Privilege not a right

CBD Case No. 176 January 20, 1995

SALLY D. BONGALONTA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and ALFONSO M. MARTIJA, respondents.

RESOLUTION

MELO, J.:

In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the Commission on Bar
Discipline, National Grievance Investigation Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant
Sally Bongalonta charged Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members of the Philippine Bar,
with unjust and unethical conduct, to wit: representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to
frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which complainant might obtain.

The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Criminal
Case No. 7635-55, for estafa, against the Sps. Luisa and Solomer Abuel. She also filed, a separate
civil action Civil Case No. 56934, where she was able to obtain a writ of preliminary attachment and
by virtue thereof, a piece of real property situated in Pasig, Rizal and registered in the name of the
Sps. Abuel under TCT No. 38374 was attached. Atty. Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the Sps.
Abuel in the aforesaid criminal and civil cases.

During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed civil Case No. 58650 for collection of
a sum of money based on a promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional Trial Court, against the
Sps. Abuel. In the said case Gregorio Lantin was represented by Atty. Alfonso Martija. In this case,
the Sps. Abuel were declared in default for their failure to file the necessary responsive pleading and
evidence ex-parte was received against them followed by a judgment by default rendered in favor of
Gregorio Lantin. A writ of execution was, in due time, issued and the same property previously
attached by complainant was levied upon.

It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned cases, Atty. Pablito
Castillo and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the same PTR and the same IBP receipt
number to wit" Permanent Light Center, No. 7, 21st Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, PTR No. 629411
dated 11-5-89 IBP No. 246722 dated 1-12-88.

Thus, complainant concluded that civil Case No. 58650 filed by Gregorio Lantin was merely a part of
the scheme of the Sps. Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction of the money judgment which complainant
might obtain in Civil Case No. 56934.

After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued it Resolution with the following findings and
recommendations:

Among the several documentary exhibits submitted by Bongalonta and attached to

the records is a xerox copy of TCT No. 38374, which Bongalonta and the
respondents admitted to be a faithful reproduction of the original. And it clearly
 appears under the Memorandum of Encumbrances on aid TCT that the Notice of
Levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband was registered and annotated in said
title of February 7, 1989, whereas, that in favor of Gregorio Lantin, on October 18,
1989. Needless to state, the notice of levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband is
a superior lien on the said registered property of the Abuel spouses over that of
Gregorio Lantin.

Consequently, the charge against the two respondents (i.e. representing conflicting
interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a
judgment which Bongalonta and her husband might obtain against the Abuel
spouses) has no leg to stand on.

However, as to the fact that indeed the two respondents placed in their appearances
and in their pleadings the same IBP No. "246722 dated
1-12-88", respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo deserves to be SUSPENDED for using,
apparently thru his negligence, the IBP official receipt number of respondent Atty.
Alfonso M. Martija. According to the records of the IBP National Office, Atty. Castillo
paid P1,040.00 as his delinquent and current membership dues, on February 20,
1990, under IBP O.R. No. 2900538, after Bongalonta filed her complaint with the IBP
Committee on Bar Discipline.

The explanation of Atty. Castillo's Cashier-Secretary by the name of Ester Fraginal

who alleged in her affidavit dated March 4, 1993, that it was all her fault in placing the
IBP official receipt number pertaining to Atty. Alfonso M. Martija in the appearance
and pleadings Atty. Castillo and in failing to pay in due time the IBP membership
dues of her employer, deserves scant consideration, for it is the bounded duty and
obligation of every lawyer to see to it that he pays his IBP membership dues on time,
especially when he practices before the courts, as required by the Supreme Court.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo be

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for using the IBP
Official Receipt No. of his co-respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.

The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence. (pp. 2-
4, Resolution)

The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. It is well to stress again that the
practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege. One of these requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to
expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A
lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. for this reason, he is
required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo guilty committing a falsehood in violation
of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND
him from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that commission of the
same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty. A copy of
the Resolution shall be spread on the personal record of respondent in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.

SO ORDERED.
 A matter of public interest

NEMESIO FLORAN AND CARIDAD FLORAN, Complainants, v. ATTY. ROY PRULE

EDIZA, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

In a Decision dated 19 October 2011, the Court found respondent Atty. Roy Prule Ediza
(Atty. Ediza) administratively liable for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 15, and
Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court upheld the
findings of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and suspended Atty. Ediza from
the practice of law for six months.

Atty. Ediza's liability stemmed from a Complaint/Affidavit 1 dated 8 September 2000

filed by the spouses Nemesio and Caridad Floran (complainants). The subject of the
complaint was a 3.5525 hectare parcel of unregistered land located in San Martin,
Villanueva, Misamis Oriental, which was covered by a tax declaration in the name of
Sartiga Epal, a relative, who gave the property to complainants.

From the records, the Court found that Atty. Ediza deceived complainants when he
asked them to unknowingly sign a deed of sale transferring a portion of their land to
him. When the sale of complainants' land pushed through, Atty. Ediza received half of
the amount of the proceeds given by the buyer and falsely misled complainants into
thinking that he would register, using the same proceeds, the remaining portion of their
land. These actions, which deprived complainants of their property, showed Atty.
Ediza's behavior as unbecoming a member of the legal profession.

The Court, in its Decision dated 19 October 2011, (1) suspended Atty. Ediza from the
practice of law for six months, effective upon receipt of the Decision; (2) directed him
to return to complainants the two sets of documents that he misled them and Sartiga
Epal into signing; and (3) ordered Atty. Ediza to pay complainants the amount of
P125,463.38, representing the amount he deceived them into paying him, with legal
interest from 8 September 2000 until fully paid. The Court further warned Atty. Ediza
that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.

Thereafter, Atty. Ediza filed a Motion for Reconsideration 2 dated 18 November 2011
which was denied by the Court in a Resolution 3 dated 8 February 2012 for lack of
substantial merit.

Atty. Ediza then filed a Manifestation of Compliance (On the Order of

Suspension)4 dated 29 May 2012 through the Office of the Bar Confidant. He also
attached a sworn statement5 attesting that he desisted from the practice of law for six
months from receipt of the decision on 18 November 2011 until 29 May 2012.

In a Resolution6 dated 3 September 2012, the Court deferred action on the

Manifestation of Compliance and adopted the recommendations of the Office of the Bar
Confidant that Atty. Ediza be required to (1) submit certifications from the IBP Local
Chapter where he is a member and the Office of the Executive Judge where he
practices his profession, both stating that he had desisted from the practice of law from
18 November 2011 to 29 May 2012; and (2) show proof of payment to complainants of
P125,463.38 plus legal interest, and the return of the two sets of documents that Atty.
Ediza misled complainants and Sartiga Epal to sign. The Court also required
complainants to manifest whether Atty. Ediza had already paid the said amount and
returned the said documents.

In an undated letter written in the vernacular, complainants wrote the Court that Atty.
Ediza had yet to comply with the Court's Decision and asked the Court's assistance in
implementing the same. Later, in a Verified Compliance with Manifestation executed
with the assistance of the Public Attorney's Office, complainants informed the Court that
as of 17 October 2012, Atty. Ediza had not paid any single centavo and neither had he
returned the required documents.

In a Resolution7 dated 25 February 2013, the Court noted the manifestations and
further ordered Atty. Ediza to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with
or be held in contempt and to comply with the Decision.

In a Manifestation Showing Cause8 dated 22 April 2013, Atty. Ediza claimed that he had
no intention to defy the Court's authority or challenge its orders and that he had served
his suspension, but asked the Court to consider that the two sets of documents were
merely fictional. He also claimed that he was at a loss as to which 'documents' the
Decision was referring to because the same were supposedly not alleged with
particularity and he had been barred by the Rules of Procedure of the IBP Committee
on Bar Discipline from requesting a bill of particulars. Atty. Ediza alleged that due to the
ambiguity about the 'documents,' the judgment was incomplete and unenforceable.
Moreover, Atty. Ediza claimed that the alleged lack of due process in the administrative
case rendered the entire proceedings void; and consequently, even the order to pay the
sum should be stricken off.

The Court, in its 15 July 2013 Resolution, 9 found this last explanation unsatisfactory
and further required Atty. Ediza to comply with the 19 October 2011 Decision within ten
days from notice, warning him of a more severe penalty in the event of his continued
failure to do so.

On 22 November 2013, the Office of the Chief Justice received a handwritten letter, in
the vernacular, from complainants requesting information on the status of the
administrative case. Again, complainants wrote the Court two letters in February 2014,
one dated 5 February and another an undated letter received by the Court on 18
February, requesting for the immediate resolution and information on the status of the
administrative case.

The Court, in its 4 June 2014 Resolution,10 noted this last letter from complainants and
required Atty. Ediza to show cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt with or be
held in contempt for failure to comply with the 19 October 2011 Decision, and again
ordered him to conform to the same.

Meanwhile, on 13 July 2014, complainants again wrote the Office of the Chief Justice
reiterating Atty. Ediza's failure to comply with the Court's directives, and noted that it
had been 17 years since the dispute with Atty. Ediza began.

Atty. Ediza then filed a Compliance with a Motion to Reopen/Reinvestigate the Case
dated 2 August 2014, claiming that he had discovered new evidence which would prove
that complainants had been engaging in fraudulent schemes that resulted in him being
victimized. Briefly, Atty. Ediza claimed that complainants never had ownership over the
subject property, and that when they initially sought his services in preparing the
document that would effect the sale and conveyance of the land in their favor, they
employed the aid of a poseur to misrepresent the real Sartiga Epal, the supposed
transferor of the property. Atty. Ediza attached the affidavits of allegedly the surviving
spouse and sons of Sartiga Epal to substantiate said averments.

In its 12 November 2014 Resolution, the Court denied the motion to

reopen/reinvestigate the case for lack of merit and again required Atty. Ediza to comply
with the 19 October 2011 Decision within five days from notice.

On 5 January 2015, the Office of the Chief Justice received another letter from
complainants, requesting the issuance of a writ of execution. In the meantime, Atty.
Ediza filed on 7 February 2015 a Manifestation and Motion, asking the Court to stay the
execution of the 19 October 2011 Decision insofar as it required the return of money
and documents to complainants, and to note his service of the suspension and lift the
same.

More than four years since the Court promulgated its Decision dated 19 October 2011,
Atty. Ediza has yet to comply with the Court's directives to (1) submit certifications
from the IBP Local Chapter where he is a member and the Office of the Executive Judge
where he practices his profession both stating that he has desisted from the practice of
law from 18 November 2011 to 29 May 2012; (2) pay complainants the amount of
P125,463.38 plus legal interest; and (3) return the two sets of documents that Atty.
Ediza misled complainants and Sartiga Epal to sign.

The Court issued numerous Resolutions dated 3 September 2012, 25 February 2013,
15 July 2013, 4 June 2014, and 12 November 2014, requiring Atty. Ediza to comply
with the 19 October 2011 Decision and show cause why he should not be disciplinary
dealt with or be held in contempt for his failure to abide by the Court's orders.
However, Atty. Ediza repeatedly and blatantly disregarded and obstinately defied these
orders from the Court. Instead, Atty. Ediza responded by (1) claiming ignorance over
the documents stated in the Decision, and worse, adjudged that the documents were
fictional; (2) alleging newly discovered evidence; (3) demanding to stay the execution
of the Decision; and (4) reporting that he has complied with the order of suspension
without submitting any required certifications from the IBP and the Office of the
Executive Judge.

The intentional delay and utter refusal to abide with the Court's orders is a great
disrespect to the Court which cannot be tolerated. Atty. Ediza willfully left unheeded all
the warnings imposed upon him, despite the earlier six-month suspension that was
meted out to him for his administrative liability. In Tugot v. Judge Coliflores,11 the Court
held that its resolutions should not be construed as mere requests from the Court. They
should be complied with promptly and completely. The failure of Atty. Ediza to comply
betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in his character, but also disrespect for the Court's
lawful orders and directives.

As a member of the legal profession, Atty. Ediza has the duty to obey the orders and
processes of this Court without delay and resistance. Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility states:

CANON 12

A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN
THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

xxxx

Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse Court processes.

In the present case, Atty. Ediza had previously been found guilty of violating the Code
of Professional Responsibility and was suspended from the practice of law for six
months. Despite the suspension, Atty. Ediza is once again demonstrating to this Court
that not only is he unfit to stay in the legal profession for failing to protect the interests
of his clients but is also remiss in following the dictates of the Court, which has
administrative supervision over him. In Martinez v. Zoleta,12 we held that the Court
should not and will not tolerate future indifference to administrative complaints and to
resolutions requiring comment on such administrative complaints. It bears stressing
that a disregard of Court directives constitutes grave or serious misconduct 13 and gross
or willful insubordination14 which warrant disciplinary sanction by this Court.15

Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary authority of the
Court over members of the Bar. Reinforcing the execution of this constitutional
authority is Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which gives this Court the power
to remove or suspend a lawyer from the practice of law. The provision states:

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds

therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(Emphasis supplied)

In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon Atty. Ediza, we are aware that the power to
disbar is one to be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct
that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as a legal professional
and as an officer of the Court.16 However, Atty. Ediza's stubborn attitude and
unwillingness to comply with the Court's directives, which we deem to be an affront to
the Court's authority over members of the Bar, warrant an utmost disciplinary sanction
from this Court.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege clothed with public
interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his
brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the
most important functions of the State - the administration of justice - as an officer of
the court.17 To enjoy the privileges of practicing law, lawyers must adhere to the rigid
standards of mental fitness, maintain the highest degree of morality, and faithfully
comply with the rules of the legal profession. 18 Clearly, Atty. Ediza's conduct has made
him unfit to remain in the legal profession.
chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roy Prule Ediza, having violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility by committing grave misconduct and willful insubordination,
is DISBARRED and his name ordered STRICKEN OFF the Roll of Attorneys effective
immediately.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the records of respondent. Further, let other
copies be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court
Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for
their information and guidance.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary
Not a property right but a privilege

LOLITA ARTEZUELA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RICARTE B. MADERAZO, respondent.

PUNO, J.:

For his failure to meet the exacting standards of professional ethics, the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in its Resolution of May 2, 2000 recommended the
suspension from the practice of law of respondent Atty. Ricarte B. Maderazo for the period of six (6)
months, with a stern warning that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely.
Respondent allegedly represented conflicting interests in violation of Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Ethics, and Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 1

By way of a Motion for Reconsideration, respondent now comes before this Court to challenge the
2

basis of the IBP's resolution, and prays for its reversal.

The factual antecedents of the case are as follows: On or about 3:00 in the early morning of
December 24, 1992, Allan Echavia had a vehicular accident at Caduman St., corner H. Abellana St.,
Mandaue City. At the time of the accident, Echavia was driving a Ford Telstar car owned by a
Japanese national named Hirometsi Kiyami, but was registered in the name of his brother-in-law,
Jun Anthony Villapez. The car rammed into a small carinderia owned by complainant Lolita
Artezuela.3

The destruction of the complainant's carinderia caused the cessation of the operation of her small
business, resulting to her financial dislocation. She incurred debts from her relatives and due to
financial constraints, stopped sending her two children to college. 4

Complainant engaged the services of the respondent in filing a damage suit against Echavia,
Villapez and one Bernardo Sia. Docketed as Civil Case No. 13666, the case was assigned to Branch
5

14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. An Amended Complaint was thereafter filed, impleading
Echavia, Kiyami and Villapez, and dropping Sia as a party-defendant. For his services, complainant
6

paid the respondent the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) as attorney's fees and Two
Thousand Pesos (₱2,000.00) as filing fee. However, the case was dismissed on March 22, 1994,
7

allegedly upon the instance of the complainant and her husband. 8

Because of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 13666, complainant filed a civil case for damages against
the respondent. It was docketed as CEB-18552 and assigned to Branch 57, Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City. The case was dismissed on June 12, 2001. 9

On November 24, 1994, Artezuela filed before this Court a verified complaint for disbarment against
the respondent. She alleged that respondent grossly neglected his duties as a lawyer and failed to
represent her interests with zeal and enthusiasm. According to her, when Civil Case No. 13666 was
scheduled for pre-trial conference on August 20, 1993, respondent asked for its postponement
although all the parties were present. Notwithstanding complainant's persistent and repeated follow-
up, respondent did not do anything to keep the case moving. He withdrew as counsel without
obtaining complainant's consent. 10

Complainant also claimed that respondent engaged in activities inimical to her interests. While acting
as her counsel, respondent prepared Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint. The said
document was even printed in respondent's office. Complainant further averred that it was
respondent who sought the dismissal of the case, misleading the trial court into thinking that the
dismissal was with her consent. 11

Respondent denied the complainant's allegations and averred that he conscientiously did his part as
the complainant's lawyer in Civil Case No. 13666. He withdrew as counsel because the complainant
was uncooperative and refused to confer with him. He also gave several notices to the complainant
and made known his intention before he filed his Manifestation to withdraw as counsel. Because of
the severed relationship, the lower court, after holding a conference, decided to grant respondent's
manifestation and advised the complainant to secure the services of a new lawyer. Complainant,
however, refused and instead, sought the dismissal of the case. 12

Respondent alleged that he sought the postponement of the Pre-Trial Conference scheduled on
August 20, 1993 so that he could file the Amended Complaint. He admitted that Echavia's Answer to
the Amended Complaint was printed in his office but denied having prepared the document and
having acted as counsel of Echavia. He claimed that complainant requested him to prepare
Echavia's Answer but he declined. Echavia, however, went back to his office and asked respondent's
secretary to print the document. Respondent intimated that the complainant and Echavia have
fabricated the accusations against him to compel him to pay the amount of ₱500,000.00. 13

This Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The IBP-Visayas
Regional Committee on Bar Discipline formed an Investigating Committee to hear the disbarment
complaint.

On October 6, 1999, Commissioner Gabriel T. Ingles issued a Report finding the respondent guilty of
representing conflicting interests, in violation of Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, as well as, of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics. He
recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year. Commissioner Ingles did not rule on the other issues.
14

As aforesaid, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines upheld the findings of
the Committee with modification only as to the penalty.

Seeking reconsideration of the IBP's resolution, respondent contends that the Investigating
Committee did not conduct trial; hence, he was not able to confront and examine the witnesses
against him. He argues that the Investigating Committee's finding that he represented Echavia is
contrary to court records and the complainant's own testimony in CEB-18552. He also casts doubt
on the credibility of the Investigating Committee to render just and fair recommendations considering
that the Investigating Commissioner and the respondent are counsel-adversaries in another case,
Civil Case No. R-33277. Finally, he questions the imposition of a six-month suspension, which he
claims to be harsh considering that his private practice is his only source of income.
15

After carefully examining the records, as well as the applicable laws and jurisprudence on the matter,
this Court is inclined to uphold the IBP's resolution.
1âwphi1.nêt

In administrative cases, the requirement of notice and hearing does not connote full adversarial
proceedings, as "actual adversarial proceedings become necessary only for clarification or when
there is a need to propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies." Due 16

process is fulfilled when the parties were given reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit
evidence in support of their arguments. 17
In the case at bar, records show that respondent repeatedly sought the postponement of the
hearings, prompting the Investigating Commissioner to receive complainant's evidence ex parte and
to set the case for resolution after the parties have submitted their respective memorandum. Hence:

"The records show that this is already the third postponement filed by respondent namely
December 12, 1996 (sic), January 3, 1996 and April 1, 1996.

The Commission for the last time, will cancel today's hearing and can no longer tolerate any
further postponement. Notify respondent by telegram for the hearing for (sic) April 22, 1996
at 2:00 P.M. Said hearing is intransferable in character.

In the meantime, complainant affirmed her complaint and likewise her witness, Allan
Echavia, also affirmed the contents of his affidavit and further stated that he had executed
the same and understood the contents thereof." 18

It is by his own negligence that the respondent was deemed to have waived his right to cross-
examine the complainant and her witness. He cannot belatedly ask this Court to grant new trial after
he has squandered his opportunity to exercise his right.

Respondent's contention that the finding of the Investigating Committee was contrary to the records
and the complainant's own admission in CEB-18552 is without merit. It is true that Atty. Aviola was
Echavia's counsel-of-record in Civil Case No. 13666 as evidenced by the certification from the clerk
of court, and as admitted by the complainant in CEB-18552, viz:
19

"ATTY. MADERAZO: (To witness- ON CROSS)

Q: Madam witness, you mentioned that the defendant in this case was the counsel of
Allan Echavia as early as August 20, 1993, wherein you learned for the first time of this fact
when you say he is counsel of Allan Echavia. (sic) You mean he is the counsel of record of
Allan Echavia in the Civil Case before Judge Dacudao? Is that what you mean?

A: What I learned was that Atty. Alviola was the counsel of Allan Echavia in the case
before Judge Dacudao but I heard Atty. Maderazo telling Allan Echavia not to admit that Atty.
Maderazo is appearing for me because he will be the one to coordinate with Allan's case.

Q: So it is clear that the defendant in this case is not the counsel of record of Allan
Echavia. It was Atty. Alviola stated by you now?

A: Atty. Maderazo was not Allan Echavia's counsel but it was Atty. Alviola who was the
counsel of record of Allan Echavia." 20

Nevertheless, the issue in this case is not whether the respondent also acted as the counsel-of-
record of Echavia. Rather, it is whether or not he had a direct hand in the preparation of Echavia's
Answer to the Amended Complaint.

To be guilty of representing conflicting interests, a counsel-of-record of one party need not also be
counsel-of-record of the adverse party. He does not have to publicly hold himself as the counsel of
the adverse party, nor make his efforts to advance the adverse party's conflicting interests of
record--- although these circumstances are the most obvious and satisfactory proof of the charge. It
is enough that the counsel of one party had a hand in the preparation of the pleading of the other
party, claiming adverse and conflicting interests with that of his original client. To require that he also
be counsel-of-record of the adverse party would punish only the most obvious form of deceit and
reward, with impunity, the highest form of disloyalty.

Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics states:

"It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of the retainer to disclose to the client the circumstances
of his relations to the parties and any interest in or in connection with the controversy, which
might influence the client in the selection of the counsel.

"It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all

concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this Canon, a
lawyer represents conflicting interests when in behalf of one of the clients, it is his
duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to
oppose." (emphasis supplied)

An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary nature of the
attorney-client relationship, sound public policy dictates that a lawyer be prohibited from representing
conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. He may not, without being guilty of
professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present
or former client. Indeed, good faith and honest intention on the part of the erring lawyer does not
make this rule inoperative. The lawyer is an officer of the court and his actions are governed by the
21

uncompromising rules of professional ethics. Thus:

"The relations of attorney and client is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste.
The question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney
has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves
attorneys, like Ceasar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to
avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice."
22

The professional obligation of the lawyer to give his undivided attention and zeal for his client's
cause is likewise demanded in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Inherently disadvantageous
to his client's cause, representation by the lawyer of conflicting interests requires disclosure of all
facts and consent of all the parties involved. Thus:

"CANON 15- All lawyers shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his clients.

xxx

Rule 15.03- A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts."

While the Resolution of the IBP is purely recommendatory, we find no reason to reverse the same. In
disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, only clear preponderance of evidence is
required to establish liability. As long as the evidence presented by complainant or that taken judicial
notice of by the Court is more convincing and worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto, the imposition of disciplinary sanction is justified.
23
A perusal of Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint shows that it indeed conflicts with the
complainant's claims. It reads:

"1. The allegations (sic) in Paragraph One (1) of the Complaint is admitted in so far as it
pertains to the personal circumstance and residence of the answering defendant. The rest of
the allegations in Paragraph One (1), and all the allegations in Paragraph Two (2) , THREE
(3), FOUR (4), FIVE (5), SIX (6), ELEVEN (11), TWELVE (12), and FOURTEEN (14), of the
Complaint are DENIED for lack of knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of such
allegations."
24

By way of prayer, Echavia states:

"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after hearing, judgment be rendered dismissing

plaintiff's complaint."
25

Anent the authorship by the respondent of the document quoted above, the Investigating Committee
found the testimonies of the complainant and Echavia credible as opposed to respondent's bare
denial. As pointed out by Echavia, he was approached by Atty. Maderazo, introduced himself as his
lawyer and after some sessions in the latter's office, asked him to return and sign a document which
he later identified as the Answer to the Amended Complaint.

The Investigating Committee found respondent's defense weak. Respondent did not bother to
present his secretary as witness, nor obtain her affidavit to prove his allegations. Instead, he offered
a convenient excuse--- that he cannot anymore locate his secretary.

Respondent argued that it was the complainant who asked him to prepare Echavia's Answer to the
Amended Complaint, after reaching an agreement whereby Echavia would testify in favor of the
complainant. After he declined the request, he claimed that it was the complainant who prepared the
document and asked his secretary to print the same. But as shown, Echavia's Answer to the
Amended Complaint was in no way favorable to the complainant.

With the dismissal of Civil Case No. 13666, Echavia is practically off the hook. We cannot find any
reason why Echavia would commit perjury and entangle himself, once again, with the law. He does
not stand to profit at all by accusing the respondent falsely.

Furthermore, considering complainant's stature and lack of legal education, we can not see how she
could have prepared Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint and device a legal maneuver as
complicated as the present case.

Respondent's attack on the credibility of Investigating Commissioner Ingles to render an impartial

decision, having been an adversary in Civil Case No. R-33277, does not convince us to grant new
trial. This is the first time that respondent questions the membership of Commissioner Ingles in the
Investigating Committee. If respondent really believed in good faith that Commissioner Ingles would
be biased and prejudiced, he should have asked for the latter's inhibition at the first instance.
Moreover, we could not find any hint of irregularity, bias or prejudice in the conduct of the
investigation that would lead us to set it aside.

Finally, we remind the respondent that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege,
and as such, must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the
lawyer's public responsibilities. The suspension of the respondent's privilege to practice law may
26

result to financial woes. But as the guardian of the legal profession, we are constrained to balance
this concern with the injury he caused to the very same profession he vowed to uphold with honesty
and fairness.1âwphi1.nêt

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Resolution of the IBP finding the respondent guilty of violating Canon 6 of
the Code of Professional Ethics, and Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is affirmed. Respondent is suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months with
a stern warning that a similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
 DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for
membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than
possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar
candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar examinations.

The Facts

Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.

On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as
members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against
respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-
taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled
that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him.
Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys
up to now.

Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant
alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001
elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate.
Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001
entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office
of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice
Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government
employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is
not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting
as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging
respondents services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the
proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyers oath but
disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the
same resolution, the Court required respondent to comment on the complaint against him.

In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific assistance to represent him before
the MBEC. Respondent claims that he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a
person who knows the law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the
inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as
a lawyer or represented himself as an attorney in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted his
resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of
the Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor
Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically motivated considering that
complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the
Roll of Attorneys.

On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment and refuted the claim of
respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan.
Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for
proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in
this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned his
appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an
employee of the government.

Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant
administrative case is motivated mainly by political vendetta.

On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation,
report and recommendation.

OBCs Report and Recommendation

The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May
2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated in
the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even
before he took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that respondents misconduct casts
a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that
respondents unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. The
OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.

On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent allegedly
violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government employee. Respondent
resigned as secretary and his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by
Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.

Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent
appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the
pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for
the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for George Bunan. In
the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel
for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the
MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him
before the MBEC and similar bodies.

On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained respondent as her counsel.
On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been
authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said party.
Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his appearance as
counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19
May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC
praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon,
Masbate.

All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the
practice of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar.

In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,1 the Court elucidated that:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment,
and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the
trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics
supplied) x x x

In Cayetano v. Monsod,2 the Court held that practice of law means any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage
in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal
profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal
knowledge or skill.

Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the
MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of
unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a
member of the Bar. Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice
law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar. 3 cräläwvirtualibräry

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to
persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise
of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and
even public trust4 since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right
to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be
withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had
practiced law without a license.5 cräläwvirtualibräry

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,6 a candidate
passed the bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held
in contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for
indirect contempt of court.7
cräläwvirtualibräry

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is
the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that
respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law.8 Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a
lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his
signature in the Roll of Attorneys.9 cräläwvirtualibräry
On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent to act
as counsel for a private client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the secretary of
the Sangguniang Bayan.

Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts
complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed
to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated
that he was resigning effective upon your acceptance. 10 Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondents
resignation effective 11 May 2001.11 Thus, the evidence does not support the charge that respondent
acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed
authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While
there was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.

 PP vs Maceda

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HON.

BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge of Branch 12,
Regional Trial Court of Antique, and AVELINO T.
JAVELLANA, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PARDO, J.:

On September 8, 1999, we denied the Peoples motion seeking

reconsideration of our August 13, 1990 decision in these cases. In
said resolution, we held that respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz
Maceda committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order
of August 8, 1989 giving custody over private respondent Avelino T.
Javellana to the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
12, San Jose, Antique, Atty. Deogracias del Rosario, during the
pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. At that time, sufficient
reason was shown why private respondent Javellana should not be
detained at the Antique Provincial Jail. The trial courts order
specifically provided for private respondents detention at the
residence of Atty. del Rosario. However, private respondent was not
to be allowed liberty to roam around but was to be held as
detention prisoner in said residence.

This order of the trial court was not strictly complied with because
private respondent was not detained in the residence of Atty. Del
Rosario. He went about his normal activities as if he were a free
man, including engaging in the practice of law. Despite our
resolution of July 30, 1990 prohibiting private respondent to appear
as counsel in Criminal Case No. 4262,1 the latter accepted cases and
continued practicing law.

On April 7, 1997, Senior State Prosecutor Henrick F. Guingoyon filed

with the Supreme Court a motion seeking clarification on the
following questions: "(1) Does the resolution of this Honorable Court
dated July 30, 1990, prohibiting Atty. Javellana from appearing as
counsel refer only to Criminal Case No. 4262? (2) Is Atty. now
(Judge) Deogracias del Rosario still the custodian of Atty. Javellana?
and (3) Since it appears that Atty. (now Judge) del Rosario never
really held and detained Atty. Javellana as prisoner in his residence,
is not Atty. Javellana considered an escapee or a fugitive of justice
for which warrant for his arrest should forthwith be issued?"2 cräläwvirtualibräry

In a resolution dated June 18, 1997, we "noted" the above motion.

After we denied the motion for reconsideration on September 8,

1999, the trial court resumed hearing Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-
3355. Earlier, on August 2, 1999, Rolando Mijares filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, a motion
seeking the revocation of the trial courts custody order and the
imprisonment of private respondent Javellana in the provincial jail.

On November 15, 1999, private respondent Javellana filed with the

Supreme Court an urgent motion seeking to clarify whether the
June 18, 1997 resolution finally terminated or resolved the motion
for clarification filed by the State Prosecutor on April 7, 1997.

Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on the filing

of criminal cases against him. By such arrest, he is deemed to be
under the custody of the law. The trial court gave Atty. Deogracias
del Rosario the custody of private respondent Javellana with the
obligation "to hold and detain" him in Atty. del Rosarios residence in
his official capacity as the clerk of court of the regional trial court.
Hence, when Atty. del Rosario was appointed judge, he ceased to be
the personal custodian of accused Javellana and the succeeding
clerk of court must be deemed the custodian under the same
undertaking.

In our mind, the perceived threats to private respondent Javelanas

life no longer exist. Thus, the trial courts order dated August 8,
1989 giving custody over him to the clerk of court must be recalled,
and he shall be detained at the Provincial Jail of Antique at San
Jose, Antique.

Regarding his continued practice of law, as a detention prisoner

private respondent Javellana is not allowed to practice his
profession as a necessary consequence of his status as a detention
prisoner. The trial courts order was clear that private respondent "is
not to be allowed liberty to roam around but is to be held as a
detention prisoner." The prohibition to practice law referred not only
to Criminal Case No. 4262, but to all other cases as well, except in
cases where private respondent would appear in court to defend
himself.

As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is

arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the law. He is
placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound
to answer for the commission of the offense.3 He must be detained
in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is
authorized by the court to be released on bail or on
recognizance.4 Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under
preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their
profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office,
elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary
consequence of arrest and detention. Consequently, all the accused
in Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 must be confined in the Provincial
Jail of Antique.

Considering that the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355

has dragged on for more than ten (10) years, the presiding judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, is ordered to
continue with the trial of said criminal cases with all deliberate
dispatch and to avoid further delay.

WHEREFORE, the August 8, 1989 order of the trial court is hereby

SETASIDE. All accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355, including
Avelino T. Javellana and Arturo F. Pacificador are ordered detained
at the Provincial Jail of Antique, San Jose, Antique, effective
immediately, and shall not be allowed to go out of the jail for any
reason or guise, except upon prior written permission of the trial
court for a lawful purpose.

Let copies of this resolution be given to the Provincial Director, PNP

Antique Provincial Police Office, San Jose, Antique and to the
Provincial Jail Warden, Provincial Jail of Antique, San Jose, Antique.

SO ORDERED.