Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

ISSN: 1057-610X (Print) 1521-0731 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uter20

Reality Versus Perception: Toward Understanding

Boko Haram in Nigeria

Anneli Botha & Mahdi Abdile

To cite this article: Anneli Botha & Mahdi Abdile (2017): Reality Versus Perception:
Toward Understanding Boko Haram in Nigeria, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, DOI:
10.1080/1057610X.2018.1403152

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1403152

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STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM
https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1403152

Reality Versus Perception: Toward Understanding Boko Haram

in Nigeria
a
Anneli Botha and Mahdi Abdileb
a
Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa;
b
Secretariat of the Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers, Helsinki

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

This article will explore the perception of individuals associated with Received 7 June 2017
civil society and working in Boko Haram–affected areas. This will Accepted 9 October 2017
compare the reality as reflected by former Boko Haram members.
Central to this analysis will be who, why, and how individuals get
involved in Boko Haram. Comparing perceptions with empirical
evidence, civil society actors, but also policymakers tasked with
addressing violent extremism, are reminded not to rely on perceptions
when developing and implementing preventative measures and
countermeasures. Additionally, a larger than expected former female
Boko Haram sample was included that allowed a comparison to be
made between the male and female samples, with specific reference
to why and how women became members of Boko Haram.

Interviewing individuals who joined violent extremist movements or interviewing individu-

als or organizations dealing with and working in affected areas are not new. Considering the
value of conducting primary research into who, why, and how individuals join Boko Haram
has on contributing to the body of knowledge in understanding radicalization into violent
extremism movements, its value in developing initiatives to prevent violent extremism
(PVE) is tremendous. Additionally, when recognizing the value of perception analysis, this
project took research in this field one step further by collecting primary data on how mem-
bers of civil society (hereafter referred to as peacebuilders)—working in areas affected by
Boko Haram activities in Nigeria—perceive who, why, and how individuals join Boko
Haram. Conducting interviews with civil society actors and other commentators are not by
any means a novelty. What is new though is interviewing Boko Haram members, as well as
those individuals active as part of civil society tasked with addressing or preventing persons
from joining violent extremist movements in one study. Understandably, perceptions of the
latter will influence the type of initiatives civil society organizations will develop and imple-
ment to prevent and counter radicalization into violent extremist organization (P/CVE). But
what if there is a difference between reality (as captured by Boko Haram members inter-
viewed) and perception on the part of civil society members? The challenge is that should

CONTACT Dr. Anneli Botha BothaA1@ufs.ac.za P.O. Box 339, Bloemfontein, 9300.
Color versions of one or more of the figures in the article can be found online at www.tandfonline.com/uter.
© 2017 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
2 A. BOTHA AND M. ABDILE

these initiatives not address the practical realities on the ground, the said efforts will not be
effective and a lasting solution to Boko Haram would not be achieved.
Through this research article the void that sometimes exists between academics and prac-
titioners will be bridged through the value empirical studies can bring to advising policy-
makers, donors, and civil society alike regarding radicalization into Boko Haram.
Developing and implementing preventative measures and countermeasures founded on
empirical data, governments and civil society will be in a better position to successfully iden-
tify those at risk, while addressing the why and how individuals are recruited.
When enquiring into the reasons for joining Boko Haram, the study utilized qualitative
and quantitative interviews with both peacebuilders and former Boko Haram fighters. Of
particular interest was the potential role religion might have played in the radicalization and
recruitment process. As will be discussed in the article, the perception that individuals are
drawn to Boko Haram by its religious ideology turned out to be incorrect. In fact, peace-
builders initially considered religion overwhelmingly as the main factor facilitating
recruitment. Qualitative interviews with peacebuilders after completion of the study showed
a more nuanced understanding of how Boko Haram managed to secure recruitment.
Furthermore, unemployment, lack of education, gender, and perceived religious and ethnic
exclusion were also indicated as factors deserving attention. The article will conclude with a
few policy recommendations.

Framing this Project

The primary focus of earlier works on Boko Haram focused on providing an overview of the
evolution of Boko Haram, while exploring the motivations, strategic and tactical operational
developments, and how best to respond to the organization. In the majority of projects that
included interviews, these discussions were conducted with government officials, academics,
and civil society to comment on its interpretation of various aspects of the organization. For
example, Aghedo and Oarhe Osumah in 2012 conducted interviews with 80 academics, jour-
nalists, security operatives, and politicians in Damaturu, Kano, Bauchi, and Maiduguri.1
These discussions were followed by the research Freedom Onuoha conducted for The
United States Institute of Peace in 2014. The interviews had been conducted with traditional
leaders, leaders of all religious groups, security officials, and female and political leaders. Fur-
thermore, focus discussions were held with youth, women, and faith groups.2 Although these
and other analyses provided valuable insights, the primary question researchers left with was
to what extent perceptions are a reflection of reality. In answering this question, interviews
were conducted with both members of civil society and former Boko Haram collaborators.
How people feel and perceive or understand an issue often shape their attitudes toward it.
For Michael A. Hogg and colleagues, such perceptions or understanding provide a “powerful
motivation to protect and promote, perhaps at all cost, the ideological integrity and superior-
ity of one’s own views.”3 Voss and Dorsey described perception as “… an interactive process
by which stimuli become interpreted by the individual, the process taking place via the inte-
gration of the stimulus events with the prior knowledge and beliefs of the individual. Percep-
tion forms part of the cognitive system … of how a person perceives is related to how a
person learns, remembers, solves problems and make decisions. How a person perceives is
also related to that person’s beliefs, knowledge, affect and goals.”4 Based on this definition,
perception and interpretation can be regarded as interwoven processes that, essentially,
 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 3

cannot be separated. Consequently, individuals form mental images of the world that pro-
vide an understanding of their surroundings. From these “images,” stereotypes emerge that
will impact how not only individuals interact or react to others, but also organizations—in
this case Boko Haram and circumstances or factors related to Boko Haram. To this end, this
study specifically sought to understand people’s perspectives as to why Boko Haram exists,
how they perceive vulnerability, and how the Nigerian government should respond to the
crisis, as well as their views on the possible solutions to the Boko Haram problem.

Research Methodology
Structured questionnaires were used to conduct quantitative and qualitative interviews with
both samples (former Boko Haram members and peacebuilders). Quantitative question-
naires included both open-ended and multiple choice questions to enable both statistical
and qualitative analyses of the data. Interviewers—who spoke the local languages and knew
the area and the local customs—were used to conduct the interviews. Given the prevailing
security environment in Maiduguri and Yola (the two cities where the interviews with for-
mer Boko Haram members took place) and the fact that staying too long in the camps where
the discussions were being held could have posed serious security risks to the research team
interviews were conducted over a three-day period.
Fifty quantitative interviews were conducted with individuals working with civil society
organizations involved in community outreach and dialogue, human rights, humanitarian
assistance, skills development, women and youth outreach, and in religious and research
institutions based in areas affected by Boko Haram. These individuals being part of the
already mentioned “peacebuilders.”5 In addition to these quantitative interviews an addi-
tional ten qualitative interviews were conducted with prominent peacebuilders in Northern
Nigeria with the following objectives in mind:
1. To Understand why and how these individuals got involved in working toward peace.
2. To get a better understanding of the perceptions of why and how individuals get
involved in Boko Haram.
It is to be expected that these insights will directly impact the peacebuilders’ decision to
implement specific counter- and preventive measures and other intervention programs. The
success of these initiatives will, however, depend on whether those most vulnerable are being
reached. The real test will therefore be to ascertain whether there is a positive correlation
between perceived and real motivations and profiles of those joining either side. This analy-
sis will be particularly relevant to the reasons for joining, as well as where and how Boko
Haram members were recruited.
FACTS International—Vibrand’s local partner in Nigeria—and the Strength in Diversity
Development Centre (SDDC), a local nongovermental organization, were identified as
organizations able to facilitate access to former Boko Haram fighters. It was not until toward
the end of 2015 that the team managed to identify areas where former Boko Haram mem-
bers were being held. In mid-2015 attempts to gain access in order to interview former Boko
Haram fighters led to Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps in North Eastern Nigeria.
Subsequently, access to former Boko Haram fighters was secured through the efforts of the
project partners in collaboration with the chairman of Adamawa State Emergency Manage-
ment Agency (ADSEMA), the IDP camp coordinator, Markoi Military Cantonment Camp,
the Civilian Joint Task Force, and the camp coordinator, Maiduguri. The first interviews
4 A. BOTHA AND M. ABDILE

were conducted in Yola (Adamawa State) and included fifty quantitative and five qualitative
interviews. The second set of discussions had been conducted in Maiduguri (Borno State)
where seventy quantitative and five qualitative interviews were completed. The fieldwork
was conducted by a bi-organizational team consisting of experienced interviewers from
FACTS International as well as social workers and counselors from the SDDC. Both organi-
zations had been aware that they were dealing with vulnerable persons, resulting in them
taking additional measures. Interviewers explained that the interview should not cause the
subject any psychological harm, although talking about distressing subjects may be stressful.
None of the respondents were forced to participate in the study, while it was further
explained that the respondent should feel free to decline to answer any questions or quit the
interview at any time. It should be emphasized that the vast majority of interviewees never
had access to a psychologist, nor an opportunity to tell their stories, including their own per-
sonal background, motivations, and relationships with other members in the organization
and its relationship with the outside world. Although interviewers were not psychologists
nor had the authority to change respondents’ circumstances, they were trained before con-
ducting the interviews to provide emotional support and not to do harm.
The study covered several areas, including:
1. The profile of former Boko Haram fighters
2. How and why those interviewed joined Boko Haram
3. Experiences while in Boko Haram
4. Aims of Boko Haram
5. Relationship with family and community
The basic criterion of selecting respondents was that those interviewed were former Boko
Haram fighters who were willing and able to provide insights into their experiences on why
and how they became members. These respondents were also asked a series of questions to
determine their perceptions as to who and why others end up in the organization.
Interviewers also made it clear that information gathered during the discussions would be
exclusively used for the purposes of the study. Second, the aim of the conversations was to
understand the person, his/her background, why and how he/she got involved in the organi-
zation and not what he/she actually did (operational information) while being a member of
the organization. It was also made clear that neither the interviewer nor the institutions par-
taking in the study work for any security agency. Although research findings would be
shared with government institutions as part of a broader audience the actual interviews,
especially respondents’ personal information, would not be made public.
Individuals held at military controlled camps included captives of Boko Haram who were
released following armed operations and kept at those camps to protect them from attacks,
but also to prevent them from re-joining the organization. Others also included former
Boko Haram members who were forcibly coerced into joining by groups of collaborators but
fled upon the invasion of the military and then taking cover at these camps. Individuals who
claimed to be innocent when captured by the military were released through the intervention
of the local government and remanded to the camps for rehabilitation. Last, women who had
been abducted by Boko Haram when their communities and villages had been invaded were
also taken to the camps upon release by the military.
The sample interviewed consisted predominantly of individuals who had been with Boko
Haram for three to five years. Similarly, since only lower-level former members were inter-
viewed, the study did not capture the experiences of middle- and top-level Boko Haram
 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 5

members. Instead the sample predominantly reflected the profile and experiences of foot sol-
diers. The sample also excluded current Boko Haram members, given the difficulties in
accessing members generally and in particular those who were outside the camps, not to
mention the security risks associated in attempting to track collaborators.

Vulnerability Due to Age and Boko Haram Membership

The common perception is that most Boko Haram members will be younger (i.e., in puberty
or young adults). Adolescence is a crucial period when individuals are most vulnerable to
being radicalized. Although different interpretations exist of the exact age “adolescence”
refers to, the period between puberty (ages 12 to 17) and early adulthood (ages 18 to 22) are
especially formative. It is at this stage that a person is at his or her most impressionable and
most open to outside influence, because they are becoming increasingly aware of the social
and political world around them and at the same time establishing their identity and political
“self.”6
Referring to criminality, Andrew Silke identified a positive correlation between age and
vulnerability during the teenage years up to the age of 28. Applying this hypothesis to terror-
ism, Silke noted that: “With terrorism, the same factors that attract young men to deviant
activity in other spheres can also play at least a partial role in the attraction terrorism holds
for a few. Higher impulsivity, higher confidence, greater attraction to risk-taking and a need
for status can all work to give life as a terrorist a certain appeal for some young males.”7
From this perspective, the age profile of respondents interviewed presented several sur-
prises. The largest part of the Boko Haram sample represented the age group 41 to 50 years
of age (30 percent), which included 32 percent male and 29 percent female respondents; fol-
lowed by the age group 30 to 34 years of age (24 percent) comprising 28 percent male and
19 percent female respondents. The youngest Boko Haram respondent interviewed was a
female of 19 years of age. It should however be noted that UNICEF in earlier research estab-
lished that much younger children form part of the organization’s ranks. Reference to an
older representation of Boko Haram members was also uncovered during 144 interviews
with arrested collaborators. In the interviews—conducted by Salami and referred to by
Onuoha—the median age of the sample was thirty years.8
Although adolescence and young adults are still at risk, identifying an older representa-
tion within Boko Haram at face value implies that the reasons for joining might be different.
It also places a question mark on the lack of attention adults receive in preventing them
from joining the organization.

Gender-Based Roles in Boko Haram

According to Zenn and Pearson,9 “Boko Haram’s ideology casts men in hyper-masculine
combat roles, their duty to violently oppose the west. By contrast, unarmed men, youths,
women, cripple and even those under age are exempt from battle and constitute illegitimate
targets.” Although not intended to counter the assessment of Zenn and Pearson, findings of
this project provided a different angle to the roles men and women play in Boko Haram.
Instead, it supports the work of Katherine Von Knop10 who commented on the evolutionary
role of women in terrorism. As explained earlier, for a female in traditional Muslim house-
holds to become involved in terrorist operations, she had to receive permission from her
6 A. BOTHA AND M. ABDILE

male relatives, as her involvement would transgress familial and societal honor codes. Since
then Al Qaeda gradually justified the evolution of the role of women from being associated
with supporting their husbands to more active operational roles.11 According to Karen Jac-
ques and Paul Taylor—by conducting a review of studies that focused on female terrorists—
closed gender roles are also relevant to right-wing movements. This is in contrast to libera-
tion movements that are more prone to uphold the traditionally established roles of male
and female.12
In the case of this study, of the 119 Boko Haram respondents who participated in the
quantitative survey, 63 were women and 56 were male. This provided a valuable opportunity
to get better insight into why and how women get involved in Boko Haram (to be analyzed
in greater detail). When those respondents were asked in which capacity women serve in
Boko Haram, the following perceptions emerged within this sample: The perception accord-
ing to the majority of Boko Haram respondents was that although women were largely
responsible for domestic services (estimated at 57 percent); a further 26.89 percent of women
were thought to serve as foot soldiers. Furthermore, 5.04 percent were of the opinion that
females provided spiritual guidance and 1.69 percent were regarded as serving in leadership
roles (see Figure 1). Not reflected in this sample, women are also being used as suicide bomb-
ers and explosives experts (3.17 percent), while 12.7 percent are working as intelligence oper-
atives, 1.59 percent as trainers, and 19.05 percent as recruiters. This sample therefore refutes
the common perception that women predominately serve as wives, or that women only pro-
vide domestic support such as cooking and cleaning, seeing that both male and female mem-
bers apparently provide these services. Instead, within the sample, women almost equalled
men as foot soldiers, outnumbered their male counterparts as recruiters (twelve female ver-
sus seven male respondents) and intelligence operatives (eight female versus six male
respondents).

Reasons for Joining Boko Haram

The reasons why individuals join a violent extremist organization have been the most con-
tentious topics in the study of radicalization. It is therefore important to note that from the
onset of the project the aim was not to present a “profile,” but rather to uncover the percep-
tions of peacebuilders and to compare that to the why and how respondents interviewed

Figure 1. Roles of Boko Haram respondents.

 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 7

ended up as members of the organization. This section will start by first describing the per-
ceptions followed by the actual reasons as provided by former Boko Haram respondents.
Second, the different reasons male and female members provided will also be analyzed.

Religion
In addition to the religious divide between the Christian south and Muslim north, peri-
odic domestic violence has had a tendency to break out along ethnic, religious, and com-
munal fault lines, particularly in response to the deep underlying fear of domination by
another group.13 The overall perception is that Muslims in northern Nigeria feel
economically and politically marginalized—especially while the country is headed by a
Christian president—and that ethnically associated religious fervor offers an outlet to
these frustrations. Respondents were asked to specifically indicate why they believe peo-
ple were drawn to Boko Haram. Peacebuilders in particular considered religion to be the
most prominent reason (82 percent) why individuals were initially attracted to the ideol-
ogy the organization presented. In contrast to this perception among peacebuilders, only
9.24 percent of Boko Haram respondents identified religion as a reason for joining the
organization. Although 9.24 percent members referred to this relationship, even less
(5.04 percent) of those interviewed considered religion as playing a role in other people’s
decision to join the organization. Consequently, this finding supports that of Silke who
noted: “Whereas the global jihad has a strategic religious aim, the religious backgrounds
of the people who join the jihad is not as clear-cut.”14
While religion provides an obvious backdrop to the activities of Boko Haram, former
members themselves did not cite it as a dominant reason for joining Boko Haram. At
the same time, peacebuilders explained that it was not religion per se, but rather the
incorrect interpretation of Islam that was a key factor. From the qualitative more in-
depth interviews, it does, however, suffice to say that peacebuilders themselves tend to
operate in a paradigm that emphasizes the role of religion out of proportion to its actual
level of influence. For example, according to one of the peacebuilders that was inter-
viewed: “[We] need to ensure that religious leaders preach the correct message; those
who spread a message of hate and radicalisation are wrong and do not help our cause.
Islam is a religion of peace.”
The questionnaire also required respondents to specifically rate the role religion played in
Boko Haram. Although religion did not play a decisive role in people’s decision to join the
organization, it influenced the inner workings of the organization as 43 percent of former
Boko Haram fighters indicated that religion had a strong influence—the most telling in this
part of the results. In contrast, although 82 percent of peacebuilders indicated that religion
played a role in people’s decision to join Boko Haram, only 46 percent considered religion
to be a factor in the organization’s activities.
Religion was identified as the most prominent factor facilitating recruitment among civil
society in a study commissioned by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in 2013. It
noted that “in all the states surveyed, there is unanimity that initial ignorance of religious
teaching is the leading factor influencing the adoption of extreme religious views, especially
among youth.”15
Likewise, Mercy Corps in its study found that “Religion was a thread that ran through
many stories of youth choosing to join. Many recruits spoke about wanting to become more
8 A. BOTHA AND M. ABDILE

devout, or being drawn to a promise of paradise.” Former male Boko Haram respondents
regarded religion to have been a stronger influence (50 percent), while in comparison, only
36.51 percent of former female Boko Haram respondents held similar views. At the other
end of the spectrum, 33.33 percent of female and 23.21 percent of male respondents indi-
cated that religion played little or no role in the organization.
On the topic of religious indoctrination, both Muslim and Christian peacebuilders agreed
that Boko Haram does not follow the true teaching of Islam, and that many Boko Haram
members are indoctrinated to believe they are fighting for Islam. This can be done as those
vulnerable to such indoctrination are not familiar enough with the teachings of the Qur’an
to know better. For example one of the peacebuilders noted that “They [Boko Haram] join
for a religious aim, yes, but only because they do not know the teaching of peace and have
been indoctrinated by bad ideology.”
The interviews with the Boko Haram fighters supported this narrative as one respondent
highlighted:
First of all, we were carried away by the name of Islam, we were told to go and do Jihad (holy
war) after that we came to discover that it was a deceitful way of introducing us into another
part of the world. Poverty, lack of money is what induces us to join Boko Haram.
Another respondent explained:
Like I told you, we were thinking we will embark on the true Muslim Jihad (Holy War) but later
on came to discover that, even your father or mother was not cleared from it. My own view was
to do Jihad (Holy War) but some other people may have their own view, different from mine.
Some persons’ may be because of poverty, some may be because of idleness or unemployment.

Despite being disillusioned, the fact that recruiters managed to sell Boko Haram to their
supporters as an organization representing Islam and justify the killing of fellow Nigerians
provides reason for concern. However, at the same time it would be a mistake not to con-
sider decades of inter-communal conflict based on religious and ethnic affiliation that forms
a central component in the Nigerian psyche.
It is especially this lack of religious understanding that motivated many religious leaders
identified as peacebuilders to take their responsibilities seriously. As another peacebuilder—
an imam—explained in an interview: “If there is no peace then there will be no progress.
And my religion teaches that peace empowers people. It is the responsibility of every Imam
to see that people live in peace.”

Economic Circumstances as a Reason for Joining Boko Haram

Although the topic of many debates, the prevailing perception still is that poverty and other
associated manifestations of poor socioeconomic circumstances are “root causes” of terror-
ism. Newman explains what is meant by the link between poverty and terrorism in stating
that: “Poverty can breed resentment and desperation and support for political extremism. In
addition, as well as providing grounds for grievance, poverty often means underdevelop-
ment, poor or weak governance, or failed states, something that has been referred to as ‘black
holes’ [from] which fanaticism can emerge.”16
From a more policy orientated perspective, according to Klaus Topfer, the then executive
director of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), in 2001: “poverty and
environmental degradation can fan the flames of hate and ignite a belief that terrorism is the
 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 9

only solution to a community’s or nation’s ills. When people are denied access to clean
water, soil, and air to meet their basic human needs, we see the rise of poverty, ill-health and
a sense of hopelessness. Desperate people can resort to desperate solutions.”17
Closer to Nigeria, Iro Aghedo and Osumah Oarhe explained that: “Essentially members of
Boko Haram are uneducated, school drop-outs, jobless youth, political thugs and students
from low socio-economic backgrounds. … Massive poverty and unemployment create a
large ‘republic’, an idle, hungry and angry brigade of persons which requires little motivation
to participate in violent engagements because these provide them the opportunity to instru-
mentalize violence for survival by looting private and public businesses.”18
It is therefore evident that poverty, the employment opportunities presented by Boko
Haram, being frustrated with life and the lack of education, could be categorized as impor-
tant factors contributing to people’s decision to join Boko Haram. Thus perceptions on the
part of peacebuilders and reality as represented by former Boko Haram members were com-
pared. Figure 2 summarizes the perceptions of peacebuilders and Boko Haram members of
the role economic factors might play versus the actual reason Boko Haram respondents
identified as originally motivating them to join the organization. As an explanation to the
question why Boko Haram attracts willing recruits, peacebuilders especially referred to this
section as being the third most important reason after religion (82 percent) and political rea-
sons (44 percent). Within economical circumstances, poverty was identified as the most
prominent reason according to 26 percent of peacebuilders as to what drove individuals to
Boko Haram. This is followed by a lack of education (20 percent) and employment opportu-
nities Boko Haram offered (16 percent). This perception is supported by Aghedo and
Osumah, who noted in the 2010 census that Yobe State, the headquarters of Boko Haram,
has the highest unemployment rate in the country with 33.2 percent19 For example, one
respondent summarized the role lack of education and unemployment plays in the radicali-
zation process of Boko Haram members: “They are frustrated; they either have no education
and no job or they have a degree but cannot find a job. They see the successful and rich peo-
ple and resent them. They want to kill them.”
Similarly, the USIP,in its study among civil society in Borno and Kaduna states in 2013,
also identified a high incidence of unemployment and poverty as the second most important
reason why youth engaged in religious-based violence: “In Kaduna state, 83 percent of

Figure 2. Financial reasons for joining Boko Haram.

10 A. BOTHA AND M. ABDILE

Table 1. Employment status of Boko Haram respondents at the time of joining.

Female Male Total

Unemployed 19 17 36
Student 4 1 5
Conduct odd jobs (working when the need 3 1 4
or opportunity arises)
Professional seeking employment 1 2 3
Just finished tertiary education and 1 0 1
seeking employment
Am a house wife 7 0 7
Self-employment 7 16 23
Agriculture (farming) 14 9 23
Private sector 2 4 6
Government (public service) 1 6 7
Civil society 0 1 1

respondents reported that unemployment and poverty are important factors. In Kano, 92
percent cited them as important.”20
In contrast to the above perceptions only 15.13 percent of Boko Haram respondents indi-
cated that they had joined the organization because of poverty and the need to be paid a sal-
ary, whereas only 5.88 percent of former members referred to the employment
opportunities the group presented. Furthermore, only 1.68 percent of former Boko Haram
members considered being frustrated with life as a factor influencing others to join Boko
Haram, while 5.88 percent of Boko Haram respondents were themselves drawn to the orga-
nization for this reason.
The perception among 16 percent of peacebuilders that individuals join Boko Haram due
to the need to be employed was refuted as only 5.88 percent of Boko Haram respondents
joined for the employment opportunities the organization offered. Instead 61 Boko Haram
respondents were previously employed and 58 respondents indicated that they were unem-
ployed at the time of joining Boko Haram (Table 1).
On the matter of education, 20 percent of peacebuilders identified a lack of education as a
contributing factor. Accordingly, 12.61 percent of Boko Haram respondents’ poor education
served as a reason for joining the organization. This emphasizes the importance of training
in securing a better life with multiple opportunities, while developing the ability to question.
The education level of the Boko Haram sample thus became an important indicator. Of the
119 Boko Haram respondents the majority (56 percent) did not finish secondary school,
while 10 percent did not receive any form of education. Among the remaining 44 percent
only 2 percent completed secondary school, vocational training (29 percent) and fewer had
university degrees (2 percent). Breaking these figures down when comparing former male
and female Boko Haram members, it is clear that most female respondents were better edu-
cated than their male counterparts (Table 2).

Personal Needs
Overall, according to 26 percent of peacebuilders interviewed, the need to belong was the
third most prominent reason (after religion and political reasons), but equal to poverty and
monetary benefit in explaining why individuals join Boko Haram. This was followed by the
need to be respected, feared as well as prestige (24 percent). Belonging in society contributes
 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 11

Table 2. Boko Haram education levels based on gender.

Male Female

Primary school 16 19
Secondary school 10 10
Finish secondary school 0 2
College/Polytechnic 6 7
University 2 0
Vocational training 15 20
No formal education 7 5

to a person’s identity, but it also serves as a platform to associate with others, contributing to
self-respect or self-esteem. According to 23.52 percent of Boko Haram respondents inter-
viewed they joined the organization to be respected, while a further 16.81 percent joined due
to a need to belong. It is however interesting to note that Boko Haram respondents’ percep-
tion as to why individuals might be drawn to Boko Haram are the furthest removed from
what they themselves identified: the need to be respected was placed at a higher rate of 28.57
percent (in contrast to respondents’ own experience at 23.52 percent), whereas a need to
belong was placed at a lower 12.61 percent (in contrast to the actual 16.81 percent) (see
Figure 3).
The potential role an individual’s close circle of friends, neighbors, and family might play
in drawing people to the organization was also assessed. For 22 percent of peacebuilders,
peer pressure explained why people joined Boko Haram. In contrast to this perception, only
0.84 percent of Boko Haram respondents identified either—pressure originating from the
family or peers—as a reason for joining Boko Haram.
Although only a very small percentage of Boko Haram members referred to pressure from
the family and peers as reasons for joining Boko Haram, the role of both, but especially those
of friends, will again be referred to in the recruitment process (see Figure 4).
In addition to family and friends, the organization itself can also provide a sense of mean-
ing and belonging. Consequently, friendships formed while being a member of the organiza-
tion in some cases facilitated an increase in the sense of belonging after an individual had
joined the organization. For example, according to one Boko Haram respondent:

Figure 3. Personal motivations.

12 A. BOTHA AND M. ABDILE

Figure 4. Peer and family pressure as reasons for joining Boko Haram.

I was introduced to Boko Haram when its members attacked and invaded our village. We were
kept under their custody for a very long time and as a result of that, they established an Islamic
school, which we were forced to attend. As a result of that we became very close to them and
that is how they initiated people by force to join them.
In addition to the need to be respected or belong, other less prominent personal reasons
included fear and joining a violent extremist organization with the hope of it leading up to
finding a spouse. The expectation of getting married was, however, not cited as a prominent
reason for joining by Boko Haram members interviewed, with only 1.68 percent of respond-
ents referring to a possible wedding as a reason for joining (see Figure 5). Keeping in mind
that most Boko Haram respondents were women, it is interesting to note that 3.36 percent
of Boko Haram respondents believed individuals joined the organization for the possibility
of getting married. On the other hand, the organization is known to have a strategy of kid-
napping young girls to be married off to Boko Haram members.
Findings of this study correspond to those of a similar study conducted by The Mercy
Corps stating that although Boko Haram has become notorious for abducting children and
forcing captives to fight or carry out suicide attacks, not all recruits join against their will.21
Although recruitment involved the use of force or intimidation, fear leading to an individual
proactively joining Boko Haram was rare as only 2.52 percent within the Boko Haram sam-
ple referred to fear as the reason why they joined the organization (see Figure 6). Although

Figure 5. Marriage as a reason for joining Boko Haram.

 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 13

Figure 6. Fear as reason for joining Boko Haram.

fear did not explain recruitment on a conscious level, Boko Haram’s presence on a subcon-
scious level most probably served as a contributing factor when reading through the qualita-
tive interviews with some of the former members. Living in areas under Boko Haram
control contributed to the perception that not joining the organization might be interpreted
as being a government agent. As a result, some of the individuals responded to these proba-
ble suspicions by proactively joining the organization in “fear” of attracting unwanted atten-
tion. Furthermore, Boko Haram’s strategy to fill its ranks through intimidation and
kidnapping was referred to in a few earlier reports.22
Although fear of Boko Haram might not have played a prominent role in motivating the
sample to join Boko Haram, fear of government security forces—to be addressed under the
next heading—played a more prominent role in the recruitment process.

Political Reasons and Participating in the Political Process

The relationship between political frustration and marginalization is well documented. In
one example, according to Weinberg: “the formation of terrorist groups is linked to the per-
formances of regimes that frustrate demands for broadened participation, if not to all, then
to some segments of the population. Terrorism and terrorist groups emerge in situations
where alienated and highly motivated elites confront the indifference of the population they
hope to lead in challenging those in positions of power.”23
Peacebuilders identified political reasons as the second most prominent reason (44 per-
cent)—after religion—why individuals decided to join Boko Haram (Figure 7). However,
only 2.52 percent of Boko Haram respondents recalled political reasons as motivating their
decision to join Boko Haram, while 6.72 percent of the same sample identified political con-
siderations as contributing to the radicalization process of others. The impression is thereby
created that although it might not have played a central role in the radicalization of the
Boko Haram sample interviewed, it still should be considered.
However, political interest is only one reason. Other factors include trust in political lead-
ers and the political process, but also the relationship and level of confidence between secu-
rity forces and the populace.
On political participation and terrorism, Choi and Piazza noted that: “… countries with
higher rates of popular political participation experience fewer terrorist incidents, suggesting
that broadening democratic participation will reduce rates of terrorism.”24
14 A. BOTHA AND M. ABDILE

Figure 7. Political reasons for joining Boko Haram.

One of the more surprising results of this study was the degree to which Boko Haram
respondents participated in the political process. This observation is made in light of Martha
Crenshaw’s explanation that “if terrorists perceive the state as unjust, morally corrupt, and
violent, terrorism may seem legitimate and justified” and that “evidence also indicates that
many terrorists are activists with prior political experience in nonviolent opposition to the
state [who consequently lost trust in non-violent means of political expression].”25 Ques-
tioning the legitimacy of the government as an important factor contributing to violent radi-
calization and terrorism has subsequently been established and confirmed through other
case studies. It was therefore unexpected to find that in addition to peacebuilders who were
the most politically active, with 72 percent voting in the 2015 elections, 47.9 percent of Boko
Haram respondents participated in elections. This is significant since being a member of a
violent extremist organization such as Boko Haram falls outside the norms of conventional
political participation and is traditionally regarded as a manifestation of individuals losing
trust in the political process. Yet this assumption was not reflected in the sample.
In addition to the percentage of respondents who participated in elections, it is equally
important to analyze the reasons why respondents did not participate, as reflected in

Figure 8. Reasons for not participating in elections.

 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 15

Figure 8. Whereas the largest percentage (45.16 percent) of the Boko Haram sample did not
have time to register, part of the study interviewing ordinary Nigerian nationals expressed
more severe reasons for not participating. For example, 27.54 percent of ordinary citizens
participating in the citizen survey believed that their vote would not have any impact, 21.82
percent felt that none of the political parties represented their opinions, a further 11.86 per-
cent did not recognize the political process and 9.75 percent did not trust it.26 These results
are particularly surprising when one compares them to the reasons for non-participation
expressed by the Boko Haram sample. These considerations include believing that one’s vote
would not have any impact; none of the political parties represent one’s opinions; not recog-
nizing the political process; and not trusting politicians. These reasons are more commonly
associated with justifications for resorting to violence or the unconventional expression of
political opinions. In comparison with the citizen survey, only 12.9 percent of Boko Haram
respondents felt that their vote would not have any impact, 1.61 percent deemed that none
of the political parties represented their opinions, 6.45 percent did not recognize the political
process, and 11.29 percent did not trust politicians.27 Although Boko Haram respondents
appeared to mistrust politicians more than any other surveyed group, their overall trust in
the political process (with specific reference to the Senate and National Assembly) is beyond
the norm when compared with the opinions of ordinary citizens and weighed up against
other extremist organizations.28
When focusing on the gender dimension of political participation, a few interesting trends
were identified when individuals participating in the citizen survey were compared with the
Boko Haram sample. Although women participating in the citizen survey were less likely to
have voted—32.33 percent did not vote versus 26.45 percent of their male counterparts—
female Boko Haram respondents were more likely to have voted (49.21 percent) than their
male counterparts (46.43 percent). For non-voting males participating in the citizen survey,
the most prominent reasons for non-participation were that they did not feel their vote
would have any impact or that they did not have time to register or go to the polls. Voter
apathy was also apparent among female respondents participating in the citizen survey,
where the primary justification for non-participation was that they did not feel that any of
the parties represented their opinions (25.97 percent) or, second, that they did not think
their vote would have any impact (25.58 percent).29
Bearing in mind this study was conducted closely after the 2015 presidential election, it
found high levels of trust in the president, both among the citizens surveyed (35 percent)
and former Boko Haram members (50 percent). Former female Boko Haram members were
also more likely to trust the president (57 percent) than their male counterparts (43 percent).
Trust in the state seemed to be embodied in the president as a figure rather than in organs of
state, with local government, National Assembly, and the Senate all mentioned specifically
(see Figure 9). This highlighted the strength of President Buhari’s mandate, as well as the
level of mistrust/distrust in government itself. By implication, the mandate of dealing with
corruption and Boko Haram decisively was strong. One of the most prominent issues raised
for government to attend to was corruption. In contrast to the norm in failed states, Niger-
ians are still participating in the political processes and still have expectations of government.
While Nigerian nationals are disappointed in their government, President Buhari has pro-
vided a sense of a new start, of new hope—and this needs to be capitalized on through
addressing the most prominent threat to security.
16 A. BOTHA AND M. ABDILE

Figure 9. Level of trust in institutions.

Trust in religious leaders was high (25 percent) among former Boko Haram members.
However, a significantly higher percentage (58 percent) of peacebuilders expressed trust in
religious leaders. As expected, the fact that many peacebuilders represented religious institu-
tions most definitely had an impact on this figure. Furthermore, 12.61 percent of former
Boko Haram members expressed trust in community leaders (higher than the 10 percent of
peacebuilders), which emphasized that both religious and community leaders could play a
positive role toward change.

Revenge Against Military Action and Recruitment

Martha Crenshaw in 1981 referred to “government use of unexpected and unusual force in
response to protestors … often compels terrorist retaliation. The development of such an
action-reaction syndrome then establishes the structure of the conflict between the regime
and its challengers.”30 In addition to establishing this platform for conflict, state repressive
measures delegitimize the state, but also create martyrs. An excellent example of the latter
was the death of Mohammed Yusuf, the founder and then leader of Boko Haram while in
police custody in July 2009. His death and the killing of hundreds of suspected members of
Boko Haram in Maiduguri during the same period led to a drastic escalation of Boko Haram
attacks under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau. According to Human Rights Watch, the
Joint Military Task Force (JTF) has killed an estimated 2,800 suspected Boko Haram mem-
bers and civilians in communities where attacks have occurred between 2009 and 2011.
According to witnesses (interviewed in the report), the “JTF has engaged in excessive use of
force, physical abuse, secret detentions, extortion, burning of houses, stealing money during
raids, and extrajudicial killings of suspects.”31 In Nigeria, Alemika in Agbiboa confirmed
that “the legacy of the Nigerian armed forces is that of arbitrariness, ruthlessness, brutality,
vandalism, incivility, low accountability to the public and corruption. The armed forces are
a reflection of the heavy-handedness of the Nigerian state itself.”32
 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 17

Figure 10. Possible role military action plays in recruitment.

With reference to the consequences of state repression as it happened in Nigeria, Della

Porta explained: “state repression encouraged secondary deviance, the individual’s even
stronger commitment to his or her deviant behaviour—which brought about a radicalization
both of people who are directly hit by repression, but also the activation and radicalization of
supporters. Cognitive, affective and relational mechanisms accompanied the activists’
descent into the underground.”33
Returning to the findings of this study, peacebuilders did not believe that military action
could prevent a person from joining Boko Haram (29.81 percent). Only 12 percent identified
a link between joining Boko Haram and military action, while 46 percent did not recognize
any influence (see Figure 10).
That being said, it was particularly interesting that the same sample indicated that a per-
son’s desire for revenge or retribution had a strong (48 percent) influence on their joining
Boko Haram. In other words, respondents made a distinction in their frame of reference
between military action and the wish for revenge as a consequence of a hard-handed
response. Furthermore, only 14 percent indicated that military action had no influence and
a further 6 percent indicated that it had little influence. A positive correlation exists between
a military or hard-handed response and a person’s decision to join a violent extremist orga-
nization. Testing this theory 57 percent of former Boko Haram fighters identified revenge as
being a strong or the only influence in their decision to join Boko Haram. These findings are
in line with findings in a study conducted by Mercy Corps, noting that “security abuses were
a source of frustration in communities that Boko Haram exploited.”34
In a different question, respondents were asked to rate the possible role revenge plays in
joining Boko Haram: the majority of respondents recalled revenge as the only (13.45 percent)
or strongest (43.7 percent) influence on their decision to join the organization. In an open-
ended question, former Boko Haram fighters indicated that the military is brutal, “merciless,”
and “pitiless.” In the words of one former Boko Haram member: “They kill innocent people
that are not members, mistaking so. I think they deliberately do so. So [people] join the group
to fight the military.” According to another respondent: “The military are very wicked, if Boko
Haram kills a soldier, the military will kill more than 10–20 Boko Haram members.”
18 A. BOTHA AND M. ABDILE

This position was even supported by peacebuilders who explained that: “The military can
kill indiscriminately; it makes people angry and they join to get back at government.”
Consequently, in the longer run, this potential effect of provoking people to seek revenge
against the military that otherwise would not have joined Boko Haram should be avoided as
only 6.72 percent within the Boko Haram sample indicated that revenge had no influence
on an individual’s decision to join Boko Haram.
Among former members, revenge directed at the state, and particularly at the Boko
Haram forces influenced 50 percent of male Boko Haram respondents—who referred to
revenge as having a strong influence—and a further 12.5 percent as the only factor influenc-
ing a person’s decision to join the organization. Female Boko Haram respondents provided
the most reserved answer with 38.1 percent being of the opinion that it had a strong
influence, while an additional 14.29 percent referred to revenge as the only influence facili-
tating radicalization and recruitment. Placing revenge in context, 42.86 percent of male
Boko Haram respondents versus 30.16 percent of female Boko Haram respondents referred
to military action as making recruitment “more likely” (see Figure 11). An important conclu-
sion to be drawn on the relationship between the type of response implemented by security
agencies and radicalization is that the latter has less to do with military action per se and
more with abuses by those agencies that contributed to a need to take revenge.
Respondents were asked inter alia who they would call when in danger. It was
expected to be closely related to the consequences of a hard-handed approach and the
role revenge might have played in the radicalization process. Although it was initially
intended to serve as a control question, the responses provided interesting results: A
very large percentage (62 percent) of peacebuilders expressed trust in the police in con-
trast to only 20.17 percent of former Boko Haram respondents. It was interesting to
note that 37.82 percent of former Boko Haram members, in contrast to only 2 percent
of peacebuilders would call the military when in danger (see Figure 12). The reason for
this might be because at the time of interview respondents were being accommodated
at IDPs overseen by the Nigerian military against the backdrop of a Boko Haram threat

Figure 11. Influence of revenge in joining Boko Haram.

 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 19

Figure 12. When in danger.

to retaliate against deserters. In the case of Boko Haram respondents, a high level of
interaction was recorded with both the police and the military. These results, however,
need to be analyzed in context, as interviews were conducted with former fighters at
rehabilitation camps, providing these individuals an opportunity to change their per-
ception of Boko Haram. Nothing distinguished whether males or females were more
likely to call the police (see Figure 13). Female respondents were slightly less likely to
call the military than their male counterparts: 22.50 percent of men indicated that they
would call the military if faced with danger, compared to 18.80 percent of women.
Possibly in relation to the increased levels of militarization in the North, 37.82 percent of
former Boko Haram members would have called on the military and 20.17 percent the police
when in danger. Breaking this figure down based on gender (see Figure 12), female Boko
Haram members were far more likely (47.62 percent) to go to the military than male (26.79
percent) respondents. Considering that religious figures normally fall outside the framework
of being called when in danger, religious leaders played an understandably small role in the
behavior of respondents in this situation.

Figure 13. Religious institutions.

20 A. BOTHA AND M. ABDILE

How Boko Haram Members were Recruited

Radicalization needs to evolve from recruitment to violent extremist movements; a reality
that often is not addressed. The Internet and social media receive a lot of attention in aca-
demic circles when discussing this process especially when referring to the so-called Islamic
State or Daeesh. However, former Boko Haram members interviewed in this study were
introduced to the organization through religious institutions; the individual’s immediate
social circle and the broader community. Although not the focus of this discussion an obser-
vation made by Clinton Watts is worth noticing when he referred to The Sinjar records (for-
eign fighters recruited to Iraq by Al Qaeda). Based on these records the Internet also did not
play a role in the radicalizing, recruiting, and coordination of recruits from the Middle East
and North Africa.35

Religious Institutions
Religious institutions, especially madrassas or religious schools are perceived—including
by Boko Haram respondents themselves—to be the venue where the most individuals
(19.33 percent) are being radicalized and recruited. Despite this perception only 12.61
percent of Boko Haram members (12.5 percent male and 2.7 percent female) were in
reality enrolled at madrassas. Although mosques were identified by Boko Haram
respondents as being the place where most of them were enlisted (14.29 percent), it is
important to note that more men (16.07 percent) than women (12.7 percent) were
recruited at a mosque (see Figure 13). In contrast, peacebuilders did not recognize the
vulnerability at these institutions. Being a gathering place, a strong possibility also
exists that mosques were used to identify and approach individuals at risk without the
knowledge and involvement of their religious leaders. Second, individual “fiery” imams,
preaching on the side of Boko Haram, might play their role in facilitating recruitment,
although their identity and examples are seldom available.
Other religious meetings were identified as the fifth most prominent venue and/or role
player facilitating recruitment after mosques, neighbors, madrassas, and the family as 10.08
percent of Boko Haram (12.7 percent female and 7.14 percent male) respondents were
enlisted at these events. Although 14.05 percent of citizens and 11.76 percent of Boko Haram
respondents recognized their vulnerability, only 2 percent of peacebuilders expressed a simi-
lar concern (see Figure 13).

Immediate Social Circle

In addition to above religious institutions, it is important to recognize the critical role per-
sonal interactions played in the recruitment process. Starting with neighbors as the second
most important avenue overall for recruitment, it is particularly important to note that
female Boko Haram members were most likely to be introduced to the organization by
neighbors (22 percent). This was overall the most critical area where women were recruited,
unlike their male counterparts (13 percent). This trend supports Von Knop’s reference to
the role Sisterhoods play in introducing women who share the Salafi-jihadist ideology.
Although this concept started with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928, women meet
each other in private homes or on certain platforms on the Internet.36
 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 21

Figure 14. Immediate social circle.

Peacebuilders were the closest in estimating the role neighbors might play in recruitment
(18 percent). Neighbors were followed by the family, introducing 11.76 percent (12.5 percent
male and 11.11 percent female) respondents to the organization (see Figure 14). As
explained in the words of another respondent:
When I was in Bama town, I did not have any intention of joining this sect. … There are few children
that have decided to join, but for me I am not, until when my cousin brother invited me for a serious
lecture one day, then from there I developed the interest of being a member of the group.

Friendships facilitated the recruitment of 7.56 percent (10.71 percent male and 4.76 per-
cent female) respondents.

Broader Community
In addition to missing the mark on the role religious institutions play in the recruitment pro-
cess, peacebuilders to a large degree overestimated the role the Internet, including social
media and schools, play in the recruitment process. Whereas 22 percent of peacebuilders
identified online activities as playing the most important role in the recruitment process,
none of the Boko Haram respondents interviewed were recruited online. That being said,
5.88 percent of Boko Haram respondents were convinced that radicalization occurs online.
Based on answers provided by Boko Haram respondents, schools were identified as sixth
on the list of venues where recruitment takes place, seeing that 8.4 percent (8.93 percent
male and 7.94 percent female) respondents were recruited at school. It is especially impor-
tant to note that there is a particularly small margin between male and female Boko Haram
respondents who were recruited at school.
Both community meetings and friends shared the seventh place as reflected in the recruitment
profiles of Boko Haram members interviewed in this study with 7.56 percent being recruited at
community meetings. It is, however, interesting to note that more female (9.52 percent) than
male (5.36 percent) respondents were recruited at community meetings. Although peacebuilders
placed schools and community meetings on the same rating scale (12 percent), neither reached
the same number of potential recruits as expected (see Figure 15).
Although both Boko Haram respondents and peacebuilders expected prisons to play a
more prominent role in the recruitment process, overall only 0.84 percent of Boko Haram
respondents, including 1.79 percent of male respondents, were recruited in prison.
22 A. BOTHA AND M. ABDILE

Figure 15. Broader community.

In addition to where recruitment took place, as discussed above, it is equally important to

briefly focus on how Boko Haram respondents were recruited: It was interesting to note that
female Boko Haram members were far more likely to be introduced by force (17 percent) than
males (5 percent). Furthermore, male Boko Haram members were more likely to report joining
the organization as a personal decision (11 percent) than the female sample (2 percent).

Policy Recommendations
Engage and Recognize the Potential Contribution and Added Value
of Religious Actors
Although the perception among peacebuilders that religion played a role in a respondent’s
decision to join Boko Haram was refuted, religious institutions are trusted entities in Nigeria
and hence have the potential to positively contribute to peace and security in the country.
Nigeria is a particularly religious country where both Christianity and Islam confirm the
identity of many Nigerian citizens, often on ethnic grounds. Although not directly linked to
the Boko Haram situation, religion as a contributing factor to conflict in the north-east of
the country is well documented. Historically, the middle belt of the country served as the
battleground between the Fulani (Muslim), the largest ethnic group from the north and
Christian tribes that included the Barome and smaller tribes in the area, as well as the Igbo
(Christian) from the south and the Yoruba (religiously mixed), predominantly over resour-
ces. This conflict was subsequently framed between Muslim herders and Christian farmers.
Although these disturbances were traditionally localized to an affected town or area, recently
these ethno-religious skirmishes started to spread to other areas through the migration of
people across the country.37 In an effort to eradicate the manipulation of religion to justify
these conflicts, the Sultan of Sokoto, Muhammadu Sa’ad Abubakar III, as the highest author-
ity in mainstream Islam in Nigeria and Roman Catholic Cardinal John Onaiyekan, the arch-
bishop of the capital, Abuja, established the Interfaith Initiative for Peace, which seeks to
defuse conflict over issues ranging from elections to land use. Speaking out against terrorism,
the challenge will be to reach out and include extremists who manipulate religion.38 It was
therefore important to note that Boko Haram respondents in this study expressed trust in
Muslim religious and community leaders (38 percent) and that they should be engaged to
help address some of the root causes and prevent young people from being radicalized.
 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 23

Provide Assistance in the Reintegration of Former Boko Haram Members

Building on the fear former fighters had of Boko Haram itself, the successful reintegra-
tion of Boko Haram fighters could act as a bulwark against the organization. For there
to exist successful initiatives at the local community level, it is vital to consider strong
local community and institutional involvement, which could help prevent sympathy for
and recruitment to Boko Haram. Local communities’ involvement also increases its
resilience and identity. In other words, individuals see themselves as part of a strong
society. By targeting these villages and/or communities, Boko Haram undermines this
very sense of communal identity, and the void that it leaves draws people to it—even
those that have been victimized. Proper protection and care for former Boko Haram
members who are already in custody is critical for future reintegration programs, as
many of those interviewed lived in fear of being hunted by Boko Haram and of the
danger of the organization’s revenge. Unless this problem is quickly addressed it could
be seen as a disincentive by those thinking of leaving Boko Haram.

Strengthen and Establish Trust in Local Governance

Despite the long-held perception that Boko Haram is anti-establishment, there is strong evi-
dence emerging from this study to show that some Boko Haram members might be per-
suaded to change course and participate in the political dialogue. As a result, good local
governance and action at the local government level is crucial as it is an often-overlooked
area of government and it is really where service delivery lies. Similarly, given the high rate
of former Boko Haram members’ political participation, especially in elections (48 percent),
it is advisable for the Nigerian government to consider entering some form of political dia-
logue with Boko Haram.

Reach Out to Former Boko Haram Fighters

Respondents informed interviewers that they had been confronted with very difficult cir-
cumstances on a daily basis in not having access to basic needs such as food and hygiene.
Even Boko Haram respondents who had not been forced into the organization were disillu-
sioned. They explained that there was a big difference between the messages preached by
Boko Haram leadership (that they are fighting for a religious cause) and the reality. In addi-
tion to threats directed at hard-liners within the organization, messaging that the majority of
Boko Haram members were victims might sway those feeling that they belong in the organi-
zation to reconsider their membership.

Rehabilitation and Reintegration Strategies

Disengagement from Boko Haram or being disillusioned about the organization should not
be interpreted as the person being de-radicalized. Even individuals who were kidnapped and
forced into the organization (not initially radicalized and recruited into the organization)
require psychological assistance when returning to their families. Special initiatives should
be developed to re-introduce former Boko Haram members to their families and the broader
community, directed at addressing any suspicion and re-establishing trust.
24 A. BOTHA AND M. ABDILE

Continuously Assess Recruitment Strategies to Identify Changing Recruitment

and Radicalization Trends
This study shows that most Boko Haram members were recruited in small, intimate groups
of friends and family members—rather than by “fiery” religious leaders. It highlights con-
stantly changing recruitment and radicalization trends, the fact that recruiters are adapting
to the tightening security environment and that, more than ever, women and young girls are
increasingly being targeted by recruiters.

Gender-Sensitive Counterinitiatives
There is a difference between the radicalization and recruitment process of men and women
into Boko Haram. This was reflected in the different roles women portrayed while being
part of the organization and the way they were introduced into the organization. At the
same time this study refuted the common perception that the majority of women were force-
fully introduced into the organization. Even women who had initially been forced into Boko
Haram might accept the organization at a later stage, similar to Stockholm syndrome. (A
condition that causes hostages to develop a psychological alliance with their captors as a sur-
vival strategy during captivity.) Consequently, both the Nigerian government and especially
peacebuilders need to carefully consider gender specific PVE and CVE strategies.

Military Action Requires Careful Consideration with Very Clear Rules of Engagement,
Especially with Non-Combatants
Unfortunately, too many former Boko Haram members interviewed referred to “pitiless”
military action on the side of the government’s troops. This fueled the need to take revenge,
resulting in yet another factor that pushed them into joining the organization. Although
ordinary and even former Boko Haram members welcome military action, its rules of
engagement and overall conduct will determine the long-term success of Nigeria’s counter-
terrorism strategy. In other words, although the immediate strategy might be to re-establish
security and stability threatened by Boko Haram, these initiatives should not be allowed to
become counterproductive by provoking future radicalization and recruitment.

Conclusion
This research project again reaffirmed the need for empirical research before developing and
implementing policy on complex issues such as preventing and countering violent extrem-
ism. Although peacebuilders that were interviewed worked in areas where Boko Haram was
active, they mistakenly identified religion (82 percent) and political reasons (44 percent), fol-
lowed by poverty (26 percent) and belonging (26 percent) as the most prominent reasons
why individuals join Boko Haram, whereas former Boko Haram respondents referred to the
need to be respected and feared (23.52 percent), need to belong (16.81 percent) and poverty
or lack of money (15.13 percent) as primary reasons for joining the organization. This is not
to say that religion and political reasons did not influence others—considering that individu-
als, part of the sample, identified these two factors as playing a role—but not to the extent
that those involved in developing and implementing countermeasures expect.
 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 25

In addition to the aforementioned reasons, the perception among peacebuilders was that
most Boko Haram members were recruited on the Internet (22 percent), while none of the
Boko Haram members that were interviewed had actually been recruited online. This is not
saying that the Internet and social media do not play a role in other countries—attempts to
prevent radicalization and recruitment through a counternarrative online will fall on deaf
ears in the context of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Instead, most Boko Haram members that
were interviewed had been introduced to the organization through neighbors (17.65 per-
cent), mosques (14.29 percent), and the madrassa (12.61 percent), thus calling for a commu-
nal approach, especially looking at religious institutions as vulnerable places. It is therefore
essential to make a distinction between religious reasons (that were not identified as a factor)
and religious institutions that facilitate recruitment.
The role religious institutions played in the recruitment process also identified another
important component in the development of effective counterstrategies: The difference
between men and women. While female Boko Haram members interviewed were predomi-
nantly recruited through neighbors (22.22 percent), most male Boko Haram members were
recruited at mosques (16.07 percent). Consequently, whereas those vulnerable could be
reached through broader initiatives at mosques, vulnerable women are being targeted at
closed social engagements, making it extremely difficult to develop and implement counter-
measures. The most appropriate approach will require broader communal buy-in and the
assistance of family and friends to identify those at risk if not for the fact that family (12.5
percent) and friends (10.71 percent) played a prominent role in the recruitment of male
Boko Haram members. Close to their male counterparts, 11.11 percent of female respond-
ents were recruited through family, while only 4.76 percent were recruited by friends.
This study highlighted the discrepancy between what civil society actors working in the
field of P/CVE perceived to be critical areas requiring their involvement versus those that
former Boko Haram members actually identified. It calls for a reality check not only in
Nigeria, but in every country affected by radicalization into violent extremism. In consider-
ing the monetary, but even more importantly the human, cost in getting it wrong, more
empirical research is needed in every affected community and it should be conducted at reg-
ular intervals to ensure that policymakers and those involved in preventing and combating
radicalization stay up to date, addressing the reality and not the perception.

Acknowledgments
We thank the chairman of Adamawa State Emergency Management Agency (ADSEMA), the IDP
camp coordinator, Markoi Military Cantonment Camp, the Civilian Joint Task Force, and the camp
coordinator, Maiduguri for giving researchers access to former Boko Haram members. A special word
of appreciation is also extended to Stuart Jones from Vibrand and his team, as well as FACTS Interna-
tional and the Strength in Diversity Development Centre (SDDC) who facilitated and conducted the
interviews. Anneli Botha, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa provided the meth-
odology and conducted the writing and analysis. Mahdi Abdile led the fieldwork in Nigeria.

Funding
The research was funded by the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Finn Church Aid (FCA), the King
Abdullah bin Abdulaziz International Centre for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue (KAICIID).
and the Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers Vienna, Austria.
26 A. BOTHA AND M. ABDILE

ORCID
Anneli Botha http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1949-7833

Notes
1. Iro Aghedo and Osumah Oarhe, “The Boko Haram Uprising: How Should Nigeria Respond?”
Third World Quarterly 33(5) (2012), pp. 853–869.
2. Freedom C. Onuoha, “Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram?” The United States Institute of Peace
Special Report 348 (2014), p. 1.
3. Michael A. Hogg, Ariel Kruglanski, and Kees van den Bos, “Uncertainty and the Roots of Extrem-
ism,” Journal of Social Issues 69(3) (2013), p. 412.
4. James F. Voss and Ellen Dorsey, “Perception and international relations: An overview.” In Singer, Eric,
and Valerie M. Hudson, eds. “Political psychology and foreign policy”. (Boulder: Westview Press 1992),
p. 132.
5. “Peace builders” refer to individuals, organizations, or entities who facilitate, moderate, prevent,
or mediate a process that seeks to resolve or prevent conflicts, political instability, and assist in
the formulation of just policies and practices that address the roots causes of past, present, and
future conflicts and political tension and instabilities.
6. David O. Sears and Sheri Levy, “Childhood and Adult Political Development,” in David O. Sears,
Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis, eds., Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003), p. 83.
7. Andrew Silke, “Holy Warriors Exploring the Psychological Processes of Jihadi Radicalization,”
European Journal of Criminology 5(1) (2008), p. 106.
8. Salami, B.N, “Suicide Bombing and National Security: Implications for the Armed Forces of
Nigeria,” Research Project submitted to the National Defence College, Abuja, Nigeria, July 2013.
In Onuoha, Freedom C., “Why do youth join Boko Haram?” US Institute of Peace, (2014) p. 4.
9. Jacob Zenn and Elizabeth Pearson, “Women, Gender and the Evolving Tactics of Boko Haram,”
Journal of Terrorism Research 5(1) (2014), p. 51.
10. A review of increasing interest in female terrorists is captured by Karen Jacques and Paul J. Tay-
lor, “Female Terrorism: A Review,” Terrorism and Political Violence 21(3) (2009), pp. 499–515.
11. Katharina Von Knop, “The Female Jihad: Al Qaeda’s Women,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30
(5) (2007), p. 407.
12. Karen Jacques and Paul J. Taylor, “Female Terrorism: A Review,” Terrorism and Political Violence
21(3) (2009), p. 508.
13. Ola Awoniyi, “Nigeria’s Obasanjo at Loss on Unrest, Cleric Blames Government,” Agence France-
Press, 27 January 2002.
14. Andrew Silke, “Holy Warriors Exploring the Psychological Processes of Jihadi Radicalization,”
European Journal of Criminology 5(1) (2008), p. 110.
15. Onuoha, “Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram?,” p. 5.
16. Edward Newman, “Exploring the ‘Root Causes’ of Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29
(8) (2006), p. 751.
17. Ibid.
18. Iro Aghedo and Osumah Oarhe, “The Boko Haram Uprising: How Should Nigeria Respond?,”
Third World Quarterly 33(5) (2012), p. 861.
19. Aghedo and Oarhe, “Insurgency in Nigeria,” p. 5.
20. Onuoha, “Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram?” p. 6.
21. Mercy Corps, “Motivations and Empty Promises.”
22. Drew Hinshaw and Joe Parkinson, “The 10,000 Kidnapped Boys of Boko Haram,” The Wall Street
Journal, 12 August 2016. Available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-kidnapped-boys-of-boko-
haram-1471013062 (accessed August 14, 2017).
23. Leonard Weinberg, “Turning to Terror: The Conditions under which Political Parties Turn to
Terrorist Activities,” Comparative Politics 23(4) (1991), p. 427.
 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 27

24. Seung-Whan Choi and James A. Piazza, “Ethnic Groups, Political Exclusion and Domestic Ter-
rorism,” Defence and Peace Economics 27(1) (2016), p. 40.
25. Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13(4) (1981), p. 390.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Anneli Botha, “Radicalisation in Kenya: Recruitment to al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican
Council,” Institute for Security Studies, ISS Paper 265, September 2014. Available at https://www.
issafrica.org/uploads/Paper265.pdf and Anneli Botha and Mahdi Abdile, “Radicalisation and al-
Shabaab recruitment in Somalia.” Institute for Security Studies, ISS Paper 266, September 2014.
Available at https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper266.pdf
29. Ibid.
30. Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” pp. 384–385.
31. Human Rights Watch, “Spiraling Violence: Boko Haram Attacks and Security Force Abuses in
Nigeria,” 11 October 2012.
32. Daniel E. Agbiboa, “Peace at Daggers Drawn? Boko Haram and the State of Emergency in
Nigeria,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 37(1) (2014), p. 61.
33. Donatella Della Porta, “Research on Social Movements and Political Violence,” Qualitative Sociol-
ogy 31(3) (2008), p. 228.
34. Mercy Corps, “Motivations and Empty Promises,” p. 14.
35. Clinton Watts, “Foreign Fighters: How Are They Being Recruited? Two Imperfect Recruitment
Models,” Small Wars Journal (2008), pp. 1–2.
36. Von Knop, “The Female Jihad,” pp. 406–407.
37. Beshiru Salawu, “Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Nigeria: Causal Analysis and Proposals for New
Management Strategies,” European Journal of Social Sciences 13(3) (2010), pp. 345–353.
38. Fred Strasser, “Top Civic Leaders Aid Nigerian Fight to Curb Extremism,” United States Institute
of Peace, 29 March 2017. Available at https://www.usip.org/publications/2017/03/top-civic-lead
ers-aid-nigerian-fight-curb-extremism (accessed 30 March 2017).