EN BANC

G.R. No. L-2506 April 16, 1906

F. STEWART JONES,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT,Defendant-

Appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General, for appellant.

Pillsbury and Sutro, for appellee.

WILLARD, J.:

On the 16th day of January, 1904 F. Stewart Jones presented a petition to the Court of Land
Registration asking that he be inscribed as the owner of a certain tract of land situatd in the
Province of Benguet, and within the reservation defined in Act No. 636. The Solicitor-General
appeared in the court below and opposed the inscription upon the ground that the property was
public land. At the trial he objected to any consideration of the case on the ground that the court
had no jurisdiction to register land situated in that reservation. The objections were overruled and
judgment entered in favor of the petitioner, from which judgment the Government appealed to this
court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The act creating the Court of Land Registration (No. 496) gave it jurisdiction throughout the
Archipelago. By Act No. 1224, which was approved August 31, 1904, and which applied to
pending cases, the court was deprived of jurisdiction over lands situated in the Province of
Benguet. That act, however, contained a proviso by which the court was given jurisdiction over
applications for registration of title to land in all cases coming within the provisions of Act No. 648.
Act No. 648 provides in its first section that -

The Civil Governor is hereby authorized and empowered by executive order to reserve from
settlement or public sale and for specific public uses any of the public domain in the Philippine
Islands the use of which is not otherwise directed by law.

Section 2 provides: "Whenever the Civil Governor, in writing, shall certify that all public lands
within limits by him described in the Philippine Islands are reserved for civil public uses, either of
the Insular Government, or of any provincial or municipal government, and shall give notice
thereof to the judge of the Court of Land Registration, it shall be the duty of the judge of said
court" to proceed in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 627. Act No. 627, which relates to
military reservations, provides that when notice is given to the Court of Land Registration of the
fact that any land has been so reserved, it shall be the duty of the court to issue notice that claims
for all private lands within the limits of the reservation must be presented for registration under
the Land Registration Act within six months from the date of issuing such notice, and that all lands
not so presented within said time would be conclusively adjudged to be public lands, and all claims
on the part of private individuals for such lands, not so presented, would be forever
barred.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On the 26th day of August, 1903, the following letter was directed by Governor Taft to the judge
of the Court of Land Registration:

SIR: You are hereby notified, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 648, entitled "An act
authorizing the Civil Governor to reserve for civil public purposes, and from sale or settlement,
any part of the public domain not appropriated by law for special public purposes, until otherwise
directed by law, and extending the provisions of Act Numbered Six hundred and twenty-seven so
that public lands desired to be reserved by the Insular Government for public uses, or private
lands desired to be purchased by the Insular Government for such uses, may be brought under
the operation of the Land Registration Act;" that the Philippine Commission has reserved for civil
public uses of the Government of the Philippine Islands the lands described in Act No. 636,
entitled "An act creating a Government reservation at Baguio, in the Province of Benguet,"
enacted February 11, 1903.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is therefore requested that the land mentioned be forthwith brought under the operation of the
Land Registration Act and become registered land in the meaning thereof, and that you proceed
in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 648.

Very respectfully,
(Signed)WM. H. TAFT,
"Civil Governor."

The court of Land Registration, acting upon this notice from the Governor, issued the notice
required by Act No. 627, and in pursuance of that notice Jones, the appellee, within the six months
referred to in the notice, presented his petition asking that the land be registered in his
name.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The first claim of the Government is that the provisions of Act No. 648 were not complied with in
the respect that this letter of the Governor did not amount to a certificate that the lands had been
reserved. The Solicitor-General says in his brief:

To bring these lands within the operation of section 2 of Act No. 648 it was necessary for the Civil
Governor first to certify that these lands were reserved for public uses, and second to give notice
thereof to the Court of Land Registration.

We do not think that this contention can be sustained. Act No. 648 conferred power upon the
Governor to reserve lands for public purposes, but it did not make that power exclusive. The
Commission did not thereby deprive itself of the power to itself make reservations in the future, if
it saw fit; neither did it intend to annul any reservations which it had formerly made. The contention
of the Government is true when applied to a case where the land has not been reserved by the
Commission. In such a case it would be the duty of the Governor to first reserve it by an executive
order, and then to give notice to the Court of Land Registration, but where the land had already
been reserved by competent authority, it not only was not necessary for the Governor to issue
any executive order reserving the land but he had no power to do so. In such cases the only duty
imposed upon him was to give notice to the Court of Land Registration that the land had been
reserved. This notice was given in the letter above quoted. The court had jurisdiction to try the
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The petitioner Jones, on the 1st day of May, 1901, bought the land in question from Sioco Cariño,
an Igorot. He caused his deed to the land to be recorded in the office of the registrar of property
on the 8th day of May of the same year. Prior thereto, and while Sioco Cariño was in possession
of the land, he commenced proceedings in court for the purpose of obtaining a possessory
information in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law. This possessory information
he caused to be recorded in the office of the registrar of property on the 12th day of March,
1901.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The evidence shows that Sioco Cariño was born upon the premises in question; that his
grandfather, Ortega, during the life of the latter, made a gift of the property to Sioco. This gift was
made more than twelve years before the filing of the petition in this case - that is, before the 16th
day of January, 1904. Sioco's grandfather, Ortega, was in possession of the land at the time the
gift was made, and has been in possession thereof for many years prior to said time. Upon the
gift being made Sioco took possession of the property, and continued in such possession until his
sale to Jones, the petitioner. Since such sale Jones has been in possession of the land, and is
now in such possession. For more than twelve years prior to the presentation of the petition the
land had been cultivated by the owners thereof, and the evidence is sufficient, in our opinion, to
bring the case within section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and to show such an adverse
possession thereof for ten years as is required by the section. The evidence of Sioco Carino
shows that what he did in the way of presenting a petition to the Spanish Government in regard
to a deed of the land was done by order of the then comandante, and was limited to securing a
measurement thereof, as he then believed. These acts did not interrupt the running of the statute
of limitations.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Acts Nos. 627 and 648 provide that the provisions of section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure
shall be applicable to all proceedings taken under either one of these acts. These acts in effect
provide that in determining whether the applicant is the owner of the land or not, the general
statute of limitations shall be considered, and shall be applied against the Government. The
evidence showing, as we have said, such an adverse possession, the petitioner proved his
ownership of the land if the Commission had authority to make the statute of limitations applicable
to these proceedings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The claim of the Government is that this provision is void; that the act thereby disposes of public
lands; that Congress is the only authority that can take such action, and that it has never
authorized or approved the action of the Commission in applying the statute of limitations to
proceedings under Acts Nos. 648 and 627. We do not think that this contention can be sustained.
Section 12 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, provides as follows:

SEC. 12. That all the property and rights which may have been acquired in the Philippine Islands
by the United States under the treaty of peace with Spain, signed December tenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight, except such land or other property as shall be designated by the
President of the United States for military and other reservations of the Government of the United
States, are hereby placed under the control of the Government of said Islands, to be administered
for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof, except as provided in this act.

This gives the Government of the Philippine Islands power to dispose of these lands, and of all
public lands, and to pass the law in question, unless there is some provision in other parts of the
act of July 1, 1902, which takes away or limits that power. The government says that such
limitation is found in section 13 of the act. That section and sections 14 and 15 are as follows:

SEC. 13. That the Gonvernment of the Philippine Islands, subject to the provisions of this Act and
except as herein provided, shall classify according to its agricultural character and
productiveness, and shall immediately make rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other
disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral lands, but such rules and regulations
shall not go into effect or have the force of law until they have received the approval of the
President, and when approved by the President they shall be submitted by him to Congress at
the beginning of the next ensuing session thereof and unless disapproved or amended by
Congress at said session they shall at the close of such period have the force and effect of law in
the Philippine Islands: Provided, That a single homestead entry shall not exceed sixteen hectares
in extent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SEC. 14. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and empowered to
enact rules and regulations and to prescribe terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect
their title to public lands in said Islands, who, prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the
United States, had fulfilled all or some of the conditions required by the Spanish laws and royal
decrees of the Kingdom of Spain for the acquisition of legal title thereto, yet failed to secure
conveyance of title; and the Philippine Commission is authorized to issue patents, without
compensation, to any native of said Islands, conveying title to any tract of land not more than
sixteen hectares in extent, which were public lands and had been actually occupied by such native
or his ancestors prior to and on the thirteenth of August, eighteen hundred and ninety-
eight.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SEC. 15. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and empowered, on
such terms as it may prescribe, by general legislation, to provide for the granting or sale and
conveyance to actual occupants and settlers and other citizens of said Islands such parts and
portions of the public domain, other than timber and mineral lands, of the United States in said
Islands as it may deem wise, not exceeding sixteen hectares to any one person, and for the sale
and conveyance of not more than one thousand and twenty-four hectares to any corporation or
association of persons: Provided, That the grant or sale of such lands, whether the purchase price
be paid at once or in partial payments, shall be conditioned upon actual and continued occupancy,
improvement, and cultivation of the premises sold for a period of not less than five years, during
which time the purchaser or grantee can not alienate or encumber said land or the title thereto;
but such restriction shall not apply to transfers of rights and title of inheritance under the laws for
the distribution of the estates of decedents.

It is first to be noted that section 13 does not apply to all lands. Timber and mineral lands are
expressly excluded. If the Commission should pass laws relating to mineral lands without
submitting them to Congress, as it has done (Act No. 624), their validity would not be determined
by inquiring if they had been submitted to Congress under section 13, but rather by inquiring if
they were inconsistent with other provisions of the act relating to mineral lands. In other words,
the fact that such laws were not submitted to Congress would not necessarily make them
void.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The same is true of legislation relating to coal lands, as to which sections 53 and 57 contain
provisions. By section 57 this Government is authorized to issue all needful rules and regulations
for carrying into effect this and preceding sections relating to mineral lands. Such regulations need
not be submitted to Congress for its approval. Act No. 1128, relating to coal lands, was not
submitted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The act of Congress also contains provisions regarding the purchase of lands beloning to religious
orders. Section 65 provides as to those lands as follows:

SEC. 65. That all lands acquired by virtue of the preceding section shall constitute a part and
portion of the public property of the Government of the Philippine Islands, and may be held, sold,
and conveyed, or leased temporarily for a period not exceeding three years after their acquisition
by said Government, on such terms and conditions as it may prescribe, subject to the limitations
and conditions provided for in this Act. . . . Actual settlers and occupants at the time said lands
are acquired by the Government shall have the preference over all others to lease, purchase, or
acquire their holdings within such reasonable time as may be determined by said Government.

Does the clause "subject to the limitations and conditions of this act" require a submission to
Congress of legislation concerning such land? If it does, then Act No. 1120, which contains such
provisions, is void, because it was never so submitted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

Section 18 of the act of Congress provides as follows:

That the forest laws and regulations now in force in the Philippine Islands, with such modifications
and amendments as may be made by the Government of said Islands, are hereby continued in
force.

Must these modifications and amendments be submitted to Congress for its approval? If they
must be, then Act No. 1148, relating thereto, is void, because it was not so
submitted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It seems very clear that rules and regulations concerning mineral, timber, and coal lands, and
lands bought from religious orders need not be submitted to Congress. If they are not inconsistent
with the provisions of the act of Congress relating to the same subjects, they are
valid.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Congress, by section 12 of the act, gave to the Philippine Government general power all property
acquired from Spain. When it required the Commision to immediately classify the agricultural
lands and to make rules and regulations for their sale, we do not think that it intended to virtually
repeal section 12. Such, however, would be the effect of the rule contended for by the
Govenrment. If, notwithstanding the provisions of section 12, any law which in any way directly or
indirectly affects injuriously the title of the Government to public lands must be submitted to the
President and Congress for approval, the general power given by section 12 is taken away. An
examination of some of the laws of the Commission will show that a holding such as is contended
for by the Government in this case would apparently require a holding that such other laws were
also void. Act No. 496, which established the Court of Land Registration, the court that tried this
case, provides in section 38 that the decrees of the court shall be conclusive on and against all
persons, including the Insular Government, and all the branches thereof. Neither the President
nor Congress ever gave their consent to this law. They never consented that the title of the
Government to public lands should be submitted to the judgment of the courts of the Islands. That
this law provides a means by which the Government may be deprived of its property in such lands
is apparent. In this very case, if the Government had not appealed from the judgment, or if it
should withdraw its appeal, the lands would be lost to it--lands which the Attorney-General claims
are public lands. The land could not be more effectually lost by the law shortening the statute of
limitations than by this law making the decrees of the Court of Land Registration binding on the
Government. In fact, the former law could not in any way prejudice the Government if it were not
for the latter law making the judgments of this court binding upon it. Both of these laws in an
indirect way affect the title to public lands, but we do not think that for that reason they are included
in the terms "rules and regulations" used in section 13 of the act of
Congress.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Act No. 1039 granted to the Province of Cavite and to the pueblo of Cavite certain public lands.
This act never was submitted either to the President or Congress. Acts Nos. 660 and 732
authorized the leasing of parts of the San Lazaro estate. The Government leased the sanitarium
at Benguet, and provided for its sale. None of these acts were ever submitted to the President or
Congress, which authorized such disposition. The Government owns many isolated tracts of land,
such as the Oriente Hotel, for example. It has reclaimed from the sea a large tract of land in
connection with the works of the port of Manila. If the Government should desire to sell this
reclaimed land or to lease a part of it for the site of an hotel, or should desire to sell the Oriente
Hotel building, we do not think legislation to accomplish such purposes would require the previous
approval of the President and of Congress. The general purpose of section 13 was to require the
Government to classify agricultural lands and to pass a homestead law - that is, a law which would
state the rules and regulations by virtue of which title to the public lands of which it can be decided
in every case whether an act of the Commission constitutes a rule or regulation within the meaning
of section 13. It is sufficient to say that the law in question (Act No. 648), making a statute of
limitations run against the Government when the title to few scattered tracts of land throughout
the Archipelago is under consideration, is not such a rule or regulations as required previous
submission to the President and Congress. It will be observed that be section 86 of the act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, Congress reserves the right to annul all legislation of the
Commission.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

There is nothing in section 14 which requires the rules and regulations therein mentioned to be
submitted to Congress. But it is said that although as to Act No. 648 submission to Congress was
not required, it is nevertheless void when applied to one not a native of the Islands, because
forbidden by this section; and that this section limits the power of the Commission to declare
possession alone sufficient evidence of title to cases in which the claimant is native and in which
the amount of land does not exceed 16 hectares.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Section 14 is not limited to agricultural lands, as are sections 13 and 15. It includes mineral and
timber lands. So far as it relates to proceedings theretofore taken under Spanish laws its benefits
are not limited to natives of the Islands nor to tracts not more than 16 hectares in extent. Where
the only claim is possession, no possession for any definite time prior to August 13, 1898, is
required, nor is proof of any possession whatever after that date demanded. According to the
strict letter of the section a native would be entitled to a patent who proved that he had been in
possession for the months of July and August only of 1898. It is not stated whether or not one
who receives such a patent must occupy the land for five years thereafter, as required by section
15. Neither is it stated whether or not a person who was in possession for the month of August,
1898, would be entitled to a patent in preference to the actual settler spoken of in section 6. When
legislating upon the subject-matter of section 14, the Commission, in Act No. 926, did not make
such a limitation as has been suggested. Section 54, paragraph 6, of that act is as follows:

All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public land, as
defined by said act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide claim
of ownership except as against the Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the
taking effect of this act, except when prevented by war or force majeure, shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and to have
received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the provision of
this chapter.
It is seen that this section does not exclude foreigners, nor is it limited to tracts not exceeding 16
hectares in extent. To adopt the view that the power of the Commission is so limited would require
a holding that this section is void as to foreigners and as to all tracts of land over 16 hectares in
extent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

This paragraph of section 54 of Act No. 926 is in substance a continuation of Act No. 648 and an
extension of its provisions to all the lands of the Islands.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

To adopt the construction contended for would lead to an unjust result. By the terms of the first
part of section 14 the Commission has the power to perfect the title to 100 hectares of land as to
which a Spaniards may have done nothing more than to file an application relating thereto, and
of which he never was in possession, while by the last party of the section the Commission would
be entirely without power to make any rules by which a native who by himself and his ancestors
had been in possession of 100 hectares. Such a discrimination in favor of foreigners and against
the natives could not have been intended. It could not have been the purpose of Congress to give
the Commission ample power to legislate for the benefit of foreigners and to limit its power to
legislate for the benefit of natives.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The meaning of these sections is not clear, and it is difficult to give to them a construction that will
be entirely free from objection. But we do not think that authority given by the Commission to
issue to a native a patent for 16 hectares of land of which he was in possession during the month
of August, 1898, was intended to limit the general power of control which by section 12 is given
to the Commission.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance the appellant. After the
expiration of twenty days let final judgment be entered in accordance herewith and ten days
thereafter let the cause be remanded to the lower court for proper procedure. So
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson and Tracey, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-24066 December 9, 1925

VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANGELA RAZON and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, defendants. THE DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Reyes for appellant.

Monico R. Mercado for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J.:

This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga by a complaint filed by
Valentin Susi against Angela Razon and the Director of Lands, praying for judgment: (a) Declaring
plaintiff the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of land described in the second paragraph of
the complaint; (b) annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, on
the ground that the land is a private property; (c) ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title
issued to said Angela Razon; and (d) sentencing the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of P500 as
damages, with the costs.

For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands denied each and every allegation contained
therein and, as special defense, alleged that the land in question was a property of the
Government of the United States under the administration and control of the Philippine Islands
before its sale to Angela Razon, which was made in accordance with law.

After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties, the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga rendered judgment declaring the plaintiff entitled to the possession of the land,
annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and ordering the
cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her, with the costs against Angela Razon. From this
judgment the Director of Lands took this appeal, assigning thereto the following errors, to wit: (1)
The holding that the judgment rendered in a prior case between the plaintiff and defendant Angela
Razon on the parcel of land in question is controlling in this action; (2) the holding that plaintiff is
entitled to recover the possession of said parcel of land; the annulment of the sale made by the
Director of Lands to Angela Razon; and the ordering that the certificate of title issued by the
register of deeds of the Province of Pampanga to Angela Razon by virtue of said sale be
cancelled; and (3) the denial of the motion for new trial filed by the Director of Lands.

The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold the land in question, then
a fish pond, tho Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza for the sum of P12, reserving the right to
repurchase the same (Exhibit B). After having been in possession thereof for about eight years,
and the fish pond having been destroyed, Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, on September
5, 1899, sold it to Valentin Susi for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase it (Exhibit A).
Before the execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had already paid its price and sown
"bacawan" on said land, availing himself of the firewood gathered thereon, with the proceeds of
the sale of which he had paid the price of the property. The possession and occupation of the
land in question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi has
been open, continuous, adverse and public, without any interruption, except during the revolution,
or disturbance, except when Angela Razon, on September 13, 1913, commenced an action in
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga to recover the possession of said land (Exhibit C),
wherein after considering the evidence introduced at the trial, the court rendered judgment in favor
of Valentin Susi and against Angela Razon, dismissing the complaint (Exhibit E). Having failed in
her attempt to obtain possession of the land in question through the court, Angela Razon applied
to the Director of Lands for the purchase thereof on August 15, 1914 (Exhibit C). Having learned
of said application, Valentin Susi filed and opposition thereto on December 6, 1915, asserting his
possession of the land for twenty-five years (Exhibit P). After making the proper administrative
investigation, the Director of Lands overruled the opposition of Valentin Susi and sold the land to
Angela Razon. By virtue of said grant the register of deeds of Pampanga, on August 31, 1921,
issued the proper certificate of title to Angela Razon. Armed with said document, Angela Razon
required Valentin Susi to vacate the land in question, and as he refused to do so, she brought
and action for forcible entry and detainer in the justice of the peace court of Guagua, Pampanga,
which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the case being one of title to real property (Exhibit F
and M). Valentin Susi then brought this action.

With these facts in view, we shall proceed to consider the questions raised by the appellant in his
assignments of error.lawphi1.net
It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the land in
question openly, continuously, adversely, and publicly, personally and through his predecessors,
since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years. While the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga against Angela Razon in the forcible entry case does not affect the Director
of Lands, yet it is controlling as to Angela Razon and rebuts her claim that she had been in
possession thereof. When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the purchase of said
land, Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof personally and through his
predecessors for thirty-four years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already
made said land a fish pond when he sold it on December 18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated
when he began to possess and occupy it, the period of time being so long that it is beyond the
reach of memory. These being the facts, the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of Cariño vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (212 U. S., 449 1), is
applicable here. In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de
jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all
the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been
in actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural
land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with
a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that
when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by
operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary
that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts,
an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a
legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already
ceased to be the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of
Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in
question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer
any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not
thereby acquire any right.

The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public domain, the plaintiff-
appellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession thereof.lawphi1.net

If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become, by
operation of law, private property of the plaintiff, there lacking only the judicial sanction of his title,
Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover possession thereof and hold it.

For the foregoing, and no error having been found in the judgment appealed from, the same is
hereby affirmed in all its parts, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., took no part.

G.R. No. 10072 November 29, 1916

WILLIAM ABRAHAM KINCAID, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
CAYETANO CABUTUTAN, ET AL., objectors-appellants.

Bernabe de Guzman, Pedro Abad Santos, Valentin Manglapus and Jose I. Pinzon for appellants.
E. A. Perkins for appellee.
TORRES, J.:

This appeal by bill of exceptions was raised by counsel for Cayetano Cabututan, Hilario Milo and
others, occupants of different portions of the land sought to be registered by William Abraham
Kincaid, from the judgment of September 13, 1913, in which the Court of Land Registration, after
a declaration of general default, denied all the adverse claims filed by the objectors and decreed
in favor of William Abraham Kincaid the adjudication and registration of the land applied for except
the parcel situated in the sitio of Anduyan, barrio of Dacanay, municipality of Tubao, Province of
La Union, described more specifically in the stipulation between the parties (record, pp. 329, 330).
This parcel was excluded for the reason that on August 25, 1911, it had already been adjudicated
and registered for school purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration
Act. There was also excluded a strip of land 12 meters in width which composed the entire length
of that part of the Tubao-Rosario Highway that crosses the land in question. The judgment further
ordered the applicant to pay into the public treasury the sum of P147.58 for the surplus of 93
hectares included in the application, and that, once the judgment became final, the proper plan
should be amended by excluding therefrom the parcels of land specified in the judgment. .

On September 28, 1911, counsel for William Abraham Kincaid filed a written application in the
Court of Land Registration for the inscription in accordance with law of a tract of land situated in
the sitio of Cataguintingan, barrio of Anduyan, municipality of Tubao, La Union, of which the
technical description, metes and bounds are particularized in the plan Exhibit A, a part of the
application, and that stated that said tract contains an area of 5,738,952 square meters, is
assessed at P15,000 and is free of all charges and encumbrances; that the applicant had acquired
this land through conveyance in 1909 by Feliciano de la Rose; and that the only adjacent owner
was Guillermo Cabututan, a resident of the barrio of Anduyan of the said municipality of Tubao,
although the property is occupied by 336 persons whose names the applicant cites in a list
accompanying his application.

On March 6, 1912, the Director of Lands through the Attorney-General filed a written opposition
to the registration sought on the ground that the said tract of land was public land, belonging to
the Government of the United States, under the control and administration of the Government of
the Philippine Islands and as such could not be registered in the name of the applicant, wherefore
he prayed the court to deny the said application, with the costs against the applicant.

During the period granted by law, 124 objectors filed in court their respective adverse claims.
Cayetano Cabututan claimed to be the owner of 1 parcel of land 28,455 square meters, through
inheritance from his ancestors, and of another parcel containing 1,560 square meters, acquired
by purchase from its previous owner; Miguel Lijos also claimed to be the owner of 1 parcel of land
of 64,472 square meters which, he alleged, he inherited from his ancestors; Nicolas Olat, of a
parcel of 3,000 square meters; Felegrin Boado, of a parcel of 8 hectares in area; Isaac de la Paz,
of a parcel of 7,560 square meters; Francisco Cabututan, of a parcel of 1,820 square meters;
Marcos Isit, of a parcel of 10,640 square meters; Modesto Selin, of a parcel of 85,720 square
meters; Perfecto Garcia, of a parcel of 7,270 square meters; Irineo Viloria, of a parcel of 26,000
square meters; Lucas Ollero. of a parcel of 1,440 square meters; Basilio Gago, of a parcel of
30,000 square meters; Julian Gago, of a parcel of 10,570 square meters; Antonio Selga, of a
parcel of 10,814 square meters; Guillermo Albay, of a parcel of 7,000 square meters; Bernabe
Albay, of a parcel of 7,000 square meters; Saturnino Garcia, of a parcel of 3,600 square meters;
Nazario Garcia, of a parcel of 2,204 square meters; Guillermo Laron, of a parcel of 3,416 square
meters; Aniceto Estoesta, of a parcel of 3,600 square meters; Lauro Fang, of a parcel of 11,890
square meters; Bonifacio Fang, of a parcel also of 11,890 square meters; Antonio Tabara, of a
parcel of 11,160 square meters; Aniceto Canero, of a parcel of 15,762 square meters; Bernardo
Biduya, of 2 parcels, respectively, of 1,260 and 12,720 square meters; Daniel Cabututan, of 2
parcels of 13,000 and 28,864 square meters, respectively; Felipe Cabututan, of 2 parcels of
respectively 40,000 and 16,700 square meters; Felix Jacola, of 3 parcels of respectively 9,576,
4,120 and 25,800 square meters; Toribio Lijos, of 3 parcels of a total area of 35,785 square
meters; Donato Biduya, also of 3 parcels, of a total area of 14,388 square meters; Sinforoso
Olarte, of 2 parcels, respectively, of 20,800 and 8,640 square meters; Modesto Laron, of 3 parcels
of a total area of 152,820 square meters; Estanislao Ramirez, of 2 parcels which together contain
97,100 square meters; Tiburcio Ventura, of 2 parcels of 1,760 and 13,190 square meters,
respectively; Teodoro Isla, of 3 parcels whose total area amounts to 30,002 square meters;
Mauricio Tabares, of 2 parcels, respectively, of 37,056 and 31,862 square meters; Leocadio
Romero, of 3 parcels of a total area of 23,756 square meters; Vidal Tabares, of 2 parcels, of 1,550
and 1,323 square meters, respectively; Lucas Ofilada, of 2 parcels which together measure
25,600 square meters; Gregorio Selga, of 2 parcels of 2,470 and 50,785 square meters,
respectively; Dalmacio Boado, of 3 parcels containing a total area of 21,995 square meters;
Silvestre Biduya, of 3 parcels of a total of 23,704 square meters; Leon Viloria, of 2 parcels
containing, respectively, 6,650 and 990 square meters; Felipe Isla, of 3 parcels containing an
area of 7,924 square meters; Segundo Fang, of 2 parcels, of 1,650 and 15,000 square meters,
respectively; Antonio Laron, of 2 parcels, respectively, of 11,899 and 5,300 square meters;
Vicente Lijos, of 3 parcels of a total area of 79,500 square meters; Primo Fang, of 4 parcels
containing an area of 54,924 square meters; Felix Tabares, of 2 parcels, respectively, of 528 and
15,080 square meters; Isidro Isla, of 3 parcels of a total area of 37,404 square meters; Crisanto
Tabares, of 2 parcels of a total area of 31,900 square meters; Victor Biduya, 5 parcels which
together measure 12,070 square meters; Crisanto Gago, of 3 parcels of a total area of 30,200
square meters; Basilio Aspillaga, of one parcel, the area of which is not stated; Isidro Emperador,
of 2 parcels of 1,800 and 5,600 square meters respectively; Eusebio Canero, of 3 parcels
containing an area of 2,400 square meters; Damaso Camacho, of a parcel of 48,300 square
meters. All the foregoing objectors, 57 in number, represented by attorneys Mina, Manglapus,
and Pinzon, claim as their property the respective parcels of land which they occupy, which they
allege they inherited from their ancestors, and which, according to the stipulation found on page
960 of the record, they have possessed for more than thirty years.itc_ALF

The following parties also filed adverse claims, alleging themselves to be the exclusive owners of
the parcels of land described in their respective oppositions, by their quiet, peaceable, and
continuous possession thereof during various period ranging from thirty to sixty years; Alfonso
Ventura, 3 parcels; Eulogio Ventura, 2 parcels; Mariano Halog, 2 parcels; Guillermo Selga, 1
parcel; Tranquilino Aspuria, in his own name and in representation of his brothers or brother and
sister (Valerio and Mariano or Maria Aspuria), 1 parcel; Miguel Ventura, 2 parcels; Toribio Milo, 1
parcel; Esteban de la Paz, one parcel; Guillermo Tabara, 1 parcel; Gregorio Laroya, 1 parcel;
Marcos de la Paz, 1 parcel; Justo Rivera, 1 parcel; Nauro Gago, 1 parcel; Antonio Refuerzo, 1
parcel; Alipio Padilla, 2 parcels; Jacinto Selga, 2 parcels; Felipe Lloren, 1 parcel; Valerio Panelo,
as successor of Pablo Panelo, 2 parcels; Narciso Orencia, 1 parcel Felipa Orencia, 1 parcel;
Pedro Estoparre, 2 parcels; Tiburcio Madriaga, 2 parcels; Ambrocio Isla, 4 parcels; Alejandro
Estoparre, 2 parcels; Servando Estoparre, 2 parcels; Eustaquio Estoparre, 2 parcels; but Adolfo
R. Gonzalez and Guillermo Orencia each of whom claims one parcel, allege that they hold
possession of these lands, the subject matter of their claims, by title other than that of inheritance.
The following named parties also objected to the registration sought and alleged themselves to
be the exclusive owners of the parcels of land included within the land sought to be registered
and held by the quietly, peaceably and continuously during periods of time ranging between thirty
and sixty years; Jose Bautista, 1 parcel; Higinio Aspiras, 2 parcels; Raymundo Padilla, 2 parcels;
Inocencio Dacanay, 1 parcel; Angel Milo, 4 parcels; Ignacio Dacalcap, 1 parcel; Roberto
Cabututan, 1 parcel; Faustino Padilla, 1 parcel; Sotero Isla, 2 parcels; Inocencio Padilla, 2 parcels;
Doroteo Milo, 2 parcels; Ignacio Dacanay, 1 parcel; Ricardo Cabututan, 2 parcels in the barrios
of Verceles and Lloren; Fausto Dacanay, 1 parcel; Antonio Isla, in substitution for his deceased
father Segundo Isla, 2 parcels; Miguel de Ocampo, 2 parcels; Gelacio Milo, 3 parcels; Serapio
Cabututan, 1 parcel; Valeriano Padilla, 1 parcel; and Alberto Cabutuan, 2 parcels.

At the hearing of this case, the provincial fiscal of La Union, in representation of the municipality
of Tubao, and the herein applicant, reached an agreement (part 2 of the record, pp. 329-30),
whereby the applicant excluded from his application the land situated southwest of the Tubao-
Rosario highway, in the sitio of Anduyan, barrio of Dacanay, municipality of Tubao, containing an
area of 5,412 square meters, which land had already been registered under the Torrens Law, in
August, 1911, and had been set aside for school purposes.

The interested parties also agreed to exclude the strip of land 12 meters wide comprising that
part of the Tubao- Rosario highway which crosses the land in question, and also the following
four parcels of land, namely: one of 6 hectares, 43 ares, and 75 centares, in behalf of Santiago
Betia; 2 of a total area of 5 hectares, 37 ares, and 50 centares, in behalf of 3 objectors, Feliciano,
Cenon, and Candido, brothers, all surnamed Ballejo; and another of 12 hectares, 18 ares, and 75
centares in area, waived by the applicant in behalf of the objectors Mariano Orencia and Esteban
Orencia. According to agreement (p. 962 of the record) Tomas Montemayor, Victoriano Olarte,
and Guillermo Milo withdrew their oppositions, their lands not being included in the land in
question.

The application for registration was accompanied by a list of the names of 336 persons who,
according to the applicant, actually occupy the tract of land situated in Cataguintingan which he
seeks to register, and of whom, in spite of due notification and summons, only 124 filed adverse
claims; 3 of these, Victoriano Olarte, Guillermo Milo or Melo, and Tomas Montemayor, already
mentioned, must be excluded. Three other adverse claims should be excluded, to wit, those of
the aforementioned Santiago Betia, the representative of the brothers Feliciano, Cenon and
Candidio Ballejo, and the representative of the other brothers Mariano and Esteban Orencia.

Of the 118 remaining objectors, 4, Fernando Viloria, Bibiana Emperador, Gregorio Boado, and
Simeon Boado, did not appeal from the judgment; but according to the bills of exceptions,
although the objectors Hilario Milo, Primo Padilla, Honorato Mabalot and Susana or Ricardo
Campos, did appeal, yet they did not, either by themselves or by their counsel, file any brief in
support of their appeal in this second instance.

Felipe Padilla, Nicomedes Lustrino, Hilario Gagauin, Emeterio Tabora or Tabara, Melecio
Dacanay, and Bernardo Dacanay do not appear, from the record, to have filed adverse claims in
the Court of Land Registration; but the record shows that they appealed from the judgment,
though their names, with the exception of Bernardo Dacanay, do not appear in the briefs
presented in this second instance. Bernardo Dacanay's name appears in the brief submitted by
the attorneys Abad Santos, Manglapus & Pinzon.
After a hearing of the case and the introduction of evidence by the parties, the court rendered the
judgment aforementioned, to which the interested parties excepted and in writing moved for a
reopening of the case and for a new trial. These motions were overruled, exception was taken by
respondents, and, upon the filing of the proper bills of exceptions, the same were approved and
transmitted to the clerk of this court.

In this decision, therefore, we shall not only consider the appeal of the 105 objectors named in
the bills of exceptions, but also the appeal filed by Bernardo Dacanay, notwithstanding that he did
not object to the application for registration.

On June 13, 1882, Basilio Biduya, a resident of Agoo, Province of La Union, applied to
the Direccion General de Administracion Civil, under the previous sovereignty, for the adjudication
of 3 parcels of waste or uncultivated land situated in Ambangonan, Tarambang, and in
Cataguintingan. The metes and bounds of this last parcel are as follows: On the north, the Masalit
River; on the east, the barrio of Anduyan; on the south, that of Damusil; and on the west, the
streams or creeks called Caoigui, Pucai and Tubao. The boundaries of the parcels of land situated
in Ambangonan and Tarambang are not given, their registration not being applied for, only the
parcel of Cataguintingan was included in the application, as will be seen further on.

Between November 17 and 20, 1882, by delegation of the gobernadorcillo of Agoo, the teneinte
de justicia, accompanied by two prominently residents and a forestry employees (after due notice
and summon to the holders of the land adjacent to or comprised within those intended to be
inspected) went upon the lands, applied for by Basilio Biduya for the purpose of measuring the
same. As Basilio Biduya had since died his eldest son Sotero was present in his place and seated
but no opposition or adverse claim whatever was presented. The parcel of land in Cataguintingan,
barrio of Tubao, 7 kilometers from the church, was found to be waste or uncultivated, situated
outside of the legua comunal of the pueblo, and to have the following boundaries; on the north,
the Masalit River; on the east, the river flowing from Ambangonan toward Masalit and known as
Anduyan, Pugo, etc.; on the south, by the Damusil Creek and public forests; and on the west, by
the creeks known as Caoigui, Pucao and Tubao. No mention is made of the parcel of land in
Ambangonan, or in Tarambang, as they are not concerned in the application.

The two tracts of land applied for both in Manila and in La Union, on April 16, 1885, having been
offered for sale at public auction, by virtue of the decree issued by the office of the Intendencia
General de Hacienda, the unappropriated public lands situated in Cataguintingan and
Ambangonan were awarded for P750 to the bidders Manuel Bernal and Froilan Sabugo; and, as
on August 11th of the same year, the latter alone paid the aggregate amount which the two should
have paid, to wit, P783.75 (Manuel Bernal making no payment) the subdeputy of the treasurer of
La Union issued to Froilan Sabugo alone, in the name of the Government, the proper deed to the
said land. This document was recorded in the Administracion General de Rantas y de
Propeidades, in the Inspeccion General de Montes and in the Gobierno Politico Militar of La
Union.

On January 25, 1900, Froilan Sabugo sold the said two tracts of land Francisco de la Rosa for
P800. Feliciano de la Rosa, administrator of the estate of the deceased Francisco de la Rosa,
lacking funds to pay the fees of attorney William Abraham Kincaid employed in the proceedings
for the probate of the will, on November 3, 1909, made a deed of conveyance of the tract of 480
hectares situated in Cataguintingan, Tubao, and bounded on the north by the Masalit River, on
the east by the Anduyan River, on the south by the Damusil Creek and public forests, and on the
west by the Caoigui, Pucao, and Tubao Creeks. This deed of conveyance, approved by the court,
was entered in the registry on February 4, 1911, by virtue of the decree of the 17th of the
preceding month of January, being rendered on a petition of the said grantee by said administrator
of said estate of Francisco de la Rosa be ordered registered, notwithstanding that its registration
had previously been denied by the register of deeds of the said Province of La Union.

It is unquestionable that the grantee William A. Kincaid, through the conveyance made by the
administrator of the estate of the deceased Francisco de la Rosa in the deed of November 3,
1909, obtained the ownership of the tract of land situated in the place known as Cataguintingan,
barrio of Tubao, pueblo of Agoo, containing 5,738,952 squares meters, or an area of 573
hectares. Decedent De la Rosa's title to the land was derived from Froilan Sabugo who sold it to
him in addition to another for P800, the vendor, Sabugo, in his turn having acquired both tracts
from the Government during the former sovereignty.

Section 19 of Act No. 496 provide that the person or persons claiming, singly or collectively, an
estate in fee simple may apply for registration of title. The applicant, in applying for the inscription
of the said tract of land in the registry, bases his petition on the ground that he is the owner of the
property by reason of the conveyance made to him by the representative of its former owner — a
conveyance which constitutes a just title conveying ownership.

Froilan Sabugo, the original owner who acquired from the Government the tract of land in
Cataguintingan together with another tract, resided, not in the pueblo of Agoo, but in San
Fernando, the capital of the Province of La Union, where he had a store. From the time he
purchased the land in question then occupied by several residents of the place, he commended
the collection of the rents paid by the occupants of the land for several years before the Revolution
broke out in 1896 to the parish priest of said pueblo of Agoo, but after this priest left the said
pueblo, no one collected the rents or canon for the occupation of the land, according to the
testimony of the witness Timoteo Soberano who stated that he did not know whether Froilan
Sabugo cultivated the said land or not. But another witness, Mariano Fang, positively asserted
that for two years he himself was engaged in clearing the land; that afterwards he himself
delivered it to Sabugo. Witness added that at the time and during a period of four years, he paid
rent for land, within the land in question, occupied by himself, to Gregorio Selga, one of the
collectors; that such rent consisted of a certain amount of rice, but that he paid this rent in the
belief that the land belonged to the Government, that this was also the belief of the other holders
of various portions of the land in question, about twenty in number. The parties stipulated between
themselves that the witnesses Antonio Subitan and Sebastian Nieva, if called to the stand, should
give the same testimony as the preceeding witness. Esterio Romero, 26 years of age, stated that
he was one of those who accompanied the surveyor when the survey was made and boundaries
fixed on the land to be registered.

From the documents exhibited by the applicant, it is unquestionable that he holds a valid and
effective title by virtue of which the ownership of the land situated in Cataguintingan, containing
some 480 hectares, was conveyed to him by the representative of its former owner, Francisco de
la Rosa, who had acquired it, together with another tract of land, from Froilan Sabugo who in his
turn had purchased it from the Government at public auction; but the record does not show as
duly proven that the applicant Kincaid, on obtaining by conveyance said tract of land, took
possession in November, 1909, or at any time afterwards, through himself, or representatives, or
agents.

Neither does the evidence adduced at the trial show that Froilan Sabugo held this tract of land for
any length of time, for the testimony of the two witnesses to the effect that they and some twenty
other people were paying rents for certain portions of the land they were occupying, under the
belief that they were thereby complying with an obligation due the Government, does not show
conclusively that Froilan Sabugo was in possession of these 480 hectares of land awarded to him
at an auction sale by the Government under the previous sovereignty, and still less so because
there is no proof who those twenty persons were who paid such rents or canon nor whether they
or their successors are among the present objectors and appellants.

There was no proof that Francisco de la Rosa, who substituted Froilan Sabugo in the rights in the
land in Cataguintingan, took possession of the property. In fact the record discloses no proof
whatever of any such possession, nor can it be considered to have been proven by the statements
of the several witnesses presented by the applicant to the effect, that prior to the latter's obtaining
the conveyance of the land, the attorney Cayetano Lukban at various times offered to sell portions
of the land to its occupants, in the name and by order of Feliciano de la Rosa.

The owner of real property sought to be registered by him in the property registry must exercise
the ownership, that is, the right of ownership and possession, of the said realty belonging to him
in fee simple (art. 348, Civ. Code). If the owner does not enjoy the possession of the thing that
belongs to him, he cannot exercise complete right of ownership is entitled to be respected in his
possession, in which case it is presumed that the owner has, by one or another of the causes
specified in article 460 of the same Code, lost the possession of the property of which he is the
owner. It must always be borne in mind that, pursuant to article 447 of the Civil Code, the
possession acquired and enjoyed as owner will serve as a title for acquiring the ownership, for
the reason that the possessor under such a title has in his favor the legal presumption that he
holds possession by reason of a just title and he cannot be forced to show it (art. 448 of the same
Code). Possession, the unquestionable foundation of the prescription of ownership, after the
expiration of the long period fixed by law, even without just title or good faith, weakens and
destroys the force and value of the best possible title to the thing possessed by one who is not
the owner thereof (arts. 447, 448, and 1959, Civ. Code).

During the trial of the case and the taking of the evidence adduced by the objectors, the attorney
for the applicant Kincaid and Attorney Valentin Manglapus, of the law firm of Mina, Manglapus &
Pinzon, in representation of 57 objectors, made the following stipulation:

That the said objectors and their witnesses shall be deemed to have testified that, were
they called to the witness stand, they would testify that the objectors hold the lands they
claim as owners, as set forth in their oppositions; that they have been in possession,
counting that of their predecessors in interest, for more than thirty years; and that such
possession has been open, public, and adverse and always as owners, until they were
cited to appear in these proceedings. (Record, p. 961.)

The said 57 objectors referred to in the preceeding stipulation, are: Crisanto Tabares, Crisanto
Gago, Basilio Aspillaga, Isidro Emperador, Eusebio Canero, Damaso Camacho, Cayetano
Cabututan, Miguel Lijos, Nicolas Olat, Felegrin Boado, Isaac de la Paz, Francisco Cabututan,
Marcos Isit, Modesto Selin, Perfecto Garcia, Irineo Viloria, Lucas Ollero, Basilio Gago, Julian
Gago, Antonio Selga, Guillermo Albay, Bernabe Albay, Saturnino Garcia, Nazario Garcia,
Guillermo Laron, Aniceto Estoesta, Lauro Fang, Bonifacio Fang, Antonio Tabara, Aniceto Canero,
Bernardo Biduya, Daniel Cabututan, Felipe Cabututan, Felix Jacola, Toribio Lijos, Donato Biduya,
Sinfroso Olarte, Modesto Laron, Estanislao Ramirez, Tiburcio Ventura, Teodoro Isla, Mauricio
Tabares, Leocadio Romero, Vidal Tabares, Lucas Ofilada, Gregorio Selga, Dalmacio Boado,
Silvestre Biduya, Leon Viloria, Felipe Isla, Segundo Fang, Antonio Laron, Vicente Lijos, Primo
Fang, Felix Tabares, Isidro Isla, and Victor Biduya. No documentary evidence was presented.

It was also stipulated between the attorney for the applicant and Attorney Alejo Mabanag, in
representation of the objectors, Angel Milo, Jose Bautista, Faustino Dacanay, Inocencio Padilla,
Higinio Aspiras, Faustino Padilla, Valeriano Padilla, Miguel de Ocampo, and Ambrosio Isla, that,
if these objector-appellants and their witnesses were called to the witness stand, they would testify
in accordance with their respective adverse claims, in regard to the same previously stipulated
facts of possession, and in accordance with the testimony already given by the objectors Ignacio
Dacanay and Pedro Madriaga. By virtue of this stipulation the said objectors (those mentioned at
the beginning of this paragraph) and their witnesses were deemed to have testified in the sense
here explained (rec., pp. 932 to 936). It is to be noted that four other objectors who have not
appealed are comprised in this stipulation.

Ignacio Dacanay testified that for more than thirty years he had been in the quiet, peaceable and
uninterrupted possession of the land that is the subject matter of his opposition, that he inherited
this property from his ancestors; that he had recognized no person as owner of the land; and that
he had never paid any rent or canon to Father Franco or his agents or collectors.

Pedro Madriaga testified that for more than forty-five years he had been in the quiet, peacable
and uninterrupted possession of the parcel of land that is the subject matter of his opposition; that
he did not know Father Saturnino Franco; and that he had not paid him or his representative any
sum whatever as rent or canon.

The record also shows that a stipulation was made between the applicant and Attorney Ambrosio
Asper in representation of 18 of the objectors — the names of 7 are omitted on account of their
not having appealed from the judgment; the remaining 11 did appeal and a brief was filed in their
names which are as follows: Alfonso Ventura, Eulogio Ventura, Mariano Halog, Guillermo Selga,
Tiburcio or Toribio Milo, Gregorio Laroya, Marcos de la Paz, Mauro Gago, Justo Rivera, Miguel
Ventura, and Esteban de la Paz. This stipulation consisted in the admission that, were these
objector-appellants called to the witness stand to testify, they would give the same testimony as
that in the stipulation between the applicant and the attorney Manglapus, to wit, that they have
held the lands they claim for more than thirty years, including in this possession that of their
predecessor in interest, and that their possession has been open, public and adverse and always
as owners (rec., pp. 961 and 979). These facts were corroborated by Jacinto Selga, Antonio
Refuerzo, Alipio Padilla, Tranquiliono Aspuria, and Guillermo Tabara.

The objector Inocencio Padilla presented in evidence the documents Exhibits 2 and 3. The first
of these is a certified copy of a document, issued by the gobernadorcillo of Agoo on December 5,
1879, wherein, it appears that Remigio Estoesta was the owner of a parcel of land in Caoigui,
which he had inherited from his ancestors and which was appraised at P50. This document was
protocolized by order of the Court of First Instance of La Union on December 13 of that year. The
second document is one of a private character. It bears the date of November 16, 1870. In it
Remigio Estoesta and his wife Estefania Castillo declare that they sold a parcel of land in
the sitio of Caoigui to Teodoro Padilla for P40.

To prove his opposition, Valeriano Padilla exhibited a certified copy of the inscription of a
possessory information approved on March 16, 1897, inscribed thirteen days later on the 29th of
the same month, and relating to 2 parcels of land, one of the m designated by the number 142
and situated in Caoigui, municipality of Agoo, barrio of Tubao.
The objector Miguel Ocampo, son of the deceased Ocampo, to prove his opposition, exhibited a
certified copy of certain proceedings, entered in the registry on March 28, 1898, relative to 4
parcels of land, of which the first and fourth are included in the application for registration and are
situated in Caoigui, municipality or barrio of Tubao (Exhibit 13; rec., p. 563).

According to the stipulation (rec., 835) between the applicant and the Attorney Mabanag (in
representation of his client Raymundo Padilla) the latter, if called to the witness stand, would
testify in accordance with the statements contained in his written opposition. This objector
presented in evidence Exhibit 4, which is a deed of purchase and sale executed on November
17, 1902, by Encarnacion Gonzalez who, for P300, sold to the said Raymundo Padilla a parcel of
land in Cabacusan, municipality of Tubao, his inheritance from his deceased father. This deed is
shown to have been entered in the property registry of San Fernando de la Union on November
22, 1902; the objector also exhibited a certificate of the municipal president and the municipal
council of the said pueblo, of November 14 of the same year, which states that though by a
judgment of 1900 Santiago Fontanilla, husband of said Encarnacion Gonzalez had been deprived
of his civil rights since then, nevertheless it is evident from the stipulation (rec., p. 933) that the
said document (Exhibit 4) attested by the gobernadorcillo of Agoo in favor of Padilla was
subsequently protocolized by the notary Tamayo, although it does not seem to have been entered
in the registry in the name of the vendor Gonzalez. However, every one admits that the old registry
books were burned or destroyed during the Revolution. The document Exhibit G which is a
certificate by the registrar of property of La Union, issued on July 22, 1913, confirms the inscription
of said deed in the name of Raymundo Padilla. (rec., p. 608).

Contrary to the statements of applicant's witnesses known as Mariano Fang and Sebastian Nieva,
that Santiago Betia was Father Franco's collector and that they themselves had paid the rent
or canon for certain parcels of land belonging to one Sabugo, the witness Betia testified that,
though he was acquainted with Father Franco, he had never been authorized to collect
the canon of the land in litigation, and that he never knew Basilio Biduya had purchased land in
Agoo.

Having thus far considered the evidence of record in respect to 78 of the objectors who in their
briefs have maintained their respective appeals in this second instance, we shall now examine
the evidence and proofs of the remaining 19 objectors who also appealed from the judgment of
the Court of Land Registration without counting the nine other objectors who presented no
evidence at the hearing of the case in first instance and who are not included in the stipulations
aforementioned.

The said 19 objector-appellants are:

Jacinto Selga, 53 years of age, alleges that he is the owner of 2 parcels of land included in the
tract of land which is the subject matter of the application; that, aside from the possession of his
predecessors in interest, he had been holding the first parcel peaceably and uninterruptedly for
more than ten years, and the second parcel for more than 33 years, that is, since inheriting them
from his father Toribio Selga; and that he never paid any sum whatever as canon to either Father
Saturnino Franco, Severo Fontanill or Gregorio Selga (with all of whom he was acquainted). This
objector exhibited the document Exhibit 17 which states that the first parcel of land he claims
belonged to the daughters of the deceased Fernando Ulac; he also presented a certified copy of
a possessory information proceeding, instituted by himself, proving possession under title of
ownership of 4 parcels of land entered in the registry on March 18, 1897. The witness Domingo
Selga corroborated the testimony of this objector.
Antonio Refuerzo, 51 years of age, claimed to hold as owner of the parcel of land that is the
subject matter of his opposition, alleging that he inherited this property from his father some thirty-
two years ago, and stated that he had never paid any sum whatever as canon to Father Franco,
nor to the said Fontanilla or Selga. The testimony of this objector appears corroborated by the
witnesses Jacinto Selga and Domingo Selga. Furthermore, he exhibited a certified copy of a
possessory information, Exhibit 20, entered in the property registry on March 15, 1897.

Alipio Padilla, 68 years of age, testified that for more than thirty-five years he had been in the
quiet and peaceable possession of two parcels of land — one acquired from a man named
Esteban, and the other inherited from his father more than forty-five years ago — that he had held
these parcels of land as owner; and that he had paid no canon to any of the aforesaid parties,
Father Franco, Fontanilla or Selga. The witnesses Teodoro Padilla, 61 years of age, and
Valeriano Padilla, 62 years of age, corroborated the testimony given by this objector who also
exhibited a certificate of possessory information (Exhibit 21) entered in the property registry on
May 7, 1897, relative to a sementera situated in Sabangan Caoigui of the pueblo of
Tubao.lawphil.net

Tranquilino Aspuria testified that in his own name and in the names of his brother and sister,
Mariano and Valeriana Aspuria, he had been holding as owner a parcel of land for more than
eighteen years, without counting the period of possession of his father, Pio Aspuria, who in turn
had inherited the land from the objector's grandfather Pablo Lagleba; that he never had
paid canon for the land; (his testimony was corroborated by the witness Domino Selga) and
presented a possessory information title (Exhibit 22) obtained in 1856 by proceedings had before
the gobernadorcillo of Agoo and protocolized by a judicial order.

Guillermo Tabara alleged that as owner he had held a parcel of land for more than seventeen
years, without counting the time of possession of his grandfather, Francisco Aspuria, from whom
he inherited the property, and that he had never paid any canon to any person whomsoever (his
testimony was corroborated by the witness Francisco Aspuria), and he exhibited a certified copy
of a deed of sale (Exhibit 23) executed May, 1879, by Regino Tuvera in favor of Francisco Aspuria
and protocolized on January 2, 1880.

Ignacio Dacanay, 55 years of age, testified that he possessed a parcel of land in the sitio of
Cataguintingan, barrio of Lloren; that he had held it ever since he was 18 years of age at which
date he received it from his father who in turn had inherited it from Dacanay's grandfather; that
he had never recognized any person whomsoever as the owner of this land, and that he had paid
no canon therefor to Father Franco or to any of his agents. The witnesses Angel and Hilario Milo
corroborated his testimony.

Felipe Lloren testified that he held as owner a parcel of land situated in the barrio of Lloren and
comprised within the land sought to be registered by the applicant; that 40 years ago he had
inherited this property from his father Francisco Lloren who in turn had acquired same by right of
first cultivation, when the objector was 18 years old; and that neither he nor his father had ever
paid any person any sum whatever as canon. (His testimony was corroborated by the witness
Buenaventura Dacanay.) He presented a possessory information title, obtained by proceedings
brought by Francisco Lloren in February, 1886, before the gobernadorcillo of Agoo, which
document proves his possession of a parcel of land in the sitio of Tubao, barrio of San Isidro and
was approved by the politico-military governor of La Union and was afterwards transmitted by
order to the main court of the province, for the purposes required by law.
So far as Felipa Orencia, Narciso Orencia, and Guillermo Orencia are concerned it was fully
proven that these objectors are descendants of Agustin Orencia who, at his death in 1867, left,
among other heirs, his children named Buenaventura Orencia (father of the objector Felipa),
Quirino Orencia (father of objector Narciso Orencia), and Joaquin Orencia (father of objector
Guillermo Orencia) as well as that the lands belonging to the said Agustin Orencia, the common
predecessor in interest, were divided among his eight children in 1875. It was also duly proven
with the legal requisites and with the permission of the owners of the adjoining properties, the
said Agustin Orencia filed information proceedings before the gobernadorcillo of Agoo regarding
a parcel of land he was occupying in the sitio of Cataguintingan, barrio of San Isidro, pueblo of
Agoo, and that his petition was granted, pursuant to article 9 of the superior decree issued by the
governor and captain general, on October 30, 1827. The fact of the partition in 1875 of a piece of
Agustin Orencia's land in Cataguintingan among his seven children and his adopted son Ramon
Ballejo appears to be corroborated by the testimony of Buenaventura Dacanay, 77 years old, an
eyewitness to this partition.

The applicant admitted by stipulation (rec., p. 872) that the objectors Guillermo Orencia and
Narciso Orencia would state, if they testified, that they adjacent boundary owners and areas of
their lands were the same as those set forth in their adverse claims. It was furthermore shown
that in 1911 Guillermo Orensia inherited from his father Joaquin Orencia the piece of land 5
hectares, 67 ares, and 60 centares, claimed by this objector, and that he also presented at the
trial the Exhibit 7, a record of a possessory information proceeding brought by Joaquin Orencia
in March, 1895, in respect to a parcel of land in Cataguintingan which he alleged he had inherited
from his father Agustin Orencia who had held it since 1858. It is this land that was conveyed to
the objector Guillermo Orencia .The second parcel claimed by the latter is a piece of land which
his father Joaquin Orencia had held since 1858, situated in the barrio of Anduyan and also a
subject matter of the said possessory proceeding, Exhibit 7, and on January 21, 1896,
preventively annotated by the register of deeds of La Union, for lack of indexed in the old
anotaduria. The piece of land that corresponds to Quirino Orencia, conveyed to him by the said
Agustin Orencia, was likewise the subject matter of a possessory information proceedings brought
by Quirino in 1895; said land passed into the possession of his son, the objector Narciso Orencia.
However, by reason of a suit for ejectment brought against Santiago Tabares, the title awarded
in the said possessory information proceeding was attached to the record which disappeared as
a result of a fire during the Revolution, after Narciso Orencia had defeated the said Tabares in
the suit (as shown by the copy of the judgment therein rendered on November 12, 1897, in favor
of the former, Exhibit 12) wherefore the land now occupied by Santiago Tabares belongs to the
objector Narciso Orencia.

Felipa Orencia likewise proved that she had received the land she claims from her grandfather
Agustin Orencia, through her father Buenaventura, in 1875, without considering the possession
of her predecessor in interest which dated from 1858.

Ricardo Cabututan testified that he had held as owner the land he claims in the barrio of Verceles,
pueblo of Tubao, for about twenty-two years, that he inherited same from his father Basilio
Cabututan who had been in possession thereof for a long period of time, (this testimony was
corroborated by his witness Sotero Isla) and also exhibited the document Exhibit 8, executed
before the gobernadorcillo of Agoo, attesting that Basilio Cabututan owned a piece of land in
the sitio of Piccao, barrio of San Isidro, which document was protocolized in court on December
13, 1879.
In regard to the opposition of Adolfo R. Gonzalez, of his brothers Eduardo and Carlos and his
sister Encarnacion Gonzalez, this objector testified that his 26 hectares of land had belonged to
his father Felipe Santiago Gonzales who had acquired the same by purchase from a man named
Manuel Bernal. His testimony in regard to the purchase of the land from Bernal was corroborated
by Raymundo Padilla. The document Exhibit 9, presented by the Gonzalez brothers and sister,
shows that in 1885 Eugenio Ramos bought 3 parcels of land from the Government, of which the
second situated in Tubao, pueblo of Agoo, containing an area of 26 hectares and 63 ares, is the
parcel now claimed by these objectors, and that the payment of the purchase price was made by
Manuel Bernal, as attested by the document Exhibit 10. No documental proof was adduced of the
sale of the land by Manuel Bernal to the father of these objectors, though, in addition to the
affirmation of Adolfo R. Gonzalez and his witness Raymundo Padilla, it appears that his land was
sold by Bernal to Felipe Santiago Gonzalez who, in May, 1896, (according to the certified copy
Exhibit 11) commenced possessory information proceedings in regard to 2 parcels of land, of
which the second is the one described as the second parcel in the said document Exhibit 9 and
also that is now claimed by these objectors. The title obtained by the said possessory proceedings
was entered in the property registry of La Union on August 31, 1896.

Ignacio Dacalcap, 60 years of age, claims to be the owner of a piece of land situated in the barrio
of Lloren, comprised within the land sought to be registered by Kincaid, and testifies that for more
than thirty years he has been in the peaceable and uninterrupted possession of same which,
inherited from his father, Eusebio, he has held as owner, without ever having paid to anyone any
amount whatever as canon therefor. His witness Sotero Isla corroborated his testimony.

Sotero Isla, 50 years of age, alleged that he was the owner of 4 parcels of land, 2 in the barrio of
Verceles and 2 in Lloren, as set forth in his adverse claim, and that he had held possession of
them for more than thirty years, peaceably and uninterruptedly as the owner thereof, by reason
of his having acquired them by inheritance from his father. His testimony was corroborated in all
respects by the witness Ignacio Dacalcap.

Valerio Panelo, 36 years of age and the successor in interest in the adverse claim filed by Pablo
Panelo, his father, testified that he held as owner 2 parcels of land included in the tract sought to
be registered, situated in the barrio of Lloren, and added that his father had bought them of Ramon
Ballejo, who, as an adopted son, had inherited them from Agustin Orencia. According to the
testimony of Buenaventura Dacanay (rec., p. 866), it is unquestionable that the lands of Agustin
Orencia were distributed among his seven children and an adopted son named Ramon Ballejo.
Although it was not established by documentary evidence that Ballejo's land was conveyed to
Pablo Panelo, it was proven by the testimony of the witnesses Ignacio Dacalcap and Narciso
Orencia (a grandson of Agustin Orencia) that it was actually so conveyed to Panelo. Narciso
Orencia further stated that for more that twenty years the Panelos had been in possession of the
land that is the subject matter of this opposition (rec., p. 902). As the applicant made no objection
to the oral evidence, offered by Valerio Panelo, to prove the conveyance of the land by Ramon
Ballejo to the objector's father Pablo Panelo, this fact must be admitted as proven.
(Conlu vs. Araneta and Guanko, 15 Phil. Rep., 387.)

Antonio Isla, son of Segunda Isla, testified that he was the exclusive owner of a parcel of land
included in Kincaid's application, and that ever since he could remember his father has cultivated
it. His testimony was corroborated by Sotero Isla.

Roberto Cabututan testified that he held as owner 2 parcels of land situated in the barrio of Lloren,
comprised within the land sought to be registered by the applicant, and that he had held
possession of them for more than seventeen years, without considering the time they had been
held by his father from whom he received them. His testimony was corroborated by Ignacio
Dacalcap.

Serapio Cabututan, 46 years of age (whose testimony was corroborated by Ignacio Dacanay and
Roberto Cabututan), stated that he was the exclusive owner of a parcel of land in the barrio of
Lloren, pueblo of Tubao, comprised within the land sought to be registered by Kincaid, and that
he had inherited same from his father Remigio Cabututan who had been in possession of it from
the time of this objector's earliest remembrances.

Gelasio Milo, 49 years of age, testified that he was in possession, as owner, of 3 parcels of land
comprised within the land referred to by the applicant; and that the first of these parcels, situated
in the sitio of Llavan, barrio of Lloren, was purchased for P230 from Erasmo Isit in October, 1907.
(According to the document Exhibit 15, the vended were Gelasio Milo and Hilario Gagauin, but it
appears that in May, 1866, Erasmo Isit obtained a document accrediting his possession of a
parcel of land in the sitio of Llavan and that his document was attested by the gobernadorcillo of
Agoo, the proceedings being subsequently approved by the politico-military governor of La Union
who ordered them recorded in the book of purchases and sales of the pueblo of Agoo, which was
done.) Milo alleged that he inherited from his father Toribio Milo the other 2 parcels of land he
claimed; that he has held them as owner for more than ten years; that his possession thereof has
been peaceable, public and adverse, and that at no time has he paid to any person any sum
whatever therefor as canon.

Therefore 97 of the objector-appellants now lawfully hold as owners their respective parcels of
land, inasmuch as they have proven such possession by parol, and many of them by documentary
evidence, and, furthermore, the applicant admitted that 78 of them had been in possession of
their respective holdings for more than thirty years, according to the stipulations made between
him and the attorneys representing these objectors. The other 19 objectors have also satisfactorily
proven that they have, for more than twenty years, as owners, been in possession of the parcels
of land they occupy, without considering the periods of possession enjoyed by their predecessors.

If a person enjoys possession under title of owner for more than thirty years, even though that
title be neither just nor of good faith, especially if said resident be a native of this country, this fact
constitutes title sufficient to acquire the dominion of the realty, for prescription by virtue of
possession of real property for more than thirty years is a positive obstacle that an adverse
claimant cannot overcome by the best title of ownership known to law (arts. 446, 447, 1959 and
1960, Civ. Code).

It has not been shown in the instant proceedings that the predecessors of the applicant were or
the applicant himself is now in possession of the whole tract of land situated in Cataguintingan;
wherefore, once proven that the said 97 objector-appellants have been holding and hold now
possession, as owners, for a period of more than thirty years, some for sixty (counting the
possession of their predecessors), it would be improper to refuse to recognize the right acquitted
by these 97 objectors, by virtue of the long period of prescription, especially when the applicant
himself by stipulation found himself compelled to admit such long possession enjoyed by 78 of
them. For this reason the applicant's title cannot prevail as a better title against the right of this
extraordinary prescription, acquired over their respective properties, by these 97 objector-
appellants.
The applicant's title can only prevail against the 9 objector-appellants who have not satisfactorily
proven that they have acquired the ownership in the parcels of land they respectively hold,
because they have not duly proven that they have been in possession thereof as owners and for
the period of time prescribed by law. Therefore, not having acquired title of ownership therein by
prescription, the parcels of land in Cataguintingan sought to be registered by the applicant who
for this purpose presented a title by which he lawfully acquired from the Government the
ownership of the said tract of land awarded to him by the former sovereignty, although, in
accordance with law, the rights held in the parcels of land comprised within this tract, held under
title of ownership by their actual occupants who have lawfully acquired possession thereof by
prescription, must be respected (arts. 438, 446, 447, and 448, Civ. Code).

The applicant has applied for the registration of 573 hectares, 89 ares, and 52 centares of land in
the said sitio of Cataguintingan, barrio of Anduyan, municipality of Tubao (formerly only a barrio
of the pueblo of Agoo), Province of La Union. Of this extensive tract of land, 93 hectares, 89 ares,
and 52 centares are public land not included within the perimeter of the land awarded by the
Spanish government to Froilan Sabugo, the first of the applicant Kincaid's predecessors in
interest. This applicant now seeks to register not only that land awarded to Sabugao as above
stated, comprising 480 hectares, but also the said 93 odd hectares, which two tracts make the
aggregate area of 573 hectares, 89 ares, and 52 centares.

As, according to the evidence of record, the applicant's petition for registration may be granted
only with respect to less than on-half of the said aggregate area of 573 and odd hectares of land,
we shall now specify the number of hectares that should be excluded in favor of the Government,
as well as the actual holders who are entitled to be considered owners of their respective
properties. Said land comprises:

1. Six hectares, 43 ares, and 75 centares, actually held by Santiago Betia, according to
the stipulation between the parties.

2. Two parcels of land containing 5 hectares, 35 ares, and 50 centares, actually held by
the brothers Feliciano, Candido and Cenon Ballejo.

3. The parcel of land of 2 hectares, 18 ares, and 75 centares, actually held by the brothers
Mariano and Esteban Orencia, by virtue of applicant's relinquishment.

4. There should also be excluded from the registration 315 hectares, 60 ares, and 71
centares of land, the aggregate area of the parcels held by the 97 objectors who have
proven their respective rights and whose rights were recognized by the applicant, together
with the parcel, acquired by the Government for school purposes, containing 54 ares and
12 centares. It is to be noted that the measurement of the parcels of land of 16 of the
objectors are those of the circumference which, reduced to hectares and barring error, are
deemed to be equivalent to 23 hectares, 85 ares, and 44 centares, and are comprised
within the said aggregate total area of 315 hectares, 60 ares, and 71 centares that must
be excluded, as aforesaid, from the 573 and odd hectares of land that are the subject
matter of the application.

5. There should also be excluded from the land sought to be registered, the land of Basilio
Aspillaga and the 12-meter strip that forms the Tubao-Rosario Road, as ascertained by
its survey and boundary marks, in accordance with the stipulations between the parties.
So that, from the fact hereinabove stated, it follows that 233 hectares, 76 ares, and 69 centares,
barring errors, should be adjudicated to the applicant Kincaid, and should be entered in the
property registry. In this total are included the parcels of land of the 9 objectors who have not
furnished proof of their respective rights therein.

The applicant's petition for the registration of the said 233 hectares, 76 ares, and 69 centares is
granted, inasmuch as, in respect thereto, no one has come forward with any adverse claims and
inasmuch as the 9 objectors who filed adverse claims for certain parts of the said land did not
present satisfactory proof. Therefore, by reason of his title the applicant must be considered as
the lawful owner of the said 233 hectares, 76 ares, and 69 centares that are not rightfully held by
anyone else. It is to be noted that, by stipulation, the lands of Tomas Montemayor, Victoriano
Olarte, and Guillermo Milo were likewise excluded, as not being comprised within the land in
question.

For the foregoing reasons, it is proper to hold, as we hereby do that (1) the adverse claims filed
by Pedro Estoparre, Eustaquio Estoparre, Alejandro Estoparre, Servando Estoparre, Inocencio
or Tiburcio Madriaga, Alberto Cabututan, Doroteo Milo, Inocencio Dacanay and Bernardo
Dacanay for certain portions of the land comprised in the application for registration are denied,
as these claimants have not proved their respective rights therein.

(2) We likewise hold that there shall be excluded from the application for registration, sought in
these proceedings, the parcels of land specified in the second preceding paragraph of this
decision designated under Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 in which specific mention is made of the number
of hectares of land to be excluded from the applicant's claim.

(3) After declaration of general default, the adjudication and registration in the property registry of
the said 233 hectares, 76 ares, and 69 centares of land shall be made in behalf and in the name
of the applicant, William Abraham Kincaid, who must pay to the Government the sum of P147.58
for the excess in the area of the land he seeks to register, and, at the applicant's expense, a new
plan of the adjudicated land shall be made by the Bureau of Lands, from which plan there shall
be excluded the parcels of land specified in the five paragraphs mentioned in the preceding
paragraph.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed in so far as it agrees with the decision, and is reversed
in so far as it does not. No special finding is made as to the costs of both instances. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Johnson, J., reserves his vote.

G.R. No. L-48321 August 31, 1946

OH CHO, applicant-appellee,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Roman Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Rafael Amparo for
appellant.
Vicente Constantino for appellee.
Ferrier, Gomez and Sotelo and J. T. Chuidian as amici curiae.
PADILLA, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment decreeing the registration of a residential lot located in the
municipality of Guinayangan, Province of Tayabas in the name of the applicant.

The opposition of the Director of Lands is based on the applicant's lack of title to the lot, and on
his disqualification, as alien, from acquiring lands of the public domain.

The applicant, who is an alien, and his predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the lot from 1880 to filing of the application for registration
on January 17, 1940.

The Solicitor General reiterates the second objection of the opponent and adds that the lower
court, committed an error in not declaring null and void the sale of the lot to the applicant.

The applicant invokes the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), or should it not be applicable to
the case, then he would apply for the benefits of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141).

The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be confirmed under the Land
Registration Act. He failed to show that he or any of his predecessors in interest had acquired the
lot from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, under the laws, orders and decrease
promulgated by the Spanish Government in the Philippines, or by possessory information under
the Mortgaged Law (section 19, Act 496). All lands that were not acquired from the Government,
either by purchase or by grant below to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any
land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest
since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never
been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish
conquest. (Cariño vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594.) The applicant does
not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessors in
interest begun in 1880.

As the applicant failed to show title to the lot, the next question is whether he is entitled to decree
or registration of the lot, because he is alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain
(sections 48, 49, C.A. No. 141).

As the applicant failed to show the title to the lot, and has invoked the provisions of the Public
Land Act, it seems unnecessary to make pronouncement in this case on the nature or
classifications of the sought to be registered.

It may be argued that under the provisions of the Public Land Act the applicant immediate
predecessor in interest would have been entitled to a decree of registration of the lot had they
applied for its registration; and that he having purchased or acquired it, the right of his immediate
predecessor in interest to a decree of registration must be deemed also to have been acquired
by him. The benefits provided in the Public Land Act for applicant's immediate predecessors in
interest should comply with the condition precedent for the grant of such benefits. The condition
precedent is to apply for the registration of the land of which they had been in possession at least
since July 26, 1894. This the applicant's immediate predecessors in interest failed to do. They did
not have any vested right in the lot amounting to the title which was transmissible to the applicant.
The only right, if it may thus be called, is their possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their
predecessors in interest, may be availed of by a qualified person to apply for its registration but
not by a person as the applicant who is disqualified.

It is urged that the sale of the lot to the applicant should have been declared null and void. In a
suit between vendor and vendee for the annulment of the sale, such pronouncement would be
necessary, if the court were of the opinion that it is void. It is not necessary in this case where the
vendors do not even object to the application filed by the vendee.

Accordingly, judgment is reversed and the application for registration dismissed, without costs.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Hilado and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., concurring:

Oh Cho, a citizen of the Republic of China, purchased in 1938 from Antonio, Luis and Rafael
Lagdameo a parcel of land located in the residential district of Guinayangan, Tayabas, which has
been in the continuous, public, and adverse possession of their predecessors in interest as far
back as 1880. on June 17, 1940, Oh Cho applied for the registration of said parcel of land. The
Director of Lands opposed the application because, among other grounds, the Constitution
prohibits aliens from acquiring public or private agricultural lands.

One of the witnesses for the applicant, on cross-examination, expressly admitted that the land in
question is susceptible of cultivation and may be converted into an orchard or garden. Rodolfo
Tiquia, inspector of the Bureau of Lands, testifying as a witness for the government, stated that
the land, notwithstanding the use to which it is actually devoted, is agricultural land in accordance
with an opinion rendered in 1939 by the Secretary of Justice. The pertinent part of said opinion,
penned by Secretary Jose Abad Santos, later Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, is as follows:

1. Whether or not the "public agricultural land" in section 1, Article XII, of the Constitution
may be interpreted to include residential, commercial or industrial lots for purposes of their
disposition.

1. Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution classifies lands of the public domain in the
Philippines into agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic classification adopted
since the enactment of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill.
At the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines, the term "agricultural
public lands" had, therefor, acquired a technical meaning in our public laws. The Supreme
Court of the Philippines in the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175,
held that the phrase "agricultural public lands" means those public lands acquired from
Spain which are neither timber nor mineral lands. This definition has been followed by our
Supreme Court in many subsequent cases. (Montano vs. Ins. Gov't 12 Phil., 572, 574;
Santiago vs. Ins. Gov't., 12, Phil., 593; Ibañes de Aldecoa vs. Ins. Gov't., 13 Phil., 159;
Ins. Gov't., vs. Aldecoa & Co., 19 Phil., 505, 516 Mercado vs. Collector of Internal
Revenue, 32 Phil., 271, 276; Molina 175, 181; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil.,
560, 564; and Ankron vs. Government of the Philippines, 40 Phil., 10, 14.)
 Residential, commercial or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have to
be included in one or more of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral,
of necessity, therefore, they must be classified as agricultural.

Viewed from the another angle, it has been held that in determining whether lands are
agricultural or not, the character of the lands is the test (Odell vs. Durant 62 N. W., 524;
Lerch vs. Missoula Brick & Tile Co., 123 p., 25). In other words, it is the susceptibility of
the land to cultivation for agricultural or not (State vs. Stewart, 190, p.,129).

Judge Pedro Magsalin, of the Court First Instance of Tayabas, rendered a decision on August 15,
1940, overruling the opposition without must explanation and decreeing the registration prayed
for the applicant. The Director of Lands appealed from the decision, and the Solicitor General
appearing for appellant, maintains that the applicant, not being a citizen of the Philippines, is
disqualified to buy or acquire the parcel of land in question and that the purchase made in question
and that the purchase made in 1938 is null and void.

This is the question squarely reversing to us for decision. The majority, although reversing the
lower court's decision and dismissing the application with we agree, abstained from the declaring
null and void the purchase made by Oh Cho in 1938 as prayed for the appellant. We deem it
necessary to state our opinion on the important question raised, it must be squarely decided.

The Solicitor General argued in his brief as follows:

I. The lower court erred decreeing the registration of the lot in question in favor of the
applicant who, according to his own voluntary admission, is a citizen of the Chinese
Republic.

(a) The phrase "agricultural land" as used in the Act of the Congress of July 1, 1902, in
the Public Land Act includes residential lots.

In this jurisdiction lands of public domain suitable for residential purposes are considered
agricultural lands under the Public Land Law. The phrase "agricultural public lands" has
well settled judicial definition. It was used for the first time in the Act of Congress of July
1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. Its means those public lands acquired form Spain
which are neither mineral nor timber lands (Mapa vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil., 572;
Ibañes de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government 13 Phil., 159; Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39
Phil., 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560; Ankron vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands, 40 Phil., 10). In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, supra, the
Supreme Court, in defining the meaning and scope of that phrase from the context of the
sections 13 and 15 of that Act, said:

The phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined by the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
which phrase is also to be found in several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926)
means those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither mineral timber lands.

xxx xxx xxx

"We hold that there is to be found in the act of Congress a definition of the phrase
"agricultural public lands," and after careful consideration of the question we are
satisfied that only definition which exists in said Act is the definition adopted by the
 court below. Section 13 say that the Government shall "make and rules and
regulations for the lease, sale, or other dispositions of public lands other than
timber or mineral lands," To our minds that is only definition that can be said to be
given agricultural lands. In other words, that the phrase "agricultural lands" as used
in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber
or mineral lands. . . ." Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, 178, 182,
emphasis added.)

"This phrase "agricultural public lands" was subsequently used in Act No. 926, which is
the first public land law of the Philippines. As therein used, the phrase was expressly given
by the Philippine Commission the same meaning intended for it by Congress as
interpreted in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, supra. This is a self-evident from
a reading of section 1, 10, 32, and 64 (subsection 6 of Act No. 926). Whenever the phrase
"agricultural public lands" is used in any of said sections, it is invariably by the qualification
"as defined by said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two."

"More specially, in the case of Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, supra, the
Supreme Court held that a residential or building lot, forming part of the public domain, is
agricultural land, irrespective of the fact that it is not actually used for purposes of
agriculture for the simple reason that it is susceptible of cultivation and may be converted
into a rural estate, and because when a land is not mineral or forestal in its nature it must
necessarily be included within the classification of a agricultural land. Because of the
special applicability of the doctrine laid down in said case, we quote at some length from
the decision therein rendered:

"The question set up in these proceedings by virtue of the appeal interposed by counsel
for Juan Ibañez de Aldecoa, is whether or not a parcel of land that is susceptible of being
cultivated, and ceasing to be agricultural land, was converted into a building lot, is subject
to the legal provisions in force regarding Government public lands which may be alienated
in favor of private individuals or corporations. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

"Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may
converted into a field, and planted with all kinds of vegetation ; for this reason,
where land is not mining or forestal in its nature, it must necessarily be included
within the classification of agriculture land, not because it is actually used for the
purposes of agriculture, but because it was originally agricultural and may again
become so under other circumstances; besides the Act of Congress (of July 1,
1902) contains only three classifications, and makes no special provision with
respect to building lots or urban land that have ceased to be agricultural land. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

"From the language of the foregoing provisions of the law, it is deduced that, with
the exception of those comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all lands
owned by State or by the sovereign nation are public in character, and per
se alienable and, provided they are not destine to the use of public in general or
reserved by the Government in accordance with law, they may be acquired by any
private or juridical person; and considering their origin and primitive state and the
 general uses to which they are accorded, they are called agricultural lands, urbans
lands and building lots being included in this classification for the purpose of
distinguishing rural and urban estates from mineral and timber lands; the
transformation they may have undergone is no obstacle to such classification as
the possessors thereof may again convert them into rural estates." (Ibañez de
Aldecoa vs. Insular Government 13 Phil., 161, 163 164, 165, 166; emphasis
added.).

(b) Under the Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land
Act), the phrase (Public Land Act), the phrase "public agricultural land"
includes lands of the public domain suitable for residential purposes.

"Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution, reads as follows:

"All agricultural timber, and mineral lands of the public domain waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other
natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant lease,
or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under
this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land,
shall not be alienated . . ." (Emphasis added.).

"Under the above-quote provision, the disposition exploitation, development or utilization

of the natural resources, including agricultural lands of the public domain is limited to
citizens of the Philippines or to the corporations or associations therein mentioned. It also
clearly appears from said provision that natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, are not subject to alienation.

"On November 7, 1936, or more than one year after the adoption of the Constitution,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, known as the Public Land Act, was approved. Under this Act
the lands of the public have been classified into three divisions: (a) alienable or disposable,
(b) timber, and (c) mineral lands. The lands designated alienable or disposable correspond
to lands designated in the Constitution as public agricultural lands, because under section
1, Article XII, public agricultural lands are the only natural resources of the country which
are the only natural resources of the country which are subject to alienation or deposition.

"Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 provide that the alienable or disposable public
lands shall be classified, according to use or purposes to which they are destined, into a
agricultural, residential, commercial, industrial, etc., lands. At first blush it would seem that
under this classification residential land is different from agricultural land. The difference
however, is more apparent than real. 'Public agricultural land ' as that phrase is used in
the Constitution means alienable lands of the public domain and therefore this phrase is
equivalent to the lands classified by the Commonwealth Act No. 141 as alienable or
disposable. The classification provided in section 9 is only for purposes administration and
disposition, according to the purposes to which said lands are especially adopted. But
notwithstanding this of all said lands are essentially agricultural public lands because only
agricultural public lands are subject to alienation or disposition under section 1, Article XII
of the Constitution. A contrary view would necessarily create a conflict between
Commonwealth Act No. 141 and section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution, and such
conflict should be avoided , if possible, and said Act construed in the light of the
fundamental provisions of the Constitution and in entire harmony therewith.

"Another universal principles applied in considering constitutional question is, that

an Act will be so construed, if possible, as to avoid conflict with the Constitution,
although such a construction may not be the most obvious or natural one. "The
Court may resort to an implication to sustain a statute, but not to destroy it." But
the courts cannot go beyond the province of legitimate construction, in order to
save a statute; and where the meaning is plain, words cannot to be read into it or
out of it for that purpose." ( 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, pp. 135, 136.)

"In view of the fact that more than one than one year after the adoption of the Constitution
the National Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed Commonwealth Act No.
141, which a compilation of the laws relative to the lands of the public domain and the
amendments thereto, form to the Constitution.

"Where the legislature has revised a statute after a Constitution has been adopted,
such a revision is to be regarded as a legislative construction that the statute so
revised conforms to the Constitution." (59 C.J., 1102; emphasis added.)

"By the way of illustration, let us supposed that a piece or tract of public land has been
classified pursuant to section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as residential land. If, by
reason of this classification, it is maintained that said land has ceased to be agricultural
public land, it will no longer be subject to alienation or disposition by reason of the
constitutional provision that only agricultural lands are alienable; and yet such residential
lot is alienable under section 58, 59, and 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 to citizens of
the Philippines or to corporations or associations mentioned in section 1, Article XII of the
Constitution. Therefore, the classification of public agricultural lands into various
subdivisions is only for purposes of administration, alienation or disposition, but it does not
destroy the inherent nature of all such lands as a public agricultural lands.

"(c) Judicial interpretation of doubtful clause or phrase use in the law, controlling.

"The judicial interpretation given to the phrase "public agricultural land" is a sufficient
authority for giving the same interpretation to the phrase as used in subsequent legislation,
and this is especially so in view of the length of time during which this interpretation has
been maintained by the courts. On this point Sutherland has the following to say:

"When a judicial interpretation has once been put upon a clause, expressed in a
vague manner by the legislature, and difficult to be understood, that ought of itself
to be sufficient authority for adopting the same construction. Buller J., said: "We
find solemn determination of these doubtful expressions in the statute, and as that
now put another construction has since prevailed, there is no reason why we
should now put another construction of the act on account of any suppose change
of convenience." This rule of construction will hold good even if the court be opinion
that the practical erroneous; so that if the matter were res integra the court would
adopt a different construction. Lord Cairns said: "I think that with regard to statutes
... it is desirable not so much that the principle of the decision should be capable
at all times of justification, as that the law should be settled, and should, when once
 settled, be maintained without any danger of vacillation or uncertainty. "Judicial
usage and practice will have weight, and when continued for a long time will be
sustained though carried beyond the pair purport of the statute."(II Lewis'
Sutherland Statutory Construction, pp. 892, 893.) .

"An important consideration affecting the weight of contemporary judicial

construction is the length of time it has continued. It is adopted, and derives great
force from being adopted, soon after the enactment of the law. It may be, and is
presumed, that the legislative sense of its policy, and of its true scope and
meaning, permeates the judiciary and controls its exposition. Having received at
that time a construction which is for the time settled, accepted, and thereafter
followed or acted upon, it has the sanction of the of the authority appointed to
expound the law, just and correct conclusions, when reached, they are, moreover,
within the strongest reasons on which founded the maxim of stare decisis. Such a
construction is public given, and the subsequent silence of the legislature is strong
evidence of acquiescence, though not conclusive. . . . (II Lewis Sutherland
Statutory Construction, pp. 894, 895.)

"Furthermore, when the phrase "public agricultural land" was used in section 1 of Article
XII of the Constitution, it is presumed that it was so used with the same judicial meaning
therefor given to it and therefor the meaning of the phrase, as used in the Constitution,
includes residential lands and another lands of the public domain, but excludes mineral
and timber lands.

"Adoption of provisions previously construed — ad. Previous construction

by Courts. — Where a statute that has been construed by the courts of the last
resort has been reenacted in same, or substantially the same, terms, the
legislature is presumed to have been familiar with its construction, and to have
adopted it is part of the law, unless a contrary intent clearly appears, or a different
construction is expressly provided for; and the same rule applies in the
construction of a statute enacted after a similar or cognate statute has been
judicially construed. So where words or phrases employed in a new statute have
been construed by the court to have been used in a particular sense in a previous
statute on the same subject, or one analogous to it, they are presumed, in the a
absence of clearly expressed intent to the contrary, to be used in the same sense
in the statute as in the previous statute." (59 C.J., 1061-1063.).

"Legislative adoption of judicial construction. — In the adoption of the code, the

legislature is presumed to have known the judicial construction which have been
placed on the former statutes; and therefore the reenactment in the code or
general revision of provisions substantially the same as those contained in the
former statutes is a legislative adoption of their known judicial constructions, unless
a contrary intent is clearly manifest. So the fact that the revisers eliminated
statutory language after it had been judicially construed shows that they had such
construction in view." (59 C. J., 1102.)

"II. The lower court erred in not declaring null and void the sale of said land to the appellant
(appellee).
"Granting that the land in question has ceased to be a part of the lands of the public domain
by reason of the long continuous,, public adverse possession of the applicant's
predecessors in interest, and that the latter had performed all the conditions essential to
a Government grant and were entitled to a certificate of title under section 48, subsection
(b), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, still the sale of said land of December 8, 1938, to the
applicant as evidenced by Exhibits B and C, was null and void for being contrary to section
5, Article XII of the Constitution, which reads as follows:

"Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be

transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain of the Philippines."

"The applicant, being a Chinese citizen, is disqualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain (section 1, Article XII of the Constitution; section 12, 22, 23, 33, 44, 48,
Commonwealth Act No. 141 ), and consequently also disqualified to buy and acquire
private agriculture land.

"In view of the well settled judicial meaning of the phrase public agricultural land,' as
hereinbefore demonstrated, the phrase 'private agricultural land,' as used in the above
quoted provision, can only mean land of private ownership, whether agricultural,
residential, commercial or industrial. And this necessarily so, because the phrase
'agricultural land used in the Constitution and in the Public Land Law must be given the
same uniform meaning to wit, any land of the public domain or any land of private
ownership, which is neither mineral or forestal.

"A word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the
statute, unless a different intention appears. ... Where words have being long used
in a technical sense and have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning,
and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a
particular statute in which they are used, the rule of construction requires that the
words used in such statute should be construed according to the sense may vary
from the strict literal meaning of the words." (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction.,
p. 758.) .

"This interpretation is in harmony with the nationalistic policy, spirit and purpose of our
Constitution and laws, to wit, `to conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation,' as
solemnly enunciated in the preamble to the Constitution.

"A narrow and literal interpretation of the phrase 'private agriculture land' would impair and
defeat the nationalistic aim and general policy of our laws and would allow a gradual,
steady, and unlimited accumulation in alien hands of a substantial portion of our
patrimonial estates, to the detriment of our national solidarity, stability, and independence.
Nothing could prevent the acquisition of a great portion or the whole of a city by subjects
of a foreign power. And yet a city or urban area is more strategical than a farm or rural
land.

"The mere literal construction of section in a statute ought not to prevail if it is

opposed to the intention of the legislature apparent by the statute; and if the words
are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other construction it is to be adopted to
effectuate that intention. The intent prevails over the letter, and the letter will, if
 possible be so read as to conform to the spirit of the act. While the intention of the
legislature must be ascertained from the words used to express it, the manifest
reason and the obvious purpose of the law should not be sacrificed to a liberal
interpretation of such words." (II Sutherland, Stat. Construction, pp. 721, 722.)

"We conclude, therefore, that the residential lot which the applicant seeks to register in his
name falls within the meaning of private agricultural land as this phrase is used in our
Constitution and, consequently, is not subject to acquisition by foreigners except by
hereditary succession."

The argument hold water. It expresses a correct interpretation of the Constitution and the real
intent of the Constitutional Convention.

One of our fellow members therein, Delegate Montilla, said:

The constitutional precepts that I believe will ultimately lead us to our desired goal are; (1)
the complete nationalization of our lands and natural resources; (2) the nationalization of
our commerce and industry compatible with good international practices. With the
complete nationalization of our lands and natural resources it is to be understood that our
God-given birthright should be one hundred per cent in Filipino hands. ... Lands and
natural resources are immovable and as such can be compared to the vital organs of a
person's body, the lack of possession of which may cause instant death or the shortening
of life. If we do not completely nationalize these two of our most important belongings, I
am afraid that the time will come when we shall be sorry for the time we were born. Our
independence will be just a mockery, for what kind of independence are we going to have
if a part of our country is not in our hands but in those of foreigner? (2 Aruego, The Framing
of the Philippine Constitution, p. 592.).

From the same book of Delegate Aruego, we quote:

The nationalization of the natural resources of the country was intended (1) to insure their
conservation for Filipino posterity; (2) to serve as an instrument of national defense,
helping prevent the extension into the country of foreign control through peaceful
economic penetration; and (3) to prevent making the Philippines a source of international
conflict with the consequent danger to its internal security and independence.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . In the preface to its report, the committee on nationalization and preservation of lands
and other natural resources said;

"International complications have often resulted from the existence of alien ownership of
land and natural resources in a weak country. Because of this danger, it is best that aliens
should be restricted in the acquisition of land and other natural resources. An example is
afforded by the case of Texas. This state was originally province of Mexico. In order to
secure its rapid settlements and development, the Mexican government offered free land
to settlers in Texas. Americans responded more rapidly than the Mexicans, and soon they
organized a revolt against Mexican rule, and then secured annexation to the United
States. A new increase of alien landholding in Mexico has brought about the desire a
prevent a repetition of the Texas affair. Accordingly the Mexican constitution of 1917
 contains serious limitation on the right of aliens to hold lands and mines in Mexico. The
Filipinos should profit from this example."

xxx xxx xxx

It was primarily for these reasons that the Convention approved readily the proposed
principle of prohibiting aliens to acquire, exploit, develop, or utilize agricultural, timber, and
mineral lands of the public domain, waters minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines. For the
same reasons the Convention approved equally readily the proposed principle of
prohibiting the transfer of assignment to aliens of private agricultural land, save in the case
of hereditary succession. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, pp. 604, 605,
606.).

All the foregoing show why we, having been a member of the Constitutional Convention, agree
with Solicitor General's position and concur in the result in this case, although we would go as far
as the outright pronouncement that the purchase made by appelle is null and void.

G.R. No. L-3793. February 19, 1908. ]

CIRILO MAPA, Petitioner-Appellee, v. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, Respondent-

Appellant.

Attorney-General Araneta, for Appellant.

Basilio R. Mapa, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. AGRICULTURAL PUBLIC LANDS DEFINED. — The phrase "agricultural public lands" defined
by the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which phrase is also to be found in several sections of the
Public Land Act (No. 926), means those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither
mineral nor timber lands.

DECISION

WILLARD, J. :

This case comes from the Court of Land Registration. The petitioner sought to have registered a
tract of land of about 16 hectares in extent, situated in the barrio of San Antonio, in the district of
Mandurriao, in the municipality of Iloilo. Judgment was rendered in favor of the petitioner and the
Government has appealed. A motion for a new trial was made and denied in the court below, but
no exception was taken to the order denying it, and we therefore can not review the evidence.

The decision of that court was based upon Act No. 926 section 54, paragraph 6 which
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as
defined by said act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide claim
of ownership except as against the Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the
taking effect of this act, except when prevented by war, or force majeure, shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and to have
received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the provisions
of this chapter."cralaw virtua1aw library

The only question submitted to the court below or to this court by the Attorney-General is the
question whether the land in controversy is agricultural land within the meaning of the section
above quoted. The findings of the court below upon that point are as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"From the evidence adduced it appears that the land in question is lowland, and has been
uninterruptedly, for more than twenty years, in the possession of the petitioner and his ancestors
as owners and the same has been used during the said period, and up to the present, as fish
ponds, nipa lands, and salt deposits. The witnesses declare that the land is far from the sea, the
town of Molo being between the sea and the said land."cralaw virtua1aw library

The question is an important one because the phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined by
said act of Congress of July 1, is found not only in section 54 above quoted but in other parts of
Act No. 926, and it seems that the same construction must be given to the phrase wherever it
occurs in any part of that law.

The claim of the Attorney-General seems to be that no lands can be called agricultural lands
unless they are such by their nature. If the contention of the Attorney-General is correct, and this
land because of its nature is not agricultural land, it is difficult to see how it could be disposed of
or what the Government could do with it if it should be decided that the Government is the owner
thereof. It could not allow the land to be entered as a homestead, for Chapter I of Act No. 926
allows the entry of homesteads only upon "agricultural public lands" in the Philippine Islands, as
defined by the act of Congress of July 1, 1902. It could not sell it in accordance with the provisions
of Chapter II of Act No. 926 for section 10 only authorizes the sale of "unreserved nonmineral
agricultural public land in the Philippine Islands, as defined in the act of Congress of July first,
nineteen hundred and two." It could not lease it in accordance with the provisions of Chapter III
of the said act, for section 22 relating to leases limits them to "nonmineral public lands, as defined
by section eighteen and twenty of the act of Congress approved July first, nineteen hundred and
two." It may be noted in passing that there is perhaps some typographical or other error in this
reference to sections 18 and 20, because neither one of these sections mentions agricultural
lands. The Government could not give a free patent to this land to a native settler, in accordance
with the provisions of Chapter IV, for that relates only to "agricultural public land, as defined by
act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two."cralaw virtua1aw library

In fact, by virtue of the provisions of Act No. 926, the Government could do nothing with this land
except to lay out a town site thereon in accordance with the provisions of Chapter V, for section
36 relating to that matter, says nothing about agricultural land.

The question before us is not what is agricultural land, but what definition has been given to that
phrase by the act of Congress. An examination of that act will show that the only sections thereof
wherein can be found anything which could be called a definition of the phrase are sections 13
and 15. Those sections are as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 13. That the Government of the Philippine Islands, subject to the provisions of this act and
except as herein provided, shall classify according to its agricultural character and
productiveness, and shall immediately make rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other
disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral lands, but such rules and regulations
shall not go into effect of have the force of law until they have received the approval of the
President, and when approved by the President they shall be submitted by him to Congress at
the beginning of the next ensuing session thereof and unless disapproved or amended by
Congress at said session they shall at the close of such period have the force and effect of law in
the Philippine Islands: Provided, That a single homestead entry shall not exceed sixteen hectares
in extent.

"SEC. 15. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and empowered
on such terms as it may prescribe, by general legislation, to provide for the granting or sale and
conveyance to actual occupants and settlers and other citizens of said Islands such parts and
portions of the public domain, other than timber and mineral lands, of the United States in said
Islands as it may deem wise, not exceeding sixteen hectares to any one person and for the sale
and conveyance of not more than one thousand and twenty-four hectares to any corporation or
association of persons: Provided, that the grant or sale of such lands, whether the purchase price
be paid at once or in partial payments shall be conditioned upon actual and continued occupancy,
improvement, and cultivation of the premises sold for a period of not less than five years, during
which time the purchaser or grantee can not alienate or encumber said land or the title thereto;
but such restriction shall not apply to transfers of rights and title of inheritance under the laws for
the distribution of the estates of decedents."cralaw virtua1aw library

It is seen that neither one of these sections gives any express definition of the phrase "agricultural
land." In fact, in section 15 the word "agricultural" does not occur.

There seem to be only three possible ways of deciding this question. The first is to say that no
definition of the phrase "agricultural land" can be found in the act of Congress; the second, that
there is a definition of that phrase in the act and that it means land which in its nature is
agricultural; and, third, that there is a definition in the act and that the phrase means all of the
public lands acquired from Spain except those which are mineral or timber lands. The court below
adopted this view, and held that the land, not being timber or mineral land, came within the
definition of agricultural land, and that therefore Section 54 paragraph 6, Act No. 926 was
applicable thereto.

1. There are serious objections to holding that there is no definition in the act of the phrase
"agricultural land." The Commission in enacting Act No. 926 expressly declared that such a
definition could be found therein. The President approved this act and it might be said that
Congress, by failing to reject or amend it, tacitly approved it. Moreover, if it should be said that
there is no definition in the act of Congress of the phrase "agricultural land," we do not see how
any effect could be given to the provisions of Act No. 916, to which we have referred. If the phrase
is not defined in the act of Congress, then the lands upon which homesteads can be granted can
not be determined. Nor can it be known what land the Government has the right to sell in
accordance with the provisions of Chapter II, nor what lands it can lease in accordance with the
provisions of Chapter III, nor the lands for which it can give free patents to native settlers in
accordance with the provisions of Chapter IV, and it would seem to follow, necessarily, that none
of those chapters could be put into force and that all that had up to this time been done by virtue
thereof would be void.
2. The second way of disposing of the question is by saying that Congress has defined agricultural
lands as those lands which are, as the Attorney-General says, by their nature agricultural. As has
been said before, the word "agricultural" does not occur in section 15. Section 13 says that the
Government "shall classify according to its agricultural character and productiveness and shall
immediately make rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other disposition of the public lands
other than timber or mineral land." This is the same thing as saying that the Government shall
classify the public lands other than timber or mineral lands according to its agricultural character
and productiveness; in other words, that it shall classify all the public lands acquired from Spain,
and that this classification shall be made according to the agricultural character of the land and
according to its productiveness.

One objection to adopting this view is that it is so vague and indefinite that it would be very difficult
to apply it in practice. What lands are agricultural in nature? The Attorney-General himself in his
brief in this case says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The most arid mountain and the poorest soil are susceptible of cultivation by the hand of
man."cralaw virtua1aw library

The land in question in this case, which is used as a fishery, could be filled up and any kind of
crops raised thereon. Mineral and timber lands are expressly excluded, but it would be difficult to
say that any other particular tract of land was not agricultural in nature. Such lands may be found
within the limits of any city. There is within the city of Manila, and within a thickly inhabited part
thereof an experimental far. This land is in its nature agricultural. Adjoining the Luneta, in the
same city, is a large tract of land, Camp Wallace, devoted to sports. The land surrounding the city
walls of Manila, between them and the Malecon Drive on the west, the Luneta on the south, and
Bagumbayan Drive on the south and east, is of many hectares in extent and is in nature
agricultural. The Luneta itself could at any time be devoted to the growing of crops.

The objection to adopting this construction on account of its uncertainty is emphasized when we
consider that whether certain land was or was not agricultural land, as defined by the act of
Congress, and therefore subject to homestead entry, to sale, or to lease in accordance with the
provisions of Act No. 926, would be a question that would finally have to be determined by the
courts, unless there is some express provision of the law authorizing the administrative officers
to determine this question for themselves. Section 2 of Act No. 926 relating to homesteads
provides that the Chief of The Bureau of Public Lands shall summarily determine whether the land
described is prima facie under the law subject to homestead settlement. Section 13, relating to
the sale of public lands, provides simply that the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall
determine from the certificate of the Chief of the Bureau of Forestry whether the land applied for
is more valuable for agricultural than for timber purposes, but it says nothing about his decisions
as to whether it is or is not agricultural land in its nature. Section 26 relating to the lease of public
lands provides that the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall determine from the certificate of
the Chief of the Bureau of Forestry whether the land applied for is more valuable for agricultural
than for timber purposes and further summarily determine from available records whether the land
is or is not mineral and does not contain deposits of coal or salts. Section 34 relating to fee patents
to native settlers makes no provision for any determination by the Chief of Bureau of Public Lands
in regard to the character of the land applied for.

After homesteads have been entered, lands, sold, and leases made by the administrative officers
on the theory that the lands were agricultural lands by their nature, to leave the matter of their
true character open for subsequent action by the courts would be to produce an evil that should
if possible be avoided.
3. We hold that there is to be found in the act of Congress a definition of the phrase "agricultural
public lands," and after a careful consideration of the question we are satisfied that the only
definition which exists in said act is the definition adopted by the court below. Section 13 says
that the Government shall "Make rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other disposition of
the public lands other than timber or mineral lands." To our minds, that is the only definition that
can be said to be given to agricultural lands. In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as
used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral
lands. As was said in the case of Jones v. The Insular Government (6 Phil Rep., 122, 133) where
these same section of the act of Congress were under discussion:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The meaning of these sections is not clear and it is difficult to give to them a construction that
would be entirely free from objection."cralaw virtua1aw library

But the construction we have adopted, to our minds, is less objectionable than any other one that
has been suggested.

There is nothing in this case of Jones v. The Insular Government which at all conflicts with the
result here arrived at. The question as to whether the lands there involved were or were not
agricultural lands within the meaning of the sections was neither discussed nor decided. In fact,
it appears from the decision that those lands, which were in the Province of Benguet, were within
the strictest definition of the phrase "agricultural lands." It appears that such lands had been
cultivated for more than twelve years. What that case decided was, not that the lands therein
involved and other lands referred to in the decision by way of illustration were not agricultural
lands but that the law there in question and the other laws mentioned therein were not rules and
regulations within the meaning of section 13.

The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the Appellant.
So ordered.

Arellano, C.J. and Torres, J., concur.

Johnson, J., concurs in the result.

G.R. No. L-3894 March 12, 1909

JUAN IBAÑEZ DE ALDECOA, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-appellee.

Del-Pan, Ortigas and Fisher for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.

TORRES, J.:

On the 8th of March, 1904, in accordance with the new Land Registration Act, Juan Ibañez de
Aldecoa applied for the registration of his title to a parcel of land, 3,375 square meters in extent,
situated in the town of Surigao; a plan and technical description of said parcel was attached to his
application.
After the formalities of the law were complied with, and an opinion of the examiner of titles
opposing the request of the applicant, had been rendered, the Attorney-General by a writing dated
March 21, 1905, objected to the registration applied for, alleging that the land in question was the
property of the Government of the United States, and is now under the control of the Insular
Government; that the title of ownership issued by the politico-militar governor of Surigao,
Mindanao, issued on the 19th of June, 1889, to Telesforo Ibañez de Aldecoa, antecessor of the
petitioner with respect to the land in question, was entirely null and void, for the reason that said
grant had not been made in accordance with the laws then in force on the subject, and because
the said governor had no authority to make such a grant; he prayed the court below to dismiss
the application with costs.

As the case stood the applicant, Aldecoa, on the 8th of April, 1905, amended his former petition,
and relying upon the provisions of paragraph 5 and 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, alleged that at
the time he requested the registration of the land in question, comprised in the plan then
submitted, the aforesaid Act No. 926 was not yet in force, and as the latter affords better facilities
for securing titles to property unprovided with them, as in the case with the land in question, the
applicant availing himself of the benefits granted by the said Act, prayed that the same be applied
to the inscription of his land, inasmuch as it was included within paragraphs 5 and 6 of section
54, Chapter VI, thereof, and prayed the court to take into consideration the amendment of his
petition.

Evidence was adduced by the petitioner at the trial of the case, and on February 2, 1907, the
judge of the Court of Land Registration entered his decision in the matter and, in view of the
opposition offered by the Insular Government denied the petition without costs, and ordered the
cancellation of the entry made of the said property in the record under No. 408, folio 206 of volume
2 of the municipality of Surigao.

The applicant excepted to this decision and moved for a new trial; his motion was overruled to
which he also excepted and presented the corresponding bill of exceptions which was approved
and submitted to this court.

The question set up in these proceedings by virtue of the appeal interposed by counsel for Juan
Ibañez de Aldecoa, is whether or not a parcel of land that is susceptible of being cultivated, and,
ceasing to be agricultural land, was converted into a building lot, is subject to the legal provisions
in force regarding Government public lands which may be alienated in favor of private individuals
or corporations. While from the remote time of the conquest of this Archipelago the occupation or
material possession together with the improvement and cultivation for a certain number of years,
as fixed by the laws of the Indies, of given portions of vacant Government lands, was the method
established by the Government to facilitate the acquisition thereof by private persons, later, by
the royal decrees of June 25, 1880, and December 26, 1884, the system of composition with the
State and that of sales by public auction were instituted as the means of acquiring such lands.

In view of the difficulties which prevented the rapid dispatch of the proceedings instituted for this
purpose, the royal decree of February 13, 1894, was promulgated, establishing the possessory
information as the method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions
which were set out in said decree.

After the change of sovereignty, the Commission enacted Act No. 926, relating to public lands, in
accordance with the provisions of sections 13, 14, and 15 of the Act of the Congress of the United
States of July 1, 1902, section 54, paragraph 6 of which (Act No. 926) is as follows:
 SEC. 54. The following-described persons or their legal successors in right, occupying
public lands in the Philippine Islands, or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles to such lands have not been perfected, may apply to the Court of
Land Registration of the Philippine Islands for confirmation of their claims and the issuance
of a certificate of title therefor to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public
lands, as defined by said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a
bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a period of ten years
next preceding the taking effect of this Act, except when prevented by a war or force
majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to
a government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title to such land under the provisions of this chapter.

All applicants for lands under paragraph one, two, three, four, and five of this section must
establish by proper official records or documents that such proceedings as are therein
required were taken and the necessary conditions complied with: Provided, however, That
such requirements shall not apply to the fact of adverse possession.

Given the above legal provisions and the data contained in the record, it is seen that the land, the
registration of which is claimed, was of the class of vacant crown or public land which the State
could alienate to private persons, and being susceptible of cultivation, since at any time the person
in possession desired to convert it into agricultural land he might do so in the same manner that
he had made a building lot of it, it undoubtedly falls within the terms of the said Act of Congress,
as well as the provisions of the abovecited section 54 and paragraph 6 thereof of Act No. 926, for
the reason that the said land is neither mining nor timber land.

We refrain from mentioning herein what originally was the nature of the land whereon was built
the greatest cities of the world; and confining ourselves to that on which the cities and towns in
these Islands were erected, it can not be denied that, at the commencement of the occupation of
this Archipelago by the Spaniards, and at the time of the distribution of lands, the latter were rural
and agricultural in their nature. Rural also were the old towns, the cradle and foundation of the
present cities and large towns of the Philippines, and as the inhabitants increased, and added to
the number of their dwellings, the farms gradually became converted into town lots.

In provincial towns, and in the suburbs of Manila, many houses are to be seen that are erected
on lots that form part of land used for agricultural purposes. If for the time being, and to the
advantage of the possessors thereof, they have ceased to be such agricultural lands, they may
later on again become transformed into farming land and, by the industry of the owner, again be
made to yield fruit.

Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may be converted into
a field, and planted with all kind of vegetation; for this reason, where land is not mining or forestall
in its nature, it must necessarily be included within the classification of agricultural land, not
because it is actually used for the purposes of agriculture, but because it was originally agricultural
and may again become so under other circumstances; besides, the Act of Congress contains only
three classifications, and makes no special provision with respect to building lots or urban lands
that have ceased to be agricultural land.

In the decision rendered by this court in the case of Mapa vs. The Insular Government, No. 3793
(10 Phil. Rep., 175), the legislation in force was interpreted in a similar sense.

It is not to be believed that it was the sense of the two sovereign powers that have successively
promulgated the said laws, to place those in possession of building lots under title of ownership
in an anomalous, uncertain and insecure position, rendering it impossible for them to obtain legal
titles to the lands appropriated by them, and denying them the care and protection of the law to
which they were certainly entitled on account of the efforts they have made, both in their behalf,
and for the benefit of the cities and towns in which they reside, contributing to the wealth and
increase of the country.

In the case at bar we have to deal with laws that were enacted after almost all the towns of this
Archipelago were established, and it must be assumed that the lawmakers have started from the
supposition that titles to the building lots within the confines of such towns had been duly acquired;
therefore, in special cases like the present one, wherein is sought the registration of a lot situated
within a town created and acknowledged administratively, it is proper to apply thereto the laws in
force and classify it as agricultural land, inasmuch as it was agricultural prior to its conversion into
a building lot, and is subject at any time to further rotation and cultivation; moreover, it does not
appear that it was ever mining or forest land.

It should be noted that article 1 of the royal decree and regulation of the 25th of June, 1880, says:
"In the Philippine Islands, all vacant lands, soils, and grounds without a lawful private owner, or,
which have never been under private control, shall be deemed to be alienable crown lands for the
effects of the regulation, and in accordance with law 14, title 12, book 4, of the Novísima
Recopilación;" that article 1 of the royal decree of the 14th of February, 1894, states: "Vacant
lands, soils, grounds, and mountains in the Philippine Islands shall be deemed to be alienable
Crown lands, provided they are not included within the following exceptions: (1) Those of private
ownership; (2) those belonging to the forest zone; (3) those comprised in the communal laws, or
within zones reserved for the use in common by residents of the community; and (4) those lands
which are susceptible of private appropriation by means of composition or possessory
information;" and that although section 13 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, directs the
Government of the Philippine Islands to classify public lands that are neither forest nor mining
lands according to their agricultural character and productiveness, section 14 authorizes and
empowers the said Government "to enact rules and regulations and to prescribe terms and
conditions to enable persons to perfect their title to public lands in said Islands, who, prior to the
transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States, had fulfilled all or some of the conditions
required by the Spanish laws and royal decrees of the Kingdom of Spain for the acquisition of
legal title thereto, yet failed to secure conveyance of title, etc.;" and section 15 authorizes and
empowers the said Government of the Philippine Islands "on such terms as it may prescribed, by
general legislation, to provide for the granting, or sale and conveyance to actual occupants and
settlers and other citizens of said Islands such parts and portions of the public domain, other than
timber and mineral lands of the United States on said Islands, as it may deem wise, etc."

From the language of the foregoing provisions of the law, it is deduced that, with the exception of
those comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by the State or by the
sovereign nation are public in character, and per se alienable and, provided they are not destined
to the use of the public in general or reserved by the Government in accordance with law, they
may be acquired by any private or judicial person; and considering their origin and primitive state
and the general uses to which they were accorded, they are called agricultural lands, urban lands
or building lots being included in this classification for the purpose of distinguishing rural and urban
estates from mineral and timber lands; the transformation they may have undergone is no
obstacle to such classification as the possessors thereof may again convert them into rural
estates.

If the land sought to be registered is neither mineral nor timber land, and on the other hand is
susceptible of cultivation the Act of Congress contains no provision whatever that would exclude
it from being classified as agricultural land, and assuming that it falls within that classification, the
benefits of paragraph 6, section 54, of Act No. 926, must forthwith be applied for the reason that
it has been fully proven that the applicant was in possession thereof for more than 13 years prior
to the 26th of July, 1904, when the said Act went into effect. Furthermore, there is no legal reason
or cause to exclude urban lands from the benefits of the aforesaid Act; on the contrary, the
interpretation that urban real estate, that is not mineral or forestall in character, be understood to
fall within the classification of agricultural land, is deemed to be most rational and beneficial to
public interests.

Therefore, in view of the foregoing, it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should be
reversed, and that it should be, as it is, hereby ordered, that, after holding in general default all
such persons as may have any interest in the said parcel of land, the registration of the same
shall be granted in accordance with the Land Registration Act. No special ruling is made as to
costs. So ordered.

Willard, J., concurs.

Carson, J., concurs in the result.

eparate Opinions

ARELLANO, C. J., concurring:

The land that is the subject of the petition in this case, is described in the judgment of the court
below, whose conclusions of fact are of the following tenor:

The object of registration in this case is a lot situated on McKinley Avenue, in the
municipality of Surigao, province of the same name; it comprises an area of 3,375 square
meters, and is bounded on the north by the seashore; on the east by the land of the heirs
of the late Andres Ojeda; on the south by the aforesaid street; and on the west by the
premises of the government building.

In order to acquire the said property, which is a building lot situated in the inhabited portion
of the said municipality of Surigao, Telesforo Ibañez de Aldecoa on June 11, 1889, filed a
petition with the politico-militar governor of the 3d District of Mindanao to whom then
belonged the municipality and Province of Surigao, claiming the said lot as being
abandoned, and requesting that he be granted a title of ownership thereto. In view of the
said petition, D. Juan Cirlot y Butler, major of Infantry, who at the time was governor,
directed bandillos (proclamations) to be published for three successive nights in the said
municipality of Surigao, calling on all persons who considered that they were entitled to
the said lot; after the bandillos had so been published, and no one appearing to claim the
lot, and it appearing from the report of the governadorcillo and principales of said
 municipality that the lot was unoccupied and that no one had ever been known to own the
same, the governor, on the 19th of the said month of June, granted to the said Telesforo
Ibañez de Aldecoa title of ownership to the said lot in order that he might forthwith build a
house thereon. The document setting forth the said concession was a certificate issued
on the same date, the 19th, by the aforesaid governor; and by order of the Court of First
Instance of Surigao, the same was entered in the record of public instruments of the said
court corresponding to said year on the 22d of October. A certified copy of the document
so recorded was obtained and attached to the record of the case, and was recorded on
the 23d of March, 1896, in the registry of property of the said Province of Surigao, lot No.
408, first entry.

After the title of ownership to the lot in question had been granted in the manner above
stated, the grantee, Telesforo Ibañez de Aldecoa, immediately took possession and within
a short time had it fenced in and took care to keep the fence in good repair; and thus
keeping the land constantly fenced in he continued to possess it publicly, in his own name
and as the owner thereof, without any interruption or opposition from anyone until he died
in the year 1902. "After the death of the said Telesforo Ibañez de Aldecoa, his widow
succeeded him in the possession of one-half of the lot in question for the reason that it
pertained to the bienes gananciales (property acquired during marriage), and his son, the
petitioner herein, as sole heir of the deceased, inherited the other half. He also has kept
the land fenced in, and lately replaced the fence with a wire one. Toward the month of
March or April, 1903, the provincial board of Surigao, in spite of the opposition and protests
on the part of the aforesaid possessors, ordered the removal of and did remove the fence
around the lot above referred to, claiming that the said lot belonged to the Province of
Surigao; that for this reason their possession was interrupted until March, 1904, when the
said possessors, after having filed their application for registration in these proceedings,
erected monuments on the lot. And that lot has never been devoted to cultivation, neither
is it by its nature suitable for any kind of cultivation.

Such are the facts that should be considered as proven in these proceedings.

From the facts set forth it evidently appears:

First. That the land in question is a building lot situated within the inhabited portion of the town of
Surigao.

Second. That since June, 1889, the said lot had been possessed with the knowledge and consent
of the said municipality, peacefully and without any opposition up to March or April, 1903, to-wit,
approximately fourteen years; that prior to the said adjudication, the gobernadorcillo and
the principales of said municipality had been cited and heard on the subject.

Third. That the little of ownership issued by the provincial official of Surigao was entered in the
registry of property of said province on the 23d of March, 1896.

Fourth. That from March or April, 1903, until March, 1904, the material possession suffered
interruption on account of an abusive and arbitrary act of intrusion of the provincial board of
Surigao which had absolutely no authority to commit such an act of spoliation; and,
Fifth. That in March, 1904, after the peaceful and quiet possession was resumed, the petitioner
instituted these proceedings for the purpose of obtaining a new title of ownership in accordance
with the Acts of the Philippine Commission that created the new registry of property.

The present opposition is based on the supposition that the said lot was a parcel of land subject
to composition, as if it were vacant Government land; that as such vacant and Government land,
it had not been duly granted by composition when in June, 1889, Telesforo Ibañez de Aldecoa
obtained his title of ownership from the politico-militar governor of said province, who was not the
person called upon to grant titles by composition after the promulgation of the royal decree of
June 25, 1880, and that of December 26, 1884; and the Court of Land Registration, assuming on
the contrary that the said land is not vacant crown land, it not being devoted to agriculture but to
building purposes, and because "by reason of its nature it is not suitable for agriculture but is
destined exclusively to building purposes, and is therefore not agricultural, it believes that the
same can not be the subject of adjudication under the provisions of the Act of Congress and Act
No. 926 of the Philippine Commission, and that in the opinion of the court, paragraph 6 of section
54 of Act No. 926 is not applicable to urban real estate."

An established rule which has been repeatedly laid down by this court, is that only the vacant
Crown lands were subject to composition; that is, rural lands devoted to cultivation. In the present
case the petitioner finds himself between the horns of a dilemma: As to whether the land in
question is urban or rural property; if it is rural, the Attorney-General argues that it has not been
subjected to composition, and that the possession thereof is consequently illegal; and if it is urban,
the lower court rejects it as not being susceptible of acquisition under the title of ownership that
has been newly created and organized. In conclusion it appears: First, that the owners of urban
real estate can not obtain Torrens titles through possession for ten years, nor by a possessory
information recorded for that or a longer period of time. Second, that urban real estate, possessed
for more than fourteen years with knowledge and consent of the authorities of the town wherein
it is located, may be recovered by the Government on the ground that it is public land that had
not been alienated by it, for the reason that it is not agricultural, nor is it mineral or timber land.

It would be necessary to demonstrate that this building lot, which was recorded in the registry of
property with possessory information, and continuously and materially possessed as private
property since June, 1889, until the 11th of April, 1899, without opposition from the Spanish
Government, was public land transferred by the treaty of Paris to the public domain of the present
sovereignty, and that under said character of public land it is not agricultural land that may be
conveyed to private dominion according to section 13 of the Act of Congress, and section 54 of
Act No. 926.

It is true that at the time above referred to, June of 1889, the politico-militar governor of Surigao
had no authority to issue titles by composition. And as a matter of fact, at that time, the said
governor did not issue to Telesforo Ibañez de Aldecoa a title by composition. So that this is not
the question.

What he did was to adjudicate to Telesforo Ibañez de Aldecoa a building lot in the town of Surigao,
and to that effect he issued to him a title of ownership to the said lot. And this is a question anent
which absolutely no argument has been made in the whole proceedings.

It is argued that the said provincial governor had no authority to issue the title, and that the said
title is null on the unwarranted supposition, that it was a title of composition such as was provided
for by the royal decrees of 1880 and 1884, which is entirely incorrect.
What should have been proven was, either that the said lot, though a building or town site (not
rural property or arable land) could not be acquired otherwise than by composition, in accordance
with the aforesaid royal decrees of 1880 and 1884, or, that the politico-militar governor of a
province could not adjudicate the ownership of land situated within the town to a resident thereof
as such building lot or urban real estate, and still less as vacant Crown land, although within the
inhabited portion of the town, as it is desired to consider the same. And in this sense nothing has
been proven or sought to be proven in the whole case.

The question is merely one supposition. The Attorney-General has supposed that it was vacant
Crown land, and as such, agricultural land which was possessed without title by composition. The
court below has supposed it to be a building lot or urban property, not agricultural land, entirely
excluded from the benefits of Act No. 926 of the Commission. And in either form the said land or
building lot possessed as private property prior to the enactment of Act No. 926, can not be
recorded in the new registry of property.

Was it an illegal possession? Was the possession held from 1889 to the 11th of April, 1899,
usurped from the Spanish Government so that at the latter date, the land thus possessed should
be considered as part of the public property which Spain transferred to the United States by the
treaty of Paris?

According to Article VIII of said treaty, Spain cede all real property which under the law was of
public domain, and as such belonged to Spain. It was held that this cession could in no way affect
the ownership or rights which, in accordance with law, corresponded to the peaceful possessor of
property of every class, that is to say, the property of private individuals.

Ever since the year 1889, the land in question has been owned by a private individual, and was
not public property belonging to the Spanish Government. It was possessed as such, and in order
to deprive it of this status it was necessary that the Spanish Government or its assignee should
recover possession of the same by due process of law. And in order to recover it, it would be
necessary to prove that the said lot, which formed a part of the inhabited portion of Surigao,
belonged to the Spanish Government on the 11th of April, 1899. This has not been advanced by
the opposition; recovery of possession has not been sought, but the title adjudicated in 1889 is
repudiated on the ground that the provincial governor of Surigao had no authority to adjudicate it
to the said private individual.

But, from the enforcement of the Laws of the Indies, provincial governors were authorized to
organize towns and distribute land for building purposes. Law 1, title 12, book 4, of
the Recopilación of the Laws of the Indies, reads:

It is our will that there shall be distributed to all those who shall go out to people the new
territories, houses, building lots, lands peonias and caballerias in the towns and places
which may be assigned to them by the governor of the new settlement . . . . After selecting
the territory, province and locality where the new community is to be founded, and after
ascertaining the conveniences and resources that may exist thereon, the governor within
whose district the same is located shall announce whether it is to be a city, town or village.
. . . (Law 2, title 81 of the same book.)

First let there be set aside whatever land may be necessary for solares (building lots) for
the people, commons, and abundant pastures whereon the cattle owned by the residents
may graze, and as much again for the use of the natives; the rest of the territory shall be
 divided into four parts, one of them, which he may select, shall be for the person who
obliged to form the town, and the other three parts shall be distributed among settlers in
equal parts. (Law 7 of the same title and book.)2

Law 8 provides as to how temples shall be constructed:

"Somewhat distant from the plaza, where it will be separated from any other building not
necessary for its use or adornment." . . . . "Building lots being assigned near it but not in
continuation, for the erection of casas reales (government buildings) and booths in the plaza for
public use . . ." it seems that the lot in question in the case at bar is contiguous to the government
building or casa real of Surigao.

Law 14 of the same title 7, book 4, is a fundamental law which, as a complement to the foregoing
organic laws of towns, provides for the separation of the land constituting the inhabited portion of
the town from land properly called vacant (baldíos), of which so much is spoken in these land
registration cases. It reads as follows:

Sufficient land having been set aside for the town common, and to allow for the growth of
the town as already provided, let all persons authorized to discover and establish new
townships indicate pasture lands adjoining the common in order that work cattle, horses,
and cattle for slaughtering purposes, together with other cattle which by ordinance the
settlers are bound to have, may graze thereon, together with an additional amount, all of
which shall be the property of the council, and the balance shall be farm lands to be drawn
by lot; there shall be as many of the latter as there are building lots in the township; and if
there should be irrigated lands, they shall likewise be divided and distributed by lot in the
same proportion among the original settlers. All other lands are to remain vacant in order
that we may grant them to new settlers. From said lands the viceroys shall reserve such
as they may think advisable to assign to towns unprovided with any, to assist them to pay
the salaries of their mayors; they shall provide commons and sufficient pasture grounds,
as provided by law, and they shall act accordingly.

Building lots are not vacant lands, and the building lots used to be distributed and adjudicated by
the governor of the province or district to which the town belonged, after hearing
the gobernadorcillo and the notables of such town. As urban property, building lots forming part
of the inhabited portion of a town, passed beyond the sphere of the administrative laws to enter
that of the civil law. Thus, all questions arising in connection with them, after they had been ceded
or granted, could only be decided by the civil law, even though raised by the Government, through
action brought before the ordinary courts of justice, and not before the administration, nor the
contentious tribunals which the Government itself had established in its relations with persons
under its administration, as has already been held by this court in the case of Roura vs. The
Insular Government (8 Phil. Rep., 214).

Vacant lands were those which remained at the disposition of the King or the supreme
government at the capital of the nation after due assignment and distribution of what was needed
for the newly formed town; such vacant lands were adjudicated by sale or by composition, or in
the form of free grants to new settlers.

We can not affirm the reason given for denying the title of ownership applied for in this case, that
the subject of the petition was a building lot, which, not being agricultural land was not entitled to
the benefits of section 54 of the Act No. 926.
Paragraph 6 of section 54, which determines the persons who may obtain confirmation of their
rights, reads: "All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and the occupation of agricultural public
lands, as defined by said Act of Congress of July 1, 1902," and what are agricultural lands as
defined by the said Act of Congress has already been declared by this court (Mapa vs. The Insular
Government, 10 Phil. Rep., 175).

On this ground the confirmation and title applied for herein should be granted.

Mapa, J., concurs.

G.R. No. L-13298 November 19, 1918

CORNELIO RAMOS, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, objector-appellee.

Basilio Aromin for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

This is an appeal by the applicant and appellant from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija, denying the registration of the larger portion of parcel No. 1 (Exhibit A of the
petitioner), marked by the letters A, B, and C on the plan, Exhibit 1, of the Government.

One Restituto Romero y Ponce apparently gained possession of a considerable tract of land
located in the municipality of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija, in the year 1882. He took
advantage of the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, to obtain a possessory information title to
the land, registered as such on February 8, 1896. Parcel No. 1, included within the limits of the
possessory information title of Restituto Romero, was sold in February, 1907, to Cornelio Ramos,
the instant petitioner, and his wife Ambrosia Salamanca.

Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered. Opposition was entered by
the Director of Lands on the ground that Ramos had not acquired a good title from the Spanish
government and by the Director of Forestry on the ground that the first parcel was forest land.
The trial court agreed with the objectors and excluded parcel No. 1 from registration. So much for
the facts.

As to the law, the principal argument of the Solicitor-General is based on the provisions of the
Spanish Mortgage Law and of the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, commonly known as the
Maura Law. The Solicitor-General would emphasize that for land to come under the protective
ægis of the Maura Law, it must have been shown that the land was cultivated for six years
previously, and that it was not land which pertained to the "zonas forestales." As proof that the
land was, even as long ago as the years 1894 to 1896, forestal and not agricultural in nature is
the fact that there are yet found thereon trees from 50 to 80 years of age.
We do not stop to decide this contention, although it might be possible, following the doctrine laid
down by the United States Supreme Court with reference to Mexican and Spanish grantes within
the United States, where some recital is claimed to be false, to say that the possessory
information, apparently having taken cognizance of the requisites for title, should not now be
disturbed. (Hancock vs. McKinney [1851], 7 Tex., 192; Hornsby and Roland vs. United States
[1869], 10 Wall., 224.) It is sufficient, as will later appear, merely to notice that the predecessor in
interest to the petitioner at least held this tract of land under color of title.

Subsection 6 of section 54, of Act No. 926, entitled The Public Land Law, as amended by Act No.
1908, reads as follows:

6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors and interest have been in the
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
public lands, as defined by said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two,
under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a period of
ten years next preceding the twenty-sixth day of July, nineteen hundred and four, except
when prevented by war or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and to have received the
same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the provisions of this
chapter.

There are two parts to the above quoted subsection which must be discussed. The first relates to
the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of what, for present
purposes, can be conceded to be agricultural public land, under a bona fide claim of ownership.

Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature
as a party would naturally exercise over his own property. Relative to actuality of possession, it is
admitted that the petitioner has cultivated only about one fourth of the entire tract. This is
graphically portrayed by Exhibit 1 of the Government, following:
The question at once arises: Is that actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the
instrument giving color of title sufficient to give title to the entire tract of land?lawphil.net

The doctrine of constructive possession indicates the answer. The general rule is that the
possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract under claim of ownership of all is a constructive
possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another. (Barr vs. Gratz's
Heirs [1819], 4 Wheat., 213; Ellicott vs. Pearl [1836], 10 Pet., 412; Smith vs. Gale [1892], 144 U.
S., 509.) Of course, there are a number of qualifications to the rule, one particularly relating to the
size of the tract in controversy with reference to the portion actually in possession of the claimant.
It is here only necessary to apply the general rule.

The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith; and he has had open, peaceable, and
notorious possession of a portion of the property, sufficient to apprise the community and the
world that the land was for his enjoyment. (See arts. 446, 448, Civil Code.) Possession in the
eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground
before it can be said that he is in possession. Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the
requirements of the law on the supposition that he premises consisted of agricultural public land.

The second division of the law requires consideration of the term "agricultural public land." The
law affirms that the phrase is denied by the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1902, known as the
Philippine bill. Turning to the Philippine Bill, we find in sections 13 to 18 thereof that three classes
of land are mentioned. The first is variously denominated "public land" or "public domain," the
second "mineral land," and the third "timber land." Section 18 of the Act of Congress comes
nearest to a precise definition, when it makes the determination of whether the land is more
valuable for agricultural or for forest uses the test of its character.
Although these sections of the Philippine Bill have come before the courts on numerous
occasions, what was said in the case of Jones vs. Insular Government ([1906], 6 Phil., 122), is
still true, namely: "The meaning of these sections is not clear and it is difficult to give to them a
construction that will be entirely free from objection." In the case which gave most serious
consideration to the subject (Mapa vs. Insular Government [1908], 10 Phil., 175), it was found
that there does exist in the Act of Congress a definition of the phrase "agricultural public lands."
It was said that the phrase "agricultural public lands" as used in Act No. 926 means "those public
lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands."

The idea would appear to be to determine, by exclusion, if the land is forestal or mineral in nature
and, if not so found, to consider it to be agricultural land. Here, again, Philippine law is not very
helpful. For instance, section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917 provides: "For the purposes
of this chapter, 'public forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved
public land, including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character."
This definition of "public forest," it will be noted, is merely "for the purposes of this chapter." A little
further on, section 1827 provides: "Lands in public forests, not including forest reserves, upon the
certification of the Director of Forestry that said lands are better adapted and more valuable for
agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under
forest, shall be declared by the Department Head to be agricultural lands." With reference to the
last section, there is no certification of the Director of Forestry in the record, as to whether this
land is better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes.

The lexicographers define "forest" as "a large tract of land covered with a natural growth of trees
and underbrush; a large wood." The authorities say that he word "forest" has a significant, not an
insignificant meaning, and that it does not embrace land only partly woodland. It is a tract of land
covered with trees, usually of considerable extent. (Higgins vs. Long Island R. Co. [1908], 114 N.
Y. Supp., 262; People vs. Long Island R. Co. [1908], 110 N. Y. Supp., 512.)

The foresters say that no legal definition of "forest" is practicable or useful. B. H. Baden-Powell,
in his work on Forest Law of India, states as follows:

Every definition of a forest that can be framed for legal purposes will be found either to
exclude some cases to which the law ought to apply, or on the other hand, to include some
with which the law ought not to interfere. It may be necessary, for example, to take under
the law a tract of perfectly barren land which at present has neither trees, brushwood, nor
grass on it, but which in the course f time it is hoped will be "reboise;" but any definition
wide enough to take in all such lands, would also take in much that was not wanted. On
the other hand, the definition, if framed with reference to tree-growth, might (and indeed
would be almost sure to) include a garden, shrubbery, orchard, or vineyard, which it was
not designed to deal with.

B. E. Fernow, in his work on the Economics of Forestry, states as follows:

A forest in the sense in which we use the term, as an economic factor, is by no means a
mere collection of trees, but an organic whole in which all parts, although apparently
heterogeneous, jumbled together by accident as it were and apparently unrelated, bear a
close relation to each other and are as interdependent as any other beings and conditions
in nature.

The Director of Forestry of the Philippine Islands has said:

During the time of the passage of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, this question of
forest and agricultural lands was beginning to receive some attention and it is clearly
shown in section 18 of the above mentioned Act; it leaves to the Bureau of Forestry the
certification as to what lands are for agricultural or forest uses. Although the Act states
timber lands, the Bureau has in its administration since the passage of this act construed
this term to mean forest lands in the sense of what was necessary to protect, for the public
good; waste lands without a tree have been declared more suitable for forestry in many
instances in the past. The term 'timber' as used in England and in the United States in the
past has been applied to wood suitable for construction purposes but with the increase in
civilization and the application of new methods every plant producing wood has some
useful purpose and the term timber lands is generally though of as synonymous with forest
lands or lands producing wood, or able to produce wood, if agricultural crops on the same
land will not bring the financial return that timber will or if the same land is needed for
protection purposes.

xxx xxx xxx

The laws in the United States recognize the necessity of technical advice of duly appointed
boards and leave it in the hands of these boards to decide what lands are more valuable
for forestry purposes or for agricultural purposes.

In the Philippine Islands this policy is follows to as great an extent as allowable under the
law. In many cases, in the opinion of the Bureau of Forestry, lands without a single tree
on them are considered as true forest land. For instance, mountain sides which are too
steep for cultivation under ordinary practice and which, if cultivated, under ordinary
practice would destroy the big natural resource of the soil, by washing, is considered by
this bureau as forest land and in time would be reforested. Of course, examples exist in
the Mountain Province where steep hillsides have been terraced and intensive cultivation
practiced but even then the mountain people are very careful not to destroy forests or
other vegetative cover which they from experience have found protect their water supply.
Certain chiefs have lodged protests with the Government against other tribes on the
opposite side of the mountain cultivated by them, in order to prevent other tribes from
cutting timber or destroy cover guarding their source of water for irrigation.

Dr. M. S. Shaler, formerly Dean of the Lawrence Scientific School, remarked that if
mankind could not devise and enforce ways dealing with the earth, which will preserve
this source of like "we must look forward to the time, remote it may be, yet equally
discernible, when out kin having wasted its great inheritance will fade from the earth
because of the ruin it has accomplished."

The method employed by the bureau of Forestry in making inspection of lands, in order to
determine whether they are more adapted for agricultural or forest purposes by a technical
and duly trained personnel on the different phases of the conservation of natural
resources, is based upon a previously prepared set of questions in which the different
characters of the land under inspection are discussed, namely:

Slope of land: Level; moderate; steep; very steep.

Exposure: North; South; East; West.

Soil: Clay; sandy loam; sand; rocky; very rocky.

Character of soil cover: Cultivated, grass land, brush land, brush land and timber mixed,
dense forest.

If cultivated, state crops being grown and approximate number of hectares under
cultivation. (Indicate on sketch.)

For growth of what agricultural products is this land suitable?

State what portion of the tract is wooded, name of important timber species and estimate
of stand in cubic meters per hectare, diameter and percentage of each species.

If the land is covered with timber, state whether there is public land suitable for agriculture
in vicinity, which is not covered with timber.

Is this land more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes? (State reasons in full.)

Is this land included or adjoining any proposed or established forest reserve or communal
forest? Description and ownership of improvements.

If the land is claimed under private ownership, give the name of the claimant, his place of
residence, and state briefly (if necessary on a separate sheet) the grounds upon which he
bases his claim.

When the inspection is made on a parcel of public land which has been applied for, the
corresponding certificate is forwarded to the Director of Lands; if it is made on a privately
claimed parcel for which the issuance of a title is requested from the Court of Land
Registration, and the inspection shows the land to be more adapted for forest purposes,
then the Director of Forestry requests the Attorney-General to file an opposition, sending
him all data collected during the inspection and offering him the forest officer as a witness.

It should be kept in mind that the lack of personnel of this Bureau, the limited time
intervening between the notice for the trial on an expediente of land and the day of the
trial, and the difficulties in communications as well as the distance of the land in question
greatly hinder the handling of this work.

In the case of lands claimed as private property, the Director of Forestry, by means of his
delegate the examining officer, submits before the court all evidence referring to the
present forest condition of the land, so that the court may compare them with the alleged
right by the claimant. Undoubtedly, when the claimant presents a title issued by the proper
authority or evidence of his right to the land showing that he complied with the
requirements of the law, the forest certificate does not affect him in the least as such land
should not be considered as a part of the public domain; but when the alleged right is
merely that of possession, then the public or private character of the parcel is open to
discussion and this character should be established not simply on the alleged right of the
claimant but on the sylvical condition and soil characteristics of the land, and by
comparison between this area, or different previously occupied areas, and those areas
which still preserve their primitive character.
Either way we look at this question we encounter difficulty. Indubitably, there should be
conservation of the natural resources of the Philippines. The prodigality of the spendthrift who
squanders his substance for the pleasure of the fleeting moment must be restrained for the less
spectacular but surer policy which protects Nature's wealth for future generations. Such is the
wise stand of our Government as represented by the Director of Forestry who, with the Forester
for the Government of the United States, believes in "the control of nature's powers by man for
his own good." On the other hand, the presumption should be, in lieu of contrary proof, that land
is agricultural in nature. One very apparent reason is that it is for the good of the Philippine Islands
to have the large public domain come under private ownership. Such is the natural attitude of the
sagacious citizen.

If in this instance, we give judicial sanction to a private claim, let it be noted that the Government,
in the long run of cases, has its remedy. Forest reserves of public land can be established as
provided by law. When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the Government as to a particular
piece of property collide, if the Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a
forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to the court convincing proof that the land is not
more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes. Great consideration, it may be stated,
should, and undoubtedly will be, paid by the courts to the opinion of the technical expert who
speaks with authority on forestry matters. But a mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-
General for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts
from giving title to the claimant.

We hold that the petitioner and appellant has proved a title to the entire tract of land for which he
asked registration, under the provisions of subsection 6, of section 54, of Act No. 926, as amended
by Act No. 1908, with reference to the Philippine Bill and the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894,
and his possessory information.

Judgment is reversed and the lower court shall register in the name of the applicant the entire
tract in parcel No. 1, as described in plan Exhibit A, without special finding as to costs. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Street and Fisher, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-13756 January 30, 1919

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, ET AL., petitioners.

VICENTE JOCSON, ET AL., appellants,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, objector-appellee.

Mariano Locsin Rama and J. E. Blanco for appellants.

Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.

MOIR, J.:

In the cadastral land registration for the town of Hinigaran, Occidental Negros, the appellants
sought to register the three lots or parcels of land involved in this appeal, which registration was
opposed by the Director of Forestry.

The trial court found that lot 1104 was almost entirely "forestry" land, that a small portion of lot
1154 and all of lots 1158 were "forestry" lands, to which appellants had no title, and declared the
lots public lands, and refused registration of the parts of these lots to which opposition had been
filed by the Forestry Bureau. The claimants excepted and perfected their bill of exceptions and
brought the case to this court for review, setting up the following assignments of error:

1. The court erred in not holding to have been proven the facts that the lots 1104, 1154,
and 1158 of the cadastral survey of Hinigaran were possessed by Bibiano Jocson as
owner during his lifetime and from a time prior to the year 1880, and, after his death, by
his heirs, on which lots nipa plants were planted and now exists and that these latter are
not spontaneous plants utilized by said heirs.

2. The court erred in not holding to have been proven the a part of lot No. 1158 is rice and
pasture land that was possessed as owner by Bibiano Jocson during his lifetime and
peaceably long before 1880, a possession continued by his heirs who still enjoy the use
of the land up to the present time.

3. The court erred in not holding to have been proven that on that same lot 1158, there
has existed since the year 1890, and still exists, a fish hatchery which has been
possessed and enjoyed by the heirs of Bibiano Jocson, as owners, for more than 27 years,
not counting the prior possession of their predecessor in interest.

4. The court erred in holding that lot No. 1158 and part of lots 1104 and 1154 are forest
land, finding this fact as sufficiently proven by the sole and absurd testimony of the ranger
to the effect that nipa is a plant of spontaneous growth and in not planted; and , as the
photographs only refer to small portions of the area of the lot, the court also erred in
holding that the whole lot was covered with firewood trees, while in fact but a very small
portion of it is covered with trees which protect the nipa plants and the fish hatchery, it
having been proven that a large part of the lot was sown with rice and used as pasture
land.

5. The court erred in not holding that the parts of lots 1104, 1154 and 1158, covered by
mangrove swamps, are agricultural land, and in not holding to have been proven that
these swamp are not available, inasmuch as they are drained at low tide; errors committed
with manifest violation of law and disregard of the jurisprudence established by the
Honorable Supreme Court of the Philippine.

6. The court erred in not holding that the claimants and appellants, by their peaceable,
public, and continuous possession for more than forty years, as owners, including that
held by their predecessors in interests, had acquired by prescription lots 1104, 1154, and
1158, in conformity with act No. 190, section 41, which, without exception, is applicable to
the State as well as to private parties, and by extraordinary prescription of thirty years.

7. The court erred in not adjudicating said lots to the claimants and appellants, in
consideration of the possession they have had for more than forty years, form the time of
their predecessor in interest to the present time, thus violating the legal provision whereby
the holders of land who have been in its possession for ten years prior to the enactment
of the land law, Act No. 926, by the United States Philippine Commission, are to be
deemed the absolute owners of such land, and to be presumed to have applied for the
same and to have complied with the Spanish laws and all the proceedings required by the
Royal Decrees on the composition of titles; and, therefore, pursuant to said Act now in
force, the land in question should be adjudicated to the possessors thereof.
 8. The court erred in not granting the new trial requested by the appellants, the motion
therefor being based on the ground that his findings of facts, if there are any, are openly
and manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence.

It is not necessary to consider all these assignments of error, for the main question involved is
whether manglares [mangroves] are agricultural lands or timber lands. If they are timber lands the
claimants cannot acquire them by mere occupation for ten years prior to July 26, 1904; if not, they
can so acquire them under the Public Land Act, and no grant or title is necessary.

This being a cadastral case there are no findings of fact, but the trial court states that lot 1104
was in possession of claimants and their ancestors for more than thirty years and lot 1154 for
more than twenty-five years. Lot 1158 is declared to be wholly "forestal." The are of the lots does
not appear.

The evidence fully sustains the contention of the claimants that they have been in possession of
all of those lots quietly, adversely and continuously under a claim of ownership for more than thirty
years prior to the hearing in the trial court. There is not a word of proof in the whole record to the
contrary. They set up no documentary title. They do claim the parts of the lands denied registration
are "mangles" with nipa and various other kinds of aquatic bushes or trees growing on them, and
that in 1890 on lot 1158 they constructed a fishpond (vivero de peces) which was later abandoned
as unprofitable, and that part of this lot is pasture land, part palay and part "mangles."

The attorney-General contends in his brief that the parts of the lands denied registration are public
forest and cannot be acquired by occupation, and that all "manglares are public forests."

In the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1902, there is a classification of all public lands of the Philippine
Islands, and in mentioning forestry land the Act of Congress used the words "timber land." These
words are always translated in the Spanish translation of that Act as "terrenos forestales." We
think there is an error in this translation and that a better translation would be "terrenos
madereros." Timber land in English means land with trees growing on it. The manglar plant would
never be called a tree in English but a bush, and land which has only bushes, shrubs or aquatic
plants growing on it can not be called "timber land."

The photographs filed by the Government as exhibits in this case show that at two places there
were trees growing on this land, but the forester who testified for the Government always calls
these lots "mangles," and he says the trees which are growing on the lands are of no value except
for firewood. The fact that there are a few trees growing in a manglar or nipa swamp does not
change the general character of the land from manglar to timber land.

That manglares are not forestry lands within the meaning of the words "Timber lands" in the Act
of Congress has been definitely decided by this Court in the case of Montano vs. Insular
Government (12 Phil. Rep., 572). In that case the court said:

Although argued at different times, five of these cases have been presented substantially
together, all being covered by one brief of the late Attorney-General in behalf of the
Government in which, with many interesting historical and graphic citations he described
that part of the marginal seashore of the Philippine Islands known as manglares, with their
characteristic vegetation. In brief, it may be said that they are mud flats, alternately washed
and exposed by the tide, in which grow various kindered plants which will not live except
when watered by the sea, extending their roots deep into the mud and casting their seeds,
 which also germinate there. These constitute the mangrove flats of the tropics, which
exists naturally, but which are also, to some extent, cultivated by man for the sake of the
combustible wood of the mangrove, like trees, as well as for the useful nipa palm
propagated thereon. Although these flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are of the opinion
that they can not be so regarded in the sense in which the term is used in the cases cited
or in general American jurisprudence. The waters flowing over them are not available for
purpose of navigation, and they "may be disposed of without impairment of the public
interest in what remains."

The court on page 573 further said:

It is a kindred case to Cirilo Mapa vs. The Insular Government . . . (10 Phil. Rep., 175).

As some discussion has arisen as to the scope of that decision, it appears opportune to
reaffirm the principle there laid down. The issue was, whether lands used as a fishery, for
the growth of nipa, and as salt deposits, inland some desistance from the sea, and
asserted, thought not clearly proved, to be overflowed at high tide, could be registered as
private property on the strength of ten years' occupation, under paragraph 6 of section 54
of Act No. 926 of the Philippine Commission. The point decided was that such land within
the meaning of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, was agricultural, the reasoning leading
up to that conclusion being that Congress having divided all the public lands of the Islands
into three classes it must be included in tone of the three, and being clearly neither forest
nor mineral, it must of necessity fall into the division of agricultural land.

In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), this court said that the phrase
"agricultural lands" as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which
are not timber or mineral lands.

Whatever may have been the meaning of the term "forestry" under the Spanish law, the Act of
Congress of July 1st, 1902, classified the public lands in the Philippine Islands as timber, mineral
or agricultural lands, and all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily
agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary
farm lands.

The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the Administrative Code of 1917 cannot
affect rights which vested prior to its enactment.

These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands the trial court should have considered them
agricultural lands. If they are agricultural lands then the rights of appellants are fully established
by Act No. 926.

Paragraph 6 of section 54 of that Act provides as follows:

All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public
lands, as defined by said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under
a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a period of ten years
next preceding the taking effect of this Act, except when prevented by war of force
majuere, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to
 a government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title to such land under the provisions of this chapter.

xxx xxx xxx

This Act went into effect July 26th, 1904. Therefore, all persons who were in possession of
agricultural public lands under the conditions mentioned in the above section of Act No. 926 on
the 26th of July, 1894, are conclusively presumed to have a grant to such lands and are entitled
to have a certificate of title issued to them. (Pamintuan vs. Insular Government, 8 Phil., Rep.,
485.)

While we hold that manglares as well as nipa lands are subject to private acquisition and
ownership when it is fully proved that the possession has been actual, complete and adverse, we
deem it proper to declare that each case must stand on its own merits.

One cannot acquire ownership of a mangrove swamp by merely cutting a few loads of firewood
from the lands occasionally. The possession must be more complete than would be required for
other agricultural lands.

The appellants were in actual possession of the lots in question from 18821, and their ancestors
before that date, and they should have been declared the owners and title should have been
issued to them.

There is no need to consider the other points raised on appeal.

The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the case is returned to the lower court, with
instruction to enter a decree in conformity with this decision. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Street, Araullo and Avanceña, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-25010 October 27, 1926

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. PAULINO

ABELLA, ET AL., claimants;
MARIA DEL ROSARIO, petitioner-appellant.

Francisco, Lualhati and Lopez for appellant.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:

This is a petition for the registration of a certain parcel or tract of land located in the municipality
of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippine Islands. It appears from the record that on the
21st day of September, 1915, the appellant Maria del Rosario presented a petition in the Court of
First Instance for the registration under the Torrens system, of the very land now in question by
virtue of her appeal. In that case, after issue joined and after hearing the evidence, the Honorable
Vicente Nepomuceno, judge, denied the registration of all of the northern portion of the land
included in her petition represented by Exhibit 1, which was the plan presented in that action,
upon the ground that said portion was more valuable for timber purposes than for agricultural
purposes. From that judgment Maria del Rosario appealed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

The Supreme Court after a consideration of the evidence affirmed the decision of the lower court.
In the course of that decision the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Moir, said: "We
have examined the plans and all the evidence presented in this case and are of the opinion that
the trial court was correct in its declaration that this send a did not mean the old road to Boñgabon.
The fact that nearly all the northern property is forestry land is a further indication that the
applicant's possessory information title did not include the land running up to the road to
Bongabon, because all the papers which the applicant has regarding this property call the
land palayero." 1 chanrobles virtual law library

Judge Nepomuceno in his decision directed that the appellant herein present an amended plan
in that case, showing the particular part or parcel of the land in question which she was entitled
to have registered. We have no evidence before us showing that order of Judge Nepomuceno
was ever complied with.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Nothing further seems to have occurred with reference to the registration of the land included in
the former case until the 26th day of April, 1921, when the Acting Director of Lands presented the
petition in the present case for the registration, under the cadastral survey, of a portion of land
located in the municipality of San Jose, which included the very land claimed by Maria del Rosario
in the former action. She presented her opposition in the present action, claiming the very land
which she claimed in the former action. The only proof which she presented in support of her
claim in the present action was the proof which she had presented in the former action. No proof
was adduced in addition thereto, which in the slightest degree showed that she was entitled to
the registration of any other parcel of land than those which had been conceded to her in the first
action.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Upon the issue and the proof adduced in the present case the Honorable C. Carballo, Auxiliary
Judge of the Sixth Judicial District, ordered registered in the name of Maria del Rosario, under
the cadastral survey, lots 3238, 3240, 3242 and 3243, which are the very lots which had been
ordered registered in her name in the former action. From that judgment she appealed to this
court upon the ground that the lower court committed an error in not registering all of the land
included in her opposition in her name.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In this court she presented a motion for rehearing and in support thereof presents some proof to
show that the northern portion of the land in question is not forestry land but that much of it is
agricultural land. With reference to said motion for rehearing, it may be said that all of the proof
which is presented in support thereof existed at the time of the trial and might, with reasonable
diligence, have been presented. It cannot, therefore, be considered now. It is not newly
discovered evidence. And moreover if it should be accepted it would not be sufficient to justify the
granting of a new trial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

After a careful examination of the entire record and the evidence adduced during the trial of this
cause as well as that adduced during the trial of the first cause, we are fully persuaded that no
error has been committed. Whether particular land is more valuable for forestry purposes than for
agricultural purposes, or vice-versa, is a question of fact and must be established during the trial
of the cause. Whether the particular land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral is a question to be
settled in each particular case, unless the Bureau of Forestry has, under the authority conferred
upon it, prior to the intervention of private interest, set aside for forestry or mineral purposes the
particular land in question. (Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 40 Phil., 10.) During
the trial of the present cause the appellant made no effort to show that the land which she claimed,
outside of that which had been decreed in her favor, was more valuable for agricultural than
forestry purposes. For all of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with
costs. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Avanceña, C. J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-630 November 15, 1947

ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA, respondent and appellee.

Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha of petitioner-appellant.

First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Carreon for respondent-appellee.
Marcelino Lontok appeared as amicus curies.

MORAN, C.J.:

Alenxander A. Kriventor alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in
December of 1941, the registration of which was interrupted by the war. In May, 1945, he sought
to accomplish said registration but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground
that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case to
the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila by means of a consulta, and that court
rendered judgment sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds, from which Krivenko appealed
to this Court.

There is no dispute as to these facts. The real point in issue is whether or not an alien under our
Constitution may acquire residential land.

It is said that the decision of the case on the merits is unnecessary, there being a motion to
withdraw the appeal which should have been granted outright, and reference is made to the ruling
laid down by this Court in another case to the effect that a court should not pass upon a
constitutional question if its judgment may be made to rest upon other grounds. There is, we
believe, a confusion of ideas in this reasoning. It cannot be denied that the constitutional question
is unavoidable if we choose to decide this case upon the merits. Our judgment cannot to be made
to rest upon other grounds if we have to render any judgment at all. And we cannot avoid our
judgment simply because we have to avoid a constitutional question. We cannot, for instance,
grant the motion withdrawing the appeal only because we wish to evade the constitutional; issue.
Whether the motion should be, or should not be, granted, is a question involving different
considerations now to be stated.

According to Rule 52, section 4, of the Rules of Court, it is discretionary upon this Court to grant
a withdrawal of appeal after the briefs have been presented. At the time the motion for withdrawal
was filed in this case, not only had the briefs been prensented, but the case had already been
voted and the majority decision was being prepared. The motion for withdrawal stated no reason
whatsoever, and the Solicitor General was agreeable to it. While the motion was pending in this
Court, came the new circular of the Department of Justice, instructing all register of deeds to
accept for registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens. The herein respondent-appellee
was naturally one of the registers of deeds to obey the new circular, as against his own stand in
this case which had been maintained by the trial court and firmly defended in this Court by the
Solicitor General. If we grant the withdrawal, the the result would be that petitioner-appellant
Alexander A. Krivenko wins his case, not by a decision of this Court, but by the decision or circular
of the Department of Justice, issued while this case was pending before this Court. Whether or
not this is the reason why appellant seeks the withdrawal of his appeal and why the Solicitor
General readily agrees to that withdrawal, is now immaterial. What is material and indeed very
important, is whether or not we should allow interference with the regular and complete exercise
by this Court of its constitutional functions, and whether or not after having held long deliberations
and after having reached a clear and positive conviction as to what the constitutional mandate is,
we may still allow our conviction to be silenced, and the constitutional mandate to be ignored or
misconceived, with all the harmful consequences that might be brought upon the national
patromony. For it is but natural that the new circular be taken full advantage of by many, with the
circumstance that perhaps the constitutional question may never come up again before this court,
because both vendors and vendees will have no interest but to uphold the validity of their
transactions, and very unlikely will the register of deeds venture to disobey the orders of their
superior. Thus, the possibility for this court to voice its conviction in a future case may be remote,
with the result that our indifference of today might signify a permanent offense to the Constitution.

All thse circumstances were thoroughly considered and weighted by this Court for a number of
days and the legal result of the last vote was a denial of the motion withdrawing the appeal. We
are thus confronted, at this stage of the proceedings, with our duty, the constitutional question
becomes unavoidable. We shall then proceed to decide that question.

Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional is as follows:

Article XIII. — Conservation and utilization of natural resources.

SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other
natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations
or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inaguration of
the Government established uunder this Constitution. Natural resources, with the
exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no licence, concession, or
lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall
be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five
years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses
other than the development of water "power" in which cases beneficial use may be the
measure and the limit of the grant.

The scope of this constitutional provision, according to its heading and its language, embraces all
lands of any kind of the public domain, its purpose being to establish a permanent and
fundamental policy for the conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the Nation.
When, therefore, this provision, with reference to lands of the public domain, makes mention of
only agricultural, timber and mineral lands, it means that all lands of the public domain are
classified into said three groups, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. And this classification
finds corroboration in the circumstance that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, that
was the basic classification existing in the public laws and judicial decisions in the Philippines,
and the term "public agricultural lands" under said classification had then acquired a technical
meaning that was well-known to the members of the Constitutional Convention who were mostly
members of the legal profession.

As early as 1908, in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175, 182), this Court said
that the phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which
phrase is also to be found in several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926), means "those
public lands acquired from Spain which are neither mineral for timber lands." This definition has
been followed in long line of decisions of this Court. (See Montano vs. Insular Government, 12
Phil., 593; Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 13 Phil., 159; Ramos vs. Director of Lands,
39 Phil., 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560; Ankron vs. Government of the
Philippines, 40 Phil., 10.) And with respect to residential lands, it has been held that since they
are neither mineral nor timber lands, of necessity they must be classified as agricultural. In Ibañez
de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government (13 Phil., 159, 163), this Court said:

Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may be converted
into a field, and planted with all kinds of vegetation; for this reason, where land is not
mining or forestal in its nature, it must necessarily be included within the classification of
agricultural land, not because it is actually used for the purposes of agriculture, but
because it was originally agricultural and may again become so under other
circumstances; besides, the Act of Congress contains only three classification, and makes
no special provision with respect to building lots or urban lands that have ceased to be
agricultural land.

In other words, the Court ruled that in determining whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the test
is not only whether it is actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural
purposes. But whatever the test might be, the fact remains that at the time the Constitution was
adopted, lands of the public domain were classified in our laws and jurisprudence into agricultural,
mineral, and timber, and that the term "public agricultural lands" was construed as referring to
those lands that were not timber or mineral, and as including residential lands. It may safely be
presumed, therefore, that what the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when
they drafted the Constitution was this well-known classification and its technical meaning then
prevailing.

Certain expressions which appear in Constitutions, . . . are obviously technical; and where
such words have been in use prior to the adoption of a Constitution, it is presumed that its
framers and the people who ratified it have used such expressions in accordance with
their technical meaning. (11 Am. Jur., sec. 66, p. 683.) Also Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dall. [U.S.],
386; 1 Law. ed., 648; Bronson vs. Syverson, 88 Wash., 264; 152 P., 1039.)

It is a fundamental rule that, in construing constitutions, terms employed therein shall be

given the meaning which had been put upon them, and which they possessed, at the time
of the framing and adoption of the instrument. If a word has acquired a fixed, technical
meaning in legal and constitutional history, it will be presumed to have been employed in
that sense in a written Constitution. (McKinney vs. Barker, 180 Ky., 526; 203 S.W., 303;
L.R.A., 1918 E, 581.)

Where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed
to have a certain meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain
meaning prior to a particular statute in which they are used, the rule of construction
 requires that the words used in such statute should be construed according to the sense
in which they have been so previously used, although the sense may vary from strict literal
meaning of the words. (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.)

Therefore, the phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing in section 1 of Article XIII of the
Constitution must be construed as including residential lands, and this is in conformity with a
legislative interpretation given after the adoption of the Constitution. Well known is the rule that
"where the Legislature has revised a statute after a Constitution has been adopted, such a
revision is to be regarded as a legislative construction that the statute so revised conforms to the
Constitution." (59 C.J., 1102.) Soon after the Constitution was adopted, the National Assembly
revised the Public Land Law and passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, and sections 58, 59 and
60 thereof permit the sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens or to associations or corporations
controlled by such citizens, which is equivalent to a solemn declaration that residential lots are
considered as agricultural lands, for, under the Constitution, only agricultural lands may be
alienated.

It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141, "alienable or disposable public
lands" which are the same "public agriculture lands" under the Constitution, are classified into
agricultural, residential, commercial, industrial and for other puposes. This simply means that the
term "public agricultural lands" has both a broad and a particular meaning. Under its broad or
general meaning, as used in the Constitution, it embraces all lands that are neither timber nor
mineral. This broad meaning is particularized in section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which
classifies "public agricultural lands" for purposes of alienation or disposition, into lands that are
stricly agricultural or actually devoted to cultivation for agricultural puposes; lands that are
residential; commercial; industrial; or lands for other purposes. The fact that these lands are made
alienable or disposable under Commonwealth Act No. 141, in favor of Filipino citizens, is a
conclusive indication of their character as public agricultural lands under said statute and under
the Constitution.

It must be observed, in this connection that prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of Public
Land Act No. 2874, aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial or residential
puposes, but after the Constitution and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right
of aliens to acquire such kind of lands is completely stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuance of the
constitutional limitation. And, again, prior to the Constitution, under section 57 of Public Land Act
No. 2874, land of the public domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes could be sold or
leased to aliens, but after the Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
such land may only be leased, but not sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall only be valid
while the land is used for the purposes referred to. The exclusion of sale in the new Act is
undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation, and this again is another legislative
construction that the term "public agricultural land" includes land for residence purposes.

Such legislative interpretation is also in harmony with the interpretation given by the Executive
Department of the Government. Way back in 1939, Secretary of Justice Jose Abad Santos, in
answer to a query as to "whether or not the phrase 'public agricultural lands' in section 1 of Article
XII (now XIII) of the Constitution may be interpreted to include residential, commercial, and
industrial lands for purposes of their disposition," rendered the following short, sharp and crystal-
clear opinion:

Section 1, Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution classifies lands of the public domain in
the Philippines into agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic classification adopted
 since the enactment of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill.
At the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines, the term 'agricultural
public lands' and, therefore, acquired a technical meaning in our public laws. The Supreme
Court of the Philippines in the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175,
held that the phrase 'agricultural public lands' means those public lands acquired from
Spain which are neither timber nor mineral lands. This definition has been followed by our
Supreme Court in many subsequent case. . . .

Residential commercial, or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have to
be included in one or more of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral,
of necessity, therefore, they must be classified as agricultural.

Viewed from another angle, it has been held that in determining whether lands are
agricultural or not, the character of the land is the test (Odell vs. Durant, 62 N.W., 524;
Lorch vs. Missoula Brick and Tile Co., 123 p.25). In other words, it is the susceptibility of
the land to cultivation for agricultural purposes by ordinary farming methods which
determines whether it is agricultural or not (State vs. Stewart, 190 p. 129).

Furthermore, as said by the Director of Lands, no reason is seen why a piece of land,
which may be sold to a person if he is to devote it to agricultural, cannot be sold to him if
he intends to use it as a site for his home.

This opinion is important not alone because it comes from a Secratary of Justice who later became
the Chief Justice of this Court, but also because it was rendered by a member of the cabinet of
the late President Quezon who actively participated in the drafting of the constitutional provision
under consideration. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 598.) And the opinion
of the Quezon administration was reiterated by the Secretary of Justice under the Osmeña
administration, and it was firmly maintained in this Court by the Solicitor General of both
administrations.

It is thus clear that the three great departments of the Government — judicial, legislative and
executive — have always maintained that lands of the public domain are classified into
agricultural, mineral and timber, and that agricultural lands include residential lots.

Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be aliented," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their
alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural
resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens
themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this
result that section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows:

Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be

transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.

This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural
resources may leak into aliens' hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public
agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private
agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 is
intended to insure the policy of nationalization contained in section 1. Both sections must,
therefore, be read together for they have the same purpose and the same subject matter. It must
be noticed that the persons against whom the prohibition is directed in section 5 are the very
same persons who under section 1 are disqualified "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain
in the Philippines." And the subject matter of both sections is the same, namely, the non-
transferability of "agricultural land" to aliens. Since "agricultural land" under section 1 includes
residential lots, the same technical meaning should be attached to "agricultural land under section
5. It is a rule of statutory construction that "a word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the
same meaning throughout the statute, unless a different intention appears." (II Sutherland,
Statutory Construction, p. 758.) The only difference between "agricultural land" under section 5,
is that the former is public and the latter private. But such difference refers to ownership and not
to the class of land. The lands are the same in both sections, and, for the conservation of the
national patrimony, what is important is the nature or class of the property regardless of whether
it is owned by the State or by its citizens.

Reference is made to an opinion rendered on September 19, 1941, by the Hon. Teofilo Sison,
then Secretary of Justice, to the effect that residential lands of the public domain may be
considered as agricultural lands, whereas residential lands of private ownership cannot be so
considered. No reason whatsoever is given in the opinion for such a distinction, and no valid
reason can be adduced for such a discriminatory view, particularly having in mind that the purpose
of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony, and private residential
lands are as much an integral part of the national patrimony as the residential lands of the public
domain. Specially is this so where, as indicated above, the prohibition as to the alienable of public
residential lots would become superflous if the same prohibition is not equally applied to private
residential lots. Indeed, the prohibition as to private residential lands will eventually become more
important, for time will come when, in view of the constant disposition of public lands in favor of
private individuals, almost all, if not all, the residential lands of the public domain shall have
become private residential lands.

It is maintained that in the first draft of section 5, the words "no land of private ownership" were
used and later changed into "no agricultural land of private ownership," and lastly into "no private
agricultural land" and from these changes it is argued that the word "agricultural" introduced in
the second and final drafts was intended to limit the meaning of the word "land" to land actually
used for agricultural purposes. The implication is not accurate. The wording of the first draft was
amended for no other purpose than to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties. The words "no
land" of the first draft, unqualified by the word "agricultural," may be mistaken to include timber
and mineral lands, and since under section 1, this kind of lands can never be private, the
prohibition to transfer the same would be superfluous. Upon the other hand, section 5 had to be
drafted in harmony with section 1 to which it is supplementary, as above indicated. Inasmuch as
under section 1, timber and mineral lands can never be private, and the only lands that may
become private are agricultural lands, the words "no land of private ownership" of the first draft
can have no other meaning than "private agricultural land." And thus the change in the final draft
is merely one of words in order to make its subject matter more specific with a view to avoiding
the possible confusion of ideas that could have arisen from the first draft.

If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands
not strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only
residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities,"
and that "they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes,
factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets,
golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in
appellant's words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor General's Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to
the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.

One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution and
which was embodied in the report of the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands
and other Natural Resources of the Constitutional Convention, is "that lands, minerals, forests,
and other natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation. They should,
therefore, be preserved for those under the sovereign authority of that nation and for their
posterity." (2 Aruego, Framing of the Filipino Constitution, p. 595.) Delegate Ledesma, Chairman
of the Committee on Agricultural Development of the Constitutional Convention, in a speech
delivered in connection with the national policy on agricultural lands, said: "The exclusion of aliens
from the privilege of acquiring public agricultural lands and of owning real estate is a necessary
part of the Public Land Laws of the Philippines to keep pace with the idea of preserving the
Philippines for the Filipinos." (Emphasis ours.) And, of the same tenor was the speech of Delegate
Montilla who said: "With the complete nationalization of our lands and natural resources it is to be
understood that our God-given birthright should be one hundred per cent in Filipino hands . . ..
Lands and natural resources are immovables and as such can be compared to the vital organs
of a person's body, the lack of possession of which may cause instant death or the shortening of
life. If we do not completely antionalize these two of our most important belongings, I am afraid
that the time will come when we shall be sorry for the time we were born. Our independence will
be just a mockery, for what kind of independence are we going to have if a part of our country is
not in our hands but in those of foreigners?" (Emphasis ours.) Professor Aruego says that since
the opening days of the Constitutional Convention one of its fixed and dominating objectives was
the conservation and nationalization of the natural resources of the country. (2 Aruego, Framing
of the Philippine Constitution, p 592.) This is ratified by the members of the Constitutional
Convention who are now members of this Court, namely, Mr. Justice Perfecto, Mr. Justice
Briones, and Mr. Justice Hontiveros. And, indeed, if under Article XIV, section 8, of the
Constitution, an alien may not even operate a small jitney for hire, it is certainly not hard to
understand that neither is he allowed to own a pieace of land.

This constitutional intent is made more patent and is strongly implemented by an act of the
National Assembly passed soon after the Constitution was approved. We are referring again to
Commonwealth Act No. 141. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874
sections 120 and 121 which granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way of reciprocity.
Said section reads as follows:

SEC. 120. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor
any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred,
except to persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of
the public domain under this Act; to corporations organized in the Philippine Islands
authorized therefor by their charters, and, upon express authorization by the Philippine
Legislature, to citizens of countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine
Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land, or
permanent improvements thereon, or any interest therein, as to their own citizens, only in
the manner and to the extent specified in such laws, and while the same are in force but
not thereafter.

SEC. 121. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the former
Public Land Act or of any other Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other
provision of law formerly in force in the Philippine Islands with regard to public
 lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually
or presumptively of the public domain or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any
permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed,
except to persons, corporations, or associations who may acquire land of the public
domain under this Act; to corporate bodies organized in the Philippine Islands whose
charters may authorize them to do so, and, upon express authorization by the Philippine
Legislature, to citizens of the countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine
Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land or
pemanent improvements thereon or any interest therein, as to their own citizens, and only
in the manner and to the extent specified in such laws, and while the same are in force,
but not thereafter: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the
conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and
legalized by competent courts, nor to lands and improvements acquired or held for
industrial or residence purposes, while used for such purposes: Provided, further, That in
the event of the ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this section and
in the last preceding section being transferred by judicial decree to persons,corporations
or associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of this
Act, such persons, corporations, or associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or
improvements to others so capacitated within the precise period of five years, under the
penalty of such property reverting to the Government in the contrary case." (Public Land
Act, No. 2874.)

It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in these section refers to all private lands,
whether strictly agricultural, residential or otherwise, there being practically no private land which
had not been acquired by any of the means provided in said two sections. Therefore, the
prohibition contained in these two provisions was, in effect, that no private land could be
transferred to aliens except "upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens
of Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate
land." In other words, aliens were granted the right to acquire private land merely by way of
reciprocity. Then came the Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 141 was passed, sections
122 and 123 of which read as follows:

SEC. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor
any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred,
except to persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of
the public domain under this Act or to corporations organized in the Philippines authorized
thereof by their charters.

SEC. 123. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous
Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in
the Philippines with regard to public lands terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any
other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain, or by royal
grant or in any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be
encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations or associations who
may acquire land of the public domain under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in
the Philippines whose charters authorize them to do so: Provided, however, That this
prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary
succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent courts: Provided, further, That
in the event of the ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this section
and in the last preceding section being transferred by judicial decree to persons,
 corporations or associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same under the
provisions of this Act, such persons, corporations, or associations shall be obliged to
alienate said lands or improvements to others so capacitated within the precise period of
five years; otherwise, such property shall revert to the Government.

These two sections are almost literally the same as sections 120 and 121 of Act No. 2874, the
only difference being that in the new provisions, the right to reciprocity granted to aliens is
completely stricken out. This, undoubtedly, is to conform to the absolute policy contained in
section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which, in prohibiting the alienation of private agricultural
lands to aliens, grants them no right of reciprocity. This legislative construction carries exceptional
weight, for prominent members of the National Assembly who approved the new Act had been
members of the Constitutional Convention.

It is said that the lot question does not come within the purview of sections 122 and 123 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, there being no proof that the same had been acquired by one of the
means provided in said provisions. We are not, however, diciding the instant case under the
provisions of the Public Land Act, which have to refer to land that had been formerly of the public
domain, otherwise their constitutionality may be doubtful. We are deciding the instant case under
section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which is more comprehensive and more absolute in the
sense that it prohibits the transfer to alien of any private agricultural land including residential land
whatever its origin might have been.

And, finally, on June 14, 1947, the Congress approved Republic Act No. 133 which allows
mortgage of "private real property" of any kind in favor of aliens but with a qualification consisting
of expressly prohibiting aliens to bid or take part in any sale of such real property as a
consequence of the mortgage. This prohibition makes no distinction between private lands that
are strictly agricultural and private lands that are residental or commercial. The prohibition
embraces the sale of private lands of any kind in favor of aliens, which is again a clear
implementation and a legislative interpretation of the constitutional prohibition. Had the Congress
been of opinion that private residential lands may be sold to aliens under the Constitution, no
legislative measure would have been found necessary to authorize mortgage which would have
been deemed also permissible under the Constitution. But clearly it was the opinion of the
Congress that such sale is forbidden by the Constitution and it was such opinion that prompted
the legislative measure intended to clarify that mortgage is not within the constitutional prohibition.

It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are construing
the Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our construction
is to preclude aliens, admitted freely into the Philippines from owning sites where they may build
their homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we will not attempt to
compromise it even in the name of amity or equity. We are satisfied, however, that aliens are not
completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential purposes. Since their
residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease
contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and
share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire.

For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public
agricultural lands, including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without
costs.

Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, and Briones, JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. L-31666, L-31667 and L-31668 April 30, 1979

LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
MANUEL DUMYUNG, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BAGUIO CITY, and the COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF BAGUIO CITY (BRANCH I), respondents.

LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
FORTUNATO DUMYUNG, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BAGUIO CITY , and the COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BAGUIO CITY (BRANCH I), respondents.

LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
DUMYUNG BONAYAN, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BAGUIO CITY, and the COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF BAGUIO CITY (BRANCH I), respondents.

Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo & Feliciano, Jesus B. Santos and Hill & Associates for petitioner.

Floro B. Bugnosen for private respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.:

This is a petition to review the order of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, Branch I,
dismissing the three complaints for annulment of titles in Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070
entitled "Republic of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus, Manuel Dumyung, et al., Defendants,
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, Intervenor" for being without merit. 1

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, commenced in the Court
of First Instance of Baguio City Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070 for annulment of Free
Patents Nos. V-152242, V-155050 and V-152243, and of the corresponding Original Certificates
of Title Nos. P-208, P-210 and P-209, on the ground of misrepresentation and false data and
informations furnished by the defendants, Manuel Dumyung, Fortunate Dumyung and Dumyung
Bonayan, respectively. the land embraced in the patents and titles are Identified as Lots 1, 2 and
3 of survey plan Psu-181763 containing a total area of 58.4169 hectares, more or less, and
situated in the Municipal District of Mankayan, Sub-province of Benguet, Mountain Province. The
Register of Deeds of Baguio City was made a formal party defendant.

The complaints in Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070 are all dated September 22, 196 l. 2

The defendants filed their respective answers. 3

The Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, petitioner herein, filed motions for intervention dated
February 5, 1962 in the three (3) civil cases 4 which were granted. 5
The complaints in intervention alleged that a portion of the titled lands in question-.ion is within
the intervenor's ordinary timber license No. 140-'62 dated July 7, 1961 expiring and up for renewal
on June 30, 1962 and another portion of said lands is embraced in its mineral claims. 6

The defendants in the three (3) civil cases filed an amended joint answer with counterclaim to the
complaint in intervention. 7 The said amended joint answer was admitted in an order dated
September 10, 1972. 8

Before the hearing on the merits of the three (3) civil cases, the plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines
represented by the Director of Lands, filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio City three (3)
criminal cases for falsification of public document. 9, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 2358, 2359
and 2360, against the defendants Manuel Dumyung, Fortunato Dumyung and Dumyung
Bonayan, private respondents herein, for allegedly making untrue statements in their applications
for free patents over the lands in question. The proceedings on the three (3) civil cases were
suspended pending the outcome of the criminal cases.

After the presentation of evidence by the prosecution in the three (3) criminal cases, the defense
filed a motion to dismiss the same on the ground that the accused had complied with all the legal
requirements in the acquisition of their patents which were duly issued by the Director of Lands
and that they are not guilty of the alleged falsification of public documents.

In an order dated December 6, 1967, the trial court sustained the theory of the defense and
dismissed the three (3) criminal cases, with costs de officio, for insufficiency of evidence to sustain
the conviction of the three (3) accused. 9

Thereupon, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss dated October 12, 1968 in Civil Cases Nos.
1068, 1069 and 1070 on the following grounds: (1) extinction of the penal action carries with it the
extinction of the civil action when the extinction proceeds from a declaration that the fact from
which the civil might arise did not exist; (2) the decision of the trial court acquitting the defendants
of the crime charged renders these civil cases moot and academic, (3) the trial court has no
jurisdiction to order cancellation of the patents issued by the Director of Lands; (4) the certificates
of title in question can no longer be assailed; and (5) the intervenor Lepanto has no legal interest
in the subject matter in litigation. 10

The Court of First Instance of Baguio, Branch I, dismissed the three (3) civil cases because:

After a careful examination and deliberation of the MOTION TO DISMISS, these

civil cases filed by the defendants as well as the two OPPOSITIONS TO MOTION
TO DISMISS filed by both plaintiff and intervenor Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company and the of all the three civil cases, it clearly shows that upon the issuance
of said Free Patents on November 26, 1960, the same were duly registered with
the office of the Register of Deeds of Baguio and Benguet, pursuant to the
provisions of Sec. 122 of Act 496, as amended, and consequently, these properties
became the private properties of the defendants, under the operation of Sec. 38 of
said Act; hence, these titles enjoy the same privileges and safeguards as Torrens
titles (Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carle, G. R. No. L-12485, July 31,
1964). It is therefore clear that OCT Nos. P-208, P-209 and P-210 belonging to the
defendants are now indefeasible and this Court has no power to disturb such
indefeasibility of said titles, let alone cancel the same.
 The records of this case further disclose that the defendants are ignorant natives
of Benguet Province and are members of the so-called Cultural Minorities of
Mountain Province, who are the same persons accused in the dismissed criminal
cases, based on the same grounds. It should be noted that these cases fall
squarely under Sec. 3 of Rule III of the New Rules of Court. 11

They plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands, and the intervenor,
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company,, filed separate motions for reconsideration of the order
dismissing Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070. 12 Both motion for reconsideration were denied
by the trial court. 13 Thereupon the intervenor, Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, filed the
instant petition.

The petitioner assigns the following errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ORIGINAL

CERTIFICATE OF TITLE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE 'INDEFEASIBLE'
SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY WERE ISSUED PURSUANT TO THE REGISTRATION
OF THE FREE PATENTS OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE

RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO THE BENEFITS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
3872.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACQUITTAL OF THE

PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE CRIMINAL CASES FOR FALSIFICATION OF
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS BARRED THE CIVIL ACTIONS FOR ANNULMENT OF
THE FREE PATENTS AND CANCELLATION OF THE ORIGINAL
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS. 14

Timber and mineral lands are not alienable or disposable. The pertinent provisions of the Public
Land Act, Commonwealth Act No. 141, provide:

Sec. 2. The provisions of this Act shall apply to the lands of the public domain; but
timber and mineral lands shag be governed by special laws and nothing in this Act
provided shall be understood or construed to change or modify the administration
and disposition of the lands commonly called 'friar lands' and those which being
privately owned, have reverted to or become the property of the Commonwealth
of the Philippines, which administration and disposition shall be governed by the
laws at present in force or which may hereafter be enacted.

Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture

and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into
—
 (a) Alienable or disposable,

(b) Timber, and

(c) Mineral lands,

and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to
another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition.

The principal factual issue raised by the plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines represented by the
Director of Lands, and the intervenor, petitioner herein, is that the lands covered by the patents
and certificates of title are timber lands and mineral lands and, therefore, not alienable. Without
receiving evidence, the trial court dismissed the three (3) cases on the ground that upon the
issuance of the free patents on November 26, 1960, said patents were duly registered in the
Office of the Registry of Deeds of Baguio pursuant to Section 122 of Act 496, as amended, and
said properties became the private properties of the defendants under the operation of Section
38 of the Land Registration Act. The trial court concluded that these titles enjoy the same
privileges and safeguards as the torrens title, and Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-208, P-209
and P-210 of the defendants are now indefeasible.

In its order denying the motion for reconsideration the trial court said,

On the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Director of Lands to dispose
of the properties since they are within the forest zone, the court finds Republic Act
No. 3872, to clear this point. Section 1, amending Section 44 of the Land Act in its
second paragraph states:

A member of the national cultural, minorities who has continuously

occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his
predecessors-in- interest, a tract or tracts of land, whether
disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right
granted in the preceding paragraph of this section: PROVIDED, that
at the time he files his free patent application, he is not the owner
of any real property secured or disposable under this provision of
the Public Land Law.

The 'preceding paragraph' refers to the right of a person to have a free patent
issued to him, provided he is qualified, which in this case the Director of Lands has
the jurisdiction to dispose, whether the land be disposable or not. This provision of
law, certainly, applies to herein defendants. The reason for this law is explicit and
could very well be seen from its EXPLANATORY NOTE, which reads:

'Because of the aggresiveness of our more enterprising Christian

brothers in Mindanao, Mountain Province, and other places
inhabited by members of the National Cultural Minorities, there has
be-en an exodus of the poor and less fortunate non-christians from
their ancestral homes during the t ten years to the fastnesses of the
wilderness where they have settled in peace on portions of
agricultural lands, unfortunately, in most cases, within the forest
zones. But this is not the end of the tragedy of the national cultural
 minorities. Because of the grant of pasture leases or permits to the
more agressive Christians, these National Cultural Minorities who
have settled in the forest zones for the last ten years have been
harassed and jailed or threatened with harassment and
imprisonment.

The thesis behind the additional paragraph to Section 44 of the

Public Land Act is to give the national culture, minorities a fair
chance to acquire lands of the public domain' ...

It is for this reason — that is, to give these national cultural minorities who were
driven from their ancestral abodes, a fair chance to acquire lands of the public
domain — that Republic Act 3872 was passed. This is the new government policy
on liberation of the free patent provisions of the Public Land Act emphasizing more
consideration to and sympathy on the members of the national cultural minorities,
which our courts of justice must uphold. 15

The trial court assumed without any factual basis that the private respondents are entitled to the
benefits of Republic Act 3872. The pertinent provision of Republic Act No, 3872 reads:

SECTION 1. A new paragraph is hereby added 1--o Section 44 of Commonwealth

Act Numbered One Hundred-d forty-one, to read as follows:

SEC. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more
than twenty-four hectares and who since July fourth, ninth hundred and twenty-six
or prior thereto, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by, himself' or
through his predecessors-in-interest. a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands
subject to disposition- or who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon while the
same has, not been occupied by any person shall be entitled, under the provision
of this chapter, to have a free patent issued to him for such tract or tracts of such
land not to exceed twenty-four hectares.

A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied and
cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in- interest, a tract or
tracts of land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the
right granted in the preceding paragraph of this section: Provided, That at the time
he files his free patent application he is not the owner of any real property secured
or disposable under this provision of the Public Land Law.

There is no evidence that the private respondents are members of the National Cultural Minorities;
that they have continously occupied and cultivated either by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest the lands in question since July 4, 1955; and that they are not the owner
of any land secured or disposable under the Public Land Act at the time they filed the free patent
applications. These qualifications must be established by evidence. Precisely, the intervenor,
petitioner herein, claims that it was in possession of the lands in question when the private
respondents applied for free patents thereon.

It was premature for the trial court to rule on whether or not the titles based on the patents awarded
to the private respondents have become indefeasible. It is well settled that a certificate of title is
void when it covers property of public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. Any
title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall
be cancelled. 16 In Director of lands vs. Abanzado 17 this Court said:

4. To complete the picture, reference may be made to the learned and scholarly
opinion of Justice Sanchez in Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, a 1968 decision. After
a review of Spanish legislation, he summarized the present state of the law thus:
'If a Spanish title covering forest land is found to be invalid, that land is public forest
land, is part of the public domain, and cannot be appropriated. Before private
interests have intervened, the government may decide for i what Portions of the
public domain shall be set aside and reserved as forest land. Possession of forest
lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.' Nor is this all He
reiterated the basic state objective on the matter in clear and penetrating language:
'The view this Court takes of the cages at bar is but in adherence to public policy
that should be followed with respect to forest lands. many have written much, and
many more have spoken, and quite often, above the pressing need for forest
preservation, conservation. protection, development and reforestation. Not without
justification For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's natural
resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green
cover on our lands produces a number Of adverse or ill effects of serious
proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they
supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappears. Denuded areas become
dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the
rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion
come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property — crops,
livestock, houses and highways — not to mention precious human lives, ...'

The acquittal of the private respondents in the criminal cases for falsification is not a bar to the
civil cases to cancel their titles. The only issue in the criminal cases for falsification was whether
there was evidence beyond reasonable doubt that the private respondents had committed the
acts of falsification alleged in the informations. The factual issues of whether or not the lands in
question are timber or mineral lands and whether or not the private respondents are entitled to
the benefits of Republic Act No. 3872 were not in issue in the criminal case.

There is need to remand these cases to the trial court for the reception of evidence on (1) whether
or not the lands in question are timber and mineral lands; and (2) whether the private respondents
belong to the cultural minorities and are qualified under Republic Act 3872 to be issued free
patents on said lands.

WHEREFORE, the order dismissing Civil Cases Nos. 1968, 1969 and 1970 of the Court of First
Instance of Baguio City is hereby set aside and said cases are remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. L-27873. November 29, 1983.]

HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI, Petitioners, v. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, Respondent.

[G.R. No. L-30035. November 29, 1983.]

ROQUE BORRE and ENCARNACION DELFIN, Petitioners, v. ANGEL ALPASAN, HEIRS OF
MELQUIADES BORRE, EMETERIO BEREBER and HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI and THE
CAPIZ COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT; FOREST LAND; CLASSIFICATION NOT LOST EVEN IF IT
HAS BEEN STRIPPED OF FOREST COVER; UNLESS RELEASED IN AN OFFICIAL
PROCLAMATION AS DISPOSABLE LANDS, RULES ON CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT
TITLE DO NOT APPLY. — A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not
lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.
Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops
by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of
the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other tress growing
in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of
its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect
so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

2. ID.; ID.; FOREST LANDS; ACQUISITIVE OWNERSHIP NOT ACQUIRED. — This Court ruled
in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muñoz (23 SCRA 1184) that possession of forest
lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. And in Republic v. Animas (56
SCRA 499), we granted the petition on the ground that the ares covered by the patent and title
was not disposable public land, it being a part of the forest zone and any patent and title to said
area is void ab initio. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to
declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes.

3. ID.; ID.; CONFIRMATION, OF IMPERFECT TITLE CASES; BURDEN OF PROVING THAT

THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW HAVE BEEN MET, RESTS ON THE APPLICANT. — In
confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he meets
the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No.
1942. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public
domain but that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name because
of an imperfect title such as those derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had continuous,
open, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of
his application.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The two petitions for review on certiorari before us question the decision of the Court of Appeals
which declared the disputed property as forest land, not subject to titling in favor of private
persons.

These two petitions have their genesis in an application for confirmation of imperfect title and its
registration filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The parcel of land sought to be
registered is known as Lot No. 885 of the Cadastral Survey of Pilar, Capiz, and has an area of
645,703 square meters.cralawnad

Roque Borre, petitioner in G.R. No, L-30035, and Melquiades Borre, filed the application for
registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui, petitioners in G.R. No. L-27873 filed an
opposition to the application of Roque and Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they prayed that
the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre containing 527,747 square meters be
confirmed and registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui.

The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an opposition to the
application for registration of title claiming that the land was mangrove swamp which was still
classified as forest land and part of the public domain.

Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885
containing 117,956 square meters was concerned and prayed that title to said portion be
confirmed and registered in his name.

During the progress of the trial, applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold whatever rights and
interests he may have on Lot No. 885 to Angel Alpasan. The latter also filed an opposition,
claiming that he is entitled to have said lot registered in his name.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117,956 square meters to Emeterio
Bereber and the rest of the land containing 527,747 square meters was adjudicated in the
proportion of 5/6 share to Angel Alpasan and 1/6 share to Melquiades Borre.

Only the Heirs of Jose Amunategui and the Director of Forestry filed their respective appeals with
the Court of Appeals, The case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 34190-R.

In its decision, the Court of Appeals held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . the conclusion so far must have to be that as to the private litigants that have been shown to
have a better right over Lot 885 are, as to the northeastern portion of a little less than 117,956
square meters, it was Emeterio Bereber and as to the rest of 527,747 square meters, it was the
heirs of Jose Amunategui; but the last question that must have to be considered is whether after
all, the title that these two (2) private litigants have shown did not amount to a registerable one in
view of the opposition and evidence of the Director of Forestry; . . .

". . . turning back the clock thirty (30) years from 1955 when the application was filed which would
place it at 1925, the fact must have to be accepted that during that period, the land was a classified
forest land so much so that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensee before 1926 and
after that; that even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber
within the area; and this can only mean that the Bureau of Forestry had stood and maintained its
ground that it was a forest land as indeed the testimonial evidence referred to above persuasively
indicates, and the only time when the property was converted into a fishpond was sometime after
1950; or a bare five (5) years before the filing of the application; but only after there had been a
previous warning by the District Forester that that could not be done because it was classified as
a public forest; so that having these in mind and remembering that even under Republic Act 1942
which came into effect in 1957, two (2) years after this case had already been filed in the lower
Court, in order for applicant to be able to demonstrate a registerable title he must have shown.

"‘open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years,
preceding the filing of the application;’

the foregoing details cannot but justify the conclusion that not one of the applicants or oppositors
had shown that during the required period of thirty (30) years prescribed by Republic Act 1942 in
order for him to have shown a registerable title for the entire period of thirty (30) years before filing
of the application, he had been in

"‘open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain’,

it is evident that the Bureau of Forestry had insisted on its claim all throughout that period of thirty
(30) years and even before and applicants and their predecessors had made implicit recognition
of that; the result must be to deny all these applications; this Court stating that it had felt impelled
notwithstanding, just the same to resolve the conflicting positions of the private litigants among
themselves as to who of them had demonstrated a better right to possess because this Court
foresees that this litigation will go all the way to the Supreme Court and it is always better that the
findings be as complete as possible to enable the Highest Court to pass final judgment;

"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision must have to be as it is hereby reversed; the application as
well as all the oppositions with the exception of that of the Director of Forestry which is hereby
sustained are dismissed; no more pronouncement as to costs."cralaw virtua1aw library

A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui contending that the
disputed lot had been in the possession of private persons for over thirty years and therefore in
accordance with Republic Act No. 1942, said lot could still be the subject of registration and
confirmation of title in the name of a private person in accordance with Act No. 496 known as the
Land Registration Act. On the other hand, another petition for review on certiorari was filed by
Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, contending that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing their complaint against the Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The Borre
complaint was for the annulment of the deed of absolute sale of Lot No. 885 executed by them in
favor of the Heirs of Amunategui. The complaint was dismissed on the basis of the Court of
Appeals’ decision that the disputed lot is part of the public domain. The petitioners also question
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in passing upon the relative rights of the parties over the
disputed lot when its final decision after all is to declare said lot a part of the public domain
classified as forest land.chanrobles law library : red

The need for resolving the questions raised by Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin in their
petition depends on the issue raised by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui, that is, whether or not Lot
No. 885 is public forest land, not capable of registration in the names of the private applicants.

The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as forest land
because it is not thickly forested but is a "mangrove swamp." Although conceding that a
"mangrove swamp" is included in the classification of forest land in accordance with Section 1820
of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that no big trees classified in Section
1821 of said Code as first, second and third groups are found on the land in question.
Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land
registration proceedings because the property had been in actual possession of private persons
for many years, and therefore, said land was already "private land" better adapted and more
valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be
kept under forest classification.

The petition is without merit.

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification
simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land
classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in
brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its
legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect
so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muñoz (23 SCRA 1184) that
possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. And in
Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted the petition on the ground that the area covered
by the patent and title was not disposable public land, it being a part of the forest zone and any
patent and title to said area is void ab initio. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of Government
is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.

The findings of the Court of Appeals are particularly well-grounded in the instant petition.

The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised Administrative Code are found
in Lot No. 885 does not divest such land of its being classified as forest land, much less as land
of the public domain. The appellate court found that in 1912, the land must have been a virgin
forest as stated by Emeterio Bereber’s witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late as 1926, it
must have been a thickly forested area as testified by Jaime Bertolde. The opposition of the
Director of Forestry was strengthened by the appellate court’s finding that timber licenses had to
be issued to certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a
license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the property was converted
into fishpond but only after a previous warning from the District Forester that the same could not
be done because it was classified as "public forest." chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he
meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act
No. 1942. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public
domain but that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name because
of an imperfect title such as those derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had continuous,
open, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of
his application.

The decision of the appellate court is not based merely on the presumptions implicit in
Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended. The records show that Lot No. 88S never ceased to be
classified as forest land of the public domain.

In Republic v. Gonong (118 SCRA 729) we ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"As held in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, all lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule
would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his
predecessors in-interests since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the
presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private
property even before the Spanish conquest."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the instant petitions, the exception in the Oh Cho case does not apply. The evidence is clear
that Lot No. 885 had always been public land classified as forest.

Similarly, in Republic v. Vera (120 SCRA 210), we ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . The possession of public land however long the period thereof may have extended, never
confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public
land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and
occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a
grant from the State. (Director of Lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177, 195)."cralaw virtua1aw library

We, therefore, affirm the finding that the disputed property Lot No. 885 is part of the public domain,
classified as public forest land. There is no need for us to pass upon the other issues raised by
petitioners Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, as such issues are rendered moot by this
finding.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G. R. No. L-30035 and G. R. No. L-27873 are DISMISSED for lack
of merit. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-43938 April 15, 1988

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT), petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) and JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-44081 April 15, 1988

BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORIA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO,
all surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-44092 April 15, 1988

ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORlA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO,
all surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

The Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that may be found in the bowels of
the earth even if the land where the discovery is made be private. 1 In the cases at bar, which
have been consolidated because they pose a common issue, this doctrine was not correctly
applied.

These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February 11,
1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin
and Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots and
covered by plan Psu-225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa
and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964. 2

The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big
Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9. 3

In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject
land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly
after the Liberation. She testified she was born in the land, which was possessed by her parents
under claim of ownership. 4 Alberto said he received Lots 6-9 in 1961 from his mother, Bella
Alberto, who declared that the land was planted by Jaime and his predecessors-in-interest to
bananas, avocado, nangka and camote, and was enclosed with a barbed-wire fence. She was
corroborated by Felix Marcos, 67 years old at the time, who recalled the earlier possession of the
land by Alberto's father. 5 Balbalio presented her tax declaration in 1956 and the realty tax receipts
from that year to 1964, 6 Alberto his tax declaration in 1961 and the realty tax receipts from that
year to 1964. 7

Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it
on September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in
September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet
had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, as
evidenced by its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its geological mappings,
geological samplings and trench side cuts, and its payment of taxes on the land. 8

For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma
and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and
recorded on January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were
purchased from these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in open,
continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by its annual assessment work
on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its payment of annual taxes thereon. 9

The location of the mineral claims was made in accordance with Section 21 of the Philippine Bill
of 1902 which provided that:
 SEC. 21. All valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the philippine Islands both
surveyed and unsurveyed are hereby declared to be free and open to exploration,
occupation and purchase and the land in which they are found to occupation and
purchase by the citizens of the United States, or of said islands.

The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought
to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No.
217 dated February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation
under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973. 10

The trial court * denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim
of possession and ownership of the land sought to be registered. 11 The applicants appealed to
the respondent court, * which reversed the trial court and recognized the claims of the applicant,
but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims. 12 In other words, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same
time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.

Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior right of ownership.
The Republic has filed its own petition for review and reiterates its argument that neither the
private respondents nor the two mining companies have any valid claim to the land because it is
not alienable and registerable.

It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at that time.
The Court of Appeals correctly declared that:

There is no question that the 9 lots applied for are within the June Bug mineral
claims of Benguet and the "Fredia and Emma" mineral claims of Atok. The June
Bug mineral claim of plaintiff Benguet was one of the 16 mining claims of James
E. Kelly, American and mining locator. He filed his declaration of the location of the
June Bug mineral and the same was recorded in the Mining Recorder's Office on
October 14, 1909. All of the Kelly claims ha subsequently been acquired by
Benguet Consolidated, Inc. Benguet's evidence is that it had made improvements
on the June Bug mineral claim consisting of mine tunnels prior to 1935. It had
submitted the required affidavit of annual assessment. After World War II, Benguet
introduced improvements on mineral claim June Bug, and also conducted
geological mappings, geological sampling and trench side cuts. In 1948, Benguet
redeclared the "June Bug" for taxation and had religiously paid the taxes.

The Emma and Fredia claims were two of the several claims of Harrison registered
in 1931, and which Atok representatives acquired. Portions of Lots 1 to 5 and all
of Lots 6 to 9 are within the Emma and Fredia mineral claims of Atok Big Wedge
Mining Company.

The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and Emma mineral claims
of Atok having been perfected prior to the approval of the Constitution of the
Philippines of 1935, they were removed from the public domain and had become
private properties of Benguet and Atok.
 It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under
consideration was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the
Government of the Commonwealth was inaugurated; and
according to the laws existing at that time, as construed and applied
by this court in McDaniel v. Apacible and Cuisia (42 Phil. 749), a
valid location of a mining claim segregated the area from the public
domain. Said the court in that case: The moment the locator
discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located, and
perfected his location in accordance with law, the power of the
United States Government to deprive him of the exclusive right to
the possession and enjoyment of the located claim was gone, the
lands had become mineral lands and they were exempted from
lands that could be granted to any other person. The reservations
of public lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral
perfected locations; and, of course, if a valid mining location is
made upon public lands afterwards included in a reservation, such
inclusion or reservation does not affect the validity of the former
location. By such location and perfection, the land located is
segregated from the public domain even as against the
Government. (Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337; Van Mess v.
Roonet, 160 Cal. 131; 27 Cyc. 546).

"The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to

segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the
locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent
therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed
by law. Where there is a valid location of a mining claim, the area
becomes segregated from the public domain and the property of
the locator." (St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. Montana Mining Co.,
171 U.S. 650; 655; 43 Law ed., 320, 322.) "When a location of a
mining claim is perfected it has the effect of a grant by the United
States of the right of present and exclusive possession, with the
right to the exclusive enjoyment of all the surface ground as well as
of all the minerals within the lines of the claim, except as limited by
the extralateral right of adjoining locators; and this is the locator's
right before as well as after the issuance of the patent. While a lode
locator acquires a vested property right by virtue of his location
made in compliance with the mining laws, the fee remains in the
government until patent issues."(18 R.C.L. 1152) (Gold Creek
Mining Corporation v. Hon. Eulogio Rodriguez, Sec. of Agriculture
and Commerce, and Quirico Abadilla, Director of the Bureau of
Mines, 66 Phil. 259, 265-266)

It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for as held
in the Gold Creek Mining Corp. Case, for all physical purposes of ownership, the
owner is not required to secure a patent as long as he complies with the provisions
of the mining laws; his possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is
as good as though secured by patent.
 We agree likewise with the oppositors that having complied with all the
requirements of the mining laws, the claims were removed from the public domain,
and not even the government of the Philippines can take away this right from them.
The reason is obvious. Having become the private properties of the oppositors,
they cannot be deprived thereof without due process of law. 13

Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution against
the alienation of all lands of the public domain except those agricultural in nature for this was
made subject to existing rights. Thus, in its Article XIII, Section 1, it was categorically provided
that:

SEC. 1. All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and
other natural resources of the Philipppines belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of
the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least 60% of the capital of
which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or
concession at the time of the inauguration of the government established under
this Constitution. Natural resources with the exception of public agricultural lands,
shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation,
development or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding 25 years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which
case beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.

Implementing this provision, Act No. 4268, approved on November 8, 1935, declared:

Any provision of existing laws, executive order, proclamation to the contrary

notwithstanding, all locations of mining claim made prior to February 8, 1935 within
lands set apart as forest reserve under Sec. 1826 of the Revised Administrative
Code which would be valid and subsisting location except to the existence of said
reserve are hereby declared to be valid and subsisting locations as of the date of
their respective locations.

The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws then
in force removed it from the public domain. 14 By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights
over the land, against even the government, without need of any further act such as the purchase
of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. 15 As the land had become the private property of
the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok.

It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private property was subject to the
"vicissitudes of ownership," or even to forfeiture by non-user or abandonment or, as the private
respondents aver, by acquisitive prescription. However, the method invoked by the de la Rosas
is not available in the case at bar, for two reasons.

First, the trial court found that the evidence of open, continuous, adverse and exclusive
possession submitted by the applicants was insufficient to support their claim of ownership. They
themselves had acquired the land only in 1964 and applied for its registration in 1965, relying on
the earlier alleged possession of their predecessors-in-interest. 16 The trial judge, who had the
opportunity to consider the evidence first-hand and observe the demeanor of the witnesses and
test their credibility was not convinced. We defer to his judgment in the absence of a showing that
it was reached with grave abuse of discretion or without sufficient basis. 17

Second, even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of the de la Rosas had really
been in possession of the subject property, their possession was not in the concept of owner of
the mining claim but of the property as agricultural land, which it was not. The property was
mineral land, and they were claiming it as agricultural land. They were not disputing the lights of
the mining locators nor were they seeking to oust them as such and to replace them in the mining
of the land. In fact, Balbalio testified that she was aware of the diggings being undertaken "down
below" 18 but she did not mind, much less protest, the same although she claimed to be the owner
of the said land.

The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of interest" between the owners
of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is a
well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to
everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. 19 Under the aforesaid
ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to
separate claims of title. This is also difficult to understand, especially in its practical application.

Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on the land while the
mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because he may
interfere with the operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy the crops
above. How deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner, go without encroaching on each
other's rights? Where is the dividing line between the surface and the sub-surface rights?

The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half
agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either
completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land
which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral — and
completely mineral — once the mining claims were perfected. 20 As long as mining operations
were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so and become agricultural,
even if only partly so, because it was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were
unlawfully occupying the surface.

What must have misled the respondent court is Commonwealth Act No. 137, providing as follows:

Sec. 3. All mineral lands of the public domain and minerals belong to the State,
and their disposition, exploitation, development or utilization, shall be limited to
citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations, or associations, at least 60% of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease
or concession at the time of the inauguration of government established under the
Constitution.

SEC. 4. The ownership of, and the right to the use of land for agricultural, industrial,
commercial, residential, or for any purpose other than mining does not include the
ownership of, nor the right to extract or utilize, the minerals which may be found
on or under the surface.
 SEC. 5. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals included
within all areas for which public agricultural land patents are granted are excluded
and excepted from all such patents.

SEC. 6. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals included
within all areas for which Torrens titles are granted are excluded and excepted
from all such titles.

This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the
benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that
may be found in public and even private land devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial,
residential or (for) any purpose other than mining." Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural
land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to
extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State to which such minerals
belong.

The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land
could be used for both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation
is that once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at
the time, such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in
the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not
be used by any private party, including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that
will impede the mining operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such owner,
he is of course entitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation
proceedings. 21

Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of
their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935
prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to
vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been
transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be
shared simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated April 30, 1976, is SET ASIDE and that
of the trial court dated March 11, 1969, is REINSTATED, without any pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,

vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI
MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO
CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI
KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-
ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU
EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY,
TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG
MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY
DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU
MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY
MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S.
ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE
CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY,
CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO
CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO
C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B.
GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O.
SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H.
MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN,
PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY,
LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG,
MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO,
JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING,
SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA,
NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T.
BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI,
MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by
her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her father MONICO
D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M.
EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR.,
SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S ASSOCIATION, INTER-
PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE
CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No.
8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).

In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment. 1 In
compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its
provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the
constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.

On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed
through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that
the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources
to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.

On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors
of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the
leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for
Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for
the dismissal of the petition.

On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene
and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle
of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of
those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the
petition be dismissed.

On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon
Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to
Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al.
that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and
mandamus be dismissed.

The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.

Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their
respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings
and during the hearing.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing
Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over
lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of
the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:

"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b)
which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;

"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including
inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral
domains are private but community property of the indigenous peoples;

"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;

"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral domains;

(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting,
extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas
claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous
peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding
25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and

"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect
and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for
critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or
reforestation."2

Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral

domains" and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said areas,
Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.3

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of
the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral
domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause
of the Constitution.4

These provisions are:

"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of
ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;

"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area
is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local
Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development
Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;

"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous
peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership,
hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in
the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;

"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve
disputes involving indigenous peoples; and

"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving rights of the indigenous peoples."5

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative
Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to
the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes
of policy and program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon the President’s
power of control over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution. 6

Petitioners pray for the following:

 "(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other
related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;

"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of
the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and
its Implementing Rules;

"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department
of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;

"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and
Management to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of
the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and

"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the State’s constitutional
mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and
conservation of Philippine natural resources."7

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:

Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice
and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged
provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged
provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the
IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of
natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the
ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to
question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.

Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a
separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions
of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58,
59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose
rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing
the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and
Vitug.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case
was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same.
Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is
DISMISSED.

Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 150327 June 18, 2003

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS., represented by the Secretary of Department of Environment

and Natural Resources, the Regional Executive Director, (DENR Region XI) and MARION
V. ABUNDO, SR., Conservation Officer (DENR Region XI), Petitioners,
vs.
MARILYN A. PERALTA, ROSIE A. LAVALAN, GRACE A. REYES, ALBERTO B. ALONDAY,
MERCY B. ALONDAY, RICHELIEU B. ALONDAY, AZUCENA B. ALONDAY AND JANETA A.
BALURAN, and the Register of Deeds of Davao City, Respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 53440 which upheld the orders, dated February 5, 1999 and May 6, 1999, of the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 13.2

The Antecedents

On September 26, 1994, Marilyn A. Peralta, Rosie A. Lavalan, Grace A. Reyes, Alberto B.
Alonday, Mercy B. Alonday, Rochelieu B. Alonday, Azucena B. Alonday, Benedicto B. Alonday,
and Janeta A. Baluran filed a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership of real property
with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 13, against the defendants Republic of the
Philippines, the Regional Executive Director of Region XI of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) and the Conservation Officer in said region. The plaintiffs alleged
therein, inter alia, that they are the heirs of Benedicto B. Alonday who applied for and was granted
Homestead Patent No. V-11244 by the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
(DENR) over Lot 3561 with an area of 237,898 square meters; the said lot was a portion of Lot
2988 of the Guiang Cadastre located in Guiang, Davao City and that on the basis of said patent,
Benedicto Alonday was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-275 over the said property by the
Register of Deeds; they purchased the said property from their father Benedicto and were issued
on April 25, 1988 Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-134231 in their names; the property was
allegedly alienable and disposable property within Project 1-B, certified on January 13, 1931 as
per LC Map No. 1412 approved by the Director of Bureau of Forestry, as confirmed by the letter
of the petitioner Regional Director, dated February 15, 1994; they had been in possession of the
said property as owner thereof since November 1965 and that some time in 1969, officers of the
Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) sought his permission to use a portion of said property with
an area of five hectares; the BFD caused the construction of a big concrete building on said
portion of the property; on June 28, 1971, Benedicto’s lawyer wrote a letter to the BFD demanding
that it vacate the said portion of his property on which the building was constructed but said letter
was ignored; on February 24, 1979, Forest Conservation Officer Marion Abundio, Sr. asked
permission from Benedicto to allow the BFD to install on a portion of the subject property
consisting of twenty-five square meters a small generator to provide electricity to the existing
building and compound of the Philippine Eagles Acclimatization and Breeding Center; Benedicto
did not give his assent to these requests of the aforenamed government officials despite which
they still caused the construction of the building and installation of the generator unit; the plaintiffs
demanded that the defendants vacate the property on July 14, 1994 but the latter refused. The
plaintiffs prayed that after due proceedings judgment be rendered in their favor and that the
defendants be ordered to vacate the subject property and pay the plaintiffs damages and litigation
expenses.

The plaintiffs appended as annexes to their petition copies of the aforesaid title and letters of the
BFD officials. In their answer to the complaint, the defendants, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), interposed the special and affirmative defenses that: (a) the complaint did not
state a cause of action against them; (b) the building constructed by the defendants was within
the perimeter of the Mt. Apo National Park, a forest reserve under Proclamation No. 59, as
amended, of the President of the Philippines, and not on the plaintiffs’ property; (c) the installation
of a generator unit did not push through; (d) Project 1-B, under which the subject property was
declassified as alienable and disposable property per Land Classification Map No. 1412, should
not prevail over Proclamation No. 59, as amended; (e) the suit was against the State which cannot
be sued without its consent; (f) the plaintiffs failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before
filing their complaint.3 The defendants prayed that the complaint be dismissed.

The parties filed their respective pre-trial briefs. After the requisite pre-trial conference, the RTC
issued an Order, dated August 29, 1995, constituting a panel of commissioners composed of
Engineer Roderick R. Calapardo, as Team Leader, and Gregorio Cenabre and Engineer Rogelio
Zantua, as members, to conduct a relocation survey and determine if the respondents’ property
is part of the Mt. Apo National Park. After the survey, the panel submitted its report to the trial
court, dated November 7, 1995, stating that: "the land in case is 92,216 square meters within the
certified Alienable and Disposable (A & D) Lands while the remaining portion of 145,682 square
meters is within the Mt. Apo National Park Reservation."4

In their comment on the report, the plaintiffs claimed that the survey team altered the boundary
line of their property in the course of the survey and that the team did not take into account Project
1-B per Land Classification Map No. 1412 approved by the Director of the Bureau of Forestry.
The defendants, on the other hand, insisted that the survey team did not alter the boundary line
of the property and that it took into account Project 1-B and Land Classification Map No. 1412 in
conducting the survey and preparing its report. On motion of the plaintiffs and with the conformity
of the defendants, through Assistant Solicitor General Aurora P. Cortez, the RTC issued an order
on March 7, 1997 declaring that there were no factual issues involved in the case and that it would
decide the case on the basis of the pleadings and memoranda of the parties as well as the
commissioners’ report.

On May 6, 1997, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants
finding and declaring that the property occupied by the defendants was part of the plaintiffs’
property. The RTC ordered the defendants to vacate the property, restore possession thereof to
the plaintiffs and remove all the improvements thereon made by them. The decretal portion of the
decision reads:

In view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered sustaining the validity and legality of the
plaintiff’s right of ownership and possession over that parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-134231 of the Registry of Davao City. Defendants are hereby ordered to
vacate the portion of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-134231 of the Registry of
Deeds of Davao City alluded to by the plaintiffs and to restore peaceful possession of the same
to them. Defendants are further ordered to remove all the improvements they have introduced
thereon.5
The RTC declared that the report of the panel did not take into account Property 1-B for LC Map
1412; hence, the said report had no probative weight. According to the RTC, the torrens title of
the property prevails over the relocation survey of the panel of commissioners and that the
Director of Forestry declassified the respondents’ property pursuant to Section 1827 of the 1987
Revised Administrative Code.

On May 30, 1997, five days before the expiration of the period to file an appeal, the defendants
filed, through registered mail, a motion for the reconsideration of the RTC decision. On June 11,
1997, the RTC issued ex parte an order expunging the said motion for reconsideration on the
ground that it was a mere scrap of paper for failure of the defendants to incorporate any notice of
hearing as required by Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Unaware of the June 11,
1997 Order of the RTC, the defendants filed on July 14, 1997 a Manifestation with Notice of
Hearing on Motion for Reconsideration dated July 7, 1997 appending thereto a notice of hearing
of their May 30, 1997 Motion for Reconsideration.

In the meantime, on July 18, 1997, the defendants received a copy of the June 11, 1997 Order of
the trial court expunging their motion for reconsideration. On July 22, 1997, the defendants filed
their notice of appeal from the decision of the court. The plaintiffs, for their part, filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal of the defendants on the ground that their May 30, 1997 Motion for
Reconsideration was a mere scrap of paper; hence, the motion did not toll the running of the
reglementary period for appeal. Thus, the defendants allegedly failed to perfect their appeal from
the decision of the court within the reglementary period. On August 11, 1997, the RTC received
the defendants’ notice of appeal.

Meanwhile, the presiding judge of Branch 13 retired, and for a time, the said RTC branch
remained vacant. On January 28, 1999, the RTC, through the newly-appointed judge, issued an
order giving due course to the defendants’ appeal declaring that they still had a period of five days
from July 18, 1997 when they received a copy of the order expunging their notice of appeal or
until July 23, 1997 within which to perfect their appeal from the June 11, 1997 Order. Since the
defendants filed their notice of appeal on July 22, 1997, they had perfected their appeal within the
reglementary period. The RTC further declared that although the defendants’ May 30, 1997
Motion for Reconsideration was defective, the Rules of Court should be liberally construed. The
RTC forthwith directed the branch clerk of court to forward the records of the case to the Court of
Appeals.

On February 5, 1999, however, the RTC issued an ex parte order dismissing the defendants’
appeal on its finding that in light of jurisprudence brought to its attention, they failed to perfect
their appeal within the reglementary period. When the defendants received the February 5, 1999
Order of the RTC, they filed a motion for reconsideration thereof, set for hearing on February 19,
1999. On February 8, 1999, the RTC issued an order declaring that the hearing set on February
19, 1999 was mooted by its Order dated February 5, 1999 which dismissed the defendants’
appeal. The plaintiffs filed on February 10, 1999 a motion for execution, claiming that the RTC
decision had become final and executory. On February 18, 1999, the RTC issued an order
granting the plaintiffs’ motion and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. The defendants
filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated February 26, 1999 of the February 5, 1999 Order of the
RTC dismissing their appeal and their opposition to the issuance of a writ of execution. The
defendants were unaware that in the interim, the RTC had already granted the plaintiffs’ motion
for a writ of execution on February 18, 1999. The plaintiffs opposed the defendants’ Motion for
Reconsideration dated February 26, 1999.
On May 6, 1999, the RTC issued an order denying the defendants’ motion for reconsideration
and at the same time denying the plaintiffs’ motion for execution on the ground that public policy
prohibited the issuance of a writ of execution against the government. The RTC recalled the writ
of execution it earlier issued.

Thereafter, the defendants, now the petitioners, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as amended, for the nullification of the
February 5, 1999 and May 6, 1999 Orders of the RTC alleging that the:

RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO

LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING ITS ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 5, 1999
AND ORDER DATED MAY 6, 1999.

II

RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO

LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN SUSTAINING THE VALIDITY AND LEGALITY OF
OWNERSHIP OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OVER A PARCEL OF LAND COVERED BY
TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 134231.6

On April 27, 2001, the CA rendered its decision denying due course and dismissing the petition
for certiorari. The appellate court held that petitioners’ May 30, 1997 Motion for Reconsideration
of the RTC decision did not comply with Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, as amended;
hence, a mere scrap of paper which did not toll the running of the reglementary period for appeal.
Thus, the RTC decision had already become final and executory. According to the appellate court,
the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petitioners’ appeal therein.
As such, they were not entitled to a writ of certiorari. The CA further held that the petitioners,
through the negligence of the OSG, failed to perfect their appeal. The CA opined that to nullify
the title of respondents over the subject property, the petitioners should have instituted a petition
for reversion, and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as
amended.

The petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside
the decision of the CA. The petitioners allege that the appellate court committed reversible error
in finding and declaring that they failed to perfect their appeal from the decision of the trial court
within the reglementary period. The CA likewise allegedly erred when it held that the RTC did not
commit grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it dismissed
the petitioners’ appeal via its February 5, 1999 Order. The petitioners contend that by dismissing
their petition, the CA thereby sustained the validity of the respondents’ title despite strong
evidence that the said property is part of the public forest and, therefore, inalienable. The
petitioners further argue that even if their notice of appeal was belatedly filed, the rule on
perfection of appeals should be suspended and that their appeal should be given due course on
grounds of equity and substantial justice. They submit that if their appeal is not reinstated, the
Republic of the Philippines will be deprived of a part of the Mt. Apo National Park consisting of no
less than 145,682 square meters. The petitioners cite the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Court
of Appeals.7

The petition is meritorious.

The Court agrees with the CA that the OSG was negligent when it filed on May 30, 1997 the
defective motion for reconsideration. Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court provides that a
motion for reconsideration or a motion for a new trial shall be made in writing stating the ground
or grounds therefor, a written notice of which shall be served by the movant on the adverse party.
Such written notice is that prescribed in Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Under
Section 4, paragraph 2 of said rule, a notice of hearing on a motion shall be served by the movant
to all the parties concerned at least three days before the date of hearing.1âwphi1 Section 5 of
the same rule requires that the notice of hearing shall be directed to the parties concerned and
shall state the time and place of the hearing of the motion. The requirements, far from being
merely technical and procedural as claimed by the petitioners, are vital elements of procedural
due process.8

Since the Rules of Court do not fix any period within which the said party may file his reply or
opposition, the trial court would have no way of determining whether the adverse party agrees or
objects to the motion and, if he objects, to hear him on his objection. Hence, the need for the
movant to set the time and place of hearing of its motion.9 The requirements entombed in Sections
4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court are mandatory and non-compliance therewith is fatal and
renders the motion pro forma; a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to
receive and which the court has no authority to act upon.10 In cases of motions for a new trial or
for the reconsideration of a judgment, the running of the period for appeal is not tolled by the mere
filing or pendency of said motion.11

In this case, the petitioners, through the OSG, received on May 20, 1997 the decision of the RTC;
hence, they had until June 4, 1997 within which to file their motion for reconsideration or for a new
trial or to perfect their appeal from said adverse decision. Although the petitioners filed the motion
for reconsideration dated May 30, 1997 within the reglementary period, said motion failed to
comply with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15. The records show that there is no proof that the
respondents were actually served with a copy of said motion, as required by Section 10, Rule 13
of the Rules of Court.1avvphi1 The OSG did not bother to file an amended motion for
reconsideration containing the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

The OSG offered no valid justification for its failure to comply with Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court except the self-serving claim of Solicitor Evaristo M. Padilla that his omission
was sheer inadvertence, caused by heavy pressure of work in preparing numerous pleadings and
in the almost daily attendance in court for naturalization cases and those for nullity of marriage,
among others. Other than the barefaced allegations of Solicitor Padilla, he offered no specific
details as to what pleadings he prepared and the hearings he attended which prevented him from
complying with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, if Solicitor Padilla
was able to prepare within the reglementary period the May 30, 1997 Motion for Reconsideration,
he offered no valid justification for his failure to incorporate in said motion or append thereto a
simple one-paragraph notice of hearing which could have been accomplished in a few minutes.
What is so nettlesome is that the May 30, 1997 Motion for Reconsideration of petitioners was
signed not only by Solicitor Padilla but also by Assistant Solicitor General Aurora P. Cortes. Even
if Solicitor Padilla, through his negligence, failed to incorporate in said motion for reconsideration
the requisite notice of hearing, the Assistant Solicitor General should have noticed the omission
before she affixed her signature thereon and sought the immediate rectification thereof by Solicitor
Padilla before said motion was filed. She did not. She offered no valid explanation for her faux
pas either. The general rule is that the clients are bound by the mistakes and negligence of their
counsel.12
In a case of recent vintage, the Court took to task the OSG for its lackadaisical attitude and
complacency in the handling of its cases for the government and reminded the OSG that:

… just like other members of the Bar, the canons under the Code of Professional Responsibility
apply with equal force on lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks.
These ethical duties are rendered even more exacting as to them because, as government
counsel, they have the added duty to abide by the policy of the State to promote a high standard
of ethics in public service. Furthermore, it is incumbent upon the OSG, as part of the government
bureaucracy, to perform and discharge its duties with the highest degree of professionalism,
intelligence and skill and to extend prompt, courteous and adequate service to the public.13

Trite to state, this Court is impelled to do so anew in this case.1âwphi1 The CA cannot be faulted
for ruling that having lost their right of appeal through the negligence of the OSG the petitioners
are not entitled to a writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of 1987 Rules of Civil Procedure.14

However, prescinding from all the foregoing, this Court grants not only petitioners’ plea that it
suspend its own rule on the perfection of appeals but also directs the reopening of the trial of the
case for the parties to adduce their respective evidence. The Court excepts this case from the
said rule in the interest of justice, to avert a grave miscarriage of justice to the State through the
negligence of the OSG. The State has the right to adduce its evidence, testimonial and
documentary. Courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of this right but,
instead, afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of its
cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.15 The trial court no less declared in its January
28, 1999 Order that although the petitioners’ May 30, 1997 Motion for Reconsideration was
defective, the Rules of Court should be liberally construed only to make a volte face and issue ex
parte an order dismissing the appeal of the petitioners and canceling the hearing on the
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration set on February 19, 1999.

What is involved in this case is a portion of land consisting of no less than 145,682 square meters
or less than fifteen hectares which they claim is part of the Mt. Apo National Park as shown by
the relocation survey of the panel of commissioners. The case is one of public interest. If the
aforesaid property is, indeed, part of the forest reserve as claimed by the petitioners but their right
to adduce their evidence is foreclosed by the dismissal of the present petition, the said property
would be forever lost to the prejudice of the State. In Republic v. Imperial,16 this Court held that:

The need, therefore, to determine once and for all whether the lands subject of petitioner’s
reversion efforts are foreshore lands constitutes good and sufficient cause for relaxing procedural
rules and granting the third and fourth motions for extension to file appellant’s brief. Petitioner’s
appeal presents an exceptional circumstance impressed with public interest and must then be
given due course.17

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the respondents as it ordered the petitioners to vacate
that portion of the subject property occupied by them and to return possession thereof to the
respondents, without requiring the parties to adduce evidence on the factual issues of (a) whether
or not the property covered by the title of the respondents is part of the Mt. Apo National Park (a
forest reserve); (b) whether or not the building constructed by the petitioners is inside the forest
reserve; and (c) whether or not the petitioners installed a generator unit in the respondents’
property.
It bears stressing that the trial court formed a panel of commissioners to conduct a relocation
survey of the subject property. The panel of commissioners found that 145,682 square meters
which is a portion of the Mt. Apo National Park had been included in the respondents’ title to the
subject property. The trial court ignored this and did not even bother to receive the parties’
respective evidence on the said report. The panel of commissioners was not even called to testify
on its findings. The appellate court will be able to review on appeal the decision of the trial court
and ascertain whether there has been a travesty of justice to the gross prejudice of the State.

The respondents will not suffer substantial prejudice if the trial is reopened. The records show
that the trial court denied respondents’ motion for a writ of execution although the trial court had
dismissed the appeal of the petitioners. The respondents did not even assail the order of the trial
court.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
53440 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City,
Branch 13, dated February 5, 1999 and May 5, 1999 in Civil Case No. 23,168-94 are SET ASIDE.
The said Regional Trial Court is DIRECTED to reopen the trial to enable the parties to adduce
their respective evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General is hereby directed to represent the
petitioners during the trial. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-32266 February 27, 1989

THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioner

vs.
RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL, respondent.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Pena & Marcos for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

The basic question before the Court is the legal classification of mangrove swamps, or manglares,
as they are commonly known. If they are part of our public forest lands, they are not alienable
under the Constitution. If they are considered public agricultural lands, they may be acquired
under private ownership. The private respondent's claim to the land in question must be judged
by these criteria.

The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located in the municipality
of Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on January 25, 1949, alleging that
he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than forty years.
He was opposed by several persons, including the petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines. After trial, the application was approved by the Court of First Instance. of Capiz. 1 The
decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 2 The Director of Forestry then came to this Court
in a petition for review on certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not
subject to private appropriation. He asks that the registration be reversed.
It should be stressed at the outset that both the petitioner and the private respondent agree that
the land is mangrove land. There is no dispute as to this. The bone of contention between the
parties is the legal nature of mangrove swamps or manglares. The petitioner claims, it is forestal
and therefore not disposable and the private respondent insists it is alienable as agricultural land.
The issue before us is legal, not factual.

For a proper background of this case, we have to go back to the Philippine Bill of 1902, one of
the earlier American organic acts in the country. By this law, lands of the public domain in the
Philippine Islands were classified into three grand divisions, to wit, agricultural, mineral and timber
or forest lands. This classification was maintained in the Constitution of the Commonwealth,
promulgated in 1935, until it was superseded by the Constitution of 1973. That new charter
expanded the classification of public lands to include industrial or commercial, residential,
resettlement, and grazing lands and even permitted the legislature to provide for other
categories. 3 This provision has been reproduced, but with substantial modifications, in the
present Constitution. 4

Under the Commonwealth Constitution, which was the charter in force when this case arose, only
agricultural lands were allowed to be alienated. 5 Their disposition was provided for under C.A.
No. 141. Mineral and timber or forest lands were not subject to private ownership unless they
were first reclassified as agricultural lands and so released for alienation.

In the leading case of Montano v. Insular Government, 6 promulgated in 1909, mangrove swamps
or manglares were defined by the Court as:

... mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which grows various
kindred plants which will not live except when watered by the sea, extending their
roots deep into the mud and casting their seeds, which also germinate there.
These constitute the mangrove flats of the tropics, which exist naturally, but which
are also, to some extent cultivated by man for the sake of the combustible wood
of the mangrove and like trees as well as for the useful nipa palm propagated
thereon. Although these flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are of the opinion that
they cannot be so regarded in the sense in which that term is used in the cases
cited or in general American jurisprudence. The waters flowing over them are not
available for purpose of navigation, and they may be disposed of without
impairment of the public interest in what remains.

xxx

Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory condition of the law, the custom
had grown of converting manglares and nipa lands into fisheries which became a
common feature of settlement along the coast and at the same time of the change
of sovereignty constituted one of the most productive industries of the Islands, the
abrogation of which would destroy vested interests and prove a public disaster.

Mangrove swamps were thus considered agricultural lands and so susceptible of private
ownership.

Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically declared, despite the above-cited case,
that mangrove swamps form part of the public forests of this country. This it did in the
Administrative Code of 1917, which became effective on October 1 of that year, thus:
 Section 1820. Words and phrase defined. - For the purpose of this chapter 'public
forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land,
including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever
character.

It is noteworthy, though, that notwithstanding this definition, the Court maintained the doctrine in
the Montano case when two years later it held in the case of Jocson v. Director of Forestry: 7

...the words timber land are always translated in the Spanish translation of that Act
(Act of Congress) as terrenos forestales. We think there is an error in this
translation and that a better translation would be 'terrenos madereros.' Lumber
land in English means land with trees growing on it. The mangler plant would never
be called a tree in English but a bush, and land which has only bushes, shrubs or
aquatic plants growing on it cannot be called 'timber land.

xxx xxx xxx

The fact that there are a few trees growing in a manglare or nipa swamps does not
change the general character of the land from manglare to timber land.

More to the point, addressing itself directly to above-quoted Section 1820, the Court declared:

'In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), this Court said
that the phrase agricultural lands as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands
acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands.

Whatever may have been the meaning of the term 'forestry' under the Spanish law,
the Act of Congress of July 1st 1902, classifies the public lands in the Philippine
Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands that are not
timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are
used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands.

The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the Administrative Code

of 1917 cannot affect rights which vested prior to its enactment.

These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands, the trial court should have
considered them agricultural lands. If they are agricultural lands, then the rights of
appellants are fully established by Act No. 926.

The doctrine was reiterated still later in Garchitorena Vda. de Centenera v. Obias, 8 promulgated
on March 4, 1933, more than fifteen years after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1917.
Justice Ostrand declared for a unanimous Court:

The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that the land covered by the
application there are mangrove lands as shown in his opponent's Exh. 1, but we
think this opposition of the Director of Forestry is untenable, inasmuch as it has
been definitely decided that mangrove lands are not forest lands in the sense in
which this phrase is used in the Act of Congress.
No elaboration was made on this conclusion which was merely based on the cases of Montano
and Jocson. And in 1977, the above ruling was reaffirmed in Tongson v. Director of
Forestry, 9 with Justice Fernando declaring that the mangrove lands in litis were agricultural in
nature. The decision even quoted with approval the statement of the trial court that:

... Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove species grow, where the trees
are small and sparse, fit only for firewood purposes and the trees growing are not
of commercial value as lumber do not convert the land into public land. Such lands
are not forest in character. They do not form part of the public domain.

Only last year, in Republic v. De Porkan, 10 the Court, citing Krivenko v. Register of
Deeds, 11 reiterated the ruling in the Mapa case that "all public lands that are not timber or mineral
lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa
swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands.

But the problem is not all that simple. As it happens, there is also a line of decisions holding the
contrary view.

In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 12 promulgated in 1983, the Court
ruled "that the Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to dispose of swamp lands or mangrove
lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest lands.

Four months later, in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, 13 the Court was more positive
when it held, again through Justice Gutierrez:

The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as
forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a 'mangrove swamps.' Although
conceding that 'mangrove swamp' is included in the classification of forest land in
accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners
argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of the said Code as first, second
and third groups are found on the land in question. Furthermore, they contend that
Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land registration
proceedings because the property had been in actual possession of private
persons for many years, and therefore, said land was already 'private land' better
adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not
required by the public interests to be kept under forest classification.

The petition is without merit.

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass
or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. 'Forested lands' do not
have to be on mountains or in out-of-the-way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may
also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature
or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
Unless and until the land classsified as 'forest' is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
 lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect titles do not
apply.'

The view was maintained in Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 14 where this Court agreed
with the Solicitor General's submission that the land in dispute, which he described as "swamp
mangrove or forestal land," were not private properties and so not registerable. This case was
decided only twelve days after the De Porkan case.

Faced with these apparent contradictions, the Court feels there is a need for a categorical
pronouncement that should resolve once and for all the question of whether mangrove swamps
are agricultural lands or forest lands.

The determination of this question is a function initially belonging to the legislature, which has the
authority to implement the constitutional provision classifying the lands of the public domain (and
is now even permitted to provide for more categories of public lands). The legislature having made
such implementation, the executive officials may then, in the discharge of their own role,
administer our public lands pursuant to their constitutional duty " to ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed' and in accordance with the policy prescribed. For their part, the courts will step
into the picture if the rules laid down by the legislature are challenged or, assuming they are valid,
it is claimed that they are not being correctly observed by the executive. Thus do the three
departments, coordinating with each other, pursue and achieve the objectives of the Constitution
in the conservation and utilization of our natural resources.

In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly delegated to the President of the Philippines the function
of making periodic classifications of public lands, thus:

Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture

and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public
domain into:

(a) Alienable or disposable,

(b) Lumber, and

(c) Mineral lands,

and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to
another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition.

Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or

disposable lands, the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time declare what lands are
open to disposition or concession under this Act.

With particular regard to alienable public lands, Section 9 of the same law provides:

For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of the public
domain alienable or open to disposition shall be classified, according to the use or
purposes to which such lands are destined, as follows:
 (a) Agricultural;

(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes;

(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and

(d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses.

The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural

Resources, shall from time to time make the classifications provided for in this
section, and may, at any time and in a similar manner, transfer lands from one
class to another.

As for timber or forest lands, the Revised Administrative Code states as follows:

Sec. 1826. Regulation setting apart forest reserves- Revocation of same. - Upon
there commendation of the Director of Forestry, with the approval of the
Department Head, the President of the Philippines may set apart forest reserves
from the public lands and he shall by proclamation declare the establishment of
such reserves and the boundaries thereof, and thereafter such forest reserves
shall not be entered, sold, or otherwise disposed of, but shall remain as such for
forest uses, and shall be administered in the same manner as public forest.

The President of the Philippines may in like manner by proclamation alter or modify
the boundaries of any forest reserve from time to time, or revoke any such
proclamation, and upon such revocation such forest reserve shall be and become
part of the public lands as though such proclamation had never been made.

Sec. 1827. Assignment of forest land for agricultural purposes. - Lands in public
forest, not including forest reserves, upon the certification of the Director of
Forestry that said lands are better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than
for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest,
shall be declared by the Department Head to be agricultural lands.

With these principles in mind, we reach the following conclusion:

Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public forests of
the Philippines as defined in the aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The
legislature having so determined, we have no authority to ignore or modify its decision, and in
effect veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion. The statutory definition remains unchanged to
date and, no less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by the executive department. More
importantly, the said provision has not been challenged as arbitrary or unrealistic or
unconstitutional assuming the requisite conditions, to justify our judicial intervention and scrutiny.
The law is thus presumed valid and so must be respected. We repeat our statement in the
Amunategui case that the classification of mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive of
its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
That determination having been made and no cogent argument having been raised to annul it,
we have no duty as judges but to apply it. And so we shall.
Our previous description of the term in question as pertaining to our agricultural lands should be
understood as covering only those lands over which ownership had already vested before the
Administrative Code of 1917 became effective. Such lands could not be retroactively legislated
as forest lands because this would be violative of a duly acquired property right protected by the
due process clause. So we ruled again only two months ago in Republic of the Philippines vs.
Court of Appeals, 15 where the possession of the land in dispute commenced as early as 1909,
before it was much later classified as timberland.

It follows from all this that the land under contention being admittedly a part of the mangrove
swamps of Sapian, and for which a minor forest license had in fact been issued by the Bureau of
Forestry from 1920 to 1950, it must be considered forest land. It could therefore not be the subject
of the adverse possession and consequent ownership claimed by the private respondent in
support of his application for registration. To be so, it had first to be released as forest land and
reclassified as agricultural land pursuant to the certification the Director of Forestry may issue
under Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative Code.

The private respondent invokes the survey plan of the mangrove swamps approved by the
Director of Lands, 16 to prove that the land is registerable. It should be plain, however, that the
mere existence of such a plan would not have the effect of converting the mangrove swamps, as
forest land, into agricultural land. Such approval is ineffectual because it is clearly in officious.
The Director of Lands was not authorized to act in the premises. Under the aforecited law, it is
the Director of Forestry who has the authority to determine whether forest land is more valuable
for agricultural rather than forestry uses, as a basis for its declaration as agricultural land and
release for private ownership.

Thus we held in the Yngson case:

It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain
that until timber or forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither
the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell
or otherwise dispose of these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for
grazing or other purposes, fishpond leases and other modes of utilization.

The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamp

lands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are
still classified as forest land or timber land and not released for fishery or other
purposes.

The same rule was echoed in the Vallarta case, thus:

It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be
owned by private persons. It is not registerable. The adverse possession which
can be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot
commence until after the forest land has been declared alienable and disposable.
Possession of forest land, no matter bow long cannot convert it into private
property.'

We find in fact that even if the land in dispute were agricultural in nature, the proof the private
respondent offers of prescriptive possession thereof is remarkably meager and of dubious
persuasiveness. The record contains no convincing evidence of the existence of
the informacion posesoria allegedly obtained by the original transferor of the property, let alone
the fact that the conditions for acquiring title thereunder have been satisfied. Nowhere has it been
shown that the informacion posesoria has been inscribed or registered in the registry of property
and that the land has been under the actual and adverse possession of the private respondent
for twenty years as required by the Spanish Mortgage Law. 17 These matters are not presumed
but must be established with definite proof, which is lacking in this case.

Significantly, the tax declarations made by the private respondent were practically the only basis
used by the appellate court in sustaining his claim of possession over the land in question. Tax
declarations are, of course, not sufficient to prove possession and much less vest ownership in
favor of the declarant, as we have held in countless cases. 18

We hold, in sum, that the private respondent has not established his right to the registration of the
subject land in his name. Accordingly, the petition must be granted.

It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the legislative definition embodied in Section
1820 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, which remains unamended up to now,
mangrove swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of the Philippines. As such, they
are not alienable under the Constitution and may not be the subject of private ownership until and
unless they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable agricultural land.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the application for
registration of title of private respondent is DISMISSED, with cost against him. This decision is
immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.