Republic of the Philippines Later, misunderstandings and unpleasant incidents developed
SUPREME COURT between the parties and when petitioner tried to terminate their
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 129742 September 16, 1998
TERESITA G. FABIAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman;
HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon; and NESTOR V. AGUSTIN, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner has appealed to us by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court from the "Joint Order" issued by public respondents on June
18, 1997 in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411 which granted the motion
for reconsideration of and absolved private respondent from
administrative charges for inter alia grave misconduct committed by
him as then Assistant Regional Director, Region IV-A, Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH).
I Herein respondent Ombudsman, in an Order dated February 26,
It appears from the statement and counter-statement of facts of the
parties that petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder
and president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation
(PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business. Private
respondent Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of
the First Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly
committed the offenses for which he was administratively charged in
the Office of the Ombudsman.
PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction
projects including those under the FMED, and private respondent,
reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner
into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the
course of which private respondent gifted PROMAT with public works
contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his
office.
relationship, private respondent refused and resisted her attempts to
do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and
threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case
against him in a letter-complaint dated July 24, 1995.
The said complaint sought the dismissal of private respondent for
violation of Section 19, Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of
1989) and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service
Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his preventive suspension. For
purposes of this case, the charges referred to may be subsumed
under the category of oppression, misconduct, and disgraceful or
immoral conduct.
On January 31, 1996, Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a
resolution finding private respondent guilty of grave misconduct and
ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits
under the law. His resolution bore the approval of Director Napoleon
Baldrias and Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera of their
office.
1996, approved the aforesaid resolution with modifications, by finding
private respondent guilty of misconduct and meting out the penalty of
suspension without pay for one year. After private respondent moved
for reconsideration, respondent Ombudsman discovered that the
former's new counsel had been his "classmate and close associate"
hence he inhibited himself. The case was transferred to respondent
Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero who, in the now challenged
Joint Order of June 18, 1997, set aside the February 26, 1997 Order
of respondent Ombudsman and exonerated private respondent from
the administrative charges.
II
In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic
Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) 1 pertinently provides that —
1
 In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders,
directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a
petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of
the written notice of the order, directive or decision or
denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Emphasis supplied)
However, she points out that under Section 7, Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman), 2 when a respondent is absolved of the charges in an
administrative proceeding the decision of the Ombudsman is final and
unappealable. She accordingly submits that the Office of the
Ombudsman has no authority under the law to restrict, in the manner
provided in its aforesaid Rules, the right of appeal allowed by
Republic Act No. 6770, nor to limit the power of review of this Court.
Because of the aforecited provision in those Rules of Procedure, she
claims that she found it "necessary to take an alternative recourse
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, because of the doubt it creates
on the availability of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Respondents filed their respective comments and rejoined that the
Office of the Ombudsman is empowered by the Constitution and the
law to promulgate its own rules of procedure. Section 13(8), Article XI
of the 1987 Constitution provides, among others, that the Office of the
Ombudsman can "(p)romulgate its rules of procedure and exercise
such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be
provided by law."
Republic Act No. 6770 duly implements the Constitutional mandate
with these relevant provisions:
Sec. 14. Restrictions. — . . . No court shall hear any
appeal or application for remedy against the decision or
findings of the Ombudsman except the Supreme Court
on pure questions of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 18. Rules of Procedure. — (1) The Office of the
Ombudsman shall promulgate its own rules of
procedure for the effective exercise or performance of
its powers, functions, and duties.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 23. Formal Investigation. — (1) Administrative
investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be
in accordance with its rules of procedure and
consistent with due process. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. — All
previsionary orders at the Office of the Ombudsman
are immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed
within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and
shall be entertained only on any of the following
grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when
supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any
order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of
public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more
than one month salary shall be final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders,
directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a
petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of
the written notice of the order, directive or decision or
denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2
 The above rules may be amended or modified by the
Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of justice may
require.
Respondents consequently contend that, on the foregoing
constitutional and statutory authority, petitioner cannot assail the
validity of the rules of procedure formulated by the Office of the
Ombudsman governing the conduct of proceedings before it, including
those rules with respect to the availability or non-availability of appeal
in administrative cases, such as Section 7, Rule III of Administrative
Order No. 07.
Respondents also question the propriety of petitioner's proposition
that, although she definitely prefaced her petition by categorizing the
same as "an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,"
she makes the aforequoted ambivalent statement which in effect asks
that, should the remedy under Rule 45 be unavailable, her petition be
treated in the alternative as an original action for certiorari under Rule
65. The parties thereafter engage in a discussion of the differences
between a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.
Ultimately, they also attempt to review and rationalize the decisions of
this Court applying Section 27 of Republic Act. No. 6770 vis-a-
vis Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07. As correctly
pointed out by public respondent, Ocampo IV vs. Ombudsman, et
al.3 and Young vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al.4 were original
actions for certiorari under Rule 65. Yabut vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, et al. 5 was commenced by a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45. Then came Cruz, Jr. vs. People, et
al.,6 Olivas vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al.,7 Olivarez vs.
Sandiganbayan, et al.,8 and Jao, et al. vs. Vasquez,9 which were
for certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus under Rule 65. Alba vs.
Nitorreda, et al. 10 was initiated by a pleading unlikely denominated as
an "Appeal/Petition for Certiorari and/or Prohibition," with a prayer for
ancillary remedies, and ultimately followed by Constantino vs. Hon.
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, et al. 11 which was a special civil action
for certiorari.
Considering, however, the view that this Court now takes of the case
at bar and the issues therein which will shortly be explained, it refrains
from preemptively resolving the controverted points raised by the
parties on the nature and propriety of application of the writ
of certiorari when used as a mode of appeal or as the basis of a
special original action, and whether or not they may be resorted to
concurrently or alternatively, obvious though the answers thereto
appear to be. Besides, some seemingly obiter statements
in Yabut and Alba could bear reexamination and clarification. Hence,
we will merely observe and lay down the rule at this juncture that
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is involved only whenever an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an
administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account
where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a
remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal
action.
III
After respondents' separate comments had been filed, the Court was
intrigued by the fact, which does not appear to have been seriously
considered before, that the administrative liability of a public official
could fall under the jurisdiction of both the Civil Service Commission
and the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, the offenses imputed to
herein private respondent were based on both Section 19 of Republic
Act No. 6770 and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807. Yet,
pursuant to the amendment of Section 9, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
by Republic Act No. 7902, all adjudications by the Civil Service
Commission in administrative disciplinary cases were made
appealable to the Court of Appeals effective March 18, 1995, while
those of the Office of the Ombudsman are appealable to this Court.
It could thus be possible that in the same administrative case
involving two respondents, the proceedings against one could
eventually have been elevated to the Court of Appeals, while the other
may have found its way to the Ombudsman from which it is sought to
be brought to this Court. Yet systematic and efficient case
management would dictate the consolidation of those cases in the
Court of Appeals, both for expediency and to avoid possible
conflicting decisions.
3
Then there is the consideration that Section 30, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution provides that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this
Constitution without its advice and consent," and that Republic Act
No. 6770, with its challenged Section 27, took effect on November 17,
1989, obviously in spite of that constitutional prohibition. The
conventional rule, however, is that a challenge on constitutional
grounds must be raised by a party to the case, neither of whom did so
in this case, but that is not an inflexible rule, as we shall explain.
Since the constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary
and other departments of the government and the judges are sworn to
support its provisions; the courts are not at liberty to overlook or
disregard its commands or countenance evasions thereof. When it is
clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in a legislative
body, it is the duty of the courts to declare that the constitution, and
not the statute, governs in a case before them for
judgment. 12
Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional
questions which are not raised in the pleadings, 13 the rule has been
recognized to admit of certain exceptions. It does not preclude a court
from inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgment
that it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which a court's
jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the court has
no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may determine whether
or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it may inquire into
the constitutionality of the statute. 14
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly
procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of
the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case
it may be raised at any time or on the court's own motion. 15 The
Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any
point in the case where that fact is developed. 16 The court has a
clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any
proceeding. 17
The foregoing authorities notwithstanding, the Court believed that the
parties hereto should be further heard on this constitutional question.
Correspondingly, the following resolution was issued on May 14,
1998, the material parts stating as follows:
The Court observes that the present petition, from the
very allegations thereof, is "an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from
the "Joint Order (Re: Motion for Reconsideration)"
issued in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411, entitled
"Teresita G. Fabian vs. Engr. Nestor V. Agustin, Asst.
Regional Director, Region IV-A, EDSA, Quezon City,"
which absolved the latter from the administrative
charges for grave misconduct, among others.
It is further averred therein that the present appeal to
this Court is allowed under Section 27 of the
Ombudsman Act of 1987 (R.A. No. 6770) and,
pursuant thereto, the Office of the Ombudsman issued
its Rules of Procedure, Section 7 whereof is assailed
by petitioner in this proceeding. It will be recalled that
R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on November 17, 1989,
with Section 27 thereof pertinently providing that all
administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to this Court in accordance with Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
The Court notes, however, that neither the petition nor
the two comments thereon took into account or
discussed the validity of the aforestated Section 27 of
R.A. No. 8770 in light of the provisions of Section 30,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that "(n)o law shall
be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without
its advice and consent."
The Court also invites the attention of the parties to its
relevant ruling in First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The
Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 110571, October 7,
1994, 237 SCRA 519) and the provisions of its former
Circular No. 1-91 and Revised Administrative Circular
4
 No. 1-95, as now substantially reproduced in Rule 43 of
the 1997 revision of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
In view of the fact that the appellate jurisdiction of the
Court is invoked and involved in this case, and the
foregoing legal considerations appear to impugn the
constitutionality and validity of the grant of said
appellate jurisdiction to it, the Court deems it necessary
that the parties be heard thereon and the issue be first
resolved before conducting further proceedings in this
appellate review.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to require the
parties to SUBMIT their position and arguments on the
matter subject of this resolution by filing their
corresponding pleadings within ten (10) days from
notice hereof.
IV
The records do not show that the Office of the Solicitor General has
complied with such requirement, hence the Court dispenses with any
submission it should have presented. On the other hand, petitioner
espouses the theory that the provision in Section 27 of Republic Act
No. 6770 which authorizes an appeal by certiorari to this Court of the
aforementioned adjudications of the Office of the Ombudsman is not
violative of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution. She claims that
what is proscribed is the passage of a law "increasing" the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court "as provided in this Constitution," and such
appellate jurisdiction includes "all cases in which only an error or
question of law is involved." Since Section 5(2)(e), Article VIII of the
Constitution authorizes this Court to review, revise, reverse, modify, or
affirm on appeal or certiorari the aforesaid final judgment or orders "as
the law or the Rules of Court may provide," said Section 27 does not
increase this Court's appellate jurisdiction since, by providing that the
mode of appeal shall be by petition for certiorari under Rule 45, then
what may be raised therein are only questions of law of which this
Court already has jurisdiction.
We are not impressed by this discourse. It overlooks the fact that by
jurisprudential developments over the years, this Court has allowed
appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 in a substantial number of cases
and instances even if questions of fact are directly involved and have
to be resolved by the appellate court. 18 Also, the very provision cited
by petitioner specifies that the appellate jurisdiction of this Court
contemplated therein is to be exercised over "final judgments and
orders of lower courts," that is, the courts composing the integrated
judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or
agencies, hence whenever the legislature intends that the decisions
or resolutions of the quasi-judicial agency shall be reviewable by the
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, a specific provision to that
effect is included in the law creating that quasi-judicial agency and, for
that matter, any special statutory court. No such provision on
appellate procedure is required for the regular courts of the integrated
judicial system because they are what are referred to and already
provided for, in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Apropos to the foregoing, and as correctly observed by private
respondent, the revised Rules of Civil Procedure 19 preclude appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies to the Supreme Court via a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45. In the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, Section 1 of Rule 45, on "Appeal by Certiorari to the
Supreme Court," explicitly states:
Sec. 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A
person desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment
or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other
courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review
on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of
law which must be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis ours).
This differs from the former Rule 45 of the 1964 Rules of Court which
made mention only of the Court of Appeals, and had to be adopted in
statutes creating and providing for appeals from certain administrative
or quasi-judicial agencies, whenever the purpose was to restrict the
scope of the appeal to questions of law. That intended limitation on
appellate review, as we have just discussed, was not fully subserved
5
by recourse to the former Rule 45 but, then, at that time there was no
uniform rule on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies.
Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition
for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the
courts enumerated in Section 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and
final orders of quasi-judicial agencies 20 are now required to be
brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under
the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely
formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate
procedure for quasi-judicial agencies. 21
It is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule 43 should apply
only to "ordinary" quasi-judicial agencies, but not to the Office of the
Ombudsman which is a "high constitutional body." We see no reason
for this distinction for, if hierarchical rank should be a criterion, that
proposition thereby disregards the fact that Rule 43 even includes the
Office of the President and the Civil Service Commission, although
the latter is even an independent constitutional commission, unlike the
Office of the Ombudsman which is a constitutionally-mandated but
statutorily created body.
Regarding the misgiving that the review of the decision of the Office of
the Ombudsman by the Court of Appeals would cover questions of
law, of fact or of both, we do not perceive that as an objectionable
feature. After all, factual controversies are usually involved in
administrative disciplinary actions, just like those coming from the Civil
Service Commission, and the Court of Appeals as a trier of fact is
better prepared than this Court to resolve the same. On the other
hand, we cannot have this situation covered by Rule 45 since it now
applies only to appeals from the regular courts. Neither can we place
it under Rule 65 since the review therein is limited to jurisdictional
questions. *
The submission that because this Court has taken cognizance of
cases involving Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, that fact may be
viewed as "acquiescence" or "acceptance" by it of the appellate
jurisdiction contemplated in said Section 27, is unfortunately too
tenuous. The jurisdiction of a court is not a question of acquiescence
as a matter of fact but an issue of conferment as a matter of law.
Besides, we have already discussed the cases referred to, including
the inaccuracies of some statements therein, and we have pointed out
the instances when Rule 45 is involved, hence covered by Section 27
of Republic Act No. 6770 now under discussion, and when that
provision would not apply if it is a judicial review under Rule 65.
Private respondent invokes the rule that courts generally avoid having
to decide a constitutional question, especially when the case can be
decided on other grounds. As a general proposition that is correct.
Here, however, there is an actual case susceptible of judicial
determination. Also, the constitutional question, at the instance of this
Court, was raised by the proper parties, although there was even no
need for that because the Court can rule on the matter sua
sponte when its appellate jurisdiction is involved. The constitutional
question was timely raised, although it could even be raised any time
likewise by reason of the jurisdictional issue confronting the Court.
Finally, the resolution of the constitutional issue here is obviously
necessary for the resolution of the present case. 22
It is, however, suggested that this case could also be decided on
other grounds, short of passing upon the constitutional question. We
appreciate the ratiocination of private respondent but regret that we
must reject the same. That private respondent could be absolved of
the charge because the decision exonerating him is final and
unappealable assumes that Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order
No. 07 is valid, but that is precisely one of the issues here. The
prevailing rule that the Court should not interfere with the discretion of
the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint is not
applicable in this administrative case, as earlier explained. That two
decisions rendered by this Court supposedly imply the validity of the
aforementioned Section 7 of Rule III is precisely under review here
because of some statements therein somewhat at odds with settled
rules and the decisions of this Court on the same issues, hence to
invoke the same would be to beg the question.
V
Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and
effects, therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly
authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the
6
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently
violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution
against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court.
No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify
such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as correctly
explained in First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et
al. 23 was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases
placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate
enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would
unnecessarily burden the Court. 24
We perforce have to likewise reject the supposed inconsistency of the
ruling in First Lepanto Ceramics and some statements
in Yabut and Alba, not only because of the difference in the factual
settings, but also because those isolated cryptic statements
in Yabut and Alba should best be clarified in the adjudication on the
merits of this case. By way of anticipation, that will have to be
undertaken by the proper court of competent jurisdiction.
Furthermore, in addition to our preceding discussion on whether
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 expanded the jurisdiction of this
Court without its advice and consent, private respondent's position
paper correctly yields the legislative background of Republic Act No.
6770. On September 26, 1989, the Conference Committee Report on
S.B. No. 453 and H.B. No. 13646, setting forth the new version of
what would later be Republic Act No. 6770, was approved on second
reading by the House of Representatives. 25 The Senate was informed
of the approval of the final version of the Act on October 2,
1989 26 and the same was thereafter enacted into law by President
Aquino on November 17, 1989.
Submitted with said position paper is an excerpt showing that the
Senate, in the deliberations on the procedure for appeal from the
Office of the Ombudsman to this Court, was aware of the provisions of
Section 30, Article III of the Constitution. It also reveals that Senator
Edgardo Angara, as a co-author and the principal sponsor of S.B. No.
543 admitted that the said provision will expand this Court's
jurisdiction, and that the Committee on Justice and Human Rights had
not consulted this Court on the matter, thus:
INTERPELLATION OF SENATOR SHAHANI
xxx xxx xxx
Thereafter, with reference to Section 22(4) which
provides that the decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court,
in reply to Senator Shahani's query whether the
Supreme Court would agree to such provision in the
light of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution which
requires its advice and concurrence in laws increasing
its appellate jurisdiction, Senator Angara informed that
the Committee has not yet consulted the Supreme
Court regarding the matter. He agreed that the
provision will expand the Supreme Court's jurisdiction
by allowing appeals through petitions for review, adding
that they should be appeals on certiorari. 27
There is no showing that even up to its enactment, Republic
Act No. 6770 was ever referred to this Court for its advice and
consent. 28
VI
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act
No. 6770 should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with
the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the
provisions of Rule 43.
There is an intimation in the pleadings, however, that said Section 27
refers to appellate jurisdiction which, being substantive in nature,
cannot be disregarded by this Court under its rule-making power,
especially if it results in a diminution, increase or modification of
substantive rights. Obviously, however, where the law is procedural in
essence and purpose, the foregoing consideration would not pose a
proscriptive issue against the exercise of the rule-making power of
7
this Court. This brings to fore the question of whether Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 is substantive or procedural.
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those
rules or statutes which are procedural, hence within the scope of this
Court's rule-making power, and those which are substantive. In fact, a
particular rule may be procedural in one context and substantive in
another. 29 It is admitted that what is procedural and what is
substantive is frequently a question of great
difficulty. 30 It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a rational
and pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own
procedural and jurisdictional system.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for
the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or
modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights
and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. 31 If the rule
takes away a vested right, it is no; procedural. If the rule creates a
right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive
matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right
then the rule deals merely with procedure. 32
In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme Court,
in the exercise of its rule-making power, of pending cases involving a
review of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which shall now be vested
with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to procedure
only. 33 This is so because it is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved
party which is affected by the law. That right has been preserved.
Only the procedure by which the appeal is to be made or decided has
been changed. The rationale for this is that no litigant has a vested
right in a particular remedy, which may be changed by substitution
without impairing vested rights, hence he can have none in rules of
procedure which relate to the remedy. 34
Furthermore, it cannot be said that the transfer of appellate jurisdiction
to the Court of Appeals in this case is an act of creating a new right of
appeal because such power of the Supreme Court to transfer appeals
to subordinate appellate courts is purely a procedural and not a
substantive power. Neither can we consider such transfer as impairing
a vested right because the parties have still a remedy and still a
competent tribunal to administer that remedy. 35
Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutes involving a
transfer of cases from one court to another, are procedural and
remedial merely and that, as such, they are applicable to actions
pending at the time the statute went into effect 36 or, in the case at bar,
when its invalidity was declared. Accordingly, even from the
standpoint of jurisdiction ex hypothesi, the validity of the transfer of
appeals in said cases to the Court of Appeals can be sustained.
WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman
Act of 1989), together with Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order
No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), and any
other provision of law or issuance implementing the aforesaid Act and
insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases
from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are hereby
declared INVALID and of no further force and effect.
The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court of
Appeals for final disposition, with said petition to be considered by the
Court of Appeals pro hoc vice as a petition for review under Rule 43,
without prejudice to its requiring the parties to submit such amended
or supplemental pleadings and additional documents or records as it
may deem necessary and proper.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing and
Purisima, JJ., concur.
8
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 169042 October 5, 2011
ERDITO QUARTO, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN SIMEON MARCELO, CHIEF
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR DENNIS VILLA IGNACIO, LUISITO M.
TABLAN, RAUL B. BORILLO, and LUIS A. GAYYA, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and mandamus1 filed by
Erdito Quarto (petitioner) assailing the Ombudsman’s January 7,
20042 and November 4, 20043 resolutions which granted Luisito M.
Tablan, Raul B. Borillo, and Luis A. Gayya (collectively, respondents)
immunity from prosecution, resulting in the respondents’ exclusion
from the criminal informations filed before the Sandiganbayan. The
petitioner seeks to nullify the immunity granted to the respondents,
and to compel the Ombudsman to include them as accused in the
informations for estafa through falsification of public documents4 and
for violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act (RA) No. 3019.5
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
The petitioner is the Chief of the Central Equipment and Spare Parts
Division (CESPD),6 Bureau of Equipment (BOE), Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Port Area, Manila. As CESPD
Chief, he is also the Head of the Special Inspectorate Team (SIT) of
the DPWH.7 The respondents are members of the SIT.8
On January 9, 2002, DPWH Secretary Simeon Datumanong created a
committee to investigate alleged anomalous transactions involving the
repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of DPWH service vehicles in
2001.9 On January 17, 2002, the committee designated the DPWH
Internal Audit Service (IAS) as its Technical Working Group to
conduct the actual investigation.10
In the course of its investigation, the DPWH-IAS11 learned that the
emergency repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of DPWH service
vehicles basically undergo the following documentary process:
I. Determination of repairs and/or spare parts needed
a. The end-user requesting repair brings the service vehicle to
the Motorpool Section, CESPD for initial inspection
and preparation of Job Order; and
b. Based on the Job Order, the SIT conducts a pre-repair
inspection (to determine the necessity of repair and whether
the repair is emergency in nature) and prepares a Pre-Repair
Inspection Report, with a recommendation for its approval by
the CESPD Chief.
II. Preparation and Approval of Requisition for Supplies and/or
Equipment with accompanying documents (Job Order and Pre-
Inspection Report)
a. The Procurement Section, Administrative Manpower
Management Service (AMMS) prepares the Requisition for
Supplies and Equipment (RSE), the Canvass Quotation of
three Suppliers, the Certificate of Emergency Purchase, and
the Certificate of Fair Wear and Tear;
b. The end-user signs the RSE with the recommending
approval of the concerned head of office; and
c. The AMMS Director approves the RSE.
III. Repair of Vehicles
a. The end-user selects the repair shop/auto supply from
accredited establishments;
b. The selected repair shop/auto supply repairs the service
vehicle and issues the corresponding sales invoice and/or
official receipt;
9
 c. The end-user accepts the repair and executes a Certificate
of Acceptance;
d. The SIT conducts a post-repair inspection (to check if the
vehicle was repaired and whether the repair conformed to
specifications) and prepares a Post-Repair Inspection Report,
with a recommendation for its approval by the CESPD Chief.
The Motorpool and the end-user would prepare the Report of
Waste Materials also for the signature of the CESPD Chief;
and
e. The Assets and Supply Management and Control Division
recommends payment of the expense/s incurred.
The processing of the payment of claims for reimbursement follows
the above process.
Based on this procedure, the DPWH-IAS discovered that from March
to December 2001, several emergency repairs and/or purchase of
spare parts of hundreds of DPWH service vehicles, which were
approved and paid by the government, did not actually take place,
resulting in government losses of approximately ₱143 million for this
ten-month period alone.12
Thus, Atty. Irene D. Ofilada of the DPWH-IAS filed before the Office of
the Ombudsman13 a Complaint-Affidavit14 and a Supplemental
Complaint-Affidavit15 charging several high-ranking DPWH officials
and employees – including the petitioner, the respondents, and other
private individuals who purportedly benefited from the anomalous
transactions – with Plunder, Money Laundering, Malversation, and
violations of RA No. 3019 and the Administrative Code.16
Atty. Ofilada imputed the following acts to the petitioner:
With dishonesty and grave misconduct, [the petitioner] x x x approved
four (4) job orders for [the] repairs [and/or] purchase of spare parts of
[the vehicle assigned to Atty. Ofilada,] noted the certificate of urgency
of said repairs [and/or] purchase[,] concurred with both the pre-repair
and post repair inspection reports thereon, participated in the
accomplishment of the supporting Requisition for Supplies and
Equipment (RSE) x x x[,] and participated in the approval of the
disbursement voucher authorizing payment of said repairs as
necessary and lawful [even if said vehicle was never referred to the
Motorpool Section, CESPD for repair].
The documents relating to [this vehicle] were filed within a period of
one month (between September to October 2001) [and] were used to
authorize the payment of said non existent ghost repairs to the
damage and prejudice of the [DPWH.]17 (emphases ours)
On the other hand, Atty. Ofilada charged the respondents with the
following:
With dishonesty and grave misconduct, [respondents] as members of
the [SIT] xxx accomplished and signed Pre-Repair Inspection and
Post Repair Inspection Reports in support of the four job orders [and
made] it appear that the vehicle was inspected prior and after the
alleged repair [although they knew that the vehicle was never turned
over for inspection]. The accomplishment of the Pre-Repair and Post-
Repair Inspection Report[s] led to the preparation of the Request for
Supplies and Equipment which was the basis of the preparation of the
disbursement vouchers ultimately authorizing the payment of the said
repairs thru reimbursement scheme to the damage and prejudice of
the DPWH.
x x x the [P]re-[R]epair and [P]ost-[R]epair [I]nspection [R]eports of the
[SIT] xxx are fictitious and falsified as no actual inspection could have
transpired[.]18 (emphasis ours)
The petitioner denied the allegations against him, claiming that he
merely relied on his subordinates when he signed the job orders and
the inspection reports.19 In contrast, the respondents admitted the
existence of irregularities in the repairs and/or purchase of spare parts
of DPWH service vehicles, and offered to testify and to provide
evidence against the DPWH officials and employees involved in the
anomaly in exchange for their immunity from prosecution. The
respondents submitted:
10
5.2 x x x since we assumed our duties as members of the SIT xxx, we
observed that [the] DPWH vehicles were being sent to the repair shop
in violation of the prescribed guidelines governing the emergency
repair of a service vehicle. In most instances, service vehicles are
immediately brought to a car repair shop of the end-user’s choice
without bringing it first to the [Motorpool Section, CESPD, BOE] for
the preparation of the required job order by [Gayya] of the Motorpool
Section and the pre-repair inspection to be conducted by the SIT.
After the purported repairs are done, SIT members are made to sign a
post-repair inspection report which already includes a typed-in
recommendation for the payment of repairs, and the signature of the
Head of the [SIT] indicating his alleged concurrence with the findings
of the SIT despite the absence of an actual inspection. The post-
repair inspection report is accompanied by the following attachments,
to wit: a) a falsified job order signed by the head of the [SIT] and the
Chief of the Motorpool Section x x x [and] e) an empty or falsified
[p]re-repair inspection report[.]
5.3 Initially[,] we tried to curb the above anomalous practices being
perpetrated by suppliers and officials of the DPWH x x x [by making]
known [our] objections to the questionable job orders for the proposed
repairs of DPWH service vehicles[,] thus:
a. On July, 9, 1999, [Tablan] wrote the Head of the SIT a
memorandum x x x stating that the job orders for [several
identified vehicles] x x x violated the prohibition against
splitting of job orders x x x. [Tablan recommended for public
bidding the proposed repairs for the said vehicles].
b. In connection with the job orders involving [several identified
vehicles] x x x Tablan and Borillo wrote the Head of the SIT a
Memorandum x x x recommending that the whereabouts of the
end-user be verified, and the service vehicle be re-inspected
and/or disposed of.
c. Since the July 9, 1999 Memorandum was returned to x x x
Tablan without any action being undertaken by the SIT Chief,
[Tablan and Borillo] reiterated the recommendation for the
public bidding of the proposed repairs described therein[.]
6. In our attempts to perform our sworn duties, however, we
incurred the displeasure of the suppliers, the head of [SIT] and
other officials of the DPWH who threatened various
administrative sanctions against us if we should not accede to
their wishes. x x x
7. In addition to the foregoing, there are other factors which
conspired to prevent us from properly performing our duties.
For one, the DPWH processes an average of 3,000 repairs per
calendar year. Given the staggering number and extent of
repairs, including the volume of paperwork, it was practically
impossible for [us] to implement the rules which proved too
tedious under the circumstance. As such, a "short-cut" of the
rules was necessary to accommodate the demands of the
end-user, the suppliers, our superiors, and other executives of
the DPWH. x x x
8. The anomalous practices of the DPWH executives and
suppliers in the purported repair of DPWH service vehicles
were indeed more widespread and rampant in the year 2001.
As a precautionary measure, we took the initiative of
photocopying these sets of falsified documents as they were
presented to us before we affixed our respective signatures
thereon. We grouped these documents into Sets A and B[.]
xxxx
11. x x x That the service vehicle x x x has not been actually
inspected by [Tablan and Borillo] is attested to by the pre and
post repair inspection reports initially bearing the signature of
the head of the SIT as concurring official without the required
signatures of Borillo and Tablan. More importantly, these
DPWH officials did not bother, in a majority of cases, to "cover
their tracks" when they prepared and signed the pre and post
repair inspection reports on the same dates. Based on proper
procedure, a post repair inspection report is to be
accomplished only after the preparation and approval of the
Job Order, pre-repair inspection report, RSE, Cash Invoice
and Acceptance by the end-user. In this case, the RSE, Cash
Invoice and Certificate of Acceptance are dated much later
11
 than the post-repair inspection report. Since xxx there was no
actual pre-repair and post-repair inspection conducted, the
foregoing sample instances paved the way for the "ghost
repairs" of DPWH service vehicles, to the detriment and
prejudice of the government.
12. Because of the anomalous transactions, the joke
circulating around the DPWH is that we are actually the
directors of the DPWH since we are the "last to sign," so to
speak. That the signature[s] of the [respondent] SIT members
are merely pro forma is all the more pronounced in a sample
set consisting of a number of pre-repair inspection reports for
a particular month in 2001. The pre-repair inspection reports of
the service vehicles indicated therein are empty of any findings
and bear the signature of the head of the SIT as concurring
official. All the foregoing documents above detailed negate the
convenient excuse proffered by DPWH executives that they
sign the documents only after the SIT had inspected the
service vehicle and prepared the pre and post repair
inspection reports.
xxxx
14.1 xxx the above examples are only a representative
sampling of the extent of the anomalous transactions involving
DPWH service vehicles which can be considered "ghost
repairs." There are more instances wherein [we] are willing to
testify to in exchange for immunity from
prosecution.20 (emphases ours)
After conducting preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman filed with
the Sandiganbayan21 several informations charging a number of
DPWH officials and employees with plunder,22 estafa through
falsification of official/commercial documents and violation of Section
3(e), RA No. 3019. On the other hand, the Ombudsman granted the
respondents’ request for immunity in exchange for their testimonies
and cooperation in the prosecution of the cases filed.
The petitioner initially filed a certiorari petition with the
Sandiganbayan, questioning the Ombudsman’s grant of immunity in
the respondents’ favor. The Sandiganbayan, however, dismissed the
petition for lack of jurisdiction and advised the petitioner to instead
question the Ombudsman’s actions before this Court.23 Hence, this
present petition.
THE PETITION
The petitioner argues that the Ombudsman should have included the
respondents in the informations since it was their inspection reports
that actually paved the way for the commission of the alleged
irregularities.24 The petitioner asserts that the respondents’ criminal
complicity clearly appears since "no repair could have started" and
"no payment for repairs, ghost or not," could have been made without
the respondents’ pre-repair and post-repair inspection reports. By
excluding the respondents in the informations, the Ombudsman is
engaged in "selective prosecution" which is a clear case of grave
abuse of discretion.
The petitioner claims that before the Ombudsman may avail of the
respondents as state witnesses, they must be included first in the
informations filed with the court. Thereafter, the Ombudsman can ask
the court for their discharge so that they can be utilized as state
witnesses under the conditions laid down in Section 17, Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court since the court has the "sole province" to determine
whether these conditions exist.
These conditions require, inter alia, that there should be "absolute
necessity" for the testimony of the proposed witness and that he/she
should not appear to be the "most guilty." The petitioner claims that
the respondents failed to comply with these conditions as the
Ombudsman’s "evidence," which became the basis of the
informations subsequently filed, shows that the respondents’
testimony is not absolutely necessary; in fact, the manner of the
respondents’ participation proves that they are the "most guilty" in the
premises.
12
 THE COMMENTS OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND THE
RESPONDENTS
The Ombudsman counters that RA No. 6770 (the Ombudsman Act of
1989) expressly grants him the power to grant immunity from
prosecution to witnesses. Given this power, the Ombudsman asserts
that Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, which presupposes
that the witness is originally included in the information, is inapplicable
to the present case since the decision on whom to prosecute is an
executive, not a judicial, prerogative.25
The Ombudsman invokes this Court’s policy of non-interference in the
Ombudsman’s exercise of his discretion in matters involving his
investigatory and prosecutorial powers.26 The petitioner’s claim that
the respondents are the "most guilty" is a matter of defense which the
petitioner may raise not in this proceeding, but in the trial proper.27
On the other hand, the respondents submit that the Ombudsman has
ample discretion in determining who should be included in the
information on the basis of his finding of probable cause. The courts
can only interfere in the Ombudsman’s exercise of his discretion in
case of a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, which the
petitioner failed to establish.28
THE PETITIONER’S REPLY29
While conceding that the Ombudsman has the power and the
discretion to grant immunity to the respondents, the petitioner asserts
that this power must be exercised within the confines of Section 17,
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court which requires, inter alia, that the
proposed witness must not appear to be the "most guilty." By ignoring
this provision and extending immunity to the respondents whose false
reports ultimately led to the payment for supposed repairs, and who
are, thus, the "real culprits,"30 the Ombudsman gravely abused his
discretion – a fatal defect correctible by certiorari.
Amplifying on the respondents’ "guilt," the petitioner cites the DPWH’s
decision in an administrative case which the Civil Service Commission
affirmed, finding the respondents guilty of dishonesty and grave
misconduct involving the same set of facts.31
OUR RULING
We dismiss the petition on two grounds: first, the petitioner did not
avail of the remedies available to him before filing this present
petition; and, second, within the context of the Court’s policy of non-
interference with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory and
prosecutory powers, the petitioner failed to establish that the grant of
immunity to the respondents was attended by grave abuse of
discretion.
I. The petitioner did not exhaust remedies available in the ordinary
course of law
As extraordinary writs, both Sections 1 (certiorari) and 3 (mandamus),
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court require, as a pre-condition for these
remedies, that there be no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. In the present case, the petitioner has
not shown that he moved for a reconsideration of the assailed
resolutions based substantially on the same grounds stated in this
present petition.32 Neither did the petitioner file a motion for the
inclusion of the respondents in the informations before filing the
present petition.33 These are adequate remedies that the petitioner
chose to forego; he bypassed these remedies and proceeded to seek
recourse through the present petition.34
Similarly, the petitioner has not shown that he filed the present petition
with this Court within the sixty-day reglementary period35 from notice
of the assailed Ombudsman’s resolutions. He did not do so, of course,
since he initially and erroneously filed a certiorari petition with the
Sandiganbayan. We remind the petitioner that the remedy from the
Ombudsman’s orders or resolutions in criminal cases is to file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 6536 with this Court.37
The petition likewise fails even on the merits.
13
II. The respondents’ exclusion in the informations is grounded on the
Ombudsman’s grant of immunity
Mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the performance of a
ministerial duty imposed by law upon the respondent.38 In matters
involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may
only be resorted to, to compel the respondent to take action; it cannot
be used to direct the manner or the particular way discretion is to be
exercised.39
In the exercise of his investigatory and prosecutorial powers, the
Ombudsman is generally no different from an ordinary prosecutor in
determining who must be charged.40 He also enjoys the same latitude
of discretion in determining what constitutes sufficient evidence to
support a finding of probable cause (that must be established for the
filing of an information in court)41 and the degree of participation of
those involved or the lack thereof. His findings and conclusions on
these matters are not ordinarily subject to review by the courts except
when he gravely abuses his discretion,42 i.e., when his action amounts
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or when he acts outside the contemplation of law.43
If, on the basis of the same evidence, the Ombudsman arbitrarily
excludes from an indictment some individuals while impleading all
others, the remedy of mandamus lies44 since he is duty-bound, as a
rule, to include in the information all persons who appear responsible
for the offense involved.45
Citing the cases of Guiao v. Figueroa46 and Castro, Jr., et al. v.
Castañeda and Liceralde,47 the petitioner argues for the inclusion of
the respondents in the criminal informations, pointing out that the
respondents accomplished the inspection reports that allegedly set in
motion the documentary process in the repair of the DPWH vehicles;
these reports led to the payment by the government and the
consequent losses.
In Guiao and Castro, we ruled that mandamus lies to compel a
prosecutor who refuses (i) to include in the information certain
persons, whose participation in the commission of a crime clearly
appears, and (ii) to follow the proper procedure for the discharge of
these persons in order that they may be utilized as prosecution
witnesses.
These cited cases, however, did not take place in the same setting as
the present case as they were actions by the public prosecutor, not by
the Ombudsman. In the present case, the Ombudsman granted the
respondents immunity from prosecution pursuant to RA No. 6770
which specifically empowers the Ombudsman to grant immunity "in
any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the
Ombudsman or under its authority, in the performance or in the
furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory objectives."
The pertinent provision – Section 17 of this law – provides:
Sec. 17. Immunities. – x x x.
Under such terms and conditions as it may determine, taking into
account the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, the
Ombudsman may grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any
person whose testimony or whose possession and production of
documents or other evidence may be necessary to determine the truth
in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the
Ombudsman or under its authority, in the performance or in the
furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory objectives. The
immunity granted under this and the immediately preceding paragraph
shall not exempt the witness from criminal prosecution for perjury or
false testimony nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from
office. [emphasis ours]
To briefly outline the rationale for this provision, among the most
important powers of the State is the power to compel testimony from
its residents; this power enables the government to secure vital
information necessary to carry out its myriad functions.48 This power
though is not absolute. The constitutionally-enshrined right against
compulsory self-incrimination is a leading exception. The state’s
power to compel testimony and the production of a person’s private
books and papers run against a solid constitutional wall when the
person under compulsion is himself sought to be penalized. In
balancing between state interests and individual rights in this
situation, the principles of free government favor the individual to
whom the state must yield.491avvphi1
14
A state response to the constitutional exception to its vast powers,
especially in the field of ordinary criminal prosecution and in law
enforcement and administration, is the use of an immunity
statute.50 Immunity statutes seek a rational accommodation between
the imperatives of an individual’s constitutional right against self-
incrimination51 (considered the fount from which all statutes granting
immunity emanate52) and the legitimate governmental interest in
securing testimony.53 By voluntarily offering to give information on the
commission of a crime and to testify against the culprits, a person
opens himself to investigation and prosecution if he himself had
participated in the criminal act. To secure his testimony without
exposing him to the risk of prosecution, the law recognizes that the
witness can be given immunity from prosecution.54 In this manner, the
state interest is satisfied while respecting the individual’s constitutional
right against self-incrimination.
III. Nature of the power to grant immunity
The power to grant immunity from prosecution is essentially a
legislative prerogative.55 The exclusive power of Congress to define
crimes and their nature and to provide for their punishment
concomitantly carries the power to immunize certain persons from
prosecution to facilitate the attainment of state interests, among them,
the solution and prosecution of crimes with high political, social and
economic impact.56 In the exercise of this power, Congress possesses
broad discretion and can lay down the conditions and the extent of the
immunity to be granted.57
Early on, legislations granting immunity from prosecution were
few.58 However, their number escalated with the increase of the need
to secure vital information in the course and for purposes of
prosecution. These statutes59 considered not only the importance of
the testimony sought, but also the unique character of some offenses
and of some situations where the criminal participants themselves are
in the best position to give useful testimony.60 RA No. 6770 or the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 was formulated along these lines and
reasoning with the vision of making the Ombudsman the protector of
the people against inept, abusive and corrupt government officers and
employees.61 Congress saw it fit to grant the Ombudsman the power
to directly confer immunity to enable his office to effectively carry out
its constitutional and statutory mandate of ensuring effective
accountability in the public service.62
IV. Considerations in the grant of immunity
While the legislature is the source of the power to grant immunity, the
authority to implement is lodged elsewhere. The authority to choose
the individual to whom immunity would be granted is a constituent part
of the process and is essentially an executive function. Mapa, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan63 is instructive on this point:
The decision to grant immunity from prosecution forms a constituent
part of the prosecution process. It is essentially a tactical decision to
forego prosecution of a person for government to achieve a higher
objective. It is a deliberate renunciation of the right of the State to
prosecute all who appear to be guilty of having committed a crime. Its
justification lies in the particular need of the State to obtain the
conviction of the more guilty criminals who, otherwise, will probably
elude the long arm of the law. Whether or not the delicate power
should be exercised, who should be extended the privilege, the timing
of its grant, are questions addressed solely to the sound judgment of
the prosecution. The power to prosecute includes the right to
determine who shall be prosecuted and the corollary right to decide
whom not to prosecute. In reviewing the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in these areas, the jurisdiction of the respondent court is
limited. For the business of a court of justice is to be an impartial
tribunal, and not to get involved with the success or failure of the
prosecution to prosecute. Every now and then, the prosecution may
err in the selection of its strategies, but such errors are not for neutral
courts to rectify, any more than courts should correct the blunders of
the defense. [emphasis ours]
RA No. 6770 fully recognizes this prosecutory prerogative by
empowering the Ombudsman to grant immunity, subject to "such
terms and conditions" as he may determine. The only textual limitation
imposed by law on this authority is the need to take "into account the
pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court," – i.e., Section 17, Rule 119
of the Rules of Court.64 This provision requires that:
15
 (a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the
accused whose discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of
said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially
corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any
offense involving moral turpitude.
This Rule is itself unique as, without detracting from the executive
nature of the power to prosecute and the power to grant immunity, it
clarifies that in cases already filed with the courts,65 the prosecution
merely makes a proposal and initiates the process of granting
immunity to an accused-witness in order to utilize him as a witness
against his co-accused.66 As we explained in Webb v. De Leon67 in
the context of the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act:
The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of
discretion — the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the
exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are
best appreciated by prosecutors. We thus hold that it is not
constitutionally impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981
vesting in the Department of Justice the power to determine who can
qualify as a witness in the program and who shall be granted
immunity from prosecution. Section 9 of Rule 119 does not support
the proposition that the power to choose who shall be a state witness
is an inherent judicial prerogative. Under this provision, the court is
given the power to discharge a state witness only because it has
already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused. The
discharge of an accused is part of the exercise of jurisdiction but is not
a recognition of an inherent judicial function. [emphasis ours]
Thus, it is the trial court that determines whether the prosecution’s
preliminary assessment of the accused-witness’ qualifications to be a
state witness satisfies the procedural norms.68 This relationship is in
reality a symbiotic one as the trial court, by the very nature of its role
in the administration of justice,69 largely exercises its prerogative
based on the prosecutor’s findings and evaluation. On this point, the
Court’s pronouncement in the 1918 case of United States v.
Abanzado70 is still very much relevant:
A trial judge cannot be expected or required to inform himself with
absolute certainty at the very outset of the trial as to everything which
may be developed in the course of the trial in regard to the guilty
participation of the accused in the commission of the crime charged in
the complaint. If that were practicable or possible there would be little
need for the formality of a trial. He must rely in large part upon the
suggestions and the information furnished by the prosecuting officer in
coming to his conclusions as to the "necessity for the testimony of the
accused whose discharge is requested"; as to the availability or
nonavailability of other direct or corroborative evidence; as to which of
the accused is "most guilty," and the like.
Notably, this cited case also observes that the Rules-provided
guidelines are mere express declarations of the conditions which the
courts ought to have in mind in exercising their sound discretion in
granting the prosecution’s motion for the discharge of an accused.71 In
other words, these guidelines are necessarily implied in the discretion
granted to the courts.
RA No. 6770 recognizes that these same principles should apply
when the Ombudsman directly grants immunity to a witness. The
same consideration – to achieve the greater and higher purpose of
securing the conviction of the most guilty and the greatest number
among the accused72 – is involved whether the grant is secured by the
public prosecutor with active court intervention, or by the
Ombudsman. If there is any distinction at all between the public
prosecutor and the Ombudsman in this endeavor, it is in the specificity
of and the higher priority given by law to the Ombudsman’s purpose
and objective – to focus on offenses committed by public officers and
employees to ensure accountability in the public service. This
accounts for the Ombudsman’s unique power to grant immunity by
16
itself and even prior to the filing of information in court, a power that
the public prosecutor himself generally does not enjoy.73
V. Extent of judicial review of a bestowed immunity
An immunity statute does not, and cannot, rule out a review by this
Court of the Ombudsman’s exercise of discretion. Like all other
officials under our constitutional scheme of government, all their acts
must adhere to the Constitution.74 The parameters of our review,
however, are narrow. In the first place, what we review are executive
acts of a constitutionally independent Ombudsman.75 Also, we
undertake the review given the underlying reality that this Court is not
a trier of facts. Since the determination of the requirements under
Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court is highly factual in nature,
the Court must, thus, generally defer to the judgment of the
Ombudsman who is in a better position (than the Sandiganbayan or
the defense) to know the relative strength and/or weakness of the
evidence presently in his possession and the kind, tenor and source
of testimony he needs to enable him to prove his case.76 It should not
be forgotten, too, that the grant of immunity effectively but
conditionally results in the extinction of the criminal liability the
accused-witnesses might have incurred, as defined in the terms of the
grant.77 This point is no less important as the grant directly affects the
individual and enforces his right against self-incrimination. These
dynamics should constantly remind us that we must tread softly, but
not any less critically, in our review of the Ombudsman’s grant of
immunity.
From the point of view of the Court’s own operations, we are
circumscribed by the nature of the review powers granted to us under
the Constitution and the Rules of Court. We rule on the basis of a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and address mainly the
Ombudsman’s exercise of discretion. Our room for intervention only
occurs when a clear and grave abuse of the exercise of discretion is
shown. Necessarily, this limitation similarly reflects on the petitioner
who comes to us on the allegation of grave abuse of discretion; the
petitioner himself is bound to clearly and convincingly establish that
the Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion in granting immunity in
order to fully establish his case.78
As a last observation, we note the unique wording of the grant of the
power of immunity to the Ombudsman. It is not without significance
that the law encompassed (and appears to have pointedly not
separated) the consideration of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court within the broader context of "such terms and conditions as the
Ombudsman may determine." This deliberate statutory wording, to our
mind, indicates the intent to define the role of Section 17, Rule 119 in
the Ombudsman’s exercise of discretion. It suggests a broad grant of
discretion that allows the Ombudsman’s consideration of factors other
than those outlined under Section 17, Rule 119; the wording creates
the opening for the invocation, when proper, of the constitutional and
statutory intents behind the establishment of the Ombudsman.
Based on these considerations, we shall now proceed to determine
whether the petitioner has clearly and convincingly shown that the
Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion in granting immunity to the
respondents.
Va. Absolute necessity for testimony of the respondents
Under the factual and legal situation before us, we find that the
petitioner miserably failed to clearly and convincingly establish that
the Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion in granting immunity to
the respondents. While he claims that both conditions (a) and (d) of
Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court are absent, we observe his
utter lack of argument addressing the "absolute necessity" of the
respondents’ testimony. In fact, the petitioner simply concluded that
the requirement of "absolute necessity" does not exist based on the
Ombudsman’s "evidence," without even attempting to explain how he
arrived at this conclusion.
We note in this regard that the respondents’ proposed testimony
tends to counteract the petitioner’s personal defense of good faith
(i.e., that he had no actual participation and merely relied on his
subordinates) in approving the job orders and in his concurrence with
the inspection reports. In their Joint Counter-Affidavit, the respondents
narrated the accused DPWH officials/employees’ flagrant disregard of
the proper procedure and the guidelines in the repair of DPWH
service vehicles which culminated in losses to the government.
Particularly telling is the respondents’ statement that a number of pre-
17
repair inspection reports for a particular month in 2001 bear the
petitioner’s signature despite the fact that these reports are not
supported by findings from the respondents as SIT members.79 This
kind of statement cannot but impact on how the Ombudsman viewed
the question of "absolute necessity" of the respondents’ testimony
since this testimony meets the defense of good faith head-on to prove
the prosecution’s allegations. Under these circumstances, we cannot
preempt, foreclose, nor replace with our own the Ombudsman’s
position on this point as it is clearly not without basis.
Vb. The respondents do not appear to be the "most guilty"
Similarly, far from concluding that the respondents are the "most
guilty," we find that the circumstances surrounding the preparation of
the inspection reports can significantly lessen the degree of the
respondents’ criminal complicity in defrauding the government. Again,
this is a matter that the Ombudsman, in the exercise of his discretion,
could not have avoided when he considered the grant of immunity to
the respondents.
We note, too, that while the petitioner incessantly harped on the
respondents’ role in the preparation of the inspection reports, yet, as
head of the SIT, he was eerily silent on the circumstances
surrounding this preparation, particularly on the respondents’
explanation that they tried "to curb the anomalous practices"80 in the
DPWH. We are aware, of course, that the present petition merely
questions the immunity granted to the respondents and their
consequent exclusion from the informations; it does not assail the
finding of probable cause against the petitioner himself. This current
reality may explain the petitioner’s silence on the respondents’
assertions; the respondents’ allegations, too, still have to be proven
during the trial. However, these considerations are not sufficient to
save the petitioner from the necessity of controverting the
respondents’ allegations, even for the limited purpose of the present
petition, since his counter-assertion on this basic ground (that the
respondents bear the most guilt) is essential and critical to the viability
of his petition.
In considering the respondents’ possible degree of guilt, we are
keenly aware of their admission that they resorted to a "short-cut"81 in
the procedure to be observed in the repairs and/or purchase of
emergency parts of DPWH service vehicles. To our mind, however,
this admission does not necessarily result in making the respondents
the "most guilty" in the premises; not even a semblance of being the
"most guilty" can be deduced therefrom.
In sum, the character of the respondents’ involvement vis-à-vis the
crimes filed against the DPWH officials/employees, coupled with the
substance of the respondents’ disclosures, compels this Court to take
a dim view of the position that the Ombudsman gravely abused his
discretion in granting immunity to the respondents. The better view is
that the Ombudsman simply saw the higher value of utilizing the
respondents themselves as witnesses instead of prosecuting them in
order to fully establish and strengthen its case against those mainly
responsible for the criminal act, as indicated by the available
evidence.1avvphi1
VI. The respondents’ administrative liability has no bearing at all on
the immunity granted to the respondents
The fact that the respondents had previously been found
administratively liable, based on the same set of facts, does not
necessarily make them the "most guilty." An administrative case is
altogether different from a criminal case, such that the disposition in
the former does not necessarily result in the same disposition for the
latter, although both may arise from the same set of facts.82 The most
that we can read from the finding of liability is that the respondents
have been found to be administratively guilty by substantial evidence
– the quantum of proof required in an administrative proceeding. The
requirement of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (which RA
No. 6770 adopted by reference) that the proposed witness should not
appear to be the "most guilty" is obviously in line with the
character83 and purpose84 of a criminal proceeding, and the much
stricter standards85 observed in these cases. They are standards
entirely different from those applicable in administrative proceedings.
VII. The policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s
investigatory and prosecutory powers cautions a stay of judicial hand
18
The Constitution and RA No. 6770 have endowed the Office of the WE CONCUR:
Ombudsman with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory
powers, freed, to the extent possible within our governmental system ANTONIO T. CARPIO
and structure, from legislative, executive, or judicial intervention, and Associate Justice
insulated from outside pressure and improper influence.86 Consistent Chairperson
with this purpose and subject to the command of paragraph 2, Section
1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,87 the Court reiterates its policy MARIA LOURDES P. A.
of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
SERENO
investigatory and prosecutory powers (among them, the power to Associate Justice
Associate Justice
grant immunity to witnesses88), and respects the initiative and
independence inherent in the Ombudsman who, "beholden to no one,
acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity BIENVENIDO L. REYES
of the public service."89 Ocampo IV v. Ombudsman90 best explains the Associate Justice
reason behind this policy:
ATTESTATION
The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and
prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions opinion of the Court’s Division.
assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the
Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in ANTONIO T. CARPIO
much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if Associate Justice
they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the Chairperson, Second Division
part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to
file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private CERTIFICATION
complainant.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
Following this policy, we deem it neither appropriate nor advisable to Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
interfere with the Ombudsman’s grant of immunity to the respondents, above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
particularly in this case, where the petitioner has not clearly and assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
convincingly shown the grave abuse of discretion that would call for
our intervention. RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against the
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
19
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 130866 September 16, 1998
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO
ARICAYOS, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for illegal
dismissal filed by herein private respondent before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, in
San Fernando, Pampanga. Private respondent alleges that he started
working as Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home
on February 6, 1995. However, there was no contract of employment
executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in
the semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed
from his employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00 which
was intended for payment by petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). 1
Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its
employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of
petitioner St. Martin's Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, private
respondent, who was formerly working as an overseas contract
worker, asked for financial assistance from the mother of Amelita.
Since then, as an indication of gratitude, private respondent
voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business.
In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter
then took over the management of the business. She then discovered
that there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other government
fees, although the records purported to show that the same were
already paid. Amelita then made some changes in the business
operation and private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed
to participate in the management thereof. As a consequence, the
latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally terminated
his employment.2
Based on the position papers of the parties, the labor arbiter rendered
a decision in favor of petitioner on October 25, 1996 declaring that no
employer-employee relationship existed between the parties and,
therefore, his office had no jurisdiction over the case. 3
Not satisfied with the said decision, private respondent appealed to
the NLRC contending that the labor arbiter erred (1) in not giving
credence to the evidence submitted by him; (2) in holding that he
worked as a "volunteer" and not as an employee of St. Martin Funeral
Home from February 6, 1995 to January 23, 1996, or a period of
about one year; and (3) in ruling that there was no employer-
employee relationship between him and petitioner.4
On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the
questioned decision and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for
immediate appropriate proceedings.5 Petitioner then filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in its resolution dated
August 18, 1997 for lack of merit,6 hence the present petition alleging
that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.7
Before proceeding further into the merits of the case at bar, the Court
feels that it is now exigent and opportune to reexamine the functional
validity and systemic practicability of the mode of judicial review it has
long adopted and still follows with respect to decisions of the NLRC.
The increasing number of labor disputes that find their way to this
Court and the legislative changes introduced over the years into the
provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 442 (The Labor Code of
the Philippines and Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.) 129 (The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) now stridently call for and
warrant a reassessment of that procedural aspect.
We prefatorily delve into the legal history of the NLRC. It was first
established in the Department of Labor by P.D. No. 21 on October 14,
1972, and its decisions were expressly declared to be appealable to
the Secretary of Labor and, ultimately, to the President of the
Philippines.
20
On May 1, 1974, P.D. No. 442 enacted the Labor Code of the
Philippines, the same to take effect six months after its
promulgation. 8 Created and regulated therein is the present NLRC
which was attached to the Department of Labor and Employment for
program and policy coordination only.9 Initially, Article 302 (now,
Article 223) thereof also granted an aggrieved party the remedy of
appeal from the decision of the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor, but
P.D. No. 1391 subsequently amended said provision and abolished
such appeals. No appellate review has since then been provided for.
Thus, to repeat, under the present state of the law, there is no
provision for appeals from the decision of the NLRC. 10 The present
Section 223, as last amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, instead
merely provides that the Commission shall decide all cases within
twenty days from receipt of the answer of the appellee, and that such
decision shall be final and executory after ten calendar days from
receipt thereof by the parties.
When the issue was raised in an early case on the argument that this
Court has no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the NLRC, and
formerly of the Secretary of Labor, since there is no legal provision for
appellate review thereof, the Court nevertheless rejected that thesis. It
held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the
acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even
though no right of review is given by statute; that the purpose of
judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its
jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the parties; and that it
is that part of the checks and balances which restricts the separation
of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications. 11
Pursuant to such ruling, and as sanctioned by subsequent decisions
of this Court, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a
motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or
subsequent remedy, 12 and then seasonably avail of the special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65, 13 for which said Rule has now fixed
the reglementary period of sixty days from notice of the decision.
Curiously, although the 10-day period for finality of the decision of the
NLRC may already have lapsed as contemplated in Section 223 of
the Labor Code, it has been held that this Court may still take
cognizance of the petition for certiorari on jurisdictional and due
process considerations if filed within the reglementary period under
Rule 65. 14
Turning now to the matter of judicial review of NLRC decisions, B.P.
No. 129 originally provided as follows:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Intermediate Appellate Court shall
exercise:
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary
writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-
judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions, except
those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the
fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases
and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts
necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its
original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and
conduct new trials or further proceedings.
These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory orders
issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central
Board of Assessment Appeals. 15
Subsequently, and as it presently reads, this provision was amended
by R.A. No. 7902 effective March 18, 1995, to wit:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
21
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary
writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-
judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security
Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil
Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution,
the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442,
as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the
third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct
hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to
resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and
appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new
trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court of Appeals
must be continuous and must be completed within, three (3) months,
unless extended by the Chief Justice.
It will readily be observed that, aside from the change in the name of
the lower appellate court, 16 the following amendments of the original
provisions of Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 were effected by R.A. No.
7902, viz.:
1. The last paragraph which excluded its application to the Labor
Code of the Philippines and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals
was deleted and replaced by a new paragraph granting the Court of
Appeals limited powers to conduct trials and hearings in cases within
its jurisdiction.
2. The reference to the Labor Code in that last paragraph was
transposed to paragraph (3) of the section, such that the original
exclusionary clause therein now provides "except those falling within
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential
Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the
fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948."
(Emphasis supplied).
3. Contrarily, however, specifically added to and included among the
quasi-judicial agencies over which the Court of Appeals shall have
exclusive appellate jurisdiction are the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees
Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission.
This, then, brings us to a somewhat perplexing impassè, both in point
of purpose and terminology. As earlier explained, our mode of judicial
review over decisions of the NLRC has for some time now been
understood to be by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. This is, of course, a special original action limited to the
resolution of jurisdictional issues, that is, lack or excess of jurisdiction
and, in almost all cases that have been brought to us, grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129
now grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals
over all final adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts and the quasi-
judicial agencies generally or specifically referred to therein except,
among others, "those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with . . . the Labor Code of the
Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, . . . ."
This would necessarily contradict what has been ruled and said all
along that appeal does not lie from decisions of the NLRC. 17 Yet,
under such excepting clause literally construed, the appeal from the
NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals, but to this Court by
necessary implication.
The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring
that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions
22
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of B.P. No. 129, and
those specified cases in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
These cases can, of course, be properly excluded from the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. However, because of
the aforementioned amendment by transposition, also supposedly
excluded are cases falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with the Labor Code. This is illogical
and impracticable, and Congress could not have intended that
procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in the Labor Code the
decisions, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other court
for that matter.
A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No.
7902 persuades us that there may have been an oversight in the
course of the deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in the
terminology used therein. In fine, Congress did intend to provide for
judicial review of the adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases by the
Supreme Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the term used for the
intended mode of review. This conclusion which we have reluctantly
but prudently arrived at has been drawn from the considerations
extant in the records of Congress, more particularly on Senate Bill No.
1495 and the Reference Committee Report on S. No. 1495/H. No.
10452. 18
In sponsoring Senate Bill No. 1495, Senator Raul S. Roco delivered
his sponsorship speech 19 from which we reproduce the following
excerpts:
The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Mr. President, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, reorganized the Court of Appeals and at the same time
expanded its jurisdiction and powers. Among others, its appellate
jurisdiction was expanded to cover not only final judgment of Regional
Trial Courts, but also all final judgment(s), decisions, resolutions,
orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards
and commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the
provisions of BP Blg. 129 and of subparagraph 1 of the third
paragraph and subparagraph 4 of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1948.
Mr. President, the purpose of the law is to ease the workload of the
Supreme Court by the transfer of some of its burden of review of
factual issues to the Court of Appeals. However, whatever benefits
that can be derived from the expansion of the appellate jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals was cut short by the last paragraph of Section 9
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which excludes from its coverage the
"decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of
the Philippines and by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.
Among the highest number of cases that are brought up to the
Supreme Court are labor cases. Hence, Senate Bill No. 1495 seeks to
eliminate the exceptions enumerated in Section 9 and, additionally,
extends the coverage of appellate review of the Court of Appeals in
the decision(s) of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Social Security Commission, and the Employees Compensation
Commission to reduce the number of cases elevated to the Supreme
Court. (Emphases and corrections ours)
xxx xxx xxx
Senate Bill No. 1495 authored by our distinguished Colleague from
Laguna provides the ideal situation of drastically reducing the
workload of the Supreme Court without depriving the litigants of the
privilege of review by an appellate tribunal.
In closing, allow me to quote the observations of former Chief Justice
Teehankee in 1986 in the Annual Report of the Supreme Court:
. . . Amendatory legislation is suggested so as to relieve the Supreme
Court of the burden of reviewing these cases which present no
important issues involved beyond the particular fact and the parties
involved, so that the Supreme Court may wholly devote its time to
cases of public interest in the discharge of its mandated task as the
guardian of the Constitution and the guarantor of the people's basic
rights and additional task expressly vested on it now "to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
23
to lack of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
We used to have 500,000 cases pending all over the land, Mr.
President. It has been cut down to 300,000 cases some five years
ago. I understand we are now back to 400,000 cases. Unless we
distribute the work of the appellate courts, we shall continue to mount
and add to the number of cases pending.
In view of the foregoing, Mr. President, and by virtue of all the reasons
we have submitted, the Committee on Justice and Human Rights
requests the support and collegial approval of our Chamber.
xxx xxx xxx
Surprisingly, however, in a subsequent session, the following
Committee Amendment was introduced by the said sponsor and the
following proceedings transpired: 20
Senator Roco. On page 2, line 5, after the line "Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution," add the phrase "THE LABOR
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES UNDER P.D. 442, AS AMENDED." So
that it becomes clear, Mr. President, that issues arising from the Labor
Code will still be appealable to the Supreme Court.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the
amendment is approved.
Senator Roco. On the same page, we move that lines 25 to 30 be
deleted. This was also discussed with our Colleagues in the House of
Representatives and as we understand it, as approved in the House,
this was also deleted, Mr. President.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the
amendment is approved.
Senator Roco. There are no further Committee amendments, Mr.
President.
Senator Romulo. Mr. President, I move that we close the period of
Committee amendments.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the
amendment is approved. (Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Thereafter, since there were no individual amendments, Senate Bill
No. 1495 was passed on second reading and being a certified bill, its
unanimous approval on third reading followed. 21 The Conference
Committee Report on Senate Bill No. 1495 and House Bill No. 10452,
having theretofore been approved by the House of Representatives,
the same was likewise approved by the Senate on February 20,
1995, 22 inclusive of the dubious formulation on appeals to the
Supreme Court earlier discussed.
The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since
appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the
legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was
and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the
NLRC. The use of the word "appeal" in relation thereto and in the
instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae because
appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both
modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The
important distinction between them, however, and with which the
Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil action
of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court
and the Court of Appeals; 23 whereas to indulge in the assumption that
appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would not
subserve, but would subvert, the intention of Congress as expressed
in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.
Incidentally, it was noted by the sponsor therein that some quarters
were of the opinion that recourse from the NLRC to the Court of
Appeals as an initial step in the process of judicial review would be
circuitous and would prolong the proceedings. On the contrary, as he
commendably and realistically emphasized, that procedure would be
advantageous to the aggrieved party on this reasoning:
24
On the other hand, Mr. President, to allow these cases to be appealed
to the Court of Appeals would give litigants the advantage to have all
the evidence on record be reexamined and reweighed after which the
findings of facts and conclusions of said bodies are correspondingly
affirmed, modified or reversed.
Under such guarantee, the Supreme Court can then apply strictly the
axiom that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may
not be reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court. A perusal of the
records will reveal appeals which are factual in nature and may,
therefore, be dismissed outright by minute resolutions. 24
While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the
matter of the wisdom of a law, on this score we add the further
observations that there is a growing number of labor cases being
elevated to this Court which, not being a trier of fact, has at times
been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of
unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is
procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from the increased
number of its component divisions; and that there is undeniably an
imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major
aspect of constitutional protection to labor.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to
supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are
interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions
for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should
hence forth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict
observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the
appropriate forum for the relief desired.
in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent
jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought therein. This
practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the
precious time of this Court but also because of the inevitable and
resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case
which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the
proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to
resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore,
reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort
to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify
availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our
primary jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises, the instant petition
for certiorari is hereby REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof
ordered to be FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for appropriate
action and disposition consistent with the views and ruling herein set
forth, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban Martinez, Quisumbing and Purisima,
JJ., concur.

Apropos to this directive that resort to the higher courts should be

made in accordance with their hierarchical order, this pronouncement
in Santiago vs. Vasquez, et al. 25 should be taken into account:

One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a

propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may
be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to
disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking
relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available
25
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 161596 February 20, 2013
ROBERTO BORDOMEO, JAYME SARMIENTO and GREGORIO BARREDO, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR, and INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:

As an extraordinary remedy, certiorari cannot replace or supplant an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, like an appeal in due course. It
is the inadequacy of a remedy in the ordinary course of law that determines whether certiorari can be a proper alternative remedy.

The Case

The petitioners implore the Court to reverse and set aside the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on May 30, 2003 in C.A.-G.R. SP
No. 65970 entitled Roberto Bordomeo, Anecito Cupta, Jaime Sarmiento and Virgilio Saragena v. Honorable Secretary of Labor and Employment
and International Pharmaceuticals, Inc., dismissing their petition for certiorari by which they had assailed the Order2 issued on July 4, 2001 by
Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), to wit:

WHEREFORE, the Order of this Office dated March 27, 1998 STANDS and having become final and having been fully executed, completely
CLOSED and TERMINATED this case.

No further motion shall be entertained.

SO ORDERED.3

and the CA’s resolution promulgated on October 30, 2003, denying their motion for reconsideration.

In effect, the Court is being called upon again to review the March 27, 1998 order issued by the DOLE Secretary in response to the petitioners’
demand for the execution in full of the final orders of the DOLE issued on December 26, 1990 and December 5, 1991 arising from the labor dispute
in International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (IPI).

Antecedents

In 1989, the IPI Employees Union-Associated Labor Union (Union), representing the workers, had a bargaining deadlock with the IPI management.
This deadlock resulted in the Union staging a strike and IPI ordering a lockout.

26
On December 26, 1990, after assuming jurisdiction over the dispute, DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres rendered the following Decision, 4 to wit:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, decision is hereby rendered as follows:

1. finding the IPI Employees Union-ALU as the exclusive bargaining agent of all rank and file employees of ALU including sales personnel;

2. dismissing, for lack of merit, the charges of contempt filed by the Union against the IPI officials and reiterating our strict directive for a
restoration of the status quo ante the strike as hereinbefore discussed;

3. dismissing the Union’s complaint against the Company for unfair labor practice through refusal to bargain;

4. dismissing the IPI petition to declare the strike of the Union as illegal; and

5. directing the IPI Employees Union-ALU and the International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. to enter into their new CBA, incorporating therein the
dispositions hereinbefore stated. All other provisions in the old CBA not otherwise touched upon in these proceedings are, likewise, to be
incorporated in the new CBA.

SO ORDERED.5

Resolving the parties’ ensuing respective motions for reconsideration or clarification,6 Secretary Torres rendered on December 5, 1991 another
ruling,7 disposing thus:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the forgoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Dismissing the motions for reconsideration filed by the International Pharmaceutical, Inc. and the Workers Trade Alliance Unions (WATU) for lack
of merit;

2. Ordering the International Pharmaceutical Inc. to reinstate to their former positions with full backwages reckoned from 8 December 1989 until
actually reinstated without loss of seniority rights and other benefits the "affected workers" herein-below listed:

1. Reynaldo C. Menor

2. Geronimo S. Banquirino

3. Rogelio Saberon

4. Estefanio G. Maderazo

27
5. Herbert G. Veloso

6. Rogelio G. Enricoso

7. Colito Virtudazo

8. Gilbert Encontro

9. Bebiano Pancho

10. Merlina Gomez

11. Lourdes Mergal

12. Anecito Cupta

13. Prescillano O. Naquines

14. Alejandro O. Rodriguez

15. Godofredo Delposo

16. Jovito Jayme

17. Emma L. Lana

18. Koannia M. Tangub

19. Violeta Pancho

20. Roberto Bordomeo

21. Mancera Vevincio

22. Caesar Sigfredo

23. Trazona Roldan

28
24. Carmelita Ygot

25. Gregorio Barredo

26. Dario Abella

27. Artemio Pepito

28. Anselmo Tareman

29. Merope Lozada

30. Agapito Mayorga

31. Narciso M. Leyson

32. Ananias Dinolan

33. Cristy L. Caybot

34. Johnnelito S. Corilla

35. Noli Silo

36. Danilo Palioto

37. Winnie dela Cruz

38. Edgar Montecillo

39. Pompio Senador

40. Ernesto Palomar

41. Reynante Germininano

42. Pelagio Arnaiz

29
43. Ireneo Russiana

44. Benjamin Gellangco, Jr.

45. Nestor Ouano (listed in paragraphs 1 & 9 of the IPI Employees Union- ALU’s Supplemental Memorandum dated 6 March 1991)

3. Ordering the International Pharmaceutical Inc. to reinstate to their former positions the following employees, namely:

a. Alexander Aboganda

b. Pacifico Pestano

c. Carlito Torregano

d. Clemencia Pestano

e. Elisea Cabatingan

(listed in paragraph 3 of the IPI Employees Union-ALU’s Supplemental Memorandum dated 6 March 1991).

No further motions of the same nature shall be entertained.8

IPI assailed the issuances of Secretary Torres directly in this Court through a petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 103330), but the Court dismissed its
petition on October 14, 1992 on the ground that no grave abuse of discretion had attended the issuance of the assailed decisions. 9 Considering that
IPI did not seek the reconsideration of the dismissal of its petition, the entry of judgment issued in due course on January 19, 1994. 10

With the finality of the December 26, 1990 and December 5, 1991 orders of the DOLE Secretary, the Union, represented by the Seno, Mendoza
and Associates Law Office, moved in the National Conciliation and Mediation Board in DOLE, Region VII on June 8, 1994 for their execution.11

On November 21, 1994, one Atty. Audie C. Arnado, who had meanwhile entered his appearance on October 4, 1994 as the counsel of 15 out of the
50 employees named in the December 5, 1991 judgment of Secretary Torres, likewise filed a so-called Urgent Motion for Execution.12

After conducting conferences and requiring the parties to submit their position papers, Regional Director Alan M. Macaraya of DOLE Region VII
issued a Notice of Computation/Execution on April 12, 1995,13 the relevant portion of which stated:

To speed-up the settlement of the issue, the undersigned on 7 February 1995 issued an order directing the parties to submit within ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of the Order, their respective Computations. To date, only the computation from complainants including those that were
not specifically mentioned in the Supreme Court decision were submitted and received by this office.

30
Upon verification of the Computation available at hand, management is hereby directed to pay the employees including those that were not
specifically mentioned in the decision but are similarly situated, the aggregate amount of FORTY-THREE MILLION SIX HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIVE AND 87/100 PESOS (₱43,650,905.87) involving NINE HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO (962) employees, in the
manner shown in the attached Computation forming part of this Order. This is without prejudice to the final Order of the Court to reinstate those
covered employees.1âwphi1

This Order is to take effect immediately and failure to comply as instructed will cause the issuance of a WRIT OF EXECUTION.14

In effect, Regional Director Macaraya increased the number of the workers to be benefitted to 962 employees – classified into six groups – and
allocated to each group a share in the ₱43,650,905.87 award,15 as follows:

GROUP NO. OF TOTAL CLAIM

EMPLOYEES
Those represented by Atty. Arnado 15 ₱4,162,361.50
Salesman 9 ₱6,241,535.44
For Union Members 179 ₱6,671,208.86
For Non-Union Members 33 ₱1,228,321.09
Employees who ratified the CBA 642 ₱23,982,340.14
Separated Employees 84 ₱1,365,136.84
TOTAL 962 ₱43,650,905.87

On May 24, 1995, Assistant Regional Director Jalilo dela Torre of DOLE Region VII issued a writ of execution for the amount of ₱4,162,361.50
(which covered monetary claims corresponding to the period from January 1, 1989 to March 15, 1995) in favor of the 15 employees represented by
Atty. Arnado,16 to be distributed thusly:17

1. Barredo, Gregorio ₱278,700.10

2. Bordomeo, Roberto ₱278,700.10

3. Cupta, Anecito ₱278,700.10

4. Delposo, Godofredo ₱278,700.10

5. Dinolan, Ananias ₱278,700.10

31
 6. Jayme, Jovito ₱278,700.10

7. Lozada, Merope ₱278,700.10

8. Mayorga, Agapito ₱278,700.10

9. Mergal, Lourdes ₱278,700.10

10. Pancho, Bebiano ₱278,700.10

11. Pancho, Violeta ₱278,700.10

12. Rodriguez, Alejandro ₱278,700.10

13. Russiana, Ireneo ₱263,685.10

14. Tangub, Joannis ₱278,700.10

15. Trazona, Rolsan ₱275,575.10

TOTAL ₱4,162,361.50

On June 5, 1995, Assistant Regional Director dela Torre issued another Writ of Execution for the amount of ₱1,200,378.92 in favor of the second
group of employees. Objecting to the reduced computation for them, however, the second group of employees filed a Motion Declaring the Writ of
Execution dated June 5, 1995 null and void.

On July 11, 1995, IPI challenged the May 24, 1995 writ of execution issued in favor of the 15 employees by filing its Appeal and Prohibition with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order in the Office of then DOLE Undersecretary Cresenciano Trajano.18

On December 22, 1995,19 Acting DOLE Secretary Jose Brillantes, acting on IPI’s appeal, recalled and quashed the May 24, 1995 writ of execution,
and declared and considered the case closed and terminated.20

Aggrieved, the 15 employees sought the reconsideration of the December 22, 1995 Order of Acting DOLE Secretary Brillantes.

On August 27, 1996, DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing granted the Motion for Reconsideration,21 and reinstated the May 24, 1995 writ of
execution, subject to the deduction of the sum of ₱745,959.39 already paid pursuant to quitclaims from the award of ₱4,162,361.50.22 Secretary
Quisumbing declared the quitclaims executed by the employees on December 2, 3, and 17, 1993 without the assistance of the proper office of the
DOLE unconscionable for having been entered into under circumstances showing vitiation of consent; and ruled that the execution of the quitclaims

32
should not prevent the employees from recovering their monetary claims under the final and executory decisions dated December 26, 1990 and
December 5, 1991, less the amounts received under the quitclaims.

Aggrieved by the reinstatement of the May 24, 1995 writ of execution, IPI moved for a reconsideration. 23

On September 3, 1996, and pending resolution of IPI’s motion for reconsideration, Regional Director Macaraya issued a writ of execution in favor of
the 15 employees represented by Atty. Arnado to recover ₱3,416,402.10 pursuant to the order dated August 27, 1996 of Secretary
Quisumbing.24 Thereafter, the sheriff garnished the amount of ₱3,416,402.10 out of the funds of IPI with China Banking Corporation, which released
the amount.25 Hence, on September 11, 1996, the 15 employees represented by Atty. Arnado executed a Satisfaction of Judgment and
Quitclaim/Release upon receipt of their respective portions of the award, subject to the reservation of their right to claim "unsatisfied amounts of
separation pay as well as backwages reckoned from the date after 15 March 1995 and up to the present, or until separation pay is fully paid."26

Notwithstanding the execution of the satisfaction of judgment and quitclaim/release, Atty. Arnado still filed an omnibus motion not only in behalf of
the 15 employees but also in behalf of other employees named in the notice of computation/execution, with the exception of the second group,
seeking another writ of execution to recover the further sum of ₱58,546,767.83.27

Atty. Arnado filed a supplemental omnibus motion for the denial of IPI’s Motion for Reconsideration on the ground of mootness.28

In the meanwhile, the employees belonging to the second group reiterated their Motion Declaring the Writ of Execution dated June 5, 1995 null and
void, and filed on May 15, 1996 a Motion for Issuance of Writ, praying for another writ of execution based on the computation by Regional Director
Macaraya.

On December 24, 1997,29 Secretary Quisumbing, affirming his August 27, 1996 order, denied IPI’s Motion for Reconsideration for being rendered
moot and academic by the full satisfaction of the May 24, 1995 writ of execution. He also denied Atty. Arnado’s omnibus motion for lack of merit;
and dealt with the issue involving the June 5, 1995 writ of execution issued in favor of the second group of employees, which the Court eventually
resolved in the decision promulgated in G.R. No. 164633.30

The employees represented by Atty. Arnado moved for the partial reconsideration of the December 24, 1997 order of Secretary Quisumbing.
Resolving this motion on March 27, 1998, Acting DOLE Secretary Jose M. Español, Jr. held as follow:31

WHEREFORE, Our Order dated December 24, 1997, is hereby AFFIRMED.

The Motion for Reconsideration/Amend/Clarificatory and Reiteration of Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution dated January 12, 1998, filed by six
(6) salesmen, namely, Geronimo S. Banquirigo, Reynaldo C. Menor, Rogelio Enricoso, Danilo Palioto, Herbert Veloso and Colito Virtudazo as well
as the Motion for Reconsideration and/or Clarification filed by Salesman Noli G. Silo, are hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit. The June 5, 1995
Writ of Execution is now considered fully executed and satisfied.

The Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed by Roberto Bordomeo and 231 others, is likewise DENIED, for lack of merit

33
SO ORDERED.32

Records reveal, however, that Virgilio Saragena, et al. brought to this Court a petition for certiorari to assail the December 24, 1997 and March 27,
1998 Orders of the Secretary of Labor (G.R. No. 134118). As stated at the start, the Court dismissed the petition of Saragena, et al. on September
9, 1998 for having been filed out of time and for the petitioners’ failure to comply with the requirements under Rule 13 and Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. 33 The entry of judgment was issued on December 7, 1998.

In the meanwhile, on July 27, 1998, Atty. Arnado filed a Motion for Execution with the DOLE Regional Office,34 demanding the following amounts
from IPI, to wit:

For Roberto Bordomeo and 14 others ₱4,990,401.00

The rest of complainants 33,824,820.41

Total P 38,815,221.41

Again, on September 22, 1998, Atty. Arnado filed a Motion for Execution with the Regional Office.35 This time, no monetary claims were demanded
but the rest of the complainants sought to collect from IPI the reduced amount of ₱6,268,818.47.

Another Motion for Execution was filed by Atty. Arnado on July 6, 1999,36 seeking the execution of the December 26, 1990 order issued by
Secretary Torres and of the April 12, 1995 notice of computation/execution issued by Regional Director Macaraya.

Ultimately, on July 4, 2001, DOLE Secretary Patricia Sto. Tomas issued her Order37 affirming the order issued on March 27, 1998, and declaring
that the full execution of the order of March 27, 1998 "completely CLOSED and TERMINATED this case."

Only herein petitioners Roberto Bordomeo, Anecito Cupta, Jaime Sarmiento and Virgilio Saragena assailed the July 4, 2001 order of Secretary Sto.
Tomas by petition for certiorari in the CA (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 65970).38

On May 30, 2003, the CA rendered its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 65970,39 to wit:

It is worthy to note that all the decisions and incidents concerning the case between petitioners and private respondent IPI have long attained
finality. The records show that petitioners have already been granted a writ of execution. In fact, the decision has been executed. Thus, there is
nothing for this Court to modify. The granting of the instant petition calls for the amendment of the Court of a decision which has been executed. In
this light, it is worthy to note the rule that final and executory decisions, more so with those already executed, may no longer be amended except
only to correct errors which are clerical in nature. Amendments or alterations which substantially affect such judgments as well as the entire
proceedings held for that purpose are null and void for lack of jurisdiction. (Pio Barreto Realty Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 360
SCRA 127).

34
This Court in the case of CA GR No. 54041 dated February 28, 2001, has ruled that the Orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated
December 24, 1997 and March 27, 1998 have become final and executory. It may be noted that the said orders affirmed the earlier orders of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment dated December 22, 1995 and August 27, 1996 granting the execution of the decision in the case between
petitioners and IPI.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.40

The petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,41 but the CA denied the motion on October 30, 2003.42

Hence, they commenced this special civil action for certiorari.

The petitioners hereby contend that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS RULED CONTRARY TO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT:

A. HELD THAT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS (WHICH MERELY SEEKS FULL EXECUTION OF DOLE FINAL
JUDGMENTS 26 DECEMBER 1990 AND 5 DECEMBER 1991 WOULD AMEND SAID FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENTS.

B. FAILED TO IMPLEMENT THE SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE SET IN PDCP VS. GENILO, G.R. NO. 106705, THAT SIMILARLY
SITUATED EMPLOYEES HAS THE RIGHT TO PROVE THEIR ENTITLEMENT TO THE BENEFITS AWARDED UNDER FINAL
JUDGMENTS.

C. HELD THAT THE QUESTIONED JUDGMENTS HAD BEEN EXECUTED WHEN THE RESPONDENTS THEMSELVES ADMIT
THE CONTRARY.

D. HELD THAT DOLE SECRETARY DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN SHE REFUSED TO FULLY
EXECUTE THE 1990 AND 1991 DOLE FINAL JUDGMENTS AND ISSUE CORRESPONDING WRITS OF EXECUTION.

The petitioners submit that of the six groups of employees classified under the April 12, 1995 notice of computation/execution issued by Regional
Director Macaraya, only the first two groups, that is, the 15 employees initially represented by Atty. Arnado; and the nine salesmen led by Geronimo
S. Banquirigo, had been granted a writ of execution. They further submit that the May 24, 1995 writ of execution issued in favor of the first group of
employees, including themselves, had only been partially satisfied because no backwages or separation pay from March 16, 1995 onwards had yet
been paid to them; that the reduced award granted to the second group of employees was in violation of the April 12, 1995 notice of

35
computation/execution; that no writ of execution had been issued in favor of the other groups of employees; and that DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas
thus committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to fully execute the December 26, 1990 and December 5, 1991 orders.

In its comment, IPI counters that the petition for certiorari should be dismissed for being an improper remedy, the more appropriate remedy being a
petition for review on certiorari; that a petition for review on certiorari should have been filed within 15 days from receipt of the denial of the motion
for reconsideration, as provided in Section 1 and Section 2 of Rule 45; and that the petition must also be outrightly dismissed for being filed out of
time.

IPI contends that the finality of the December 24, 1997 and March 27, 1998 orders of the DOLE Secretary rendered them unalterable; that Atty.
Arnado had already brought the December 24, 1997 and March 27, 1998 orders to this Court for review (G.R. No. 134118); and that the Court had
dismissed the petition for having been filed out of time and for the petitioners’ failure to comply with Rule 13 and Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Ruling

We dismiss the petition for certiorari.

Firstly, an appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to be taken to this Court within 15 days from notice of the
judgment or final order raising only questions of law, was the proper remedy available to the petitioners. Hence, their filing of the petition
for certiorari on January 9, 2004 to assail the CA’s May 30, 2003 decision and October 30, 2003 resolution in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 65970 upon their
allegation of grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA was improper. The averment therein that the CA gravely abused its discretion did not
warrant the filing of the petition for certiorari, unless the petition further showed how an appeal in due course under Rule 45 was not an adequate
remedy for them. By virtue of its being an extraordinary remedy, certiorari cannot replace or substitute an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, like an appeal in due course.43

We remind them that an appeal may also avail to review and correct any grave abuse of discretion committed by an inferior court, provided it will be
adequate for that purpose.

It is the adequacy of a remedy in the ordinary course of law that determines whether a special civil action for certiorari can be a proper alternative
remedy. We reiterate what the Court has discoursed thereon in Heirs of Spouses Teofilo M. Reterta and Elisa Reterta v. Spouses Lorenzo Mores
and Virginia Lopez,44 viz:

Specifically, the Court has held that the availability of appeal as a remedy does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent or preclude a party from
making use of certiorari if appeal is not an adequate remedy, or an equally beneficial, or speedy remedy. It is inadequacy, not the mere absence
of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari. A
remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or
resolution of the lower court or agency. It is understood, then, that a litigant need not mark time by resorting to the less speedy remedy
of appeal in order to have an order annulled and set aside for being patently void for failure of the trial court to comply with the Rules of
Court.

36
Nor should the petitioner be denied the recourse despite certiorari not being available as a proper remedy against an assailed order, because it is
better on balance to look beyond procedural requirements and to overcome the ordinary disinclination to exercise supervisory powers in order that a
void order of a lower court may be controlled to make it conformable to law and justice. Verily, the instances in which certiorari will issue cannot be
defined, because to do so is to destroy the comprehensiveness and usefulness of the extraordinary writ. The wide breadth and range of the
discretion of the court are such that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus, and
that in the exercise of superintending control over inferior courts, a superior court is to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case "as
the ends of justice may require." Thus, the writ will be granted whenever necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial
justice.45 (Emphasis supplied)

Even so, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court still requires the petition for certiorari to comply with the following requisites, namely: (1) the writ
of certiorari is directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.46

Jurisprudence recognizes certain situations when the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be deemed proper, such as: (a) when it is necessary to
prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party; (b) where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment; (c) where there
may be danger of a failure of justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient; (e) where the issue raised is one purely of
law; (f) where public interest is involved; and (g) in case of urgency.47 Yet, a reading of the petition for certiorari and its annexes reveals that the
petition does not come under any of the situations. Specifically, the petitioners have not shown that the grant of the writ of certiorari will be
necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice to them.

In dismissing the petitioners’ petition for certiorari, the CA in effect upheld the Secretary of Labor’s declaration in her assailed July 4, 2001 decision
that the full satisfaction of the writs of execution had completely closed and terminated the labor dispute.

Yet, the petitioners have ascribed grave abuse of discretion to the CA for doing so.

We do not agree. We find no just cause to now issue the writ of certiorari in order to set aside the CA’s assailed May 30, 2003 decision. Indeed, the
following well stated justifications for the dismissal of the petition show that the CA was correct, viz:

xxxx

It is worthy to note that all the decisions and incidents concerning the case between petitioners and private respondent IPI have long attained
finality. The records show that petitioners have already been granted a writ of execution. In fact, the decision has been executed. Thus, there is
nothing for this Court to modify. The granting of the instant petition calls for the amendment of the Court of a decision which has been executed. In
this light, it is worthy to note the rule that final and executory decisions, more so with those already executed, may no longer be amended except
only to correct errors which are clerical in nature. Amendments or alterations which substantially affect such judgments as well as the entire
proceedings held for that purpose are null and void for lack of jurisdiction (Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 360
SCRA 127).

37
This Court in the case of CA GR No. 54041 dated February 28, 2001, has ruled that the Orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated
December 24, 1997 and March 27, 1998 have become final and executory. It may be noted that the said orders affirmed the earlier orders of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment dated December 22, 1995 and August 27, 1996 granting the execution of the decision in the case between
petitioners and IPI.

There is nothing on the records to support the allegation of petitioners that the Secretary of Labor and Employment abused her discretion. The
pertinent portion of the assailed order reads:

"Given that this office had already ruled on all incidents of the case in its March 27, 1998 order and the Writ of Execution dated June 5, 1995 had
already attained finality and had in fact been completely satisfied through the deposit with the Regional Office of the amount covered by the Writ,
the subsequent Motions filed by Atty. Arnado can no longer be entertained, much less granted by this Office. Thus, at this point, there is nothing
more to grant nor to execute."48

xxxx

In a special civil action for certiorari brought against a court with jurisdiction over a case, the petitioner carries the burden to prove that the
respondent tribunal committed not a merely reversible error but a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
impugned order.49 Showing mere abuse of discretion is not enough, for the abuse must be shown to be grave. Grave abuse of discretion means
either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the
respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such
as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction.50 Under the circumstances, the CA committed no abuse of discretion, least of all grave, because its justifications were supported
by the history of the dispute and borne out by the applicable laws and jurisprudence.

And, secondly, the records contradict the petitioners’ insistence that the two writs of execution to enforce the December 26, 1990 and December 5,
1991 orders of the DOLE Secretary were only partially satisfied. To recall, the two writs of execution issued were the one for ₱4,162,361.50, later
reduced to ₱3,416,402.10, in favor of the 15 employees represented by Atty. Arnado, and that for ₱1,200,378.92 in favor of the second group of
employees led by Banquerigo.

There is no question that the 15 employees represented by Atty. Arnado, inclusive of the petitioners, received their portion of the award covered by
the September 3, 1996 writ of execution for the amount of ₱3,416,402.10 through the release of the garnished deposit of IPI at China Banking
Corporation. That was why they then executed the satisfaction of judgment and quitclaim/release, the basis for the DOLE Secretary to expressly
declare in her July 4, 2001 decision that the full satisfaction of the writ of execution "completely CLOSED and TERMINATED this case."51

Still, the 15 employees demand payment of their separation pay and backwages from March 16, 1995 onwards pursuant to their reservation
reflected in the satisfaction of judgment and quitclaim/release they executed on September 11, 1996.

The demand lacked legal basis. Although the decision of the DOLE Secretary dated December 5, 1991 had required IPI to reinstate the affected
workers to their former positions with full backwages reckoned from December 8, 1989 until actually reinstated without loss of seniority rights and

38
other benefits, the reinstatement thus decreed was no longer possible. Hence, separation pay was instead paid to them. This alternative was
sustained in law and jurisprudence, for "separation pay may avail in lieu of reinstatement if reinstatement is no longer practical or in the best interest
of the parties. Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement may likewise be awarded if the employee decides not to be reinstated."52

Under the circumstances, the employment of the 15 employees or the possibility of their reinstatement terminated by March 15, 1995. Thereafter,
their claim for separation pay and backwages beyond March 15, 1995 would be unwarranted. The computation of separation pay and backwages
due to illegally dismissed employees should not go beyond the date when they were deemed to have been actually separated from their
employment, or beyond the date when their reinstatement was rendered impossible. Anent this, the Court has observed in Golden Ace Builders v.
Talde:53

The basis for the payment of backwages is different from that for the award of separation pay. Separation pay is granted where reinstatement is no
longer advisable because of strained relations between the employee and the employer. Backwages represent compensation that should have
been earned but were not collected because of the unjust dismissal. The basis for computing backwages is usually the length of the employee’s
service while that for separation pay is the actual period when the employee was unlawfully prevented from working.

As to how both awards should be computed, Macasero v. Southern Industrial Gases Philippines instructs:

[T]he award of separation pay is inconsistent with a finding that there was no illegal dismissal, for under Article 279 of the Labor Code and as held in
a catena of cases, an employee who is dismissed without just cause and without due process is entitled to backwages and reinstatement or
payment of separation pay in lieu thereof:

Thus, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs: backwages and reinstatement. The two reliefs provided are separate and distinct. In
instances where reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained relations between the employee and the employer, separation pay is
granted. In effect, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable,
and backwages.

The normal consequences of respondents’ illegal dismissal, then, are reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, and payment of
backwages computed from the time compensation was withheld up to the date of actual reinstatement. Where reinstatement is no longer
viable as an option, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service should be awarded as an alternative. The
payment of separation pay is in addition to payment of backwages. (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

xxxx

Clearly then, respondent is entitled to backwages and separation pay as his reinstatement has been rendered impossible due to strained relations.
As correctly held by the appellate court, the backwages due respondent must be computed from the time he was unjustly dismissed until his actual
reinstatement, or from February 1999 until June 30, 2005 when his reinstatement was rendered impossible without fault on his part.

The Court, however, does not find the appellate court's computation of separation pay in order. The appellate court considered respondent to have
served petitioner company for only eight years. Petitioner was hired in 1990, however, and he must be considered to have been in the service not
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only until 1999, when he was unjustly dismissed, but until June 30, 2005, the day he is deemed to have been actually separated (his reinstatement
having been rendered impossible) from petitioner company or for a total of 15 years. 54

As for the portions of the award pertaining to the rest of the employees listed in the April 12, 1995 notice of execution/computation (i.e., those
allegedly similarly situated as the employees listed in the December 5, 1991 order of the DOLE Secretary) still remaining unsatisfied, the petitioners
are definitely not the proper parties to ventilate such concern in this or any other forum. At any rate, the concern has already been addressed and
resolved by the Court in G.R. No. 164633.55

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari for its lack of merit; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on May 30, 2003; and
ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

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