City of Manila v.

IAC

FACTS:

Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. died on June 4,1971 and was buried on June 6,1971 in Lot No. 159,
Block No. 194 of the North Cemetery which lot was leased by the city to Irene Sto. Domingo,
from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021. Full payment of the rental therefor amounts to P50.00 and
no other document was executed to embody such lease. The burial record for Block No. 194 of
Manila North Cemetery does not reflect the term of duration of the lease in favor of the Sto.
Domingos.

Administrative Order No. 5 of the City Mayor of Manila prescribes uniform procedure and
guidelines in the processing of documents pertaining to and for the use and disposition of burial
lots and plots. Subject lot was leased to the bereaved family for 5 years only.

On the basis of such certification, the authorities of the North Cemetery authorized the
exhumation and removal of the remains, placing the bones and skull in sack and kept the same
in the depository of the cemetery. Thereafter, the lot in question was rented out to another
lessee.

The plaintiffs went to the cemetery on All Souls Day and found out that the resting place of
their dear departed did not anymore bear the stone marker which they placed on the tomb.

Hence, this case.

The trial court rendered its decision ordering the defendants to give plaintiffs the right to make
use of another single lot within the North Cemetery for a period of 43 years 4 months and 11
days; to search for the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. and thereafter, to bury
the same in the substitute lot.

The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals which modified the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE:

Are the operations and functions of a public cemetery a proprietary function?

HELD:

Yes. The operations and functions of a public cemetery are proprietary function. Under
Philippine laws, the City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such endowed with the
faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and through its city government in
conformity with law, and in its proper corporate name. It may sue and be sued, and contract
and be contracted with. Its powers are twofold in character-public, governmental or political on
the one hand, and corporate, private and proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are
those exercised in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and
they include the legislative, judicial, public and political. Municipal powers on the one hand are
exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community and include those which are
ministerial, private and corporate.

Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence of a special law, the North Cemetery
is a patrimonial property of the City of Manila which was created by resolution of
the Municipal Board of August 27, 1903 and January 7, 1904. The administration and
government of the cemetery are under the City Health Officer, the order and police of the
cemetery, the opening of graves, niches, or tombs, the exhuming of remains, and the
purification of the same are under the charge and responsibility of the superintendent of the
cemetery. The City of Manila furthermore prescribes the procedure and guidelines for the use
and dispositions of burial lots and plots within the North Cemetery through Administrative
Order No. 5, s. 1975. With the acts of dominion, there is, therefore no doubt that the North
Cemetery is within the class of property which the City of Manila owns in its proprietary or
private character. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in
favor of the private respondents. Hence, obligations arising from contracts have
the force of law between the contracting parties. Thus a lease contract executed by the
lessor and lessee remains as the law between them.Therefore, a breach of contractual
provision entitles the other party to damages even if no penalty for such breach is
prescribed in the contract.
Ceferino Inciong v. Hon. Eufemio Domingo

FACTS:

Philippine Sugar Commission failed to pay real estate taxes due on its sugar refinery situated at
Brgy. Caloocan, Balayan, Batangas. The Provincial Treasurer of Batangas scheduled the sale of
said refinery at public auction. To restrain the sale, PHILSUCOM filed a petition for prohibition in
the Court of Appeals against the Provincial Treasurer and Provincial Assessor of Balayan,
Batangas.

Meanwhile, Barangay Caloocan thru petitioner Atty. Ceferino Inciong filed a Motion for
Intervention alleging that Barangay Caloocan is an indispensable party in the case as it has a
10% share of the property tax sought to be collected from PHILSUCOM.

PHILSUCOM and the Municipal Treasurer of Balayan, Batangas entered into an Amnesty
Compromise Agreement pursuant to Executive Order No. 42. The agreement was submitted to
the Court of Appeals and the case was accordingly dismissed.
PHILSUCOM paid the amount of P7,199,887.51 to the Municipal Treasurer. Out of this amount,
the Municipal Treasurer allocated to Barangay Caloocan as its share 10% or a total of
P719,988.75.

Consequently, Atty. Ceferino Inciong filed a case for payment of attorney's fees against the
Province of Batangas, Municipality of Balayan and Barangay Caloocan.

The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of Atty. Ceferino Inciong.

Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

May Atty. Inciong be awarded the Atty’s fees at 10% ?

HELD:

Yes. Atty Inciong may be awarded the atty’s fees at 10%. As correctly stated by the Office of
the Solicitor General, the position of respondent Chairman of the COA disallowing payment of
attorney's fees to petitioner Atty. Ceferino Inciong is not proper in the light of the following
considerations.

(1) The employment by Barangay Caloocan of petitioner as its counsel, even if allegedly
unauthorized by the Sangguniang Barangay, is binding on Barangay Caloocan as it took no
prompt measure to repudiate petitioner's employment (Province of Cebu v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 147 SCRA 447).

(2) The Decision dated August 9, 1989 of Branch XI, Regional Trial Court, Balayan, Batangas in
Civil Case No. 1878, directing Barangay Caloocan to pay attorney's fees to petitioner, has
become final and executory and is binding upon Barangay Caloocan (Mercado v. Court of
Appeals, 162 SCRA 75).

(3) COA Circular No. 86-255 cannot diminish the substantive right of petitioner to recover
attorney's fees under the final and executory Decision dated August 9, 1989 of the Regional
Trial Court.

In its Comment, the respondent, thru the COA Legal Office states that PHILSUCOM paid the
amount of P7,199,887.51 to the Municipal Treasurer under the Amnesty Compromise
Agreement. Out of this amount, the Municipal Treasurer allocated to Barangay Caloocan as its
share the amount of P719,988.75. This allocation is erroneous because pursuant to Republic
Act No. 5447, Barangay Caloocan should only share from the basic tax which is
50% of what PHILSUCOM paid because the other half should go to the Special
Education Fund. Under the said Republic Act No. 5447, the rightful share of
Barangay Caloocan should be P359,994.38 only.

Thus, payment of attorney's fees to petitioner Atty. Ceferino Inciong must be in an amount
equivalent to 10% of P359,994.38.
Province of Cebu v. Hon. IAC

FACTS:

Incumbent Governor Rene Espina was on official business in Manila. Vice-Governor Priscillano
Almendras and 3 members of the Provincial Board enacted Resolution No. 188, donating to the
City of Cebu 210 province. The deed of donation was immediately executed in behalf of the
Province of Cebu by Vice-Governor Almendras and accepted in behalf of the City of Cebu by
Mayor Sergio Osmeña, Jr. The document was prepared and notarized by a private lawyer, and
was later approved by the Office of the President through Executive Secretary Juan Cancio.

Accordingly the lots donated were to be sold by the City of Cebu to raise funds that would be
used to finance its public improvement projects. 1 year period was given within which to
dispose the donated lots.

Upon his return from Manila, Governor Espina denounced as Legal and immoral the action of
his colleagues in donating practically all the patrimonial property of the province of Cebu,
considering that the latter's income was less than one. fourth (1/4) of that of the City of Cebu.

Some taxpayers and Atty. Garcia filed a suit to declare the donation illegal, null and void.

Garcia filed the complaint for the annulment of the deed of donation with an application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

For services rendered in Civil Case no. 238-BC, CFI of Cebu, respondent Pablo P. Garcia filed a
Notice of Attorney's Lien.

Petitioner Province of Cebu opposed stating that the payment of attorney's fees and
reimbursement of incidental expenses are not allowed by law and settled jurisprudence to be
paid by the Province.

ISSUE:

Whether Atty. Garcia is entitled to attorney’s fees.

HELD:
Yes. Atty. Garcia is entitled to attorney’s fees. Until the contrary is clearly shown an attorney is
presumed to be acting under authority of the litigant whom he purports to represent (Azotes v.
Blanco, 78 Phil. 739) His authority to appear for and represent petitioner in litigation, not
having been questioned in the lower court, it will be presumed on appeal that counsel was
properly authorized to file the complaint and appear for his client. (Republic v. Philippine
Resources Development Corporation, 102 Phil. 960) Even where an attorney is employed by an
unauthorized person to represent a client, the latter will be bound where it has knowledge of
the fact that it is being represented by an attorney in a particular litigation and takes no prompt
measure to repudiate the assumed authority. Such acquiescence in the employment of an
attorney as occurred in this case is tantamount to ratification (Tan Lua v. O' Brien, 55 Phil. 53).
The act of the successor provincial board and provincial officials in allowing respondent Atty.
Pablo P. Garcia to continue as counsel and in joining him in the suit led the counsel to believe
his services were still necessary.

We apply a rule in the law of municipal corporations: "that a municipality may become
obligated upon an implied contract to pay the reasonable value of the benefits
accepted or appropriated by it as to which it has the general power to contract. The
doctrine of implied municipal liability has been said to apply to all cases where money or
other property of a party is received under such circumstances that the general law,
independent of express contract implies an obligation upon the municipality to do justice with
respect to the same." (38 Am Jur. Sec. 515, p. 193):

The obligation of a municipal corporation upon the doctrine of an implied contract does not
connote an enforceable obligation. Some specific principle or situation of which equity takes
cognizance must be the foundation of the claim. The principle of liability rests upon the theory
that the obligation implied by law to pay does not originate in the unlawful contract, but arises
from considerations outside it. The measure of recovery is the benefit received by the municipal
corporation. The amount of the loan, the value of the property or services, or the compensation
specified in the contract, is not the measure. If the price named in the invalid contract is shown
to be entirely fair and reasonable not only in view of the labor done, but also in reference to the
benefits conferred, it may be taken as the true measure of recovery.
Pilar v. Sangguniang Bayan ng Dansol, Pangasinan

FACTS:
Petitioner Expedito Pilar was elected vice mayor of Dasol, Pangasinan. The Sanguniang Bayan
adopted Resolution No. 1 which increased the salaries of the mayor and municipal treasurer to
P18,636.00 and P16,044.00 per annum respectively. The said resolution did not provide for an
increase in salary of the vice mayor despite the fact that such position is entitled to an annual
salary of P16,044.00.

Petitioner questioned the failure of the Sanguniang Bayan to appropriate an amount for the
payment of his salary. The proper provincial and national officials endorsed compliance with
Circular 9-A of the Joint Commission on Local Government and Personnel Administration in
giving the revised rate of salary for petitioner.

The Sanguniang Bayan enacted a resolution appropriating the amount of P500.00 per month as
the salary of the petitioner. Thereafter, it was increased to P774.00 per month.

Another resolution appropriating the amount of P15,144.00 as payment of the unpaid salaries
of the petitioner was enacted. The resolution was vetoed by the respondent mayor resulting
into the filing by the petitioner of a petition for a writ of mandamus.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner is entitled to payment of damages.

HELD:

Yes. Petitioner is entitled to payment of damages. We find and rule that petitioner is entitled to
damages and attorney’s fees because the facts show that petitioner was forced to litigate in
order to claim his lawful salary which was unduly denied him for three (3) years and that the
Mayor acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy petitioner’s plainly valid, just
and demandable claim. (Article 2208, (2) and (5), New Civil Code).

That respondent Hon. Mayor Lodovico Espinosa alone should be held liable and responsible for
the miserable plight of the petitioner is clear. Respondent Mayor vetoed without just cause on
October 26, 1982 the Resolution of the Sanguniang Bayan appropriating the salary of the
petitioner. While "to veto or not to veto involves the exercise of discretion" as contended by
respondents, respondent Mayor, however, exceeded his authority in an arbitrary
manner when he vetoed the resolution since there exists sufficient municipal funds
from which the salary of the petitioner could be paid. Respondent Mayor’s refusal,
neglect or omission in complying with the directives of the Provincial Budget Officer and the
Director of the Bureau of Local Government that the salary of the petitioner be provided for and
paid the prescribed salary rate, is reckless and oppressive, hence, by way of example or
correction for the public good, respondent Mayor is liable personally to the petitioner for
exemplary or corrective damages.
Rama v. CA

FACTS:

Petitioner Conrado L. de Rama wrote a letter to the Civil Service Commission seeking the recall
of the appointments of 14 municipal employees on the allegation that the appointments of the
said employees were midnight appointments of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done in
violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution.

While the matter was pending before the CSC, employees: Elsa Marino, Morell Ayala, and
Flordeliza Oriazel, filed with the CSC a claim for payment of their salaries alleging that petitioner
withheld the payment of their salaries and benefits. aw 1ibrary

The CSC denied petitioner’s request for the recall of the appointments of the 14 employees, for
lack of merit. It upheld the validity of the appointments on the ground that they had already
been approved by the Head of the CSC Field Office in Lucena City.

ISSUE:

Whether the appointment of the 14 employees were valid.

Yes. The appointment of the 14 employees were valid. The records reveal that when the
petitioner brought the matter of recalling the appointments of the fourteen (14) private
respondents before the CSC, the only reason he cited to justify his action was that these were
"midnight appointments" that are forbidden under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution.
However, the CSC ruled, and correctly so, that the said prohibition applies only to
presidential appointments. In truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits local
elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her
tenure. Petitioner certainly did not raise the issue of fraud on the part of the outgoing mayor
who made the appointments. Neither did he allege that the said appointments were tainted by
irregularities or anomalies that breached laws and regulations governing appointments. His
solitary reason for recalling these appointments was that they were, to his personal belief,
"midnight appointments" which the outgoing mayor had no authority to make.

It has been held that upon the issuance of an appointment and the appointee’s
assumption of the position in the civil service, "he acquires a legal right which
cannot be taken away either by revocation of the appointment or by removal
except for cause and with previous notice and hearing" Moreover, it is well-settled that
the person assuming a position in the civil service under a completed appointment acquires a
legal, not just an equitable, right to the position. This right is protected not only by statute, but
by the Constitution as well, which right cannot be taken away by either revocation of the
appointment, or by removal, unless there is valid cause to do so, provided that there is previous
notice and hearing.