Genuine Necessity

Illustrative Case : Municipality of Meycayuan vs. IAC

157 SCRA 640 (1998)

Facts:
Respondent Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation filed with the Office of the
Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan an application for a permit to fence a parcel of land. The
fencing of said property was allegedly to enable the storage of the respondent’s heavy equipment
and various finished products.
The Municipal Council of Meycauayan passed Resolution manifesting the intention to
expropriate the respondent’s parcel of land. It was opposed by the respondent Philippine Pipes and
Merchandising Corporation with the office of the Provincial Governor.
Special Committee recommended that the Provincial Board of Bulacan disapprove or annul the
resolution in question because there was no genuine necessity for the Municipality of Meycauyan to
expropriate the respondent’s property for use as a public road. Then Provincial Board of Bulacan
passed Resolution disapproving and annulling the Resolution passed by the Municipal Council of
Meycauayan.
However, Petitioner (Municipality of Meycauayan) filed with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan a
special civil action for expropriation, and upon deposit of the amount of P24,025.00, which is the
market value of the land, with the PNB, the trial court issued a writ of possession in favor of the
Petitioner.
The respondent went to IAC, on petition for review, which the appellate court affirmed the trial
court’s decision. But upon MR, the decision was reversed and held that there is no genuine necessity
to expropriate the land for use as public road as there were several other roads for the same purpose
and another more expropriate lot for the proposed public road.
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner has the right to expropriate?
Held:
The Petitioner’s purpose in expropriating the respondent’s property is to convert the same into a
public road for the purposes to ease the traffic in the area of vehicles. However, it reveals that there
are other connecting links or several roads for the same purpose and another lot for proposed public
road. The Petitioner itself admits that there are four (4) such cross roads in existence.
The foundation of the right to exercise the power of eminent domain is genuine necessity and
that necessity must be of public character. Condemnation of private property is justified only if it is
for the public good and there is genuine necessity of a public character. Consequently, the courts
have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to
determine whether there is a genuine necessity therefor.
It is still a judicial question whether in the exercise of such competence, the party adversely affected
is the victim of partiality and prejudice. That the equal protection clause will not allow.
There is absolutely no showing in the petition why the more appropriate lot for the proposed
road which was offered for sale has not been the subject of the petitioner’s attempt to expropriate
assuming there is a real need for another connecting road.
Petition DISMISSED.

Illustrative Case : Republic vs. De Knecht

GR No. 87351, February 12,1990

Fact: The Petitioner On February 20, 1979 filed in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal in Pasay City
an expropriation proceedings against the owners of the houses standing along Fernando Rein-Del Pan
streets among them is the respondent and some fifteen other defendant who filed a motion to
dismiss alleging lack of jurisdiction, pendency of appeal with the President of the Philippines,
prematureness of complaint and arbitrary and erroneous valuation of the properties, filed an ex
parte urgent motion for the issuance by the trial court of a restraining order to restrain the Petitioner
from proceeding with the taking of immediate possession and control of the property sought to be
condemned. In June, 1979 the Petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession of the
property to be expropriated which the lower court granted and created a Committee of three to
determine the just compensation for the lands involved in the proceedings. Respondent filed with
this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition, and directed against the order of the lower court
dated June 14, 1979 praying that the Petitioner be commanded to desist from further proceeding in
the expropriation action and from implementing said order where the court granted in favor of the
respondent Adrian Avilado Antazo

On August 8, 1981 defendants Maria Del Carmen Roxas Vda. de Elizalde and others moved to dismiss
the expropriation action in compliance with the dispositive portion of the aforesaid decision of this
Court which had become final and in order to avoid further damage to same defendants who were
denied possession of their properties. On September 2, 1983, the Republic filed a motion to dismiss
said case due to the enactment of the Batas Pambansa Blg. 340 expropriating the same properties
and for the same purpose. The lower court in an order of September 2, 1983 dismissed the case by
reason of the enactment of the said law. The motion for reconsideration thereof was denied in the
order of the lower court dated December 18, 1986.
Respondent appealed from said order to the Court of Appeals wherein in due course a decision was
rendered on December 28, 1988 in favor of the respondents and setting aside the decision of the CA.

Issue: whether an expropriation proceeding that was determined by a final judgment of this Court
may be the subject of a subsequent legislation for expropriation.

Held: Yes, While it is true that said final judgment of the Supreme Court on the subject becomes the
law of the case between the parties, it is equally true that the right of the petitioner to take private
properties for public use upon the payment of the just compensation is so provided in the
Constitution and our laws. Such expropriation proceedings may be undertaken by the petitioner not
only by voluntary negotiation with the land owners but also by taking appropriate court action or by
legislation.

Illustrative Case : De la Paz Masikip vs. Judge Legaspi

GR No.136349, January 23,2006

Fact: Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City,
Metro Manila. The Respondent City of Pasig, notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a
portion of her property to be used for the “sports development and recreational activities” of the
residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was pursuant to Ordinance enacted by the then Sangguniang
Bayan of Pasig. Again respondent wrote another letter to petitioner, but this time the purpose was
allegedly “in line with the program of the Municipal Government to provide land opportunities to
deserving poor sectors of our community.” petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that the
intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the area of her
lot is neither sufficient nor suitable to “provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our
community.” respondent reiterated in a letter that the purpose of the expropriation of petitioner’s
property is “to provide sports and recreational facilities to its poor residents.” Subsequently,
respondent filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation and prayed that the trial court,
after due notice and hearing, issue an order for the condemnation of the property; The petitioner
filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint. The trial court dismissed the motion on the ground that
there is a genuine necessity to expropriate the property. The motion for reconsideration of the
petitioner was denied by the trial court which prompted petitioner to file with the Court of Appeals a
special civil action for certiorari who dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration was also denied.

Issue: Where the expropriation of private property for the benefit of a small community
notwithstanding that there is such a recreational facility only a short distance away, is considered to
be for public use?
Held: No. The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from “the
necessity” and the taking must be limited to such necessity. the court held that the very foundation
of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public
character. Moreover, the ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany and not follow,
the taking of the land. That “necessity within the rule that the particular property to be expropriated
must be necessary, does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as
would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least inconvenience and expense to the
condemning party and the property owner consistent with such benefit.” That respondent City of
Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner’s property.