THE CONCEPTS OF SUBSTANCE AND MODE IN

SPINOZA

CHARLES E. JARRETT

L i k e his S c h o l a s t i c predecessors, Spinoza makes a

categorial division of things "in return natura" or "extra
i n t e | l e c t u m " i n t o s u b s t a n c e s a n d m o d e s . ~ T h e d i v i s i o n is o n
t h e f a c e o f it i n t e n d e d to h e e x c l u s i v e , e x h a u s t i v e , a n d , o n e
w o u l d h o p e , n o n - t r i v i a l . A s set f o r t h by S p i n o z a , it is d r a w n
in t e r m s o f t w o u n d e f i n e d n o t i o n s t h a t e x p r e s s r e l a t i o n s o f
o n t o l o g i c a l a n d c o n c e p t u a l d e p e n d e n c e . It is t h e m a i n g o a l
o f this p a p e r to d e t e r m i n e , w i t h o u t g i v i n g f o r m a l d e f i n i -
tions, w h a t t h e s e n o t i o n s a r e . A s u b s i d i a r y g o a l is to
i n d i c a t e w h a t S p i n o z a ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f a s u b s t a n c e is, a n d ,
a l o n g t h e way, to p u t a n e n d to s o m e c o m m o n l y e x p r e s s e d
misinterpretations of Spinoza's substance.
T h e r e is n o d o u b t t h a t t h a t t h e p r i m i t i v e n o t i o n s w i t h
w h i c h S p i n o z a d e f i n e d his c o n c e p t s o f s u b s t a n c e a n d m o d e ,
are intended to e x p r e s s some k i n d o f o n t o l o g i c a l a n d
conceptual dependence. A s u b s t a n c e is w h a t e v e r is in a n d
c o n c e i v e d t h r o u g h ilself, w h i l e a m o d e is w h a t e v e r is in a n d
c o n c e i v e d t h r o u g h a n o t h e r . =' W h a t o n e s h o u l d like to k n o w
is j u s t e x a c t l y w h a t s o r t o f o n t o l o g i c a l a n d c o n c e p t u a l
dependence it is w i t h w h i c h S p i n o z a is o p e r a t i n g .
For whatever reason, Spinoza does not always clearly
distinguish two dilferent kinds of ontological dependence
-- namely, the depe,ldence of a property on something
that h a s it (e.g. t h e m o t i o n o f t h i s b o d y o n t h e b o d y : % a n d
the dependence o f a n e f f e c t o n its c a u s e o r c a u s e s (e.g. a
person o n his p a r e n t s ' ) . In at least o n e p a s s a g e l h e
d i s t i n c t i o n is apparently c o n l l a t e d :

See Wolfson, vol. I, pp. 61-66 and, for Spinoza's view, E,I,iv,d; vi,c;
xv,d; and xxviii,d.
The question whether a mode is in and conceived only through a
substance is answered negatively below. See also the author's "The
Logical SIrutture of Spinoza's Ethics, Part I."
:' Spinoza's example of a mode in ('.M. I,i (G.I,237,1-5).
" Spinoza's example of a cause in E,I,xvii,s (G.II,63,18-19).

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G o d is a b e i n g o f w h o m all a t t r i b u t e s a r e p r e d i c a t e d ;
w h e n c e it c l e a r l y follows t h a t all o t h e r t h i n g s c a n by n o
m e a n s be o r be u n d e r s t o o d , a p a r t f r o m o r o u t s i d e h i m .
W h e r e f o r e we m a y say with all r e a s o n t h a t G o d is a
c a u s e o f all t h i n g s . ~
T h i s lack o f clarity is p e r h a p s f u r t h e r a t t e s t e d to by t h e fact
t h a t t h e r e h a v e b e e n , a m o u g o t h e r s , t wo i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s
t h a t d i v e r g e in t h a t o n e h o l d s t h a t m o d e s a r e p r o p e r t i e s o f
substance, while the o t h e r holds that 'the' (defining)
r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e m is a c a u s a l o n e .
B a y l e a t t r i b u t e s to S p i n o z a t h e view t h a t an a c c i d e n t , o r
r a t h e r , a m o d e , d e p e n d s o n a s u b s t a n c e "as o n a s u b j e c t o f
i n h e s i o n . ''6 T h a t t h e r e is an o b j e c t - p r o p e r t y r e l a t i o n be-
t w e e n a s u b s t a n c e a n d its m o d e s is s u p p o r t e d by an
e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n o f E , I , xvi 7 a n d subse-
q u e n t r e f e r e n c e s to it. In I , x v i , d S p i n o z a m a i n t a i n s t h a t t h e
m o r e r eal i t y a t h i n g has, t h e m o r e p r o p e r t i e s ( " p r o p r i e t -
ates") f o l l o w f r o m its e s s e n c e , w h i c h is u s e d to s h o w that
" i n f i n i t e t h i n g s in i n f i n i t e ways" f o l l o w f r o m G o d (the
u n i q u e s u b s t a n c e ) . A n d in I , x x i x , d S p i n o z a cites I,xvi to
j u s t i f y t h e c l a i m that m o d e s h a v e ( n e c e s s a r i l y ) f o l l o w e d
f r o m G o d . E v e r y m o d e m u s t t h e r e f o r e be t h o u g h t by
S p i n o z a to b e a p r o p e r t y of G o d . ~ W e m i g h t also n o t e t h e
p a s s a g e in t h e Short Treatise, w h e r e , t a l k i n g a b o u t G o d ,
S p i n o z a says, " H e m u s t , i n d e e d , be t h e sublecturn o f all
o t h e r t h i n g s . ''~'
T h i s v i e w is f u r t h e r s u p p o r t e d by t h e fact t h a t an
a c c i d e n t ( w h i c h c le a r l y is a p r o p e r t y ) was typically d e f i n e d
as t h a t w h i c h is in a n o t h e r , ~ w h e r e " i n " is u n d e r s t o o d in
t h e s e n s e r o u g h l y s p e c i f i e d by A r i s t o t l e in t h e C a t e g o r i e s ,
la, 23-25:

K.V. l,iii. Wulf translation. "Attribute" does not here bear the technical
sense it does in the Ethics.
'~ Curley, p. 14.
7 See the list of abbreviations above.
" Note that "infinite things in infinite ways" is glossed as "all things" in
E,I,xvii,s; xxxiii,d; and xxxiv,d (G.II,62,15-17; 73,22-24; and 77,1-3,
respectively).
Wolf translation of the Short Treatise, p. 19.
'~ Wolfson, vol. I, p. 64, especially note 3.

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 SUBSTANCE AND MODE IN SPINOZA

a) ~v 6~roKetp.~vw ~e X~/t0 5 ~u -trot ~x-~ tbs Ix~pos 6w6tp•

Os XoJp~s ~LVOtt Tel ~1) ~ ~t3rr{,V II
A n d Spinoza, although he rejected the expression "acci-
dent", d e f i n e d its r e p l a c e m e n t , " m o d e " , i n p a r t b y t h e
expression "in another". Furthermore, he uses "cannot be
without", reminiscent o f b) "ot~6vot'rov • e~,veLL"
i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y w i t h "is in. ''~2
It s e e m s , t h e n , t h a t S p i n o z a d o e s r e g a r d m o d e s as
properties of substance, and that when he asserts that
m o d e s a r e in t h e u n i q u e s u b s t a n c e , h e m e a n s t h a t t h e y
i n h e r e in it in t h e s a m e w a y t h a t a n ' a c c i d e n t ' l i k e m o t i o n
i n h e r e s in a b o d y .
A n o b j e c t i o n is r a i s e d h e r e by C u r l e y :
Spinoza's modes are, prima facie, of the wrong logical
t y p e to b e r e l a t e d to s u b s t a n c e in t h e s a m e w a y
D e s c a r t e s ' m o d e s a r e r e l a t e d to s u b s t a n c e , f o r t h e y a r e
p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g s (E I P 2 5 C ) , n o t q u a l i t i e s . A n d it is
d i f f i c u l t to k n o w w h a t it w o u l d m e a n to say t h a t
p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g s i n h e r e in s u b s t a n c e . W h e r e q u a l i t i e s a r e
s a i d to i n h e r e in s u b s t a n c e , this m a y b e v i e w e d as a w a y
o f s a y i n g t h a t t h e y a r e p r e d i c a t e d o f it. W h a t it w o u l d
m e a n to say t h a t o n e t h i n g is p r e d i c a t e d o f a n o t h e r is a
m y s t e r y t h a t n e e d s s o l v i n g . '~
T h e d i f f i c u l t y , h o w e v e r , c a n b e s o l v e d by d i s t i n g u i s h i n g
i n h e r e n c e f r o m p r e d i c a t i o n , w h i c h is n o t w i t h o u t p r e c e -
d e n t . A c c o r d i n g to T h e P h i l o s o p h e r :
S o m e t h i n g s a r e in a s u b j e c t , b u t a r e n e v e r p r e d i c a b l e o f
a s u b j e c t . F o r i n s t a n c e , ... a c e r t a i n w h i t e n e s s m a y b e
p r e s e n t in t h e b o d y ( f o r c o l o u r r e q u i r e s a m a t e r i a l basis),
yet it is n e v e r p r e d i c a b l e o f a n y t h i n g . '4
" "By 'in a subject' I do not mean what is in something as a part, but
rather what is unable to exist apart from that in which it is." That "in"
was understood in this way is supported by the use of the expression
"in a subject" and "dependentiam a subjecto" in explaining the
substance-accident distinction, where "in a subject" is the translation of
Aristotle's "kv ~)poK~ttz~vc0." (v. Wol[son, vol. I, p. 64, note 2).
"~ v. E,I,xv,d and cf. E,I,def.v. In I,xv,d, Spinoza switches from "is in and
conceived through" to "can neither be nor be conceived without" and
back again. (cf. etiam l,xxv,d with I,ax.iv)
~ Curley, p. 18.
t~ Categories, la, 24-29, Ross edition (translated by E.M. Edghill).

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T h u s , a c c o r d i n g to A r i s t o t l e , t h e r e a r e p a r t i c u l a r s (or, if
y o u p r e f e r , i n d i v i d u a l s ) in c a t e g o r i e s o t h e r t h a n t h a t o f
(Aristotelian) substance -- e.g. particular qualities like the
w h i t e n e s s o f t h i s c h a i r , w h i c h is d i s t i n c t f r o m t h e w h i t e n e s s
o f a n y t h i n g else, e v e n if t h e i r s h a d e is e x a c t l y t h e s a m e .
The, or one, relation between the whiteness of the chair,
a n d t h e c h a i r , is c a l l e d " b e i n g i n " , a n d it is s o m e t h i n g v e r y
m u c h l i k e t h i s r e l a t i o n , I s u b m i t , t h a t S p i n o z a b e l i e v e s to
h o l d b e t w e e n a p a r t i c u l a r s u c h as a h o r s e ( a n A r i s t o t e l i a n
primary substance and a Spinozistic mode), and Spinoza's
one substance? ~
The d i f f i c u l t y r a i s e d by C u r l e y a b o u t p r e d i c a t i o n is
c e r t a i n l y n o t t r a n s p a r e n t , b u t t h e n n e i t h e r is t h e n o t i o n o f
p r e d i c a t i o n . Still, t h e r e m a y b e a s e n s e in w h i c h " ' t h i n g s "
a r e p r e d i c a b l e o f s u b s t a n c e , w h i c h will a c c o u n t f o r S p i n -
o z a ' s r e m a r k t h a t all a t t r i b u t e s , t h a t is, all o t h e r t h i n g s , a r e
predicated of God. m On one occasion, Aristotle talked of
predicating the name or the definition of a thing:
W i t h r e g a r d to t h o s e t h i n g s w h i c h a r e p r e s e n t in a
s u b j e c t , it is g e n e r a l l y t h e c a s e t h a t n e i t h e r t h e i r n a m e
n o r t h e i r d e f i n i t i o n is p r e d i c a b l e o f t h a t in w h i c h t h e y
are present. Though, h o w e v e r , t h e d e f i n i t i o n is n e v e r
p r e d i c a b l e , t h e r e is n o t h i n g in c e r t a i n c a s e s to p r e v e n t
the name being used. For inslance, "white" being present
in a b o d y is p r e d i c a t e d o f t h a t in w h i c h it is p r e s e n t , f o r
a b o d y is c a l l e d w h i t e . T h e d e f i n i t i o n , h o w e v e r , o f t h e
c o l o r " w h i t e " is n e v e r p r e d i c a t e d o f t h e b o d y . ~7
T h i s i d e a m a y b e c a r r i e d c~ver t o S p i n o z a . J u s t as w e
predicate the name "while" of a chair, and not the
d e f i n i t i o n , so w e c o u l d say, o n S p i n o z a ' s b e h a l f , t h a t we c a n
p r e d i c a t e l h e l l ; n n e , btlt n o t l h e d e f i n i l i o n o f " S o c r a t e s " , o f
G o d . W e w o u l d t h e n say, " ( ; o d is S o c r a t e s , " w h i c h will b e
u n d e r s t o o d in a way a n a l o g o u s to " T h i s c h a i r is w h i t e . " W e
w o u l d n o t t h e n b e c o m m i t t e d to t h e b e l i e f t h a t G o d is a

'" 1 say "very much like", rather than "is", because, so far as 1 can see,
Aristotle, unlike Spinoza, holds that the relation is irreflexive, and
Spinoza, unlike Aristotle, holds that it is not transitive.
"+ Wolf's n'anslation of the Short Treatise, 17. 19. The question of
predication is also discussed later in this paper.
'? Categories, 2a, 27-33 (Ross edition}+

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m o d e , a n y m o r e t h a n w e w o u l d to t h e b e l i e f t h a t t h e c h a i r
is a c o l o r . B u t S p i n o z a d o e s n o t tell us w h e t h e r , in a
r e g i m e n t e d l a n g u a g e , " G o d is S o c r a t e s " will b e w e l l - f o r m e d .
It m a y b e t h a t h e w o u l d i n s t e a d say, " G o d h a s S o c r a t e s " ( o r
even "God socratizes"), on the model of "The chair has
w h i t e n e s s " ( o r b e t t e r , " E i n s t e i n h a s hair").
B u t if all m o d e s a r e p r o p e r t i e s o f G o d , t h e n B a y l e ' s
o b j e c t i o n a p p e a r s a p t - - o n e s h o u l d n o t say:
" P e t e r d e n i e s this, h e w a n t s t h a t , h e a f f i r m s s u c h a n d
s u c h a t h i n g " ; f o r a c t u a l l y , a c c o r d i n g to his t h e o r y , it is
G o d w h o d e n i e s , w a n t s , a f f i r m s . TM
H e n c e " c o n t r a d i c t o r y p r o p e r t i e s m u s t b e a s c r i b e d to G o d in
v i o l a t i o n o f t h e laws o f l o g i c , ''~ a n d "all k i n d s of m o r a l
e n o r m i t i e s m u s t h e p r e d i c a t e d d i r e c t l y o f G o d . ''2~
S p i n o z a ' s b e s t a n s w e r to B a y l e s e e m s to h e this: A r i s -
t o t e l i a n p r i m a r y s u b s t a n c e s a r e a t t r i b u t e d d i r e c t l y to G o d
(by w h i c h I m e a n t h a t G o d ( d i r e c t l y ) h a s t h e m , o r t h a t t h e y
a r e ( d i r e c t l y ) in ( ; o d ) . T h e y a r e f i r s t - o r d e r m o d i f i c a t i o n s .
Second-order inodilications, or modifications of primary
s u b s t a n c e s ( s u c h as t h e i n d i v i d u a l w h i l e n e s s o f this b o d y )
a r e o n l y i n d i r e c t l y in G o d , h u t d i r e c t l y in t h e i r p r i m a r y
suhstances. Second-order m o d i f i c a t i o n s will t h e n h e a t t r i -
b u t e d to G o d o n l y i n s o f a r as h e is m o d i f i e d by a f i r s t - o r d e r
modificalion. Thus, cotllra Bayle, "Socrates affirms such
a n d s u c h , " d o e s not h e c o m e , in S p i n o z a ' s c a n t m i c a l l a n -
guage, "(;od al|irms such and such," hut ralher, "(;od,
i n s o f a r as h e is m o d i | i e d by Socrales, a f f i r m s s u c h a n d
s u c h . " A n d o f c o u r s e it m a y well h e that G o d i n s o f a r ;is tie
is m o d i f i e d lay S o c r a t e s , a f f i r m s s u c h a n d s u c h , hut t h a l
i n s o f a r as h e is m o d i f i e d by A r i s t o t l e , h e d o e s n o t . ~' H e n c e
t h e laws o f l o g i c a r e safe, a n d it: is not t h e c a s e t h a l G o d is
immoral.
A l t h o u g h t h e basic i d e a b e h i n d t h e n o t i o n o f b e i n g in a
t h i n g is t h a t o f b e i n g i n s t a n t i a l e d (in a r e s t r i c t e d b u t
u n s p e c i f i e d way), t h e r e is n o n e a t c r a n s l a t i o n f r o m "x is in

'~ Bayle, remark N, pp. 309-310 (nanslatcd by R.H. l'opkin),

'" Curley, p. 12.
"'~ O p . (;it.
~L " ] l l S O | ' a r as" is l l O t , 0|" COLII'SC, ~l l l l l [ } l - f l l l l C t i O l l a l operator.

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y'" t o " y h a s x . " G i v e n a p r o p o s e d d e f i n i t i o n , h o w e v e r , 22

w h e r e a, b, a n d c a r e d i s t i n c t , if a is i n b, a n d b is i n c, t h e n
a is i n c. B u t e v e n t h o u g h c h a s b a n d b h a s a, it is n o t
a l w a y s t r u e t h a t c h a s a. ( R a t h e r , as t h e e x a m p l e s a b o v e
i l l u s t r a t e , c i n s o f a r as it is m o d i f i e d b y b, h a s a.)
It would be useful in this connection for Spinoza to
distinguish being directly in from being indirectly in,
p e r h a p s as f o l l o w s :
x is d i r e c t l y i n y if a n d o n l y if x is i n y a n d t h e r e is n o set,
z, s u c h t h a t
(i) x is i n s o m e m e m b e r o f z, a n d
(ii) some member o f z is i n y, a n d
(iii) n o t w o m e m b e r s o f z, w a n d w', a r e s u c h t h a t w is i n
w' a n d w ' is i n w, a n d
(iv) e v e r y m e m b e r o f z is e i t h e r i n s o m e o t h e r m e m b e r o f
z, o r e l s e i n y, a n d
(v) every member o f z is s u c h t h a t e i t h e r s o m e o t h e r
member o f z is i n it, o r x is i n it.
T h e n x is i n d i r e c t l y i n y if a n d o n l y if x is i n y a n d x is n o t
d i r e c t l y i n y (i.e. t h e r e is a s e t z, s a t i s f y i n g ( i ) - ( v ) ) .
N o w (at l e a s t i n a c e r t a i n r a n g e o f c a s e s ) a h a s b if a n d
o n l y if b is d i r e c t l y i n a. S o G o d d o e s n o t h a v e w h i t e n e s s ,
e v e n t h o u g h S o c r a t e s d o e s , b e c a u s e w h i t e n e s s is n o t d i r e c t l y
i n G o d (it is d i r e c t l y i n S o c r a t e s a n d i n d i r e c t l y i n G o d ) .
I t is all t h e m o r e i m p o r t a n t , i n v i r t u e o f B a y l e ' s c r i t i c i s m ,
t o r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e p a s s a g e i n E , I , xv, d , w h e r e e v e r y -
t h i n g is s a i d t o b e i n G o d alone, is a s l i p o n S p i n o z a ' s p a r t .
F o r t h e a f f e c t s (v. E , I I I , d e f . i i i ) , f o r e x a m p l e , are clearly
m o d e s o f m o d e s , i.e. t h e y a r e i n d i r e c t l y i n G o d , w h i l e o u r
b o d i e s a r e m o d e s o f G o d a n d a r e d i r e c t l y i n G o d . ~s S o i n

~ T h e definition of "is in" is found in the author's "A Note on Spinoza's

Ontology," Philosophical Studies, Vol. 29, No.6.
~ T h e view here put forward is, I think, correct in outline, but may
require modification in its details. It is certainly complicated by the
infinite modes (and, to a lesser extent, the attributes). For the infinite
mode of moion-and-rest is in and conceived through God (by l,xv),
and, it might be thought, finite bodies are in and conceived through
this mode. This would make finite bodies (and Aristotelian primary
substances generally) indirectly in God. Furthermore, the face of the
universe apparently fits in between finite modes and motion-and-rest

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demoting Aristotelian substances to modes and retaining

the dependence o f t h e t r a d i t i o n a l ' a c c i d e n t s ' (like c o l o r ,
m o t i o n , a n g e r , a n d so on) o n t h o s e A r i s t o t e l i a n s u b s t a n c e s ,
Spinoza did implicitly recognize a kind of type-hierarchy of
m o d e s .24
A v i e w p u t f o r t h b y C u r l e y 22 i n o p p o s i t i o n t o B a y l e ' s , is
t h a t , a c c o r d i n g t o S p i n o z a , t o b e i n s o m e t h i n g is t o b e
c a u s e d b y t h a t t h i n g . I f t h i s is t r u e , t h e n
(a) f o r all x a n d f o r all y, x is i n y if a n d o n l y if y is a
c a u s e o f x,
is t r u e . A s I a r g u e e l s e w h e r e , ~6 h o w e v e r , E , I , a x . i v m a y b e
r e p r e s e n t e d as,

(and the infinite intellect?). Spinoza is evidently unique in thinking of

general properties as having the things that exhibit them. Note that this
may explain the lack of stress on the distinction between bodies and,
say, their color, in relation to God - - a body is not in a favored position
with respect to God, because it is not directly in God.
It is the general thesis that modifications are properties that I am
primarily concerned with (although not every property is a modifica-
tion, for the attributes are properties but not modes). The above
considerations relative to this thesis I regard as details. Nevertheless,
the picture that Spinoza gives is roughly this: only infinite understand-
ing (the infinite intellect) and motion-aud-rest are directly in God. The
face of the whole universe ("facies totius Universi") is directly in
motinn-and-rest. (The thought side is complicated by the unclarity
surround the face of the universe; it may be conceived under extension
only, or under thought and extension; v. Ep. lxiv (G.IV,278,24-28),
and cf. E,II,lem.,vii,s.) Thus, taking the modes 'nearest' to God as of
order 1, the next 'nearest' as order 2, and st) on, we have the following:
Extension Thought
Order 1: motion-and-rest infinite intellect
2: face of universe analogue of face of universe
3: finite bodies finite thoughts
4: states and prucesses states and processes
of finite bodies of finite thoughts
~4 Parkinson's remark ("Being and Knowledge in Spinoza", p. 27 of van
der Bend), that "...Spinoza does not speak of modes of modes," can be
seen to be incorrect, by comparing E,III,def.iii with E,I,def.v. In
E,III,def.iii, Spinoza speaks of "Corporis affectiones" - - that is, of
affections (modes) of a body, where a body is itself a mode of God.
~ v. Curley, pp. 19, 40, 49, and especially 74.
~ See my "The Logical Structure of Spinoza's Ethics, Part l."

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(b) f o r all x a n d f o r all y, y is a c a u s e o f x if a n d o n l y if x

is c o n c e i v e d t h r o u g h y,
w h i c h in c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h (a) y i e l d s t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t
(c) f o r all x a n d f o r all y, x is in y if a n d o n l y if x is
c o n c e i v e d t h r o u g h y.
B u t n o w , if it is g r a n t e d t h a t e a c h a t t r i b u t e is c o n c e i v e d
t h r o u g h itself ( E , I , x ) , it f o l l o w s t h a t e a c h a t t r i b u t e is a l s o in
i t s e l f (by (c) a b o v e ) , a n d is t h e r e f o r e a s u b s t a n c e (by
E,l,def.iii). Evidently, then, one cannolf maintain both that
to b e in s o m e t h i n g is to b e c a u s e d b y t h a t t h i n g , a n d t h a t
e a c h a t t r i b u t e is n o t i d e n t i c a l w i t h a s u b s t a n c e (i.e. t h e
s u b s t a n c e o f w h i c h it is a n a t t r i b u t e ) . ~7
Now while the conclusion of this argument may well be
c o r r e c t ( t h a t e v e r y a t t r i b u t e is a s u b s t a n c e , a c c o r d i n g to
S p i n o z a ) , I d o n o t t h i n k t h a t it is p r o p e r l y r e a c h e d by t h e
a b o v e p r e m i s e s . (a), in m y v i e w , s h o u l d b e r e j e c t e d ; b u t t h e
r e j e c t i o n o f (a) c a r r i e s w i t h it t h e r e j e c t i o n o f e i t h e r (b) o r
(c). [(b) a n d (c) e n t a i l (a).] H o w e v e r , E , I , a x . i v is in f a c t u s e d
by S p i n o z a as a b i c o n d i t i o n a l (v. l,iii,d a n d I , x x v , d ) , a n d
o n e p a r t o f (c), viz. if x is in y, t h e n x is c o n c e i v e d t h r o u g h
y, is a p p a r e n t l y a s s u m e d by S p i n o z a in d e r i v i n g f r o m d e f s .
iii a n d v, a n d ax. i, t h e c o n c h t s i o n t h a t e v e r y t h i n g is e i t h e r
a s u b s t a n c e o r a m o d e . (V. I , i v , d ; l,vi,c; 1,xv,d; a n d
l,xxviii,d.) Hence w e a r e d r i v e n , it s e e m s ( g i v e n t h e
r e j e c l i o n <)f (a), to t h e c o n c h t s i o n t h a t it is n o t t h e c a s e t h a t
f o r all x, a n d f o r all y, if x is c o n c e i v e d t h r o u g h y, l h e n x is
in y.~
S p i n o z a is by n o m e a n s c l e a r o n t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r to
b e in is t h e s a u t e as to b e c a u s e d by. T h e r e is e v i d e n c e in
his w o r k s f u r b o t h v i e w s , a h h o u g h o n t h e w h o l e , I t h i n k ,
the evidence faw)rs the negative answer.

..,7 Curley apparently does maintain the identity of substance and attribute
(v. pp. 17-1•, ibid.), and he gives an argument for the view that every
atlribute is a substance (ibid.). However, this is qualified oll p. 16
("Spinoza ... does identify substance with its attributes, or rather, with
Ihe totality of attributes"), and the attributes are maintained to be
actually distinct on p. 171. This latter view is, prima [acie, impossible, if
every attrihute is a substance, and there is exactly one substance.
~" A finite body, for example, is conceived through other finite bodies
which cause it, hut it is not in them.

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I shall c o n s i d e r t h e e v i d e n c e f o r t h e a t f i r m a t i v e a n s w e r
first.
I n t h e T D I E we f i n d t h e f o l l o w i n g : " ...si res sit in se,
sive, ut v u l g o d i c i t u r , c a u s a sui, t u m ...,,2~ T h e f o r c e o f this
is m i t i g a t e d by t h r e e t h i n g s : (a) t h e use o f " v u l g o " m a y be
d e r o g a t o r y , b u t e v e n if n o t , S p i n o z a d o e s n o t c o m m i t
h i m s e l f to t h e view t h a t " c a u s e o f itself" m e a n s t h e s a m e as
" i n itself" ( a n d so, p r e s u m a b l y t h a t " i n " m e a n s " c a u s e d
by"); (b) S p i n o z a d o e s n o t d e f i n e " c a u s e o f itself" in t e r m s
o f " i n itself" ( o r v i c e - v e r s a ) in t h e Ethics ( a n d h e d o e s , in
I , d e f . i ' d e f i n e ' " c a u s e o f itself"); (c) E v e n if, w h a t is t r u e ,
S p i n o z a ' s v i e w is t h a t w h a t e v e r is in itself is t h e c a u s e of
itself, a n d v i c e - v e r s a , it d o e s n o t f o l l o w t h a t w h a t e v e r is
c a u s e d by s o m e t h i n g is in t h a t t h i n g . ( T h e fact t h a t a
r e f l e x i v e p r o n o u n is u s e d h e r e c a n n o t be casually i g n o r e d . )
In the Short Treatise Spinoza a r g u e d ,
...it clearly follows that all o t h e r t h i n g s ( ( o t h e r t h a n G o d ) )
c a n by n o m e a n s be, o r be u n d e r s t o o d , a p a r t f r o m o r
o u t s i d e h i m . T h e r e f o r e we ,nay say with a l l r e a s o n t h a t
G o d is a c a u s e o f all t h i n g s ? ~
S i n c e in t h e Ethics, S p i n o z a is c o n t e n t to p a r a p h r a s e "is in
a n d c o n c e i v e d t h r o u g h " as " c a n n o t be o r he c o n c e i v e d
w i t h o u t " , ~* this p a s s a g e m a y s u g g e s t that h e is a s s u m i n g tha~
to b e in ( a n d b e c o n c e i v e d t h r o u g h ? ) is t h e s a m e as t o h e
c a u s e d by. B u t it s h o u l d be n o l e d that in t h e Ethics this
i n f e r e n c e a p p e a r s to be m o r e fully e x p l a i n e d in I , x x v , d
w h e r e I , ax . i v is u s e d . So it m i g h t well be that S p i n o z a
w o u l d h a v e j u s t i f i e d t h e m o v e m a d e a b o v e in t h e S h o r t
T r e a t i s e n o t by s a y i n g that h e m e a n s t h e s a m e by "is c a u s e d
by" as "is in" ( " c a n n o t be o u t s i d e " ) , b u t by a s s e r t i n g I,ax.iv.
S i m i l a r l y , w h e n h e w r o t e in E , I , x x v , s :
a n d , to p u t it briefly, in t h e s e n s e in w h i c h G o d is said
to be t h e c a u s e o f h i m s e l f , h e s h o u l d also be said to be

'~ "... if a thing be in itself, or, as it is commonly said, cause of itself,

then..." (G.II,34,10-11).
K.V. I,iii (Wolf translation, p. 41, 8-11).
s~ v. note 12 above.

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a c a u s e o f all t h i n g s , w h i c h will b e e v e n m o r e c l e a r l y
evident from the following corollary? 2
and followed this with,
things are nothing except affections, or modes, of God's
a t t r i b u t e s , by w h i c h t h e a t t r i b u t e s o f G o d a r e e x p r e s s e d
in a c e r t a i n a n d d e t e r m i n a t e way. T h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n is
evident from proposition 15 a n d definition 5.
(E,I,xxv,cp ~
the suppressed premise might well be I,ax.iv, not the view
t h a t to b e in is t h e s a m e as t o b e c a u s e d by. ( S i m i l a r l y f o r
t h e " a d e o q u e " o f E , I , x v i i i , d , if it is t a k e n s e r i o u s l y , as I
t h i n k it s h o u l d be.)
T h e m a i n t e x t u a l e v i d e n c e f o r t h e v i e w t h a t to b e in is
n o t t h e s a m e as t o b e c a u s e d by, is s o m e w h a t i n d i r e c t . F i r s t ,
as n o t e d a b o v e , " c a u s e o f i t s e l f " is n o t d e f i n e d in t e r m s o f
" i n i t s e l f " , n o r v i c e - v e r s a . S e c o n d l y , if this w e r e so,
p r o p o s i t i o n s x v a n d xvi ( a n d xvi,c.i) w o u l d b e p r a c t i c a l l y
the same. For l,xv states that everything is in ( a n d
conceived through) God, and I,xvi (and I,xvi,c.i) states that
i n f i n i t e t h i n g s in i n f i n i t e w a y s - - t h a t is, a l l t h i n g s s4 - - h a v e
f o l l o w e d f r o m o r b e e n c a u s e d by G o d . B u t S p i n o z a ' s u s e o f
these propositions indicates very strongly that they are not
t h e s a m e . I , x v is u s e d , o r at least c i t e d , in I , x x i i i , d ; x x v i i i , s ;
xxx,d; xxxi,d; II,x,c.,d; xxxiii,d; xxxvi,d; xlv,d; IV,xxviii,d;
x x x v i i , d ; V , x i v , d a n d x x x v i , s . A n d I , x v i is u s e d in I , x v i i , s ;
x x v i , d ; x x x i i i , d ; x x x i v , d ; x x x v i , d ; A p p . ( G . I I , 83, 2 7 - 3 3 ) ;
II,iii,s; x l i v , c . 2 , d ; xlv,s; I V , P r e f . ( G . I I , 2 0 6 , 2 4 - 2 6 ) ; i v , d ; a n d
V , x x i i . A s i d e f r o m t h e s e uses, n o n e o f w h i c h o v e r l a p , I , x v
a n d I , x v i a r e b o t h u s e d in I , x v i i , d ; x v i i i , d ; x x i x , d ; a n d
I I , i i i , d ; ~ t h e y a r e also b o t h u s e d to e s t a b l i s h I , x x v . B u t in
t w o o f t h e five p l a c e s w h e r e b o t h a r e u s e d , t h e y q u i t e
c l e a r l y f u n c t i o n in e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t w a y s ( I , x v i i , d a n d

:'~ "et, ut verbo dicam, eo sensu, quo Deus dicitur causa sui, eliam
onmium rerum causa dicendus est, quod adhuc clarius ex sequenti
Corollario constabit."
~:' "Res particulares nihil sunt, nisi Dei attributorum affectiones, sive modi,
quibus Dei attributa certo, et determinato modo exprimuntur. Demon-
stratio patet ex Proposkione 15.. et Definitione 5." (E,l,xxv,c)
:v* v. note 8 above.
~' Actually it is l , x v i , c . i , not 1,xvi, that is used in I,xviii,d.

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I I , i i i , d ) , w h i l e t h e i r u s e in I , x v i i i , d a n d I , x x v ( w h e r e it is
s a i d in t h e s c h o l i u m t h a t I , x x v f o l l o w s m o r e c l e a r l y f r o m
I , x v i ) a r e e x p l a i n e d a b o v e . A n d in I , x x i x , d , I h o l d , I , x v a n d
I , x v i a r e a g a i n u s e d d i f f e r e n t l y - - I , x v is u s e d b a s i c a l l y to
s h o w t h a t e v e r y t h i n g d i s t i n c t f r o m G o d is a m o d e , a l t h o u g h
S p i n o z a is n o t e x p l i c i t h e r e . T h u s it is a p p a r e n t t h a t , f o r
t h e m o s t p a r t , I , x v a n d I , x v i h a v e t h e i r o w n w o r k to d o .
T h i r d l y , t h e i d e n t i t y o f b e i n g in a n d b e i n g c a u s e d by,
requires, I think, that we suppose that Spinoza conflated
t h e o b j e c t - p r o p e r t y a n d c a u s e - e f f e c t d i s t i n c t i o n s . F o r if x is
c a u s e d by y, x is in y, a n d h e n c e it is a m o d e , 36 a n d a
p r o p e r t y , :~7 o f y.
It s e e m s , t h e n , t h a t t o h e in a t h i n g is n o t t h e s a m e as t o
be caused by it ~ it is, r a t h e r , a r e l a t i o n t h a t h a s
t r a d i t i o n a l l y b e e n c o n c e i v e d to h o l d b e t w e e n i n d i v i d u a l
q u a l i t i e s a n d t h e t h i n g s t h a t h a v e t h e m (e.g. m y a n g e r a n d
m e ) , b u t w h i c h , in S p i n o z a ' s h a n d s , is a r e l a t i o n t h a t also
holds between an Aristotelian primary substance and
s o m e t h i n g else, viz. C, o d . It is also a r e l a t i o n t h a t o b t a i n s
( t h o u g h in o n l y o n e case) b e t w e e n a t h i n g a n d itself.
W e h a v e t h u s an i n f o r m a l elucidation of Spinoza's
c o n c e p t i o n o f b e i n g in a t h i n g . (A f o r m a l d e f i n i t i o n c a n b e
p r o v i d e d as well, u s i n g q u a n t i f i c a t i o n t h e o r y w i t h i d e n t i t y
a n d necessity.:t9 T h e s e c o n d p r i m i t i v e w h i c h S p i n o z a u s e s
to d e f i n e his n o t i o l a s o f s u b s t a n c e a n d m o d e , is " b e i n g
conceived lhrough." lI was c l a i m e d e a r l i e r t h a t " x is
conceived through y" is a v a r i a n t way o f s a y i n g , " t h e
concept of x includes (involves, depends on) the concept of
y." A n d E , l , a x . i v s l a t e s a m a t e r i a l e q u i v a l e n c e b e t w e e n "y is
a c a u s e o f x " a n d " x is c o n c e i v e d t h r o u g h y " . ~

:"~ Here I assume that x :P y and that whatever is in a thing is conceived

through it. This type of case is enough to establish a conflation, since,
for example, everyone was produced by his parents, and hence would
be a property of rhem.
~7 v. the argumenls above. The best evidence is found in E,l,xxix,d and
Spinoza's use there of l,xvi.
:~" v. note 22 above.
:"' This is supported in E,III,def.i, where ade(luate and inadequate
(partial) causes are distinguished, the former being those whose effects
can be clearly and distinctly perceived ("percipi") through them alone,

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T h e i d e a t h a t t h e r e is a p r e d i c a t i o n r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n a
mode and a substance, expressed by S p i n o z a ' s t a l k o f
concept involvement, is s u g g e s t e d by t h i s r e m a r k of
D e s c a r t e s ' : " C u r e q u i d d i c i m u s in a l i c u j u s r e i n a t u r a , sive
c o n c e p t u , c o n t i n e r i , i d e m est ac si d i c e r e m u s id d e e a r e
v e r u m esse, sive d e ipsa p o s s e a f f l r m a r i . " ( " W h e n w e say
t h a t s o m e t h i n g is c o n t a i n e d in t h e n a t u r e o r c o n c e p t o f
s o m e t h i n g , it is t h e s a m e as if w e s a i d t h a t it is t r u e o f t h a t
t h i n g , o r c a n b e a f f i r m e d o f it.") 4~ W h i l e t h i s m a y h a v e
i n f l u e n c e d S p i n o z a " , t h e e x p l i c a t i o n o f "x is c o n c e i v e d
t h r o u g h y" as " x is t r u e o f y'" s e e m s r u l e d o u t by t h e f a c t
t h a t w h e n e v e r t h e c o n c e p t o f x i n v o l v e s t h e c o n c e p t o f y,
t h e r e is a causal r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n x a n d y. A n d it is n o t at
all t e m p t i n g t o s u p p o s e t h a t e f f e c t s a r e ' t r u e o f ' o r t r u l y
'predicated of' their causes.
It h a s o f t e n b e e n said t h a t S p i n o z a t h i n k s o f c a u s a l
r e l a t i o n s as l o g i c a l o n e s . T h e c l e a r e s t i n d i c a t i o n o f this,
p e r h a p s , is f o u n d in E , l , x v i i , s ( G . 1 1 , 6 2 , 1 4 - 1 9 ) , w h e r e it is
s a i d t h a t e v e r y t h i n g h a s f o l l o w e d f r o m G o d by t h e s a m e
n e c e s s i t y t h a t it f o l l o w s f r o m t h e n a t u r e o f a t r i a n g l e t h a t
its t h r e e a n g l e s a r e e q u a l to t w o r i g h t a n g l e s .
G i v e n t h e e q u i v a l e n c e b e t w e e n b e i n g c a u s e d by a n d
b e i n g c o n c e i v e d t h r o u g h , we s h o u l d n o t t h e n b e s u r p r i s e d
to f i n d t h a t S p i n o z a talks a b o u t w h a t is c o n c e i v e d t h r o u g h
s o m e t h i n g , as w h a t is d e d u c e d , o r d e d u c i b l e , f r o m it. M o s t
s u g g e s t i v e is t h e o c c u r r e n c e o f " d e b e t n e c e s s a r i o c o n c l u d i ,
sive p e r c i p i p e r a l i q u o d D e i a t t r i b u t n m " ( " m u s t n e c e s s a r i l y
he concluded, or perceived through, some attribute of

while the latter are ones whose effects can be understood ("intelligi")
through them, but not through them alone. (Spinoza does not wish
here to distinguish "percipi', "intelligi" or "concipi" from each other.)
The fact that adequate and inadequate causes are de[ined in terms of
conception through, tempts one to take I,ax.iv as a definition of
"cause". "Is a cause of" would then not be a primitive, and would be
eliminable wherever it occurs.
4,, Oeuvres de Descartes, vol. Vll, p. 162, edited by Adam and Tannary.
(The Principles o[ Philosophy, I,def.ix)
~ It was repeated by Spinoza in his presentation of Descartes' Principles of
Philosophy (G.I,150,37 - - 151,2; PP.l,def.ix) Cf. G.II,379,26--28.

04
 SUBSTANCE AND MODE IN SPINOZA

God") in E,I,xxiii,d. 4~ F u r t h e r m o r e , in II,xlvii,s

(G.II,128,14-17), t h e t h i r d k i n d o f k n o w l e d g e , w h i c h is
p o s s i b l e in p a r t o n l y b e c a u s e t h e c o n c e p t o f e a c h t h i n g
i n v o l v e s t h e c o n c e p t o f G o d , 4:~ is d e s c r i b e d as r e s u l t i n g
from deduction :
S i n c e , h o w e v e r , all t h i n g s a r e i n G o d , a n d a r e c o n c e i v e d
t h r o u g h G o d , it f o l l o w s t h a t w e c a n d e d u c e f r o m t h i s
knowledge many things that we may know adequately,
a n d t h u s f o r m t h a t t h i r d k i n d o f k n o w l e d g e . 44
T h e r e is t h u s little d o u b t t h a t S p i n o z a c l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d
conception through something with deduction f r o m it.
Nevertheless, this idea should not be stressed too much,
nor should Spinoza's conception of deduction be assumed
to coincide with ours. For, aside from d i f f i c u l t i e s in
i d e n t i f y i n g j u s t w h a t is d e d u c e d f r o m w h a t , 4 L t h e f a c t t h a t
anything can be deduced from itself would require us to
say t h a t e v e r y t h i n g is c o n c e i v e d t h r o u g h itself. F u r t h e r ,

"~ G.I1,67,2-3. And it seems clear that Spinoza intends no distinction here
between "percipi" and "concipi", the note to II,def.iii notwithstanding.
'~ See E,II,xlv and of. II,xlvii,d and s.
4, "Gum autem omnia in Deo sint, et per Deum concipiantur, sequitur,
nos ex cognitione hac plurima posse deducere, quae adequate cognos-
camus, atque adeo tertium illud cognitionis genus formare." E,ll,xlvii,s.
'~ The trouble is this: causal relations (and conceptual ones) are spoken o[
by Spinoza as holding hetween objects like Socrates and (;rid, while
deductive relations obtain between propositions (or ideas that inw)lve
affirmation and negation). When Socrates is conc:eived through a and b,
this might mean thai the idea that Socrates exists is deduced from the
idea that a and b exist (ahmg with the laws of nature, perhaps; v.
Curley, pp. 45-81). On the other hand, it might mean that tile concept
(idea, proposition) that Socrates is such-and-such, is deduced from the
ideas that a is 9 and b is W In the former case, there could not,
apparently, be non-existent things that are conceived through some-
thing (contra l,vii,s.ii ((;.11,50,6-12); but this is a difficult passage in
any event; in the latter case, we do not know what the concept of, say,
Socrates is. (One might, however, maintain" that it is the idea that
includes everything that is true of him - - v. Pt'.l,defAx, and E,II,xii
and its demonstration. If so, we probably never have a complete
concept of Socrates, or anything else, and so for humans to conceive
one thing through another, is a mere ideal. But this is incompatible
with remarks such as that found in E,II,xlvii,s (see note 44).)

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e v e n w h e n t h e c o n c l u s i o n is n o t a p r e m i s e , it is clear t h a t
n o t j u s t a n y valid d e d u c t i v e a r g u m e n t with t r u e p r e m i s e s
w o u l d be h e l d by S p i n o z a to e x p l a i n ( a d e q u a t e l y ) t h e t r u t h
of t h e c o n c l u s i o n . O n e m i g h t well b e able to d e d u c e
Socrates' m o r t a l i t y f r o m t r u e p r e m i s e s t h a t d o n o t m e n t i o n
its causes; b u t , e v e n if o n e k n o w s that t h e p r e m i s e s a r e
t r u e , o n e has n o t t h e r e b y c o n c e i v e d (clearly a n d distinctly)
his m o r t a l i t y t h r o u g h a n y t h i n g .
Since to b e c o n c e i v e d t h r o u g h s o m e t h i n g , h o w e v e r
u n c l e a r , is closely c o n n e c t e d with e x p l a n a t i o n a n d d e d u c -
tion, we h a v e i n t u i t i v e s u p p o r t f o r s o m e of t h e views
a d v a n c e d above. W h a t I h a v e s u g g e s t e d is that x is i n y
o n l y if x is c o n c e i v e d t h r o u g h y,46 b u t that it is n o t g e n e r a l l y
t r u e t h a t x is c o n c e i v e d t h r o u g h y o n l y if x is in y. T o b e in
a t h i n g is to b e o n t o l o g i c a l l y d e p e n d e n t o n it (as a n
a c c i d e n t d e p e n d s o n its s u b s t a n c e ) , a n d , I suggest, to b e
c o n c e i v e d t h r o u g h a t h i n g is s i m p l y to be explained in terms
o[ it.
N o w a n e x p l a n a t i o n of why a c e r t a i n t h i n g exists, is
c e r t a i n l y to b e g i v e n in t e r m s of t h o s e t h i n g s o n which it
d e p e n d s - - i.e. (if this is h e l p f u l ) o n those t h i n g s which, if
they h a d n ' t existed, t h e t h i n g to b e e x p l a i n e d w o u l d n o t
h a v e existed. If, as I m a i n t a i n above, b e i n g in is a r e s t r i c t e d
k i n d of d e p e n d e n c e , a n d n o t t h e s a m e as a g e n e r a l causal
r e l a t i o n , t h e n t h e d e p e n d e n c e of a o n b, which is e x p r e s s e d
by s a y i n g that a is in b, r e q u i r e s that the e x i s t e n c e of a b e
e x p l a i n e d at least in p a r t by the e x i s t e n c e of b. T h i s is why
x is in y only if x is c o n c e i v e d t h r o u g h y. B u t t h e fact that a
is c o n c e i v e d t h r o u g h b does n o t r e q u i r e that it be in b,
b e c a u s e t h e r e is the m o r e g e n e r a l r e l a t i o n of causality that
a c c o u n t s for a's b e i n g e x p l a i n e d o r c o n c e i v e d t h r o u g h b.
H e n c e it is n o t in g e n e r a l t h e case that if x is c o n c e i v e d
t h r o u g h y, t h e n x is in y. A n d the m a t e r i a l e q u i v a l e n c e
(I,ax.iv) b e t w e e n b e i n g c o n c e i v e d t h r o u g h a n d b e i n g c a u s e d
by, m e r e l y e x p r e s s t h e fact that S p i n o z a ' s n o t i o n of
causality is, like Aristotle's, a n e x t r e m e l y g e n e r a l o n e .
A l t h o u g h we h a v e f r o m t h e f o r e g o i n g a p l a u s i b l e view of

~" This explains the inference from E,l,defs. iii and v, and ax. i, to the
conclusion that only substances and modes exist.

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 SUBSTANCE AND MODE 1N SPINOZA

t h e t e r m s w i t h w h i c h s u b s t a n c e is d e f i n e d , t h e r e is still
s o m e q u e s t i o n a b o u t w h a t s u b s t a n c e is. a7 I d o n o t i n t e n d t o
s u r v e y all o f t h e v a r i o u s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s that have been, or
c o u l d b e , g i v e n , b u t I will d i s c u s s t h o s e t h a t s e e m t o b e
most plausible, giving in the end the view that seems to me
to be correct.
There are two (similar) interpretations that, among
others, deserve consideration. O n o n e , G o d is all t h i n g s
( t a k e n t o g e t h e r ) - - t h a t is, h e is t h e t o t a l i t y o f all t h i n g s , as
O n t h e o t h e r , h e is each t h i n g ( a n d t h e r e is o n l y o n e s u c h
' t h i n g ' ) . S p i n o z a o c c a s i o n a l l y s e e m s t o t a l k , i n t h e Short
Treatise, as if t h e l a t t e r w e r e t r u e :
. . . t h e m o r e it is S o m e t h i n g , t h e m o r e a t t r i b u t e s it m u s t
have, and consequently God being the most perfect, and
all t h a t is A n y t h i n g , h e m u s t a l s o h a v e i n f i n i t e , p e r f e c t ,
a n d all a t t r i b u t e s . 4~
Thus the extreme pantheistic interpretation seems to be
supported. F o r , o n e m i g h t s u p p o s e , s i n c e G o d is all t h a t is
a n y t h i n g , if a c e r t a i n t h i n g is a n y t h i n g , t h e n it is G o d . S o
only God exists.
T h i s v i e w , h o w e v e r , is i n c o m p a t i b l e with much of the
Ethics:" F o r e x a m p l e , I , x x i v , c o m b i n e d w i t h t h e v i e w s t h a t
G o d ' s e s s e t ~ c e i n v o l v e s e x i s t e n c e (v. l , x i a n d l , x i , d ) a n d t h a t
there are things produced by God, requires that there be
t h i n g s d i s t i n c t f r o m G o d . A n d E , I I , x Sl~llC'S (ill e f f e c t ) t h a t

'~' Although "mode" is defined using these terms as well ("is in" and "is
conceived through"), there is little question ahout its exlensinn. (Infinite
triodes are the exception.) Aristotelian primary substances are all
modes, as are their states and events.
"~ See Hampshire, pp. 36, 38-41; Mark, pp. 9, 12; De Deugd, p. 146.
Hampshire also seems to take the extreme monistic and pantheistic
view - - v. p. 41.
*~' K.V. l,ii (Wolf translation, p. 21).
:~' ludeed, even in the Shorf Treatise, Spinoza often writes as if there are
things distinct from God, e.g. "... if he (God) did not exist, I should not
be able to assert anything at all about him; although this can he done in
the case of other things, even when they do not exist. Pie must also be,
indeed, the subjectum of all other things." (K.V. l,i; Wolf translation, p.
19.)

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n o m a n is a s u b s t a n c e . F u r t h e r m o r e , Spinoza remarks in
Ep. lxxiii (1675):
F o r t h e r e s t , as t o t h e d o c t r i n e w h i c h c e r t a i n C h u r c h e s
add to these, namely, that God assumed human
nature, I expressly warned them that I do not
understand w h a t t h e y say. I n d e e d , to confess the
t r u t h , t h e y s e e m t o s p e a k n o less a b s u r d l y t h a n if
s o m e o n e w e r e t o tell m e t h a t a c i r c l e a s s u m e d t h e
n a t u r e o f a s q u a r e , sj
I t is d i f f i c u l t t o s e e h o w t h e e x t r e m e p a n t h e i s t i c i n t e r p r e -
tation ever was thought to be adeqhate, in the face of the
e v i d e n c e it e n c o u n t e r s i n t h e E t h i c s . P e r h a p s it is e a s i l y
confused with the view that no two things are really
d i s t i n c t , i n D e s c a r t e s ' u s e o f t h a t e x p r e s s i o n . 52 T h i s d o e s n o t
mean, however, that everything is ( r e a l l y ) i d e n t i c a l w i t h
God.
A v i e w s i m i l a r t o t h e a b o v e , is t h a t o f G o d as a w h o l e , o r
t h e t o t a l i t y o f "all b e i n g " ( " o m n e e s s e " ) , as s t a t e d i n t h e
T D I E : "... e s t n i m i r u m h o c e n s , u n i c u m , i n f i n i t u m , h o c e s t ,
est omne esse, et praeter quod nullam datur esse. ''~ Here,
one might suggest, we are to think of Aristotelian primary
s u b s t a n c e s as s u m m e d u p i n t o o n e i n f i n i t e l y e x t e n d e d ( a n d
thinking) being.
T h e t r o u b l e w i t h t h i s s u g g e s t i o n is t h a t t h i s i n f i n i t e b e i n g
is n a t u r a n a t u r a t a n o t n a t u r a n a t u r a n s . ~~ T h a t is, a s u m m a t i o n

"' "Caeterum quod quaedam Ecclesiae his addunt, quod Deus naturarn
h n m a n a n l assmnpserit, monui expresse, me, quid dicant, nescire, imo
tat vermn fatear non minus absurde mihi Ioqui videntur, quam mihi
diceret, quod circulus naturam quadrati induerit." (Wolf translation
used.)
~ Cf. Curley, p. 9. Curley is not quite accurate in saying that a real
distinction can obtain only belween two substances, according Io
Descarles. For in the Principles o[ Philosophy (I,Ixi) he grants that, in a
derivative way, the distinctions between one substance, and a mode of
a n o t h e r substance, a n d between two modes nf different substances, are
real.
r,~ "... this certainly is a single, infinite being, that is, it is all being, besides
which which no being is given." (G.II,29,16-18)
~' ()n this distinction, v. E,l,xxix,s.

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 SUBSTANCE AND MODE IN SPINOZA

o f f i n i t e b e i n g s is a n i n f i n i t e b e i n g t h a t is a m o d e , n o t a
s u b s t a n c e . T h i s m a y b e s e e n by n o t i n g t h e p a s s a g e s in
which Spinoza asserts that our minds (or rather, intellects)
a r e p a r t s o f t h e i n f i n i t e i n t e l l e c t o f G o d (in E , I I , x i , c a n d
E,V,xl,s-+~). B u t G o d ' s i n t e l l e c t is a m o d e , as E , I , x x x i
asserts? ~
It m i g h t b e t h o u g h t , however, t h a t t h e p a s s a g e in
E,II,lem.vii,s (G.II,102,10-13) supports this view, since,
after suggesting a way of conceiving apparently discon-
n e c t e d t h i n g s as o n e t h i n g , S p i n o z a s t a t e s :
A n d if w e c o n t i n u e in t h i s w a y t o i n f i n i t y , w e m a y
easily conceive that the whole of nature is o n e
i n d i v i d u a l w h o s e p a r t s , t h a t is, all b o d i e s , v a r y in
infinite ways, without any change in t h e w h o l e
i n d i v i d u a l . ~7
However this "totam naturam" is n o t , o n m y v i e w , a
s u b s t a n c e - - f o r u n l i k e a n y s u b s t a n c e , it h a s p a r t s i n t o
w h i c h it is d i v i s i b l e . ,+'~ It is, r a t h e r , t h e f a c e o f t h e w h o l e
U n i v e r s e ( " f a c i e s t o t i u s U n i v e r s i " ) , as S p i n o z a p r a c t i c a l l y

~ G.II,94,30-31 and G.II,306,20-24, respectively.

See also E,I,xxxii,d and I,xvii,s (whose force is not to show that God's
intellect and ours is the same only in name, but to show that this is so,
/./the intellect of God cnnstitutes or pertains to his essence - - which is a
way of saying: if God's intellect is an attribute (V.I,def.iv).) Similarly
I,xxxiii,s.ii does not grant that the intellect or will "pertains to the
essence of C,od," except for Ihe sake of argument. The White-Stirling
translation of "... Deo aliam libertatem assueti sunt tribuere, hinge
diversam ab ilia, quae a nobis (Defin. 7.) tradita est; videlicet, absnlutam
voluntatem," (G.11,74,30-33) as "... they have been in the habit of
assigning to God another liberty widely different from that absolute will
which (Def. 7) we have taught," is misleading. The passage should
read, "... they are in the habit of attributing to God another liberty,
namely an absolute will, very dilt'erent from that which (DeC 7) we
have taught." There is no absolute will, according to Spinoza, since
such a will is free (in his usage). On this see II,xlviii and its
demonst rat ion.
5~ "Et si sic ~ r r o in infinitum pergamus, facile concipiemus, totam
naturam unum esse Individuum, cujus partes, hoc est, omnia corporia
infinitis tnodis variant, absque ulla totius lndividui mutatione."
~" See E,l,xii and l,xiii.

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 C.E. JARRETT

asserts by referring, i n E p . lxiv ( G . I V , 2 7 8 , 2 6 - 2 8 ) , to

E , I I , l e m . v i i , s . ~'~
In rejecting the above interpretation, I suppose that
natura naturans and natura naturata are not identical, even
in a way. To suppose otherwise would require that
something be in and conceived through itself, and also in
and conceived through another (v. E , I , x x i x , s ) ; t h a t is,
something may be both a substance and a mode. But this,
as I t h i n k S p i n o z a c a n d e m o n s t r a t e , is i m p o s s i b l e . 6~
The interpretation according t o w h i c h s u b s t a n c e is a
supreme l a w o f n a t u r e "* ( o r g r o u p o f s u c h l a w s ) , is
attractive, especially because of E,I,xvi,xvii, and their
d e m o n s t r a t i o n s . 6~ T h e l a w s o f G o d ' s n a t u r e a r e i d e n t i f i e d

~" In Ep. lxiv Spinoza responded to Tschirnhaus' request (relayed through

Schuller in Ep. lxiii) for examples of things immediately produced by
God, and o| things produced by an infinite mode. Spinoza gave as an
example of something of the second sort, "facies totius Universi, quae
quamvis infinitis modis variet, manet tamen semper eadem, de quo vide
Schol. 7. Lemmatis ante Prop. 14. p. 2." Wolf translates this last phrase
as, "on this subject see Scholium 7 to the Lemma before Proposition
XIV, Part I1." (Wolf, Correspondence, p. 308), which presumably
prompts Parkinson's remark, "This last reference is a mistake of
Spinoza's for the Scholium to the 7th lemma." (Parkinson, p. 77, note
8) T h e mistake, however, is Wolf's. "Schol. 7. Lemmatis" is ambiguous
between "Scholium 7 to the lemma" and "the scholium to the 7th
lemma." (Note that in the Ethics, while Spinoza prefers to place
numerals after the words they modify, he also places them before such
words: e.g. in E,I,viii,s.i, and in two places in l,viii,s.ii, he writes "7.
Prop."; and in l,xi, Aliter i, he writes, "(per 2. Prop.)" Cf. the dating of
the letters and Ep. Ixiii.) Since the reference in Ep. Ixiv is ambiguous
(and there is no 7th Scholium to the lemma before E,II,xiv), there is no
evidence that Spinoza made a mistake. Wolf merely made the wrong
disambiguation.
~0 T h e demonstration proceeds from I,defs. iii and v, and l,ax.ii (which I
regard as a universal closure of a biconditional). For a more complete
discussion of this, see my " T h e Logical Structure of Spinoza's Ethics,
Part I."
~' See Curley, p. 158, where laws of nature and the essence of God are
said to be the same, according to Spinoza (and cf. l,xx); v. etiam
Hubbeling, p. 13.
62 V. etiam E,l,App. (G.II,83,29-33).

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 S U B S T A N C E A N D MODE IN S P I N O Z A

w i t h t h e n e c e s s i t y o f t h e d i v i n e n a t u r e i n I , x v i i , d a n d it is
a p p a r e n t l y 63 b e c a u s e e v e r y t h i n g follows from these laws
( I , x v i ) t h a t S p i n o z a s t a t e s i n I , x v i , c . i t h a t G o d is a c a u s e o f
everything, and that "all things have necessarily followed
from the given nature of God" (I,xxxiii,d, in the first line).
T h i s s u g g e s t s t h a t G o d , G o d ' s n a t u r e , a n d G o d ' s laws, a r e
t h e s a m e . 64
N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h i s v i e w is s u r e l y w r o n g . F o r , f i r s t , G o d ' s
l a w s a r e ( p a r t of) h i s i n t e l l e c t , ~ a n d h i s i n t e l l e c t is a m o d e .
Secondly, as Wolf notes, ~ God (and his attributes) are
active, whereas laws are not. Thirdly, Spinoza repeatedly
s p e a k s o f G o d i n s u c h a w a y t h a t it is d i f f i c u l t , t o s a y t h e
least, to see how he could have maintained him to be a law
o r s e t o f laws. G o d , f o r e x a m p l e , is i n d i v i s i b l e , e x t e n d e d ,
t h i n k s , a n d s o o n . ~7 M o s t t e l l i n g , p e r h a p s , a r e p a s s a g e s s u c h
as t h e f o l l o w i n g , w h e r e , t a l k i n g a b o u t G o d , S p i n o z a says,
"He must also be, indeed, t h e subjectum o f all o t h e r
t h i n g s . ''6~
W h a t t h e n is S p i n o z a ' s s u b s t a n c e ? I t is, u n d e r e x t e n s i o n ,
m a t t e r , o r , if w e a r e p e r m i t t e d t h e p h r a s e , p h y s i c a l e n e r g y .
And under thought, it is m e n t a l ' s t u f f ' , o r e n e r g y . ~ I n
support of this view, especially with regard to the physical
s i d e o f it, w e m a y n o t e t h a t i n T T P , v i , S p i n o z a i n s e r t e d t h e
qualification:
Note that by "Nature" here I do not understand matter

'~ But only apparently, on my view.

And l,xx explicitly identifies (whatever exactly this comes to) God and
his essence, or nature.
'~ v. TTP,iii (G.III,46,1-2) for identification of laws with decrees; TTP,vi
(G.III,83,12-15) for, at least apparent identification of both with the will
of God; and v. E,II,xlix,c for identification of the will and intellect, v.
etiam I,xxxiii,s.ii (G.II,75,7-9 and 20-23).
e~ "Spinoza's Conception of the Attributes of Substance," pp. 18--24.
~ Curley anticipates this type of objection (and more specifically the part
based on indivisibility), and replies briefly on p. 78.
'~ Wolf translation of S.T. (p. 19).
~' This idea has been previously expressed by Mats,on, The History of
Philosophy, p. 318, and by Wolf, "Spinoza's Conception of the Attributes
of Substance," p. 22.

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a l o n e , a n d its a f f e c t i o n s , b u t b e s i d e s m a t t e r , o t h e r i n f i n i t e
t h i n g s . TM
A n d i n E , I , x v , s w e f i n d (in a d d i t i o n t o t h e p h r a s e s " m a t t e r ,
i n s o f a r as it is s u b s t a n c e ''TJ a n d " w a t e r . . . i n s o f a r as it is
s u b s t a n c e ''Te) t h e f o l l o w i n g , w h e r e S p i n o z a is t a l k i n g o f
quantity:
...if... w e c o n c e i v e it, i n s o f a r as it is s u b s t a n c e . . , it is
f o u n d t o b e i n f i n i t e , s i n g l e , a n d i n d i v i s i b l e .... E s p e c i a l l y if
o n e a t t e n d s t o t h i s as w e l l : t h a t m a t t e r is e v e r y w h e r e t h e
s a m e , n o r a r e p a r t s d i s t i n g u i s h e d in it, e x c e p t i n s o f a r a s
w e c o n c e i v e m a t t e r t o b e d i v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d , w h e n c e its
parts are only distinguished modally, not, however,
really.7:~
T h e r e is little d o u b t , t h e n , t h a t S p i n o z a ' s u n i q u e s u b s t a n c e
is m a t t e r . 74
T h i s view s e e m s to w o r k fairly well in t h e c a s e o f
extended s u b s t a n c e , b u t t h e t h i n k i n g s u b s t a n c e is m o r e
d i f f i c u l t ( f o r m e ) t o i m a g i n e . 7r' A r e t h o u g h t s c o m p o s e d o f
m e n t a l s t u f f , o r e n e r g y , in t h e s a m e w a y t h a t p h y s i c a l
objects are composed of matter? Difficulties about the
m e n t a l s p h e r e a s i d e , h o w e v e r , o n e m i g h t s u s p e c t t h a t , if
m a t t e r is s u b s t a n c e , b e i n g in is a r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n a n o b j e c t
a n d t h a t o f w h i c h it is c o m p o s e d . ( T h i s a c c o r d s w e l l w i t h
t h e i n t u i t i v e i d e a t h a t if t h e o b j e c t is d e s t r o y e d , t h e m a t t e r
r e m a i n s - - ' u n c h a n g e d ' at a f u n d a m e n t a l level - - b u t t h e

:. . . . N.B. m e hi(: per naturam non intelligere solam materiam, ejusque

afl-ectiones, sed praeter materiam alia infinita." (G.III,83,34-35)
7, "materia, quatenus substantia' (G.II,60,7).
7~ "aqua ... quatenus substantia" (G.II,60,3-4).
7., ... si ... earn, quatenus substantia est, c(mcipimus ... infinita, unica, &
indivisihilis reperietur ... Praecipue si ad hoc etiam attendatur, quod
materia ubique eadem est, nec partes in eadem distinguuntur, nisi
quatenus materiam diversimode affectam esse concipimus, unde ejus
partes m o d a l i t e r t a n t u m d i s t i n g u u n t u r , non a u t e m realiter."
(G.II,59,27-35).
7~ And this may provide further justification for Spinoza's claim in Ep. L
that God is only very misleading called 'one or single'. For "matter"
("materia") is a mass term, as on occasion is "substance" ("substantia").
~" This is not intended as a forceful objection. It would no doubt carry
very little weight with Spinoza.

102
 S U B S T A N C E AND MODE IN SPINOZA

object c a n n o t exist u n l e s s what it is c o m p o s e d of does.) B u t

this s u g g e s t i o n does n o t seem viable, for o n S p i n o z a ' s view
( a c c o r d i n g to the a b o v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ) , c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of
finite b o d i e s are in those bodies, a n d in G o d , w h e r e in
n e i t h e r case is it t e m p t i n g to s u p p o s e that t h e r e is a
composition relation.
T h e t e n t a t i v e c o n c l u s i o n s of this p a p e r a r e t h e n :
I. a. " B e i n g in", as f o u n d in S p i n o z a , e x p r e s s e s a r e l a t i o n
of o n t o l o g i c a l d e p e n d e n c e that is m o d e l e d a f t e r t h e
d e p e n d e n c e of a n ' i n d i v i d u a l p r o p e r t y ' o n its b e a r e r .
A n d t h e r e is n o o b v i o u s c o n c e p t u a l a b s u r d i t y in
S p i n o z a ' s position.
b. " B e i n g c o n c e i v e d t h r o u g h " e x p r e s s e s a r e l a t i o n of
e x p l a n a t o r y d e p e n d e n c e which
i. is e n t a i l e d by, b u t does n o t entail, the r e l a t i o n of
b e i n g in, a n d
ii. is e q u i v a l e n t to b e i n g c a u s e d by (or, h a v i n g , as a
cause).
II. a . T h e e x p r e s s i o n " m o d e " , as u s e d by S p i n o z a , has as
p a r t of its e x t e n s i o n , A r i s t o t e l i a n p r i m a r y subst~inces
as well as qualities of those s u b s t a n c e s .
h. S p i n o z a ' s stthstance is not each t h i n g , the totality
of finite things, n o r a law of n a t u r e . It is, a l t h o u g h
this is n o t the w h o l e story, t n a l t e r . 7~
U n i v e r s i t y of A l b e r t a
E d m o n t o n , Alberta
Canada T6(; 2El

Rutgers University,
C a m d e n C o l l e g e of A r t s & S c i e n c e
C a m d e n , N.J. 0 8 1 0 2
U.S.A.

'6 I a m g r e a t l y i n d e b t e d to W a l l a c e M a l s o n f o r c o m m e n t s on an earlier
version of this paper.

103
 C.E. JARRETT

Abbreviations
G. Spinoza Opera, edited by Carl G e b h a r d t , Heidel-
berg: Carl Winter, 1925. (followed by v o l u m e
(I-IV), page and line numbers.)
E. Ethica (followed by part n u m b e r s (I-V) a n d proposi-
tion numb~ers (i, ii, etc.) a n d / o r

def. definition c. corollary

ax. axiom d. d e m o n s t r a t i o n
lem. lemma expl. explanatior
s. scholium pref. preface
app. appendix

T h u s , for example, "E,I,xiv, c.ii" refers to the

second corollary to proposition f o u r t e e n of the first
part of the Ethics, a n d "II,x,c,s" to the scholium to
the corollary of II,x.

TDIE Tractatus de Intellectus Eraendatione

K.V. Korte Verhandeling van God, de Mensch en des zelfs
Welstand (also r e f e r r e d to as "S.T," and "Short
Treatise")
PP. Renati Des Cartes Principiorum Philosophiae (followed
by part n u m b e r s (I and II) and propositions, etc. as
in E.)
CM. Cogitata Metaphysica
TTP. Tractatus Theologico- Politicus
Ep. Epistolae (as n u m b e r e d by G e b h a r d t in G.)

Works cited by r e f e r e n c e to their a u t h o r s will be f o u n d in

the Bibliography. Latin quotations are f r o m G e b h a r d t ' s
Spinoza Opera, and, unless otherwise noted, translations are
mine. Wolf's translation of the Short Treatise is used
throughout.

104
 SUBSTANCE AND MODE IN SPINOZA

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aristotle9 Categoriae. Ed. L. Minio-Paluello. Oxford Classical Texts. Oxford
1949.
--. The Basic Works of Aristotle. Ed. W.D. Ross, Random House, N.Y.
1941.
Bayle, Piere. Historical and Critical Dictionary Selections. Trans. & Ed.
Richard H. Popkin. Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis. 1965.
Boscherini, E.G. Lexicon Spinozanum. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1970.
(2 vols.)
Curley, E.M. Spinoza's Metaphysics: An Essay in Interpretation. Harvard U.P.,
Cambridge, Mass. 1969.
De Deugd, C. The Significance of Spinoza's First Kind of Knowledge. Van
Gorcum, Netherlands 1966.
Descartes9 Oeuvres de Descartes9 Eds. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery,
Paris 1897-1910. (12 vols.)
Philosophical Works I. Trans. E.S. Haldane and GT.R. Ross.
Cambridge U.P., Cambridge 1968.
Hampshire, Stuart. Spinoza. Penguin, Baltimore 1967.
Hubbeling, H.G. Spinoza's Methodology. Van Gorcum, Netherlands 1967.
Jarrett, Charles E. "The Logical Structure of Spinoza's Ethics, Part I".
Synthese (forthcoming, 1977).
--. "A Note on Spinoza's Ontology" Philosophical Studies, Volume 29,
No.6, June 1976.
Mark, Thomas Carson. Spinoza's Theory of Truth. Columbia U.P., N.Y. and
I,ondon 1972.
Matsou, Wallace 1. A History of Philosophy. American Book Co., 1968.
Parkinson, G.H.R. Spinoza's Theory of Knowledge. Oxford U.P., Oxford
1964.
Spinoza. Spinoza Opera. Ed. Carl Gebhardt. Carl Winter, Heidelberg 1925.
(4 vols.)
--. Ethic of Benedict De Spinoza. Trans. W. Hale White and Ameilia
H. Stirling, Oxford U.P. 1923. (4th Ed.).
van der Bend, J.G. (Ed.) Spinoza on Knowing, Being, and Freedom. Van
Gorcum, Netherlands 1974.
Wolf, A. The Correspondence of Spinoza. Cass, London 1966.
- - . "Spinoza's Conception of the Attributes of Substance."
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. XXVII. (Reprinted in S. Paul
Kashap (Ed.) Studies in Spinoza; Critical and Interpretive Essays. UC Press,
Berkeley 1972.)
9 Spinoza's Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being. Russell &
Russell, N.Y. 1966.
Wolfson, Harry Austryn. The Philosophy of Spinoza; Unfolding the Latent
Processes of His Reasoning. Schocken, N.Y. 1969. (2 vols.)

105