Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 39, No.

4
November 2001 pp. 619–39

‘Europeanizing’ Civil Society: NGOs as

Agents of Political Socialization*

ALEX WARLEIGH
Queen’s University Belfast

Abstract
As a strategy for tackling the ‘democratic deficit’, attention is increasingly
shifting towards the ‘Europeanization’ of civil society, the latter being
traditionally viewed as a means both to limit state power and to promote
intra-citizenry solidarity. However, this attempted change requires in turn
actors who are both able and willing to act as agents of political socialization
in the context of EU policy-making. This article examines the emphasis
placed by both EU actors and the current academic literature on NGOs as
such agents. Drawing on an analysis of similar claims made in development
policy, I isolate the main indicators of NGOs’ ability to foster the Europeaniza-
tion of civil society via political socialization and put forward seven key tests
of their ability to carry out this function in the EU context. These are then
evaluated against the results of original empirical investigations. I argue that
NGOs are currently unsuited to the task of Europeanizing civil society thanks
to their inability to promote the political socialization of their supporters. As
a consequence that task requires EU-level institutional reform informed by
iterated public dialogue, as well as change in the working practices of NGOs.

* This article draws on research conducted under the ESRC project on Strategies of Civic Inclusion in Pan-
European Society, Grant No. L213 25 2022. I am grateful to the participants at the conference on ‘The
Changing Politics of the European Union’ (Chatham House, 22–23 March 2001) as well as three
anonymous referees for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
620 ALEX WARLEIGH

Introduction: Civil Society and European Integration –

The Quest for Agency
Civil society has returned to the centre of political discourse over the last
decade and a half. Following the lead of de Tocqueville (1981[1835]), it has
long been viewed by liberal political theorists as the means to elaborate a
legitimate state (or governance) structure by limiting its scope and by encour-
aging or facilitating political engagement by, and mutual solidarity between,
otherwise alienated individuals. Civil society, then, acts as a mediator between
the citizen and the state: it is ‘a sphere of dynamic and responsive public
discourse between the state, the public sphere, consisting of voluntary organ-
izations, and the market sphere, concerning private firms and unions’ (Janoski,
1998, p.12).1
The ‘Europeanization’ of civil society – its increased role in governance at
the EU level, and its adoption of an explicitly European rather than purely
national dimension – has risen up the agenda as a part of the solution to the
notorious democratic deficit. Civil society has been championed by both right
and left, and seen respectively as both the defeat of ‘big government’ and a
means of ‘bringing the citizen back in’ (Keane, 1988). A Europeanized civil
society can be represented as part of polity development in both neoliberal
(market-driven) and social democratic terms: as both a necessary complement
to the internal market and as a means to redress the underdevelopment of social
policy at the EU level, an intriguing parallel with EU citizenship (Warleigh,
2001). Thus, while they differ about the kind of civil society they wish to see
at the European/EU level, most actors appear to agree that a greater role for
civil society must be a central feature of European governance in the future.
Institutional reform remains vital to ensure that citizens are actually able to
engage with the Union once they have developed the necessary will and
capacities. As preliminary steps, the EU must thus repeatedly deliver signifi-
cant public goods which are valued by the citizen (Gabel, 1998); more closely
match its competences with those the public considers appropriate for transna-
tional governance (Blondel et al., 1998); and offer more frequent, and more
useful, opportunities for political participation by the individual (Wiener and
Della Salla, 1997; Bellamy and Warleigh, 1998). However, such reforms are
second-order concerns insofar as they are likely to go largely unheeded by, or
even face opposition from, large sections of the Member State publics; to
establish a deeper European political authority successfully, it is first neces-
sary to construct a European public space populated by self-conscious Euro-
pean citizens (Pérez-Díaz, 1998). This in turn directs reformers’ attention
1 Other definitions of civil society exist, ranging from the Marxist and Gramscian to the normative. I take

here the definition offered by Janoski as the ‘social scientific’; for other definitions, see inter alia Janoski
(1998) and Devine (1996).
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001
 ‘EUROPEANIZING’ CIVIL SOCIETY 621

towards political socialization, a process which ‘affect[s] a person’s tendency

to support or reject the system as a whole, [and] shape[s] his determination to
engage in political activity’ (Heater, 1974, pp. 108).
Political socialization – learning to adapt to the political system in which
one lives – occurs not just through formal education, but through experience
and participation (Heater, 1974; Almond and Verba, 1963; Dawson et al.,
1977). Part of this process is determined by early experiences in childhood,
especially in the family context. Nonetheless, it is a process which is both
ongoing and interactive, shaped by contact between the individual and both
other people and social structures (Dawson et al., 1977, pp. 33–46). It is
possible to learn new political habits and change even deeply entrenched points
of view. It is also possible to learn to adapt to new political contexts and
systems. Thus, both political education and political experience are important;
higher levels of both tend to translate into more frequent political participation
(Almond and Verba, 1963). Membership of groups is crucial in this process
since the latter act as channels of information, help interpret situations (and
thus the individual’s role in, and response to, them), and try to mobilize their
members in order to secure favourable policy developments (Dawson et al.,
1977, pp. 181–2).2
There remains, however, the vital question of agency: who will undertake
the necessary process of political education about, and provide the ability to
obtain political experience of, the EU? There are limits to what even favour-
ably disposed national governments can do, because they are, interdependence
notwithstanding, territorially defined. As mentioned above, they have also
shown little inclination to undertake this task – the post-Nice process offers
some possibility that such reticence may change, but it is unlikely that the
Member States will abandon their traditional positions entirely in the short to
medium term (Warleigh, 2002). The institutions of the EU are similarly
incapacitated, mired in the ongoing pressure of the ‘democratic deficit’,
despite what have often been significant reforms, such as the gradual empow-
erment of the European Parliament. To facilitate the Europeanization of civil
society, the EU requires a set of actors from outside official circles (and with
widely perceived legitimacy) to demonstrate the value of engaging with EU
decision-making processes, to train citizens in relevant skills (or at least help
them understand the importance of such engagement), and begin, or more
optimistically to continue, the process of generating transnational solidarity
through the construction of cross-border supporter bases. Political parties,
however, continue to play a relatively minor role in EU governance (although
see the article in this issue by Simon Hix (pp. 663–88) on the growth of partisan
2‘Primary groups’ such as family and friends play a key role here, but so do ‘secondary groups’ such as
political parties, trade unions and interest groups (Dawson et al., 1977).
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001
622 ALEX WARLEIGH

politics in the European Parliament). Moreover, to the extent that issue and
identity politics are replacing traditional political cleavages, it appears neces-
sary to bring the attention of citizens to the EU via political issues which
concern them, rather than by attempting to enthuse them about an integration
process which either bores, or appears broadly disadvantageous to, them:
Eurobarometer 54 (Autumn 2000) indicates that only 50 per cent of the EU
population considers European integration a good thing, and only 47 per cent
consider their country to have benefited from it. In this situation, attention is
increasingly being paid by both practitioners and academics to non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs)3 such as Greenpeace, BEUC (the European
Consumers Union Bureau) and Action Aid as potential catalysts of change:
NGOs often have large supporter bases and claim to function in ‘alternative’
ways which promote political socialization.4 There is, moreover, a clear
precedent for similar thinking: the Union institutions have in the past proved
more than capable of attracting lobbyists and constructing broad coalitions to
serve their institutional interests (Cram, 1998). Moreover, these coalitions
already often include NGOs (Greenwood, 1997; Warleigh, 2000).
However, in general, interest groups have regarded Europeanization of
their own activities and policy areas instrumentally, mobilizing to secure their
objectives or in response to enticements by the Commission, rather than out of
‘European’ zeal (Greenwood and Ronit, 1994; Reising, 1998). Their contribu-
tion to the legitimacy of the Union has thus largely been through helping to
produce more broadly acceptable policy outcomes rather than socialization of
their supporters. Further, relations between the NGO community and the
Commission are by no means always cordial (Warleigh, 2000). By its current
practice of providing funding for selected NGOs and preferring to work with
EU-level umbrella organizations, the Commission risks undermining both the
autonomy of NGOs (through imposing conditions on the grant of subsidies)
and their suitability as mechanisms of voice for the otherwise disenfranchized
(by favouring certain ‘tame’ groups). Given that NGOs operating in Brussels
are by no means predisposed to collaborate regularly even when they work in
the same policy sector (Geyer, 2001; see also below), this is a significant
problem. Moreover, since NGOs are sectoral in their interests there is a clear
limit to their ability to claim general representativity – compared with political
3 It is notoriously difficult to define NGOs as they cover such a wide range of policy areas and types of
organization. I here adopt the definition proposed by the World Bank (Operational Directive 14.70, 28
August 1989): NGOs are ‘groups and institutions that are entirely or largely independent of government
and that have primarily humanitarian or co-operative rather than commercial objectives; they are private
organizations that pursue activities to relieve suffering, provide basic social services, or undertake
community development; they also include citizens’ groups that raise awareness and influence policies’.
4 Whether this is true or not is a moot point (see below). However, it is certainly the case that NGOs often

make such claims, and in some cases attempt internal reforms – albeit with limited success – when such
claims are demonstrably inaccurate (Lister, 1999).

© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001

 ‘EUROPEANIZING’ CIVIL SOCIETY 623

parties, for example, their scope is narrower even if their memberships are
often far greater. Additionally, although they can be influential in shaping
individual policy outcomes by helping construct the necessary ‘policy coali-
tions’ (Warleigh, 2000), overall the ability of NGOs to influence EU policy
output is less than that of corporate lobbyists (Balanyá et al., 2000). Attempts
to make good this gap by affirmative action have so far been insufficient
(Venables, 2001). Clearly, if they are to play any significant role in the process
of Union democratization, NGOs must be granted further and more regular
access to EU decision-makers.
However, my hypothesis here is that, as in development policy, the crucial
test of whether NGOs are suitable vehicles for the entrenchment (and here, the
Europeanization) of civil society is their internal democracy (Edwards et al.,
1999; Robinson, 1994). They must not only seek and be able to achieve
influence over EU policy outcomes, but also educate their supporters5 about
EU policy and structures (Mitrany, 1954), as well as allow their supporters to
play a role in the formation of NGO policy on issues to be tackled at the EU
level. It must be recalled that two crucial variables which shape political
socialization are the experiences and relationships of the individual, and the
latter’s needs and capacities to act in the public sphere (Dawson et al., 1977,
pp. 39–40). Thus, NGOs must not only increase their supporters’ levels of
awareness about problems to be addressed at the EU level and how to
contribute to that process, but also provide a mechanism by which they can do
so (by participating in the decision-making of the NGO itself). Otherwise the
socialization process will be stillborn, with insufficient outlets for the newly
raised levels of awareness.
I argue that NGOs are, currently at least, unable to act as catalysts for the
Europeanization of civil society, since their internal governance procedures
are insufficiently democratic. I found no evidence of significant political
socialization by NGOs; decision-making is normally left in the hands of key
officers, with very little – if any – supporter input. NGOs usually make little
or no effort to educate their supporters about the need for engagement with EU
decision-makers, although they may well report on their lobbying at EU level.
Moreover – and perhaps more worryingly – I found no evidence that supporters
are unhappy with this passive role, displaying at best little interest in the EU
as a focus of campaigning or locus of political authority. Intriguingly, my
evidence points towards an EU often regarded by NGO supporters erroneously
as an irrelevance, with the WTO regarded far more often as an important target

5 Most NGOs have supporters rather than members. Within the ‘supporter’ category, a range of sub-
categories can be deployed, and many NGOs distinguish between donors, volunteers and campaigners. I
use the term ‘supporter’ throughout this article, unless there is a need to make a further distinction for
clarity.
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001
624 ALEX WARLEIGH

for mobilization. Thus, the prospects for the Europeanization of civil society
are slim unless internal reform is undertaken by the apparently chosen agents
of political socialization – NGOs – and accompanied by a broader process of
public dialogue-informed institutional reform within the EU itself.
I draw on research interviews carried out in two stages in Brussels, London
and around the UK between January 1999 and December 2000. The first set
involved actors (including NGO officers) in the legislative process for four
selected case study directives in environmental and consumer policy.6 The
second set of interviews was carried out with European policy officers from a
range of NGOs active at the EU level, and included both peak and non-peak
organizations across a range of issue areas – environment policy, consumer
policy, development policy, animal welfare, and social policy. It was impor-
tant to consider both peak and non-peak organizations in order to assess
whether good practice at the level of a given NGO would be frustrated by its
membership of the larger organization. It was important to investigate NGOs
from these policy areas because they resonate with large sections of the public
and demonstrate the EU’s growing role in matters other than market-making.
I also targeted groups which had experienced difficulties in functioning as part
of EU-level umbrella organizations, since it is especially nationally-based
groups, without privileged access to actors in Brussels, which will need to be
reached by the EU if it wants to contact further sections of the public. Although
the second part of the fieldwork was carried out in the UK, the NGOs in the
sample contained actors from several Member States, as well as NGOs of
different sizes, budgets and objectives, all linked by the fact that they are active
in seeking furtherance of their goals by engaging with the EU. Thus, at least
some generalizability is likely. An indication of the NGOs in the sample is
given in Table 1.
The structure of the article is as follows. Section I draws on the literature
on NGOs and democratization in development policy studies, to establish key
indicators of success or failure in NGO shaping of civil society, and to establish
equivalent indicators for the EU context. Subsequently Section II relates the
key findings of my empirical research, and Section III returns to my hypothesis
and sets out conclusions.

I. NGOs and Civil Society: Lessons from Development Policy

My purpose in this section is explicitly not to propose a comparison between
the EU and countries which receive development aid on the grounds that both
the EU as a system and developing countries are in the process of democrati-
zation: in terms of political, social and economic structures and practices there
6 For a full analysis of the policy-making dynamics uncovered by this fieldwork, see Warleigh (2000).
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001
 ‘EUROPEANIZING’ CIVIL SOCIETY 625
Table 1: Indicative Selection of NGOs in the Sample
NGO Character Principal Policy Areas Size

World Wide Fund European peak Environment Large European

for Nature (Europe) organization
Consumers’ National Consumer policy Large national
Association
Consumers in National peak Consumer policy Large national
Europe organization
Stonewall National Civil liberties/ Medium national
social policy
Action Aid National Development policy Medium national
Eurostep European peak Development policy Medium European
organization
BEUC European peak Consumer policy Medium European
organization
Compassion in National Animal welfare/ Medium national
World Farming environment
European Dialogue National Social policy Small national

are obviously far too many significant differences to justify such an approach.
However, in all comparative political science it is necessary to use the best
comparator available given the absence of a complete equivalent for any given
subject of study (Calvert, 1993): in other words, it is helpful to go slightly ‘out
of area’ in order to help identify key variables for the present study, given the
lack of evidence from nearer to home. In fact, analysis of the literature on
development policy reveals much of interest here: it points to systemic
constraints, actor behaviours and management problems whose equivalents in
the EU context are easily identifiable. However, it is obviously necessary
explicitly to adapt such findings to the EU context in order to develop useful
analytical categories. For example, in development policy NGO supporters are
usually in the developed world, whereas their clients and/or targets are
elsewhere, usually in the ‘south’, and in the EU case this kind of gap does not
usually arise (with the exception of environment policy).
In the area of development policy, NGOs have been given official recog-
nition as contributors to the entrenchment, and even creation, of civil society.
The UN and World Bank explicitly refer to NGOs as key actors in the process
of constructing a new civil society in developing countries, and often impose

© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001

626 ALEX WARLEIGH

conditions on their donations of aid to bolster the role and authority of NGOs
acting in such territories (Whaites, 1996). Donor governments can preserve
their neoliberal credentials whilst contracting welfare work out to NGOs
which, in their capacity as implementers of social and welfare policies, ease the
cost burden on recipient governments, and also allow them to keep good faith
in public with the economic policy requirements imposed on them by donor
countries (Edwards and Hulme, 1996b).
NGOs can be highly effective in this role, if they work collaboratively in
their own sector and with other official and unofficial agencies (Brown and
Ashman, 1996). In fact, certain studies reveal that this collaboration can, at its
best, produce a situation in which governments and NGOs are interdependent,
with no evidence of a principal–agent dynamic. This is often the case in Africa,
for example, since the cadres in both NGO and government communities often
share similar backgrounds, education and values (van Klinken, 1998). NGOs
can go further still; they can be responsible for the fostering and safe-keeping
of civil society under a dictatorial regime (Hojman, 1993). Looking beyond
national borders, there is evidence to support the argument that NGOs could
become at least co-shapers of a globalized civil society with the rise of protest
at global (WTO, Davos summit) level. In this analysis, NGOs may (after
internal organizational reform) be the harbingers of a worldwide struggle to
empower the ‘4th world’, i.e. the disenfranchized in any country, developed or
otherwise (Edwards et al., 1999; Fowler, 1999; Klein, 2000).
Nonetheless, there are significant corollaries to be borne in mind. Accord-
ing to Covey (1996), NGOs are at an immediate difficulty in comparison with
other forms of organization in that they need to satisfy two sets of accounta-
bility criteria: they must not only meet their stated aims, but do so in a way
which empowers both supporters and clients, thereby reinforcing civil society.
Thus, it is not enough for NGOs to be efficient. To justify their claims to
difference and the promotion of alternative values, as well as the role in civil-
society building which they have been allocated and also tend to claim, they
must demonstrate political socialization of their client/member group as a
result of their work. The cognitive and affective impact of NGOs’ work is thus
at least as important as their practical success rates: existing merely as an
efficient service provider is not enough, no matter how worthy the service. In
this respect development NGOs’ contribution to the reinforcement of civil
society is rendered problematic, as most of them are service providers, an
unsurprising fact given the official justification of their role set out above
(Clayton, 1994).
The relationship between northern NGOs (NNGOs) and their partners in
the south (SNGOs) is also open to question. Several writers have commented

© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001

 ‘EUROPEANIZING’ CIVIL SOCIETY 627

on many NNGOs’ ability and will to allow SNGOs very little influence in their
partnership. Indeed, NNGOs often use the alleged failings of their southern
equivalents as an excuse both to ignore their own shortcomings and impose
their own agendas on unwilling so-called partners (James, 1997; Powell and
Seddon, 1997; Lister, 1999). Either through deliberate choice or through lack
of viable alternatives, even the most well-intentioned NGOs usually find that
they are merely tools in a project of rolling back the state, whose primary target
is to secure economic growth by non-social democratic means (Feldman,
1997; Powell and Seddon, 1997; Morris-Suzuki, 2000). At best, they can hope
that good service delivery will produce a multiplier effect (Fowler, 1993).
Thus, the very fact which legitimizes the work of NGOs in the eyes of
international organizations and host governments is what makes their contri-
bution to the entrenchment of civil society in those countries highly unlikely.
Worse, such governments often use NGOs as part of a strategy to marginalize
the sectors of society they most disfavour by promoting a bogus discourse of
inclusion-via-NGOs which is in fact deliberately limited to only favoured
groups (Devine, 1996).7 Thus, through no fault of their own, NGOs often find
that they are doing the precise opposite of building civil society: they are
reinforcing the power of the state at the expense of the most vulnerable within
it, and aiding further social division. Moreover, NGOs can often be too eager
to ‘gap-fill’, rushing to exploit seeming opportunities provided by the lack of
state provision which in fact stretch their resources and expertise too far
(Whaites, 1998). Evangelism thus leads to a no-win situation in which the state
refuses to act and NGOs are incapable of doing so.
This lack of critical reflection on their own activities hampers NGOs in
other ways, even if we restrict analysis to the issue of civil society formation.
The fact that donors insist on conditionality means that NGOs are often
compromised by – or complicit in – the promulgation of neoliberal-inspired
views of good governance which are often inappropriate for the client commu-
nities (Robinson, 1994). Since host governments often refuse to recognize as
legitimate NGOs which they do not themselves at least part-fund (Edwards and
Hulme, 1996b), this inability to be reflexive is often actually imposed. Thus,
NGOs simply fail to live up to the criteria for their effectiveness set out by
Covey (1996). Instead of going where they can do most good for the margin-
alized, they often mimic multinational corporations by seeking the most
beneficial locations in terms of resources (Feldman, 1997). There may be good
reasons for this: after all, no organization can work without funding. However,
it is clearly important to remember that this constraint will limit the ability of
NGOs to act impartially, for all the reasons set out above.
7There are of course parallels with NGO activity in the EU, as quasi-clientelistic relationships can lie
behind ostensibly inclusive patterns of consultation about policy.
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001
628 ALEX WARLEIGH

Studies into the ability of NGOs to foster or construct civil society through
work in development policy thus reveal that this is unlikely without a
supporting state which is both sufficiently strong to provide resources and
structures, and sufficiently open to democratization to allow NGOs a free hand
(Brown and Altman, 1996; Whaites, 1998; Lister, 1999). In addition, they must
have a client group which is both willing and able to collaborate in the process
of civil society creation. They thus need, rather paradoxically, to draw on
existing political socialization. Crucially, given that most development NGOs
are not set up by client groups or their members (Uphoff, 1996), and pay scant
regard to internal accountability and transparency (Edwards and Hulme,
1996a), they are unlikely to have this capacity. Thus, it appears that the primary
task of development NGOs is to be the providers of welfare services – a worthy
and useful function, but not one to be confused with politicization or the
inculcation (or even reinforcement) of participatory political values. Table 2
lists the main variables to analyse in studying the role NGOs can play in the
Europeanization of civil society as indicated by analysis of their attempts to
play a similar role in development policy.8
The first key variable here, the ability to construct ‘policy coalitions’,
equates to the ability of NGOs in development policy to work collectively with

Table 2: NGOs and Civil Society Construction

Key Variable Indicator in EU Context

Collaboration with other NGOs and Ability to construct policy coalitions

like-minded actors
Independence
Democratic internal governance
Cognitive impact on supporters
Concentration on politicization
rather than service delivery
Ability to be self-critical
Ability to draw on existing
political socialization
Reliance on non-official sources of funding
(either EU or national)
Participation in decision-making by supporters
Increased awareness of, and engagement with,
EU decision-making
Privileging advocacy role
Officer-supporter dialogue; internal review
Large base of supporters willing to participate
in decision-making

8The need for a strong supporting state structure is not listed as a key variable for two reasons: first, to
avoid a circular debate on whether the EU is, or could ever be, a Westphalian-style state; second, because
even in the interlocking system of EU governance, there is no question that the necessary ability to provide
supporting structures for NGO activity exists, an assumption which is not always safe to make in
development policy. However, I acknowledge that should the Member States wish to prevent NGOs
contributing to the Europeanization of civil society, they are likely to be able to do so.

© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001

 ‘EUROPEANIZING’ CIVIL SOCIETY 629

both governmental and other actors in order to secure policy objectives and/or
influence legislation. In the EU context, this does not have to mean becoming
part of a policy community, but rather developing the ability to operate
effectively in the maelstrom of networks which shape the EU public policy
process. The second criterion, independence, essentially focuses on financial
issues: in both development policy and the EU context, NGOs must be able to
choose their own course of action rather than be compelled by financial
pressures to undertake tasks or follow policy positions imposed by an external
funding body. Third, the issue of participation by supporters in decision-
making is of vital importance if the socialization function is to be achieved (see
above). Fourth, and similarly, NGOs are able to help facilitate political
socialization of their supporters into the EU system only if they carry out
education about that system and the ways in which it can be affected. This
corresponds to the more general criterion in development policy of trying to
encourage the birth of citizenship by cognitive impact. The fifth criterion,
privileging advocacy, is important because it allows NGOs to act as channels
of political opinion rather than either service deliverers or, in the EU context,
mouthpieces of the institutions. The sixth criterion is vital: NGOs must have
reflexive practices of internal governance, in which officers communicate
regularly and fully with supporters and also treat the latter as real interlocutors
rather than consumers. Finally, NGOs must take the initial commitment of
their supporters and harness it by encouraging and developing their will and
ability to take part in the NGO’s governance processes. This equates to the need
in development policy for NGOs to draw on (often non-existent) prior political
socialization to be optimally effective, and is a criterion in which EU-level
NGOs have the potential to do well, since at least some degree of political
socialization is demonstrated by an individual’s choice to support them.

II. NGOs and Civil Society Construction in the European Union9

In the following section I isolate each key variable and present an analysis of
the relevant fieldwork data.

Variable 1: Collaboration with Like-minded Actors

Many NGOs are certainly able to find suitable partners at EU level. As I explain
elsewhere (Warleigh, 2000), they are entirely capable of finding actors whose
concerns are symmetrical, at least on a given issue, and thereby able to create
or at least take part in the ‘policy coalitions’ which shape EU output. EU actors

9The data presented in this section should be understood as the general line of the interviewees unless
specifically attributed. Interview transcripts are on file at Queen’s University, Belfast.
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001
630 ALEX WARLEIGH

even approach NGO officers in order to secure their support. However, what
is less clear is the latter’s ability to make strong links with other actors from the
NGO community. All NGO officers interviewed reported that they have few
regular allies within the NGO community; officers preferred to make alliances
on an ad hoc basis with other NGOs able to answer strategic needs. Larger10
NGOs saw this process as one which often allowed them to develop senior
roles within issue-specific partnerships, since they had the resources to impose
their will on their partners. Smaller NGOs tended to be heavily reliant on
umbrella organizations at the EU level, often leaving much of the EU-level
campaigning work to them. Nationally-based NGOs tended to focus their
campaigning work on national actors, hoping thereby to feed their concerns
into the EU policy-making process. However, even if only as a result of
resource problems, NGOs do not tend to ‘gap-fill’ at EU level, since they
concentrate on dossiers which are crucial to their interests or to which they feel
able to make a difference. As a corollary, however, there was no apparent sense
that it was always necessary for the NGO community to be represented; if the
officers of each NGO in the sample felt that an issue was insufficiently central
to their concerns, they would not mobilize, even if this would mean an absence
of NGO voices.

Variable 2: Independence
Smaller NGOs in the sample reported increasing difficulty with maintaining
their independence. Lack of resources and low supporter numbers were
pushing them to undertake more rather than less project work on a contract
basis, with funding provided by official sources. Of course, such NGOs retain
some ability simply not to bid for projects they dislike – but the need for
resources inevitably truncates this, given the widespread imposition of condi-
tionality on project work by funders. Larger NGOs were less constrained by
this problem, since donations from members of the public and such fund-
raising activities as operating gift catalogues make up a significant proportion
of their income. Even so, officers from such larger NGOs reported that
competition for funding between different kinds of NGO could lead to an
insidious extra influence for official funders through an undeclared strategy of
divide-and-rule and the privileging of certain kinds of NGO over others.11

10 I make no claim to having developed a scientific taxonomy of NGOs, using the labels ‘larger’ and
‘smaller’ purely to mark the difference between an organization like Oxfam, an internationally recognized
NGO with hundreds of staff in many countries, and European Dialogue, an NGO dedicated to promoting
east–west dialogue in Europe, which has a core staff of fewer than 5 and a very small office in London.
11 This view was expressed particularly by environmental groups, anxious about their inability to shape

agendas in the field of development policy.

© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001

 ‘EUROPEANIZING’ CIVIL SOCIETY 631

Variable 3: Democratic Internal Governance

None of the NGOs in the sample functioned as a supporter-run organization.
Almost all of their officers consider citizens who send them money or
volunteer their services to be ‘supporters’ or ‘friends’ rather than members.
Decision-making about lobbying or campaigning was heavily centralized, and
shaped entirely by the relevant officers, although in the larger NGOs often via
elaborate mechanisms to ensure that all the relevant staff members within the
organization were able to make an input. Supporters played no formal role in
the decision-making of any NGO in the sample, with three exceptions. In one
case (War on Want), members are specifically defined as supporters able to
attend the AGM; in another case, members are expected to attend the annual
general meeting (AGM) as a primary part of their responsibilities (European
Dialogue); in a third case, members are able to sit on the governing council,
which is also elected by the membership (Consumers’ Association). Umbrella
organizations were punctilious about ensuring that their members (i.e. NGOs)
had an equal say in decision-making, but acknowledged that subsidiarity
prevented their ensuring that the same was done by their member organizations
internally. NGO officers were often perplexed when asked about their account-
ability, considering it to exist primarily in terms of reflecting the values of the
organization for which they worked, honest financial accounting, and acting
within the law via formal methods, such as annual meetings of the board of
trustees. Actors in development and environment sectors considered that they
had a ‘responsibility’ towards those they were trying to help – client groups,
or the environment itself. However, no interviewee considered that his/her
NGO was primarily accountable to its supporters. Instead, they usually
considered that dissemination of information via a very general (and often
glossy rather than in-depth) newsletter – usually quarterly, but occasionally
less regular – was an adequate form of transparency. Supporter input into
decision-making was usually minimal, although those who decided on a self-
selecting basis to volunteer their expertise or evidence for use in campaigning
were welcomed. In one case (Stonewall), supporters are regularly sent opinion
surveys, the results of which are used to fine-tune campaigns (but not to choose
their subject or objectives).

Variable 4: Cognitive Impact on Supporters

In the case of one of the umbrella organizations in the sample (Consumers in
Europe), it was reported that certain member organizations had affiliated
themselves as a conscious strategy for understanding how the EU works and
affects their interests. It was possible in some cases for individual supporters
with an interest in a particular campaign to work as part of it on a voluntary

© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001

632 ALEX WARLEIGH

basis, particularly in smaller NGOs. However, even in such cases it was

reported by NGO officers that such activism was brought to the organization
by the supporter, rather than deliberately fostered by the NGO itself. Campaign
input by supporters tended to be the provision of evidence or expertise, with
the primary focus being on solving a particular problem, and mobilization at
the EU level seen as purely instrumental, if the need for it was understood at
all. Most supporters of the NGOs in the sample were not aware of the
organization’s activities at EU level. Their appreciation and understanding of
the EU’s impact and powers was universally thought to be low. Most NGO
officers12 believed they had no responsibility to explain to supporters why it
was necessary for them to engage with the EU, although all NGOs in the sample
report their activities at EU level just as they report their work at national level.
In many cases officers considered that their supporters were largely divorced
from the EU policy agenda and unaware of its role in the policy area(s) they
prioritized; instead, supporters interested in the non-national arena of decision-
making tended to be more aware of, and more concerned about, the WTO, IMF
and World Bank. Moreover, the fact that certain of the NGOs in the sample had
predominantly been active at the European Court of Human Rights and the
Council of Europe rather than the EU meant that their supporters thought of
these institutions rather than those of the Union when considering the ‘Euro-
pean’ level of campaigns.

Variable 5: Concentration on Politicization rather than Service Delivery

Most NGOs in the sample undertake both campaigning and service delivery
work, but in terms of the EU itself only campaigns are pertinent activities: even
if the EU funds projects for the sample NGOs they tend to be realized outside
the EU, in the former Soviet bloc or developing countries. Nonetheless, the
NGOs have not yet placed great emphasis on explicit politicization of their
supporters regarding EU issues, and have not constructed any lasting ‘civil
society’ coalition at EU level, favouring instead issue-specific alliances with
any actors possessing symmetrical concerns alongside membership of umbrel-
la organizations devoted to their specific policy areas. Although officers
reported that it is necessary to build coalitions on a cross-national basis to shape
policy, competition between NGOs for resources and public profile precluded
the formation of stable advocacy coalitions. Nonetheless, in at least one case
(animal welfare), the extension of EU competence has led to the establishment
of new NGOs in several Member States, and also co-operation between

12 An exception is Consumers in Europe. The Consumers’ Association also reported an attempt to take on

an educational role about the EU, but said that it had been forced to discontinue this due to resource
problems.

© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001

 ‘EUROPEANIZING’ CIVIL SOCIETY 633

them.13 Supporters are regularly called upon to take part in campaigns by such
means as letter-writing, but the minimal role played by supporters in the
internal governance of the NGOs in the sample means that their political
socialization by the NGO is limited. Moreover, smaller NGOs reported an
increased need to turn to service delivery in order to secure funding. However,
at least one NGO in the sample (War on Want) is engaged in an explicit process
of attempting to politicize its supporters in order to strengthen its credibility as
a campaigning organization. Moreover, several other interviewees stated that
their organizations were increasingly seeking to emphasize campaigning
work, and would thus be undertaking a process of consciousness-raising
among their supporters in the coming years.14

Variable 6: Ability to be Self-critical

Although issues of accountability and participation were insufficiently en-
trenched in the culture of NGOs in the sample, the interviews nonetheless
revealed an ability to conduct performance audits. Several of the NGOs studied
have undertaken such reviews in recent years, with varying degrees of
supporter involvement. There was no uniform trend; the smallest NGO in the
sample, European Dialogue, is shifting towards service delivery thanks to
resource pressures, yet others were seeking to increase their role in advocacy
and campaigning. In all such cases, the decision to shift emphasis came from
the officers of the NGO, sometimes under pressure from external funders.

Variable 7: Ability to Draw on Existing Political Socialization

In a very basic sense, this is a key difference between the supporters of NGOs
in the Member States and their target clients in development policy – the
former by definition have at least some degree of civic culture and choose to
express it through support of selected organizations, whereas client groups
may have no, or very different, notions of political participation from those of
the NGO officers or supporters in the ‘north’. Nonetheless, all interviewees
admitted that there is often a severe dislocation between what their supporters
want or are interested in and what the NGO actually does. Many supporters
have no idea about the issues involved in lobbying at national or transnational
level; moreover, they may be moved to support an NGO by no more than well-
meaning but vague notions about doing ‘good works’ such as saving whales
or feeding the hungry. This means that NGO officers have to engage with a
range of issues about which their supporters usually know little, and in which

13Interview with NGO officer, 1 December 2000.

14This is particularly true of Action Aid, which is seeking as a parallel trend to increase the role of its
SNGO stakeholders in project management in order to concentrate on campaigning and advocacy issues.

© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001

634 ALEX WARLEIGH

they may be uninterested. This leads to the conclusion that NGOs often
undertake activities about which their supporters know and understand very
little, and with which they may disagree.15 When issues are tackled transna-
tionally, this problem is exacerbated. In one case, it was stated that the NGO
had a very active membership drawn predominantly from middle class/
professional sectors, whose professional and political skills were regularly
placed at the NGO’s disposal.16 Smaller NGOs were happy to allow supporters
to add their expertise to their teams on specific campaigns on a voluntary basis.
However, a key finding of the fieldwork is that most NGO supporters do not
seek to play an active role in the governance of the organization or to influence
its policies and campaigns. Every interviewee stated this; several pointed to
evidence from surveys of supporter opinion which they had carried out and in
some cases even had independently reviewed. Several conceded that this lack
of participation was a problem for their credibility,17 and one organization in

Table 3: Civil Society Europeanization

Key Variable Indicator in EU Context Rating
(* = low; **** = high)

Collaboration with other Ability to construct ***

NGOs and like-minded
actors
Independence
Democratic internal
governance
Cognitive impact on
supporters
Concentration on
politicization rather than
service delivery
Ability to be self-critical
Ability to draw on existing
political socialization
policy coalitions
Reliance on non-official ***
sources of funding
Participation in decision- *
making by supporters
Increased awareness of, and *
engagement with,
EU decision-making
Privileging advocacy role ***
Officer-supporter dialogue; **
internal review
Large base of supporters willing *
to participate in decision-making

15 From the point of view of securing ‘progressive’ outcomes to policy disputes, this may be beneficial;
some interviewees stated that supporters of their NGO often had generally conservative political views.
A certain degree of obfuscation about the activities of the organization was thus necessary to secure its
objectives, but this is hardly transparent and accountable internal governance.
16 Interview with NGO officer, 20 November 2000.
17 Intriguingly, by no means all of them related this back to their organization’s opaque decision-making

structures.
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001
 ‘EUROPEANIZING’ CIVIL SOCIETY 635

the sample is actively trying to promote greater participation (War on Want).

Table 3 summarizes the main findings of the fieldwork.

III. Conclusions: Institutional Reform and

The Europeanization of Civil Society
This research sheds light on the changing nature of politics in the EU by
addressing the potential for enhancing the democratization process through the
Europeanization of civil society. NGOs are much favoured as key catalysts in
this process. The evidence presented here suggests that we should be sceptical
about their potential in this regard. Thus, other tools are likely to be necessary.
My hypothesis was that NGOs will be unable to act as agents of civil society
Europeanization unless they are internally democratic and both willing and
able to act as instruments of political socialization, with particular reference to
EU decision-making and policy. I found that NGOs are as yet simply not ready
to play this role, and, given the continuing resource problems forcing the
smallest among their number to head in the opposite direction, it cannot be
assumed that their capacity to act in this way will improve. Although NGOs can
score highly on their ability to influence EU policy and are developing higher
profiles as political campaigners, their internal governance is far too elitist to
allow supporters a role in shaping policies, campaigns and strategies, even at
one remove. Moreover, and more disconcertingly, it appears clear that most
NGO supporters do not actually want to undertake such a role. Thus, even if,
as is possible, NGOs undertake a thorough review of their internal governance
procedures and their role as educators about ‘civicness’, it cannot be assumed
that supporters will wish to avail themselves of the new opportunities for
influencing EU policy. They may thus remain unaware of the impact of the EU
on their daily lives, even when this is positive – a key problem given that there
is no underlying permissive consensus on which the Union can draw. Conse-
quently, the main finding of work in development policy – that NGOs are no
‘magic bullet’ which will automatically hit the target of political socialization
(Edwards and Hulme, 1996a) – is repeated here.
Thus, the Europeanization of civil society requires a twin strategy in which
NGOs can reform and play a part, but in which issues of institutional reform
at the EU level constitute a vital complement. First, the opportunity structures
available to NGOs at EU level must be improved, and a genuine attempt made
to reach NGOs which hitherto have not mobilized at EU level. As a flanking
measure, the role of civil society in all stages of the legislative chain must be
enhanced. To that end, national governments must be obliged openly to consult
relevant civil society actors about proposed EU legislation according to a
quasi-corporatist model based on a system of national committees appointed
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001
636 ALEX WARLEIGH

by independent commissions. Moreover, as Scott (1998) suggests, the ‘part-

nership principle’ of cohesion policy must be exported to other areas of EU
activity. This could be done particularly effectively in environmental, consum-
er and social policies, involving a broad swathe of citizens and socializing them
into the evolving ‘European’ system. However, EU actors must not expect
NGOs to tell them what they want to hear. Instead, the Union should impose
a different kind of conditionality: NGOs must address their internal democracy
as the price of access to EU decision-makers. This would benefit the Union by
providing opportunities for political socialization of the citizen. It would also
benefit NGOs, since, by adopting a more ‘stake-holding’ style, they would
simultaneously re-emphasize their links to the public and allow supporters to
identify more closely with them. In turn, this could produce a virtuous circle
in terms of member/supporter commitment and involvement – a real asset for
the notoriously resource-constrained NGO sector.
Second, a broader attempt to engage the public and initiate further institu-
tional reform based on sustained public dialogue is required in order to bring
the trajectories of integration and public opinion closer together. In this
respect, the civil dialogue proposed as preparation for the IGC due in 2004 is
promising, but it must be elaborated as a genuine attempt to uncover public
opinion rather than as a bid to impose a particular model of reform decided a
priori by either federalists or intergovernmentalists. Taken together, such
measures would provide great opportunities to Europeanize civil society and
thereby improve the EU’s ability to manage persisting differences between its
citizens.

Correspondence:
Alex Warleigh
Institute of Governance, Public Policy and Social Research
Queen’s University Belfast
Belfast BT7 1NN, Northern Ireland
Tel: (+44) 0 2890 335 382 Fax: (+44) 0 2890 238 133
email: A.Warleigh@qub.ac.uk

References
Almond, G. and Verba, S. (1963) The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democ-
racy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
Balanyá, B., Doherty, A., Hœdeman, O., Ma’anit, A. and Wesselius, E. (2000) Europe
Inc: Regional and Global Restructuring and the Rise of Corporate Power
(London: Pluto).

© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001

 ‘EUROPEANIZING’ CIVIL SOCIETY 637
Bellamy, R. and Warleigh, A. (1998) ‘From an Ethics of Integration to an Ethics of
Participation: Citizenship and the Future of the European Union’. Millennium,
Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 447–70.
Blondel, J., Svensson, S. and Sinnott, R. (1998) People and Parliament in the
European Union: Participation, Democracy and Legitimacy (Oxford: Claren-
don).
Brown, L.D. and Ashman, D. (1996) ‘Participation, Social Capital and Intersectoral
Problem Solving: African and Asian Cases’. World Development, Vol. 24, No. 9,
pp. 1467–79.
Calvert, P. (1993) An Introduction to Comparative Politics (London: Harvester
Wheatsheaf).
Clayton, A. (1994) ‘Introduction’. In Clayton, A. (ed.), pp. 1–7.
Clayton, A. (ed.) (1994) Governance, Democracy and Conditionality: What Role for
NGOs? (Oxford: INTRAC).
Covey, J.G. (1996) ‘Accountability and Effectiveness in NGO Policy Alliances’. In
Edwards, M. and Hulme, D. (eds), pp. 198–214.
Cram, L. (1998) ‘The EU Institutions and Collective Action: Constructing a European
Interest?’. In Greenwood, J. and Aspinwall, M. (eds) Collective Action in the
European Union (London: Routledge), pp. 63–80.
Dawson, R., Prewitt, K. and Dawson, K. (1977) Political Socialization. 2nd edn
(Boston: Little, Brown).
Devine, J. (1996) NGOs: Changing Fashion, or Fashioning Change?, Occasional
Paper 02/96 (University of Bath: Centre for Development Studies).
Edwards, M. and Hulme, D. (1996a): ‘Beyond the Magic Bullet? Lessons and
Guidelines’. In Edwards M. and Hulme, D. (eds).
Edwards, M. and Hulme, D. (1996b) ‘Introduction: NGO Performance and Account-
ability’. In Edwards, M. and Hulme, D. (eds), pp. 1–21.
Edwards, M. and Hulme, D. (eds) (1996c) Beyond the Magic Bullet – NGO Perform-
ance and Accountability in the Post-Cold War World (West Hartford, Connecti-
cut: Kumarian Press)
Edwards, M., Hulme, D. and Wallace, T. (1999) ‘NGOs in a Global Future: Marrying
Local Delivery to Worldwide Leverage’. Public Administration and Develop-
ment, Vol. 19, pp. 117–36.
Eriksen, E.O. and Fossum, J.E. (eds) (2000) Democracy in the EU: Integration
Through Deliberation? (London: Routledge).
Feldman, S. (1997) ‘NGOs and Civil Society: (Un)Stated Contradictions’. Annals of
the American Society of Political and Social Science, Vol. 554, pp. 46–65.
Fowler, A. (1993) ‘Non-Governmental Organizations as Agents of Democratization:
An African Perspective’. Journal of International Development, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp.
325–39.
Fowler, A. (1999) ‘Relevance in the 21st Century: The Case for Devolution and
Global Association of International NGOs’. Development in Practice, Vol. 9, Nos.
1&2, pp. 43–51.
Gabel, M.J. (1998) Interests and Integration: Market Liberalization, Public Opinion
and European Union (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press).
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001
638 ALEX WARLEIGH

Geyer, R. (2001) ‘Can EU Social NGOs Co-operate to Promote EU Social Policy?’.

Journal of Social Policy, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 477–93.
Greenwood, J. (1997) Representing Interests in the European Union (Basingstoke:
Macmillan).
Greenwood, J. and Ronit, K. (1994) ‘Interest Groups in the European Community:
Newly Emerging Dynamics and Forms’. West European Politics, Vol. 17, No. 1,
pp. 31–52.
Hall, J.A. (1995) ‘In Search of Civil Society’. In Hall, J.A. (ed.), pp. 1–31.
Hall, J.A. (ed.) (1995) Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison (Cambridge:
Polity).
Heater, D. (1974) Contemporary Political Ideas (London: Longman).
Hojman, D.E. (1993) ‘Non-governmental Organizations and the Chilean Transition
to Democracy’. European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, Vol.
54, pp. 7–24.
James, R. (1997) ‘Organizational Strengthening of European NGOs’. Journal of
International Development, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 605–11.
Janoski, T. (1998) Citizenship and Civil Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press).
Keane, J. (1998) ‘Introduction’. In Keane, J. (ed.) Civil Society and the State: New
European Perspectives (London: Verso), pp. 1–31.
Klein, N. (2000) No Logo (London: Flamingo).
Lister, S. (1999) Power in Partnership? An Analysis of an NGO’s Relationships with
its Partners (London: LSE, Centre for Voluntary Organization).
Mitrany, D. (1954) ‘A New Democratic Experiment’. Review of International
Cooperation, Vol. 47, No. 5, pp. 110–12.
Morris-Suzuki, T. (2000) ‘For and Against NGOs’. New Left Review, March-April,
pp. 63–84.
Pérez-Díaz, V. (1995) ‘The Possibilities of Civil Society: Traditions, Character and
Challenges’. In Hall, J.A. (ed.), pp. 80–109.
Pérez-Díaz, V. (1998) ‘The Public Sphere and a European Civil Society’. In Alexan-
der, J. (ed.) Real Civil Societies: Dilemmas of Institutionalization (London: Sage),
pp. 211–38.
Powell, M. and Seddon, D. (1997) ‘NGOs and the Development Industry’. Review of
African Political Economy, Vol. 71, pp. 3–10.
Reising, U.K.H. (1998) ‘Domestic and Supranational Political Opportunities: Euro-
pean Protest in Selected Countries 1980–95’. European Integration Online Papers
Vol. 2 [1998], No. 5 «http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1998-005a.htm».
Robinson, M. (1994) ‘Governance, Democracy and Conditionality: NGOs and the
New Policy Agenda’. In Clayton, A. (ed.), pp. 35–52.
Scott, J. (1998) ‘Law, Legitimacy and EC Governance: Prospects for “Partnership”’.
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 175–94.
Tocqueville, A. de (1981[1835]) De la Démocratie en Amérique (Paris: Garnier-
Flammarion).

© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001

 ‘EUROPEANIZING’ CIVIL SOCIETY 639
Uphoff, N. (1996) ‘Why NGOs are Not a Third Sector’. In Edwards, M. and Hulme,
D. (eds).
Van Klinken, M.K. (1998) ‘Beyond the NGO–Government Divide: Network NGOs
in East Africa’. Development in Practice, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 349–53.
Venables, T. (2001) ‘Towards Parity of Influence? NGOs in EU Policy Making’.
Paper given to the Conference ‘Persuasion, Advocacy and Influence in the
European Union’, University of Reading, 26–7 January.
Walzer, M. (ed.) (1995) Toward a Global Civil Society (Oxford: Berghahn).
Warleigh, A. (2000) ‘The Hustle: Citizenship Practice, NGOs and “Policy Coalitions”
in the European Union – The Cases of Auto Oil, Drinking Water and Unit Pricing’.
Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 229–43.
Warleigh, A. (2001) ‘Purposeful Opportunists? EU Institutions and the Struggle over
European Citizenship’. In Bellamy, R. and Warleigh, A. (eds) Citizenship and
Governance in the European Union (London: Continuum), pp. 19–40.
Warleigh, A. (2002, forthcoming) ‘Towards Network Democracy? The Potential of
Flexible Integration’. In Farrell, M., Fella, S. and Newman, M. (eds) European
Integration in the 21st Century: Unity and Diversity? (London: Sage).
Whaites, A. (1996) ‘Let’s Get Civil Society Straight: NGOs and Political Theory’.
Development in Practice, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 240–4.
Whaites, A. (1998) ‘NGOs, Civil Society and the State: Avoiding Theoretical
Extremes in Real-world Issues’. Development in Practice, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 343–
9.
Wiener, A. (1998) ‘European’ Citizenship Practice: Building Institutions of a Non-
state (Oxford: Westview).
Wiener, A. and Della Salla, V. (1997) ‘Constitution-making and Citizenship Practice:
Bridging the Democracy Gap in the EU?’. Journal of Common Market Studies,
Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 595–614.

© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001