No! Please! Just Don’t Take Kalashnikov!

Word Count: 2000

I’m going same order and I accept his value and criterion on Responsible Policymaking.

Also, extend all my case arguments that weren’t addressed: justifications and background.

Solvency 1: Corruption
- Point B claims that legal reform is difficult.
First) Difficulty doesn’t equate to solvency. None of his evidence claims that it’s impossible
to reform the system it just says difficult. Until we see evidence that reform is “too”
difficult, this impact is stating a known fact, not a barrier.

Second) Empirics prove that given the right motivation, Russia can git ‘er dun.
- Ocheltree & Katz in 2006 document:
Matthew Ocheltree [Research assistant with the Trade, Equity and Development Project since February 2006, graduate of Harvard College and holds a Master of Studies in English
literature from Oxford University] & Sherman E. Katz [Adjunct professor of International Trade at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Senior
associate in the Trade, Equity and Development project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, William M. Scholl Chair in International Business at The Center for
Strategic & International Studies in Washington D.C from February 2000 to February 2006, During 30 years of practicing international trade law, he represented U.S. and foreign
corporations, governments, and multilateral institutions in trade policy issues, including national trade regulation and litigation, World Trade Organization negotiations, agreements
and dispute settlement] “Intellectual Property Rights as a Key Obstacle to Russia’s WTO Accession” Carnegie Paper No. 73, (October 2006) The CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
INTERNATIONAL PEACE [The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a private, nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing cooperation between nations and promoting
active international engagement by the United States] <accessed July 10, 2010> http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18781 (EG)

“At the 2004 G-8 summit at Sea Island, Georgia, Putin publicly admitted that IPR was a genuine
problem for the first time following years of denial, but only after the United States
threatened to suspend the $550 million in benefits that Russia was receiving through the U.S.
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Six weeks later, amendments to Russia’s copyright law that had

been languishing for eleven years were expeditiously passed, according to industry sources.”
- Point C says that laws are unenforceable
First) None of the NEG evidence ever claims that laws are unenforceable. If that were true,
we should see a near zero enforcement of IPR laws… yet that’s not the case. Sure
corruption makes enforcement harder, but there isn’t any evidence that says it can’t be
overcome by enforcement or that it is strong enough to block reform.
Second) O contraire… Russia is very effective… when they want to be
Ocheltree & Katz 2006 find:
Matthew Ocheltree [Research assistant with the Trade, Equity and Development Project since February 2006, graduate of Harvard College and holds a Master of Studies in English
literature from Oxford University] & Sherman E. Katz [Adjunct professor of International Trade at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Senior
associate in the Trade, Equity and Development project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, William M. Scholl Chair in International Business at The Center for
Strategic & International Studies in Washington D.C from February 2000 to February 2006, During 30 years of practicing international trade law, he represented U.S. and foreign
corporations, governments, and multilateral institutions in trade policy issues, including national trade regulation and litigation, World Trade Organization negotiations, agreements
and dispute settlement] “Intellectual Property Rights as a Key Obstacle to Russia’s WTO Accession” Carnegie Paper No. 73, (October 2006) The CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
INTERNATIONAL PEACE [The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a private, nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing cooperation between nations and promoting
active international engagement by the United States] <accessed July 10, 2010> http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18781 (EG)

in the days preceding the G-8’s July 2006

“As one representative of the media industry who is active in Russia has pointed out,

summit in Saint Petersburg, with many Western delegations in the area, it was impossible to find a pirated DVD of
the movie Pirates of the Caribbean, which had been released less than two weeks before the summit. But after the summit,
illegal copies could be found on nearly every street corner. This example suggests that the
Russian authorities can limit the sale of pirated goods when they want to do so.”

- But if corruption isn’t the barrier… what iz? Aaaaahhh, that iz ze cuesjun.

Because Ocheltree & Katz luv IPRz so much… they are back again, and identify the main
barrier to enforcement as simply a lack of political will. In 2006 they argue:
Matthew Ocheltree [Research assistant with the Trade, Equity and Development Project since February 2006, graduate of Harvard College and holds a Master of Studies in English
literature from Oxford University] & Sherman E. Katz [Adjunct professor of International Trade at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Senior
associate in the Trade, Equity and Development project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, William M. Scholl Chair in International Business at The Center for
Strategic & International Studies in Washington D.C from February 2000 to February 2006, During 30 years of practicing international trade law, he represented U.S. and foreign
corporations, governments, and multilateral institutions in trade policy issues, including national trade regulation and litigation, World Trade Organization negotiations, agreements
and dispute settlement] “Intellectual Property Rights as a Key Obstacle to Russia’s WTO Accession” Carnegie Paper No. 73, (October 2006) The CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
INTERNATIONAL PEACE [The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a private, nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing cooperation between nations and promoting
active international engagement by the United States] <accessed July 10, 2010> http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?
fa=view&id=18781 (EG)
“These failures are indicative of a deeper lack of political will in Russia, whether due to an erroneous sense of
confident expectation, a misplaced pride in Russian legal standards, or an equally troubling incompetence within the federal bureaucracy. They are also symptomatic of deeply rooted
cultural assumptions and a lack of awareness about intellectual property rights that dates back to the Soviet era, when intellectual property goods were owned by the state and made

Russia’s enforcement failures and cultural

available to the people either for free or at heavily subsidized prices. Whatever the reason,

consciousness must be confronted, and efforts must be made to address them before
Russia can expect to be able to join the World Trade Organization.”

Looking back at the issue, though corruption is prevalent, it has before and can again be
overcome to effectively enforce the law. Lack of strong negative evidence or empirics both
deny corruption as a significant solvency barrier. Rather, political will is what is blocking
enforcement… will that can be overcome by sanctions.

Solvency 2: Sanctions
Point A argues that sanctions have insufficient leverage
Unfortunately, the card is not Russia specific. In cross-x we talked about 3 specific
examples of sanction working on Russia, yet the NEG tries to get away with a generic card.
His card also claims that “more often than not” sanctions fail… well, hate to break it to
you… but Russia is one of the few countries that lets IPR sanctions slide. Leverage should
go AFF on Russia specificity.

Point B claims that lack of cooperation undermines sanctions

First) There’s no link: The card is full of these requirements for sanctions being ineffective,
yet he provides no indication of whether the US-Russia relationship meets any of these
requirements. I can’t prove a lack of something, so NEG has the burden of proof here.

Second) This isn’t a take-out. The card never claims that sanctions can’t be effective even
if the standards are met. In light of the incomplete barrier placed by the card and the fact
that precedent is on the Aff side, this argument should go Aff.
As a general response, let’s take a look at sanctions’ effectiveness

First) Russia Responds: You’ve already seen that GSP sanctions solicited new copyright law,
but let’s look at 2 more examples.

Professor of business law Robert Bird in 2006 highlights both examples:

Robert C. Bird [Assistant Professor of Business Law, University of Connecticut] “Defending Intellectual Property Rights in the BRIC Economies” AMERICAN BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
(Summer 2006) (43 Am. Bus. L.J. 317) <accessed May 30, 2010> (EG)

“Russia endured lobbying by the United States to join the Berne Convention and
motion picture industry backed

improve its intellectual property laws or else potentially lose Most Favored Nation trade
status with the United States [U.S.]. In response, the former Soviet republic enacted intellectual
property laws protecting computer programs, databases, and integrated circuit
topologies.89 In 1993, Russia enacted a comprehensive copyright law.90”
Later in the same article Bird says
“American threats of trade sanctions against the BRICs resulted in significant changes to
domestic and international laws. Coercion placed intellectual property on the GATT agenda in spite of fierce resistance from developing countries.
Threats of a trade war encouraged China to enact more stringent copyright laws and close pirating factories. Russia improved its copyright laws

under threat from Congress to withhold ratification of a trade agreement granting Russia
preferential trade status.”

Sanctions have broken through in the past, let’s look at what they’ll have to break through
now.

Two) Political Will Overcome: Russia can enforce, but chooses not to
Professor of business law, Bird & Cahoy in 2006 highlight the problem and the solution:
Robert C. Bird [Assistant Professor of Business Law, School of Business, University of Connecticut] & Daniel R. Cahoy [Associate Professor of Business Law, Smeal College of Business,
the Pennsylvania State University] “The Emerging BRIC Economies: Lessons from Intellectual Property Negotiation and Enforcement” NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 400-425(Summer 2007) <accessed June 17, 2010> (EG)

“In a nation where copyright piracy ranks second to none in the world, Russian authorities
have finally commenced raids against illegal optical disc plants.81 These raids, however, are
rarely executed by surprise and often undertaken without the cooperation of the copyright
holders of the pirated materials.82 The result has been that almost all of the optical disc
plants raided over the last three years remain in operation.83 Furthermore, Russian authorities are apparently not above
outright chicanery to hide the extent of piracy. The IIPA reports that when a U.S. government official met Russian government officials in Moscow in late January 2007, all pirated
products disappeared from the store and market shelves or stores were closed.84 On February 5, after the U.S. delegation departed, pirated goods miraculously returned to these

The Russian government has the resources to suppress piracy, but the lack of
establishments.85

strong incentives or impending sanctions gives it little reason to do so.”

Three) Advocacy: May I also remind the judges that sanctions are also advocated for use
again. The status quo has no advocate, I do.

So the case is solved, but are the advantages outweighed by the law of unintended
consequences? I think not!

DA 1: Relations
Point A claims that relations are hurt… I’ve got 3 responses
First) Uniqueness – Relations are frosty and getting worse.
Thomas Graham, the former director of the National Security Council for Russia in a report
with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in 2008 found that:
Thomas Graham [Senior Director, National Security Council for Russia from 2004 to 2007] “U.S.-Russia Relations: Facing Reality Pragmatically” (July 2008) CENTER FOR STRATEGIC
AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES http://www.ifri.org/downloads/Graham_US_Russia.pdf

“Although both sides publicly tout the relationship between the presidents as a sign of the
strength of relations between the two countries, the frequency, intensity, and substance of
interaction has declined sharply since 2001–2002, when the hopes for strategic partnership
shone brightest. Other channels have fared even less well.”

Second) Empirics: Russia’s been sanctioned for IPRs 3 times, so the precedent is there; but
how has Russia responded? NEG didn’t know in CX but the literature should be there if
relations were hurt, so we need to see empirics from the NEG until this becomes his
debate. Again, I can’t prove the lack of something so the burden is his again.

Third) Quantification: How much are relations hurt. A little? A lot? Quantification of the link
here is key to evaluating the potential impacts below. Until we see quantification on this
point, you should vote NEG on it.

Point B claims that cooperation is hurt… I have 3 responses

First) There’s no threshold. How much do relations have to be hurt before they’ll stop
cooperating with us? Do we have to throw a stick at them to trigger or nuke them? Without
a threshold, it is impossible to establish at what point this impact would be triggered.

Second) There’s no internal link that shows that decreased relations leads to decreased
cooperation. The card says cooperation is key, but there’s no evidence from the NEG at this
point that says that cooperation will actually be harmed frosty relations. The internal link is
key to impacting this DA.

Third) The case outweighs. I outlined billion of dollars in economic harm to both countries
as well as thousands of lives lost annually due to one infringing product. The case
outweighs in light of the lack of quantification this DA offers.

And now… for the last DA…

DA 2: Economy
First of all, let’s take a look at the link.
It is very interesting because this DA is premised on the fact that our case can’t solve and
that sanctions would actually have to be implemented. It’s key to understand that our case
doesn’t sanction Russia right off; we allow them three years to comply. This means that
since the threat of sanctions solves as it has in the past, there will be no need for sanctions
and thus no DA. If you give solvency to me, then this DA also goes with it… to me.

So the threat of sanctions solves, which means the economic impact won’t materialize.

For point 2, let’s take a look at the impact.

My basic response to this is that the case outweighs. Yeah. Sanctions are designed to be
bad for the economy, and by nature of globalization, they’ll be bad for us too. However, the
economic devastation caused by the squo IPR situation outweighs this risk. Let me direct
you back to the $6.5 billion lost over 5 years and the $2.8 billion lost in 2008 alone… all
lost by US business. Since there is no quantification of how much sanctions would hurt the
US, you should prefer to solve the billions of dollars we do know about.

Solving the billions in IPR losses coupled with the humanitarian benefit outweighs the
temporary harm of economic sanctions… if they actually need to be implemented. Which
they won’t. Just sayin’.
Lastly, let’s look at the example the NEG brought up about Soviet pipeline sanctions failing

Note that I am responding to this example independently of the DA. I agree that the
sanction hurt CAT, I’m responding to this as a solvency example.

First) The Soviet Union is not Russia. I think it’s fairly obvious that USSR examples aren’t
applicable in the face of Russia specific precedent and advocacy.

Second) The sanctions used there weren’t IPR sanctions. They were targeted at a very
different problem using different sanctions. My examples were specific to Russia, IPRs, and
the specific sanctions we use.

Third) The Implication: I know this wasn’t used as an explicit example of sanctions failing,
but I wouldn’t to go ahead and make sure this couldn’t be used as such. As outlined above,
this example is not a legit example of sanctions failing that is applicable to the case. Can’t
use it. End of story.

So… let us look back upon this day and see what we have learned.

First) The plan is need. Desperately needed might I add. None of my justifications were
addressed which leaves us with a dire situation at hand. US business loses billions of
dollars annually with costs climbing. Russia’s government loses millions and its economy
loses billion as well. Apart from that, Russia’s domestic innovative potential has been
destroyed. On the humanitarian side, counterfeit products are killing by the thousands. We
saw that just one counterfeit product, vodka, kills thirty-thousand Russians every year and
that’s only one example! The status quo is in dire need of repair, and my plan can fix it.

Second) The plan can solve. Russia has empirically proven that it can fight piracy when it
wants to. Negative evidence is too weak to establish corruption as anything close to a
solvency irritant much less a solvency take-out. We also saw that sanctions have been
empirically proven to be effective on Russia and that they are destined to work again.
Corruption isn’t a barrier, political will is, but the threat of sanctions can break down that
barrier. The plan can and will solve.

Third) Is there a net-benefit? Absolutely! First, there is a dire need in the status quo that
has been neglected in the status quo and will remain neglected with a negative ballot.
Second, we see that there are only slight costs. While relations may be hurt, there is too
much vagueness on the part of the negative to make this a voting issue. The economic DA
is premised on non-solvency when the case will obviously solve. Billions in economic
benefit and thousands of lives saved outweighs the potential small harm to relations.

Voting AFF is the responsible path.