OUT OF THE MOUNTAINS: THE COMING AGE OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA MOUNTAINS Ua ea ae eat A) COVER PAGE — 1/1OUT OF THE MOUNTAINS: THE COMING AGE OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA CONTENTS Acknowledgments Introduction: Ambush in Afghanistan 1. Out of the Mountains 2. Future Cities, Future Threats 3. The Theory of Competitive Control 4. Conflict in Connected Cities 5. Crowded, Complex, and Coastal Appendix: On War in the Urban, Networked Littoral Notes Index CONTENTS — 1/1(OUT OF THE MOUNTAINS: THE COMING AGE OF THE URBAN GUERILLA, 3 The Theory of Competitive Control Devdopmen: nny we wasslow una hage mgtionef people expel om te vorhwas of Brad ate ae 7 caeto Rein. The sme mae lng tok place a my ares thefivla, The drag ganscame its power around his sare time a insted alsin the few Sieh evommert and peice overcame hon any, the dag enc contr fhe eightortnnds end th rls, nneing,csping a ling ido the ‘ave. Te: not sare onthe eae deta because Tas ak. The drug gang bought ents and mindsy ing sme of the pert resdents by providing ‘oo and gecesi. also any inthe drug gang were-e" otra he fave, intresting dynam isan far note compeaed tan an expla Mere. ‘Thedruz zing beeame the pare power an lea theroleof he arerament. The gang emma centers nd a simple roads pave yon vei ‘hecomerunty what woul yo bak? Abr yar of bing neloctd and shunned hy he gemient, wh dy tua Te gang ad hare vosbat oy people were heppy about atthe excepted 8 What clos could they do? tien Rech 20a [The Fish Trap. 5:20 asm. Apr 5.1999 ‘Mush Island, Bas Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea ‘The camp is quletin the dawn, Teas rolled out of my mosqulto net bythe bates roo ofthe enormous Junge tee my signalersare using san antenna rst for ourhigh frequency rao, tho en nk for overa thousand mails back to curhoadquerersinnorthors Australie. Most my soldiers rest sleeping, buta few have been up for hous, shng inthe net wth spears antraps, wach ty and our local partners mace the day before. \Wie'reincurthird week of survival taining with ou sister uit, 2nd Batalion f the Pacific Islands Regiment, onan ian off the north oust cf New (Guinea And 'm looking cose at tho ching tapas rub the soepoutofmny ayes ‘Many soveisin Australasia andthe Pasi, ike most others throughcut te word, sera to have indepandentiy invented the ishing tgp seme ‘me in thelate Aesth poviod of prehistory = One radiional pe swore from naraw stands of bamboo, reads, or ras, form seliner that 's dosed et one end, with a conical opening atthe othr thet ets fish enter but stops them rom backing out This isa standard type of rap in Now Guinea and aswell as hein 2 besutfalyntinte work of tcitional aa trap like this isa highly eectivelmntingtool. With the ight bait paced ith good understanding of tides, currents, sh betavor, and movement pater, itean produce atleast ne atc every day. The trap Tm bokingat ‘sonly afew hours old, bat thas already caught fur eoral tout fom the inlet. 3, THE THEORY OF COMPETITIVE CONTROL — 1 / 33‘OUT OF THE MOUNTAINS: THE COMING AGE OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA ‘ish taps look ephemeral, but their limsinessis «deliberate deception: the strands, individually weak, form a resiientnetwork. Indeed, the ‘Aimsior the trap locke, the less the ish notice ion thei way in, hungry for bait thay brush nonchalantly pat the very spiks that wil later imprison them. The tap's strength sts structre Insargents make ish traps aso militias, gangs, warlords, mas social movements, religions (Jess, for instance, called his apostles tobe “fishers of men") and, ofcourse, goverment Ike rel fish traps, there metaphorical traps are woven of many trands—persuasive, administretive, and coercive. Though ezch ofthe stands may be brite, their combined effet creates a contro structure thats easy and attractive for people to enter, at ‘then locks them into a system of persuasion and coercion set of incendves and disieeoxives trom which they find extremely difcu: wo break out ‘Weve already looked at the megatrends that ae transforming the planet and wil shape the conflict environment ofthe next generation. Weve ‘explored coaceptssuel.as urban metabolism, carrying capacity, cess biclogical systems, feral cies, dask networks, and the ways ia whieh nonstate armed groupe interact with populations end geveraments in the complex nban systoms. In Chaptcr 2, Wwe looked a threo examples Mumbai, “Mogadishu, and Kingston—that cover the speetram ofthreats that axict naw and which willbe even more widespread in the usban,ittaral, networked environment offture confit. Tn each of these examples, the interaction between a nonstate armed group and alceal population prompted a series of events in an urban microhabtat, wile netvorked connectivity gave these events 2 far broader eect. ‘tn ths chapter, want to drill down to that byperiocal level, to look te inmate interaction between nonstate groupsand populations. My Roa, haere is to understand the way tt acnstate armed groups ty tocontrol populations, and the way those populations manipulate them in retara. A secondary chjetive is to bagin tho search fora paradigm that goes boyoad the confines of classical ccuntorinsurgencythecrs, and I start by examining ‘he relationship between armed graups and populations from the point of view afthearmed actor, before loking 2 the same relationship ftom the standpoint of the unarmed or noxcombatantcvian In essence, this chapter looks at how nonstate armed groups of all ypes (and the states with which they compete, coexist or partner sek to contol populations —the kindof complextwo-way interaction that's highlighted in the quote that began this chapter, trom 2 reiéentin an urban sium in Brazil And the fi traps, tt turns ot, very useful analogy for the network of incentive structures they usetoda s0, HL Insurgent Control Systems in Afghanistan 1S useful to begin wih a description of how a real-life contol system operates and the wa in Afghanistan has unfortunately provided many opportuntiestocbserve such systems in ation. Is alsohelpfal to start with 2 nonurban example, since this ets us loka processes of control ina simpler society anda less cluttered environment, without initially heving to account forthe comples impact of urbanization literalietion, and networked conneetivity. In addition this example helps toderacnstrate that patorns of commpatitive contra are independent of terrain crsype of group indeed, they may be universal. ‘So, let's imagine a vilage elder in Kandaher province in zom.> He may have spate with ansighboring Vilage over orchard land grazingights, 3, THE THEORY OF COMPETITIVE CONTROL — 2/33‘OUT OF THE MOUNTAINS: THE COMING AGE OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA ‘or water for rigation. Such disputes ere common in Afghanistan, where popaltion displacement, agrcakura disruption, and changed settlement pattems have eroded community consensus about and ownership, Desadae of coin, ina society where 44 percent of the popalationis under fiteen years, have meant tht discrdc isall most Afghans knove.° Written resorésof land ovmership cither never existed or have been destroyed. The fall ofthe monarchy in 2973, the brual Communist lan reform program in 1973-78, the Sovet-Afghan war of 1978-89, the cv war ofthe 19908, the 2001 invasion, and since thoa the Teibanincurgoney have all contibuted to population movement and dsplacemen: that magnifis this chs. ‘Traditionally dispute suck: s this would have been solved through negotiation anoag cers by calling a mediator from another district, through «nga (atrial assembly), o, les often, threugh the government courts. Elders would have been farailar with the nih, the customary table of punishments and peyments used to settle disputes; some would spedaize in this area of traditional justice. two partes toa dspute couldn't agree on ‘common mirth, they might use that of another vilage or wb” But today the elders in many parts of Afghanistan are gone—dead, exied, cowed, ot ‘nbiing-or peshaps co-opted bythe insurgents, by Local warlonis or corrup ffcals Fake “lders," who specialize in negetiating with foreigners, ‘uavel fom cist: wo district, giving villages a front maa who locks the part and can extract money, contracts and concessions from: international ‘woops or ai agensis, while the real eldershang back or hide. The government has litle permanent presence inthis district, and there's no zelible or legitimate government cour system. Hoe can our hypothetical elder resohe his depute? ‘Welle can wm othe Taliban. Over the years, the Insurgents have evolved. resent se of oeal guerilla governance insitlons. They've appointed a governor foreach local area, par of shadow provincial and district government cadre (sometimesalso kxown asthe “district commission" that indudes financial comptroller, miliary commander, anda qazi~a religious ule. Dispute resolution and mediation ae the ‘macitional functions of eligiousleades in Afghen society, and before the Russian war respected mmllahs or maulauis often mediated exasty this sort of conf." Likewise, law and order have always been the Taba’ primary concemns—indeed, the movement got its tart during the Sovie-Afyian ‘War Inhe 1980s, wen madrassa students and thelr teachers from districts west of Kandabur Clty tok up arms in reaction othe peccsived un Islamic behavior of ter mujahideen, and fought the Soviewsin “Taliban frosts" ‘sr. Carter Malkastan—one of our generation’ greatest analysts of insurgency, and acourageous partitpant-observer of conflict cn the ground — us noted ia the ease of Helmand province, religious leaders hada reset, mice, and deuse network before the war Mullas wadiioually moved ‘rom village to village every few yeas, maintaining close communication with ther elercs in distant villages.” Asa result, beng ested tothe ‘nterests of anyone vilage or group of elders, they had zn independence of action, ess parochial outlook, anda wicespread and wel-organized cca, political, and economic network that allowed them to medite local dspates and to assume 2 leadership role during the upheavals of eantict. BY ‘tapping into this religious network, co-opting local mulls, the Taliban were able to multiply and enhance thelr ilvence. This sno, of eurse, ‘unique to slam oto Afghanistan—1 saw che same thing happen with Greek Orthodux press when T was a peacekeeger in Cyprus in 1997 and wi Catholic leray during the violence in ast Timor in :ayp.* Bu in Afghanistan, because ote weakness of secular stat institutions, this pattern has ‘kena particularly poveetl form. 3. THE THEORY OF COMPETITIVE CONTROL — 3/33