Rule 128:

GENERAL PROVISIONS

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 ONG CHIA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 127240 | March 27, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioner, Ong Chia, was born in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at the
port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where
he found employment. Eventually, he started his own business, and married a Filipina, with whom
he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted
as a Filipino citizen under the Revised Naturalization Law, stating therein his qualifications and
his lack of the disqualifications. During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications
and presented three witnesses to corroborate his testimony. The trial court granted the petition and
admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, appealed all the names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all
his former place of residence; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner
during his entire stay in the Philippines; (4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his
previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared and (5) failed to support his petition with
the appropriate documentary evidence.

Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization filed by
petitioner, the income tax returns allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his
net income could hardly support himself and his family. The State also annexed a copy of
petitioner's 1977 marriage contract and a Joint-Affidavit executed by petitioner and his wife.

The CA reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It ruled that
due to the importance naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from raising questions not
presented in the lower court and brought up for the first time on appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the appellate court erred in considering the documents which had merely been
annexed by the State not having been presented and formally offered as evidence are considered
mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value,"

HELD:

Petitioner’s contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 of the Rules of Court which
provides that —

These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization
and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or
in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. (CELINO)

Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, S34) now being
invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for
naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in
such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon
the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more
practical and convenient course of action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings
are not covered by the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not
preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis
of the same documents.

The reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered
is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim
that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the
appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief
he filed with the CA.

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 ZULUETA vs CA
G.R. 107383, | 20 February 1996

FACTS:

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Dr. Alfredo Martin. Sometime on
March 26, 1962, Cecilia entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence
of her mother, a driver and private respondent’s secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet
of her husband’s clinic and took 157 documents belonging to private respondent, [i.e. greeting
cards, cancelled checks, diaries, passport, and photographs], of Dr. Martin and his alleged
paramours. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation
and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her
husband.

ISSUE: Whether the injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence to be
inviolable apply even to the spouse of the aggrieved party.

HELD:

The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring
"the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable" is no less applicable simply
because it is the wife who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced.
The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order from a court
or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." The
intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures
absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband
nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion
for each one to share what one knows with the other, and this has nothing to do with the duty of
fidelity that each owes to the other.

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 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT"
G.R. No. 150224 | May 19, 2004

FACTS:

Appellant Yatar was charged with Rape with Homicide. Judilyn and her husband, together with
Isabel Dawang, left for their farm in Nagbitayan some two kilometers away. Kathylyn was left
alone in the house.

Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights in her house were off. She called out for her
granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground floor was open. She noticed that the water
container she asked Kathylyn to fill up earlier that... day was still empty. She went up the ladder
to the second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She found that the door was tied
with a rope, so she went down to get a knife. While she groped in the dark, she felt a lifeless body
that was cold and rigid. She found out that it was the naked body of her granddaughter, Kathylyn.
The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that appellant was seen going down the
ladder of the house of Isabel Dawang

When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge of Kathylyns's death...
appellant asked the police officers if he could relieve himself. Police Officer Cesar Abagan
accompanied him to the toilet around seven to ten meters away from the police station. They
suddenly heard someone shout in the Ilocano dialect, "Nagtaray!" (He's... running away!). Police
Officer Orlando Manuel exited through the gate of the Police Station and saw appellant running
away. Appellant was approximately 70 meters away from the station when Police Officer Abagan
recaptured him. He was charged with Rape with Homicide. When he was arraigned on July 21,
1998, appellant pleaded "not guilty”, but appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with
Homicide and was accordingly, sentenced to Death.

ISSUE: Whether the circumstantial evidence may be resorted to.

HELD:

YES. The weight of the prosecution’s evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule
which provides that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as
sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the
accused committed the crime.

Significantly, subsequent testing showed that DNA of the sperm specimen from the vagina of the
victim was identical the semen to be that of appellant’s gene type.
DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to link a
suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence has been
left. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source of both
inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely in effecting a more accurate account
of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing the acquittal
of the innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of justice in every case.

DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from
suspicion in the same principle as fingerprints are used. Incidents involving sexual assault would
leave biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the
victim’s body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture
could also be transferred to the victim’s body during the assault. Forensic DNA evidence is helpful
in proving that there was physical contact between an assailant and a victim. If properly collected
from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with known samples to place the
suspect at the scene of the crime.

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following
factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination
of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.

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Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA
evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by
the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles
of human genetics and molecular biology.

Independently of the physical evidence of appellant’s semen found in the victim’s vaginal canal,
the trial court appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to sustain a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant and his wife were living in the house of Isabel
Dawang together with the victim, Kathylyn Uba; (2) In June 1998, appellant’s wife left the house
because of their frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter
from his estranged wife in the early morning on June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant was seen by Apolonia
Wania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the kitchen of the house of Isabel
Dawang, acting strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw
appellant going down the ladder of the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt,
and again at 1:30 p.m., this time wearing a black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left when the
husband of Judilyn Pas-a was approaching; (7) Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty white
shirt coming down the ladder of the house of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was found dead; (8)
The door leading to the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The
victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool of blood with her intestines protruding from her body
on the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained pants, bra, underwear and
shoes scattered along the periphery; (10) Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the victim’s
vagina (Exhibit "H" and "J"); (11) The stained or dirty white shirt found in the crime scene was
found to be positive with blood; (12) DNA of slide, Exhibit "J" and "H", compared with the DNA
profile of the appellant are identical; and (13) Appellant escaped two days after he was detained
but was subsequently apprehended, such flight being indicative of guilt.

Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken chain

which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, is the
perpetrator of the crime.

To determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence, three requisites must concur: (1)
there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.

In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample taken
from him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well
as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.

This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against
testimonial compulsion. The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of
extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence
sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.

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 NENA LAZALITA* TATING vs. FELICIDAD TATING MARCELLA, represented by
SALVADOR MARCELLA, CARLOS TATING, and the CA
G.R. No. 155208 | March 27, 2007

FACTS:

The present case arose from a controversy involving a parcel of land owned by Daniela Solano
Vda. de Tating (Daniela) as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4393. Daniela
sold the subject property to her granddaughter, herein petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating (Nena), in
whose title over the subject property was transferred. She declared the property in her name for
tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon. However, the land remained in possession
of Daniela.

On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that she had actually no
intention of selling the property; the true agreement between her and Nena was simply to transfer
title over the subject property in favor of the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the
subject property for the purpose of helping her defray her business expenses; she later discovered
that Nena did not secure any loan nor mortgage the property; she wants the title in the name of
Nena cancelled and the subject property reconveyed to her.

Daniela died on July 29, 1988 leaving her children as her heirs, namely: Ricardo, Felicidad, Julio,
Carlos and Cirilo who predeceased Daniela and was represented by herein petitioner.

In a letter dated March 1, 1989, Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died they discovered the
sworn statement she executed on December 28, 1977 and, as a consequence, they are demanding
from Nena the return of their rightful shares over the subject property as heirs of Daniela. Nena
did not reply. Efforts to settle the case amicably proved futile.

Carlos and Felicidad, represented by her son Salvador, filed a complaint with the RTC of Cadiz
City against Nena praying for the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela
in her favor, cancellation of the TCT issued in the name of Nena, and issuance of a new title and
tax declaration in favor of the heirs of Daniela. Nena denied that any fraud or misrepresentation
attended the execution of the subject Deed of Absolute Sale. She also denied having received the
letter of her uncle, Carlos.

The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant. The CA rendered
its Decision affirming the judgment of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether the CA "has decided the instant case without due regard to and in violation of the
applicable laws and Decisions of this Honorable Court and also because the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, which it has affirmed, is not supported by and is even against the evidence
on record."

HELD:

The Court rules in favor of the petitioner. The CA and the trial court ruled that the contract of sale
between petitioner and Daniela is simulated. A contract is simulated if the parties do not intend to
be bound at all (absolutely simulated) or if the parties conceal their true agreement (relatively
simulated). The primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract is the intention
of the parties. Such intention is determined from the express terms of their agreement as well as
from their contemporaneous and subsequent acts.

In the present case, the main evidence presented by private respondents in proving their allegation
that the subject deed of sale did not reflect the true intention of the parties thereto is the sworn
statement of Daniela dated December 28, 1977.

There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn statement. However, the admissibility
of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends
on its relevance and competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already
admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be

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admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines
provided by the rules of evidence. It is settled that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence
since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in
writing the affiant's statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one
writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the
affiant. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants
themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.

The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the sworn statement
probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness stand as she is already
dead, the RTC and the CA should not have given probative value on Daniela's sworn statement for
purposes of proving that the contract of sale between her and petitioner was simulated and that, as
a consequence, a trust relationship was created between them. Private respondents should have
presented other evidence to sufficiently prove their allegation that Daniela, in fact, had no intention
of disposing of her property when she executed the subject deed of sale in favor of petitioner. As
in all civil cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the material allegations of his complaint
and he must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the
defendant.

However, even if Daniela's affidavit of June 9, 1983 is disregarded, the fact remains that private
respondents failed to prove by clear, strong and convincing evidence beyond mere preponderance
of evidence that the contract of sale between Daniela and... petitioner was simulated. The legal
presumption is in favor of the validity of contracts and the party who impugns its regularity has
the burden of proving its simulation. Since private respondents failed to discharge the burden of
proving their allegation that the contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela was simulated, the
presumption of regularity and validity of the October 14, 1969 Deed of Absolute Sale stands.

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 PEOPLE vs. RODRIGO SALAFRANCA
G.R. No. 173476 | February 22, 2012

FACTS:

Past midnight on July 31, 1993, Bolanon was stabbed near the Del Pan Sports Complex in
Binondo, Manila whereby his assailant ran away. Bolanon was still able to walk to the house of
his uncle Rodolfo B. Estaño in order to seek help. His uncle rushed him to the Philippine General
Hospital by taxicab. When they are on their way to the hospital Bolanon told Estaño that it was
Salafranca who had stabbed him. Bolanon eventually succumbed at the hospital at 2:30 A.M.
despite receiving medical attention and that the stabbing of Bolanon was personally witnessed by
Augusto Mendoza, then still a minor of 13 years, who was in the complex at the time.

Salafranca fled after stabbing Bolanon. He evaded arrest for a long period, despite the warrant for
his arrest being issued. He was finally arrested on April 23, 2003, and detained at the Manila City
Jail. RTC convicted Salafranca. On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings and conclusions of the
RTC, citing the dying declaration made to his uncle pointing to Salafranca as his assailant,
and Salafranca’s positive identification as the culprit by Mendoza. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE: Whether the declaration of Bolanon that Salfranca is his assailant is admissible either as a
dying declaration or as a part of the res gestae, or both.

HELD:

The testimony of Estano provides for the circumstances which qualified the utterance of Bolanon
as both a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae, considering that the Court has recognized
that the statement of the victim an hour before his death and right after the hacking incident bore
all the earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the res gestae either of which was an
exception to the hearsay rule.

A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may
nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that the declaration
must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time
the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) that
the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case
for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.

A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence
as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a)the principal
act, there’s gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had
time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances. The court ruled that the requisites for admissibility of a
declaration as part of the res gestae concur in the case at bar.

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 SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION vs. CA
G.R. No. 128538 | February 28, 2001

FACTS:

On December 13, 1983 petitioner SCC Chemical Corporation (SCC)obtained a loan through its
chairman private respondent Danilo Arrieta and vice president, Pablo Bermundo from State
Investment House Inc. (SIHI) in the amount of Php 129,824.48. Private respondents executed a
surety agreement binding themselves jointly and severally to pay the obligation on
maturity date. SCC failed to pay the loan and despite demands, no payment was made.

SIHI filed a case of sum of money against SCC with a prayer for preliminary attachment against
private respondents. SCC contends that SIHI has no cause of action because the promissory note
was null, void and no binding effect. During the pre-trial stage, no settlement was reached
however, stipulation of facts was agreed upon, thus, the case proceeded to trial. SIHI presented
one witness to prove its claim. The cross- examination of the said witness was postponed despite
being calendared many times. SCC or its counsel failed to appear several times, thus, the RTC
declared SCC to have waived its right to cross-examine the witness of SIHI and the case was
deemed submitted for decision.

SCC elevated the case to CA and contended that SIHI had failed to show, by a preponderance of
evidence, that the latter had a case against it; and that the witness presented to prove its claim was
incompetent because he had no personal knowledge of the transaction. SCC also contended that
no proof was shown of the genuineness of the signatures in the documentary exhibits presented as
evidence and that these signatures were neither marked nor offered in evidence by SIHI. The
appellate court affirmed the RTC’s decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether judicial admission requires proof
2. Whether the testimony of the witness is a hearsay evidence and thus inadmissible

HELD:
1. No. A judicial admission requires no proof. Petitioner’s admission as to the execution of the
promissory notes by it through private respondents Arrieta and Bermundo at pre-trial sufficed
to settle the question of the genuineness of the signatures. The admission having been made in
stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must be treated as a judicial admission. Under
Sec. 4, Rule 129 of the ROC.2.

2. As a rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative value. However, the rule does
admit of an exception. Where a party failed to object to hearsay evidence, then the same is
admissible. The rationale for this exception is to be found in the right of a litigant to cross-
examine. It is settled that it is the opportunity to cross-examine which negates the claim that
the matters testified to by a witness are hearsay. However, the right to cross-examine may be
waived. The repeated failure of a party to cross-examine the witness is an implied waiver of
such right.

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 Rule 129:
WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED

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LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES VICENTE BANAL and LEONIDAS
ARENAS-BANAL
G.R. No. 143276 | July 20, 2004

FACTS:

Sps. Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the registered owners of agricultural land
situated in San Felipe, Basud, Camarines Norte. A portion of the land was compulsorily acquired
by the DAR pursuant the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.

Respondents rejected the valuation of petitioner; hence, a summary administrative proceeding was
conducted before the PARAD to determine the valuation of the land. Eventually, the PARAD, in
its Decision, affirmed the Landbank’s valuation. Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD,
respondents filed with the RTC a petition for determination of just compensation.

In determining the valuation of the land, the trial court based the same on the facts established in
another case pending before it.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC was correct in taking judicial notice as to the valuation of the property,
which is in issue in the case at bar, in another case pending before it

HELD: NO

RTC, in concluding the valuation of respondents' property, merely took judicial notice of the
average production figures in the Rodriguez case pending before it and applied the same to this
case without conducting a hearing and worse, without the knowledge or consent of the parties.

Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the
records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or
before the same judge. They may only do so "in the absence of objection" and "with the knowledge
of the opposing party," which are not obtaining here.

In this regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the necessity
of a hearing before a court takes judicial notice of a certain matter, thus:

"SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. – During the trial, the court, on its own
initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any
matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.

After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or
on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be
heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.”

The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.

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 MENANDRO B. LAUREANO vs. CA
G.R. No. 114776 | February 2, 2000

FACTS:

In 1978, Laureano was hired as a pilot by the Singapore Airlines Limited (SAL). In 1982 however,
SAL was hit by recession and had to lay off some employees. Laureano was one of them, and so
he asked for reconsideration, which was not granted. Aggrieved, Laureano filed a labor case for
illegal dismissal against SAL. But in 1987, he withdrew the labor case, and instead filed a civil
case for damages due to illegal termination of contract against SAL. He filed the case here in the
Philippines. SAL moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The
motion was denied. On trial, SAL alleged that the termination of Laureano is valid pursuant to
Singaporean law.

The trial court ruled in favor of Laureano. SAL appealed the case raising the issue of lack of
jurisdiction, non-applicability of Philippine laws, and estoppel, among others. The Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether the court can take judicial notice on Singapore Laws

HELD: NO.

Defendant, in its motion to dismiss, alleged: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case, and (2) that Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the instant case.
Defendant contends that the complaint is for illegal dismissal together with a money claim arising
out of and in the course of plaintiff’s employment "thus it is the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC who
have the jurisdiction pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code" and that, since plaintiff was
employed in Singapore, all other aspects of his employment contract and/or documents executed
in Singapore. Thus, defendant postulates that Singapore laws should apply and courts thereat shall
have jurisdiction.

Singapore Airlines timely appealed before the respondent court and raised the issues of
jurisdiction, validity of termination, estoppel, and damages.

The specific Singaporean Law which holds valid the dismissal of Laureano is not proved in court.
As such, the trial court cannot make a determination if the termination is indeed valid under
Singaporean Law. Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. SAL has
the burden of proof. SAL failed to prove such law hence Philippine law shall apply. However, the
case must be dismissed on the ground of estoppel. Under our laws, all money claims arising from
employer-employee relationships must be filed within three years from the time the cause of action
accrued. Laureano’s cause of action accrued in 1982 when he was terminated but he only filed the
money claim in 1987 or more than three years from 1982. Hence, he is already barred by
prescription.

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 CASAN MACODE MACQUILING vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 195649 | July 2, 2013

FACTS:

We are not unaware that the term of office of the local officials elected in the May 2010 elections
has already ended on June 30, 2010. Arnado, therefore, has successfully finished his term of office.
While the relief sought can no longer be granted, ruling on the motion for reconsideration is
important as it will either affirm the validity of Arnado’s election or affirm that Arnado never
qualified to run for public office.

Respondent failed to advance any argument to support his plea for the reversal of this Court’s
Decision dated April 16, 2013. Instead, he presented his accomplishments as the Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and reiterated that he has taken the Oath of Allegiance not only twice
but six times. It must be stressed, however, that the relevant question is the efficacy of his
renunciation of his foreign citizenship and not the taking of the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines. Neither do his accomplishments as mayor affect the question before this Court.

Respondent cites Section 349 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of the United States as
having the effect of expatriation when he executed his Affidavit of Renunciation of American
Citizenship on April 3, 2009 and thus claims that he was divested of his American citizenship. If
indeed, respondent was divested of all the rights of an American citizen, the fact that he was still
able to use his US passport after executing his Affidavit of Renunciation repudiates this claim.

ISSUE: Whether the court can take judicial notice of foreign laws

HELD: No.

The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws, which must be presented as public
documents of a foreign country and must be "evidenced by an official publication thereof." Mere
reference to a foreign law in a pleading does not suffice for it to be considered in deciding a case.

American law does not govern in this jurisdiction. Instead, Section 40(d) of the Local Government
Code calls for application in the case before us, given the fact that at the time Arnado filed his
certificate of candidacy, he was not only a Filipino citizen but, by his own declaration, also an
American citizen. It is the application of this law and not of any foreign law that serves as the basis
for Arnado’s disqualification to run for any local elective position.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. KHADDAFY JANJALANI, GAMAL B. BAHARAN
G.R. No. 188314 | January 10, 2011

FACTS:

On February 14, 2005, a bus was going from Navotas to Alabang. Two men got on the bus. Both
seemed suspicious according to Elmer Andales, the conductor. The two men alighted in Ayala
Avenue. Moments after, Andales felt an explosion. He then saw fire quickly engulfing the bus. He
ran out of the bus towards a nearby mall. After a while, he went back to where the bus was. He
saw their bus passengers either lying on the ground or looking traumatized. A few hours after, he
made a statement before the Makati Police Station narrating the whole incident.

After the explosion, the spokesperson for Abu Sayyaff announced over radio that the explosion
was a Valentine’s gift. Accused Asali, member of Abu Sayaff, gave a television interview,
confessing that he had supplied the explosive devices for the said bombing.

The bus conductor identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the
two men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February. Asali testified that he had
given accused Baharan and Trinidad the TNT used in the bombing incident in Makati City.
Accused contended that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court gravely erred in accepting accused-appellants’ plea of guilt despite
insufficiency of searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of the said plea

HELD:

It is true that under the rule, statements made by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are
admissible only when made during the existence of the conspiracy. However, as the Court ruled
in People v. Buntag, if the declarant repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial confession
becomes a judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both conspirators. Thus, in
People v. Palijon, the Court held the following:

We must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An

extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence against the confessant but not against
his co-accused as they are deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him. A judicial
confession is admissible against the declarant’s co-accused since the latter are afforded
opportunity to cross-examine the former. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies
only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to testimony at trial where the party
adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Mercene’s
admission implicating his co-accused was given on the witness stand. It is admissible in
evidence against appellant Palijon. Moreover, where several accused are tried together for
the same offense, the testimony of a co-accused implicating his co-accused is competent
evidence against the latter.

14
 Rule 130:
RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY

15
 JUNIE MALILLIN Y. LOPEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 172953 | April 30, 2008

FACTS:

On the strength of a warrant of search and seizure issued by the RTC of Sorsogon City, a team of
five police officers raided the residence of petitioner in Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon City on 4
February 2003. The search—conducted in the presence of barangay kagawad Delfin Licup as well
as petitioner himself, his wife Sheila and his mother, Norma—allegedly yielded two (2) plastic
sachets of shabu and five (5) empty plastic sachets containing residual morsels of the said
substance. Accordingly, petitioner was charged with violation of The Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.

Petitioner entered a negative plea. Supt. Lorlie Arroyo (Arroyo), the forensic chemist who
administered the examination on the seized items, was presented as an expert witness to identify
the items submitted to the laboratory. She revealed that the two filled sachets were positive of
shabu and that of the five empty sachets, four were positive of containing residue of the same
substance. She further admitted that all seven sachets were delivered to the laboratory by Esternon
in the afternoon of the same day that the warrant was executed except that it was not she but rather
a certain Mrs. Ofelia Garcia who received the items from Esternon at the laboratory.

The trial court finds accused guilty of the crime charged and reasoned that the fact that shabu was
found in the house of petitioner was prima facie evidence of petitioner's animus possidendi
sufficient to convict him of the charge inasmuch as things which a person possesses or over which
he exercises acts of ownership are presumptively owned by him. It also noted petitioner's failure
to ascribe ill motives to the police officers to fabricate charges against him.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision
affirming the judgment of the trial court but modifying the prison sentence. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied by the appellate court. Hence, the instant petition which
raises substantially the same issues.

ISSUE: Whether the chain of custody rule was strictly complied with

HELD: No.

Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act of
possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral certainty, together with the fact that
the same is not authorized by law. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of
the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. Essential therefore in
these cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. Be that as it
may, the mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the
moral certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt. More than just the fact of possession, the fact
that the substance illegally possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as
exhibit must also be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a
finding of guilt. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of
an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is
what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from
the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every
person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was
and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received
and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would
then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the
item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.

The prosecution's evidence is incomplete to provide an affirmative answer. Considering that it was
Gallinera who recorded and marked the seized items, his testimony in court is crucial to affirm
whether the exhibits were the same items handed over to him by Esternon at the place of seizure

16
and acknowledge the initials marked thereon as his own. The same is true of Garcia who could
have, but nevertheless failed, to testify on the circumstances under which she received the items
from Esternon, what she did with them during the time they were in her possession until before
she delivered the same to Arroyo for analysis.

The prosecution was thus unsuccessful in discharging its burden of establishing the identity of the
seized items because it failed to offer not only the testimony of Gallinera and Garcia but also any
sufficient explanation for such failure. In effect, there is no reasonable guaranty as to the integrity
of the exhibits inasmuch as it failed to rule out the possibility of substitution of the exhibits, which
cannot but inure to its own detriment. This holds true not only with respect to the two filled sachets
but also to the five sachets allegedly containing morsels of shabu.

17
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELIMON PAGADUAN y TAMAYO
G.R. No. 179029 | August 12, 2010

FACTS:

Captain de Vera, SPO1 Balido and PO3 Almarez conducted a buy-bust operation which resulted
to the apprehension of the herein accused. Thereafter, the buy-bust team brought the appellant to
the Diadi Police Station for investigation. At the police station, Captain de Vera prepared a request
for laboratory examination. The appellant was transferred to the Diadi Municipal Jail where he
was detained. Two days later, or on December 29, 2003, PO3 Almarez transmitted the letter-
request, for laboratory examination, and the seized plastic sachet to the PNP Crime Laboratory,
where they were received by PO2 Fernando Dulnuan. Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Alfredo
Quintero, the Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, conducted an examination on the
specimen submitted, and found it to be positive for the presence of shabu.

The accused was charged with violation of RA 9165 and was convicted. Accused appealed the
decision of the RTC and claimed that: (1) his guilt was not prove beyond reasonable doubt due to
failure of the police did not conduct a prior surveillance on him before conducting the buy-bust
operation; and (2) a period of two days had lapsed from the time the shabu was confiscated to the
time it was forwarded to the crime laboratory for examination.

ISSUE: Whether chain of custody was sufficiently established when the two-day period which
lapsed between the day of apprehension and day of turn- over to the laboratory was not explained

HELD: No.

The chain of custody rule requires that there be testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the object seized was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that
every person who touched it would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was
and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received
and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.

The strict compliance to the chain of custody rule may not always be possible under Þeld
conditions. For this reason, the implementing rules provides that "non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items."

Thus, noncompliance thereof is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution’s case; police procedures
in the handling of confiscated evidence may still have some lapses, as in the present case. These
lapses, however, must be recognized and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds, and the
integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved.

In the present case, the prosecution did not bother to offer any explanation to justify the failure of
the police to conduct the required physical inventory, photographing of the seized drugs and the
details of the turn over during the two-day period.

The records show that the seized specimen was forwarded by PO3 Almarez to the PNP Crime
Laboratory on December 29, 2003, where it was received by PO2 Dulnuan, and later examined by
PSI Quintero. However, the person from whom PO3 Almarez received the seized illegal drug for
transfer to the crime laboratory was not identified. As earlier discussed, the identity of the duty
desk officer who received the shabu, as well as the person who had temporary custody of the seized
items for two days, had not been established.

18
 NARCISO SALAS v. ANNABELLE MATUSALEM
G.R. No. 180284 | September 11, 2013

FACTS:

On May 26, 1995, respondent filed a complaint for Support/Damages against petitioner in the RTC
of Cabanatuan City (Civil Case No. 2124-AF).

Respondent claimed that petitioner is the father of her son Christian Paulo Salas who was born on
December 28, 1994. Petitioner, already 56 years old at the time, enticed her as she was then only
24 years old, making her believe that he is a widower. Petitioner rented an apartment where
respondent stayed and shouldered all expenses in the delivery of their child, including the cost of
caesarean operation and hospital confinement. However, when respondent refused the offer of
petitioner’s family to take the child from her, petitioner abandoned respondent and her child and
left them to the mercy of relatives and friends. Respondent further alleged that she attempted
suicide due to depression but still petitioner refused to support her and their child. Respondent thus
prayed for support pendente lite and monthly support in the amount of P20,000.00, as well as
actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

Petitioner filed his answer with special and affirmative defenses and counterclaims. He described
respondent as a woman of loose morals, having borne her first child also out of wedlock when she
went to work in Italy.

At the trial, respondent and her witness Grace Murillo testified. Petitioner was declared to have
waived his right to present evidence and the case was considered submitted for decision based on
respondent’s evidence. Murillo corroborated respondent’s testimony.

On April 5, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent. Petitioner appealed,
the CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied
by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling that respondent’s evidence
sufficiently proved that her son Christian Paulo is the illegitimate child of petitioner

HELD: Yes.

Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate filiation may be established
in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Article 172 of the Family Code
of the Philippines further states:
The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in
the preparation of the certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing
of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity.
Neither can such birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument and it has no
probative value to establish filiation to the alleged father.

As to the Baptismal Certificate of Christian Paulo Salas also indicating petitioner as the father, we
have ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can only
serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not
necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child’s
paternity.

19
The rest of respondent’s documentary evidence consists of handwritten notes and letters, hospital
bill and photographs taken of petitioner and respondent inside their rented apartment unit. Pictures
taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father are inconclusive evidence to
prove paternity.

As to the handwritten notes of petitioner and respondent showing their exchange of affectionate
words and romantic trysts, these, too, are not sufficient to establish Christian Paulo’s filiation to
petitioner as they were not signed by petitioner and contained no statement of admission by
petitioner that he is the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes were authentic, they do not
qualify under Article 172 (2) vis-à- vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as competent
evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument
signed by the parent concerned.

An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by “any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,” like his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission,
a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree,
admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule
130 of the Rules of Court. Reviewing the records, we find the totality of respondent’s evidence
insufficient to establish that petitioner is the father of Christian Paulo.

In sum, we hold that the testimonies of respondent and Murillo, by themselves are not competent
proof of paternity and the totality of respondent’s evidence failed to establish Christian Paulo’s
filiation to petitioner. This Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish
paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation
or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity
or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.

20
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RUPER POSING y ALAYON
G.R. No. 196973 | July 31, 2013

FACTS:

Buy-bust operation was conducted by SPO1 Angeles, Cortez and Nicart. Ruper Posing was
arrested and two transparent sachets of what appears to be shabu were marked, turned over for
laboratory analysis and turned over to evidence custodian. He was found guilty by the court and
the same was affirmed by CA.

Posing kept contending on the alleged lapses in the procedure observed by the apprehending
officers, like SPO1 Angeles’ failure to recall the duty officer to whom he turned over the
specimens, and the officer who brought the specimens to the crime laboratory. Also, they
questioned the absence of an inventory report of the confiscated drugs and that there were no
photographs taken in the presence of the accused-appellant and that of a representative from the
media or the Department of Justice or any elected public officer.

ISSUE: Whether the prosecution failed to establish the complete and unbroken chain of custody
requirement

HELD: SC affirmed the decision of the CA.

R.A. 9165 and its subsequent Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) do not require strict
compliance as to the chain of custody rule. x x x It has been emphasized that what is essential is
“the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would
be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.”

Briefly stated, non-compliance with the procedural requirements under RA 9165 and its IRR
relative to the custody, photographing, and drug-testing of the apprehended persons, is not a
serious flaw that can render void the seizures and custody of drugs in a buy-bust operation.

With the illegal sale of dangerous drugs established beyond reasonable doubt, the handling of the
evidence, or the observance of the proper chain of custody, which is also an indispensable factor
in prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, is the next matter to be resolved.

Chain of Custody” means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage,
from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall
include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item,
the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use
in court as evidence, and the final disposition.

21
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ASIR GANI y ALIH & NORMINA GANI y GALOS
G.R. No. 198318 | November 27, 2013

FACTS:

On May 5, 2004, SI Saul received information from a confidential informant that accused-
appellant Normina Gani (Normina), alias Rohaima, was looking for a buyer of shabu. SI Saul
agreed to meet the informant and Normina for negotiation at the Pearl Hotel in Manila. They
eventually met, and SI Saul was introduced by the informant to Normina as an interested buyer of
shabu. Normina initially offered to sell 500 grams of shabu to SI Saul, but the two later on agreed
on the sale of 100 grams of shabu for One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) to be
consummated in the afternoon of the following day.

After the meeting, SI Saul reported back to the NBI Headquarters to tell his superior, Atty. Ruel
Lasala (Lasala), about the transaction. Atty. Lasala instructed SI Saul to coordinate with the PDEA
and formed a buy-bust team composed of, among other people, SI Saul, SI Otic, SI Arteche, SI
Escurel, and Atty. Galicia. SI Saul was designated as the poseur-buyer and was given the marked
money.

The following day, SI Saul arrived at around 2:00 in the afternoon; while accused-appellant got
there at around 4:30 in the afternoon, riding in tandem on a motorcycle with a man, later on
identified as accused-appellant Asir Gani (Asir). When SI Saul approached accused-appellants,
the latter asked the former about the money. SI Saul then showed them the marked money wrapped
in transparent plastic inside a clutch bag. SI Saul, in turn, asked accused-appellants about the
shabu. Accused-appellants showed SI Saul the plastic packs of shabu inside a blue bag. SI Saul
handed over the marked money to accused-appellant Gani. Accused-appellant Gani passed on the
marked money to accused-appellant Normina and turned over the possession of the shabu to SI
Saul.

When SI Saul already saw the buy-bust team members approaching, he grabbed accused-appellant
Asir's hands and introduced himself as an NBI agent. Accused-appellants were arrested and duly
advised of their constitutional rights. During the search incidental to accused-appellants' arrest,
the buy-bust team seized from accused-appellants' possession two other sachets of shabu, the
marked money, accused-appellant Asir's .45 caliber pistol, and the motorcycle. The buy-bust team
and accused-appellants then proceeded to the FTI Barangay Hall.

At the FTI Barangay Hall, SI Saul conducted an inventory of the items recovered from accused-
appellants, including the two plastic sachets of shabu subject of the sale, which SI Saul marked
"ES-1 05-06-04" and "ES-2 05-06-04," representing SI Saul's initials and the date of the buy-
bust. All these were done in the presence of accused-appellants and two barangay officials. SI
Saul's inventory report, however, did not include the two other sachets of shabu seized from
accused-appellants' possession. Thereafter, the buy-bust team brought accused-appellants to the
NBI Headquarters in Manila.

At the NBI Headquarters, accused-appellants were booked and further investigated. The following
day, May 7, 2004, several members of the buy-bust team executed the Joint Affidavit of Arrest of
accused-appellants. SI Saul also executed an incident report, requested... for laboratory
examination of the contents of the plastic sachets marked "ES-1 05-06-04" and "ES-2 05-06-04,"
and submitted the said specimens to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Division where they were
received by NBI Forensic Chemist II Patingo, and based on the forensic analysis by NBI Forensic
Chemist II Patingo and Forensic Chemist III Viloria-Magsipoc, the contents of said sachets tested
positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.

The RTC found the accused-appellants guilty of the crime charged, which was later on affirmed
by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether the prosecution failed to comply with the rules on the custody of seized drugs
under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165

22
HELD:

The Court finds the appeal bereft of merit.

The combined testimonial, documentary, and object evidence of the prosecution produced a
detailed account of the buy-bust operation against accused-appellants and proved all the essential
elements of the crime charged against them.

In the prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the following elements must
concur: (1) the identities of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment thereof. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually occurred, coupled with the
presentation in court of the substance seized as evidence.

The Court further finds that the arresting officers had substantially complied with the rule on the
chain of custody of the dangerous drugs as provided under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.

Jurisprudence has decreed that, in dangerous drugs cases, the failure of the police officers to make
a physical inventory and to photograph the sachets of shabu, as well as to mark the sachets at the
place of arrest, do not render the seized drugs inadmissible in evidence or automatically impair
the integrity of the chain of custody of the said drugs. What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

In this case, testimonial and documentary evidence for the prosecution proved that immediately
after accused-appellants' arrest, they were brought to the FTI Barangay Hall. It was there, in the
presence of two barangay officials, that SI Saul conducted an inventory of the two plastic sachets
of shabu subject of the buy-bust operation, plus the other items seized from accused-appellants'
possession during the search conducted incidental to accused-appellants' arrest. It was also at the
barangay hall where SI Saul marked the two plastic sachets of shabu sold to him by accused-
appellants and the date of the buy-bust operation. Thereafter, the buy-bust team, with accused-
appellants, proceeded to the NBI Headquarters. At the NBI Headquarters, SI Saul made a request
for examination of the two plastic sachets of shabu, marked "ES-1 05-06-04" and "ES-2 05-06-
04," and personally handed the same to NBI Forensic Chemist II Patingo. NBI Forensic Chemist
II Patingo, together... with NBI Forensic Chemist III Viloria-Magsipoc, conducted the laboratory
examination of the contents of the two sachets marked "ES-1 05-06-04" and "ES-2 05-06-04" and
kept said sachets in his custody until the same were submitted to the RTC as evidence during trial.

Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct in its observation that the failure of the buy-bust team to
take pictures of the seized drugs immediately upon seizure and at the site of accused-appellants'
apprehension, and to mark and make an inventory of the same in the presence of all... the persons
named in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, are not fatal and did not render the seized drugs
inadmissible in evidence given that the prosecution was able to trace and establish each and every
link in the chain of custody of the seized drugs and, hence, the identity and integrity of the said
drugs had been duly preserved. For the same reasons, it was not imperative for the prosecution to
present as witnesses before the RTC the two barangay officials who witnessed the conduct of the
inventory. At best, the... testimonies of these two barangay officials will only be corroborative,
and would have no significant impact on the identity and integrity of the seized drugs.

Moreover, accused-appellants' uncorroborated defenses of denial and frame-up cannot prevail over
the prosecution witnesses' positive testimonies, coupled with the presentation in court by the
prosecution of the corpus delicti. Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the
credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. Oft-repeated is the rule
that in cases involving violations of Republic Act No. 9165, credence is given to prosecution
witnesses who are police officers (or in this case, NBI... agents) for they are presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary. Absent any
indication that the NBI agents herein were ill motivated in testifying against accused-appellants,
their testimonies deserve full credence. In contrast, the defenses of denial and frame-up have been
invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and
standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of Republic Act No. 9165. In order to prosper,
the defenses of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence.
Accused-appellants presented no such evidence in this case.

23
 CITIBANK, N.A. MASTERCARD vs. EFREN S. TEODORO
G.R. No. 150905 | September 23, 2003

FACTS:

Respondent Teodoro made various purchases through his credit card. Accordingly, he was billed
by petitioner for those purchases, for which he tendered various payments.

Petitioner claims that as of January 20, 1995, the obligations of respondent stood at P191,693.25,
inclusive of interest and service charges. Several times it demanded payment from him, but he
refused to pay, claiming that the amount demanded did not correspond to his actual obligations.
His refusal prompted petitioner to file a Complaint for collection on January 25, 1996 before the
RTC of Makati City. The RTC, in an Order dismissed the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction over
the amount involved. The case was then transferred to MTC of Makati City.

During the trial, petitioner presented several sales invoices or charge slips, which added up to only
P24,388.36. Although mere photocopies of the originals, the invoices were marked in evidence as
Exhibits F to F-4. Because all these copies appeared to bear the signatures of respondent, the trial
court deemed them sufficient proof of his purchases with the use of the credit card. Accordingly,
the MTC in its July 25, 2000 Decision ordered him to pay petitioner the amount of P24,388.36
plus interest and penalty fee.

Thereafter, respondent appealed the MTC judgment to the RTC of Makati City but the RTC
affirmed the MTC Decision.

The focal issue of the case according to the CA was whether the photocopies of the sales invoices
or charge slips, marked as Exhibits F to F-4, were competent proofs of the obligations of
respondent. These were the only evidence presented by petitioner that could prove the actual
amount of obligation he had incurred in favor of the former. In reversing the trial courts, the CA
ruled that this evidence was insufficient to prove any liability on respondent’s part.

Although petitioner was able to prove the existence of the original sales invoices, it failed to prove
their due execution or to account for their loss or unavailability.

Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE: Whether the photocopies of the sales invoices or charge slips marked during trial as
Exhibits F to F-4 are admissible in evidence.

HELD:

The burden of proof rests upon petitioner, as plaintiff, to establish its case based on a
preponderance of evidence. It is well-settled that in civil cases, the party that alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it. Petitioner failed to prove that respondent had an obligation in the principal
amount of P24,388.36, because the photocopies of the original sales invoices it had presented in
court were inadmissible in evidence. Moreover, had they been admissible, they would still have
had little probative value.

The original copies of the sales invoices are the best evidence to prove the alleged obligation.
Photocopies thereof are mere secondary evidence. As such, they are inadmissible because
petitioner, as the offeror, failed to prove any of the exceptions provided under Section 3 of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, as well s the conditions of their admissibility. Because of the
inadmissibility of the photocopies in the absence of the originals, respondent’s obligation was not
established.

Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. When the original document has been lost
or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or
existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its
contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

24
Applying the above Rule to the present case, before a party is allowed to adduce secondary
evidence to prove the contents of the original sales invoices, the offeror must prove the following:
(1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the
reason for its nonproduction in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to
which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows:
existence, execution, loss, and contents. At the sound discretion of the court, this order may be
changed if necessary.

In the present case, the existence of the original sales invoices was established by the photocopies
and the testimony of Hernandez. Petitioner, however, failed to prove that the originals had been
lost or could not be produced in court after reasonable diligence and good faith in searching for
them.

Indeed, the loss of the originals and reasonable diligence in the search for them were conditions
that were not met, because the sales invoices might have been found by Equitable. Hernandez,
testifying that he had requested the originals from Equitable, failed to show that he had
subsequently followed up the request.

Finally, when more than one original copy exists, it must appear that all of them have been lost,
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court before secondary evidence can be given of any one. A
photocopy may not be used without accounting for the other originals.

Each of these three copies is regarded as an original in accordance with Section 4 (b) of Rule 130
of the Rules of Court. Petitioner failed to show that all three original copies were unavailable, and
that due diligence had been exercised in the search for them.

25
 WILGEN LOON, vs POWER MASTER, INC., TRI-C GENERAL SERVICES, and
SPOUSES HOMER and CARINA ALUMISIN
G.R. No. 189404 | December 11, 2013

FACTS:

Respondents Power Master Inc. and Tri-C General Services employed and assigned the petitioners
as janitors and leadsmen in various Philippine long distance Telephone Company (PLDT) offices in the
Metro Manila area. Subsequently, the petitioners filed a complaint for money claims against
Power Master Inc., Tri-C General Services and their officers, the spouses Homer and Carina Alumisin
(collective, the respondents).

The petitioners alleged in their complaint that they were not paid minimum wages,
overtime, holiday, premium, service incentive leave, and thirteenth month pays. They further
averred that the respondents made them sign blank payroll sheets. The petitioners amended their
complaint and included illegal dismissal as their cause of action. They claimed that the
respondents relieved them from service in retaliation for the filing of their original
complaint.

Notably, the respondents did not participate in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter on April 19, 2001 and Mat
21, 2001 when Mr. Romulo Pacia, Jr. appeared on the respondents' behalf. The respondents’ counsel also appeared
in a preliminary mandatory conference on July 5, 2001.

The Labor Arbiter awarded the petitioners’ salary differential, service incentive leaves and 13th
month pays. In awarding these claims, the LA stated that the burden in proving the payment of
these money claims rests with the employer. However, they were not awarded back wages, overtime, holiday
and premium pays for failure to show that they rendered overtime work and worked on holidays. Moreover,
it was not decided that they were illegally dismissed for failure to show notice of termination of employment.

Both parties appealed the ruling of the LA. NLRC affirmed the LA’s ruling with regard the payment of holiday pay
and attorney’s fees, but vacated the awards of salary differential, 13th month pays and service incentive
leaves. Moreover, NLRC allowed the respondents to present pieces of evidence for the first time on appeal
on the ground that they have been deprived of due process. It also ruled that petitioners were legally
dismissed due to gross misconduct. The CA, later on, affirmed the ruling of the NLRC.

ISSUE: Whether the respondents were estopped from submitting pieces of evidence for the first
time on appeal

HELD:

In labor cases, strict adherence to the technical rules of procedure is not required. Time and again,
we have allowed evidence to be submitted for the first time on appeal with the NLRC in the interest
of substantial justice.

However, this liberal policy should still be subject to rules of reason and fairplay. The liberality of
procedural rules is qualified by two requirements: (1) a party should adequately explain any delay
in the submission of evidence; and (2) a party should sufficiently prove the allegations sought to
be proven. The reason for these requirements is that the liberal application of the rules before
quasi-judicial agencies cannot be used to perpetuate injustice and hamper the just resolution of the
case. Neither is the rule on liberal construction a license to disregard the rules of procedure.

The NLRC capriciously and whimsically admitted and gave weight to the respondents’ evidence
despite its finding that they voluntarily appeared in the compulsory arbitration proceedings. The
NLRC blatantly disregarded the fact that the respondents voluntarily opted not to participate, to
adduce evidence in their defense and to file a position paper despite their knowledge of the
pendency of the proceedings before the LA. The respondents were also grossly negligent in not
informing the LA of the specific building unit where the respondents were conducting their
business and their counsel’s address despite their knowledge of their non-receipt of the processes.

Furthermore, the respondents failed to sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be proven. Why
the respondents’ photocopied and computerized copies of documentary evidence were not

26
presented at the earliest opportunity is a serious question that lends credence to the petitioners’
claim that the respondents fabricated the evidence for purposes of appeal. While we generally
admit in evidence and give probative value to photocopied documents in administrative
proceedings, allegations of forgery and fabrication should prompt the adverse party to present the
original documents for inspection. It was incumbent upon the respondents to present the originals,
especially in this case where the petitioners had submitted their specimen signatures. Instead, the
respondents effectively deprived the petitioners of the opportunity to examine and controvert the
alleged spurious evidence by not adducing the originals. This Court is thus left with no option but
to rule that the respondents’ failure to present the originals raises the presumption that evidence
willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.

Viewed in these lights, the scales of justice must tilt in favor of the employees. This conclusion is
consistent with the rule that the employer’s cause can only succeed on the strength of its own
evidence and not on the weakness of the employee’s evidence.

27
 THERESITA, JUAN, ASUNCION, PATROCINIA, RICARDO, and GLORIA, all
surnamed DIMAGUILA vs. JOSE and SONIA A. MONTEIRO
G.R. No. 201011 | January 27, 2014

FACTS:

Respondent spouses Monteiro filed their Complaint for Partition and Damages before the RTC,
against the petitioners Dimaguilas. The complaint alleged that all the parties were co-owners and
prayed for the partition of a residential house and lot. Sps. Monteiro anchored their claim on a deed
of sale executed in their favor by the heirs of Pedro Dimaguila (Pedro).

In their Answer, the Dimaguilas and the other defendants countered that there was no co-ownership
to speak of in the first place. They alleged that the subject property had long been partitioned
equally.

Upon resumption of the proceedings, Sps. Monteiro filed their Motion for Leave to Amend and/or
Admit Amended Complaint. The RTC granted their motion. In amending their complaint, Sps.
Monteiro adopted the Dimaguilas' admission in their original answer that the subject property had
already been partitioned, and further averred that Pedro's share was sold by his heirs to them
through a Bilihan ng Lahat Naming Karapatan (Bilihan) with the acquiescence of the heirs of
Esperanza and Leandro appearing in an Affidavit of Conformity and Waiver; and that when they
attempted to take possession of the share of Pedro, they discovered that the subject portion was
being occupied by the Dimaguilas.

In their Answer to the amended complaint, the Dimaguilas admitted that the subject property was
inherited by, and divided equally between Perfecto and Vitaliano, but denied the admission in their
original answer that it had been actually divided into southern and northern portions. Instead, they
argued that the Extrajudicial Partition mentioned only the division of the subject property "into
two and share and share alike." In effect, they argued the existence of a co-owenrship, contrary to
their original position.

The RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Monteiro and ordered the Dimaguilas to turn over the
possession of the subject 1 /3 portion of the southern-half of the property. The trial court found
that although the extrajudicial partition merely divided the property into two share and share alike,
evidence aliunde was appreciated to show that there was an actual division of the property into
south and north between Perfecto and Vitaliano, and that such partition was observed and honored
by their heirs. These pieces of evidence were the cadastral map of Liliw and a corresponding list
of claimants, which showed that the subject property had long been registered as Lot 876 (northern-
half), claimed by Buenaventura Dimaguila (Buenaventura), an heir of Vitaliano, and Lot 877
(southern-half), claimed by Perfecto. As to the authenticity of the Bilihan, the RTC found the
document to be regular and authentic absent any piece of evidence to the contrary.

The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC; then, CA denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration
for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the rule on hearsay and best evidence rule were violated

HELD: No.

Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when
the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except when the original is a public record in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office. Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the original
of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents
may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Section 24 of
Rule 132 provides that the record of public documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody or the record.

Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding list of claimants of the
area covered by the map were presented by two public officers. The first was Crisostomo Arves,

28
Clerk III of the Municipal Assessor's Office, a repository of such documents. The second was
Dominga Tolentino, a DENR employee, who, as a record officer, certifies and safekeeps records
of surveyed land involving cadastral maps. The cadastral maps and the list of claimants, as
ce1iified true copies of original public records, fall under the exception to the best evidence rule.

As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries
in official records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official records
made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the
official's attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the course of his duty.
The document's trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official
duty.

Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department tasked to execute,
supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. It is, therefore, clear that the cadastral map
and the corresponding list of claimants qualify as entries in official records as they were prepared
by the DENR, as mandated by law. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay rule and are prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

29
 RAFAEL S. ORTAEZ vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, OSCAR INOCENTES, AND
ASUNCION LLANES INOCENTES
G.R. No. 107372 | January 23, 1997

FACTS:

On September 30, 1982, private respondents sold to petitioner two (2) parcels of registered land in
Quezon City for a consideration of P35,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively.

Private respondents received the payments for the above-mentioned lots, but failed to deliver the
titles to petitioner. On April 9, 1990 the latter demanded from the former the delivery of said titles.
Private respondents, however, refused on the ground that the title of the first lot is in the possession
of another person, and petitioner's acquisition of the title of the other lot is subject to certain
conditions.

Offshoot, petitioner sued private respondents for specific performance before the RTC. In their
answer with counterclaim private respondents merely alleged the existence of the following oral
conditions which were never reflected in the deeds of sale:
"3.3.2 Title to the other property (TCT No. 243273) remains with the defendants (private
respondents) until plaintiff (petitioner) shows proof that all the following requirements
have been met:
(i) Plaintiff will cause the segregation of his right of way amounting to 398 sq. m.;
(ii) Plaintiff will submit to the defendants the approved plan for the segregation;
(iii) Plaintiff will put up a strong wall between his property and that of defendants' lot
to segregate his right of way;
(iv) Plaintiff will pay the capital gains tax and all other expenses that may be incurred
by reason of sale. x x x."

During trial, private respondent Oscar Inocentes, a former judge, orally testified that the sale was
subject to the above conditions, although such conditions were not incorporated in the deeds of
sale. Despite petitioner's timely objections on the ground that the introduction of said oral
conditions was barred by the parol evidence rule, the lower court nonetheless, admitted them and
eventually dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed the court a quo. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the parol evidence is admissible

HELD: No.

The parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible. Private respondents’ oral testimony on the
alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of the case, depending
exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. Spoken
words could be notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform
language. Thus, under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, when the
terms of an agreement were reduced to writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain all the terms
agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents thereof.
Considering that the written deeds of sale were the only repository of the truth, whatever is not
found in said instruments must have been waived and abandoned by the parties. Examining the
deeds of sale, we cannot even make an inference that the sale was subject to any condition. As a
contract, it is the law between the parties.

The parol evidence herein sought to be introduced would vary, contradict or defeat the operation
of a valid instrument, hence, contrary to the rule that:

The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to x x x the terms of a written instrument by
testimony purporting to show that, at or before the signing of the document, other or
different terms were orally agreed upon by the parties.

Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, “it cannot serve the
purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not

30
mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake.” No such fraud or mistake
exists in this case.

In this case, the deeds of sale are clear, without any ambiguity, mistake or imperfection, much less
obscurity or doubt in the terms thereof.

Private respondents did not expressly plead that the deeds of sale were incomplete or that it did
not reflect the intention of the buyer (petitioner) and the seller (private respondents). Such issue
must be “squarely presented.” Private respondents merely alleged that the sale was subject to four
(4) conditions which they tried to prove during trial by parol evidence. Obviously, this cannot be
done, because they did not plead any of the exceptions mentioned in the parol evidence rule. Their
case is covered by the general rule that the contents of the writing are the only repository of the
terms of the agreement. Considering that private respondent Oscar Inocentes is a lawyer (and
former judge) he was “supposed to be steeped in legal knowledge and practices” and was
“expected to know the consequences” of his signing a deed of absolute sale. Had he given an iota’s
attention to scrutinize the deeds, he would have incorporated important stipulations that the
transfer of title to said lots were conditional.

31
 LAPULAPU FOUNDATION, INC. and ELIAS Q. TAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
(Seventeenth Division) and ALLIED BANKING CORP.
G.R. No. 126006 | January 29, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioner Elias Q. Tan, then President of the co-petitioner Lapulapu Foundation, Inc.,
obtained four loans from the respondent Allied Banking Corporation covered by
four promissory notes in the amounts of P100,000.00 each.

The entire obligation amounted to P493,566.6q, and despite demands made on them by the
respondent Bank, the petitioners failed to pay the same. The respondent Bank was constrained to
file with the RTC a complaint seeking payment by the petitioners jointly and solidarily the entire
amount.

The petitioner Foundation denied incurring indebtedness from the respondent Bank alleging that
the loans were obtained by petitioner Tan in his personal capacity, which was admitted by the
latter. But for Tan’s part, the parties agreed that the loans were to be paid from the proceeds of
Tan’s shares of common stocks in the Lapulapu Industries Corp., a real estate firm. The loans were
covered by promissory notes which were automatically renewable (“rolled-over”) every year.

According to petitioner Tan, the respondent Bank’s employee required him to affix two signatures
on every promissory note, assuring him that the loan documents would be filled out in accordance
with their agreement, However, after he signed and delivered the documents to the respondent
Bank, these were filled out in a manner not in accordance with the agreement, such that the
petitioner Foundation was included as a party thereto. Further, he alleged that prior to the filing of
the complaint, the respondent Bank made no demand on him.

The trial court finds preponderance of evidence in favor of the plaintiff, requiring the defendants
Tan and the Foundation to pay jointly and solidarily to the Bank.

On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification on the judgment by deleting the award of attorney’s
fees in favor of the respondent Bank for being without basis. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in applying the Parol Evidence Rule as basis for adjudging joint
and solidary liability on the part of the petitioners

HELD:

The Parol Evidence Rule constrains this Court to reject petitioner Tan’s claim regarding the
purported unwritten agreement between him and the respondent Bank on the payment of the
obligation. Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Revised Ruled of Court provides that “when the terms of
an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all the terms agreed
upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement.”
In this case, the promissory notes are the law between the petitioners and the respondent Bank.
These promissory notes contained maturity dates, and that the amounts therein should be paid on
such dates. Nowhere was it stated that they would be renewed yearly or “rolled-over” annually
until paid from the proceeds of petitioner Tan’s shares in the firm Accordingly, this purported
unwritten agreement could not be made to vary or contradict the terms and conditions in the
promissory notes.

Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary,

contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract. While parol evidence is admissible to explain
the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract
additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in writing, unless there has
been fraud or mistake. No such allegation had been made by the petitioners in this case.

32
 MODESTO LEOVERAS vs. CASIMERO VALDEZ
G.R. No. 169985 | June 15, 2011

FACTS:

Maria Sta. Maria and Dominga Manangan were the registered owners of the three-fourths (¾) and
one-fourth(¼) pro-indiviso, respectively - of a parcel of land located in Poblacion, Manaoag,
Pangasinan [covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 24695, with an area of 28,171
square meters].

In September 1932, Sta. Maria sold her share to one Benigna Llamas. The sale was duly annotated
at the back of OCT No. 24695 (original title). When Benigna died in 1944, she willed her three-
fourths share equally to her sisters Alejandra Llamas and Josefa Llamas. Thus, Alejandra and
Josefa each owned one-half (½) of Benigna’s three-fourths (¾) share. On June 14, 1969, Josefa
sold her own one-half share (subject property) to the respondent and the petitioner, as evidenced
by a Deed of Absolute Sale. On even date, said parties executed an Agreement (which was in the
nature of a Partition Agreement), allotting their portions on the subject property. They
subsequently took possession of their respective portions and declared the same in their name for
taxation purposes.

In 1996, respondent Valdez asked the Register of Deeds (RD) of Lingayen, Pangasinan, on the
requirements for the transfer of title over the portion allotted to him on the subject property. He
learned that petitioner Leoveras already obtained two (2) transfer certificates of title in his [latter’s]
name, one of which covered his portion on the property and the original title could not be found.
The RD furnished respondent the following instead (or collectively, petitioner’s documents):
1) Two (2) deeds of absolute sale dated June 14, 1969, both executed by Sta. Maria,
purportedly conveying an unspecified portion of OCT No. 24695 as follows: a. 11, 568
square meters to the respondent and petitioner, b. 8, 689 square meters to one Virgilia Li
Menese;
2) Deed of Absolute Sale (Benigna Deed) also dated June 14, 1969 executed by Benigna
Llamas;
3) Subdivision Plan of [PSU 21864 of] OCT No. 24695;
4) Affidavit of Confirmation of Subdivision (Affidavit) dated May 3, 1994.

In his complaint, respondent sought the nullification of the petitioner’s titles by contesting the
authenticity of the petitioner’s documents, particularly the Benigna Deed, by presenting Benigna’s
death certificate. Respondent argued that Benigna could not have executed such a deed in 1969
because she already died in 1944. The respondent added that neither could Sta. Maria have sold to
the parties her three-fourths (¾) share in 1969because she had already sold the same to Benigna in
1932. Likewise, respondent denied his purported signature appearing in the Affidavit.

The RTC dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC by ruling against the
authenticity of the Benigna Deed and the Affidavit, holding that the totality of the evidence
presented sufficiently sustains [the respondent’s] claim that the titles issued to [the petitioner] were
based on forged and spurious documents.

In the present petition, petitioner Leoveras asserts that after the subject sale, the parties physically
partitioned the subject property and possessed their respective portions, thereby setting the limits
of their ownership. He further admits that the Benigna Deed is "fabricated" but hastens to add that
it was only designed (i) to affirm the "true intent and agreement" of the parties on the extent of
their ownership, as shown by their actual physical possession, and (ii) as a "convenient tool" to
facilitate the transfer of title to his name.

ISSUE: Whether the Affidavit, which, as claimed by herein petitioner, operates to have validly
corrected the mistake in the earlier Agreement, such that the parties’ true intention then was to
include in the petitioner’s share the disputed property

HELD: No.

The petitioner’s argument calls to fore the application of the parol evidence rule, i.e., when the
terms of an agreement are reduced to writing, the written agreement is deemed to contain all the
terms agreed upon and no evidence of these terms can be admitted other than what is contained in
33
the written agreement. Whatever is not found in the writing is understood to have been waived and
abandoned.

To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule, the Rules of Court allows a party to present
evidence modifying, explaining or adding to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue
in his pleading, as in this case, the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties. The failure of the written agreement to express the true intention of the
parties is either by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident, which nevertheless
did not prevent a meeting of the minds of the parties.

At the trial, the petitioner attempted to prove, by parol evidence, the alleged true intention
of the parties by presenting the Affidavit, which allegedly corrected the mistake in the previously
executed Agreement and confirmed his ownership of the parcels of land covered by his titles. It
was the petitioner’s staunch assertion that the respondent co-executed this Affidavit supposedly to
reflect the parties’ true intention.

In the present petition, however, petitioner Leoveras made a damaging admission that the Benigna
Deed is fabricated, thereby completely bolstering the respondent’s cause of action for
reconveyance of the disputed property on the ground of fraudulent registration of title. Since the
Affidavit merely reflects what is embodied in the Benigna Deed, the petitioner’s admission,
coupled with the respondent’s denial of his purported signature in the Affidavit, placed in serious
doubt the reliability of this document, supposedly the bedrock of the petitioner’s defense.

Curiously, if the parties truly intended to include in the petitioner’s share the disputed property,
the petitioner obviously need not go at length of fabricating a deed of sale to support his
application for the transfer of title of his rightful portion of the subject property. Notably, there is
nothing in the Affidavit which supports the petitioner’s claim that the partition of the subject
property is based on the parties’ actual possession.

34
 HEIRS OF LOURDES SAEZ SABANPAN vs. ALBERTO C. COMORPOSA
G.R. No. 152807 | August 12, 2003

FACTS:

A Complaint for unlawful detainer with damages was filed by petitioners against respondents
before the Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur Municipal Trial Court.

The Complaint alleged that Marcos Saez was the lawful and actual possessor of the disputed
property. In 1960, he died leaving all his heirs, his children and grandchildren.

In 1965, Francisco Comorposa who was working in the land of Oboza was terminated from his
job. The termination of his employment caused a problem in relocating his house. Out of pity and
for humanitarian consideration, Adolfo Saez allowed Francisco Comorposa to occupy the land of
Marcos Saez. Francisco Comorposa left for Hawaii, U.S.A. He was succeeded in his possession
by the respondents who likewise did not pay any rental and are occupying the premises through
petitioners tolerance. On 1998, a formal demand was made upon the respondents to vacate the
premises but the latter refused to vacate the same and claimed that they were the legitimate
claimants and the actual and lawful possessors of the premises. Thus, an action for unlawful
detainer was filed by petitioners against respondents.

Respondents, in their Answer, denied the material allegations of the Complaint and alleged that
they entered and occupied the premises in their own right as true, valid and lawful claimants,
possessors and owners of the said lot way back in 1960 and up to the present time; that they have
acquired just and valid ownership and possession of the premises by ordinary or extraordinary
prescription, and that the Regional Director of the DENR, Region XI has already upheld their
possession over the land in question when it ruled that they were the rightful claimants and
possessors and were, therefore, entitled to the issuance of a title.

The Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur rendered judgment in favor of petitioners
but the Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, on appeal, reversed and set aside the said
decision.

Affirming the RTC, the CA upheld the right of respondents as claimants and possessors. The
appellate court held that -- although not yet final -- the Order issued by the regional executive
director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) remained in full force
and effect, unless declared null and void. The CA added that the Certification issued by the DENRs
community environment and natural resources (CENR) officer was proof that when the cadastral
survey was conducted, the land was still alienable and was not yet allocated to any person.

Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in giving weight to the CENR Officers Certification,
which only bears the facsimile of the alleged signature of a certain Jose F. Tagorda

HELD: No.

Petitioners contend that the CENR Certification dated July 22, 1997 is a sham document, because
the signature of the CENR officer is a mere facsimile. In support of their argument, they cite
Garvida v. Sales Jr. and argue that the Certification is a new matter being raised by respondents
for the first time on appeal.

In Garvida, the Court held “A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission
and reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area
at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric
current.”

Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best exact copies. As such,
they are not admissible in evidence, as there is no way of determining whether they are genuine or
authentic.

35
The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a facsimile of the signature of
CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda. The facsimile referred to is not the same as that which is alluded
to in Garvida. The one mentioned here refers to a facsimile signature, which is defined as a
signature produced by mechanical means but recognized as valid in banking, financial, and
business transactions.

Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the Certification. In fact, the DENR regional
director has acknowledged and used it as reference in his Order dated April 2, 1998.

If the Certification were a sham as petitioner claims, then the regional director would not have
used it as reference in his Order. Instead, he would have either verified it or directed the CENR
officer to take the appropriate action, as the latter was under the formers direct control and
supervision.

Petitioners claim that the Certification was raised for the first time on appeal is incorrect. As early
as the pretrial conference at the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), the CENR Certification had already
been marked as evidence for respondents as stated in the Pre-trial Order. The Certification was not
formally offered, however, because respondents had not been able to file their position paper.

Neither the rules of procedure nor jurisprudence would sanction the admission of evidence that
has not been formally offered during the trial. But this evidentiary rule is applicable only to
ordinary trials, not to cases covered by the rule on summary procedure -- cases in which no full-
blown trial is held.

36
 ELLERY MARCH G. TORRES, vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT and GAMING
CORPORATION, represented by ATTY. CARLOS R. BAUTISTA
G.R. No. 193531 | December 14, 2011

FACTS:

Petitioner was a Slot Machine Operations Supervisor (SMOS) of respondent Philippine

Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) who was terminated due to his alleged
participation in padding of Credit Meter Readings (CMR) or slot machines at Casino Filipino-
Hyatt.

Petitioner filed with the CSC a Complaint against PAGCOR for illegal dismissal. CSC held that
petitioner's appeal had already prescribed. The CSC did not give credit to petitioner's claim that he
sent a facsimile transmission of his letter reconsideration within the period prescribed by the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. It found that a verification of one of
the telephone numbers where petitioner allegedly sent his letter reconsideration disclosed that such
number did not belong to the PAGCOR's Office of the Board of Directors; and that petitioner
should have mentioned about the alleged facsimile transmission at the First instance when he filed
his complaint and not only when respondent PAGCOR raised the issue of prescription in its
Comment.

Petitioner contends that he filed his letter reconsideration of his dismissal on August 13, 2007,
which was within the 15-day period for filing the same; and that he did so by means of a facsimile
transmission sent to the PAGCOR's Office of the Board of Directors. He claims that the sending
of documents thru electronic data message, which includes facsimile, is sanctioned under Republic
Act No. 8792, the Electronic Commerce Act of2000. Petitioner further contends that since his
letter reconsideration was not acted upon by PAGCOR, he then filed his complaint before the CSC.

ISSUE: Whether a letter reconsideration filed through facsimile is allowed

HELD:

Even assuming arguendo that petitioner indeed submitted a letter reconsideration which he claims
was sent through a facsimile transmission, such letter reconsideration did not toll the period to
appeal. The mode used by petitioner in filing his reconsideration is not sanctioned by the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. As we stated earlier, the motion for
reconsideration may be filed only in two ways, either by mail or personal delivery.

In Garvida v. Sales, Jr., it was held inadmissible in evidence the filing of pleadings through fax
machines and ruled that: “x x x A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best,
an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of
determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally
signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading. x x x.”

Moreover, a facsimile transmission is not considered as an electronic evidence under the Electronic
Commerce Act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, it was held that
a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional
equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.

37
 RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH
SAGUD
G.R. No. 182835 | April 20, 2010

FACTS:

Rustan Ang was charged of violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children
Act for purposeful sending Short Messaging Service (SMS) using his mobile phone, a
pornographic picture to one Irish Sagud, who was his former girlfriend, whereby the face of the
latter was attached to a completely naked body of another woman making it to appear that it was
said Irish Sagud who is depicted in the said obscene and pornographic picture thereby causing
substantial emotional anguish, psychological distress and humiliation to the said Irish Sagud.

Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic
document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under
Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).

ISSUE: Whether text messages to be admissible as evidence in a criminal case must be

authenticated following the Electronic Evidence Rule

HELD:

The answer is in the negative. Electronic Evidence Rule do not apply to the present criminal action.
The said Rules applies only to civil actions, quasi- judicial proceedings, and administrative
proceedings. (A.M. No.01-7-01-SC, Rule 1, Section 2.)

However, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture for the first
time before the Supreme Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the
admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be
deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.

Moreover, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic
Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.
In conclusion, the Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime
charged beyond reasonable doubt.

38
 PEOPLE vs. ENOJAS
G.R. No. 204894 | 10 March 2014

FACTS:

Appellants Enojas, Gomez, Santos and Jalandoni were charged for the crime of Murder before the
Regional Trial Court. P02 Gregorio testified that he was with P02 Pangilinan when they saw a
suspiciously parked taxi, of which the driver was appellant Enojas, they invited the said driver to
the police station for further questioning; appellant Enojas voluntarily went with the police
officers. However, on their way to the police station, they stopped at a convenience store, wherein
they had an encounter with suspected robbers. P02 Pangilinan was able shoot one of the suspects
dead, but was shot, causing his death. Upon hearing the shots, P02 Gregorio responded but was
unsuccessful. The suspected robbers successfully fled, and upon return to the police mobile,
appellant Enojas fled as well. Suspecting that appellant Enojas was involved, the police officers
searched the abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone belonging to appellant Enojas, of which
they used to monitor and to communicate with the accused appellants. Thereafter, they were able
to conduct an entrapment operation that resulted to the arrest of herein appellants. Appellants
pointed out that they were entitled to an acquittal since they were all illegally arrested and since
the evidence of the text messages were inadmissible, not having been properly identified.

The trial Court rendered its decision finding the accused appellants guilty of murder. On appeal,
the appellate Court affirmed the decision of the court a quo, hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the appellate Court erred when it affirmed the decision of the trial Court and held
that electronic evidence may be admitted as to criminal cases

HELD: No.

As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the Court’s
earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. Text messages
are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal
knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages
with the other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent
from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such
messages and was competent to testify on them.

The accused lament that they were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest. But, assuming that
this was so, it cannot be a ground for acquitting them of the crime charged but for rejecting any
evidence that may have been taken from them after an unauthorized search as an incident of an
unlawful arrest, a point that is not in issue here. At any rate, a crime had been committed—the
killing of PO2 Pangilinan—and the investigating police officers had personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the persons they were to arrest had committed it. The text messages to and from the
mobile phone left at the scene by accused Enojas provided strong leads on the participation and
identities of the accused. Indeed, the police caught them in an entrapment using this knowledge.

39
 LUISA NAVARRO MARCOS vs. THE HEIRS OF THE LATE DR. ANDRES
NAVARRO, JR.
G.R. No. 198240 | July 3, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioner discovered that respondents are claiming exclusive ownership of the subject lot.
Respondents based their claim on the Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property where Andres, Sr.
(common ascendant of both petitioner and respondent) donated the subject lot to Andres, Jr.
Believing that the affidavit is a forgery, the sisters, requested a handwriting examination of the
affidavit. The PNP handwriting expert PO2 Mary Grace Alvarez found that Andres, Sr.’s signature
on the affidavit and the submitted standard signatures of Andres, Sr. were not written by one and
the same person.

Thus, the sisters sued the respondents for annulment of the deed of donation. After the pre-trial,
respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness. They argued that the RTC did not
authorize the handwriting examination of the affidavit. RTC granted respondents’ motion and
disqualified PO2 Alvarez as a witness. Petitioners elevated the case before the CA by way of
petition for certiorari. CA denied the petition.

ISSUE: Whether the expert testimony, of the expert who is not authorized by the trial court, is
disqualified

HELD: No.

A witness must only possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in the
Rules of Court. Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence provides the qualifications of a
witness, i.e., all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to
others, may be witnesses.

The disqualifications are as follows: (1) Section 19, Rule 130 disqualifies those who are mentally
incapacitated and children whose tender age or immaturity renders them incapable of being
witnesses; (2) Section 20 of the same rule provides for disqualification based on conflicts of
interest or on relationship; (3) Section 21 provides for disqualification based on privileged
communications; and (4) Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on disqualification of witnesses
but it states the grounds when a witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was
called. The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of
disability other than those mentioned in the Rules.

As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and make known her
perception to others. We have no doubt that she is qualified as a witness. She cannot be disqualified
as a witness since she possesses none of the disqualifications specified under the Rules.
Respondents’ motion to disqualify her should have been denied by the RTC for it was not based
on any of these grounds for disqualification.

The RTC rather confused the qualification of the witness with the credibility and weight of her
testimony. Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear that the opinion of an
expert witness may be received in evidence.

40
 MAXIMO ALVAREZ vs. SUSAN RAMIREZ
G.R. No. 143439 | October 14, 2005

FACTS:

Respondent Susan Ramirez was the complaining witness in a criminal case or arson pending before
the RTC. The accused was petitioner Maximo Alvarez, estranged husband of Esperanza Alvarez,
sister of respondent. On June 21, 1999, Esperanza Alvarez was called to the witness stand as the
first witness against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from
testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital
disqualification.

Respondent filed an opposition to the motion. Pending resolution of the motion, the trial court
directed the prosecution to proceed with the presentation of the other witnesses. On September 2,
1999, the trial court issued the questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza Alvarez from further
testifying and deleting her testimony from the records. The prosecution filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied in the other assailed Order dated October 19, 1999. This prompted
respondent to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with application for
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. On May 31, 2000, the Appellate Court
rendered a Decision nullifying and setting aside the assailed Orders issued by the trial court. Hence,
this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether Esperanza can testify over the objection of her estranged husband on the ground
of marital privilege

HELD: Yes.

Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. During their marriage, neither the husband
nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse,
except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed
by one against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants.

The reasons given for the rule are:

1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the
risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness;
and
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through
the hostile testimony of the other.

But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in
civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the
other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases,
outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic
relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility
which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case,
identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-
existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life, which the law
aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their absence, merely leave a void in
the unhappy home.

Therefore, Esperanza may testify over the objection of her husband. The disqualification of a
witness by reason of marriage under Sec. 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court has its
exceptions as where the marital relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be
preserved. The acts of the petitioner stamp out all major aspects of marital life. On the other hand,
the State has an interest in punishing the guilty and exonerating the innocent, and must have the
right to offer the testimony of Esperanza over the objection of her husband.

41
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. HON. MARIANO C. CASTAÑEDA, JR.
G.R. No. L-46306 | February 27, 1979

FACTS:

Benjamin Manaloto was charged with the crime of Falsification of Public Document. The
complaint was filed by his wife, Victoria Manaloto.

That on or about the 19th day of May, 1975, in the Municipality of San Fernando, province of
Pampanga, Philippines, Benjamin falsified in a deed of sale the house and lot belonging to the
conjugal partnership in favor of Ponciano Lacsamana, making it appear that his spouse gave her
marital consent to said sale.

At the trial, the prosecution called the wife to the witness stand but the defense moved to disqualify
her as a witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130. The prosecution stated that it is a "criminal case for
a crime committed by one against the other." Notwithstanding such opposition, respondent Judge
granted the motion, disqualifying Victoria.

ISSUE: Whether a wife may testify against her husband in a criminal case for falsification of public
document done by forging the signature of the wife a contract of sale of conjugal property

HELD: No.

The case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule. WHEN AN OFFENSE DIRECTLY
ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL RELATION, IT
COMES WITHIN THE EXCEPTION to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the
other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the other.

In the case, it must be noted that had the sale of the said house and lot, and the signing of the wife's
name by her husband in the deed of sale, been made with the consent of the wife, no crime could
have been charged against said husband. It is the husband's breach of his wife's confidence which
gave rise to the offense charged. And it is this same breach of trust which prompted the wife to
make the necessary complaint.

With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where the victim of the crime and
the person who stands to be directly prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person but the
wife herself. And it is undeniable that the act had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the
conjugal relation. This is apparent not only in the act of the wife in personally lodging her
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent efforts in connection
with the instant petition, which seeks to set aside the order disqualifying her from testifying against
her husband. Taken collectively, the actuations of the witness-wife underscore the fact that the
martial and domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have become so strained that
there is no more harmony to be preserved said nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed.
In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that
identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidence of private life
which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which, through their absence, merely
leave a void in the unhappy home.

42
 ENRIQUE RAZON vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and VICENTE B.
CHUIDIAN, in his capacity as Administrator of the Estate of the Deceased JUAN T.
CHUIDIAN
G.R. No. 74306 | March 16, 1992

FACTS:

Respondent, as administrator of the estate Juan Chuidian, filed an action for specific performance
against petitioner praying that the later be compelled to deliver the stock certificate representing
the share holdings of Juan Chuidian in E. Razon, Inc. (ERI).

During trial, petitioner testified that: (1) all the shares of stock in the name of stockholders of
record of the corporation were fully paid for by defendant, Razon; (2) said shares are subject to
the agreement between defendants and incorporators; (3) petitioner distributed shares of stock
previously placed in the names of the withdrawing nominal incorporators to some friends including
Juan T. Chuidian; (4) the shares of stock were actually owned and remained in the possession of
Razon; and (5) Thus, the stock certificate under the name of the late Chuidian actually belongs to
the petitioner with the understanding that he shall remain in possession thereof until such time as
he was paid therefor by the other nominal incorporators/stockholders.

Trial court ruled that the real owner of the stocks is the petitioner. On appeal, the CA reversed the
decision of the trial court. CA ruled that petitioner is disqualified from being a witness under the
dead man’s statute (Section 20(a) Rule 130). Petitioner, assailing CAÕs decision, contends that:
(1) dead man’s statute is inapplicable in this case; (2) respondent did not object to his oral
testimony; and (3) the petitioner was subjected to a rigid cross-examination regarding
such testimony.

ISSUES:
1. Whether dead man’s statute disqualifies a defendant from testifying against the claims of
an administrator in relation to a transaction entered into by the deceased during
his lifetime
2. Whether failure to object to a testimony on the ground of dead man’s statute rule
constitutes as a waiver to object to the admissibility of such testimony

HELD:

1. The reason for the rule is that if persons having a claim against the estate of the deceased
or his properties were allowed to testify as to the supposed statements made by him
(deceased person), many would be tempted to falsely impute statements to deceased
persons as the latter can no longer deny or refute them, thus unjustly subjecting their
properties or rights to false or unscrupulous claims or demands. The purpose of the law is
to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in
question on the part of the surviving party. The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it
contemplates in that it is applicable to a case against the administrator or its representative
of an estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person.

In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of petitioner as
defendant in an action commenced by the administrator of the estate of the late Juan
Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by the late Juan T.
Chuidian. It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the
prohibition of the rule. The case was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor
was it filed upon claims against the estate.

2. Granting that the petitioner’s testimony is within the prohibition of Section 20 (a), Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, the private respondent is deemed to have waived the rule. It is
also settled that the court cannot disregard evidence which would ordinarily be incompetent
under the rules but has been rendered admissible by the failure of a party to object thereto.

43
 LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA vs. LAMBERTO T. CHUA
G.R. No. 143340 August 15, 2001

FACTS:

In this case, petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that a partnership existed between respondent Chua and Jacinto Sunga from 1977 until
Jacinto’s death. In the absence of any written document to show such partnership between
respondent and Jacinto, petitioners argue that these courts were proscribed from hearing the
testimonies of respondent and his witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership three years
after Jacinto’s death. To support this argument, petitioners invoke the “Dead Man’s Statute” or
“Survivorship Rule” under Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that provides:

“SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party.– Parties or

assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an
executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person
of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person, or
against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring
before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.”

Petitioners thus implore this Court to rule that the testimonies of respondent and his alter ego,
Josephine, should not have been admitted to prove certain claims against a deceased person, now
represented by petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether the “Dead Man’s Statute” applies to this case so as to render inadmissible
respondent’s testimony and that of his witness, Josephine

HELD: No.

The "Dead Man’s Statute" provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from
testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the
undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction. But
before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is
necessary that: (1) the witness is a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf
a case is prosecuted; (2) the action is against an executor or administrator or other representative
of a deceased person or a person of unsound mind; (3) the subject-matter of the action is a claim
or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against person of unsound mind; (4)
the testimony refers to any matter of fact which occurred before the death of such deceased person
or before such person became of unsound mind.

Two reasons forestall the application of the "Dead Man’s Statute" to this case. First, petitioners
filed a compulsory counterclaim against respondent in their answer before the trial court, and with
the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed this case from the
ambit of the "Dead Man’s Statute. "Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the executor or
administrator or representatives of the estate that sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein
respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat the counterclaim.
Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, respondent is not disqualified from testifying as to
matters of fact occurring before the death of the deceased, said action not having been brought
against but by the estate or representatives of the deceased.

Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the "Dead Man’s Statute" for the simple
reason that she is not "a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted." Records show that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the
existence of the partnership between respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners’ insistence that Josephine
is the alter ego of respondent does not make her an assignor because the term "assignor" of a party
means "assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not the assignor of a right assigned
before any cause of action has arisen." Plainly then, Josephine is merely a witness of respondent,
the latter being the party plaintiff.

44
 TERESITA P. BORDALBA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF NICANOR JAYME
G.R. No. 112443 | January 25, 2002

FACTS:

Lot 1242 was originally owned by the late spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de
Jayme. In 1947,the property was extra-judicially partitioned in the following manner: 1/3 to their
grandchild Nicanor Jayme; 1/3to their daughter Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez; and 1/3 to an
unidentified party.

Petitioner, daughter of Elena, filed an application for issuance of a Free Patent over the same lot
1242. When the application was granted and corresponding OCT was issued, petitioner subdivided
the property into 6 lots and disposed the two parcels thereof. Upon learning of the issuance of the
Free Patent and OCT, as well as the conveyances made by petitioner, respondents filed with RTC
the instant complaint for annulment and cancellation of the Free Patent and OCT against
petitioner and purchasers.

Petitioner averred that Lot No. 1242 was acquired by her through purchase from her mother, who
was in possession of the lot in the concept of an owner since 1947. However, on cross-
examination, petitioner admitted that the existence of the above-mentioned Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition. She, however, identified one of the signatures in the said Deed to be the signature of her
mother.

The trial court, giving weight on the testimony of witnesses as to the existence of the extra-judicial
partition and finding that fraud was employed by petitioner in obtaining Free Patent and OCT,
declared said patent and title void and ordered its cancellation. CA affirmed with modification the
decision of the trial court. Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition, assailing the decision of the
CA. Petitioner contends that the testimonies given by the witnesses for private respondents which
touched on matters occurring prior to the death of her mother should not have been admitted by
the trial court, as the same violated the dead man’s statute.

ISSUE: Whether the Dead Man’s Statute applies to disqualify the testimonies of all the witnesses
attesting to the existence of an agreement entered into by the deceased during her lifetime

HELD:

Dead Man’s Statute finds no application in the present case. The dead man’s statute does not
operate to close the mouth of a witness as to any matter of fact coming to his knowledge in any
other way than through personal dealings with the deceased person, or communication made by
the deceased to the witness.

Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony of their witnesses in the present case is
based, inter alia, on the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and other documents, and not on
dealings and communications with the deceased, the questioned testimonies were properly
admitted by the trial court.

45
 JOSIELENE LARA CHAN vs. JOHNNY T. CHAN
G.R. No. 179786 | July 24, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioner Josielene Lara Chan filed before the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage to respondent Johnny Chan, the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and
the award of custody of their children to her. Josielene claimed that Johnny failed to care for and
support his family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant
drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs. Indeed, she had convinced him to undergo hospital
confinement for detoxification and rehabilitation.

During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form that Johnny
attached to his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital.
The form carried a physician’s handwritten note that Johnny suffered from "methamphetamine
and alcohol abuse." Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum addressed to Medical City, covering Johnny’s medical records when he was there confined.
The request was accompanied by a motion to "be allowed to submit in evidence" the records sought
by subpoena duces tecum.

Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-patient
privilege. Court sustained the opposition and denied Josielene’s motion. It also denied her motion
for reconsideration, prompting her to file a special civil action of certiorari before the Court of
Appeals (CA), imputing grave abuse of discretion to the RTC.

CA denied Josielene’s petition.

ISSUE: Whether hospital records may not be the subject of a subpoena duces tecum before trial
on the ground of privilege communication

HELD: Yes.

The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician who gets
information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined without the
patient’s consent as to any facts which would blacken the latter’s reputation. This rule is intended
to encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and
give him access to his body, enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of that ailment and
provide the appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could be compelled in the future to come
to court and narrate all that had transpired between him and the patient might prompt the latter to
clam up, thus putting his own health at great risk.

Disclosing hospital records would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on
privileged matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter’s prior consent.

To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records – the results
of tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment
he gave him – would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient’s
consent. Physician memorializes all these information in the patient’s records.

46
 JUDGE UBALDINO A. LACUROM vs. ATTY. ELLIS F. JACOBA and ATTY. OLIVIA
VELASCO-JACOBA
A.C. No. 5921 | March 10, 2006

FACTS:

Judge Lacurom filed the present complaint against respondents before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. The antecedent facts are as follows: (1) respondents law firm acts as the counsel in
the unlawful detainer case appealed to the sala of Judge Lacurom; (2) Judge Lacurom reversed the
decision of the MTC and ruled against the counsels’ client; (3) the losing party filed an MR signed
by Velasco-Jacoba; (4) the MR contains scathing remarks against the Judge; (5) Judge Lacurom
ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and explain why she should not be held in
contempt of court for the contents of her motion; (6) Velasco-Jacoba explained that she is not the
author of the motion as she merely signed the same as it was the practice between her and her
husband, her co-counsel in the law firm; (7) Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of
contempt; (8)Velasco-Jacoba filed a petition for certiorari assailing the decision of Judge Lacurom;
(9) Judge Lacurom issued another order directing Jacoba (husband of Velasco-Jacoba) to explain
why he should not be held in contempt;(10) Jacoba, in his answer, denied that he prepared the
motion; (11) as to against Velasco-Jacoba's statements implicating him, Jacoba invoked the marital
privilege rule in evidence; (12) Judge Lacurom later rendered a decision finding Jacoba guilty of
contempt of court.

ISSUE: Whether marital privilege rule may be invoked against a statement made by one spouse
against the other without actually denying the contents of the statement

HELD: No.

Jacoba’s Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition did not contain a denial of his wife's account.
Instead, Jacoba impliedly admitted authorship of the motion.

The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the claimant to
object timely to its presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as implied consent. This
waiver applies to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion.

47
 CLARITA J. SAMALA vs. ATTY. LUCIANO D. VALENCIA
A.C. No. 5439 | January 22, 2007

FACTS:

A complaint was filed by Samala against Atty. Valencia for Disbarment on the following grounds:
(a) serving on two separate occasions as counsel for contending parties; (b) knowingly misleading
the court by submitting false documentary evidence; (c) initiating numerous cases in exchange for
nonpayment of rental fees; and (d) having a reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimate
children.

After respondent filed his Comment, the Court referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report
and recommendation. The Commissioner found respondent guilty of violating Canons 15 and 21
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended the penalty of suspension for six
months.

In a minute Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of Commissioner Reyes but increased the penalty of suspension from six months
to one year.

Records show that in Civil Case filed in the RTC for nonpayment of rentals, herein respondent,
while being the counsel for defendant Valdez, also acted as counsel for the tenants Lagmay,
Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga by filing an Explanation and Compliance before the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether the termination of the lawyer-client relationship allows a counsel to act as counsel
against a previous client

HELD: No.

The termination of the relation of attorney and client provides no justification for a lawyer to
represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The reason for the rule
is that the client's confidence once reposed cannot be divested by the expiration of the professional
employment. Consequently, a lawyer should not, even after the severance of the relation with his
client, do anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which he
previously represented him nor should he disclose or use any of the client's confidences acquired
in the previous relation.

The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is founded on principles of public
policy and good taste. It springs from the attorney's duty to represent his client with undivided
fidelity and to maintain inviolate the client's confidence as well as from the injunction forbidding
the examination of an attorney as to any of the privileged communications of his client.

48
 COMMISSIONER JOSE T. ALMONTE, VILLAMOR C. PEREZ, NERIO ROGADO,
and ELISA RIVERA vs. HONORABLE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ and CONCERNED
CITIZENS
G.R. No. 95367 | May 23, 1995

FACTS:

Pursuant to his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from
unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed, Ombudsman issued a subpoena duces
tecum requiring petitioners as chief accountant and record custodian of the Economic Intelligence
and Investigation Bureau(EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for
the year 1988" and all evidence such as vouchers from enforcing his orders.

Petitioners do not question the power of the Ombudsman to issue a subpoena duces tecum nor the
relevancy or materially of the documents required to be produced, to the pending investigation in
the Ombudsman's office. Petitioners claimed that they cannot be ordered to produce documents
relating to personal services and salary vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea that such
documents are classified. Disclosure of the documents in question is resisted on the ground that
"knowledge of EIIB's documents relative to its Personal Services Funds and its plantilla . . . will
necessarily lead to knowledge of its operations, movements, targets, strategies, and tactics and the
whole of its being" and this could "destroy the EIIB."

ISSUE: Whether privileged communication may be invoked against a subpoena duces tecum
enjoining the production of records relating to personal services funds on the ground that they are
state secrets

HELD: No.

For information to be accorded confidentiality on the ground that such are state secrets, the
necessity of according such treatment must be shown. Governmental privilege against disclosure
is recognized with respect to state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This
privilege is based upon public interest of such paramount importance as in and of itself
transcending the individual interests of a private citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof,
the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights.

Where there is a strong showing of necessity, the claim of privilege should not be lightly accepted,
but even most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court
is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at stake. A fortiori, where necessity is dubious, a
formal claim of privilege, made under the circumstances of this case, will haw to prevail.

Where the claim of confidentiality does not rest on the need to protect military, diplomatic or other
national security secrets but on a general public interest in the confidentiality of his conversations,
courts have declined to find in the Constitution an absolute privilege of the President against a
subpoena considered essential to the enforcement of criminal laws.

In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the
production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is the
gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities
affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax
evasion, dollar salting." Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it may be
sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that
compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling production, no similar
excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other considerations unless it falls under statutorily-
created ones such as the Government's privilege to withhold the identity of persons who furnish
information of violations of laws.

49
OSCAR CONSTANTINO, MAXIMA CONSTANTINO and CASIMIRA MATURINGAN,
vs. HEIRS OF PEDRO CONSTANTINO, JR., represented by ASUNCION
LAQUINDANUM
G.R. No. 181508 | October 2, 2013

FACTS:

Pedro Constantino, Sr., ancestors of the petitioners and respondents, owned several parcels of land,
one of which is an unregistered parcel of land situated at Sta. Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan. Pedro,
Sr., upon his death, was survived by his six (6) children. Respondents Asuncion Laquindanum and
Josefina Cailipan, great grandchildren of Pedro Sr., in representation of Pedro, Jr. filed a complaint
against petitioners Oscar Constantino, Maxima Constantino and Casimira Maturingan,
grandchildren of Pedro Sr., for the nullification of a document denominated as "Pagmamana sa
Labas ng Hukuman’

In the said complaint, respondents alleged that petitioners asserted their claim of ownership over
the whole parcel of land (240 sq m) owned by the late Pedro Sr., to the exclusion of respondents
who are occupying a portion thereof. Thus, respondents sought to annul the "Pagmamana sa Labas
ngHukuman" as well as the Tax Declarations that were issued on the basis of such document.

The petitioners claimed that the document "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman" pertaining to the
240 sq m lot was perfectly valid and legal, as it was a product of mutual and voluntary agreement
between and among the descendants of the deceased Pedro Sr.

Further, petitioners alleged that the respondents have no cause of action against them considering
that the respondents’ lawful share over the estate of Pedro Sr., had already been transferred to them
as evidenced by the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver executed by Angelo
Constantino, Maria Constantino (mother of respondent Asuncion), Arcadio Constantino and
Mercedes Constantino, all heirs of Pedro Jr.

Pre-trial conference was conducted wherein the parties entered into stipulations and admissions as
well as identification of the issues to be litigated. Thereupon, trial on the merits ensued.

RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the respondents finding that the parties are in pari delicto,
whereby the law leaves them as they are and denies recovery by either one of them. Parties who
are equally guilty cannot complain against each other.

Not convinced, the respondents appealed the afore quoted decision to the Court of Appeals (CA)
raising, among others, the erroneous application by the trial court of the doctrine of "in pari delicto"
in declaring the validity of the document "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman."

CA ruled in favor of the respondents heirs of Pedro, Jr., declaring that the "Extrajudicial Settlement
with Waiver" covering the 192 sq mlot actually belongs to Pedro Jr., hence, not part of the estate
of Pedro Sr.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erroneously disregarded the stipulations and admissions during the pre-
trial conference on which the application of the doctrine in pari delicto was based

HELD: Yes.

Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions. Pre-trial admission in
civil cases is one of the instances of judicial admissions explicitly provided for under Section 7,
Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that the contents of the pre-trial order shall control
the subsequent course of the action, thereby, defining and limiting the issues to be tried.

We are aware that the last paragraph of Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court serves as a
caveat for the rule of conclusiveness of judicial admissions – for, in the interest of justice, issues
that may arise in the course of the proceedings but which may not have been taken up in the pre-
trial can still be taken up.

Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court reads:

50
 Section 7. Record of pre-trial. – The proceedings in the pre-trial shall be recorded. Upon
the termination thereof, the court shall issue an order which shall recite in detail the
matters taken up in the conference, the action taken thereon, the amendments allowed to
the pleadings, and the agreements or admissions made by the parties as to any of the
matters considered. Should the action proceed to trial, the order shall, explicitly define
and limit the issues to be tried. The contents of the order shall control the subsequent
course of the action, unless modified before trial to prevent injustice.

In addition, Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, provides that:

An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the
same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing
that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

As contemplated in the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court, the general rule
regarding conclusiveness of judicial admission upon the party making it and the dispensation of
proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission was made through
palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no such admission was in fact made. The latter
exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he made such an admission.

However, respondents failed to refute the earlier admission/stipulation before and during the
trial. While denying ownership by Pedro Sr. of the 192 sq m lot, respondent Asuncion
Laquindanum, when placed on the stand, offered a vague explanation as to how such parcel of
land was acquired by Pedro Jr.

Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale
in favour of spouses Uy, all the heirs of Annunciation should have participated. Considering that
Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not
properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them and
consequently, a total nullity.

51
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ROLENDO GAUDIA "LENDOY" or "DODO"
G.R. No. 146111 | February 23, 2004

FACTS:

Information for the crime of rape was filed against “Lendoy”, appellant herein. The prosecution
presented Remelyn’s mother, Amalia Loyola, as its primary witness. Amalia stated in her
complaint affidavit that two weeks after the incident, Remelyn told her, that Lendoy is crazy, he
brought me to the ipil-ipil trees. The prosecution also presented Tulon Mik, Remelyns neighbor
and a barangay kagawad in their area. Mik testified that on 24 March 1997, at about 4:00 p.m., he
and his wife were on their way home after registering at the COMELEC office. They were in a
hurry as their child was running a fever. Mik saw appellant carrying a small girl in his arms. He
identified the little girl as Remelyn Loyola, daughter of Amalia Loyola. Appellant and Remelyn
were on their way toward the ipil-ipil trees.

The appellant, Rolendo Gaudia, interposed the defense of alibi.

After trial, the trial court found that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict
appellant for the crime of rape with the qualifying circumstance that the victim was below seven
years of age. Appellant was sentenced to death.

ISSUE: Whether the offer of compromise by appellant’s parents as tendered by Amalia Loyola
should not be taken against him, while the offer of compromise he allegedly made to Amalia’s
husband, as relayed by Amalia in her testimony, should be excluded as evidence for being hearsay
(as to offer of compromise)

HELD:

Appellant’s charge that the offers of compromise allegedly made by the parents of the appellant to
Amalia, and by the appellant himself to Amalia’s husband should not have been taken against him
by the trial court, even if sustained, will not exculpate him. To be sure, the offer of compromise
allegedly made by appellant to Amalia Loyola’s husband is hearsay evidence, and of no probative
value. It was only Amalia who testified as to the alleged offer, and she was not a party to the
conversation which allegedly transpired at the Hagonoy Municipal Jail. A witness can only testify
on facts which are based on his personal knowledge or perception. The offer of compromise
allegedly made by the appellant’s parents to Amalia may have been the subject of testimony of
Amalia. However, following the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet, the actions
of his parents cannot prejudice the appellant, since he was not a party to the said conversation, nor
was it shown that he was privy to the offer of compromise made by them to the mother of the
victim. They cannot be considered as evidence against appellant but we reiterate that these errors
are not enough to reverse the conviction of the appellant.

52
 CONRADO C. DOLDOL vs AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 164481 | September 20, 2005

FACTS:

Provincial Auditor conducted an audit of the cash and cash account of Conrado C. Doldol, the
Municipal Treasurer of Urbiztondo, Pangasinan. The State Auditors discovered that Doldol had a
shortage of P801,933.26.The State Auditors submitted their Report to the Provincial Auditor on
their examinations showing his shortages. On the same day, Doldol wrote the Provincial Treasurer
requesting that a re-audit be conducted on his cash and cash account, taking exception to the
findings of the State Auditors.

Instead of pursuing his request for a re-audit, Doldol opted to refund the missing funds. On
September 15, 1995,he remitted P200,000.00 to the Acting Municipal Treasurer for which he was
issued Official Receipt No. 436756.Doldol promised to pay the balance of his shortage, as follows:
P200,000.00 on October 31, 1995, andP884,139.66 on or before November 30, 1995. However,
he reneged on his promise.

Two informations for malversation of public funds were then filed against Doldol in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of San Carlos City. Doldol was convicted.

ISSUE: Whether Doldol committed misappropriation of funds

HELD: Yes.

Except for his bare testimony, the petitioner offered no competent and credible evidence to prove
that the missing funds were actually cash advances of employees in the municipality. The
petitioner could have offered in evidence the documents evidencing the names of the recipients
and amounts of the cash advances, but failed to do so. Moreover, the petitioner wrote the Provincial
Auditor and offered to refund the missing funds as follows: P200,000.00 on September 15, 1995,
P200,000.00 on or before October 31, 1995, and P884,139.66 on November 30, 1995. He was able
to pay only P200,000.00 on September 15, 1995, and failed to remit the balance of his shortage.
Such partial restitution of the petitioners of the cash shortage is an implied admission of
misappropriation of the missing funds.

The ruling of the CA on this matter is correct:

On September 15, 1995, not too long after the shortages in the municipal funds were discovered,
appellant made a partial payment/settlement in the amount of 200,187.80 pesos as evidenced by
Official Receipt. With respect to the balance of the missing funds, appellant promised to pay the
same in installment basis. Appellant, though, failed to comply with his undertaking. Said payment
is of no moment and could not have legally brought acquittal for the appellant. On the contrary, as
guided by Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, We hold that said payment, particularly
when taken in conjunction with appellants commitment to gradually pay the remainder of the
missing funds, is a clear offer of compromise which must be treated as an implied admission of
appellants guilt that he embezzled or converted the missing funds to his personal use.

53
 JOSUE R. LADIANA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 144293 | December 4, 2002

FACTS:

The accused, a public officer, being then a member of the Integrated National Police (INP now
PNP) assigned at the Lumban Police Station, Lumban, Laguna, acting in relation to his duty which
is primarily to enforce peace and order within his jurisdiction, taking advantage of his official
position confronted Francisco San Juan why the latter was removing the steel pipes which were
previously placed to serve as barricade to prevent the entry of vehicles along P. Jacinto Street,
Barangay Salac, Lumban, Laguna, purposely to insure the safety of persons passing along the said
street and when Francisco San Juan told the accused that the latter has no business in stopping
him, said accused who was armed with a firearm, attacked and shot Francisco San Juan with the
firearm hitting Francisco San Juan at his head and neck inflicting upon him fatal wounds thereby
causing the death of Francisco San Juan.

Petitioner admitted that he shot the victim while the latter was attacking him. “Kaya itong si
Kapitan San Juan ay sumugod at hinawakan ako sa may leeg ng aking suot na T-shirt upang ako
ay muling saksakin; sa dahilang hindi ako makatakbo o makaiwas sa kabila ng aking pananalag
hanggang magpaputok ako ng pasumala sa kanya; sa bilis ng pangyayari ay hindi ko alam na siya
ay tinamaan”

The Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution had been able to establish the guilt of petitioner
beyond reasonable doubt. The court a quo held that his Counter-Affidavit, in which he had
admitted to having fired the fatal shots that caused the victims death, may be used as evidence
against him. It underscored the admission made by the defense as to the authorship, the authenticity
and the voluntariness of the execution of the Counter-Affidavit. In short, it ruled that the document
had sufficiently established his responsibility for the death of the victim. However, it found no
evidence of treachery; thus, it convicted him of homicide only.

Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE: Whether the contents in the counter affidavit are considered an admission or confession

HELD: The contents may be considered as admission.

The answer is in the negative. It is only an admission. Sections 26 and 33 of Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence distinguish one from the other as follows:

"SEC. 26. Admissions of a party. – The act, declaration or omission of a party as to

a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.

"SEC. 33. Confession. – The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the
offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence
against him."

In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt; in an admission, there is merely a statement

of fact not directly involving an acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the
offense with which one is charged. Thus, in the case at bar, a statement by the accused admitting
the commission of the act charged against him but denying that it was done with criminal intent is
an admission, not a confession.

Petitioner admits shooting the victim – which eventually led to the latter’s death – but denies
having done it with any criminal intent. In fact, he claims he did it in self-defense. Nevertheless,
whether categorized as a confession or as an admission, it is admissible in evidence against him as
the voluntariness of the execution thereof was admitted by the defense.

54
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENJAMIN SAYABOC y SEGUBA, PATRICIO
ESCORPISO y VALDEZ, MARLON BUENVIAJE y PINEDA, and MIGUEL
BUENVIAJE y FLORES
G.R. No. 147201 | January 15, 2004

FACTS:

Before the Court is the decision of 9 November 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 2912 finding appellant Benjamin Sayaboc guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death;
and (2) finding appellant Marlon Buenviaje guilty as principal and appellants Miguel Buenviaje
and Patricio Escorpiso guilty as accomplices in the crime of homicide.

On December 2, 1994, in the Municipality of Solano, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines and
the accused attacked, and assaulted Joseph Galam y Antonio, inflicting upon him mortal wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of
his heirs.

The appellants argue that the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc may not be admitted in evidence
against him because the PAO lawyer who was his counsel during the custodial investigation, was
not a competent, independent, vigilant, and effective counsel. He was ineffective because he
remained silent during the entire proceedings. He was not independent, as he was formerly a judge
in the National Police Commission, which was holding court inside the PNP Command of
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya.

ISSUES: Whether an extrajudicial confession made during custodial investigation wherein the
rights of the accused were merely recited to him may be admissible in evidence against such
accused.

HELD: No.

The showing of a spontaneous, free, and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing. The right
to be informed requires "the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle." It should allow the
suspect to consider the effects and consequences of any waiver he might make of these rights.
More so when the suspect is one like Sayaboc, who has an educational attainment of Grade IV,
was a stranger in Nueva Vizcaya, and had already been under the control of the police officers for
two days previous to the investigation, albeit for another offense.

55
 CARLOS L. TANENGGEE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 179448 June 26, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioner was charged with estafa through falsification of commercial documents. The
prosecution alleged that:(1) the petitioner as branch manager caused the preparation of promissory
notes (PN) and cashier’s check in the name of one of their valued client; (2) that by forging the
signature of such client, petitioner was able to obtain the proceeds of the loan evidenced by the
PN.

After the discovery of the irregular loans, an internal audit was conducted and an administrative
investigation was held in the Head Office of Metrobank, during which appellant signed a written
statement in the form of questions and answers admitting the commission of the allegations in the
Information. Trial court convicted the accused. On appeal, the CA affirmed his conviction.

Elevating the case before the SC, petitioner avers that the written statement should not be admitted
as evidence against him as it was taken in violation of his rights under Section 12, Article III of
the Constitution, particularly of his right to remain silent, right to counsel, and right to be informed
of the first two rights. Hence, the same should not have been admitted in evidence against him.

ISSUE: Whether a statement of an accused-employee made during administrative investigation

conducted by his employer may not be admitted as evidence against the former on the ground that
it was made without the assistance of a counsel

HELD: No.

The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt

obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution is applicable only in custodial
interrogation. Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement
authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant manner.

In the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounseled written statement
regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch he managed, the following are clear: (1) the
questioning was not initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by an internal affairs
manager of the bank; and, (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any
significant manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under custodial
investigation and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the taking of his
written statement. No error can therefore be attributed to the courts below in admitting in evidence
and in giving due consideration to petitioner’s written statement as there is no constitutional
impediment to its admissibility.

56
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAUL SANTOS Y NARCISO, MARIO MORALES
Y BACANI, PETER DOE and RICHARD DOE, Accused, RAUL SANTOS y NARCISO
G.R. Nos. 100225-26 | May 11, 1993

FACTS:

Santos was charged and convicted of murder and frustrated murder. On appeal, accused makes the
following assignment of errors: (1) his identification in the police line-up by the two witnesses is
inadmissible as he was not afforded his right to counsel; (2) he questions the trial court for
admitting a sworn statement by one Ronaldo Guerrero, a witness in another criminal case accused
was also charged with the murder which had taken place in the very same site where Bautista and
Cupcupin were ambushed as such accused contends that the affidavitof Ronaldo Guerrero was
hearsay evidence, considering that the prosecution did not present Ronaldo Guerrero as a witness
during the trial.

ISSUES:
1. Whether identification in the police line-up is not admissible on the ground that the accused
was not provided with a counsel
2. Whether the trial court may admit a sworn statement of a witness taken from another
criminal case wherein the accused for both cases are one and the same

HELD:
1. There is "no real need to afford a suspect the service of counsel at police line- up. The
customary practice is, of course, that it is the witness who is investigated or interrogated in
the course of a police line-up and who gives a statement to the police, rather than the
accused who is not questioned at all at that stage. In the instant case, there is nothing in the
record of this case which shows that in the course of the line-up, the police investigators
sought to extract any admission or confession from appellant Santos.

2. Section 34, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that “Evidence that one did or did not
do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same
or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or
knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage and the like."

The trial court did not commit reversible error in admitting the Guerrero affidavit for the
limited purpose for proving knowledge or plan or scheme, and more specifically, that
appellant knew that the particular corner of two (2)particular streets in Malabon was a good
place to ambush a vehicle and its passengers. As in fact, both in the instant case, as well as
the case where Guerrero’s testimony was originally presented, the scene of the crime is one
and the same.

57
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFREDO NARDO y ROSALES
G.R. No. 133888 | March 1, 2001

FACTS:

The victim, Lorielyn Nardo, is the eldest daughter of accused- appellant. She was born on
September 11, 1981 and, at the time of the incident, was fourteen (14) years old. During the trial,
the defense endeavored to portray the victim as an incorrigible liar. Occasions were cited wherein
the victim supposedly lied in order to obtain money or her parents' permission to leave the house.
The defense also presented Atty. Gonzales (employer of the accused) as a witness which describes
the victim as the one capable of concocting lies.

ISSUE: Whether the crime of rape was established

HELD:

While lying may constitute a habit, the court believes that the falsehoods committed by the victim
assuming them for the moment to be true, are petty and inconsequential. They are not as serious
as charging one's own father of the sordid crime of rape, with all of its serious repercussions. Rule
130, Section 34, of the Rules of Court provides that: "Evidence that one did or did not do a certain
thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did nor did not do the same or a similar thing
at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan,
system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like."

On the argument of the accused-appellant that the trial court should have given credence to the
witness, Atty. Santer G. Gonzales, because he is a member of the bar, the court reasoned out that
the witness took the witness stand not as a lawyer but as an ordinary person. He testified in his
capacity as accused-appellant's employer. As such, no special privilege should be accorded him
by the trial court by reason of his being a member of the bar. He did not appear in that case as an
officer of the court but as a mere witness, and hence should be treated as one.

Sifting through the entire body of evidence presented in this case, the court find nothing which
would destroy the moral certainty of accused- appellant's guilt. While there may be some
inconsistencies in the testimony of the victim, these are considered as minor inconsistencies which
serve to strengthen her credibility as they are badges of truth rather than indicia of falsehood.
Minor inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of witnesses, as they may even tend to strengthen
rather than weaken their credibility. Inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses with
respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of their declaration,
their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. Such minor flaws may even enhance the worth of
a testimony, for they guard against memorized falsities. Besides, a rape victim cannot be expected
to recall vividly all the sordid details of the violation committed against her virtue.

58
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources vs. HEIRS OF FELIPE ALEJAGA SR.
G.R. No. 146030 December 3, 2002

FACTS:

On Dec. of 1978, Alejaga Sr. filed a Free Patent Application with the District Land Office is Roxas
City. On March of 1979, the free patent was ordered to be issued to him. The Defendant (Register
of Deeds) also issued the OCT for the parcel of land.

On April of that same year, Ignacio Arrobang requested the Director of Lands in manila, through
a letter, to investigate for irregularities in the issuance of the title of a foreshore land in favor of
Alejaga Sr. The investigator, Isagani Cartagena recommended to the Director to file a civil
proceeding to cancel the Free Patent issued to Alejaga Sr.

On April 18, 1990, the government through the Solicitor General instituted an action for
Annulment/Cancellation of Patent and Title and Reversion against Alejaga Sr. He died pending
the proceeding. He was substituted by his heirs.

The RTC declared Isagani’s testimony as hearsay and the Patent null and void, and the CA reversed
the RTC brushing aside as hearsay Isagani Cartagena’s testimony that Land Inspector Efren L.
Recio had not conducted an investigation on the free patent application of Felipe Alejaga Sr.

ISSUE: Whether Isagani’s testimony can be considered as hearsay hence cannot be properly
admitted in court

HELD: No.

The report of Special Investigator Isagani P. Cartagena has not been successfully rebutted. In that
report, Recio supposedly admitted that he had not actually conducted an investigation and ocular
inspection of the parcel of land. Cartagena’s statement on Recio’s alleged admission may be
considered as “independently relevant.” A witness may testify as to the state of mind of another
person -- the latter’s knowledge, belief, or good or bad faith -- and the former’s statements may
then be regarded as independently relevant without violating the hearsay rule. Thus, because
Cartagena took the witness stand and opened himself to cross-examination, the Investigation
Report he had submitted to the director of the Bureau of Lands constitutes part of his testimony.
Those portions of the report that consisted of his personal knowledge, perceptions and conclusions
are not hearsay. On the other hand, the part referring to the statement made by Recio may be
considered as independently relevant.

The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that conversations communicated to a

witness by a third person may be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or falsity, they
were actually made. Evidence as to the making of such statements is not secondary but primary,
for in itself it (a) constitutes a fact in issue [36] or (b) is circumstantially relevant to the existence
of such fact.

Since Cartagena’s testimony was based on the report of the investigation he had conducted, his
testimony was not hearsay and was, hence, properly admitted by the trial court.

59
 ANNA LERIMA PATULA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 164457 | April 11, 2012

FACTS:

Petitioner, a sales representative at Footlucker’s Chain of Stores, was charged with estafa for
failure to account for the proceeds of the sales and deliver the collection to the said company.
During the trial, prosecution, in order to prove that collectibles lawfully belonging to the company
where misappropriated by the accused, submitted the following documentary evidence: (a) the
receipts allegedly issued by petitioner to each of her customers upon their payment, (b) the ledgers
listing the accounts pertaining to each customer with the corresponding notations of the receipt
numbers for each of the payments, and (c) the confirmation sheets accomplished by Guivencan
herself. The ledgers and receipts were marked and formally offered as Exhibits B to YY, and their
derivatives, inclusive. Prosecution also presented Guivencan to testify on the entries in the
documentary evidence. Petitioner’s counsel interposed a continuing objection on the ground that
the figures entered in Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive, were hearsay because the
persons who had made the entries were not themselves presented in court.

ISSUE: Whether testimony of a witness pertaining to entries in a document made by another

person constitutes hearsay and may not be admitted as evidence

HELD:

Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that a witness can testify only to those
facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own perception,
except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The personal knowledge of a witness is a
substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed
fact. A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that
purpose because her testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness
presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of her
information.

The reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence is that the person from whom the witness derived
the information on the facts in dispute is not in court and under oath to be examined and cross-
examined.

Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as evidence
of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assert or becomes the basis of inference, and,
therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when made on the witness stand, subject
to the test of cross- examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an
assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the
hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that
he heard the accused say that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is admissible not to prove
that the complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that the accused uttered those words.
This kind of utterance is hearsay in character but is not legal hearsay. The distinction is, therefore,
between (a) the fact that the statement was made, to which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b)
the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.

Hence, as Guivencan’s testimony intends to prove an asserted fact, i.e., misappropriation on the
part of the accused through documentary evidence of which the witness has no personal
knowledge, the same is inadmissible for being a hearsay evidence.

60
 PEOPLE vs. CESARIO MONTANEZ and DANIEL SUMAYLO
March 17, 2004

FACTS:

This is a murder case of one Perlito Ollanes filed against Cesario Montañez and Daniel Sumaylo.
During trial, Edmundo Ollanes, older brother of the deceased Perlito, testified that after their
fishing along the seashore at Pangabuan, Toledo City with Joven Hintogaya and the deceased, he
heard a gunshot coming from the direction of the house of Perlito. He rushed to the scene and saw
his brother lying prostrate. Perlito was still then alive but barely breathing when he said that he
was on the verge of death and mentioned Montañez’ name three times as the one who shot him.
Joven Hintogaya corroborated Edmundo’s testimony. He testified that Perlito was his brother-in-
law. He was carrying a kerosene lamp as he and Perlito were on their way home that fateful night.
Perlito was about seven meters away from him. Suddenly, he heard a gunshot and saw that Perlito
was hit. He fell to the ground. Joven went near Perlito, still carrying the kerosene lamp, and saw
the appellant holding a long handgun in his right hand. In the meantime, the appellant went near
Perlito and dropped a piece of paper with writings in the Cebuano dialect, then left. When Perlito
was carried by Edmundo to the hospital, the former died on the way.

Trial court convicted Montañez with murder being principal and Sumaylo with homicide. CA
affirmed.

The appellant contends that both the trial court and the appellate court erred in giving credence
and full probative weight to the testimonies of Edmundo and Joven. He insists that he was in the
house of Emilia Antipolo, one-and-a-half kilometers away from the house of the victim, when the
latter was shot. Besides, Sumaylo already confessed to being the sole assailant, and thereby
absolved him of any criminal liability for the victim’s death. The appellant argues that it was
illogical for the trial court to convict him of murder as an accomplice, although Sumaylo, who was
the principal by direct participation for the killing of the victim, was convicted of homicide. There
is no evidence on record that he conspired with Sumaylo in killing the victim. His mere presence
at the scene of the killing did not render him criminally liable as an accomplice.

ISSUE: Whether the testimony of Edmundo is admissible in evidence

HELD: Yes.

Perlito’s statement that it was the appellant who shot him was a dying declaration. The statement
is highly reliable, having been made in extremity when the declarant is at the point of death and
when any hope of survival is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and when the mind
is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth. Even if the declarant did not
make a statement that he was at the brink of death, the degree and seriousness of the words and
the fact that death superseded shortly afterwards may be considered as substantial evidence that
the declaration was made by the victim with full realization that he was in a dying condition.

61
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THEODORE BERNAL, JOHN DOE and
PETER DOE
G.R. No. 113685 June 19, 1997

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Theodore Bernal, together with two other persons whose identities and
whereabouts are still unknown, were charged with the crime of kidnapping Bienvenido Openda Jr.
in Regional Trial Court of Davao City.

A plea of not guilty having been entered by Bernal during his arraignment, trial ensued. The
prosecution presented certain Salito Enriquez who testified that Openda Jr. had an illicit affair with
Bernal’s wife Naty and this was the motive behind the Bernal’s kidnapping of Openda Jr. Another
witness who testified for the prosecution was one, Adonis Sagarino, a childhood friend and
neighbor of the victim who overheard at the billiard hall at about 11AM with his two companions
that a certain person has to be kidnapped and it turned out to be Openda Jr.

RTC rendered judgment finding Bernal "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
kidnapping for the abduction and disappearance of Bienvenido Openda Jr. under Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code.

Bernal assails the lower court for giving weight and credence to the prosecution witnesses'
allegedly illusory testimonies and for convicting him when his guilt was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt.

ISSUE: Whether the testimony of Perlito is admissible

HELD: Yes.

Openda, Jr.’s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with Bernal’s wife is
admissible in evidence, pursuant to Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.:

“Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. -- The declaration made by a person deceased, or
unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration
was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant’s own interest, that a reasonable
man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true,
may be received in evidence against himself or his successors-in-interest and against third
persons.”

With the deletion of the phrase “pecuniary or moral interest” from the present provision, it is safe
to assume that “declaration against interest” has been expanded to include all kinds of interest,
that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or even penal.

A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit: “(1) that the
declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant;
(3) that at the time he made said declaration the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to
his aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such
declaration to be true.”

Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His
confession to Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his own interest, since his affair with Naty
Bernal was a crime, is admissible in evidence because no sane person will be presumed to tell a
falsehood to his own detriment.

62
 CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and TEODORA DOMINGO
G.R. No. 121027 | July 31, 1997

FACTS:

This is a case of an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land and an apartment. Teodora Guerrero
died and left a parcel of land and an apartment. Her husband Martin Guerrero adjudicates the said
land to him and consequently sold to Teodora Domingo. The nephews and nieces Tison et al seek
to inherit by right of representation from the property disputed property presenting documentary
evidence to prove filial relation. The respondent contended that the documents/evidence presented
is inadmissible for being hearsay since the affiants were never presented for cross-examination.

The trial court issued an order granting the demurrer to evidence and dismissing the complaint for
reconveyance.

In upholding the dismissal, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the documentary evidence
presented by herein petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint
affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish filiation. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a trial court may dismissed an action for reconveyance on the ground of
complainant’s failure to prove his alleged filiation on which the cause of action is anchored
2. Whether or not testimony as to filiation to a deceased person is inadmissible for being a
hearsay evidence

HELD:

1. The answer is in the negative. The court a quo and respondent appellate court have
regrettably overlooked the universally recognized presumption on legitimacy. The
presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code actually fixes a civil status for the child born
in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child
can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and
within the period limited by law. The burden of proof rests not on herein petitioners who
have the benefit of the presumption in their favor, but on private respondent who is
disputing the same.

2. The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties
concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in1946, categorically declared that the former is
Teodora’s niece. Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is
admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify;
(2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3)
that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the
declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the
suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen
thereon.

There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth elements. What remains for
analysis is the third element, that is, whether or not the other documents offered in evidence
sufficiently corroborate the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime
regarding the pedigree of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tisonor, if at all, it is necessary to
present evidence other than such declaration.

Distinction must be made as to when the relationship of the declarant may be proved by
the very declaration itself, or by other declarations of said declarant, and when it must be
supported by evidence aliunde. The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming
seeks recovery against a relative common to both claimant and declarant, but not from the
declarant himself or the declarant’s estate, the relationship of the declarant to the common
relative may not be proved by the declaration itself. There must be some independent proof

63
of this fact. As an exception, the requirement that there be other proof than the declarations
of the declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate
of the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through his declarations to
the property of some other member of the family.

We are sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one instance where the
general requirement on evidence aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right
to part of the estate of the declarant herself.

64
 FRANCISCO JISON vs. CA and MONINA JISON
February 24, 1998

FACTS:

This is a case pertaining to the recognition as an illegitimate child of Francisco Jison by one
Monina Jison. Monina presented a total of 11 witnesses as to her relationship with Francisco Jison
whom she allegedly called “Daddy” since she was a child. She also presented certifications issued
by the Local Civil Registrar of Dingle, Iloilo and her baptismal certificate all to prove her
allegation that Francisco impregnated her mother (deceased) Esperanza Amolar who was then
employed as the nanny of Francisco’s daughter, Lourdes. However, Francisco refuted all the
allegations of Monina. Trial court resolved the complaint against Monina the latter being barred
by estoppel by the deed which the latter allegedly signed when she was 25 years old withdrawing
her claim as the daughter of Francisco. CA reversed.

ISSUE: Whether the evidence presented is enough to establish filiation

HELD: No.

Under Rule 130, Section 39, the contents of these documents may not be admitted, there being no
showing that the declarants-authors were dead or unable to testify, neither was the relationship
between the declarants and MONINA shown by evidence other than the documents in question.

Neither may it be admitted under Rule 130, Section 40. Rule 130, Section 40, provides:

Sec. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. – The reputation or tradition
existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its
members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member
of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family
books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the like may be received as
evidence of pedigree.

It is evident that this provision may be divided into two (2) parts: the portion containing the Þrst
underscored clause which pertains to testimonial evidence, under which the documents in question
may not be admitted as the authors thereof did not take the witness stand; and the section
containing the second underscored phrase. What must then be ascertained is whether letter
presented in this case as private documents, fall within the scope of the clause "and the like" as
qualified by the preceding phrase "entries in family bibles or other family books or charts,
engravings on rights and family portraits,"

We hold that the scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of this provision, in
light of the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are commonly known as "family
possessions," or those articles which represent, in effect, a family's joint statement of its belief as
to the pedigree of a person. These have been described as objects "openly exhibited and well
known to the family," or those "which, if preserved in a family, may be regarded as giving a family
tradition." Plainly then, letters, as private documents not constituting "family possessions" as
discussed above, may not be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 40.

Neither may these exhibits be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 41 regarding common
reputation, it having been observed that: the weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory
that it is the general repute, the common reputation in the family, and not the common reputation
in community, that is a material element of evidence going to establish pedigree. Thus, matters of
pedigree may be proved by reputation in the family, and not by reputation in the neighborhood or
vicinity, except where the pedigree in question is marriage which may be proved by common
reputation in the community.

65
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FRANK LOBRIGAS, MARLITO LOBRIGAS (At
Large) and TEODORICO MANTE (acquitted) FRANK LOBRIGAS
G.R. No. 147649 | December 17, 2002

FACTS:

Taylaran was a regular farmhand of Castor Guden and on February 19, 1996, he asked permission
not to work for it was raining and he had to go to the store of Teodorico Mante. However, around
4PM, Felix returned to Castor Guden’s house with bruises and injuries all over his body and told
the latter that he was mauled by accused. Felix spent the night in Castor’s house and left the
following morning to go to the seaside house of Aguilar, his cousin, to heal wounds in the
saltwater. However, the next day he died. Rosa, daughter of Felix, testified that a day after the
mauling her father came to her house and told her that he was beaten up by Frank Lobrigas, Marlito
Lobrigas and Teodorico Mante.

Accused-appellant contends that there was no direct evidence linking him as one of the assailants.
He claims that while there were ante-mortem declarations made by the victim to the two
prosecution witnesses pointing to him as one of the maulers, the trial court, nevertheless, dismissed
them as invalid dying declaration since they were uttered by the victim not under a consciousness
of an impending death. Neither should such declarations be considered as part of res gestae since
the victim was drunk and very mad at. Lastly, the evidence of flight is not sufficient to overcome
the constitutional presumption of innocence.

On the other hand, the prosecution argues that: (1) the victim’s declarations naming accused-
appellant as one of the assailants are admissible as part of the res gestae since they were made
immediately after a startling occurrence; (2) the flight of accused-appellant after the incident and
his subsequent escape from custody were indicative of his guilt; and (3) there was no improper
motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses when they testified against accused-appellant.

ISSUE: Whether the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the evidence of flight are
sufficient to establish the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD: No.

The trial court held that although the foregoing declarations cannot be deemed a dying declaration
since they do not appear to have been made by the declarant under the expectation of a sure and
impending death, the same are nonetheless part of the res gestae. However, only the declaration
made to Castor Guden are admissible in evidence as such.

A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the
hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
(3) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances. All these requisites concur in the case at bar. The principal act, the mauling of the
victim, was a startling occurrence. The declarations were made shortly after the mauling incident
while the victim was still under the exciting influence of the startling occurrence, without any prior
opportunity to contrive a story implicating accused-appellant. The declaration concerns the
circumstances surrounding the mauling of Felix Taylaran.

However, the declaration made by the victim to his daughter, Rosa does not satisfy the second
requirement of spontaneity because they were made a day after the incident and the exciting
influence of the startling occurrence was no longer present. Nevertheless, we hold that Rosa
Solarte’s testimony on what her father told her constitutes independent relevant statements distinct
from hearsay, and are thus admissible not as to the veracity thereof, but as proof of the fact that
they had been uttered.

Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, only the fact that such statements were
made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule does not apply,
hence, the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is
not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.

66
 PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC vs. JAIME M. RAMOS, NILDA RAMOS, ERLINDA
ILANO, MILAGROS ILANO, DANIEL ILANO AND FELIPA JAVALERA
G.R. No. 92740 | March 23, 1992

FACTS:

Respondents filed an action for damages against petitioner alleging the following: (1) they are
passengers of PAL Flight No. 264 on September 24, 1985; (2) they check-in at least one (1) hour
before the published departure time; (3) no one was at the check-in counter until 30 minutes before
departure; (4) upon checking-in, they were informed that their tickets were cancelled and the seats
awarded to chance passengers; (5) they have to take the bus instead; and (6) they suffered damages
due to the cancellation.

Petitioner disclaims any liability, claiming that the non-accommodation of Respondent on said
flight was due to their having check-in late for their flight. During the trial, defendant presented
the check-in counter clerk at their Naga Branch on the date of respondent’s scheduled flight. The
clerk testified that: (1) the respondents were late and that he noted the time of check-in on their
tickets; and (2) there were other passengers who came late before the respondents. In relation to
the testimony, two documentary evidence were offered, namely: (1) the ticket bearing the notation
“late 4:02” of the clerk; and (2) the passenger manifest showing the other names of other
passengers who were also late.

Respondent objected to the documentary evidence submitted and argued that those are self-
serving.

ISSUE: Whether the entries made on a ticket by employees of a party in the course of their business
may be given weight on the ground that the same is self-serving

HELD: Yes.

The plane tickets of the private respondents with the notation "late 4:02" stamped on the flight
coupon by the check-in clerk immediately upon the check-in of private respondents and the
passenger Manifest of Flight PR 264 which showed the non-accommodation of Capati and Go and
the private respondents are entries made in the regular course of business which the, private
respondents failed to overcome with substantial and convincing evidence other than their
testimonies.

Consequently, they carry more weight and credence. A writing or document made
contemporaneously with a transaction in which are evidenced facts pertinent to an issue, when
admitted as proof of those facts, is ordinarily regarded as more reliable proof and of greater
probative force than the oral testimony of a witness as to such facts based upon memory and
recollection Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable as against a written document that
speaks a uniform language

Private respondents’ only objection to these documents is that they are self- serving cannot be
sustained. The hearsay rule will not apply in this case as statements, acts or conduct accompanying
or so nearly connected with the main transaction as to form a part of it, and which illustrate,
elucidate, qualify or characterize the act, are admissible as part of the res gestae.

67
 RUDY LAO vs. STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC.
August 14, 2003

FACTS:

Petitioner Lao, owner of a Fuso truck insured by respondent Standard Insurance Co., Inc., filed a
claim with the latter. However, the claim was denied by the insurance company on the ground that
the driver of the insured truck, Leonardo Anit, as stated in the Police Blotter, did not possess a
proper driver’s license at the time of the accident. The restriction in Leonardo Anit’s driver’s
license provided that he can only drive four-wheeled vehicles weighing not more than 4,500 kgs.
Since the insured truck he was driving weighed more than 4,500 kgs., he therefore violated the
"authorized driver" clause of the insurance policy.

Thus, petitioner filed an action for breach of contract and damages. During trial, Respondent
offered as evidence the police blotter and presented the investigating police officer who made the
entries on the said blotter report. On the other hand, petitioner offered in evidence the Motor
Vehicle Accident Report stating that the driver at the time of the accident is not Anit but
Giddie Boy. The said report was made three days after the accident or on April27, 1985.

RTC dismissed the complaint and this was affirmed by CA on appeal. Petitioner assails the
admissibility and evidentiary weight given to the police blotter, as a basis for the factual finding
of the RTC and the CA. He contends that the same entry was belied by the Motor Vehicle Accident
Report and testimony of the investigating policeman himself.

ISSUE: Whether the police blotter is admissible in evidence

HELD: Yes.

The police blotter was admitted under Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court. Under the said
rule, the following are the requisites for its admissibility:

a. that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person, specially enjoined
by law to do so;
b. that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such
other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law;
c. that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him
stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official
information.

We agree with the trial and appellate courts in finding that the police blotter was properly admitted
as they form part of official records. Entries in police records made by a police officer in the
performance of the duty especially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the fact therein
stated, and their probative value may be either substantiated or nullified by other competent
evidence. Although police blotters are of little probative value, they are nevertheless admitted and
considered in the absence of competent evidence to refute the facts stated therein.

68
 MEYNARDO SABILI vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FLORENCIO LIBREA
G.R. No. 193261 | April 24, 2012

FACTS:

When petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein that
he had been a resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8) months. Private respondent
Florencio Librea filed a Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and
to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification. He alleged that
petitioner failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement under Section 39 of the
Local Government Code.

In order to prove his compliance with the residency requirement, petitioner presented as evidence
his barangay certificate. The COMELEC in disqualifying the petitioner did not consider the
Certification issued by Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain Dominador Honrade. COMELEC
brushed it aside on the ground that the said Certification was not sworn to before a notary public
and, hence, “cannot be relied on.” Subsequently, petitioner presented another, substantially
identical, Certification from the said Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain, save for the fact that it had
now been sworn to before a notary public.

ISSUE: Whether the barangay certificate is inadmissible in evidence on the ground that it is not
notarized

HELD: No.

Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court provides: Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance
of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

Three (3) requisites must concur for entries in official records to be admissible in evidence: (a)
The entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so;
(b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) The public officer or other person had
sufficient knowledge of the facts stated by him, which facts must have been acquired by
him personally or through official information.

As to the first requisite, the Barangay Secretary is required by the Local Government Code to
“keep an updated record of all inhabitants of the barangay.” Regarding the second requisite, it is
the business of a punong barangay to know who the residents are in his own barangay. Anent the
third requisite, the Barangay Captain’s exercise of powers and duties concomitant to his position
requires him to be privy to these records kept by the Barangay Secretary.

69
 MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO) vs. HON. QUISUMBING and
MERALCO EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS ASSOCIATION (MEWA)
February 22, 2000

FACTS:

MEWA, the duly recognized labor organization of the rank-and-file employees of MERALCO
informed the latter of its intention to re-negotiate the terms and conditions of their existing
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Thereafter, collective bargaining negotiations
proceeded. However, despite the series of meetings between the negotiating panels of MERALCO
and MEWA, the parties failed to arrive at “terms and conditions” acceptable to both of them which
prompted MEWA to file a Notice of Strike with the National Capital Region Branch of the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the DOLE on the grounds of bargaining
deadlock and unfair labor practices. Upon the existence of the strike, MERALCO filed an Urgent
Petition with the DOLE Secretary praying that the latter should assume jurisdiction over the labor
dispute and to enjoin the striking employees to go back to work. Acting on such petition, the Labor
Secretary granted and resolved the labor dispute by ordering the grant of a 4,500 wage increase,
as well as a new and improved fringe benefits under the remaining 2 years of the CBA for the
rank-and-file employees. Unsatisfied, MERALCO filed a supplement to the motion for
reconsideration alleging that the Secretary did not property appreciate the effect of the awarded
wages and benefits on MERALCO’s financial viability. Hence, in a decision on January 27, 1999,
the orders of the Secretary were set aside and the wage increase is now from 1,900 to 2,200.
MERALCO warns that if the wage increase of 2,200 per month as ordered by the Secretary is
allowed, it would simply pass the cost covering such increase to the consumers through increase
in the rate of electricity.

ISSUE: Whether the argument is tenable

HELD: No.

This is a non sequitur. The Court cannot be threatened with such a misleading argument. An
increase in the prices of electric current needs the approval of the appropriate regulatory
government agency and does not automatically result from a mere increase in the wages of
petitioner’s employees. Besides, this argument presupposes that petitioner is capable of meeting a
wage increase. The All Asia Capital report upon which the Union relies to support its position
regarding the wage issue can not be an accurate basis and conclusive determinant of the rate of
wage increase. Section 45 of Rule 130 Rules of Evidence provides:

"Commercial lists and the like. - Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons engaged
in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation is
admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is
published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by
them therein."

Under the afore-quoted rule, statement of matters contained in a periodical may be admitted only
"if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally
used and relied upon by them therein." As correctly held in our Decision dated January 27, 1999,
the cited report is a mere newspaper account and not even a commercial list. At most, it is but an
analysis or opinion which carries no persuasive weight for purposes of this case as no sufficient
figures to support it were presented. Neither did anybody testify to its accuracy. It cannot be said
that businessmen generally rely on news items such as this in their occupation. Besides, no
evidence was presented that the publication was regularly prepared by a person in touch with the
market and that it is generally regarded as trustworthy and reliable. Absent extrinsic proof of their
accuracy, these reports are not admissible. In the same manner, newspapers containing stock
quotations are not admissible in evidence when the source of the reports is available. With more
reason, mere analyses or projections of such reports cannot be admitted. In particular, the source
of the report in this case can be easily made available considering that the same is necessary for
compliance with certain governmental requirements.

70
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LANIE ORTIZ-MIYAKE
G.R. Nos. 115338-39 | September 16, 1997

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale on a
complaint initiated by Elenita Marasigan, Imelda Generillo and Rosamar del Rosario.

In convicting appellant of illegal recruitment in large scale, the lower court adopted a previous
decision of Branch78 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Paranaque as a basis for the judgment.
Said previous decision was a conviction for estafa involving the same circumstances in the instant
case, wherein complainants Generillo and Del Rosario charged appellant with two counts of estafa.
This decision was not appealed and had become final and executory.

On appeal, the OSG argued that the Makati court could not validly adopt the facts embodied in the
decision of the Paranaque court to show that illegal recruitment was committed against Generillo
and Del Rosario as well. Illegal recruitment was allegedly proven to have been committed against
only one person, particularly, Elenita Marasigan. Appellant, therefore, may only be held guilty of
simple illegal recruitment and not of such offense in large scale.

ISSUE: Whether the court may adopt the findings of fact and decision of another court involving
the same parties and incidents

HELD: No.

The answer is in the negative. Trial court’s utilization of and reliance on the previous decision of
the Paranaque court must be rejected. Every conviction must be based on the findings of fact made
by a trial court according to its appreciation of the evidence before it. A conviction may not be
based merely on the findings of fact of another court, especially where what is presented is only
its decision sans the transcript of the testimony of the witnesses who testified therein and upon
which the decision is based.

A previous decision or judgment, while admissible in evidence may only prove that an accused
was previously convicted of a crime. 30 It may not be used to prove that the accused is guilty of a
crime charged in a subsequent case, in lieu of the requisite evidence proving the commission of
the crime, as said previous decision is hearsay. To sanction its being used as a basis for conviction
in a subsequent case would constitute a violation of the right of the accused to confront the
witnesses against him.

71
HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO AND JANE GO, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and HIGHDONE COMPANY, LTD., ET AL.
G.R. No. 185527 July 18, 2012

FACTS:

Petitioners were charged before the MTC for Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal
Code. The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos,
Cambodia.

The private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping,
alleging that he was being treated for lung infection. Notwithstanding petitioners' Opposition, the
MeTC granted the motion. Petitioners sought its reconsideration which the MeTC denied,
prompting petitioners to file a Petition for Certiorari before the RTC.

RTC granted the petition and declared the MeTC Orders null and void.11The RTC held that
Section 17, Rule 23on the taking of depositions of witnesses in civil cases cannot apply
suppletorily to the case since there is a specific provision in the Rules of Court with respect to the
taking of depositions of prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, which is primarily intended to
safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused to meet the witness against him face to face.

The prosecution elevated the case to the CA. CA reversed the ruling of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether the MTCC was correct in allowing to take the deposition of the witness outside
the PH notwithstanding the constitutional guarantee given to the accused

HELD: No. We rule in favor of the petitioners.

The procedure for testimonial examination of an unavailable prosecution witness is covered under
Section 15, Rule 119. The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open
court. This is true especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his
right to a public trial and to meet the witnesses against him face to face.

The requirement is the "safest and most satisfactory method of investigating facts" as it enables
the judge to test the witness' credibility through his manner and deportment while testifying. It is
not without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the conditional examination of
witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony.

For purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness
who would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before
the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate
of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

72
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDWIN IBANEZ y ALBANTE and ALFREDO
(FREDDIE) NULLA y IBANEZ
G.R. No. 197813 | September 25, 2013

FACTS:

Appellants were all charged in an Information for Murder of Wilfredo Atendido y Dohenog. The
prosecution presented the victim’s wife, Rowena and minor daughter, Rachel (10 years old) as
witnesses. Rachel testified that she saw the appellants killed her father. The defense, on the other
hand, presented Aniceta as witness whose testimony discredit that of Rachel. Aniceta testified that
she and Rachel were out on that day selling doormats and only returned at 6:00 p.m. Thus, Rachel
could not have witnessed the murder of Wilfredo.

The trial court convicted the accused. The conviction was affirmed by the CA. Appellant, on appeal
with the SC, tried to further discredit Rachel’s testimony by arguing that Rachel was a mere child
who had studied only until the first grade of elementary school and could barely read, and did not
know how to tell time.

ISSUE: Whether a child witness may be disqualified on the ground that she does not know how to
read and tell time

HELD: No.

This Court finds the testimony of Rachel credible, and clear and convincing. The testimony flows
from a person who was present in the place where the killing occurred. They are replete with details
sufficient to shift the burden of evidence to appellants. We have no reason to doubt Rachel’s
credibility. Her candid account of the incident, standing alone, clearly established the components
of the crime of murder. Appellants’ defense of denial, not sufficiently proven, cannot overcome
the conclusions drawn from said evidence. We find no cogent reason to deviate from the findings
and conclusions of the trial court. Rachel’s testimony was delivered in a firm, candid, and
straightforward manner. There is no showing that Rachel wavered from the basic facts of her
testimony, even when she was subjected to a rigorous examination.

We find no error in the lower courts’ disposal of the issue. We have scrutinized the testimony of
lone eyewitness, Rachel. Throughout her testimony, in her direct, cross and re-direct and re-cross
examinations, she candidly recounted the events surrounding the killing of her father.

As the lower courts have done, we accord full faith and credence to Rachel’s testimony. She was
young and unschooled, but her narration of the incident was categorical, without wavering. It has
no markings of a concocted story, impressed upon her by other people.

With exceptions provided in the Rules of Court, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can
make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. That is even buttressed by the Rule on
Examination of a Child Witness which specifies that every child is presumed qualified to be a
witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child's
competence. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive,
remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth
in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination
of a child. Thus, petitioners’ flimsy objections on Rachel’s lack of education and inability to read
and tell time carry no weight and cannot overcome the clear and convincing testimony of Rachel
as to who killed her father.

We likewise note that the line of questioning of the defense during cross-examination on the
competency of Rachel to read and tell time did not distract her in recollecting how her father was
attacked by accused-appellants. From her position underneath the house of her "Kuya Unyo," she
saw her father, Wilfredo, attacked by accused-appellants. Although she was astonished as the
happening unfolded, her ability to perceive, remember, and make known her perception was not
diminished.

73
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PO2 ALBERT ABRIOL, MACARIO ASTELLERO,
and JANUARIO DOSDOS,
G.R. No. 123137. October 17, 2001

FACTS:

Appellants PO2 Albert Abriol of the Philippine National Police (PNP), Macario Astellero,
Januario Dosdos, and PNP P/Chief Inspector Gaudioso Navales were charged with murder
allegedly committed against Alejandro Flores alias Alex and violation of Presidential Decree No.
1866 on Illegal Possession of Firearms. The incident happened in the intersection of P. del Rosario
St. and Jones Avenue, Cebu City when one Romeo Sta. Cruz, a radio news reporter aboard his
jeep, around ABS-CBN Compound heard a couple of gunshots and saw a man shouting for help.
He also saw a red “Jiffy” which made a U-turn and stopped at beside the fallen figure of a man
and a tall, thin man alighted and fired several shots at the prostrate figure. The Jiffy sped away but
was accosted still by the police patrol cars and arrested the persons inside the Jiffy who were now
the accused. When arraigned, all the accused pleaded not guilty to both charges. Since the
indictments arose from the same incident, the cases were jointly tried. The prosecution presented
SPO4 Lemuel Caser, ballistician of the PNP Crime Laboratory to establish the gun caliber used
that wounded and killed the victim. However, the defense presented Dr. Jesus Cerna, medico-legal
officer of the Cebu City PNP Command to testify on the caliber of the firearms which might have
caused the gunshot wounds. The latter also opined that with respect to the grazing wounds found
on the victim’s body, it was impossible to determine the caliber of the firearm used. Trial court
convicted the accused.

ISSUE: Whether the prosecution’s expert witness is qualified to testify as such capacity

HELD: Yes.

An expert witness is "one who belongs to the profession or calling to which the subject matter of
the inquiry relates and who possesses special knowledge on questions on which he proposes to
express an opinion." There is no definite standard of determining the degree of skill or knowledge
that a witness must possess in order to testify as an expert. It is sufficient that the following factors
be present:
1) training and education;
2) particular, first-hand familiarity with the facts of the case; and
3) presentation of authorities or standards upon which his opinion is based. The question of
whether a witness is properly qualified to give an expert opinion on ballistics rests with the
discretion of the trial court.

We agree with the trial court that P/Inspector Caser qualifies as a ballistics expert. He is a licensed
criminologist, trained at the Ballistics Command and Laboratory Center in Fort Bonifacio, in the
PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, and in the National Bureau of Investigation. He had
previously testified as an expert witness in at least twenty-seven (27) murder and homicide cases
all over the country. An expert witness need not present comparative microphotographs of test
bullets and cartridges to support his findings. Examination under a comparison microscope
showing that the test bullet and the evidence bullet both came from the same gun is sufficient.

74
 BOBBY “ABEL” AVELINO Y BULAWAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 181444 | July 17, 2013

FACTS:

Herein accused was charged with murder. During the trial, the defense presented as one of its
witness Scene of the Crime Operative (SOCO) PSI Lito D. Cabamongan to testify on the possible
position of the gunman based on the wounds sustained by the victim. With Cabamongan’s
testimony, the defense intends to assail the testimony of the eye-witnesses, Manalangsang and
Canada, as to the position of the gunman. Cabamongan’s testimony was offered as an ordinary
witness.

On appeal, the CA sustained the conviction of the accused and disregarded the testimony of SOCO
Cabamongan. Aggrieved, petitioner now seeks to reverse his conviction, arguing that the CA erred
in relying on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Manalangsang and Canada and
disregarding the inconsistencies between the statements of Manalang sang and the findings of the
medico-legal and SOCO PSI Cabamongan as to the position of the gunman.

ISSUE: Whether the testimony of an expert presented as an ordinary witness may be admitted in
evidence and be considered against the testimony of an eye-witness

HELD: No.

Expert evidence is admissible only if: (a) the matter to be testified to is one that requires expertise,
and (b)the witness has been qualified as an expert. In this case, counsel for the petitioner failed to
make the necessary qualification upon presenting Cabamongan during trial.

Jurisprudence further provides that minor inconsistencies in immaterial details do not destroy the
probative value of the testimony of a witness regarding the very act of the accused. The case of
Madali v. People elucidates thus:

Given the natural frailties of the human mind and its incapacity to assimilate all material details of
a given incident, slight inconsistencies and variances in the declarations of a witness hardly weaken
their probative value. It is well settled thatimmaterial and insignificant details do not discredit a
testimony on the very material and significant point bearing on the very act of accused-appellants.
As long as the testimonies of the witnesses corroborate one another on material points, minor
inconsistencies therein cannot destroy their credibility. Inconsistencies on minor details do not
undermine the integrity of a prosecution witness. Thus, the positive identification of the petitioner
as the gunman by Manalangsang, as corroborated by Cañada, must stand. Indeed, it has been
consistently held by this Court that in criminal cases the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses
is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose conclusion thereon deserves much
weight and respect because the judge has the direct opportunity to observe said witnesses on the
stand and ascertain if they are telling the truth or not. Absent any showing that the lower courts
overlooked substantial facts and circumstances, which if considered, would change the result of
the case, this Court gives deference to the trial court’s appreciation of the facts and of the credibility
of witnesses, especially since Manalangsang and Cañada’s testimony meets the test of credibility.
The Court also notes that other than his claim of denial, petitioner failed to show how the
prosecution failed to overcome the presumption of innocence.

75
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EMILIANO DURANAN, a.k.a. Kalbo
G.R. Nos. 134074-75. January 16, 2001

FACTS:

Complainant was 25 years old and considered to be retarded and finished only up to Grade VI,
unemployed and simply helped in the household chores for her family while Kalbo was a tenant
in the apartment rented by the family of AAA. Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not
guilty to each charge of rape against him, whereupon he was tried.

The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, complainant AAA, complainants mother BBB,
and the attending medico-legal officer at Camp Crame, Dr. Rosalina O. Cosidon.

Accused-appellant filed a demurrer to the evidence, but the trial court denied it. The defense
thereafter presented its witnesses, namely, accused-appellant Emiliano Duranan, accused-
appellants alleged roommates, Rico Bariquit and Carlito Catubig, and his wife Carlita Duranan.

The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused-appellant guilty of two counts of rape.

Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of rape since the
victim’s mental age was not proven. He argues that under Art. 335(2) of the Revised Penal Code,
an essential element for the prosecution for rape of a mental retardate is a psychiatric evaluation
of the complainant’s mental age to determine if her mental age is under twelve. He further claims
that only in cases where the retardation is apparent due to the presence of physical deformities
symptomatic of mental retardation can the mental evaluation be waived.

ISSUE: Whether the testimony of the mother as to the sanity of her daughter is admissible

HELD: Yes.

Rule 130, 50 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

Opinion of Ordinary witnesses. -- The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given
may be received in evidence regarding ---
a. the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
b. a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
c. the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.

The mother of an offended party in a case of rape, though not a psychiatrist, if she knows the
physical and mental condition of the party, how she was born, what she is suffering from, and what
her attainments are, is competent to testify on the matter.

It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental condition of
a person, provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe the speech, manner, habits,
and conduct of the person in question. Generally, it is required that the witness details the factors
and reasons upon which he bases his opinion before he can testify as to what it is. As the Supreme
Court of Vermont said: “A non-expert witness may give his opinion as to the sanity or insanity of
another, when based upon conversations or dealings which he has had with such person, or upon
his appearance, or upon any fact bearing upon his mental condition, with the witness’ own
knowledge and observation, he having first testified to such conversations, dealings, appearance
or other observed facts, as the basis for his opinion.

76
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAFAEL DIOPITA y GUZMAN
G.R. No. 130601. December 4, 2000

FACTS:

Accused was charged with Robbery with Rape. During the trial, the accused was positively
identified by the victim as her assailant. The trial court formally rejected his defense of alibi and
convicted him of the crime charged; consequently, accused-appellant is now before us on appeal.
Accused-appellant in his brief, maintains that it was impossible for him to have committed the
crime charged since he is a person of good moral character, holding as he does the position of
"Ministerial Servant" in the congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, and that he is a godly man, a
righteous person, a responsible family man and a good Christian who preaches the word of God.

ISSUE: Whether the testimonies of the accused of his good moral character sufficient to acquit
him of his charges

HELD: No.

The SC affirmed his conviction; the guilt of accused-appellant has been established by the
evidence beyond reasonable doubt.

The fact that accused-appellant is endowed with such "sterling" qualities hardly justifies the
conclusion that he is innocent of the crime charged. Similarly, his having attained the position of
"Ministerial Servant" in his faith is no guarantee against any sexual perversion and plunderous
proclivity on his part.

Indeed, religiosity is not always an emblem of good conduct, and it is not the unreligious alone
who succumbs to the impulse to rob and rape. An accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply
because of his previous good moral character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance or reversal
of his conviction must be resolved on the basic issue of whether the prosecution had discharged
its duty of proving his guilt beyond any peradventure of doubt. Since the evidence of the crime in
the instant case is more than sufficient to convict, the evidence of good moral character of accused-
appellant is unavailing.

In light of this positive and direct evidence of accused-appellants culpability, the trial court
correctly discarded his defense of alibi. It is an elementary rule that alibi cannot prevail over the
clear and positive identification of the accused as the very person who committed the crime.
Moreover, in order to justify an acquittal based on this defense, the accused must establish by clear
and convincing evidence that (a) he was in another place at the time of the commission of the
offense; and, (b) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time it
was committed. This, accused-appellant miserably failed to do.

77
 Rule 131:
BURDEN OF PROOFS AND
PRESUMPTIONS

78
 FAR EAST BANK TRUST COMPANY vs. ROBERTO MAR CHANTE, a.k.a. ROBERT
MAR G. CHAN
G.R. No. 170598 | October 9, 2013

FACTS:

Instant complaint was filed by petitioner against Chante to recover from Chan the principal sum
of P770,488.30representing the unpaid balance of the amount fraudulently withdrawn from Chan’s
ATM. FEBTC alleged that between 8:52 p.m. of May 4, 1992 and 4:06 a.m. of May 5, 1992, Chan
had withdrawn funds totalingP967,000.00 from the PNB-MEGALINK ATM facility at the Manila
Pavilion Hotel in Manila; that the withdrawals were done in a series of 242 transactions with the
use of the same machine, at P4,000.00/withdrawal; and that the transactions were processed and
recorded by the respective computer systems of PNB and MEGALINK despite the following
circumstances, namely: (a) the offline status of the branch of account (FEBTC Ongpin Branch);
(b) Chan’s account balance being only P198,511.70 at the time; (c) the maximum withdrawal
limit of the ATM facility being P50,000.00/day; and (d) his withdrawal transactions not
being reflected in his account, and no debits or deductions from his current account with the
FEBTC Ongpin Branch being recorded. FEBTC asserted further that defendant took advantage of
a system bug which allowed the excessive withdrawals.

Chan denied liability and instead insisted that he had been actually home at the time of the
withdrawals. He alluded to a possible “inside job” as the cause of the supposed withdrawals, citing
a newspaper report to the effect that an employee of FEBTCÕs had admitted having debited
accounts of its depositors by using his knowledge of computers as well as information available to
him. Chan claimed that it would be physically impossible for any human being like him to stand
long hours in front of the ATM facility just to withdraw funds.

ISSUE: Whether a civil action may be decided in favor of the plaintiff where the defendant relies
on bare and uncorroborated denial of the former’s allegation

HELD: No.

The party who alleges an affirmative fact has the burden of proving it because mere allegation of
the fact is not evidence of it. Verily, the party who asserts, not he who denies, must prove.

In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence is given
on either side. This is because our system frees the trier of facts from the responsibility of
investigating and presenting the facts and arguments, placing that responsibility entirely upon the
respective parties. The burden of proof, which may either be on the plaintiff or the defendant, is
on the plaintiff if the defendant denies the factual allegations of the complaint in the manner
required by the Rules of Court; or on the defendant if he admits expressly or impliedly the essential
allegations but raises an affirmative defense or defenses, that, if proved, would exculpate him from
liability.

Burden of proof is a term that refers to two separate and quite different concepts, namely: (a) the
risk of non-persuasion, or the burden of persuasion, or simply persuasion burden; and (b) the duty
of producing evidence, or the burden of going forward with the evidence, or simply the production
burden or the burden of evidence.

In its first concept, it is the duty to establish the truth of a given proposition or issue by such a
quantum of evidence as the law demands in the case at which the issue arises. In its other concept,
it is the duty of producing evidence at the beginning or at any subsequent stage of trial in order to
make or meet a prima facie case. Generally speaking, burden of proof in its second concept passes
from party to party as the case progresses, while in its first concept it rests throughout upon the
party asserting the affirmative of the issue.

Being the plaintiff, FEBTC must rely on the strength of its own evidence instead of upon the
weakness of Chan’s evidence. Its burden of proof thus required it to preponderantly demonstrate
that his ATM card had been used to make the withdrawals, and that he had used the ATM card
and PIN by himself or by another person to make the fraudulent withdrawals. Otherwise, it could
not recover from him any funds supposedly improperly withdrawn from the ATM account.

79
 IBAAN RURAL BANK INC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MR. and MRS.
RAMON TARNATE
G.R. No. 123817 | December 17, 1999

FACTS:

Spouses Cesar and Leonila Reyes were the owners of three (3) lots mortgaged to Ibaan Rural Bank,
Inc. On June 11, 1976, with the knowledge and consent of the petitioner, the spouses as sellers,
and Mr. and Mrs. Ramon Tarnate [herein private respondents] as buyers, entered into a Deed of
Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage of the lots in question. Private respondents failed to
pay the loan and the bank extra-judicially foreclosed on the mortgaged lots. The Provincial Sheriff
conducted a public auction of the lots and awarded the lots to the bank, the sole bidder. On
December 13, 1978, the Provincial Sheriff issued a Certificate of Sale which was registered on
October 16, 1979. The certificate stated that the redemption period expires two (2) years from the
registration of the sale.

No notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure was given to the private respondents. On September 23,
1981, private respondents offered to redeem the foreclosed lots and tendered the redemption
amount of P77,737.45. However, petitioner Bank refused the redemption on the ground that it had
consolidated its titles over the lots. The Provincial Sheriff also denied the redemption on the ground
that private respondents did not appear on the title to be the owners of the lots.

Private respondents filed a complaint to compel the bank to allow their redemption of the
foreclosed lots. They alleged that the extra-judicial foreclosure was null and void for lack of valid
notice and demand upon them. They further argued that they were entitled to redeem the foreclosed
lots because they offered to redeem and tendered the redemption price before October 16, 1981,
the deadline of the 2-year redemption period.
After trial on the merits, the lower court ruled in favor of herein private respondents and against
the petitioner. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the
lower court.

ISSUE: Whether or not failure to previously contest the redemption period stated on the certificate
of sale precludes the bank from asserting it as a defense to oppose the exercise of right of
redemption

HELD:

By its silence and inaction, petitioner misled private respondents to believe that they had two years
within which to redeem the mortgage. After the lapse of two years, petitioner is estopped from
asserting that the period for redemption was only one year and that the period had already lapsed.
Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence
when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to
believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he
will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.

When petitioner received a copy of the Certificate of Sale registered in the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Lipa City, it had actual and constructive knowledge of the certificate and its contents.
For two years, it did not object to the two-year redemption period provided in the certificate. Thus,
it could be said that petitioner consented to the two-year redemption period specially since it had
time to object and did not. When circumstances imply a duty to speak on the part of the person for
whom an obligation is proposed, his silence can be construed as consent.

80
 SPOUSES REYNALDO ALCARAZ and ESMERALDA ALCARAZ vs. PEDRO M.
TANGGA-AN, MENAS R. TANGGA-AN, VIRGINIA III YVETTE R. TANGGA-AN,
CECIL T. VILLAFLOR, HERMES R. TANGGA-AN, VENUS R. TANGGA-AN,
JUPITER R. TANGGA-AN, YVONNE T. FRI, VIVIEN R. TANGGA-AN and HON.
JUDGE P. BURGOS and THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 128568 | April 9, 2003

FACTS:

Petitioners leased a building from Respondent’s predecessor (Virginia). At the time of the
perfection of the contract, the petitioner spouses, as lessees, were aware that the NHA, and not
Virginia, the lessor, owned the land on which the rented house stood yet they signed the same,
obliged themselves to comply with the terms thereof for five years and performed their obligations
as lessees for two years.

After two years from the effectivity of the lease contract, Respondents filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer, with damages against petitioner for failure to pay rent. On the other hand, the
petitioner spouses alleged that they paid the rent to the new owners (Virgilio and Angelita) of the
lot where the building stood and not to respondents since the latter supposedly no longer had the
legal right to collect rentals. Petitioner claimed that the lease contract ceased to be effective
because Virgilio’s assumption of ownership of the land stripped the respondents of ownership of
the building.

MTC rendered a decision in favor of plaintiffs. MTC ruled that petitioner failed to show that the
subject house belonged to Virgilio. On the other hand, the respondents proved that the property in
question is registered in their name. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC based
on the petitioner’s failure to present any documentary evidence modifying or amending the
contract of lease to justify the transfer of payment of the monthly rental to Virgilio Tanga-an who
claims only as the registered owner of the lot on which the leased house is located

ISSUE: Whether a defendant in a suit, to which the cause of action arises from a contract may
assail the operation of such contract by disputing a previously affirmed fact

HELD: No.

Petitioner were aware that the lot in question was not owned by the lessors at the time the lease
contract was entered into. After recognizing the validity of the lease contract for two years, the
petitioner spouses are barred from alleging the automatic cancellation of the contract on the ground
that the respondents lost ownership of the house after Virgilio acquired title over the lot. Section
2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides as a conclusive presumption that:

Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. – The following are instances of conclusive

presumptions:(a)

Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and
deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he
cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to
falsify it;

81
 HEIRS OF CIPRIANO TRAZONA, vs. HEIRS OF DIONISIO CANADA
G.R. No. 175874 December 11, 2013

FACTS:

Cipriano Trazona owned Lot No. 5053ÐH covered by Tax Declaration No. 07764. Sometime in
1997, when the heirs of Cipriano, herein petitioners, tried to secure a copy of Tax Declaration No.
07764, they were informed that Tax Declaration No. 07764 had been cancelled and, in lieu thereof,
Tax Declaration No. 23959 was issued on 24 June 1996 in the name of Dionisio, the owner of the
property adjacent to Cipriano’s lot. Apparently, respondents had caused the issuance of Tax
Declaration No. 23959 by submitting a Deed of Absolute Sale supposedly executed by Cipriano
in favor of Dionisio. The deed of sale covers a portion of Cipriano’s property which was
encroached upon by Dioniso during the former’s lifetime, but the new tax declaration issued covers
the whole property of Cipriano.

Consequently, petitioners filed a Complaint against respondents for quieting of title, annulment of
deed of sale, cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 23959. Petitioners alleged therein that the Deed
of Absolute Sale dated 27June 1956 was a forgery. During the trial, petitioners presented an expert
witness testifying to the forgery of Cipriano’s signature on the assailed deed.

RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. Based on RTC Judge’s observation Cipriano’s signature on the
assailed deed bares a difference as compared to other documents bearing his signature. On appeal,
CA ruled that petitioners had failed to prove by requisite evidence their allegation that the assailed
deed was a forgery. The deed, being a notarized document, enjoyed the presumption of
authenticity and due execution. Also, the fact that it was an ancient document that remained
unaltered after so many years, bodes well for its authenticity.

ISSUE: Whether the presumption of regularity of a notarized ancient document may be assailed
by the testimony of an expert witness and independent observation of the trial court as to the
forgery of signature therein

HELD: Yes.

It is true that notarized documents are accorded evidentiary weight as regards their due execution.
Nevertheless, while notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity, this presumption is
disputable. They can be contradicted by evidence that is clear, convincing, and more than merely
preponderant.

In this case, clear and convincing evidence that is enough to overturn the presumption of regularity
of the assailed deed was presented. First, the document examiner determined that the signature of
Cipriano in the assailed deed had been forged. No issue has been raised about his expertise.
Second, the RTC did not just rely on expert testimony in ruling that the signature was forged. It
likewise supported its finding that the signature was forged through independent observation.

Lastly, when the record management analyst from the Bureau of Archives presented the assailed
deed, the paper was noted to be white, while its supposed contemporaries in the bunch from where
it was taken had turned yellow with age. Further, when the analyst was asked the question of when
the assailed deed was received by the Bureau of Archives, she answered that it was forwarded to
them only on 28 September 1987 by RTC Region 7, Notarial Division.

82
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO PADRIGONE a.k.a.
ROBERTO SAN MIGUEL
G.R. No. 137664 | May 9, 2002

FACTS:

Roberto Padrigone a.k.a. Roberto San Miguel, Michael San Antonio, Jocel Ibaneta and Abelardo
Triumpante were charged with rape committed against Rowena Contridas. All the accused,
including appellant Roberto Padrigone, interposed the defense of denial and alibi.

The trial court gave credence to the prosecution evidence and rendered a decision convicting the
accused ROBERTO PADRIGONE a.k.a. ROBERTO SAN MIGUEL, GUILTY of the crime of
Rape, under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended by Section 11, R.A. 7659) while
the other accused JOCEL IBANITA, MICHAEL SAN ANTONIO and ABELARDO
TRIUMPANTE are ACQUITTED.

On appeal, the appellant contends that the prosecution evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant assails the procedural irregularities committed by the
prosecution and by the trial court. He claims that the prosecution suppressed evidence by not
presenting Rowena, the victim, when the latter should have had her sane moments. As a
consequence, the trial court deprived appellant of the opportunity to cross-examine her when she
allegedly declared before the Chief of Police of Buhi that it was only appellant who raped her
which declaration became the basis for the latter’s conviction.

ISSUE: Whether the non-presentation of Rowena on the witness stand deprives the accused of the
right to cross-examine which is suppression of testimony against them

HELD: No.

The non-presentation of Rowena on the witness stand cannot be considered as suppression of

evidence. Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the rule that “evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced” does not apply if (a) the evidence is at the disposal of
both parties; (b) the suppression was not willful; (c) it is merely corroborative or cumulative; and
(d) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.

Plainly, there was no suppression of evidence in this case. First, the defense had the opportunity
to subpoena Rowena even if the prosecution did not present her as a witness. Instead, the defense
failed to call her to the witness stand. Second, Rowena was certified to be suffering from “Acute
Psychotic Depressive Condition” and thus “cannot stand judicial proceedings yet.” The non-
presentation, therefore, of Rowena was not willful. Third, in any case, while Rowena was the
victim, Nimfa was also present and in fact witnessed the violation committed on her sister.

83
 METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY vs. COURT OF APPEALS and G.T.P.
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 122899 | June 8, 2000

FACTS:

Mr. Chia and Respondent GTP entered into a contract of sale with assumption of mortgage wherein
the latter assumes the former’s indebtedness with Metrobank. Respondent, pursuant to the balance
declared by Metrobank prior to the execution of the sale, paid Chia’s loan balance with Metrobank
in the amount of P116,000.00+.

This notwithstanding, petitioner METROBANK refused to release the real estate mortgage on the
subject property despite repeated requests, thus prompting respondent GTP to file an action for
specific performance against petitioner METROBANK and Mr. Chia. Metrobank refused to
discharge of the real estate mortgage on the claim that the subject property still secures "other
unliquidated past due loans’ as there exist a stipulation in subject Deeds of Mortgage that
mortgagors’ debts subsequently obtained would be covered by the same security. Hence, the
payment made by GPT does not extinguish the mortgage. The trial court ruled in favor of the
respondent. On appeal, CA reversed the decision. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.

With this unfavorable turn of events, respondent GTP, filed a motion for reconsideration with
alternative prayer to require METROBANK to furnish appellee (GTP) of the alleged unpaid
balance of Mr. Chia." At the re-scheduled date of oral arguments where METROBANK was
supposed to bring before the CA the current statement of the mortgage debt of Mr. Chia secured
by the deeds of mortgage sought to be released, METROBANKÕs counsel did not appear.
Consequently, CA reversed its previous decision.

ISSUE: Whether the failure of the mortgagee to present the proof of loan secured by the mortgage
estopped him from further asserting the existence of such liability

HELD: Yes.

The answer is in the affirmative. It is a well-settled rule that when the evidence tends to prove a
material fact which imposes a liability on a party, and he has it in his power to produce evidence
which from its very nature must overthrow the case made against him if it is not founded on fact,
and he refuses to produce such evidence, the presumption arises that the evidence, if produced,
would operate to his prejudice, and support the case of his adversary.

The scheduled oral arguments before the CA was supposed to be Metrobank’s golden opportunity
to prove the existence the "other unliquidated past due loans" which is the basis of its refusal to
release the mortgage property. But Metrobank failed to appear thereon.

No rule of law is better settled than that a party having it in his power to prove a fact, if it exists,
which, if proved, would benefit him, his failure to prove it must be taken as conclusive that the
fact does not exist."

84
 FILOMENA G. DELOS SANTOS, JOSEFA A. BACALTOS, NELANIE A. ANTONI,
AND MAUREEN A. BIEN v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REPRESENTED BY ITS
COMMISSIONERS
G.R. No. 198457, August 13, 2013

FACTS:

Congressman Cuenco entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with the Vicente Sotto Memorial
Medical Center (VSMMC) appropriating to the hospital the amount of P1,500,000.00 from his
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) to cover the medical assistance of indigent patients
under the Tony N' Tommy (TNT)Health Program. It was agreed that Cuenco shall identify and
recommend the patients who may availed of the program.

Several years after the enforcement of the MOA, allegations of forgery and falsification of
prescriptions and referrals for the availment of medicines under the TNT Program surfaced.
Consequently, an audit thereof was conducted and rampant violations of bidding and
audit procedure were revealed. Thereafter, Special Audit Team Supervisor, Boado disallowed the
amount of P3,386,697.10 for the payment of drugs and medicines for anti-rabies with falsified
prescription and documents, and holding petitioners, together with other VSMMC officials,
solidarily liable therefor.

By way of defense, petitioners nonetheless argue that VSMMC was merely a passive entity in the
disbursement of funds under the TNT Program and, thus, invoke good faith in the performance of
their respective duties, capitalizing on the failure of the assailed Decisions of the CoA to show that
their lapses in the implementation of the TNT Program were attended by malice or bad faith.

ISSUE: Whether the assertion of goof faith in the performance of a public function prevails over
factual findings revealing violation of rules and regulations in the performance of such function

HELD:

Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is a presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties. However, this presumption must fail in the
presence of an explicit rule that was violated. Petitioners failed to make a case justifying their non-
observance of existing auditing rules and regulations, and of their duties under the MOA.
Evidently, petitioners’ neglect to properly monitor the disbursement of Cuenco's PDAF facilitated
the validation and eventual payment of 133 falsified prescriptions and fictitious claims for anti-
rabies vaccines supplied by both the VSMMC and Dell Pharmacy, despite the patent irregularities
borne out by the referral slips and prescriptions related thereto. Had there been an internal control
system installed by petitioners, the irregularities would have been exposed, and the hospital would
have been prevented from processing falsified claims and unlawfully disbursing funds from
the said PDAF.

85
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HADJI SOCOR CADIDIA
G.R. No. 191263 | October 16, 2013

FACTS:

Accused was charged with violation of RA 9165. The prosecution presented Trayvilla, a Non-
Uniformed Personnel of the PNP, who testified that on 31 July 2002 at around 6:30 in the morning,
while performing her duty as a female frisker assigned at the NAIA Terminal I, she frisked the
accused Cadidia upon her entry at the departure area and she noticed something unusual and thick
in the area of Cadidia’s buttocks. Upon inquiry, Cadidia answered that it was only her sanitary
napkin which caused the unusual thickness. Not convinced with Cadidia’s explanation, Trayvilla
and her female co-employee Bagsican brought the accused to the comfort room inside the domestic
airport to check. When she and Bagsican asked Cadidia to remove her underwear, they discovered
that inside were two sachets of shabu. The two sachets of shabu were turned over to their
supervisorSPO3 Musalli I. Appang (SPO3 Appang). Trayvilla recalled that Cadidia denied that
the two sachets of shabu were hers and said that she was only asked by an unidentified person to
bring the same.

During trial, accused interposed the defense of frame-up. Both the trial court and the CA, on
appeal, conviced the accused. The accused also assails the application of presumption of regularity
in the performance of duties of the witnesses. She claimed that the self- serving testimonies of
Trayvilla and Bagsican failed to overcome her presumption of innocence guaranteed by the
Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties of a public officer may
be assailed by bare allegations of frame-up

HELD: Yes.

In cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution
witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular
manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill-motive on the part of the police
officers.”

In this case, the prosecution witnesses were unable to show ill-motive for the police to impute the
crime against Cadidia. Trayvilla was doing her regular duty as an airport frisker when she handled
the accused who entered the x-ray machine of the departure area. There was no pre-determined
notice to particularly search the accused especially in her private area. The unusual thickness of
the buttocks of the accused upon frisking prompted Trayvilla to notify her supervisor SPO3
Appang of the incident. The subsequent search of the accused would only show that the two female
friskers were just doing their usual task when they found the illegal drugs inside accused’s
underwear. This is bolstered by the fact that the accused on the one hand and the two friskers on
the other were unfamiliar to each other. Neither could they harbour any ill-will against each other.
The allegation of frame-up and denial of the accused cannot prevail over the positive testimonies
of three prosecution witnesses who corroborated on circumstances surrounding the apprehension.

86
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESUS EDUALINO
G.R. No. 119072 | April 11, 1997

FACTS:

Accused Jesus Edualino was charged with rape allegedly committed against AAA, 22 yrs old
married woman with child. The incident happened in Mambalot, Brooke’s Point, Palawan when
AAA and her mother went on a dance. When AAA was already drunk, Edualino took advantage
of the same and had carnal knowledge with her. However, the defense had a different version in
such a way that Edualino established the indecency, and other negative attributes of AAA to show
that such rape was with her consent and through her fault, being allegedly under the influence of
marijuana. Trial court convicted Edualino. The conviction of accused-appellant is elevated to the
Supreme Court on automatic review.

Accused-appellant raises the issue of the character of complainant AAA. It is argued that a
responsible and decent married woman, who was then three (3) months pregnant, would not be out
at two (2) o'clock in the morning getting drunk much less would a decent Filipina ask a man to
accompany her to drink beer. It is contended that complainant merely concocted the charge of rape
to save her marriage since her husband had found out that she was using drugs and drinking alcohol
and even made a spectacle of herself when she tried to seduce accused-appellant on 11 May 1994
while she was under the influence of drugs and alcohol.

ISSUE: Whether the testimony of the accused has a probative value

HELD: No.

At the outset of this discussion, it should be pointed out that the moral character of a rape victim
is immaterial in the prosecution and conviction of the accused. The Court has ruled that prostitutes
can be the victims of rape.
In the present case, even if accused-appellant's allegations that the victim was drunk and under the
influence of drugs and that she (the victim) cannot be considered a decent and responsible married
woman, were true, said circumstances will not per se preclude a finding that she was raped.

Accused-appellant cannot successfully argue that no rape occurred because no medical

examination was conducted to confirm the presence of spermatozoa in her private parts.
The Court has repeatedly held that a medical examination of the victim is not a prerequisite in
prosecutions for rape.

A person accused of rape can be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim provided the
testimony is credible, natural, convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature and the
course of things.

After a careful and thorough study of the records of the case, the Court is convinced that the
constitutional presumption of accused-appellant's innocence has been overcome by proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

87
 Rule 132:
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE

88
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEONARDO FABRE y VICENTE
G.R. No. 146697 | July 23, 2002

FACTS:

Leonardo Fabre was charged with rape before Regional Trial Court, Br. VI, of Prosperidad,
Agusan del Sur, because of raping his own daughter Marilou Fabre. Accused pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged. At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimony of Marilou, that of Adela
Fabre, her mother and the wife of the accused, and that of Dr. Reinerio Jalalon, the doctor who
examined Marilou, along with the medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Jalalon, the sworn
statement of Adela, and the criminal complaint signed by both Marilou and Adela. The defense,
during its turn in the presentation of evidence, countered with the testimony of the accused himself.
It also called Adela Fabre back to the witness stand.

The trial court gave credence to the evidence given by the prosecution, particularly to the narration
of the young complainant, expressing a quote from an observation once made by this Tribunal in
one of its decision that even when consumed with revenge, it (would) take a certain amount of
psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which (could) put her own father
for the rest of his remaining life in jail and drag herself and the rest of her family to a lifetime of
shame.

RTC Convicted the accused. The case was elevated to SC on automatic review.

The accused averred that THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING
CREDENCE TO ACCUSED APPELLANTS DEFENSE OF ALIBI AND DENIAL. he defense
argues, rather desperately, that the testimony of appellant should acquire added strength for the
failure of the prosecution to conduct cross-examination on him and to present any rebuttal
evidence. The cross-examination of a witness is a prerogative of the party against whom the
witness is called. The purpose of cross-examination is to test the truth or accuracy of the statements
of a witness made on direct examination. The party against whom the witness testifies may deem
any further examination unnecessary and instead rely on any other evidence theretofore adduced
or thereafter to be adduced or on what would be believed is the perception of the court thereon.
Certainly, the trial court is not bound to give full weight to the testimony of a witness on direct
examination merely because he is not cross-examined by the other party.

ISSUE: Whether the contention of the accused is tenable

HELD: No.

The cross-examination of a witness is a prerogative of the party against whom the witness is called.
Its purpose is to test the truth or accuracy of the witness’ statements on direct examination. The
party against whom the witness testifies may deem any further examination unnecessary and
instead rely on any other evidence theretofore adduced or thereafter to be adduced or on what
would be believed is the perception of the court thereon. The trial court is not bound to give full
weight to the testimony of a witness on direct examination merely because he is not cross-
examined by the other party.

The alibi of appellant itself would not appear to be deserving of serious consideration. His account
that at the time of the alleged rape he was working at a coconut plantation, just about one kilometer
away from the place of the crime, hardly would amount to much. Nor would the testimony of
Adela Fabre, his wife, merit any better regard. At first, she testified that on the day of the rape
incident, she had left their house at four o'clock in the afternoon. Later, however, she changed her
story by saying that she had left the house in the morning and returned only at ten o'clock that
same morning, staying home the whole day thereafter. In any event, in order that alibi might
prosper, it would not be enough for an accused to prove that he was somewhere else when the
crime was committed; he would have to demonstrate likewise that he could not have been
physically present at the place of the crime or in its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission. Clearly, in the instant case, it was not at all impossible nor even improbable for
appellant to have been at the crime scene. Upon the other hand, the evidently candid and
straightforward testimony of Marilou should be more than enough to rebut the claim of innocence
made by appellant.

89
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESUS PEREZ y SEBUNGA
G.R. No. 142556 | February 5, 2003

FACTS:

For automatic review is the Decision of the Regional Trial Court finding appellant Jesus S. Perez
guilty of raping Mayia P. Ponseca and imposing on appellant the death penalty.

On appeal, Appellant contends that his identification in open court by Mayia was
highly irregular. Appellant points out that the prosecutor had already identified him as the man
wearing an orange t-shirt when the prosecutor asked Mayia to identify her alleged rapist. Appellant
stresses that when Mayia identified him in open court, she referred to him as a man named
"Johnny" and did not give any description or any identifying mark. Moreover, appellant claims he
was alone in the cell when Mayia identified him after the police arrested him. Appellant bewails
that the identification was not done with the usual police line-up.

ISSUE: Whether the testimony of the minor-victim should be expunged on the ground that leading
questions were asked during her testimony in court

HELD: No.

As a rule, leading questions are not allowed. However, the rules provide for exceptions when the
witness is a child of tender years as it is usually difficult for such child to state facts without
prompting or suggestion. Leading questions are necessary to coax the truth out of their reluctant
lips. In the case at bar, the trial court was justified in allowing leading questions to Mayia as she
was evidently young and unlettered, making the recall of events difficult, if not uncertain.

The trend in procedural law is to give wide latitude to the courts in exercising control over the
questioning of a child witness. The reasons are spelled out in our Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness, which took effect on December 15, 2000, namely, (1) to facilitate the ascertainment of
the truth, (2) to ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of
the child, (3) to protect children from harassment or undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste of
time. Leading questions in all stages of examination of a child are allowed if the same will further
the interests of justice."

90
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAIME CASTILLANO, SR. alias Talino,
RONALD CASTILLANO alias Nono and JAIME CASTILLANO, JR. alias Junjun
G.R. No. 139412 | April 2, 2003

FACTS:

The altercation of the parties to this incident began when Diosdado did not consent and even asked
herein Jaime Castillano Sr. from the latter’s indiscriminate firing of his gun. Diosdado was a farmer
in a barangay in Camarines Sur in a farmland just meters away from the farmland of Jaime
Castillano Sr. The animosity even worsened and deepened which led to the alleged plan of killing
Diosdado by the father and two sons, all surnamed Castillano. Such plan was realized on that
fateful night of July 8, 1996. However, upon the attempt of the accused to flew, they were accosted
during a check point in that place with their bags with them. Just to save them all from being
imprisoned, Ronald, solely admitted to have killed Diosdado but alleged self-defense. Trial court
convicted Ronald and Jaime Jr. while exonerating Jaime Sr. Appellant Jaime Jr. avers that the
testimony of Luz Volante was inconsistent with her testimony during preliminary investigation in
the trial court and her sworn statement before the police investigators.

ISSUE: Whether Luz’s testimony in open court can be impeached by her own testimony during
preliminary investigation

HELD: No.

The Office of the Solicitor General asserts that the credibility of the testimony of Luz, the
prosecution’s principal witness, cannot be impeached via her testimony during the preliminary
examination before the municipal trial court nor by her sworn statement given to the police
investigators for the reason that the transcripts and sworn statement were neither marked and
offered in evidence by the appellants nor admitted in evidence by the trial court. Moreover, the
appellants did not confront Luz with her testimony during the preliminary examination and her
sworn statement to the police investigators. Luz was not, therefore, accorded a chance to explain
the purported inconsistencies, as mandated by Section 13, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Evidence which reads:

How witness is impeached by evidence of inconsistent statement. - Before a witness can be

impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present
testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places
and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed
to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any
question is put to him concerning them.

The Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General. Before the credibility of a witness and
the truthfulness of his testimony can be impeached by evidence consisting of his prior statements
which are inconsistent with his present testimony, the cross-examiner must lay the predicate or the
foundation for impeachment and thereby prevent an injustice to the witness being cross-examined.
The witness must be given a chance to recollect and to explain the apparent inconsistency between
his two statements and state the circumstances under which they were made.

In this case, the appellants never confronted Luz with her testimony during the preliminary
examination and her sworn statement. She was not afforded any chance to explain any
discrepancies between her present testimony and her testimony during the preliminary examination
and her sworn statement. The appellants did not even mark and offer in evidence the said transcript
and sworn statement for the specific purpose of impeaching her credibility and her present
testimony. Unless so marked and offered in evidence and accepted by the trial court, said transcript
and sworn statement cannot be considered by the court.

91
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO PLASENCIA y DESAMPARADO alias
"Tonying," ROBERTO DESCARTIN y PASICARAN alias "Ruby" and JOELITO
(JULITO), DESCARTIN y PASICARAN
G.R. No. 90198 | November 7, 1995

FACTS:

Antonio Plasencia, Roberto Descartin and Joelito (Julito) Descartin were accused of robbery with
homicide in information allegedly committed against Herminio Mansueto. When arraigned, all the
accused entered a plea of "not guilty" to the charge; whereupon, trial commenced. The main
defense interposed is one of alibi.

The Regional Trial Court did not give credence to the defense of alibi. It convicted the three accused of
murder (punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code), instead of robbery with homicide,
explaining that the term "homicide" was used in the information in its generic sense. Finding conspiracy,
the trial court ruled that the killing was qualified by both treachery and abuse of superior strength with the
latter, however, being absorbed by the former.

On appeal, the accused appellants attacked the credibility of the prosecutions witness, Francisca
Espina because is a pejured witness who has an axe to grind against him because his dog had once
bitten Francisca's child and because of her alleged inconsistencies, faults the trial court for allowing
the witness to glance at the notes written on her palm while testifying. He also argues that his alibi,
being corroborated, should have been given weight.

ISSUE: Whether the use of use of memory aids during an examination of a witness is allowed

HELD: Yes.

The use of memory aids during an examination of a witness is not altogether proscribed. Section
16, Rule 132, of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 16. When witness may refer to memorandum. — A witness may be allowed to refresh
his memory respecting a fact, by anything written or recorded by himself or under his
direction at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time
when the fact was fresh in his memory and he knew that the same was correctly written or
recorded; but in such case the writing or record must be produced and may be inspected by
the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it and may read
it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such a writing or record, though he
retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing or record
correctly stated the transaction when made; but such evidence must be received with
caution.

Allowing a witness to refer to her notes rests on the sound discretion of the trial court. In this case,
the exercise of that discretion has not been abused; the witness herself has explained that she
merely wanted to be accurate on dates and like details.

Appellants see inadvertency on Francisca's appearing to be "jittery" on the witness stand.

Nervousness and anxiety of a witness is a natural reaction particularly in the case of those who are
called to testify for the first time. The real concern, in fact, should be when they show no such
emotions.

92
ROSELLA D. CANQUE vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and SOCOR CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 96202. April 13, 1999

FACTS:

Rosario Canque is a contractor doing business under the name RDC Construction. Canque had
contracts with the government and in relation to the projects, she entered into two contracts with
Socor Construction Corporation for supplying as well as applying certain materials in the
construction sites. When Socor Construction billed Canque, it amounted to a total of P299,717.75
which included interest. Canque refused to pay the amount, claiming that Socor Construction failed
to submit the delivery receipts showing the actual weight in metric tons of the items and the
acceptance thereof of the government. This led to a complaint being filed with RTC of Cebu for
recovery the amount stated. During trial, Socor Construction presented its Vice President, Sofia
Sanchez and its bookkeeper Dolores Aday while Canque’s evidence consisted only of her own
testimony. The trial court ruled in favor of Socor Construction, ordering Canque to pay the amount.
The CA affirmed. Canque contests the admissibility of the said Book of Collectible Accounts
(Exhibit K). On its part, Socor Construction said that that although the entries cannot be considered
an exception to the hearsay rule, they may be admitted under Rule 132, Section 10 of the Rules of
Court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether testimony of a witness as to entries made by her based on bills provided to her is
inadmissible on the ground of hearsay evidence rule.
2. Whether the testimony of a witness as to entries made by her based on information provided
to her may be admissible as memorandum used to refresh the memory of the witness

HELD:

1. Yes. When the witness had no personal knowledge of the facts entered by him, and the
person who gave him the information is individually known and may testify as to the facts
stated in the entry which is not part of a system of entries where scores of employees have
intervened, such entry is not admissible without the testimony of the informer.
2. No. Assuming that the book of collectible accounts presented by the respondent would
qualify as a memorandum, the memorandum used to refresh the memory of the witness
does not constitute evidence, and may not be admitted as such, for the simple reason that
the witness has just the same to testify on the basis of refreshed memory. In other words,
where the witness has testified independently of or after his testimony has been refreshed
by a memorandum of the events in dispute, such memorandum is not admissible as
corroborative evidence. It is self-evident that a witness may not be corroborated by any
written statement prepared wholly by him. He cannot be more credible just because he
supports his open-court declaration with written statements of the same facts even if he did
prepare them during the occasion in dispute, unless the proper predicate of his
failing memory is previously laid down. What is more, even where this requirement as
been satisfied, the express injunction of the rule itself is that such evidence must be received
with caution, if only because it is not very difficult to conceive and fabricate evidence of
this nature. This is doubly true when the witness stands to gain materially or otherwise
from the admission of such evidence.

93
 YASUO IWASAWA, PETITIONER, vs. FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN1 (A.K.A
FELISA GANGAN ARAMBULO, AND FELISA GANGAN IWASAWA) AND THE
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASAY CITY
G.R. No. 204169 | September 11, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioner, a Japanese national married Private respondent in 2002. In July 2009, petitioner noticed
his wife become depressed. Suspecting that something might have happened in the Philippines, he
confronted his wife about it. To his shock, private respondent confessed to him that she received
news that her previous husband passed away. This prompted petitioner to file a petition for the
declaration of his marriage to private respondent as null and void on the ground that their marriage
is a bigamous one.

During trial, aside from his testimony, petitioner also offered the following pieces of documentary
evidence issued by the NSO: (1) Certificate of Marriage between petitioner and private respondent
to prove the fact of marriage between the parties on November 28, 2002; (2) Certificate of
Marriage between private respondent and Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo to prove the fact
of marriage between the parties on June 20, 1994.

Certificate of Death of Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo; (3) Certification from the NSO to the effect
that there are two entries of marriage recorded by the office pertaining to private respondent.

RTC rendered the assailed decision. It ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove private
respondent’s prior existing valid marriage to another man. It held that while petitioner offered the
certificate of marriage of private respondent to Arambulo, it was only petitioner who testified about
said marriage.

The RTC ruled that petitioner’s testimony is unreliable because he has no personal knowledge of
private respondent’s prior marriage nor of Arambulo’s death which makes him a complete stranger
to the marriage certificate between private respondent and Arambulo and the latter’s death
certificate. It further ruled that petitioner’s testimony about the NSO certification is likewise
unreliable since he is a stranger to the preparation of said document.

ISSUE: Whether the testimony of the NSO records custodian certifying the authenticity and due
execution of the public documents issued by said office was necessary before they could
be accorded evidentiary weight

HELD: No.

There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner are all public
documents. Art. 410 of the Civil Code provides that “the books making up the civil register and
all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie
evidence of the facts therein contained.”

As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due
execution and genuineness. Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded said documents on the sole
ground that the petitioner did not present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them to
testify on their authenticity and due execution since proof of authenticity and due execution was
not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents admissible, they deserve to be
given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
And in the instant case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted since neither the private
respondent nor the public prosecutor presented evidence to the contrary.

94
 ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. vs. PHILAM INSURANCE CO., INC. (now Chartis
Philippines Insurance, Inc.)
G.R. No. 181163 | July 24, 2013

FACTS:

Nichimen Corporation shipped to Universal Motors 219 packages containing 120 units of brand
new Nissan Pickup Truck on board the vessel S/S "Calayan Iris" from Japan to Manila. The
shipment was insured with Philam against all risks. When the package arrived and was unloaded
by ATI, it was found that the package marked as 03-245-42K/1 was in bad order. The shipment
was withdrawn by R.F. Revilla Customs Brokerage, Inc., the authorized broker of Universal
Motors, and delivered to the latter’s warehouse. Owing to the extent of the damage to said cargoes,
Universal Motors declared them a total loss.

Universal Motors filed a formal claim for damages against Westwind, ATI10 and R.F. Revilla
Customs Brokerage, Inc. When Universal Motors’ demands remained unheeded, it sought
reparation from and was compensated by Philam. Accordingly, Universal Motors issued a
Subrogation Receipt in favor of Philam.

RTC rendered judgment in favor of Philam and ordered Westwind and ATI to pay Philam. On
appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC. When the case was elevated to
the SC, petitioners objected to the admission of Marine Certificate and the Subrogation Receipt
for being hearsay as they were not authenticated by the persons who executed them.

ISSUE: Whether the certificates and/or receipts offered as evidence required authentication

HELD: Yes.

The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be
presented as evidence in court. Public documents, as enumerated under Section 19, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court, are self-authenticating and require no further authentication in order to be
presented as evidence in court.

In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed or instrument executed by a private
person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some
disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a
public document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication
in the manner prescribed under Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules:

SEC. 20. Proof of private document. – Before any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.

The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four instances,

specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one within the context of Section 21, Rule 132
of the Rules; (b) when the genuineness and authenticity of the actionable document have not been
specifically denied under oath by the adverse party; (c) when the genuineness and authenticity of
the document have been admitted; or (d) when the document is not being offered as genuine.

Indubitably, Marine Certificate No. 708-8006717-4 and the Subrogation Receipt are private
documents which Philam and the consignee, respectively, issue in the pursuit of their business.
Since none of the exceptions to the requirement of authentication of a private document obtains in
these cases, said documents may not be admitted in evidence for Philam without being properly
authenticated.

95
 LOMISES ALUDOS, deceased, substituted by FLORA ALUDOS vs. JOHNNY M.
SUERTE
G.R. No. 165285 | June 18, 2012

FACTS:

Lomises acquired from the Baguio City Government the right to occupy two stalls in the Hangar
Market in Baguio City. Lomises entered into an agreement with respondent Johnny M. Suerte for
the transfer of all improvements and rights over the two market stalls. Before full payment could
be made, however, Lomises backed out of the agreement and returned the P68,000.00.Thus,
Johnny filed a complaint against Lomises for specific performance with damages.

RTC nullified the agreement between Johnny and Lomises for failure to secure the consent of the
Baguio City Government to the agreement. The RTC found that Lomises was a mere lessee of the
market stalls, and the Baguio City Government was the owner-lessor of the stalls. On appeal, CA
agreed with the RTC that the assignment of the leasehold rights was void for lack of consent of
the lessor, the Baguio City Government. The sale of the improvements, however, was
valid because these were LomisesÕ private properties.

Lomises, however, objects to the CA ruling upholding the validity of the agreement insofar as it
involved the sale of improvements on the stalls. Lomises alleges that the sale of the improvements
should similarly be voided because it was made without the consent of the Baguio City
Government, the owner of the improvements, pursuant to the May 1, 1985 lease contract.

ISSUE: Whether a document repeatedly mentioned in the pleadings of the parties which was
presented only on appeal may be considered for purposes of adjudicating the case

HELD: No.

The CA has already rejected the evidentiary value of the May 1, 1985 lease contract between the
Baguio City Government and Lomises, as it was not formally offered in evidence before the RTC;
in fact, the CA admonished Lomises’ lawyer, Atty. Lockey, for making it appear that it was part
of the records of the case. Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the court shall consider
no evidence which has not been formally offered. "The offer of evidence is necessary because it is
the duty of the court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence
offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or
purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of
probative weight." Although the contract was referred to in Lomises’ answer to Johnny’s
complaint and marked as Exhibit "2" in his pre- trial brief, a copy of it was never attached. In fact,
a copy of the May 1, 1985 lease contract "surfaced" only after Lomises filed a motion for
reconsideration of the CA decision.

96
 WESTMONT INVESTMENT CORPORATION vs. AMOS P. FRANCIA, JR., CECILIA
ZAMORA, BENJAMIN FRANCIA, and PEARLBANK SECURITIES, INC.
G.R. No. 194128 | December 7, 2011

FACTS:

Respondents filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages arising from their
investments against petitioner Westmont Investment Corporation (Wincorp) and respondent
Pearlbank Securities Inc. the case was set for the presentation of the defense evidence of Wincorp.

On March 7, 2003, three (3) days before the scheduled hearing, Wincorp filed a written motion to
postpone the hearing. The RTC denied Wincorp’s Motion to Postpone and considered it to have
waived its right to present evidence. The Motion for Reconsideration of Wincorp was
likewise denied.

On September 27, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the Francias and held Wincorp
solely liable to them. The CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC. Wincorp filed an
MR with the CA attaching to the said motion evidentiary evidence which it was not able to present
during trial.

ISSUE: Whether documents attached to a motion for reconsideration made before the appellate
court maybe considered for purposes of adjudicating the merits of the case

HELD: No.

Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence states that: "The court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be
specified."

A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to
enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the
evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to
its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will not be required to review
documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court. Evidence not formally offered during the
trial cannot be used for or against a party litigant. Neither may it be taken into account on appeal.

The rule on formal offer of evidence is not a trivial matter. Failure to make a formal offer within
a considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it. Consequently, any evidence
that has not been offered shall be excluded and rejected.

Prescinding therefrom, the very glaring conclusion is that all the documents attached in the motion
for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court and all the documents attached in
the defendant-appellant’s brief filed by defendant- appellant Wincorp cannot be given any
probative weight or credit for the sole reason that the said documents were not formally offered as
evidence in the trial court because to consider them at this stage will deny the other parties the right
to rebut them.

97
 Rule 133:
WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF
EVIDENCE

98
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. DELFIN CALISO
G.R. No. 183830 | October 19, 2011

FACTS:

Caliso was arraigned and tried for rape with homicide, but the Regional Trial Court found him
guilty of murder for the killing of AAA, a mentally-retarded 16-year old girl, and sentenced him to
death.

On appeal, CA affirmed Caliso’s conviction for murder based on the same ratiocinations the RTC
had rendered. The CA also relied on the identification by Amegable of Caliso, despite his back
being turned towards her during the commission of the crime. The CA ruled that she made a
positive identification of Caliso as the perpetrator of the killing, observing that the incident
happened at noon when the sun had been at its brightest, coupled with the fact that Amegable’s
view had not been obstructed by any object at the time that AAAÕs body had been submerged
in the water.

ISSUE: Whether the testimony of a witness attesting to identifying the perpetrator of a crime by
merely seeing his back constitutes positive identification that warrants conviction

HELD: No.

No matter how honest Amegable’s testimony might have been, her identification of Caliso by a
sheer look at his back for a few minutes could not be regarded as positive enough to generate that
moral certainty about Caliso being the perpetrator of the killing, absent other
reliable circumstances showing him to be AAA’s killer.

In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established
by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the Prosecution is not to prove the
crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the commission of the crime can be
established, there can be no conviction without proof of identity of the criminal beyond reasonable
doubt.

There are two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a
criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of
the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where, although a
witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to
positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter
is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the
commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which forms part of
circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an
unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author
of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to
possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever
be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that there can be no
conviction until and unless an accused is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely
absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix
wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort to circumstantial
evidence would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of direct evidence,
then felons would go free and the community would be denied proper protection.

Amegable’s identification of Caliso as the perpetrator did not have unassailable reliability, the only
means by which it might be said to be positive and sufficient. The test to determine the moral
certainty of an identification is its imperviousness to skepticism on account of its distinctiveness.
To achieve such distinctiveness, the identification evidence should encompass unique physical
features or characteristics, like the face, the voice, the dentures, the distinguishing marks or tattoos
on the body, fingerprints, DNA, or any other physical facts that set the individual apart from the
rest of humanity.

99
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELIMON PATENTES y ZAMORA
G.R. No. 190178 | February 12, 2014

FACTS:

Accused was charged with forcible abduction with rape. During the trial, complainant testified that
she was abducted by the accused and brought to the latter’s residence where the former was
repeatedly rape for 8 days. However, in the course the complainant’s testimony, she testified that
in between those 8 days, she was able to visit her grandmother.

Furthermore, when prosecution presented Dr. Cruz testified that he examined AAA. In his report,
he noted the following observations about AAA: (1) contusion on the breast caused by a kiss mark;
(2) hymen was intact and can readily admit a normal-sized erect male penis without sustaining any
injury; and (3) vaginal canal was negative for spermatozoa. Dr. Cruz also added that he cannot tell
whether it was AAAÕs first sexual intercourse as the vagina was not injured but had healed
lacerations.

On the other hand, the defense presented Wilma Enriquez, a friend of the complainant, who
testified that after the dates wherein the latter was supposedly rape, the latter visited her and
discussed plans about marrying the accused. Trial court convicted the accused. On appeal with
CA, conviction of the accused was confirmed.

ISSUE: Whether there was proof beyond reasonable doubt

HELD: No.

A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt, which means
a moral certainty that the accused is guilty; the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution. In the
case at bar, the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of establishing with moral certainty
the truthfulness of the charge that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA against her will using
threats, force or intimidation.

The testimony of the offended party in crimes against chastity should not be received with
precipitate credulity for the charge can easily be concocted. Courts should be wary of giving undue
credibility to a claim of rape, especially where the sole evidence comes from an alleged victim
whose charge is not corroborated and whose conduct during and after the rape is open to conflicting
interpretations. While judges ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation that a rape
victim undergoes as she seeks justice, they should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is
to render justice based on the law.

The numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of private complainant have created reasonable
doubt in Our mind. In view of the foregoing considerations, the presumption of innocence in favor
of appellant must be upheld considering that the evidence brought forth in trial falls short of the
quantum of proof to support a conviction.

100
 GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION,
represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner, vs. HON. FELIXBERTO
T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ
G.R. No. 153675 | April 19, 2007

FACTS:

Petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for
the extradition of private respondent. For his part, private respondent filed, in the same case, a
petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.

Initially, the petition for bail was denied by Judge Bernardo. On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo,
Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing the case. It was then raffled off to Branch presided by
respondent judge. On October30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of
the Order denying his application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge.

On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was
denied by respondent judge in his Order. Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the
trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law
providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal
proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail since there is nothing in the Constitution or
statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely
to criminal proceedings

HELD: No.

Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a

criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of
liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary
detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the
detention should be reasonable.

Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained
incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other
words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime.
By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental
right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition
court to grant him bail. While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an
extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a
right to due process under the Constitution.

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its
obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats
the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty
obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential 101xtradite’s rights to life, liberty, and due
process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by
international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an
101xtradite of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is
satisfactorily met

An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying
bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof
of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of
substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of
extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his
Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,

101
proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in
granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof
beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must
prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the
orders and processes of the extradition court.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not
a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether
private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."

102
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES versus ALFONSO FONTANILLA y OBALDO
G.R. No. 177743 | January 25, 2012

FACTS:

Jose Olais was walking along the provincial road when Alfonso Fontanilla suddenly struck him in
the head with a piece of wood called bellang. Olais fell facedown to the ground, but Fontanilla hit
him again in the head with a piece of stone. Fontanilla desisted from hitting Olais a third time only
because Joel Marquez and Tirso Abunan, the sons-in-law of Olais, shouted at him, causing him to
run away. Marquez and Abunan rushed their father-in-law to a medical clinic, where Olais was
pronounced dead on arrival. Consequently, Fontanilla was charged with murder.

At the trial, Fontanilla claimed self-defense. Prosecution presented the physician who conducted
the autopsy on the cadaver of Olais. She attested that her post-mortem examination showed that
Olais had suffered a fracture on the left temporal area of the skull, causing his death. She opined
that a hard object or a severe force had hit the skull of the victim more than once, considering that
the skull had been already fragmented and the fractures on the skull had been radiating.

The RTC rejected Fontanilla’’s plea of self-defense by observing that he had "no necessity to
employ a big stone, inflicting upon the victim a mortal wound causing his death" due to the victim
attacking him only with bare hands. It noted that Fontanilla did not suffer any injury despite his
claim that the victim had mauled him; that Fontanilla did not receive any treatment, and no medical
certificate attested to any injury he might have suffered, having been immediately released from
the hospital.

ISSUE: Whether testimony of accused alleging self-defense may be given credence amidst gravity
of the injury sustained by the victim

HELD: No.

Fontanilla pleaded self-defense. In order for self- defense to be appreciated, he had to prove by
clear and convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is the
indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is
established, self-defense is unavailing, for there is nothing to repel.

The plea of self-defense was thus belied, for the weapons used by Fontanilla and the location and
number of wounds he inflicted on Olais revealed his intent to kill, not merely an effort to prevent
or repel an attack from Olais. We consider to be significant that the gravity of the wounds
manifested the determined effort of the accused to kill his victim, not just to defend himself.

103
 PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK vs. ANTONIO B.
BALMACEDA and ROLANDO N. RAMOS
G.R. No. 158143 | September 21, 2011

FACTS:

PCIB filed an action for recovery of sum of money with damages against Antonio Balmaceda.
PCIB alleged that Balmaceda, by taking advantage of his position as branch manager, fraudulently
obtained and encashed 34Manager’s checks amounting to 11M+. PCIB also impleaded Ramos as
one of the recipients of a portion of the proceeds from Balmaceda’s alleged fraud. For failure to
file an answer, Balmaceda was declared in default. On the other hand, Ramos filed an Answer
denying any knowledge of Balmaceda’s scheme. Ramos admitted receiving money from
Balmaceda as payment for the fighting cocks that he sold to Balmaceda, but maintained that he
had no knowledge of the source of Balmaceda’s money.

RTC issued a decision in favor of PCIB. On appeal, the CA dismissed the complaint against
Ramos, holding that no sufficient evidence existed to prove that Ramos colluded with Balmaceda
in the latter’s fraudulent manipulations. According to the CA, the mere fact that Balmaceda made
Ramos the payee in some of the Manager’s checks does not suffice to prove that Ramos was
complicit in Balmaceda’s fraudulent scheme. It was also observed that other persons were also
named as payees in the checks that Balmaceda acquired and encashed, and PCIB only chose to go
after Ramos. With PCIB’s failure to prove Ramos’ actual participation in Balmaceda’s fraud, no
legal and factual basis exists to hold him liable.

PCIB insists that since Ramos’ defense – anchored on mere denial of any participation in
Balmaceda’s wrongdoing – is an intrinsically weak defense, it was error for the CA to exonerate
Ramos from any liability.

ISSUE: Whether appellate court may exonerate defendant on the basis of his mere denial of the
imputed wrong in a civil case

HELD: Yes.

While mere denial by the defendant is intrinsically weak evidence, this does not mean that the
complainant may just rely on the weakness of the defense presented by the former. The rule is that
the party asserting a claim must still provide proof of his allegation. In civil cases, the party
carrying the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence
which, to the court, is more worthy of belief than the evidence offered in opposition.

On its face, all that PCIB’s evidence proves is that Balmaceda used Ramos’ name as a payee when
he filled up the application forms for the Manager’s checks. But, as the CA correctly observed, the
mere fact that Balmaceda made Ramos the payee on some of the Manager’s checks is not enough
basis to conclude that Ramos was complicit in Balmaceda’s fraud; a number of other people were
made payees on the other Manager’s checks yet PCIB never alleged them to be liable, nor did the
Bank adduce any other evidence pointing to Ramos’ participation that would justify his separate
treatment from the others.

104
 DRA. LEILA A DELA LLANA vs. REBECCA BIONG, doing business under the name
and style of Pongkay Trading
G.R. No. 182356 | December 4, 2013

FACTS:

Joel Primero, a truck driver employed by the Respondent, was involved in a vehicular accident
which resulted to minor injuries of Petitioner Dra. dela Llana. The traffic investigation that Joel
was recklessly imprudent in driving the truck. More than one month after the incident, Petitioner
was diagnose with whiplash injury which she attributed to the accident that had happened.

Petitioner had to undergo physical therapy and eventually a spine surgery to treat the injury.
However, while the surgery was successful, petitioner can no longer practice her profession.
Consequently, petitioner sued the respondent for damages for the medical expenses and loss of
earnings.

At the trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary witness and Joel as a hostile witness.
Dra. Dela Llana reiterated that she lost the mobility of her arm because of the vehicular accident.
To prove her claim, she identified and authenticated a medical certificate dated issued by Dr. Milla.
The medical certificate stated that Dra. dela Llana suffered from a whiplash injury.

The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana. But on appeal, CA reversed the RTC ruling. It held
that Dra. Dela Llana failed to establish a reasonable connection between the vehicular accident
and her whiplash injury by preponderance of evidence.

ISSUE: Whether mere assertion that damages suffered was caused by a certain event imputable
against the defendant without explaining the causal link between the injury and the imputed act
warrants a ruling in favor of the complainant

HELD: No.

In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. He who alleges has the burden
of proving his allegation by preponderance of evidence or greater weight of credible evidence. The
reason for this rule is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof.
In short, mere allegations are not evidence.

In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joel’s negligence and
Dra. Dela Llana’s whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela Llana. She must establish by preponderance
of evidence that Joel’s negligence, in its natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produced her whiplash injury, and without which her whiplash injury
would not have occurred.

Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, the elements necessary to establish a quasi-delict case are:
(1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some person
for whose acts the defendant must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect
between such negligence and the damages.

Notably, Dra. dela Llana anchors her claim mainly on three pieces of evidence: (1) the pictures of
her damaged car, (2) the medical certificate dated November 20, 2000, and (3) her testimonial
evidence. However, none of these pieces of evidence show the causal relation between the
vehicular accident and the whiplash injury. In other words, Dra. dela Llana, during trial, did not
adduce the factum probans or the evidentiary facts by which the factum probandum or the ultimate
fact can be established, as fully discussed below.

105
 OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs ANTONIO T. REYES
G.R. No. 170512 | October 5, 2011

FACTS:

Petitioner adjudged Reyes guilty of grave misconduct after finding that Reyes, being then the Head
of Office of the LTO in Mambajao, Camiguin, illegally exacted money from Acero in exchange
for the issuance of a driver’s license to the latter, notwithstanding that Acero did not pass the
requisite written examination therefor.

ISSUE: Whether the charge of grave misconduct against Reyes was sufficiently proven by
substantial evidence

HELD:

Indeed, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 mandates that the findings of fact by the Office of
the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence.[32] In administrative and
quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence is necessary to establish the case for or
against a party. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It is that amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even
if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.

Indeed, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 mandates that the findings of fact by the Office of
the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence.[32] In administrative and
quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence is necessary to establish the case for or
against a party. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It is that amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even
if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.

106
 XAVIER C. RAMOS vs. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK INC. and/or ALFONSO L.
SALCEDO, JR.
G.R. No. 203186 | December 4, 2013

FACTS:

Ramos was employed by BPI Family as Vice-President for Dealer Network Marketing/Auto Loans
Division. His duties and responsibilities includes the receipt and approval of applications for auto
loans from auto dealers and salesmen. During his tenure, a person pretending to be their valued
client Acosta secured another auto loan from BPI Family which had remained unpaid. After
investigation, BPI Family discovered that: (1) a person misrepresented herself as Acosta and
succeeded in obtaining the delivery of a Toyota Prado pursuant to the Purchase Order (PO) and
Authority to Deliver (ATD) issued by Ramos; (2) Ramos released these documents without the
prior approval of BPI Family’s credit committee.

Consequently, Ramos’ employment was severed and his last pay and benefits were deducted with
a portion of the losses incurred by BPI due to the Acosta incident. Claiming that the deductions
made by BPI Family were illegal, Ramos filed a complaint for underpayment of retirement benefits
against BPI. Labor Arbiter (LA)dismissed Ramos’s complaint. NLRC reversed the LA in a
Decision alleged negligence committed by Ramos was not substantially proven as he was not
expected to personally examine all loan documents that passthrough his hands or to require the
client to personally appear before him because he has subordinates to do those details for him.

CA affirmed the finding of negligence on the part of Ramos, holding that Ramos was remiss in his
duty. But it also attributed negligence on the part of BPI Family since it sanctioned the practice of
issuing the PO and ATD prior to the approval of the credit committee. Finding BPI Family’s
negligence to be concurrent with Ramos, the CA found it improper to deduct the entire
P546,000.00 from Ramos’ retirement benefits and, instead, equitably reduced the same to the
amount of P200,000.00.

ISSUE: Whether the findings of fact by a labor tribunal may be assailed by petition of certiorari

HELD:

As a general rule, in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the appellate court
does not assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
based their conclusion. The query in this proceeding is limited to the determination of whether or
not the NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
rendering its decision. However, as an exception, the appellate court may examine and measure
the factual findings of the NLRC if the same are not supported by substantial evidence.

The Court has not hesitated to affirm the appellate court’s reversals of the decisions of labor
tribunals if they are not supported by substantial evidence. The requirement that the NLRCÕs
findings should be supported by substantial evidence is clearly expressed in Section 5, Rule 133
of the Rules of Court which provides that "in cases filed before administrative or quasi- judicial
bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount
of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."

Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the CA to have erred in attributing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in finding that the deduction made from Ramos’
retirement benefits was improper as BPI was not able to substantially prove its imputation of
negligence against Ramos. Well- settled is the rule that the burden of proof rests upon the party
who asserts the affirmative of an issue.

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 JESSE U. LUCAS vs. JESUS S. LUCAS
G.R. No. 190710 | June 6, 2011

FACTS:

Petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation specifically seeking a
DNA testing order to abbreviate the proceedings. RTC dismissed the. The court opined that
petitioner must first establish these four procedural aspects before he can present evidence of
paternity and filiation. Petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case considering that (a) his
mother did not personally declare that she had sexual relations with respondent, and petitioner’s
statement as to what his mother told him about his father was clearly hearsay; (b) the certificate of
live birth was not signed by respondent; and (c) although petitioner used the surname of
respondent, there was no allegation that he was treated as the child of respondent by the latter or
his family.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted by the RTC. On appeal by the
respondent to CA, CA remarked that petitioner filed the petition to establish illegitimate filiation,
specifically seeking a DNA testing order to abbreviate the proceedings. It noted that petitioner
failed to show that the four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action had been
met. The CA further held that a DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed
to establish a prima facie case.

ISSUE: Whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order
for purposes of proving filiation

HELD:

Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient
justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court
may order a compulsory blood test.

As a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing,
the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained
hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily
undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether
there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order
for blood testing.

The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father
from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner
must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.

Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains
discretionary upon the court. The court may, for example, consider whether there is absolute
necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity
and the DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a
DNA testing.

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 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. AMELIO TRIA and JOHN DOE
G.R. No. 193250 | April 25, 2012

FACTS:

Respondent Tria was a former Branch Manager of PNB-MWSS. MWSS opened a Current
Account with the said PNB Branch and made an initial deposit of PhP 6,714,621.13. On April 22,
2004, PNB-MWSS received a letter-request from MWSS instructing the deduction of PhP
5,200,000 from C/A and the issuance of the corresponding manager’s check payable to a certain
"Atty. Rodrigo A. Reyes." The letter-request, supporting documents, and Manager’s Check
Application Form were then evaluated by the bank’s Sales and Service Officer (SSO), Bagasani,
who found the same to be in order. Thus, a manager’s check was issued payable to Atty. Reyes.

On April 26, 2004, PNB-MWSS received cash delivery from PNBÕs Cash Center in the amount of
PhP 8,660,000. On the same day, respondent Tria accompanied Atty. Reyes in presenting
Manager’s Check No. 1165848 to PNB’s Circle Branch. SSO, Flandez of PNB-MWSS Sale and
Service Head, Veniegas and placement of Tria’s signature on the check above the handwritten note
"PAYEE IDENTIFIED Ð AMELIO C. TRIA."

It was later on found that MWSS did not authorize the issuance of the said manager’s check. PNB
conducted its own investigation and, at its conclusion, sought to hold Tria liable for qualified theft.
During preliminary investigation, the Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) issued a Resolution finding
no probable cause against Tria. ACP’s resolution was affirmed both by DOJ and CA.

ISSUE: Whether there is probable cause to prosecute Tria with qualified theft

HELD: Yes.

While discretionary authority to determine probable cause in a preliminary investigation to

ascertain sufficient ground for the filing of an information rests with the executive branch, such
authority is far from absolute. It may be subject to review when it has been clearly used with grave
abuse of discretion. And indeed, grave abuse of discretion attended the decision to drop the charges
against Tria as there was more than probable cause to proceed against him for qualified theft.

It must be emphasized at the outset that what is necessary for the filing of a criminal information
is not proof beyond reasonable doubt that the person accused is guilty of the acts imputed on him,
but only that there is probable cause to believe that he is guilty of the crime charged.

Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, are such facts as are sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof. It is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person
charged was guilty of the crime for which he is to be prosecuted. A finding of probable cause needs
only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that
it was committed by the accused.

The acts of Tria and the relevant circumstances that led to the encashment of the check provide
more than sufficient basis for the finding of probable cause to file an information against him and
John Doe/Atty. Reyes for qualified theft. In fact, it is easy to infer from the factual milieu of the
instant case the existence of all the elements necessary for the prosecution of the crime of qualified
theft.

109
 RUBEN DEL CASTILLO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 185128 | 30 January 2012

FACTS:

Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner was engaged in selling shabu, police officers
headed bySPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-buy operation at the
house of petitioner, secured a search warrant from the RTC which was granted. During the
implementation of the warrant, petitioner escaped and illegal drugs were found inside a nipa hut
in front of his rented two-story residence.

Consequently, an Information was filed before the RTC against petitioner, charging him with
violation of Section16, Article III of R.A. 6425. RTC convicted the accused. The finding of
conviction was affirmed by the CA. On appeal with the SC, petitioner assailed the validity of the
issuance of the search warrant on the ground that the police officer who applied for the same as no
personal knowledge of the basis for the issuance of such warrant.

ISSUE: Whether validity of the issuance of a search warrant may be questioned on appeal on the
ground that the person applying for the warrant had no personal knowledge of the cause for the
issuance thereof

HELD:

It must be remembered that the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched
and persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid. A designation or description that points
out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace
officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness.

In the present case, the search warrant specifically designates or describes the residence of the
petitioner as the place to be searched. Incidentally, the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a
nipa hut, 20 meters away from the residence of the Del Castillo. The confiscated items, having
been found in a place other than the one described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits
of an invalid warrantless search, the presentation of which as an evidence is a violation of Del
Castillo’s constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure.

110
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALBERTO ANTICAMARA y CABILLO and
FERNANDO CALAGUAS FERNANDEZ a.k.a. LANDO CALAGUAS
G.R. No. 178771 | June 8, 2011

FACTS:

Lando, Al, Dick Tañedo, Roberto Tañedo, Marvin Lim, Necitas Ordeñiza-Tañedo, and Fred Doe
are charged with the crimes of Murder and of Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention in two separate
Informations.

When arraigned of the aforementioned crimes, Lando, Al and Cita all pleaded not guilty, while
Dick, Bet, Marvin and Fred Doe remained at-large. Thereafter, a joint trial ensued.

At about 3:00 in the early morning of May 7, 2002, while AAA and the victim Abad Sulpacio
were sleeping inside the house of the Estrella family in Barangay Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan
several persons entered to rob the place. Inside the house, she saw and recognized the accused
Lando Calaguas and Dick Tañedo, and heard the latter uttering "somebody will die". Bringing her
outside the house, Lando pushed her into the Revo where she saw inside Abad Sulpacio who was
blindfolded and with his hands tied. Inside the Revo, she recognized the accused Dick Tañedo,
Lando Calaguas, Marvin Lim, Roberto Tañedo, Alberto Anticamara and Fred. The last time that
she saw Abad Sulpacio was when he was dragged out from the vehicle by Lando, Fred, Marvin
and Al upon reaching Sitio Rosalia. At that, time Dick Tañedo stayed with her in the vehicle.
Thereafter, when Fred returned to the vehicle, she heard him uttered: "Make a decision now. Abad
has already four (4) bullets in his body, and the one left is for this girl."

The RTC of Rosales, Pangasinan, Branch 53, rendered its Decision finding Accused Nicetas "Cita"
Tañedo acquitted of the crime charged for insufficiency of evidence; Accused Fernando Calaguas
Fernandez (alyas Lando Calaguas) and Alberto Anticamara (alyas Al Camara) are hereby found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime of Murder qualified by treachery; the
penalty of DEATH is hereby imposed upon the two (2) accused Fernando Calaguas Fernandez
(Lando Calaguas) and Alberto Anticamara (Al Camara). The CA rendered a Decision affirming
the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC gravely erred in rendering a verdict of conviction despite the fact that
the guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt

HELD: No.

The trial court found that although there was no direct eyewitness in the killing of Sulpacio in the
early morning of May 7, 2002 at Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, the
prosecution adduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish with moral certainty the
identities and guilt of the perpetrators of the crime.

Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the
existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; (c) the combination
of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form
an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.

In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution, when analyzed and taken
together, lead to the inescapable conclusion that the appellants are responsible for the death of
Sulpacio.

In the case at bar, although no one directly saw the actual killing of Sulpacio, the prosecution was
able to paint a clear picture that the appellants took Sulpacio away from the house of the Estrellas,
tied and blindfolded him, and brought him to another place where he was repeatedly shot and
buried.

111
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARITESS ALOLOD, EFREN DEOCAMPO,
ELMER DEOCAMPO and EDWIN DEOCAMPO EFREN DEOCAMPO
G.R. No. 185212 | February 15, 2012

FACTS:

Maritess Alolod, Efren Deocampo, Edwin Deocampo, and Elmer Deocampo were charged with
double murder. RTC convicted them considering the following circumstantial evidence: (1) Efren
had always been banned from the old couple’s house because they strongly disapproved his
relationship with Maritess; (2) The old couple were enjoying good health before of May 27, 1998;
(3) On May 28 they suddenly went missing; (4) On the night of May 27 the security guard at
Salaman Institute saw Efren and Edwin standing on the school side of the fence next to the old
couple’s house. The next day, the guard discovered that the fence wire had been cut; (5) At about
2:00 a.m. of May 28 a neighbor heard the sound of a woman sobbing and what seemed like the
butchering of a pig; (6) At break of dawn, a witness saw Efren in the Alolod kitchen; (7) From
then on Efren and his brothers frequented the old couple’s house, with Efren wearing the old man’s
watch; (8) Maritess lied about her adoptive parents going to Cotabato City / Davao City for medical
treatment when people started looking for them; (9) A witness heard Efren instructing Maritess to
plant more camote on a pile of red soil beside the house; and (10)The bodies of the old couple
were found underneath those plants.

On appeal, Accused Efren Deocampo assailed their conviction based on circumstantial evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s finding that accused Efren was
responsible for the murder of the Alolod couple based on circumstantial evidence

HELD:

The rule of evidence that applies when no witness saw the commission of the crime:

SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. – Circumstantial evidence

is sufficient for conviction if:

a. There is more than one circumstance;

b. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
c. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.

The circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain that inexorably leads to one fair conclusion:
the accused committed the crime to the exclusion of all others.

In this case, the trial court was correct in holding that the accused was guilty due to the following
facts: (1) the presence of the accused in the victim’s house and used of the latter’s things when he
had always been banned therefrom during the lifetime of the victim; (2) the cover-up story of
the adopted daughter that her parent went away for a medical check-up; (3) the planting of camote
on the ground where the victim’s where found buried; (4) testimony of a neighbor hearing a scream
the night before the victims went missing then seeing the accused inside the house of the victims.
All these when taken together leads only to one conclusion, i.e., that the accused is guilty of the
crime charged.

112