;d) exemption from training fees for socioeconomic programs undertaken by the
OSCA as part of its work;e) free medical and dental services in government establishment[s] anywhere in
the country, subject to guidelines to be issued by the Department of Health, the Government Service
Insurance System and the Social Security System;f) to the extent practicable and feasible, the continuance
of the same benefits and privileges given by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Social
Security System (SSS) and PAG-IBIG, as the case may be, as are enjoyed by those in actual service.

 To implement the tax provisions of RA 9257, the Secretary of Finance and the DSWD issued its
own Rules and Regulations. Hence, this petition.
 Manila Memorial Park and La Funeraria Paz are not questioning the 20% discount granted to
senior citizens but are only assailing the constitutionality of the tax deduction scheme prescribed
under RA 9257 and the implementing rules and regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF.
 Manila Memorial Park and La Funeraria Paz posit that the tax deduction scheme contravenes
Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution, which provides that: "private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation."
 DSWD and DOF maintain that the tax deduction scheme is a legitimate exercise of the State’s
police power.

ISSUE: Whether the legally mandated 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power or
eminent domain?

HELD: Yes, it is a valid exercise of police power. In conclusion, we maintain that the correct rule in
determining whether the subject regulatory measure has amounted to a "taking" under the power of
eminent domain is the one laid down in Alalayan v. National Power Corporation and followed in Carlos
Superdurg Corporation consistent with long standing principles in police power and eminent domain
analysis. Thus, the deprivation or reduction of profits or income. Gross sales must be clearly shown to be
unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory. Under the specific circumstances of this case, such
determination can only be made upon the presentation of competent proof which Manila Memorial and
La Funeraria Paz failed to do. A law, which has been in operation for many years and promotes the
welfare of a group accorded special concern by the Constitution, cannot and should not be summarily
invalidated on a mere allegation that it reduces the profits or income/gross sales of business
establishments.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by HON. NASSER C.

PANGANDAMAN, in his capacity as DAR-OIC Secretary
vs.
SUSIE IRENE GALLE
G.R. No. 171836 | August 11, 2014
POLITICAL LAW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 AND AGRARIAN LAW

DOCTRINE: It has been the consistent pronouncement of this Court that the determination of just
compensation is basically a judicial function. Also, it is settled that in the computation of just
compensation for land taken for agrarian reform, both Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657 or
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988/CARL) and the formula prescribed in the applicable
Administrative Order of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) should be considered.

FACTS:
 Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that it was
improper for this Court to declare null and void the Decision in DARAB Case No. JC-RIX-
ZAMBO-0011-CO, which fixed just compensation on the basis of outdated 1991 data instead of
valuation criteria as of 1993, the time of taking of the subject property; that said October 15, 1996
DARAB Decision is already final and executory and thus beyond judicial review, even by this
Court; and that even if it were to be assumed that said DARAB Decision is null and void, it
nonetheless cannot be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.
 Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration insisting that
the October 15, 1996 DARAB Decision is correct; that the 1991 valuation is accurate since the
actual taking of Galle's property for purposes of fixing just compensation may be said to have
occurred at that time when the Notice of Coverage was served upon Galle; that a property
valuation discrepancy of three years is not significant in the determination of just compensation
due to the owner of expropriated property; and that the DARAB Decision, being correct and
having attained finality, shall prevail as regards the amount of just compensation to be paid for
Galle's expropriated property.

ISSUE: Whether or not DARAB’S decision on the determination of just compensation is already final
and executory, thus beyond judicial review?

HELD: NO. The Court finds nothing wrong with using the appreciation and depreciation rate factor of
5% employed by bank appraisers, in the absence of official DAR data/evidence or any other reliable
method, and given the DAR's incompetence in handling Galle's case and the unjust consequences that
resulted from such inefficiency and neglect. After all, Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL) provides that -

Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. - In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition
of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by
the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered.
The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the
Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.

In Alfonso, the Court reiterated the settled doctrine that the ultimate determination of just compensation
in expropriation proceedings remains a judicial prerogative, stating thus:

For the guidance of the bench, the bar, and the public, we reiterate the rule: Out of regard for the DAR's
expertise as the concerned implementing agency, courts should henceforth consider the factors stated in
Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, as translated into the applicable DAR formulas in their determination
of just compensation for the properties covered by the said law. If, in the exercise of their judicial
discretion, courts find that a strict application of said formulas is not warranted under the specific
circumstances of the case before them, they may deviate or depart therefrom, provided that this
departure or deviation is supported by a reasoned explanation grounded on the evidence on record. In
other words, courts of law possess the power to make a final determination of just compensation.

ANTONIO KING VS. FRANCISCO ROBLES

G.R. No. | 197096-97 | December 2, 2013
POLITICAL LAW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

DOCTRINE:

FACTS:
 The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Azkcon Group of Companies and/or Jay Ar
Lazo were adjudged guilty of having illegally dismissed Rogelio from service and were ordered
to reinstate Rogelio to his former position, to pay him full backwages from the time his salary
was withheld up to his actual reinstatement. This Decision became final and executory. Labor
Arbiter Robles issued a writ of execution commanding the execution arm of the NLRC "to
proceed to the premises of Azkcon Group of Companies and/or Jay Ar Lazo located at J.P.
Ramos St., Bo. Talipapa, Caloocan City or wherever it may be found and collect the sum of x x x
P471,200.99 representing [Rogelio's] backwages and 13th month pay. In case you fail to collect
said amount in cash, you are to cause the satisfaction of the same from the movable or
immovable properties of the respondent not exempt from execution.

In compliance with the directive in the writ of execution, respondent Deputy Sheriffs served a
Notice of Levy/Sale on Execution on Personal Properties upon the representative of therein
respondents. Personal properties found inside the compound were levied upon. Meanwhile,
Philippine Metal and Alloy Fabrication Corporation (PMAFC, one of the companies represented
by King) filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim before Arbiter Robles, asserting ownership over
the levied properties. Subsequently, PMAFC filed a Motion to Quash Notice of Levy/Sale on
Execution of Personal Property and to Inhibit Sheriffs. PMAFC contended that the Deputy
Sheriffs levied on properties belonging to PMAFC worth P12 million and that the Deputy Sheriffs
intended to sell the said properties for a measly sum of P471,200.99. PMAFC thus prayed that the
Notice of Levy/Sale on Execution be set aside for being void ab initio and the Deputy Sheriffs be
disqualified. In an Order Arbiter Robles directed Rogelio to post a Sheriffs Indemnity Bond in an
amount double the judgment award.
  After the consolidation of the cases and hearing the parties' respective position, the Ombudsman
dismissed all the charges against the respondents for lack of probable cause.

According to the Ombudsman, petitioner's evidence failed to establish the four elements of the
crime of robbery. The Ombudsman held that the intent to gain is totally absent since Rogelio is
the owner of the subject properties on account of his being the highest bidder and a Certificate of
Sale issued to him. Thus, Rogelio cannot be charged for taking the personal property of another.
 Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman erred in its finding of lack of probable cause to hold respondents
for trial?

HELD: NO. It must be emphasized that the Ombudsman is a constitutional officer duty-bound to
investigate on its own or on complaint by "any person, any act or omission of a public officer or employee
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." By constitutional fiat and
under RA 6770, the Ombudsman is given wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers on
offenses committed by public officers free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention. Because of
the endowment of broad investigative authority, the Ombudsman is empowered to determine, based on
the sufficiency of the complaint, whether there exist reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and file the corresponding information with
the appropriate courts. In contrast, if the Ombudsman finds the complaint insufficient in form or
substance, it may also dismiss the complaint. Such prerogative is beyond the ambit of this Court to
review the Ombudsman's exercise of discretion in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it
except when the exercise thereof is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

EDCEL LAGMAN VS. MEDIALDEA

G.R. No. 231658 | July 4, 2017
POLITICAL LAW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

DOCTRINE: The judicial power to review the sufficiency of factual basis of the declaration of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not extend to the calibration of the
President’s decision of which among his graduated powers he will avail of in a given situation.

FACTS:
 President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao on May 23, 2017
for a period not exceeding 60 days.
 The full text of Proclamation No. 216 reads as follows:
 WHEREAS, Proclamation No. 55, series of 2016, was issued on 04 September 2016 declaring a
state of national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao;
 WHEREAS, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution provides that ‘x x x In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he (the President) may, for a period not exceeding
sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any
part thereof under martial law x x x’;
 WHEREAS, Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6968, provides
that ‘the crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising and taking arms against the
Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws,
the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval
 or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially,
of any of their powers or prerogatives’;
 WHEREAS, part of the reasons for the issuance of Proclamation No. 55 was the series of violent
acts committed by the Maute terrorist group such as the attack on the military outpost in Butig,
Lanao del Sur in February 2016, killing and wounding several soldiers, and the mass jailbreak
in Marawi City in August 2016, freeing their arrested comrades and other detainees;
 WHEREAS, today 23 May 2017, the same Maute terrorist group has taken over a hospital in
Marawi City, Lanao del Sur, established several checkpoints within the City, burned down
certain government and private facilities and inflicted casualties on the part of Government
forces, and started flying the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in several areas,
thereby openly attempting to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government this part
of Mindanao and deprive the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws
of the land and to maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, constituting the crime of
rebellion; and
 WHEREAS, this recent attack shows the capability of the Maute group and other rebel groups to
sow terror, and cause death and damage to property not only in Lanao del Sur but also in other
parts of Mindanao.
 NOW, THEREFORE, I, RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE, President of the Republic of the Philippines,
by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and by law, do hereby proclaim as
follows:
 SECTION 1. There is hereby declared a state of martial law in the Mindanao group of islands for
a period not exceeding sixty days, effective as of the date hereof.
 SECTION 2. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall likewise be suspended in the
aforesaid area for the duration of the state of martial law.
 DONE in the Russian Federation, this 23rd day of May in the year of our Lord, Two Thousand
and Seventeen.
 Three (3) Petitions were filed questioning the legality of the said declaration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitions are the “appropriate proceeding” covered by paragraph 3, Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution sufficient to invoke the mode of review required by the Court.

HELD: YES. All three petitions beseech the cognizance of this Court based on the third paragraph of
Section 18, Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
During the oral argument, the petitioners theorized that the jurisdiction of this Court under the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII is sui generis. It is a special and specific jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court different from those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII.88
The Court agrees.
1. a) Jurisdiction must be specifically conferred by the Constitution or by law.
It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or by the
law. Unless jurisdiction has been specifically conferred by the Constitution or by some legislative act, no
body or tribunal has the power to act or pass upon a matter brought before it for resolution. It is likewise
settled that in the absence of a clear legislative intent, jurisdiction cannot be implied from the language of
the Constitution or a statute. It must appear clearly from the law or it will not be held to exist.
A plain reading of the afore-quoted Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically grants authority to
the Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
1. b) “In an appropriate proceeding” does not refer to a petition for certiorari filed under Section 1 or 5 of
Article VIII.
 It could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution that the phrase “in an appropriate
proceeding” would refer to a Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII. The
standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has committed any grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the performance of his or her functions. Thus,
it is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension. It
must be emphasized that under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the President’s exercise of emergency powers. Put differently, if this Court applies the
standard of review used in a petition for certiorari, the same would emasculate its constitutional task
under Section 18, Article VII.
1. c) Purpose/ significance of Section 18, Article VII is to constitutionalize the pre-Marcos martial law ruling
in In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang.
The third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII was inserted by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to
constitutionalize the pre-Marcos martiail law ruling of this Court in In the Matter of the Petition for
Habeas Corpus of Lansang, to wit: that the factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political question but precisely within the
ambit of judicial review.
“In determining the meaning, intent, and purpose of a law or constitutional provision, the history of the
times out of which it grew and to which it may be rationally supposed to bear some direct relationship,
the evils intended to be remedied, and the good to be accomplished are proper subjects of inquiry.” Fr.
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. (Fr. Bernas), a member of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987
Constitution, explained:
The Commander-in-Chief provisions of the 1935 Constitution had enabled President Ferdinand Marcos to
impose authoritarian rule on the Philippines from 1972 to 1986. Supreme Court decisions during that
period upholding the actions taken by Mr. Marcos made authoritarian rule part of Philippine
constitutional jurisprudence. The members of the Constitutional Commission, very much aware of these
facts, went about reformulating the Commander-in-Chief powers with a view to dismantling what had
been constructed during the authoritarian years. The new formula included revised grounds for the
activation of emergency powers, the manner of activating them, the scope of the powers, and review of
presidential action.94 (Emphasis supplied)
To recall, the Court held in the 1951 case of Montenegro v. Castaneda95 that the authority to decide
whether there is a state of rebellion requiring the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is lodged with the President and his decision thereon is final and conclusive upon the courts. This
ruling was reversed in the 1971 case of Lansang where it was held that the factual basis of the declaration
of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political question
and is within the ambit of judicial review.However, in 1983, or after the declaration of martial law by
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, the Court, in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, abandoned the ruling
in Lansang and reverted to Montenegro. According to the Supreme Court, the constitutional power of the
President to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not subject to judicial inquiry.
Thus, by inserting Section 18 in Article VII which allows judicial review of the declaration of martial law
and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the framers of the 1987 Constitution in effect
constitutionalized and reverted to the Lansang doctrine.
1. d) Purpose of Section 18, Article VII is to provide additional safeguard against possible abuse by the
President on the exercise of the extraordinary powers.
Section 18, Article VII is meant to provide additional safeguard against possible abuse by the President in
the exercise of his power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. Reeling from the aftermath of the Marcos martial law, the framers of the Constitution deemed it
wise to insert the now third paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII. This is clear from the records of the
Constitutional Commission when its members were deliberating on whether the President could
proclaim martial law even without the concurrence of Congress.
1. e) Purpose of Section 18, Article VII is to curtail the extent of the powers of the President.
 The most important objective, however, of Section 18, Article VII is the curtailment of the extent of the
powers of the Commander-in-Chief. This is the primary reason why the provision was not placed in
Article VIII or the Judicial Department but remained under Article VII or the Executive Department.
During the closing session of the Constitutional Commission’s deliberations, President Cecilia Munoz
Palma expressed her sentiments on the 1987 Constitution. She said:
The executive power is vested in the President of the Philippines elected by the people for a six-year term
with no reelection for the duration of his/her life. While traditional powers inherent in the office of the
President are granted, nonetheless for the first time, there are specific provisions which curtail the extent
of such powers. Most significant is the power of the Chief Executive to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus or proclaim martial law.
The flagrant abuse of that power of the Commander-in-Chief by Mr. Marcos caused the imposition of
martial law for more than eight years and the suspension of the privilege of the writ even after the lifting
of martial law in 1981. The new Constitution now provides that those powers can be exercised only in
two cases, invasion or rebellion when public safety demands it, only for a period not exceeding 60 days,
and reserving to Congress the power to revoke such suspension or proclamation of martial law which
congressional action may not be revoked by the President. More importantly, the action of the President
is made subject to judicial review, thereby again discarding jurisprudence which render[s] the executive
action a political question and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts to adjudicate.
For the first time, there is a provision that the state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution nor abolish civil courts or legislative assemblies, or vest jurisdiction to military tribunals
over civilians, or suspend the privilege of the writ. Please forgive me if, at this point, I state that this
constitutional provision vindicates the dissenting opinions I have written during my tenure in the
Supreme Court in the martial law cases.101
1. f) To interpret “appropriate proceeding” as filed under Section 1 of Article VIII would be contrary to the
intent of the Constitution.
To conclude that the “appropriate proceeding” refers to a Petition for Certiorari filed under the expanded
jurisdiction of this Court would, therefore, contradict the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution
to place additional safeguards against possible martial law abuse for, invariably, the third paragraph of
Section 18, Article VII would be subsumed under Section 1 of Article VIII. In other words, the framers of
the Constitution added the safeguard under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII on top of the
expanded jurisdiction of this Court.
1. g) Jurisdiction of the Court is not restricted to those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII.
The jurisdiction of this Court is not restricted to those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. For
instance, its jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President can be found in the last paragraph of Section 4, Article
VII.102 The power of the Court to review on certiorari the decision, order, or ruling of the Commission on
Elections and Commission on Audit can be found in Section 7, Article IX(A).
1. h) Unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII make it sui generis.
The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII clearly indicate that it should be
treated as sui generis separate and different from those enumerated in Article VIII.Under the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII, a petition filed pursuant therewith will follow a different rule on
standing as any citizen may file it. Said provision of the Constitution also limits the issue to the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by the Chief Executive of his emergency powers. The usual
period for filing pleadings in Petition for Certiorari is likewise not applicable under the third paragraph
of Section 18, Article VII considering the limited period within which this Court has to promulgate its
decision.
A proceeding “[i]n its general acceptation, [is] the form in which actions are to be brought and defended,
the manner of intervening in suits, of conducting them, the mode of deciding them, of opposing
judgments, and of executing.” In fine, the phrase “in an appropriate proceeding” appearing on the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of
questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive’s emergency powers,
as in these cases. It could be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved by the
Court.

NOTES FROM TET:

1. Pls follow format strictly. Note that the font is Book Antiqua size 12 for the title of the case and
size 10 for the rest of the digest.
2. Separate digest with the border and make sure the digests are in chronological order;
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POLITICAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 2018 Del Castillo Digests) Pls use the name of
the Bar Subject as indicated in the Bar Syllabus;
4. Footnotes will be supplied containing the names of the team members of the Bar Subject for
proper giving of credit; and
5. STANDARD: If ako ba mag-bbar, ito ba gagamitin ko pang-review?