SUPREME COURT

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 150000 September 26, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
TRI-PLUS CORPORATION, respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision1 dated September 14, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60671, which
affirmed the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Metro Cebu in LRC Case No.
N-21 granting herein respondent's application for registration of title to Lots Nos. 1061 and 1062 of
the Cadastral Survey of Consolacion, Cebu.

The facts of the case are as follows:

On April 30, 1997 Tri-Plus Corporation2, through its president, Euclid C. Po, filed with the MTC of
Consolacion, Metro Cebu,3 an Application for Registration of Title over two parcels of land designated
as Lots 1061 and 1062 of the cadastral survey of Consolacion, Cebu, containing an area of 3,939 and
4,796 square meters, respectively, and located at Barangay Tayud, Consolacion, Cebu. 4 In its
application, Tri-Plus alleged that it is the owner in fee simple of the subject parcels of land, including
the improvements thereon, having acquired the same through purchase; and that it is in actual,
continuous, public, notorious, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject properties in the
concept of an owner for more than 30 years, including that of its predecessors-in-interest.5 The case
was docketed as LRC Case No. N-21.6

On September 4, 1997, the trial court received an Opposition to the Application for Registration filed
by the Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on the grounds
that neither the applicant nor its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto;
that the muniments of title submitted by the applicant which consists, among others, of tax
declarations and receipts of tax payments, do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of
a bona fide acquisition of the land applied for or of its open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; that
the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of a Spanish title or grant may no longer be availed
of by the applicant because it failed to file an appropriate application for registration in accordance
with the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 892; and that the subject parcels of land are
portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and are not subject to
private appropriation.7

On September 19, 1997, Tri-Plus presented documentary evidence to prove compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements of the law. On even date, a Manifestation and Motion was filed by the heirs
of Toribio Pepito praying that they be given a period of 10 days within which to file their written
opposition.8 However, the oppositors failed to file their written opposition on time. The trial court then
commissioned its clerk of court to receive evidence from the applicant and directed the former to
submit a report thereon. Accordingly, a Commissioner's Report was submitted on the proceedings
taken.9

In its Judgment dated February 26, 1998, the MTC made the following finding and conclusion:
 The totality of the evidence, both documentary and testimonial, of the applicant clearly shows
that it and its predecessors-in-interest had been in actual, public, exclusive and continuous
possession in concept of owner of the parcels of land above-mentioned for no less than thirty
(30) years prior to the filing of the instant petition for registration of its imperfect title. This
being so, the applicant is entitled that its title be confirmed under the provisions of the Torrens
System of Registration.10

Accordingly, it disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the applicant
TRI-PLUS LAND CORPORATION the exclusive and absolute owner of Lot 1061 of the Cadastral
Survey of Consolacion, Cebu, as shown on plan Ap-07-002362 (Exhibit "J") and described in
its corresponding technical description (Exhibit "K"), and Lot 1062 of the Cadastral Survey of
Consolacion, Cebu, as shown on plan Ap-07-002366 (Exhibit "O") and described in its
corresponding technical description (Exhibit "P").

Once this decision becomes final, let an Order for the issuance of the decree of registration for
Lots 1061 and 1062, Consolacion Cadastre, be issued in the name of TRI-PLUS LAND
CORPORATION.

SO ORDERED.11

The OSG appealed the trial court's judgment with the CA.12

Subsequently, the Land Registration Authority (LRA), through its Director on Registration, submitted a
Report dated August 6, 1998 to the MTC, pertinent portions of which read as follows:

1. Two (2) parcels of land described as Lots 1062 and 1061, Cad. 545-D, Consolacion
Cadastre on Plan Ap-07-002366 and Ap-07-002362, both situated in the Barangay of Tayud,
Municipality of Consolacion, Province of Cebu, are being applied for original registration of
title;

2. After examining the afore-said plan discrepancy was noted in the bearings and distances of
line 3-4 and 4-5 of Lot 1061, Ap-07-002362, being S.57 deg. 19'W 8.02m. and S.52 deg.
10'W 18.24, which do not conform with the bearings and distances (N. 52 deg. 01'E., 18.00m)
and (N. 52 deg. 47'E., 17.71m.) along lines 12-13 and 11-12, respectively of plan Rs-07-01-
000358, lot 1508, Consolacion Cad. 545-D, decreed in LRA (NALTDRA) Record No. N-60851.

3. That the above discrepancy was brought to the attention of the Regional Technical Director,
DENR, Land Management Services, Region VII, Mandaue City, for verification and correction in
a letter dated 7 July 1998.

4. This Authority is not in a position to verify whether or not the parcels of land subject of
registration are already covered by land patent.13

On September 14, 2001, the CA rendered the presently assailed Decision finding no reversible error in
the appealed judgment, thereby, affirming the same.14

Hence, herein petition based on the following assignments of errors:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT THE TRIAL
COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND DECIDE THE CASE, BECAUSE THE
IDENTITY OF THE LAND REMAINS UNCERTAIN.
 II

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT

RESPONDENT FAILED TO DISCHARGE THE BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE PROPERTY IS
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT

RESPONDENT IS DISQUALIFIED FROM ACQUIRING LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.15

As to the first assigned error, petitioner contends that the CA erred in relying on the original survey
plan approved by the Lands Management Services of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) when it ruled that the applicant was able to duly establish the identity of Lot 1061.
This reliance, petitioner argues, is mistaken considering that the Report of the Director on Registration
of the LRA pointed to a discrepancy in the bearings and distances of the boundaries which separate
Lot 1061 from an adjoining land, Lot 1058. This discrepancy, petitioners submit, casts doubt on the
identity of the land subject of the application for registration. Petitioner then concludes that if there is
uncertainty in the metes and bounds of the property sought to be titled, the trial court cannot acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Hence, the proceedings before the trial court,
including its decision granting the application for registration, are void.

As to the second assignment of error, petitioner argues that the CA erred in holding that the applicant
was able to prove that the subject properties are alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
Petitioner contends that a mere notation appearing in the survey plans of the disputed properties
showing that the subject lands had been classified as alienable and disposable on June 25, 1963 is not
sufficient to establish the nature and character of these lands. Petitioner asserts that there should be a
positive act on the part of the government, such as a certification from the DENR, to prove that the
said lands are indeed alienable and disposable. Petitioner further contends that even if the subject
properties were classified as alienable and disposable on June 25, 1963, the law, nonetheless, requires
that such classification should have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Anent the last assigned error, petitioner contends that since the applicant failed to discharge the
burden of proving that the subject properties are alienable and disposable, there is no basis for the CA
to rule that these properties are private lands.

In its Comment, respondent contends that it was able to prove the identity of Lot 1061 with certainty.
While it admits the discrepancy in the bearings and distances which form the boundary between Lot
1061 and the adjoining Lot 1058, respondent contends that such discrepancy is merely technical in
nature because Lots 1058 and 1061 remain the same and that there is neither an increase nor
decrease in the area of the subject lot sought to be titled; and that what was required by the LRA in
its Report was for the applicant to correct and adjust the bearings and distances of Lot 1061 in order
to conform to the boundaries of Lot 1058.

Respondent also argues that the notations appearing in the survey plans of the subject properties
serve as sufficient proof that these lands are alienable and disposable. Respondent asserts that the
survey plans were duly approved by the DENR, Lands Management Services whose official acts are
presumed to be in accordance with law.

Lastly, respondent argues that its predecessor-in-interest's continuous, actual, adverse and peaceful
possession of the subject properties in the concept of an owner for a period of more than 30 years,
coupled with the fact that they declared these lands in their name, gives a strong presumption in
respondent's favor that the subject properties no longer form part of the public domain.

Parties filed their respective Memoranda.16

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

At the outset, however, the Court does not agree with petitioner's contention in its first assigned error
that respondent failed to properly identify Lot 1061 which is one of the lots sought to be titled.

Insofar as the identity of the land subject of an application for original registration is concerned, this
Court has laid down the rule, as follows:

The submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of
Lands, in cases for application of original registration of land is a mandatory requirement. The
reason for this rule is to establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does not
overlap a parcel of land or a portion thereof already covered by a previous land registration,
and to forestall the possibility that it will be overlapped by a subsequent registration of any
adjoining land. The failure to comply with this requirement is fatal to petitioner's application
for registration.17

However, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals 18 and in the more recent cases of Spouses
Recto v. Republic of the Philippines19 and Republic of the Philippines v. Hubilla20, the Court ruled that
while the best evidence to identify a piece of land for registration purposes is the original tracing cloth
plan from the Bureau of Lands (now the Lands Management Services of the DENR), blueprint copies
and other evidence could also provide sufficient identification. In the present case, respondent
submitted in evidence a blueprint copy of the Advance Plan of Lot 1061 21 and a Technical
Description22 thereof, both of which had been duly certified and approved by the Lands Management
Services of the DENR. The Court finds these pieces of evidence as substantial compliance with the
legal requirements for the proper identification of Lot 1061. The discrepancy in the common boundary
that separates Lot 1061 from Lot 1058, as contained in the LRA Report does not cast doubt on the
identity of the subject lot. As the CA correctly held, the discrepancy is not substantial because it does
not unduly increase or affect the total area of the subject lot and at the same time prejudice the
adjoining lot owner. It is only when the discrepancy results to an unexplained increase in the total
area of the land sought to be registered that its identity is made doubtful. Besides, only a portion of
the many boundaries of Lot 1061 has been found to bear a discrepancy in relation to the boundary of
one adjoining lot and the LRA Report simply recommends that the Lands Management Services of the
DENR verify the reported discrepancy and make the necessary corrections, if needed, in order to avoid
duplication in the issuance of titles covering the same parcels of land.

Petitioner's argument that, on the basis of the LRA Report, the MTC should have dismissed
respondent's application for registration for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, is without
merit. The MTC could not have possibly done this because said Report was submitted to the trial court
more than five months after the latter rendered its Decision. A copy of the LRA Report attached to the
present petition shows that it is dated August 6, 1998 while the MTC decision was rendered much
earlier on February 26, 1998. In fact, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) perfected its appeal by
filing a notice of appeal of the MTC Decision on April 2, 1998, which is also prior to the submission of
the LRA report. Hence, by the time the LRA report was submitted to the MTC, the latter has already
lost jurisdiction over the case, not on the ground cited by petitioner but because the appeal to the CA
was already perfected, vesting jurisdiction upon the appellate court.

In any case, while the subject lands were properly identified, the Court finds that respondent failed to
comply with the other legal requirements for its application for registration to be granted.

Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following: (a) that the land forms part of
the alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona
fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.23

In the present case, the Court finds merit in petitioner's contention that respondent failed to prove the
first requirement that the properties sought to be titled forms part of the alienable and disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain.
Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, provides that the classification and
reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is the prerogative of
the Executive Department. Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all
lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any
ownership of land.24 All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State.25 Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as
alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable
public domain.26

It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject
of the application is alienable or disposable.27

In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as required by law is
the notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said properties are alienable and
disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof required by law. To prove that the land subject of
an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act
of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action,
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute.28 The applicant
may also secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied for are alienable and
disposable.29 In the case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the
Lands Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the technical correctness of
the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of
the property surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper government
agency to prove that the lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable.

As to the second requirement, testimonial evidence were presented to prove that respondent's
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the subject lots in the concept of an owner for the
period required by law. The first witness was Thelma Pilapil who claims to be the daughter of
Constancia Frias from whom respondent bought Lot 1061. Pilapil testified that her family has been in
possession of Lot 1061 since her birth.30 When her testimony was offered on October 7, 1997, she was
40 years old.31 Deducting 40 years from 1997, it means that her family started possession of Lot 1061
only in 1957. The second witness who was presented was Tomas Frias from whom respondent bought
Lot 1062. Frias testified that he was 67 years old at the time that his testimony was taken on October
7, 1997.32 He claims that he started owning the subject lot when he was 17 years old and had been in
possession of the same since then.33 Hence, by simple arithmetic, the testimony of Frias proves that
he came to possess Lot 1062 only in 1947. While he testified that Lot 1062 was previously owned by
his father and that he inherited the property from his parents, no evidence was presented to show
that the latter indeed previously owned the said property and that they had been in possession of the
same on or before June 12, 1945.

Moreover, other pieces of evidence presented by respondent to prove the period of its possession and
that of its predecessors-in-interest show that the subject properties were declared for taxation
purposes beginning only in 1961.34 This date may be considered as relatively recent considering that
respondent's predecessors-in-interest claim to have been in possession of the subject properties as
early as 1947. While belated declaration of a property for taxation purposes does not necessarily
negate the fact of possession, tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are, nevertheless,
good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying
taxes for a property that is not in his actual, or at least, constructive possession. 35 In the present
case, respondent failed to explain why, despite the claim of its predecessors-in interest that they
possessed the subject properties in the concept of an owner as early as 1947, it was only in 1961 that
they started to declare the same for purposes of taxation.

From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent and its predecessors-in-interest failed to prove that
they had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject properties under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, as required by law.
Well-entrenched is the rule that the burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the applicant
who must show clear, positive and convincing evidence that his alleged possession and occupation
were of the nature and duration required by law.36 In the present case, the Court finds that
respondent failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the legal requirements that the lands
sought to be titled are alienable and disposable and that its predecessors-in-interest were already in
possession of the subject lots since 1945 or earlier.

As to the last assigned error, respondent having failed to prove that the subject properties are
alienable and disposable public lands, the Court agrees with petitioner that there would be no basis in
concluding that these lands have already become private. The presumption remains that said
properties remain part of the inalienable public domain and, therefore, could not become the subject
of confirmation of imperfect title.

Finally, while it is an acknowledged policy of the State to promote the distribution of alienable public
lands as a spur to economic growth and in line with the ideal of social justice, the law imposes
stringent safeguards upon the grant of such resources lest they fall into the wrong hands to the
prejudice of the national patrimony.37 The Court must not, therefore, relax the stringent safeguards
relative to the registration of imperfect titles.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September
14, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 60671 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Tri-Plus Corporation's
application for registration and issuance of title to Lots 1061 and 1062, Consolacion Cad-545-D, in LRC
Case No. N-21 filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Consolacion, Metro Cebu, is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION

G. R. No. 112567 - February 7, 2000

THE DIRECTOR, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and

AQUILINO L. CARIÑO, Respondents.

PURISIMA, J.:

At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside
the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 11, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. 29218, which affirmed
the Decision, dated February 5, 1990, of Branch XXIV, Regional Trial Court of Laguna, in LRC No. B-
467, ordering the registration of Lot No. 6 in the name of the private respondent.

The facts that matter are as follows:

On May 15, 1975, the private respondent, Aquilino Cariño, filed with the then Branch I, Court of First
Instance of Laguna, a petition1 for registration of Lot No. 6, a sugar land with an area of forty-three
thousand six hundred fourteen (43,614) square meters, more or less, forming part of a bigger tract of
land surveyed as Psu-108952 and situated in Barrio Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna.

Private respondent declared that subject land was originally owned by his mother, Teresa Lauchangco,
who died on February 15, 1911,2 and later administered by him in behalf of his five brothers and
sisters, after the death of their father in 1934.3

In 1949, private respondent and his brother, Severino Cariño, became co-owners of Lot No. 6 by
virtue of an extra-judicial partition of the land embraced in Plan Psu-108952, among the heirs of
Teresa Lauchangco. On July 26, 1963, through another deed of extrajudicial settlement, sole
ownership of Lot No. 6 was adjudicated to the private respondent.4

Pertinent report of the Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands (now Bureau of Lands Management),
disclosed:

xxx-xxx-xxx

1. That the land subject for registration thru judicial confirmation of imperfect title is situated in the
barrio of Sala, municipality of Cabuyao, province of Laguna as described on plan Psu-108952 and is
identical to Lot No. 3015, Cad. 455-0, Cabuyao Cadastre; and that the same is agricultural in nature
and the improvements found thereon are sugarcane, bamboo clumps, chico and mango trees and one
house of the tenant made of light materials;

2. That the land subject for registration is outside any civil or military reservation, riverbed, park and
watershed reservation and that same land is free from claim and conflict;

3. That said land is neither inside the relocation site earmarked for Metro Manila squatters nor any
pasture lease; it is not covered by any existing public land application and no patent or title has been
issued therefor;

4. That the herein petitioner has been in continuous, open and exclusive possession of the land who
acquired the same thru inheritance from his deceased mother, Teresa Lauchangco as mentioned on
the Extra-judicial partition dated July 26, 1963 which applicant requested that said instrument will be
presented on the hearing of this case; and that said land is also declared for taxation purposes under
Tax Declaration No. 6359 in the name of the petitioner;
x x x - x x x - x x x5

With the private respondent as lone witness for his petition, and the Director of Lands as the only
oppositor, the proceedings below ended. On February 5, 1990, on the basis of the evidence on record,
the trial court granted private respondent's petition, disposing thus:

WHEREFORE, the Count hereby orders and declares the registration and confirmation of title to one
(1) parcel of land identified as Lot 6, plan Psu-108952, identical to Cadastral Lot No. 3015, Cad. 455-
D, Cabuyao Cadastre, situated in the barrio of Sala, municipality of Cabuyao, province of Laguna,
containing an area of FORTY THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FOURTEEN (43,614) Square Meters,
more or less, in favor of applicant AQUILINO L. CARINO, married to Francisca Alomia, of legal age,
Filipino, with residence and postal address at Biñan, Laguna.

After this decision shall have become final, let an order for the issuance of decree of registration be
issued.

SO ORDERED.6

From the aforesaid decision, petitioner (as oppositor) went to the Court of Appeals, which, on
November 11, 1993, affirmed the decision appealed from.

Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present Petition; theorizing that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NOT SUBMITTED
PROOF OF HIS FEE SIMPLE TITLE OR PROOF OF POSSESSION IN THE MANNER AND FOR THE LENGTH
OF TIME REQUIRED BY THE LAW TO JUSTIFY CONFIRMATION OF AN IMPERFECT TITLE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NOT
OVERTHROWN THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE LAND IS A PORTION OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
BELONGING TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.7

The Petition is impressed with merit.

The petition for land registration8 at bar is under the Land Registration Act.9 Pursuant to said Act, he
who alleges in his petition or application, ownership in fee simple, must present muniments of title
since the Spanish times, such as a titulo real or royal grant, a concession especial or special grant,
a composicion con al estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title through purchase; and
"informacion possessoria" or "possessory information title", which would become a "titulo gratuito" or
a gratuitous title.10

In the case under consideration, the private respondents (petitioner below) has not produced a single
muniment of title substantiate his claim of ownership. 11 The Court has therefore no other recourse,
but to dismiss private respondent's petition for the registration of subject land under Act 496.

Anyway, even if considered as petition for confirmation of imperfect title under the Public land Act (CA
No. 141), as amended, private respondent's petition would meet the same fate. For insufficiency of
evidence, its denial is inevitable. The evidence adduced by the private respondent is not enough to
prove his possession of subject lot in concept of owner, in the manner and for the number of years
required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title.
Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141,12 as amended R.A. No. 1942 and R.A. No. 3872, the law
prevailing at the time the Petition of private respondent was filed on May 15, 1975, provides:

Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claim and the issuance of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx-xxx-xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of
the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied)

Possession of public lands, however long, never confers title upon the possessor, unless the occupant
can prove possession or occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required period to
constitute a grant from the State.13

Notwithstanding absence of opposition from the government, the petitioner in land registration cases
is not relieved of the burden of proving the imperfect right or title sought to be confirmed. In Director
of Lands vs. Agustin,14 this Court stressed that:

. . . The petitioner is not necessarily entitled to have the land registered under the Torrens system
simply because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose the registration of his land. He must
show, even though there is no opposition, to the satisfaction of the court, that he is the absolute
owner, in fee simple. Courts are not justified in registering property under the Torrens system, simply
because there is no opposition offered. Courts may, even in the absence of any opposition, deny the
registration of the land under the Torrens system, upon the ground that the facts presented did not
show that petitioner is the owner, in fee simple, of the land which he is attempting to have
registered.15

There is thus an imperative necessity of the most rigorous scrutiny before imperfect titles over public
agricultural lands may be granted judicial
recognition.16

The underlying principle is that all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the state as part of the public domain. As enunciated in Republic
vs. Lee:17

. . . Both under the 1935 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no less than the utilization of
the natural resources is ordained. There would be a failure to abide by its command if the judiciary
does not scrutinize with care applications to private ownership of real estate. To be granted, they
must be grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible evidence. Where, as in this case, no such proof would
be forthcoming, there is no justification for viewing such claim with favor. It is a basic assumption of
our polity that lands of whatever classification belong to the state. Unless alienated in accordance with
law, it retains its right over the same as dominus. . . .18

In order that a petition for registration of land may prosper and the petitioners may savor the benefit
resulting from the issuance of certificate of title for the land petitioned for, the burden is upon him
(petitioner) to show that he and/or his predecessor-in-interest has been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and adverse possession and occupation of the land sought for registration, for at least (30)
thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the petition for confirmation of title.19
In the case under consideration, private respondent can only trace his own possession of subject
parcel of land to the year 1949, when the same was adjudicated to him by virtue of an extra-judicial
settlement and partition. Assuming that such a partition was truly effected, the private respondent has
possessed the property thus partitioned for only twenty-six (26) years as of 1975, when he filed his
petition for the registration thereof. To bridge the gap, he proceeded to tack his possession to what he
theorized upon as possession of the same land by his parents. However, other than his unilateral
assertion, private respondent has not introduced sufficient evidence to substantiate his allegation that
his late mother possessed the land in question even prior to 1911.

Basic is the rule that the petitioner in a land registration case must prove the facts and circumstances
evidencing his alleged ownership of the land applied for. General statements, which are mere
conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are unavailing and cannot suffice.20

From the relevant documentary evidence, it can be gleaned that the earliest tax declaration covering
Lot No. 6 was Tax Declaration No. 3214 issued in 1949 under the names of the private respondent
and his brother, Severino Cariño. The same was followed by Tax Declaration No. 1921 issued in 1969
declaring an assessed value of Five Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-three (P5,233.00) Pesos and Tax
Declaration No. 6359 issued in 1974 in the name of private respondent, declaring an assessment of
Twenty-One Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy (P21,770.00) Pesos.21

It bears stressing that the Exhibit "E" referred to in the decision below as the tax declaration for
subject land under the names of the parents of herein private respondent does not appear to have any
sustainable basis. Said Exhibit "E" shows that it is Tax Declaration 1921 for Lot No. 6 in the name of
private respondent and not in the name of his parents.22

The rule that findings of fact by the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court is
not without exceptions. Where, as in this case, pertinent records belie the findings by the lower courts
that subject land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of private respondent's predecessor-
in-interest, such findings have to be disregarded by this Court. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,23 the
Court ratiocinated thus:

This case represents an instance where the findings of the lower court overlooked certain facts of
substance and value that if considered would affect the result of the case (People v. Royeras, 130
SCRA 259) and when it appears that the appellate court based its judgment on a misapprehension of
facts (Carolina Industries, Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., et al., 97 SCRA 734; Moran, Jr. v. Court
of Appeals, 133 SCRA 88; Director of Lands v. Funtillar, et al., G.R. No. 68533, May 3, 1986). This
case therefore is an exception to the general rule that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are
final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to this Court.'

and

. . . in the interest of substantial justice this Court is not prevented from considering such a pivotal
factual matter that had been overlooked by the Courts below. The Supreme Court is clothed with
ample authority to review palpable errors not assigned as such if it finds that their consideration is
necessary in arriving at a just decision.24

Verily, the Court of Appeals just adopted entirely the findings of the trial court. Had it examined the
original records of the case, the said court could have verified that the land involved was never
declared for taxation purposes by the parents of the respondent. Tax receipts and tax declarations are
not incontrovertible evidence of ownership. They are mere indicia of claim of ownership.25 In Director
of Lands vs. Santiago.26

. . . if it is true that the original owner and possessor, Generosa Santiago, had been in possession
since 1925, why were the subject lands declared for taxation purposes for the first time only in 1968,
and in the names of Garcia and Obdin? For although tax receipts and declarations of ownership for
taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that
the holder had a claim of title over the property.27

As stressed by the Solicitor General, the contention of private respondent that his mother had been in
possession of subject land even prior to 1911 is self-serving, hearsay, and inadmissible in evidence.
The phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public, and in concept of owner", by which characteristics
private respondent describes his possession and that of his parents, are mere conclusions of law
requiring evidentiary support and substantiation. The burden of proof is on the private respondent, as
applicant, to prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence that the alleged possession of his
parents was of the nature and duration required by law. His bare allegations without more, do not
amount to preponderant evidence that would shift the burden of proof to the oppositor. 28

In a case,29 this Court set aside the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals for the
registration of a parcel of land in the name of the applicant, pursuant to Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Law; holding as follows:

Based on the foregoing, it is incumbent upon private respondent to prove that the alleged twenty year
or more possession of the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan which supposedly formed part of
the thirty (30) year period prior to the filing of the application, was open, continuous, exclusive,
notorious and in concept of owners. This burden, private respondent failed to discharge to the
satisfaction of the Court. The bare assertion that the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan had
been in possession of the property for more than twenty (20) years found in private respondent's
declaration is hardly the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this nature. Private
respondent should have presented specific facts that would have shown the nature of such possession.
. . .30

In Director of Lands vs. Datu,31 the application for confirmation of imperfect title was likewise denied
on the basis of the following disquisition, to wit:

We hold that applicants' nebulous evidence does not support their claim of open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious occupation of Lot No. 2027-B en concepto de dueño. Although they claimed that they
have possessed the land since 1950, they declared it for tax purposes only in 1972. It is not clear
whether at the time they filed their application in 1973, the lot was still cogon land or already
cultivated land.

They did not present as witness their predecessor, Peñaflor, to testify on his alleged possession of the
land. They alleged in their application that they had tenants on the land. Not a single tenant was
presented as witness to prove that the applicants had possessed the land as owners.

xxx-xxx-xxx

On the basis of applicants' insubstantial evidence, it cannot justifiably be concluded that they have an
imperfect title that should be confirmed or that they had performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant of a portion of the public domain.32

Neither can private respondent seek refuge under P.D. No. 1073,33 amending Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 under which law a certificate of title may issue to any occupant of a public
land, who is a Filipino citizen, upon proof of open, continuous exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Failing to prove that his predecessors-in-interest occupied
subject land under the conditions laid down by law, the private respondent could only establish his
possession since 1949, four years later than June 12, 1945, as set by law.

The Court cannot apply here the juris et de jure presumption that the lot being claimed by the private
respondent ceased to be a public land and has become private property. 34 To reiterate, under the
Regalian doctrine all lands belong to the State. 35 Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its
basic rights over the same as dominus.36
Private respondent having failed to come forward with muniments of title to reinforce his petition for
registration under the Land Registration Act (Act 496), and to present convincing and positive proof of
his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of Lot No. 6 en concepto de dueño for at
least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of his petition, 37 the Court is of the opinion, and so
finds, that subject Lot No. 6 surveyed under Psu-108952, forms part of the public domain not
registrable in the name of private respondent.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 11,
1993, in CA-G.R. No. 29218 affirming the Decision, dated February 5, 1990, of Branch XXIV, Regional
Trial Court of Laguna in LRC No. 8-467, is SET ASIDE; and Lot No. 6, covered by and more particularly
described in Psu-108952, is hereby declared a public land, under the administrative supervision and
power of disposition of the Bureau of Lands Management. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997

WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA and ANNA DOMINIQUE COSETENG, as members of the Philippine

Senate and as taxpayers; GREGORIO ANDOLANA and JOKER ARROYO as members of the
House of Representatives and as taxpayers; NICANOR P. PERLAS and HORACIO R.
MORALES, both as taxpayers; CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, NATIONAL ECONOMIC
PROTECTIONISM ASSOCIATION, CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES,
LIKAS-KAYANG KAUNLARAN FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE RURAL RECONSTRUCTION
MOVEMENT, DEMOKRATIKONG KILUSAN NG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, INC., and
PHILIPPINE PEASANT INSTITUTE, in representation of various taxpayers and as non-
governmental organizations, petitioners,
vs.
EDGARDO ANGARA, ALBERTO ROMULO, LETICIA RAMOS-SHAHANI, HEHERSON ALVAREZ,
AGAPITO AQUINO, RODOLFO BIAZON, NEPTALI GONZALES, ERNESTO HERRERA, JOSE LINA,
GLORIA. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ORLANDO MERCADO, BLAS OPLE, JOHN OSMEÑA,
SANTANINA RASUL, RAMON REVILLA, RAUL ROCO, FRANCISCO TATAD and FREDDIE WEBB,
in their respective capacities as members of the Philippine Senate who concurred in the
ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization; SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management; CARIDAD VALDEHUESA, in her capacity as National Treasurer; RIZALINO
NAVARRO, in his capacity as Secretary of Trade and Industry; ROBERTO SEBASTIAN, in his
capacity as Secretary of Agriculture; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of
Finance; ROBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs; and TEOFISTO
T. GUINGONA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The emergence on January 1, 1995 of the World Trade Organization, abetted by the membership
thereto of the vast majority of countries has revolutionized international business and economic
relations amongst states. It has irreversibly propelled the world towards trade liberalization and
economic globalization. Liberalization, globalization, deregulation and privatization, the third-
millennium buzz words, are ushering in a new borderless world of business by sweeping away as mere
historical relics the heretofore traditional modes of promoting and protecting national economies like
tariffs, export subsidies, import quotas, quantitative restrictions, tax exemptions and currency
controls. Finding market niches and becoming the best in specific industries in a market-driven and
export-oriented global scenario are replacing age-old "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies that unilaterally
protect weak and inefficient domestic producers of goods and services. In the words of Peter Drucker,
the well-known management guru, "Increased participation in the world economy has become the key
to domestic economic growth and prosperity."

Brief Historical Background

To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation wrought by the Second World War, plans for the
establishment of three multilateral institutions — inspired by that grand political body, the United
Nations — were discussed at Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton Woods. The first was the World Bank (WB)
which was to address the rehabilitation and reconstruction of war-ravaged and later developing
countries; the second, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which was to deal with currency
problems; and the third, the International Trade Organization (ITO), which was to foster order and
predictability in world trade and to minimize unilateral protectionist policies that invite challenge, even
retaliation, from other states. However, for a variety of reasons, including its non-ratification by the
United States, the ITO, unlike the IMF and WB, never took off. What remained was only GATT — the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. GATT was a collection of treaties governing access to the
economies of treaty adherents with no institutionalized body administering the agreements or
dependable system of dispute settlement.

After half a century and several dizzying rounds of negotiations, principally the Kennedy Round, the
Tokyo Round and the Uruguay Round, the world finally gave birth to that administering body — the
World Trade Organization — with the signing of the "Final Act" in Marrakesh, Morocco and the
ratification of the WTO Agreement by its members.1

Like many other developing countries, the Philippines joined WTO as a founding member with the
goal, as articulated by President Fidel V. Ramos in two letters to the Senate (infra), of improving
"Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of
tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products." The President also saw in the
WTO the opening of "new opportunities for the services sector . . . , (the reduction of) costs and
uncertainty associated with exporting . . . , and (the attraction of) more investments into the
country." Although the Chief Executive did not expressly mention it in his letter, the Philippines — and
this is of special interest to the legal profession — will benefit from the WTO system of dispute
settlement by judicial adjudication through the independent WTO settlement bodies called (1) Dispute
Settlement Panels and (2) Appellate Tribunal. Heretofore, trade disputes were settled mainly through
negotiations where solutions were arrived at frequently on the basis of relative bargaining strengths,
and where naturally, weak and underdeveloped countries were at a disadvantage.

The Petition in Brief

Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines "to place nationals and products of member-
countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products" and (2) that the WTO "intrudes, limits
and/or impairs" the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court, the instant
petition before this Court assails the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987
Constitution to "develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino
labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods."

Simply stated, does the Philippine Constitution prohibit Philippine participation in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization? Does it proscribe Philippine integration into a global
economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized? These are the main questions raised in this
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court praying (1) for
the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine Senate in the
ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization (WTO Agreement, for brevity) and (2) for the prohibition of its implementation and
enforcement through the release and utilization of public funds, the assignment of public officials and
employees, as well as the use of government properties and resources by respondent-heads of various
executive offices concerned therewith. This concurrence is embodied in Senate Resolution No. 97,
dated December 14, 1994.

The Facts

On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of The Department of Trade and
Industry (Secretary Navarro, for brevity), representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act, for brevity).

By signing the Final Act,2 Secretary Navarro on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, agreed:
 (a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their
respective competent authorities, with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in
accordance with their procedures; and

(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.

On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received a letter dated August 11, 1994
from the President of the Philippines,3 stating among others that "the Uruguay Round Final Act is
hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the
Constitution."

On August 13, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received another letter from the President
of the Philippines4 likewise dated August 11, 1994, which stated among others that "the Uruguay
Round Final Act, the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, the Ministerial Declarations
and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services are hereby submitted to
the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution."

On December 9, 1994, the President of the Philippines certified the necessity of the immediate
adoption of P.S. 1083, a resolution entitled "Concurring in the Ratification of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization."5

On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which "Resolved, as it is
hereby resolved, that the Senate concur, as it hereby concurs, in the ratification by the President of
the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization."6 The text of the WTO
Agreement is written on pages 137 et seq. of Volume I of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations and includes various agreements and associated legal instruments
(identified in the said Agreement as Annexes 1, 2 and 3 thereto and collectively referred to as
Multilateral Trade Agreements, for brevity) as follows:

ANNEX 1

Annex 1A: Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Agriculture
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of he
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the
General on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Pre-Shipment Inspection
Agreement on Rules of Origin
Agreement on Imports Licensing Procedures
Agreement on Subsidies and Coordinating
Measures
Agreement on Safeguards

Annex 1B: General Agreement on Trade in Services and Annexes

Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual

Property Rights
 ANNEX 2

Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing

the Settlement of Disputes

ANNEX 3

Trade Policy Review Mechanism

On December 16, 1994, the President of the Philippines signed 7 the Instrument of Ratification,
declaring:

NOW THEREFORE, be it known that I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of

the Philippines, after having seen and considered the aforementioned Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization and the agreements and associated legal
instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement
which are integral parts thereof, signed at Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994, do
hereby ratify and confirm the same and every Article and Clause thereof.

To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is composed of the
Agreement Proper and "the associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and
three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof."

On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not only the WTO Agreement
(and its integral annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and
(2) the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services. In his Memorandum dated May 13,
1996,8 the Solicitor General describes these two latter documents as follows:

The Ministerial Decisions and Declarations are twenty-five declarations and decisions
on a wide range of matters, such as measures in favor of least developed countries,
notification procedures, relationship of WTO with the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), and agreements on technical barriers to trade and on dispute settlement.

The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services dwell on, among other

things, standstill or limitations and qualifications of commitments to existing non-
conforming measures, market access, national treatment, and definitions of non-
resident supplier of financial services, commercial presence and new financial service.

On December 29, 1994, the present petition was filed. After careful deliberation on respondents'
comment and petitioners' reply thereto, the Court resolved on December 12, 1995, to give due course
to the petition, and the parties thereafter filed their respective memoranda. The court also requested
the Honorable Lilia R. Bautista, the Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations stationed in Geneva,
Switzerland, to submit a paper, hereafter referred to as "Bautista Paper," 9 for brevity, (1) providing a
historical background of and (2) summarizing the said agreements.

During the Oral Argument held on August 27, 1996, the Court directed:

(a) the petitioners to submit the (1) Senate Committee Report on the matter in
controversy and (2) the transcript of proceedings/hearings in the Senate; and

(b) the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, to file (1) a list of Philippine
treaties signed prior to the Philippine adherence to the WTO Agreement, which
derogate from Philippine sovereignty and (2) copies of the multi-volume WTO
Agreement and other documents mentioned in the Final Act, as soon as possible.
After receipt of the foregoing documents, the Court said it would consider the case submitted for
resolution. In a Compliance dated September 16, 1996, the Solicitor General submitted a printed copy
of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, and in another Compliance dated
October 24, 1996, he listed the various "bilateral or multilateral treaties or international instruments
involving derogation of Philippine sovereignty." Petitioners, on the other hand, submitted their
Compliance dated January 28, 1997, on January 30, 1997.

The Issues

In their Memorandum dated March 11, 1996, petitioners summarized the issues as follows:

A. Whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable.

B. Whether the petitioner members of the Senate who participated in the deliberations
and voting leading to the concurrence are estopped from impugning the validity of the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization or of the validity of the
concurrence.

C. Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
contravene the provisions of Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, all of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

D. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization

unduly limit, restrict and impair Philippine sovereignty specifically the legislative power
which, under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987 Philippine Constitution is "vested in the Congress
of the Philippines";

E. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization

interfere with the exercise of judicial power.

F. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they voted for concurrence in the
ratification of the constitutionally-infirm Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization.

G. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they concurred only in the ratification
of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, and not with the
Presidential submission which included the Final Act, Ministerial Declaration and
Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services.

On the other hand, the Solicitor General as counsel for respondents "synthesized the several issues
raised by petitioners into the following": 10

1. Whether or not the provisions of the "Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization and the Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in
Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that agreement" cited by petitioners directly
contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and
Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

2. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair
the exercise of legislative power by Congress.

3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial
power by this Honorable Court in promulgating the rules of evidence.
 4. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate "in the ratification by the President of
the Philippines of the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization" implied
rejection of the treaty embodied in the Final Act.

By raising and arguing only four issues against the seven presented by petitioners, the Solicitor
General has effectively ignored three, namely: (1) whether the petition presents a political question or
is otherwise not justiciable; (2) whether petitioner-members of the Senate (Wigberto E. Tañada and
Anna Dominique Coseteng) are estopped from joining this suit; and (3) whether the respondent-
members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion when they voted for concurrence in the
ratification of the WTO Agreement. The foregoing notwithstanding, this Court resolved to deal with
these three issues thus:

(1) The "political question" issue — being very fundamental and vital, and being a matter that probes
into the very jurisdiction of this Court to hear and decide this case — was deliberated upon by the
Court and will thus be ruled upon as the first issue;

(2) The matter of estoppel will not be taken up because this defense is waivable and the respondents
have effectively waived it by not pursuing it in any of their pleadings; in any event, this issue, even if
ruled in respondents' favor, will not cause the petition's dismissal as there are petitioners other than
the two senators, who are not vulnerable to the defense of estoppel; and

(3) The issue of alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent senators will be taken
up as an integral part of the disposition of the four issues raised by the Solicitor General.

During its deliberations on the case, the Court noted that the respondents did not question the locus
standi of petitioners. Hence, they are also deemed to have waived the benefit of such issue. They
probably realized that grave constitutional issues, expenditures of public funds and serious
international commitments of the nation are involved here, and that transcendental public interest
requires that the substantive issues be met head on and decided on the merits, rather than skirted or
deflected by procedural matters. 11

To recapitulate, the issues that will be ruled upon shortly are:

(1) DOES THE PETITION PRESENT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY? OTHERWISE

STATED, DOES THE PETITION INVOLVE A POLITICAL QUESTION OVER WHICH THIS
COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION?

(2) DO THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS THREE ANNEXES
CONTRAVENE SEC. 19, ARTICLE II, AND SECS. 10 AND 12, ARTICLE XII, OF THE
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?

(3) DO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES LIMIT, RESTRICT,
OR IMPAIR THE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY CONGRESS?

(4) DO SAID PROVISIONS UNDULY IMPAIR OR INTERFERE WITH THE EXERCISE OF

JUDICIAL POWER BY THIS COURT IN PROMULGATING RULES ON EVIDENCE?

(5) WAS THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE IN THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS
ANNEXES SUFFICIENT AND/OR VALID, CONSIDERING THAT IT DID NOT INCLUDE THE
FINAL ACT, MINISTERIAL DECLARATIONS AND DECISIONS, AND THE
UNDERSTANDING ON COMMITMENTS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES?

The First Issue: Does the Court

Have Jurisdiction Over the Controversy?
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution,
the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty
of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty
(to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld." 12 Once a
"controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this
Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional
mandate to decide." 13

The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters 14 raised in the petition is clearly set out in the
1987 Constitution, 15 as follows:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial department's duty and power to strike down grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government including Congress. It is an
innovation in our political law. 16 As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, 17 "the
judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to
pass judgment on matters of this nature."

As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, 18 it will not shirk, digress from or
abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse
of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality
or department of the government.

As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, we have no hesitation at all in holding that this petition should
be given due course and the vital questions raised therein ruled upon under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. Indeed, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional
issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials. On
this, we have no equivocation.

We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will not review
the wisdom of the decision of the President and the Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO, or
pass upon the merits of trade liberalization as a policy espoused by said international body. Neither
will it rule on the propriety of the government's economic policy of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes,
subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its
constitutional duty "to determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement
and its three annexes.

Second Issue: The WTO Agreement

and Economic Nationalism

This is the lis mota, the main issue, raised by the petition.

Petitioners vigorously argue that the "letter, spirit and intent" of the Constitution mandating
"economic nationalism" are violated by the so-called "parity provisions" and "national treatment"
clauses scattered in various parts not only of the WTO Agreement and its annexes but also in the
Ministerial Decisions and Declarations and in the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services.
Specifically, the "flagship" constitutional provisions referred to are Sec 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and
12, Article XII, of the Constitution, which are worded as follows:

Article II

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
AND STATE POLICIES

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.

xxx xxx xxx

Article XII

NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 10. . . . The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and
operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic
materials and locally produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them
competitive.

Petitioners aver that these sacred constitutional principles are desecrated by the following WTO
provisions quoted in their memorandum: 19

a) In the area of investment measures related to trade in goods (TRIMS, for brevity):

Article 2

National Treatment and Quantitative Restrictions.

1. Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994,

no Member shall apply any TRIM that is inconsistent with the
provisions of Article II or Article XI of GATT 1994.

2. An illustrative list of TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations

of general elimination of quantitative restrictions provided for in
paragraph I of Article XI of GATT 1994 is contained in the Annex to
this Agreement." (Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures,
Vol. 27, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments, p. 22121, emphasis
supplied).
The Annex referred to reads as follows:

ANNEX

Illustrative List

1. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in
paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or
enforceable under domestic law or under administrative rulings, or compliance with
which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which require:

(a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin

or from any domestic source, whether specified in terms of particular
products, in terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of
proportion of volume or value of its local production; or

(b) that an enterprise's purchases or use of imported products be

limited to an amount related to the volume or value of local products
that it exports.

2. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general elimination of

quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT 1994 include
those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic laws or under
administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage,
and which restrict:

(a) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to

the local production that it exports;

(b) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to

its local production by restricting its access to foreign exchange inflows
attributable to the enterprise; or

(c) the exportation or sale for export specified in terms of particular

products, in terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of a
preparation of volume or value of its local production. (Annex to the
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay
Round Legal Documents, p. 22125, emphasis supplied).

The paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 referred to is quoted as follows:

The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no
less favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin in
respect of laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use, the
provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of
differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively
on the economic operation of the means of transport and not on the
nationality of the product." (Article III, GATT 1947, as amended by the
Protocol Modifying Part II, and Article XXVI of GATT, 14 September
1948, 62 UMTS 82-84 in relation to paragraph 1(a) of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round, Legal
Instruments p. 177, emphasis supplied).
 (b) In the area of trade related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS, for
brevity):

Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment

no less favourable than that it accords to its own nationals with regard
to the protection of intellectual property. . . (par. 1 Article 3,
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspect of Intellectual Property rights,
Vol. 31, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments, p. 25432 (emphasis
supplied)

(c) In the area of the General Agreement on Trade in Services:

National Treatment

1. In the sectors inscribed in its schedule, and subject to any

conditions and qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord
to services and service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all
measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less
favourable than it accords to its own like services and service
suppliers.

2. A Member may meet the requirement of paragraph I by according

to services and service suppliers of any other Member, either formally
suppliers of any other Member, either formally identical treatment or
formally different treatment to that it accords to its own like services
and service suppliers.

3. Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be

considered to be less favourable if it modifies the conditions of
completion in favour of services or service suppliers of the Member
compared to like services or service suppliers of any other Member.
(Article XVII, General Agreement on Trade in Services, Vol. 28,
Uruguay Round Legal Instruments, p. 22610 emphasis supplied).

It is petitioners' position that the foregoing "national treatment" and "parity provisions" of the WTO
Agreement "place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and
local products," in contravention of the "Filipino First" policy of the Constitution. They allegedly render
meaningless the phrase "effectively controlled by Filipinos." The constitutional conflict becomes more
manifest when viewed in the context of the clear duty imposed on the Philippines as a WTO member
to ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as
provided in the annexed agreements. 20 Petitioners further argue that these provisions contravene
constitutional limitations on the role exports play in national development and negate the preferential
treatment accorded to Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.

On the other hand, respondents through the Solicitor General counter (1) that such Charter provisions
are not self-executing and merely set out general policies; (2) that these nationalistic portions of the
Constitution invoked by petitioners should not be read in isolation but should be related to other
relevant provisions of Art. XII, particularly Secs. 1 and 13 thereof; (3) that read properly, the cited
WTO clauses do not conflict with Constitution; and (4) that the WTO Agreement contains sufficient
provisions to protect developing countries like the Philippines from the harshness of sudden trade
liberalization.

We shall now discuss and rule on these arguments.

Declaration of Principles
Not Self-Executing
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." The
counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution 21 is called the "basic political creed of the nation"
by Dean Vicente Sinco. 22 These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles
ready for enforcement through the courts. 23 They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the
exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the
leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, 24 the principles and state policies enumerated in
Article II and some sections of Article XII are not "self-executing provisions, the disregard of which
can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation."

In the same light, we held in Basco vs. Pagcor 25 that broad constitutional principles need legislative
enactments to implement the, thus:

On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personal Dignity) 12 (Family) and
13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2
(Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are
merely statements of principles and policies. As such, they are basically not self-executing,
meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such principles.

In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing

principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They were rather directives
addressed to the executive and to the legislature. If the executive and the legislature
failed to heed the directives of the article, the available remedy was not judicial but
political. The electorate could express their displeasure with the failure of the executive
and the legislature through the language of the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2).

The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of board constitutional principles
are sourced from basic considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authority to wade "into
the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making." Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his
concurring opinion in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr., 26 explained these reasons as follows:

My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal
right — a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of
the Constitution — that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the
public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment grating all or
part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the court should be understood as simply saying that
such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the
general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine
Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity
so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of
action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at
least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or
disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend
themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this
matter.

The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable

regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded
conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Constitution which reads:

Sec. 1. . . .
 Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphasis supplied)

When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and
"the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully
submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At
least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have
no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where
no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making
departments — the legislative and executive departments — must be given a real and effective
opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them
before the courts should intervene.

Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with

Other Constitutional Mandates to Attain
Balanced Development of Economy

On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down general principles
relating to the national economy and patrimony, should be read and understood in relation to the
other sections in said article, especially Secs. 1 and 13 thereof which read:

Sec. 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and
services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding
productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially the
underprivileged.

The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound
agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and
efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both
domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises
against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.

In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country
shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and
utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 1 lays down the basic goals of national economic
development, as follows:

1. A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth;

2. A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services provided by the nation for the benefit of
the people; and
3. An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially the
underprivileged.

With these goals in context, the Constitution then ordains the ideals of economic nationalism (1) by
expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos "in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony" 27 and in the use of "Filipino labor, domestic materials
and locally-produced goods"; (2) by mandating the State to "adopt measures that help make them
competitive; 28 and (3) by requiring the State to "develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." 29 In similar language, the Constitution takes into account
the realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of "a trade policy that serves the general
welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality ad
reciprocity"; 30 and speaks of industries "which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets"
as well as of the protection of "Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade
practices."

It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System, et
al., 31 this Court held that "Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory,
positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing
laws or rule for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to
put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable." However, as the constitutional provision itself
states, it is enforceable only in regard to "the grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony" and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. It refers to
exceptions rather than the rule. The issue here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is
self-executing or not. Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing provisions in
the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And
we hold that there are.

All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world
on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against
foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. 32 In other words, the Constitution did not
intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in
the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited
entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In
fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign
competition that is unfair.

WTO Recognizes Need to

Protect Weak Economies

Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that the WTO itself has some built-in advantages to
protect weak and developing economies, which comprise the vast majority of its members. Unlike in
the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in the Security Council, in the
WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each member's vote equal in weight
to that of any other. There is no WTO equivalent of the UN Security Council.

WTO decides by consensus whenever possible, otherwise, decisions of the Ministerial

Conference and the General Council shall be taken by the majority of the votes cast,
except in cases of interpretation of the Agreement or waiver of the obligation of a
member which would require three fourths vote. Amendments would require two
thirds vote in general. Amendments to MFN provisions and the Amendments provision
will require assent of all members. Any member may withdraw from the Agreement
upon the expiration of six months from the date of notice of withdrawals. 33

Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO than
through one-on-one negotiations with developed countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can
form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda more decisively than outside the Organization.
This is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the
basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize the need of developing countries like the
Philippines to "share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their
economic development." These basic principles are found in the preamble 34 of the WTO Agreement as
follows:

The Parties to this Agreement,

Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be
conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a
large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and
expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the
optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable
development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance
the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and
concerns at different levels of economic development,

Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that
developing countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a share
in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic
development,

Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and

mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs
and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in
international trade relations,

Resolved, therefore, to develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral

trading system encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the results
of past trade liberalization efforts, and all of the results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations,

Determined to preserve the basic principles and to further the objectives underlying
this multilateral trading system, . . . (emphasis supplied.)

Specific WTO Provisos

Protect Developing Countries

So too, the Solicitor General points out that pursuant to and consistent with the foregoing basic
principles, the WTO Agreement grants developing countries a more lenient treatment, giving their
domestic industries some protection from the rush of foreign competition. Thus, with respect to tariffs
in general, preferential treatment is given to developing countries in terms of the amount of tariff
reduction and the period within which the reduction is to be spread out. Specifically, GATT requires an
average tariff reduction rate of 36% for developed countries to be effected within a period of six (6)
years while developing countries — including the Philippines — are required to effect an average tariff
reduction of only 24% within ten (10) years.

In respect to domestic subsidy, GATT requires developed countries to reduce domestic support to
agricultural products by 20% over six (6) years, as compared to only 13% for developing countries to
be effected within ten (10) years.

In regard to export subsidy for agricultural products, GATT requires developed countries to reduce
their budgetary outlays for export subsidy by 36% and export volumes receiving export subsidy
by 21% within a period of six (6) years. For developing countries, however, the reduction rate is
only two-thirds of that prescribed for developed countries and a longer period of ten (10) years within
which to effect such reduction.
Moreover, GATT itself has provided built-in protection from unfair foreign competition and trade
practices including anti-dumping measures, countervailing measures and safeguards against import
surges. Where local businesses are jeopardized by unfair foreign competition, the Philippines can avail
of these measures. There is hardly therefore any basis for the statement that under the WTO, local
industries and enterprises will all be wiped out and that Filipinos will be deprived of control of the
economy. Quite the contrary, the weaker situations of developing nations like the Philippines have
been taken into account; thus, there would be no basis to say that in joining the WTO, the
respondents have gravely abused their discretion. True, they have made a bold decision to steer the
ship of state into the yet uncharted sea of economic liberalization. But such decision cannot be set
aside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, simply because we disagree with it or simply
because we believe only in other economic policies. As earlier stated, the Court in taking jurisdiction of
this case will not pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of trade liberalization as an economic
policy. It will only perform its constitutional duty of determining whether the Senate committed grave
abuse of discretion.

Constitution Does Not

Rule Out Foreign Competition

Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a "self-reliant and independent national economy" 35 does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither
"economic seclusion" nor "mendicancy in the international community." As explained by Constitutional
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:

Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly

aware of overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does
not mean autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the
international community. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign
control of the national economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the
development of natural resources and public utilities. 36

The WTO reliance on "most favored nation," "national treatment," and "trade without discrimination"
cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that
apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on "equality and
reciprocity," 37 the fundamental law encourages industries that are "competitive in both domestic and
foreign markets," thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade
environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with
the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown
capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino
entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to
prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.

Constitution Favors Consumers,

Not Industries or Enterprises

The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any business or enterprise, nor
does it contain any specific pronouncement that Filipino companies should be pampered with a total
proscription of foreign competition. On the other hand, respondents claim that WTO/GATT aims to
make available to the Filipino consumer the best goods and services obtainable anywhere in the world
at the most reasonable prices. Consequently, the question boils down to whether WTO/GATT will favor
the general welfare of the public at large.

Will adherence to the WTO treaty bring this ideal (of favoring the general welfare) to reality?

Will WTO/GATT succeed in promoting the Filipinos' general welfare because it will — as promised by its
promoters — expand the country's exports and generate more employment?
Will it bring more prosperity, employment, purchasing power and quality products at the most
reasonable rates to the Filipino public?

The responses to these questions involve "judgment calls" by our policy makers, for which they are
answerable to our people during appropriate electoral exercises. Such questions and the answers
thereto are not subject to judicial pronouncements based on grave abuse of discretion.

Constitution Designed to Meet

Future Events and Contingencies

No doubt, the WTO Agreement was not yet in existence when the Constitution was drafted and ratified
in 1987. That does not mean however that the Charter is necessarily flawed in the sense that its
framers might not have anticipated the advent of a borderless world of business. By the same token,
the United Nations was not yet in existence when the 1935 Constitution became effective. Did that
necessarily mean that the then Constitution might not have contemplated a diminution of the
absoluteness of sovereignty when the Philippines signed the UN Charter, thereby effectively
surrendering part of its control over its foreign relations to the decisions of various UN organs like the
Security Council?

It is not difficult to answer this question. Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of
contemporary events. They should be interpreted to cover even future and unknown circumstances. It
is to the credit of its drafters that a Constitution can withstand the assaults of bigots and infidels but
at the same time bend with the refreshing winds of change necessitated by unfolding events. As one
eminent political law writer and respected jurist 38 explains:

The Constitution must be quintessential rather than superficial, the root and not the
blossom, the base and frame-work only of the edifice that is yet to rise. It is but the
core of the dream that must take shape, not in a twinkling by mandate of our
delegates, but slowly "in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts," where it will in time
develop its sinews and gradually gather its strength and finally achieve its substance.
In fine, the Constitution cannot, like the goddess Athena, rise full-grown from the
brow of the Constitutional Convention, nor can it conjure by mere fiat an instant
Utopia. It must grow with the society it seeks to re-structure and march apace with
the progress of the race, drawing from the vicissitudes of history the dynamism and
vitality that will keep it, far from becoming a petrified rule, a pulsing, living law
attuned to the heartbeat of the nation.

Third Issue: The WTO Agreement and Legislative Power

The WTO Agreement provides that "(e)ach Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations
and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed
Agreements." 39 Petitioners maintain that this undertaking "unduly limits, restricts and impairs
Philippine sovereignty, specifically the legislative power which under Sec. 2, Article VI of the 1987
Philippine Constitution is vested in the Congress of the Philippines. It is an assault on the sovereign
powers of the Philippines because this means that Congress could not pass legislation that will be good
for our national interest and general welfare if such legislation will not conform with the WTO
Agreement, which not only relates to the trade in goods . . . but also to the flow of investments and
money . . . as well as to a whole slew of agreements on socio-cultural matters . . . 40

More specifically, petitioners claim that said WTO proviso derogates from the power to tax, which is
lodged in the Congress. 41 And while the Constitution allows Congress to authorize the President to fix
tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts, such
authority is subject to "specified limits and . . . such limitations and restrictions" as Congress may
provide, 42 as in fact it did under Sec. 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
 Sovereignty Limited by
International Law and Treaties

This Court notes and appreciates the ferocity and passion by which petitioners stressed their
arguments on this issue. However, while sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-
encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily
agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations.
Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest
of the world. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution "adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of
peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations." 43 By the doctrine of
incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are
considered to be automatically part of our own laws. 44 One of the oldest and most fundamental rules
in international law is pacta sunt servanda — international agreements must be performed in good
faith. "A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on
the parties . . . A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its
legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations
undertaken." 45

By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their
voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater
benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with
coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to
limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been used to record
agreements between States concerning such widely diverse matters as, for example, the lease of
naval bases, the sale or cession of territory, the termination of war, the regulation of conduct of
hostilities, the formation of alliances, the regulation of commercial relations, the settling of claims, the
laying down of rules governing conduct in peace and the establishment of international
organizations. 46 The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered
absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of
membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations. As aptly put by
John F. Kennedy, "Today, no nation can build its destiny alone. The age of self-sufficient nationalism is
over. The age of interdependence is here." 47

UN Charter and Other Treaties

Limit Sovereignty

Thus, when the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of its 51 charter members, it consented to
restrict its sovereign rights under the "concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation."47-A Under Article 2
of the UN Charter, "(a)ll members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes
in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against
which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action." Such assistance includes
payment of its corresponding share not merely in administrative expenses but also in expenditures for
the peace-keeping operations of the organization. In its advisory opinion of July 20, 1961, the
International Court of Justice held that money used by the United Nations Emergency Force in the
Middle East and in the Congo were "expenses of the United Nations" under Article 17, paragraph 2, of
the UN Charter. Hence, all its members must bear their corresponding share in such expenses. In this
sense, the Philippine Congress is restricted in its power to appropriate. It is compelled to appropriate
funds whether it agrees with such peace-keeping expenses or not. So too, under Article 105 of the
said Charter, the UN and its representatives enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities, thereby
limiting again the exercise of sovereignty of members within their own territory. Another example:
although "sovereign equality" and "domestic jurisdiction" of all members are set forth as underlying
principles in the UN Charter, such provisos are however subject to enforcement measures decided by
the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security under Chapter VII of the
Charter. A final example: under Article 103, "(i)n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other
international agreement, their obligation under the present charter shall prevail," thus unquestionably
denying the Philippines — as a member — the sovereign power to make a choice as to which of
conflicting obligations, if any, to honor.

Apart from the UN Treaty, the Philippines has entered into many other international pacts — both
bilateral and multilateral — that involve limitations on Philippine sovereignty. These are enumerated
by the Solicitor General in his Compliance dated October 24, 1996, as follows:

(a) Bilateral convention with the United States regarding taxes on income, where the
Philippines agreed, among others, to exempt from tax, income received in the
Philippines by, among others, the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States, the
Export/Import Bank of the United States, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
of the United States. Likewise, in said convention, wages, salaries and similar
remunerations paid by the United States to its citizens for labor and personal services
performed by them as employees or officials of the United States are exempt from
income tax by the Philippines.

(b) Bilateral agreement with Belgium, providing, among others, for the avoidance of
double taxation with respect to taxes on income.

(c) Bilateral convention with the Kingdom of Sweden for the avoidance of double
taxation.

(d) Bilateral convention with the French Republic for the avoidance of double taxation.

(e) Bilateral air transport agreement with Korea where the Philippines agreed to
exempt from all customs duties, inspection fees and other duties or taxes aircrafts of
South Korea and the regular equipment, spare parts and supplies arriving with said
aircrafts.

(f) Bilateral air service agreement with Japan, where the Philippines agreed to exempt
from customs duties, excise taxes, inspection fees and other similar duties, taxes or
charges fuel, lubricating oils, spare parts, regular equipment, stores on board
Japanese aircrafts while on Philippine soil.

(g) Bilateral air service agreement with Belgium where the Philippines granted Belgian
air carriers the same privileges as those granted to Japanese and Korean air carriers
under separate air service agreements.

(h) Bilateral notes with Israel for the abolition of transit and visitor visas where the
Philippines exempted Israeli nationals from the requirement of obtaining transit or
visitor visas for a sojourn in the Philippines not exceeding 59 days.

(i) Bilateral agreement with France exempting French nationals from the requirement
of obtaining transit and visitor visa for a sojourn not exceeding 59 days.

(j) Multilateral Convention on Special Missions, where the Philippines agreed that
premises of Special Missions in the Philippines are inviolable and its agents can not
enter said premises without consent of the Head of Mission concerned. Special
Missions are also exempted from customs duties, taxes and related charges.

(k) Multilateral convention on the Law of Treaties. In this convention, the Philippines
agreed to be governed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

(l) Declaration of the President of the Philippines accepting compulsory jurisdiction of

the International Court of Justice. The International Court of Justice has jurisdiction in
 all legal disputes concerning the interpretation of a treaty, any question of
international law, the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a
breach "of international obligation."

In the foregoing treaties, the Philippines has effectively agreed to limit the exercise of its sovereign
powers of taxation, eminent domain and police power. The underlying consideration in this partial
surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the other contracting states in granting the
same privilege and immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its citizens. The same reciprocity
characterizes the Philippine commitments under WTO-GATT.

International treaties, whether relating to nuclear disarmament, human rights, the

environment, the law of the sea, or trade, constrain domestic political sovereignty
through the assumption of external obligations. But unless anarchy in international
relations is preferred as an alternative, in most cases we accept that the benefits of
the reciprocal obligations involved outweigh the costs associated with any loss of
political sovereignty. (T)rade treaties that structure relations by reference to durable,
well-defined substantive norms and objective dispute resolution procedures reduce the
risks of larger countries exploiting raw economic power to bully smaller countries, by
subjecting power relations to some form of legal ordering. In addition, smaller
countries typically stand to gain disproportionately from trade liberalization. This is
due to the simple fact that liberalization will provide access to a larger set of potential
new trading relationship than in case of the larger country gaining enhanced success
to the smaller country's market. 48

The point is that, as shown by the foregoing treaties, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without
violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of . . .
cooperation and amity with all nations."

Fourth Issue: The WTO Agreement and Judicial Power

Petitioners aver that paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 49 intrudes on the power
of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures. 50

To understand the scope and meaning of Article 34, TRIPS, 51 it will be fruitful to restate its full text as
follows:

Article 34

Process Patents: Burden of Proof

1. For the purposes of civil proceedings in respect of the infringement of the rights of
the owner referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of Article 28, if the subject matter of a patent
is a process for obtaining a product, the judicial authorities shall have the authority to
order the defendant to prove that the process to obtain an identical product is
different from the patented process. Therefore, Members shall provide, in at least one
of the following circumstances, that any identical product when produced without the
consent of the patent owner shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be deemed
to have been obtained by the patented process:

(a) if the product obtained by the patented process is new;

(b) if there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was

made by the process and the owner of the patent has been unable
through reasonable efforts to determine the process actually used.
 2. Any Member shall be free to provide that the burden of proof indicated in paragraph
1 shall be on the alleged infringer only if the condition referred to in subparagraph (a)
is fulfilled or only if the condition referred to in subparagraph (b) is fulfilled.

3. In the adduction of proof to the contrary, the legitimate interests of defendants in

protecting their manufacturing and business secrets shall be taken into account.

From the above, a WTO Member is required to provide a rule of disputable (not the words "in the
absence of proof to the contrary") presumption that a product shown to be identical to one produced
with the use of a patented process shall be deemed to have been obtained by the (illegal) use of the
said patented process, (1) where such product obtained by the patented product is new, or (2) where
there is "substantial likelihood" that the identical product was made with the use of the said patented
process but the owner of the patent could not determine the exact process used in obtaining such
identical product. Hence, the "burden of proof" contemplated by Article 34 should actually be
understood as the duty of the alleged patent infringer to overthrow such presumption. Such burden,
properly understood, actually refers to the "burden of evidence" (burden of going forward) placed on
the producer of the identical (or fake) product to show that his product was produced without the use
of the patented process.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the patent owner still has the "burden of proof" since, regardless of
the presumption provided under paragraph 1 of Article 34, such owner still has to introduce evidence
of the existence of the alleged identical product, the fact that it is "identical" to the genuine one
produced by the patented process and the fact of "newness" of the genuine product or the fact of
"substantial likelihood" that the identical product was made by the patented process.

The foregoing should really present no problem in changing the rules of evidence as the present law
on the subject, Republic Act No. 165, as amended, otherwise known as the Patent Law, provides a
similar presumption in cases of infringement of patented design or utility model, thus:

Sec. 60. Infringement. — Infringement of a design patent or of a patent for utility

model shall consist in unauthorized copying of the patented design or utility model for
the purpose of trade or industry in the article or product and in the making, using or
selling of the article or product copying the patented design or utility model. Identity
or substantial identity with the patented design or utility model shall constitute
evidence of copying. (emphasis supplied)

Moreover, it should be noted that the requirement of Article 34 to provide a disputable presumption
applies only if (1) the product obtained by the patented process in NEW or (2) there is a substantial
likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and the process owner has not been
able through reasonable effort to determine the process used. Where either of these two provisos
does not obtain, members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the
provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes.

By and large, the arguments adduced in connection with our disposition of the third issue —
derogation of legislative power — will apply to this fourth issue also. Suffice it to say that the
reciprocity clause more than justifies such intrusion, if any actually exists. Besides, Article 34 does not
contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the concept of adversarial
dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.

So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most international conventions on patents, trademarks
and copyrights, the adjustment in legislation and rules of procedure will not be substantial. 52

Fifth Issue: Concurrence Only in the WTO Agreement and

Not in Other Documents Contained in the Final Act
Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its annexes — but not in the
other documents referred to in the Final Act, namely the Ministerial Declaration and Decisions and the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services — is defective and insufficient and thus
constitutes abuse of discretion. They submit that such concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone is
flawed because it is in effect a rejection of the Final Act, which in turn was the document signed by
Secretary Navarro, in representation of the Republic upon authority of the President. They contend
that the second letter of the President to the Senate 53 which enumerated what constitutes the Final
Act should have been the subject of concurrence of the Senate.

"A final act, sometimes called protocol de cloture, is an instrument which records the winding up of
the proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually includes a reproduction of the texts of treaties,
conventions, recommendations and other acts agreed upon and signed by the plenipotentiaries
attending the conference." 54 It is not the treaty itself. It is rather a summary of the proceedings of a
protracted conference which may have taken place over several years. The text of the "Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations" is contained in just
one page 55 in Vol. I of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. By signing
said Final Act, Secretary Navarro as representative of the Republic of the Philippines undertook:

(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their
respective competent authorities with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in
accordance with their procedures; and

(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.

The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required
from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement.

The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were deemed adopted without need for ratification. They
were approved by the ministers by virtue of Article XXV: 1 of GATT which provides that
representatives of the members can meet "to give effect to those provisions of this Agreement which
invoke joint action, and generally with a view to facilitating the operation and furthering the objectives
of this Agreement." 56

The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services also approved in Marrakesh does not apply
to the Philippines. It applies only to those 27 Members which "have indicated in their respective
schedules of commitments on standstill, elimination of monopoly, expansion of operation of existing
financial service suppliers, temporary entry of personnel, free transfer and processing of information,
and national treatment with respect to access to payment, clearing systems and refinancing available
in the normal course of business."57

On the other hand, the WTO Agreement itself expresses what multilateral agreements are deemed
included as its integral parts, 58 as follows:

Article II

Scope of the WTO

1. The WTO shall provide the common institutional frame-work for the conduct of
trade relations among its Members in matters to the agreements and associated legal
instruments included in the Annexes to this Agreement.

2. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2, and 3,

(hereinafter referred to as "Multilateral Agreements") are integral parts of this
Agreement, binding on all Members.
 3. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annex 4 (hereinafter
referred to as "Plurilateral Trade Agreements") are also part of this Agreement for
those Members that have accepted them, and are binding on those Members. The
Plurilateral Trade Agreements do not create either obligation or rights for Members
that have not accepted them.

4. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 as specified in annex 1A

(hereinafter referred to as "GATT 1994") is legally distinct from the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, dated 30 October 1947, annexed to the Final Act
adopted at the conclusion of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, as subsequently rectified,
amended or modified (hereinafter referred to as "GATT 1947").

It should be added that the Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the
members' deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the letter of President Ramos dated August
11, 1994, 59 the senators
of the Republic minutely dissected what the Senate was concurring in, as follows: 60

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Now, the question of the validity of the submission came up in
the first day hearing of this Committee yesterday. Was the observation made by
Senator Tañada that what was submitted to the Senate was not the agreement on
establishing the World Trade Organization by the final act of the Uruguay Round which
is not the same as the agreement establishing the World Trade Organization? And on
that basis, Senator Tolentino raised a point of order which, however, he agreed to
withdraw upon understanding that his suggestion for an alternative solution at that
time was acceptable. That suggestion was to treat the proceedings of the Committee
as being in the nature of briefings for Senators until the question of the submission
could be clarified.

And so, Secretary Romulo, in effect, is the President submitting a new . . . is he

making a new submission which improves on the clarity of the first submission?

MR. ROMULO: Mr. Chairman, to make sure that it is clear cut and there should be no
misunderstanding, it was his intention to clarify all matters by giving this letter.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

Can this Committee hear from Senator Tañada and later on Senator Tolentino since
they were the ones that raised this question yesterday?

Senator Tañada, please.

SEN. TAÑADA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Based on what Secretary Romulo has read, it would now clearly appear that what is
being submitted to the Senate for ratification is not the Final Act of the Uruguay
Round, but rather the Agreement on the World Trade Organization as well as the
Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding and Commitments in
Financial Services.

I am now satisfied with the wording of the new submission of President Ramos.

SEN. TAÑADA. . . . of President Ramos, Mr. Chairman.

 THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Tañada. Can we hear from Senator Tolentino?
And after him Senator Neptali Gonzales and Senator Lina.

SEN. TOLENTINO, Mr. Chairman, I have not seen the new submission actually
transmitted to us but I saw the draft of his earlier, and I think it now complies with the
provisions of the Constitution, and with the Final Act itself . The Constitution does not
require us to ratify the Final Act. It requires us to ratify the Agreement which is now
being submitted. The Final Act itself specifies what is going to be submitted to with the
governments of the participants.

In paragraph 2 of the Final Act, we read and I quote:

By signing the present Final Act, the representatives agree: (a) to submit as
appropriate the WTO Agreement for the consideration of the respective competent
authorities with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their
procedures.

In other words, it is not the Final Act that was agreed to be submitted to the
governments for ratification or acceptance as whatever their constitutional procedures
may provide but it is the World Trade Organization Agreement. And if that is the one
that is being submitted now, I think it satisfies both the Constitution and the Final Act
itself .

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Tolentino, May I call on Senator Gonzales.

SEN. GONZALES. Mr. Chairman, my views on this matter are already a matter of
record. And they had been adequately reflected in the journal of yesterday's session
and I don't see any need for repeating the same.

Now, I would consider the new submission as an act ex abudante cautela.

THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Gonzales. Senator Lina, do you want to make
any comment on this?

SEN. LINA. Mr. President, I agree with the observation just made by Senator Gonzales
out of the abundance of question. Then the new submission is, I believe, stating the
obvious and therefore I have no further comment to make.

Epilogue

In praying for the nullification of the Philippine ratification of the WTO Agreement, petitioners are
invoking this Court's constitutionally imposed duty "to determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in giving its
concurrence therein via Senate Resolution No. 97. Procedurally, a writ of certiorari grounded on grave
abuse of discretion may be issued by the Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when it is amply
shown that petitioners have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 61 Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of
discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 62 Failure
on the part of the petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion will result in the dismissal of the
petition. 63

In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets that the Senate, whose act is under review, is one
of two sovereign houses of Congress and is thus entitled to great respect in its actions. It is itself a
constitutional body independent and coordinate, and thus its actions are presumed regular and done
in good faith. Unless convincing proof and persuasive arguments are presented to overthrow such
presumptions, this Court will resolve every doubt in its favor. Using the foregoing well-accepted
definition of grave abuse of discretion and the presumption of regularity in the Senate's processes,
this Court cannot find any cogent reason to impute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate's exercise
of its power of concurrence in the WTO Agreement granted it by Sec. 21 of Article VII of the
Constitution. 64

It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to develop an
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino
labor, products, domestic materials and locally produced goods. But it is equally true that such
principles — while serving as judicial and legislative guides — are not in themselves sources of causes
of action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental constitutional principles relied upon by the
Senate which mandate the pursuit of a "trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all
forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity" and the promotion of
industries "which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets," thereby justifying its
acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative
and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation
and amity with all nations.

That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the
WTO Agreement thereby making it "a part of the law of the land" is a legitimate exercise of its
sovereign duty and power. We find no "patent and gross" arbitrariness or despotism "by reason of
passion or personal hostility" in such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at
least some of its members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the
national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute
grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave
abuse in the exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludably, what the Senate did was a valid
exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the
realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the
people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and
economic globalization is a matter that our people should determine in electing their policy makers.
After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a
member.

The eminent futurist John Naisbitt, author of the best seller Megatrends, predicts an Asian
Renaissance 65 where "the East will become the dominant region of the world economically, politically
and culturally in the next century." He refers to the "free market" espoused by WTO as the "catalyst"
in this coming Asian ascendancy. There are at present about 31 countries including China, Russia and
Saudi Arabia negotiating for membership in the WTO. Notwithstanding objections against possible
limitations on national sovereignty, the WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral
trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. The alternative to WTO
is isolation, stagnation, if not economic self-destruction. Duly enriched with original membership,
keenly aware of the advantages and disadvantages of globalization with its on-line experience, and
endowed with a vision of the future, the Philippines now straddles the crossroads of an international
strategy for economic prosperity and stability in the new millennium. Let the people, through their
duly authorized elected officers, make their free choice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

IN BANC

GR No. L-48321 August 31, 1946

OH CHO, applicant-appellee,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor-appellant.

Office of the General Solicitor Roman Ozaeta and Assistant General Solicitor Rafael Amparo for
appellant.
Vicente Constantino for appellee.
Ferrier, Gomez and Sotelo and JT Chuidian as amici curiae.

PADILLA, J .:

This is an appeal from a judgment decreeing the registration of a residential lot located in the
municipality of Guinayangan, Province of Tayabas in the name of the applicant.

The opposition of the Director of Lands is based on the applicant's lack of title to the lot, and on his
disqualification, as alien, from acquiring lands of the public domain.

The applicant, who is an alien, and his predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the lot from 1880 to filing of the application for registration on
January 17, 1940.

The Solicitor General reiterates the second objection of the opponent and adds that the lower court,
committed an error in not declaring null and void the sale of the lot to the applicant.

The applicant invokes the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), or should it not be applicable to the
case, then he would apply for the benefits of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141).

The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be confirmed under the Land
Registration Act. He failed to show that he or any of his predecessors in interest had acquired the lot
from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, under the laws, orders and decrease
promulgated by the Spanish Government in the Philippines, or by possessory information under the
Mortgaged Law (section 19, Act 496). All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant below to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that
should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time
immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of
the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish
conquest. (Honey vs. Insular Government, 212 US, 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594.) The applicant does not
come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessors in interest
begun in 1880.

As the applicant failed to show title to the lot, the next question is whether he is entitled to decree or
registration of the lot, because he is alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain
(sections 48, 49, CA No. 141) .

As the applicant failed to show the title to the lot, and has invoked the provisions of the Public Land
Act, it seems unnecessary to make pronouncement in this case on the nature or classifications of the
sought to be registered.
It may be argued that under the provisions of the Public Land Act the applicant immediate
predecessor in interest would have been entitled to a decree of registration of the lot had they applied
for its registration; and that he having purchased or acquired it, the right of his immediate
predecessor in interest to a decree of registration must be assumed also to have been acquired by
him. The benefits provided in the Public Land Act for applicant's immediate predecessors in interest
should comply with the condition precedent for the grant of such benefits. The condition precedent is
to apply for the registration of the land of which they had been in possession at least since July 26,
1894. This the applicant's immediate predecessors in interest failed to do. They did not have any
vested right in the lot amounting to the title which was transmissible to the applicant. The only right,
if it may thus be called, is their possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their predecessors in
interest, may be availed of by a qualified person to apply for its registration but not by a person as the
applicant who It is disqualified.

It is urged that the sale of the lot to the applicant should have been declared null and void. In a suit
between vendor and vendee for the annulment of the sale, such pronouncement would be necessary,
if the court were of the opinion that it is void. It is not necessary in this case where the vendors do not
even object to the application filed by the vendee.

Accordingly, judgment is reversed and the application for registration dismissed, without costs.

Moran, CJ, Feria, Pablo, Hilado and Bengzon, JJ., Concur.

Separate Opinions

PERFECT, J., concurring:

Oh Cho, a citizen of the Republic of China, purchased in 1938 from Antonio, Luis and Rafael Lagdameo
a parcel of land located in the residential district of Guinayangan, Tayabas, which has been in the
continuous, public, and adverse possession of their predecessors in interest as far back as 1880. on
June 17, 1940, Oh Cho applied for the registration of said parcel of land. The Director of Lands
opposed the application because, among other grounds, the Constitution prohibits aliens from
acquiring public or private agricultural lands.

One of the witnesses for the applicant, on cross-examination, expressly admitted that the land in
question is susceptible of cultivation and may be converted into an orchard or garden. Rodolfo Tiquia,
inspector of the Bureau of Lands, testifying as a witness for the government, stated that the land,
notwithstanding the use to which it is actually devoted, is agricultural land in accordance with an
opinion rendered in 1939 by the Secretary of Justice. The pertinent part of said opinion, penned by
Secretary Jose Abad Santos, later Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, is as follows:

1. Whether or not the "public agricultural land" in section 1, Article XII, of the Constitution
may be interpreted to include residential, commercial or industrial lots for purposes of their
disposition.

1. Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution classifies lands of the public domain in the
Philippines into agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic classification adopted since
the enactment of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. At the time
of the adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines, the term "agricultural public lands" had,
therefor, acquired a technical meaning in our public laws. The Supreme Court of the
Philippines in the leading case of Map vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that the
phrase "agricultural public lands" means those public lands acquired from Spain which are
neither timber nor mineral lands. This definition has been followed by our Supreme Court in
many subsequent cases. (Montano vs. Ins. Gov't 12 Phil., 572, 574; Santiago vs. Ins. Gov't.,
 12, Phil., 593; Ibañes de Aldecoa vs. Ins. Gov't., 13 Phil., 159; Ins. Gov't., Vs. Aldecoa & Co.,
19 Phil., 505, 516 Market vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 32 Phil., 271, 276; Molina 175,
181; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry , 39 Phil., 560, 564; and Ankron vs .. Government of the
Philippines, 40 Phil., 10, 14.)

Residential, commercial or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have to be
included in one or more of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral, of
necessity, therefore, they must be classified as agricultural.

Viewed from the other angle, it has been held that in determining whether lands are
agricultural or not, the character of the lands is the test (Odell vs. Durant 62 NW, 524;
Lerch vs. Missoula Brick & Tile Co., 123 p ., 25). In other words, it is the susceptibility of the
land to cultivation for agricultural or not (State vs. Stewart, 190, p., 129).

Judge Pedro Magsalin, of the Court First Instance of Tayabas, rendered a decision on August 15, 1940,
overruling the opposition without must explanation and decreeing the registration prayed for the
applicant. The Director of Lands appealed from the decision, and the Solicitor General appearing for
appellant, maintains that the applicant, not being a citizen of the Philippines, is disqualified to buy or
acquire the parcel of land in question and that the purchase made in question and that the purchase
made in 1938 is null and void.

This is the question squarely reversing to us for decision. The majority, although reversing the lower
court's decision and dismissing the application with we agree, abstained from the declaring null and
void the purchase made by Oh Cho in 1938 as prayed for the appellant. We deem it necessary to state
our opinion on the important question raised, it must be squarely decided.

The Solicitor General argued in his brief as follows:

I. The lower court erred decreeing the registration of the lot in question in favor of the
applicant who, according to his own voluntary admission, is a citizen of the Chinese Republic .

( a ) The phrase "agricultural land" as used in the Act of the Congress of July 1, 1902, in the
Public Land Act includes residential lots .

In this jurisdiction lands of public domain suitable for residential purposes are considered
agricultural lands under the Public Land Law. The phrase "agricultural public lands" has well
settled judicial definition. It was used for the first time in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
known as the Philippine Bill. Its means those public lands acquired form Spain which are
neither mineral nor timber lands (Map vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil., 572; Ibañes de
Aldecoa vs. Insular Government 13 Phil., 159; Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil ., 175;
Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560; Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands,
40 Phil., 10). In the case of Map vs. Insular Government, supra , the Supreme Court, in
defining the meaning and scope of that phrase from the context of the sections 13 and 15 of
that Act, said:

The phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined by the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which
phrase is also to be found in several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926) means those
public lands acquired from Spain which are neither timber lands ore.

xxxxxxxxx

"We hold that there is to be found in the act of Congress a definition of the phrase"
agricultural public lands, "and after careful consideration of the question we are
satisfied that only definition which exists in said Act is the definition adopted by the
court below. Section 13 say that the Government shall "make and rules and
regulations for the lease, sale, or other dispositions of public lands other than timber
 or mineral lands," To our minds that is only definition that can be said to be given
agricultural lands. In other words , that the phrase "agricultural lands" as used in Act
No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral
lands... " Map vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, 178, 182, emphasis added.)

"This phrase" agricultural public lands "was subsequently used in Act No. 926, which is the
first public land law of the Philippines. As therein used, the phrase was expressly given by the
Philippine Commission the same meaning intended for it by Congress as interpreted in the
case of Map vs. Insular Government , supra . This is a self-evident from a reading of section 1,
10, 32, and 64 (subsection 6 of Act No. 926). Whenever the phrase "agricultural public lands"
is used in any of said sections, it is invariably by the qualification "as defined by said Act of
Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two."

"More specially, in the case of Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government , supra , the
Supreme Court held that a residential or building lot, forming part of the public domain, is
agricultural land, irrespective of the fact that it is not actually used for purposes of agriculture
for the simple reason that it is susceptible of cultivation and may be converted into a rural
estate, and because when a land is not mineral or forestry in its nature it must necessarily be
included within the classification of a agricultural land. of the special applicability of the
doctrine laid down in said case, we quote at some length from the decision therein rendered:

"The question set up in these proceedings by virtue of the appeal interposed by counsel for
Juan Ibañez de Aldecoa, is whether or not a parcel of land that is susceptible of being
cultivated, and ceasing to be agricultural land, was converted into a building lot , is subject to
the legal provisions in force regarding Government public lands which may be alienated in
favor of private individuals or corporations.

xxxxxxxxx

"Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may
converted into a field, and planted with all kinds of vegetation; for this reason, where
land is not mining or forestry in its nature, it must necessarily be included within the
classification of agriculture land, not because it is actually used for the purposes of
agriculture, but because it was originally agricultural and may again become so under
other circumstances; besides the Act of Congress (of July 1, 1902) contains only three
classifications , and makes no special provision with respect to building lots or urban
land that have ceased to be agricultural land.

xxxxxxxxx

"From the language of the foregoing provisions of the law, it is deduced that, with the
exception of those comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by
State or by the sovereign nation are public in character, and per se alienable and ,
provided they are not destine to the use of public in general or reserved by the
Government in accordance with law, they may be acquired by any private or juridical
person; and considering their origin and primitive state and the general uses to which
they are accorded , they are called agricultural lands, urbans lands and building lots
being included in this classification for the purpose of distinguishing rural and urban
estates from mineral and timber lands; the transformation they may have undergone
is no obstacle to such classification as the possessors thereof may again convert them
into rural estates. " (Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government 13 Phil., 161, 163
164, 165, 166; emphasis added.).

( b ) Under the Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act),
the phrase (public Land Act), the phrase "public agricultural land" includes
lands of the public domain suitable for residential purposes .
"Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution, reads as follows:

"All agricultural timber, and mineral lands of the public domain waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned
by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant lease, or concession at the time of
the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural
resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated...
" (Emphasis added.).

"Under the above-quote provision, the disposition exploitation, development or utilization of

the natural resources, including agricultural lands of the public domain is limited to citizens of
the Philippines or to the corporations or associations therein mentioned. It also clearly appears
from said provision that natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, are
not subject to alienation.

"On November 7, 1936, or more than one year after the adoption of the Constitution,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, known as the Public Land Act, was approved. Under this Act the
lands of the public have been classified into three divisions: ( a ) alienable or disposable, ( b )
timber, and ( c ) mineral lands. The lands designated alienable or disposable correspond to
lands designated in the Constitution as public agricultural lands, because under section 1,
Article XII, public agricultural lands are the only natural resources of the country which are the
only natural resources of the country which are subject to alienation or deposition.

"Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 provide that the alienable or disposable public lands
shall be classified, according to use or purposes to which they are destined, into a agricultural,
residential, commercial, industrial, etc., lands. At first blush it would seem that under this
classification residential land is different from agricultural land. The difference however, is
more apparent than real. equivalent to the lands classified by the Commonwealth Act No. 141
as alienable or disposable, according to the purposes to which said lands are especially
adopted. But notwithstanding this of all said lands are essentially agricultural public lands
because only agricultural public lands are subject to alienation or disposition under section 1,
Article XII of the Constitution. A contrary view would necessarily create a conflict between
Commonwealth Act No. 141 and section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution, and such conflict
should be avoided, if possible, and said Act construed in the light of the fundamental
provisions of the Constitution and in entire harmony therewith.

"Another universal principles applied in considering constitutional question is, that an

Act will be so construed, if possible, as to avoid conflict with the Constitution, although
such a construction may not be the most obvious or natural one." The Court may
resort to an implication to sustain a statute, but not to destroy it. "But the courts
cannot go beyond the province of legitimate construction, in order to save a statute;
and where the meaning is plain, words cannot to be read into it or out of it for that
purpose. " (1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, pp. 135, 136.)

"In view of the fact that more than one than one year after the adoption of the Constitution
the National Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed Commonwealth Act No. 141,
which a compilation of the laws relative to the lands of the public domain and the amendments
thereto, form to the Constitution.

" Where the legislature has revised a statute after a Constitution has been adopted,
such a revision is to be considered as a legislative construction that the statute so
revised conforms to the Constitution. " (59 CJ, 1102; emphasis added.)
"By the way of illustration, let us supposed that a piece or tract of public land has been
classified pursuant to section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as residential land. If, by
reason of this classification, it is maintained that said land has ceased to be agricultural public
land, it will no longer be subject to alienation or disposition by reason of the constitutional
provision that only agricultural lands are alienable; 141 to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations mentioned in section 1, Article XII of the Constitution. Therefore,
the classification of public agricultural lands into various subdivisions is only for purposes of
administration, alienation or disposition, but it does not destroy the inherent nature of all such
lands as a public agricultural lands.

"( c ) Judicial interpretation of doubtful clause or phrase use in the law, controlling.

"The judicial interpretation given to the phrase" public agricultural land "is a sufficient
authority for giving the same interpretation to the phrase as used in subsequent legislation,
and this is especially so in view of the length of time during which this interpretation has been
maintained by the courts On this point Sutherland has the following to say:

"When a judicial interpretation has once been put upon a clause, expressed in a vague
manner by the legislature, and difficult to be understood, that ought of itself to be
sufficient authority for adopting the same construction. Buller J., said:" We find solemn
determination of these doubtful expressions in the statute, and as that now put
another construction has since prevailed, there is no reason why we should now put
another construction of the act on account of any suppose change of convenience.
"This rule of construction will hold good even if the court be opinion that the practical
erroneous; so that if the matter were res integra the court would adopt a different
construction. Lord Cairns said: "I think that with regard to statutes ... it is desirable
not so much that the principle of the decision should be capable at all times of
justification, as that the law should be settled, and should, when once settled, be
maintained without any danger of vacillation or uncertainty. "Judicial usage and
practice will have weight, and when continued for a long time will be sustained though
carried beyond the pair purport of the statute." (II Lewis' Sutherland Statutory
Construction, pp. 892, 893.).

"An important consideration regarding the weight of contemporary judicial

construction is the length of time it has continued. It is adopted, and derives great
force from being adopted, soon after the enactment of the law. It may be, and is
presumed, that the Legislative sense of its policy, and of its true scope and meaning,
permeates the judiciary and controls its exposition. the of the authority appointed to
expound the law, just and correct conclusions, when reached, they are, moreover,
within the strongest reasons on which founded the maxim of stare decisis . Such a
construction is public given, and the subsequent silence of the legislature is strong
evidence of acquiescence, though not conclusive... (II Lewis Sutherland Statutory
Construction, pp. 894, 895.)

"Furthermore, when the phrase" public agricultural land "was used in section 1 of Article XII of
the Constitution, it is presumed that it was so used with the same judicial meaning therefor
given to it and therefor the meaning of the phrase, as used in the Constitution, includes
residential lands and another lands of the public domain, but excludes mineral and timber
lands.

" Adoption of provisions previously construed - ad. Previous construction by Courts . -

Where a statute that has been construed by the courts of the last resort has been
reenacted in same, or substantially the same, terms, the legislature is presumed to
have been familiar with its construction, and to have adopted it is part of the law,
unless a contrary intent clearly appears, or a different construction is expressly
provided for; and the same rule applies in the construction of a statute enacted after a
similar or cognate statute has been judicially construed. So where words or phrases
 employed in a new statute have been construed by the court to have been used in a
particular sense in a previous statute on the same subject, or one analogous to it, they
are presumed, in the a absence of clearly expressed intent to the contrary, to be used
in the same sense in the statute as in the previous statute. " (59 CJ, 1061-1063.).

" Legislative adoption of judicial construction . - In the adoption of the code, the
legislature is presumed to have known the judicial construction which have been
placed on the former statutes; and therefore the reenactment in the code or general
review of provisions substantially the same as those contained in the former statutes
is a legislative adoption of their known judicial constructions, unless a contrary intent
is clearly manifest. So the fact that the revisers eliminated statutory language after it
had been judicially construed shows that they had such construction in view. " (59 CJ,
1102.)

"II. The lower court erred in not declaring null and void the sale of said land to the appellant
(appellee).

"Granting that the land in question has ceased to be a part of the lands of the public domain
by reason of the long continuous ,, public adverse possession of the applicant's predecessors
in interest, and that the latter had performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and were entitled to a certificate of title under section 48, subsection ( b ), of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, still the sale of said land of December 8, 1938, to the applicant
as evidenced by Exhibits B and C, was null and void for being contrary to section 5, Article XII
of the Constitution, which reads as follows:

"Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be

transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain of the Philippines."

"The applicant, being a Chinese citizen, is disqualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain (section 1, Article XII of the Constitution; section 12, 22, 23, 33, 44, 48,
Commonwealth Act No. 141), and consequently also disqualified to buy and acquire private
agriculture land.

"In view of the well settled judicial meaning of the phrase public agricultural land, 'as
hereinbefore demonstrated, the phrase' private agricultural land, 'as used in the above quoted
provision, can only mean land of private ownership, whether agricultural, residential,
commercial or industrial. And this necessarily so, because the phrase 'agricultural land used in
the Constitution and in the Public Land Law must be given the same uniform meaning to wit,
any land of the public domain or any land of private ownership, which is neither mineral or
forestry.

"A word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the
statute, unless a different intention appears. ... Where words have being long used in
a technical sense and have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning, and
have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a particular
statute in which they are used, the rule of construction requires that the words used in
such statute should be construed according to the sense may vary from the strict
literal meaning of the words . " (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction., P. 758.).

"This interpretation is in harmony with the nationalistic policy, spirit and purpose of our
Constitution and laws, to wit,` to conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, 'as
solemnly enunciated in the preamble to the Constitution.

"A narrow and literal interpretation of the phrase 'private agriculture land' would impair and
defeat the nationalistic aim and general policy of our laws and would allow a gradual, steady,
 and unlimited accumulation in alien hands of a substantial portion of our heritage estates, to
the detriment of our national solidarity, stability, and independence. Nothing could prevent the
acquisition of a great portion or the whole of a city by subjects of a foreign power. And yet a
city or urban area is more strategical than a farm or rural land.

"The mere literal construction of section in a statute ought not to prevail if it is

opposed to the intention of the legislature apparent by the statute; and if the words
are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other construction it is to be adopted to
effectuate that The intent prevails over the letter, and the letter will, if possible be so
read as to conform to the spirit of the act. While the intention of the legislature must
be ascertained from the words used to express it, the manifest reason and the obvious
purpose of the law should not be sacrificed to a liberal interpretation of such words.
" (II Sutherland, Stat. Construction, pp. 721, 722.)

"We conclude, therefore, that the residential lot which the applicant seeks to register in his
name falls within the meaning of private agricultural land as this phrase is used in our
Constitution and, consequently, is not subject to acquisition by foreigners except by hereditary
succession . "

The argument hold water. It expresses a correct interpretation of the Constitution and the real intent
of the Constitutional Convention.

One of our fellow members therein, Delegate Montilla, said:

The constitutional precepts that I believe will ultimately lead us to our desired goal are; (1)
the complete nationalization of our lands and natural resources; (2) the nationalization of our
commerce and industry compatible with good international practices. With the complete
nationalization of our lands and natural resources it is to be understood that our God-given
birthright should be one hundred per cent in Filipino hands. ... Lands and natural resources
are immovable and as such can be compared to the vital organs of a person's body, the lack of
possession of which may cause instant death or the shortening of life. If we do not completely
nationalize these two of our most important belongings, I am afraid that the time will come
when we shall be sorry for the time we were born. Our independence will be just a mockery,
for what kind of independence are we going to have if a part of our country is not in our hands
but in those of foreigner? (2 Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 592.).

From the same book of Delegate Aruego, we quote:

The nationalization of the natural resources of the country was intended (1) to insure their
conservation for Filipino posterity; (2) to serve as an instrument of national defense, helping
prevent the extension into the country of foreign control through peaceful economic
penetration; and (3) to prevent making the Philippines a source of international conflict with
the consequent danger to its internal security and independence.

xxxxxxxxx

. . . In the preface to its report, the committee on nationalization and preservation of lands
and other natural resources said;

"International complications have often resulted from the existence of alien ownership of land
and natural resources in a weak country. Because of this danger, it is best that aliens should
be restricted in the acquisition of land and other natural resources. An example is afforded by
the case of Texas This state was originally province of Mexico In order to secure its rapid
settlements and development, the Mexican government offered free land to settlers in Texas
Americans responded more rapidly than the Mexicans, and soon they organized a revolt
against Mexican rule, and then secured annexation to the United States.A new increase of
 alien landholding in Mexico has brought about the desire a prevent a repetition of the Texas
affair.According to the Mexican constitution of 1917 contains serious limitation on the right of
aliens to hold lands and mines in Mexico. The Filipinos should profit from this example. "

xxxxxxxxx

It was primarily for these reasons that the Convention approved readily the proposed principle
of prohibiting aliens to acquire, exploit, develop, or utilize agricultural, timber, and mineral
lands of the public domain, waters minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces
of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines. For the same reasons the
Convention approved readily available the proposed principle of prohibiting the transfer of
assignment to aliens of private agricultural land, save in the case of hereditary succession. (2
Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, pp. 604, 605, 606.).

All the foregoing show why we, having been a member of the Constitutional Convention, agree with
Solicitor General's position and concur in the result in this case, although we would go as far as the
outright pronouncement that the purchase made by appelle is null and void .

BRIONES, M., with whom PARAS and TUASON, MM., Are dissident:

The applicant in this file asks for the registration of the lot in question as private property land , and
only with an additional character invokes the provisions of chapter 8 of Law No. 2874 on public land
(Exceptions, p. 3.)

For its part, the Director of Land opposes the application under three grounds, namely: (1) because
neither the applicant nor his predecessors in interest can demonstrate sufficient title on said plot of
land, not having acquired the same or by title of composition with the State under the sovereignty of
Spain, nor by title of possessory information under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894; (2)
because the aforementioned lot is a portion of the public domain lands belonging to the
Commonwealth of the Philippines; (3) Because the applicant is a Chinese citizen, he is not qualified
under the provisions of the Philippine Constitution to acquire public or private land ( idem , pages 5
and 6).

Both the applicant and the Land Director practiced their tests before an arbitrator appointed by the
Tayabas Court of First Instance. In view of such evidence, Judge Magsalin, of the aforementioned
Court, issued a judgment in favor of the applicant, of which we transcribe the following pertinent
portions:

The representation of the opposition Land Director tries to prove through the testimony of the
Land Bureau Inspector that, the land object of the request is part of the public domain and
also the applicant is a Chinese citizen, but said witness affirmed that the land object of The
present application is a plot located within the population of the municipality of Guinayanga,
Tayabas, and in it there is a house of strong materials and lacking merit this opposition must
be dismissed.

Therefore, after dismissing the opposition of the Land Director, the plot of land object of the
present application described in the plan Psu-109117 is awarded with its improvements, in
favor of the applicant Oh Cho, Chinese citizen, of legal age, married with Yee Shi, and resident
in the municipality of Guinayanga, Tayabas, Philippine Islands. (Decision, page 8, Record on
Appeal.)

From the transcribed the following is inferred in a forced manner: ( a ) that the lower court flatly
dismisses the opposition of the Land Director based on the assumption that the questioned lot is part
of the public domain ; ( b ) that the same court rejected the other basis of the opposition, that is,
being the Chinese citizen applicant is incapacitated under our Constitution to acquire land, already
public, already private, even if it is a plot of urban character; ( c ) that, according to
the Judge's decision to quo , the questioned land not being public, is necessarily private land .

The Land Director, not being satisfied with the sentence, appealed to the Court of Appeal and makes
two allegations of error in his plea, none of which calls into question the quality of private of the land
in question. The appellant does not raise any question of fact; It raises only a question of
law. Therefore, in the reconstitution of this file - the original was burned during the war - there has
been no need to include shorthand notes or documentary evidence, and in fact we have considered
and decided this matter without such notes and evidence. The lawyer Constantine, of the appellate, in
the hearing for the reconstitution of the cars, made this statement; "In view also of the fact that the
questions involved here are only questions of law, this representation waives the right to present the
evidence presented in the trial court...." For his part, the Attorney General, in explaining the case on
behalf of the appellant Director of Land, began his allegation with the following statement:

This appeal is a test case. There are now several cases of exactly the same nature pending in
the trial courts.

Whether or not an alien can acquire a residential lot and register it in his name is
the only question raised in this appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Tayabas which sustained the affirmance and decreed the registration of the said property in
favor of the applicant who, by his own voluntary admission, is a citizen of the Chinese
Republic. This question is raised in connection with the constitutional provision that no private
agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned to foreigners except in cases of hereditary
succession. (Pags. 1, 2, allegation of the appellant.)

Having appealed the sentence to the Court of Appeal, why was this matter raised to the Supreme
Court, before which it was pending even before the war, and unresolved during the Japanese
occupation? The reason is not specifically stated in the records, but since it is not an appeal of the
Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court, the only explanation that is possible is that he realized that the
appeal did not raise more than a question of law , I order, as was rigorous, the transfer of the matter
to this Court because it is within its jurisdiction and competence.

We have considered necessary to establish the previous premises because they serve as the basis for
the argument that we will then develop to support this dissent.

I. It is clear from the foregoing that the Land Director has opposed the requested registration, among
other reasons, because the land is public ; that the lower court has dismissed this basis for "lacking
merit," failing that the land is private ; that the Director of Land, in his appeal to us, does not question
this Judge's conclusion to quo , but rather by admitting that the land is privately owned, argues,
however, that under section 5, Article XII of the Constitution In the Philippines, the applicant, because
he is a foreigner, cannot acquire private agricultural land, an urban lot such as the one in this file
being included in this concept. Having raised the matter in such terms, can this Court consider and
resolve a point not between the parties - a point that is firm and definitively resolved and is not
subject to appeal? In other words: can this Court, as does the majority in its opinion, revoke a lower-
court conclusion that is not discussed in the appellant's plea? Can we, in good procedural law, declare
the land in question on our own initiative, when the Attorney General himself, who represents the
State, admits in his allegation the private character of the lot, and only raises a question, of law, to
know: that under our Constitution no transfer act of ownership in favor of a foreigner is valid, so it is
an urban property, because the phrase "private agricultural land" contained in the Constitution
encompasses not only rustic but also urban farms ? And, above all, can we, in fairness and justice,
consider and review a point that is not only not discussed by the parties, because they take it for
granted and established, but that it is law and de facto at the same time? What basis do we have to
do it when we do not have both testimony and documentary evidence in front of us? Our answer is, at
all, negative.

The jurisdiction of this Court to review the sentences of the lower courts, of which an appeal has been
filed, is based on the principle that said jurisdiction, in its exercise, has to be limited to the
controversial issues, and this is determined by the reporting of errors that the appellant makes in his
allegation. Article 19 of the old rules of procedure in this Supreme Court said in its first paragraph the
following:

Attached to the allegation of the appellant and in a separate statement, a list of the legal
errors to be discussed will be attached. The specification of each of these errors will be made
by separate paragraphs, clearly, in a concise manner, and without incurring repetitions, and
will be numbered in correlative order.

Article 20 of the same regulation stipulated:

No error of law outside the one related to competition on the subject of a litigation, will be
taken into consideration as it has not been pointed out in the relation of the errors and
presented as one of the grounds in the allegation.

Interpreting these regulatory provisions, the Court made in the case of Santiago v. Felix (24 Jur. Fil.,
391), the following doctrinal pronouncements:

1. APPEAL; EFFECT TO STOP FILING ERRORS; FIRMLY ESTABLISHED RULE. - It is a rule

established by the jurisprudence of the Courts of these Islands, by virtue of repeated and
uniform sentences of this Court, that if in an appeal the appellant ceases to indicate the errors
incurred by the lower Court, and will limit itself to discussing matters of fact in general, it is
not possible for this Court to consider or review the adverse resolution to the appellant, for the
reason of having passed against the law and the weight of the evidence, but it is necessary
that State and specify the error or errors that determined the appealed decision that the
appellant describes as illegal and unfair.

2. Id .; Id .; Same Rule as Adopted by the Courts of the United States. - The same legal
doctrine is in observance in the Courts of the United States of North America, since a general
statement that the Court erred in issuing a ruling in favor of one of the parties is not sufficient
as a basis for the The Court may review the appealed sentence, because unless the Judge's
assessment of the facts alleged and proven in trial is manifestly contrary to the result and
weight of the evidence, the Court of Justice usually accepts the Judge's judgment and
judgment. on matters of fact, and it is not appropriate to revoke the appeal appealed without
good cause. (Enriquez vs. Enriquez, 8 Jur. Fil., 574; Chaplaincy of
Tambobong against Antonio, 8 Jur. Fil., 693; Paterno against the City of Manila, 17 Jur. Fil.,
26) "(Santiago vs. Felix, 24 Jur . Fil., 391.)

This doctrine was subsequently reiterated in the following matters: Tan Me Nio v. Customs
Administrator, 34 Jur. Fil., 995, 996; Hernaez vs. Montelibano, 34 Jur. Fil., 1011.

Rule 53, section 6, of the current court regulations, provides the following:

SEC. 5. Questions that may be decided . - No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over
the subject matter will be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors and properly
argued in the brief, save as the court, at its option, may notice plain errors not specified, and
also clerical errors .

It will not be said that the question of whether the land in question is public or private, considered and
resolved by the majority in its decision without prior indication of error or appropriate argument in the
Attorney General's allegation , is included among the exceptions referred to in the rule above
transcribed because it neither affects the jurisdiction over the matter of the dispute, nor is it a "plain
error," or "clerical error."

It will be noted that in the old regulation there was no such thing as "plain errors not specified"
(patent errors or manifest not specified in the allegation). But is it possible to invoke this reservation
in the case at hand Undoubtedly not, for the following reasons: ( a ) the records do not prove that the
Judge who made a patent and manifest error in declaring in his sentence that the land is not public
but private; We have no choice but to accept on your face the conclusion of the sentencing Judge on
this matter for the simple reason that we have no evidence or documentary evidence before us, and,
therefore, there is no basis to review, much less to revoke said conclusion, having interpreted this
reservation in the sense that you can only take "judicial knowledge of the palpable error with regard to
the records and proceedings"; ( b ) even admitting for a moment, for the purposes of the argument,
that His Honor the Judge suffered a palpable error in establishing said conclusion, since the Attorney
General does not raise the issue in his plea, it must be understood that he has renounced his right to
do so, choosing to base your case on other reasons and reasons; therefore, we are not empowered to
consider the alleged error as motu proprio , since obviously it is not an oversight or oversight of the
State representative, but a deliberate resignation, and jurisprudence on the matter tells us that "the
underlying, fundamental purpose of the reservation in the rule is to prevent the loss of justice by
virtue of an oversight. " Here are some relevant authorities:

Purpose of exception as to plain errors . - The provision in the rule requiring assignments of
error, permitting the court, at its option, to notice a plain error not assigned, "was and in
intended, in the interest of justice, to reserve to the appellate court the right, resting in public
duty, to take cognizance of palpable error on the face of the record and proceedings ,
especially such as clearly demonstrate that the suitor has no cause of action.
" Santaella vs. Otto F. Lange Co. (155 Fed., 719, 724; 84 CCA, 145).

The rules does not intend that we are to sift the record and deal with questions which are of
small importance, but only to notice errors which are obvious upon inspection and of a
controlling character. The underlying purpose of this reservation in the rule is to prevent the
miscarriage of justice from oversight . Mast vs. Superior Drill Co. (154 Fed., 45, 51; 83 CCA
157).

II. So far, we have developed our argument under the assumption that the quality of private litigation
grounds is not a controversial dispute in this instance because the question in the Attorney General's
argument is not raised nor is it a matter of dispute between the parties in the pending appeal before
we; therefore, we are not entitled to review, much less revoke motu proprio own the conclusion of the
court to quo on the matter. Now we are going to work under another assumption - that the Attorney
General has made the corresponding error signaling and the question is, therefore, properly raised
before this Supreme Court for the purposes of the review. The question of course is the following: did
the Judge make a mistake in declaring and conceptualizing the land in question as private, or is it, on
the contrary, correct in that regard? We are of the opinion that the Judge did not make a mistake, that
the land in question meets the legal conditions necessary to qualify it as private and differentiate it
from a public domain property, and that, therefore, the applicant has a confirmed title on the property
under the provisions of Land Registration Law No. 496.

Affirm in the majority decision that the applicant has not been able to prove that the or any of its
causes in law acquired the state lot through purchase or concession under the laws, ordinances and
decrees promulgated by the Spanish Government in the Philippines, or under of the procedures
related to possessory information under the mortgage law in time of Spain. From this the majority
draw the conclusion that the questioned land is not private because, according to its criteria, "all the
land that was not acquired from the Government (Spanish Government, it is meant), whether by
purchase, or by concession, belong to the public domain"; and citing as an authority the classic affair
of Cariño against the Insular Government, the presentation admits no more exception to the rule than
the case in which a land has been in the possession of the occupant and of his predecessors in interest
since time immemorial, as such justifying possession the presumption that the land had never been
part of the public domain, or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest. "

What, in the first place, does not seem correct is the security with which the paper states that the land
was not acquired under Spanish sovereignty by virtue of any of the ways known in the legislation of
that time, because as we do not have before us evidence, there is naturally no way to check the
certainty of the proposition. If it is taken into account that the Land Director opposed the application
for registration on the grounds that the land is in the public domain, and that the lower court
dismissed this foundation, the presumption is that the quality of private land was satisfactorily tested ,
a presumption that is strengthened if it is considered that the Attorney General, in sustaining the
Government's appeal, does not dispute or question in his allegation the conclusion that the said land is
of private property.

On the other hand, the majority seems to give a too absolute and rigid character to the proposition
that "all the lands that were not acquired from the Government (in time of Spain), by purchase or by
concession, belong to the public domain." Strictly interpreting the law, this Supreme Court denied the
registration requested in the famous affair of Cariño against the Insular Government that cites the
majority in its opinion, which is why it is accentuated in the paper - on the grounds that Cariño could
not prove title of purchase, concession or possessory information issued by the Government in time of
Spain, being therefore the land part of the public domain. But when the matter was raised in degree of
appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, it revoked the judgment of this Court, declaring the
land as private property and decreeing its registration in the name of the applicant. In the luminous
presentation of Judge Holmes sit conclusions proclaiming the liberal spirit of that great jurist and
reaffirm with democratic vigor the property rights of the natives of these Islands on their land against
the feudal concept and theory that the Crown of Spain She was the absolute owner until the last span
of land and that no inhabitant could own anything, unless she had in her hands a title or paper issued
by that Government. Here is what Judge Holmes says:

We come, then, to the question on which the case was decided below - namely, whether the
plaintiff owns the land. The position of government, shortly stated, is that Spain assumed,
asserted, and had title to all the land in the Philippines except so far it saw fit to allow private
titles to be acquired; that there was no prescription against the Crown, and that, if there was,
a decree of June 25, 1880, required registration within a limited time to make the title
good; that the plaintiff's land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not always,
public land; that the United States succeeded to the title of Spain, and so that the plaintiff has
no rights that the Philippine Government is bound to respect.

If we suppose for the moment that the government's contention is so far correct that the
Crown of Spain in form asserted a title to this land at the date of the treaty of Paris, to which
the United States succeeded, it is not to be assumed without argument that the plaintiff's case
is at an end. It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, "embodied the universal feudal theory
that all lands were held from the Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of conquering
nations towards people not recognized as entitled to the treatment accorded to those in the
same zone of civilization with themselves. It is true, also that, in legal theory, sovereignty is
absolute, and that, as against foreign nations, the United States may assert, as Spain
asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow that, as against the inhabitants of the
Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain had such power . When theory is left on one
side, sovereignty is a question of strength, and may vary in degree. How far a new sovereign
shall insist upon the theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past, and how far it
shall recognize actual facts, are matters for it to decide. (US Supreme Court Reports, Vol. 212,
p. 596.)

Later, the following is said in the aforementioned ruling of the Federal Supreme Court:

It is true that, by section 14, the Government of the Philippines is empowered to enact rules
and prescribe terms for perfecting titles to public lands were some, but not all, Spanish
conditions has been fulfilled, and to issue patents to natives for not more than 16 hectares of
public lands actually occupied by the native or his ancestors before August 13, 1898. But this
section perhaps might be satisfied if confined to cases where the occupation was of land
admitted to be public land, and had not continued for such a length of time and under such
circumstances as to give rise to the understanding that the occupants were owners at that
date. We hesitate to suppose that it was intended to declare every native who had not a paper
title a trespasser , and to set the claims of all the wilder tribes afloat.
 xxxxxxxxx

If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover such clear proof
that it was bas by that law as to satisfy us that he does not own the land. To begin with, the
older decrees and laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to indicate pretty
clearly that the natives were recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal
grant. In other words, Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the
Philippines into trespassers or even into tenants at will. For instance, Book 4, title 12, Law 14
of the Compilation of Laws of the Indies , cited for a contrary conclusion in
Valenton vs. Murciano (3 Phil., 537), while it commands viceroys and others, when it seems
proper, to call for the exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm those who hold by good
grants or justa prescription . It is true that it begins by the characteristic assertion of feudal
overlordship and the origin of all titles in the King or his predecessors. That was theory and
discourse. The fact was that titles were admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers of
Spain beyond this recognition in their books .

Prescription is mentioned again in the royal cedula of October 15, 1754, cited in (3 Phil., 546):
"Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they
shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription. " It may be that this means
possession from before 1700; but, at all events, the principle is admitted. As prescription,
even against Crown lands, was recognized by the laws of Spain, we see no sufficient reason
for hesitating to admit that it was recognized in the Philippines in regard to lands over which
Spain had only a paper sovereignty .

It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 attributes title to those "who may prove"
possession for the necessary time, and we do not overlook the argument that this means may
prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have
recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to
convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in
danger, if he had read every word of it . The words "may prove" (credit), as well, or better, in
view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any
litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to
show that, for want of it, ownership actually earned would be lost. The effect of the proof,
wherever made, as not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
decree, if not by earlier law. The royal decree of February 13, 1894, declaring forfeited titles
that were capable of adjustment under the decree of 1880, for which adjustment had not been
sought, should not be construed as a confiscation , but as the withdrawal of a privilege. As a
matter of fact, the applicant never was disturbed. This same decree is quoted by the court of
land registration for another recognition of the common-law prescription of thirty years as still
running against alienable Crown land.

xxxxxxxxx

. . . Upon a consideration of the whole case we are of opinion that law and justice require that
the applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should not be deprived of what, by the
practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined
interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain . (US Supreme Court Reports, Vol. 212, pp.
597-599.)

It is evident from the jurisprudence set forth in the aforementioned affair of Cariño against the Insular
Government that whatever the theory about the feudal superdomain that the Crown of Spain assumed
over all lands in the Philippines, in practice and in reality it was recognized that the mere period of
time in possession (20 or 30 years, as the case may be) could establish and in fact establish private
property rights by just prescription, and the presumptive title so acquired was for all intents and
purposes equivalent to an express concession or title letter issued by the Government. But anyway -
paraphrasing what was said by Judge Holmes - even supposing that Spain had such sovereignty or
feudal dominance over all the lands in this archipelago, and that against other nations the United
States, upon succeeding Spain, would affirm said suberania, of it does not follow that against the
inhabitants of the Philippines the American Government (now the Philippine Republic) would take the
position that Spain had such absolute power. Historically it is known that the change of sovereignty
had the effect of liquidating many Spanish institutions and laws that became obsolete, archaic in the
new state of affairs, and incompatible with the spirit of the new regime. There was no reason for this
change not to also produce its healthy effects on the legal norms of the property regime on
land. Paraphrasing again to Judge Holmes, and applying the doctrine to the present case, there is no
reason why, medinate "a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten Spanish law," what is evidently
considered public ground, under all concepts and norms , is a private land.

The jurisprudence established in the Affair against the Insular Government has come to establish the
norm, the basic authority in matters of registration before our courts. Socaire of its sense and
genuinely liberal tendency have been registered under the Torrens system infinity of private land. In
much less meritorious cases than the one in question, the character or condition of private ownership
of the land on which the applications were applied has been recognized by our courts, not applying the
enabling and supplementary clauses of the public land laws - Law No. 926, then No. 2874, and finally
No. 141 of the Commonwealth - but the strictest provisions of Law No. 496 on the registration of
private land, under the Torrens system. There is no reason for this liberal and progressive trend to
suffer a deviation in the present case.

But even under the Spanish legislation interpreted strictly, we believe that the land in question is as
private as the land in the matter of Cariño, if not more. According to the judgment of the inferior - the
united data for this examination, since it has already been said repeatedly that we do not have the
evidence before us - "the land object of the present request was originally of Captain Gina and that it
was in possession since 1880 , later it became Francisco Reformado until 1885, later in 1886 it was
Claro Lagdameo, on the death of this happened in possession of his widow Fortunata Olega de
Lagdameo, in 1929 he sold it to his three children Antonio, Luis and Rafael appellidados Lagdameo,
according to Exhibits F and G, and the latter in turn sold it in 1938 to the applicant Oh Cho, according
to Exhibits B 1-and C-1. " "... This land is a residential plot within the population of the municipality of
Guinayangan, Tayabas, and in it there is a house of strong materials that occupies almost all the land
..." (Piece of Exceptions, page 8) .

As you can see, at least since 1880 there was a well-known owner and owner of the land - Captain
Gina. However, it coincides that on June 25 of that year that precisely when the Decree was issued
"for the adjustment and adjudication of real estate unduly occupied by private individuals in the
Philippine Islands." While it is true that the purpose of the Decree or law was to order that the
adjustment and registration procedures described therein be complied with and practiced, and in that
sense to require that each obtain a title document or, failing that, lose your property It is also true
that the Decree expressed certain qualifications that seemed to denote that these formal procedures
were not strictly applied to everyone. One of these caveats, for example, provided (Article 5) that, for
all legal purposes, "all those who have been in possession for a period of time would be considered as
owners - for cultivated land, 20 20 years without interruption, is enough, and for uncultivated land, 30
years. " And Article 6 provides that "interested parties not included in the two preceding articles
(articles that recognize the prescription of 20 and 30 years) may legalize their possession, and
consequently acquire full ownership of said land, through adjustment and adjudication procedures.
processed as follows. " This last provision seems to indicate, by its terms, that it is not applicable to
those who have already been declared owners by virtue of the simple course of a certain period of
time ( See Affection Against Insular Government, supra , 598).

It does not appear in the sentence of the inferior that Captain Gina has accepted the provisions of the
aforementioned Decree of June 25, 1880, obtaining a title document to legalize her possession, but
the opposite is not positive either, because we do not have before us the evidence . But even
supposing that the formalities prescribed in the Decree have not been fulfilled, it does not follow that
the land was no longer private, because the presumption is that there was no need for such formality
because Captain Gina or her legal causes They had already been declared owners of the property for
the mere duration of a period of time, in accordance with the exceptions mentioned. This presumption
is all the more logical since Article 8 of the Decree provided for the case of parties that did not request
within one year the adjustment and adjudication of land whose possession they enjoyed improperly,
and concluded that the Treasury "will resume the domain of State on the land "and will sell at auction
the part that is not reserved for itself; and not only does it not record in records that the possession of
Capitata Gina or her legal successors has never been considered illegal or that the State and its
agents have adopted and practiced against them the errands and procedures referred to in the
aforementioned article 8 of the Decree, but, on the contrary, it is stated in the sentence that since
Captain Gina in 1880 there were successive transmissions of rights first to Francisco Reformado in
1885 and then to Claro Lagdameo in 1886, and to the death of the latter to his widow Fortunata Olega
de Lagdameo, from whom the title passes under purchase and sale to his sons Antonio, Luis and
Rafael surnamed Lagdameo, and the last transaction on the plot took place quite recently, in 1938,
when the last named were sold to Oh Cho the applicant in this registration dossier. From all of which it
follows that the plot in question was always considered private property - at least where memory
reaches - from 1880 until the American sovereignty in the Philippines died, and that neither the State
nor its agents ever interfered in the made of his exclusive possession, continuous and published by
owner for different persons not only under the Decree of June 25, 1880 so many times mentioned, but
even under the Decree of February 13, 1894 (possessory information) that was practically the Last
decree issued in the aftermath of Spanish sovereignty in relation to the adjustment and adjudication
of realengos or public lands. And do not say that this would have been inadvertently by the
authorities, particularly the Treasury, because it is a plot located in the same town of Guinayangan,
one of the oldest towns in the province of Tayabas, it is unquestionable that if it did not meet the
conditions and requirements to be conceptualized as private property and the possession of its
successive occupants was improper and illegal, and the Treasury and Treasury agents would have
promptly confiscated it under article 8 already cited of the Decree of June 25, 1880
( See Honey against Insular Government, ut supra 598.) The fact that none of this has happened is
the best proof that at the time of Spain the different and successive occupants of this site already had
perfect Sunday title, and it is simply absurd, ridiculous that now, at After 66 years, the land is
declared public; and all why and for what - to render submission, repeating again the subtle irony of
Judge Homles, to the "refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain." And it is more the
futility of this late tribute to an anachronism, to a legal mummy of an increasingly remote past, if it is
considered that when Judge Homes pronounced his sentence clearly releases and progressive
(January 23, 1909) we were only 10 years after the fall of Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines,
while now that a radical deviation from the groove traced by the solid fence of the sentence is
attempted, we are almost half a century away, with full republican dominion over the territory
national. This should not worry us if it were not because this decision can now be interpreted as an
abrogation of so many precedents molded in the turquoise of the Holmesian doctrine, and at the same
time as the demarcation of the starting point of a new route in our jurisprudence on registration of
land.

However, in the majority opinion it is said that the applicant cannot successfully claim that his lot is
private land because the possession of his first predecessor (Captain Gina) began only in 1880, while
in the matter of Affection Against Insular government is required as a requirement possession from
time immemorial, possession that, according to the majority. "It would justify the presumption that
the land had never been part of the public domain, or that it had been private property even before
the Spanish conquest." It does not seem that one wants to indicate a date, a year, as a rule to
determine the immemoriality of the possessory beginning. But what date, what year would this
be? 1870, '60, '50? Wouldn't it be enough v. gr . 1875, '65, or '55? In the matter of Cariño the known
and remembered date of the initial possession could be set around the middle of the last century, that
is, 1849, because according to the evidence, Cariño and his predecessors had owned the land a little
more than 50 years until the treaty of Paris - April 11, 1899. In the present case, from Captain Gina
until the applicant filed her application for registration on January 17, 1940, 60 years had elapsed; so
that in terms of the time of possession both cases are identical. With an advantage in favor of the
present case, namely: while in the matter of Cariño the lands object of the request were grazing, in
large part, and only cultivated a few portions, in which the lot occupies us is urban, but in one of the
oldest villages in the Philippines, with a house of strong materials nestled in it. It is undeniable that
the possession of an urban plot is more concrete, more strict and more adverse to the whole world,
without excluding the State.

But even limiting ourselves to possession under Spanish sovereignty for the purposes of qualifying the
land as private property, it can still be said that the present case is as good if not better than
Cariño's. In the affair of Cariño the known starting point is around 1849; in ours, 1880, when the
possession of Captain Gina began, according to the sentence appealed. But this does not mean that
before Capitana Gina the plot was no longer an urban property, owned by someone else as a private
property. Keep in mind that it is a plot located in the town of Guinayangan, one of the oldest in
Tayabas. We do not have the exact date of the foundation of that town in front of us, and we do not
have time now to do historical research. But fortunately we have managed to save a substantial part
of our private library from the devastation caused by the recent war, and one of the books saved is
the celebrated Geographical, Statistical and Historical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands published in
Madrid by Fr. Manuel Buzeta y Fr Felipe Bravo in 1950, according to the imprint of two volumes. In the
2nd volume, pp. 70 and 71, a description of the town of Guinayanga is given, with a good copy of
historical, geographical, social and economic data. The description begins in this way: "People with a
priest and governor, on the Island of Luzon, province of Tayabas, dioc, of Nueva caceres"; . . "It has
about 1,500 houses, generally of simple construction, distinguishing itself as the best manufactures
the parish house and the so-called court of justice, where the jail is." Considering that we can take
judicial knowledge that at the time of Spain the municipality and the parish were the culmination of a
slow and long process of civilization and Christianization, we can therefore assume that long before
1850 - 50, 70 or 100 years - the people of Guinayangan were already a geographical, civil and
spiritual unit, in full rule, and with definitive characters of urban viability. It is also perfectly possible
to presume that its inhabitants owned their respective lots as owners, as well as what happened in
other duly organized municipalities. It cannot be presumed that the State allowed them to unduly
occupy their plots, without taking against them the action referred to in article 8 of the
aforementioned Decree of June 25, 1880; and we have already seen that it does not appear in the
records that the plot in question has ever been confiscated by the Treasury or Treasury agents, or the
possession of the same is declared illegal, in accordance with the provisions of said Decree. So from
any angle that the present matter is seen, it falls perfectly under the norms of immemorial possession
established in the Affection affair.

III. Since the land in question has been shown to be private, it is necessary to conclude that the
applicant has the right to have his title confirmed under the provisions of Land Registration Law No.
496, in accordance with the Torrens system. It is a firmly established doctrine in this jurisdiction that
a foreigner has a perfect right to have private land registered in his name, under the Torrens system,
and that the provisions of the public land law are inapplicable to private land
( see Agari v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Jur. Fil., 150; Tan Yungquip v. Land Director,
42 Jur. Fil., 134; Central Capiz v. Ramirez, 40 Jur. Fil., 926). In the first aforementioned case, the
applicant was a Japanese named Ichisuke Agari and the request was deemed to be a private land,
acquired in time from Spain through composition with the state. In the second case the applicant was
a Chinese and the application was estimated for the same reason, having proved a known and
remembered possession of 30 to 40 years prior to the submission of the application, that is, a shorter
time than the present case The same happened in the third aforementioned case, the owners of the
farm being Spanish. Confirm, therefore, the sentence appealed.