GAVINA MAGLUCOT-AW, CATALINA ORCULLO, RICHARD ESTANO, NIDA

MAGLUCOT, MELANIA MAGLUCOT-CATUBIG, EMILIANO CATUBIG, LADISLAO

SALMA, petitioners, vs. LEOPOLDO MAGLUCOT, SEVERO MAGLUCOT,
WILFREDA MAGLUCOT-ALEJO and CONSTANCIO ALEJO, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for recovery of possession and damages
alleging, inter alia, that they are the owners of Lot No. 1639-D. Said lot was originally
part of Lot No. 1639 which was covered by Original Certificate Title No. 6775 issued in
the names of Hermogenes Olis, Bartolome Maglucot, Pascual Olis, Roberto Maglucot,
Anselmo Lara and Tomas Maglucot on 16 August 1927.[1] On 19 April 1952, Tomas
Maglucot, one of the registered owners and respondents predecessor-in-interest, filed a
petition to subdivide Lot No. 1639.

Sometime in 1963, Guillermo Maglucot rented a portion of Lot No. 1639-D (subject lot).
Subsequently, Leopoldo and Severo, both surnamed Maglucot, rented portions of
subject lot in 1964 and 1969, respectively, and each paying rentals therefor. Said
respondents built houses on their corresponding leased lots. They paid the rental
amount of P100.00 per annum to Mrs. Ruperta Salma, who represented the heirs of
Roberto Maglucot, petitioners predecessor-in-interest. In December 1992, however,
said respondents stopped paying rentals claiming ownership over the subject lot.
Petitioners thus filed the complaint a quo

ISSUE:

whether there was a valid partition in 1952

RULING:

this Court notes that the order of partition was issued when the ruling in Fuentebella vs.
Carrascoso,[26] which held that the order of partition is interlocutory, was controlling. In
addition, the reports of the commissioners not having been confirmed by the trial court
are not binding.[27] In this case, both the order of partition and the unconfirmed sketch
plan are, thus, interlocutory. Nevertheless, where parties do not object to the
interlocutory decree, but show by their conduct that they have assented thereto, they
cannot thereafter question the decree,[28] especially, where, by reason of their conduct,
considerable expense has been incurred in the execution of the
commission.[29] Respondents in this case have occupied their respective lots in
accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan. They cannot after acquiescing to the order
for more than forty (40) years be allowed to question the binding effect thereof.
211. PHILIP C. SANTOS and HEIRS OF ELISEO M. SANTOS, petitioners,
vs. LADISLAO M. SANTOS

FACTS:

On May 13, 1993, Ladislao Santos, a resident in the United States of America, the Appellant in
the present recourse, through his Attorney-in-fact, Noe Santos, filed a complaint, with the
Regional Trial Court of Rizal, against his brother, Eliseo Santos and the latters son, Philip
Santos, the Appellees in the present recourse, for Judicial Partition.

The Appellant averred, inter alia, in his complaint, that, when his and Eliseo Santos sister, Isidra
Santos, died intestate on April 1, 1967, without any issue, they inherited her parcel of land
covered by Tax Declaration 1115, issued by the Provincial Assessor of Rizal located along
General Luna Street, Gitnangbayan, San Mateo, Rizal; that, sometime, in February 1, 1993, the
Appellant discovered that Tax Declaration No. 1115 had been cancelled by Tax Declaration No.
7892, under the name of his nephew, Appellee Philip Santos, and that, on December 16, 1980,
Virgilio Santos executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Residential Land on the
basis of which Tax Declaration No. 04-0016 was issued to the Appellee Philip Santos.

ISSUE:

WON THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT

RESPONDENTS RIGHT TO FILE THIS INSTANT ACTION FOR PARTITION HAS
ALREADY PRESCRIBED

RULING:

Considering that petitioners Eliseo and Philip disputed the status of Ladislao as co-
owner on the ground that the brothers entered into a Combined Deed of
Partition wherein the entire Isidra property was conveyed to Eliseo, It was then
incumbent upon them to present the best evidence obtainable to prove the same. We
agree with the Court of Appeals that the claim of a subsisting co-ownership by Ladislao
over the Isidra property has not been effectively refuted by Eliseo and Philip, and that
Eliseo and his successors-in-interest (Virgilio and Philip) did not acquire exclusive title
over the entire Isidra property

212. CONCEPCION V. VDA. DE DAFFON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT

OF APPEALS, LOURDES OSMEA VDA. DE DAFFON, AILEEN DAFFON, JOSELITO
DAFFON, JR., ANA VANESA DAFFON, LEILA DAFFON and SUZETTE
DAFFON, respondents.

FACTS:
 Petitioner Concepcion Villamor was married to the late Amado Daffon, with whom
she begot one son, Joselito Daffon. Joselito married Lourdes Osmea, and they bore six
children, namely, Aileen, Joselito Jr., Ana Vanesa, Leila, Julius and Suzette.
Amado passed away on January 21, 1982. His son, Joselito, died on October 25,
1990.
On January 21, 1994, respondents Lourdes Osmea Vda. De Daffon, together with
her six minor children, instituted an action for partition against petitioner Concepcion
Villamor Vda. de Daffon, which case was docketed as Civil Case No. DNA-281 of the
Regional Trial Court of Danao City, Branch 25.[1] Respondents alleged that Amado left
several real and personal properties which formed part of his conjugal partnership with
petitioner. Joselito being a forced heir of Amado was entitled to at least one half of
Amados estate, consisting of his share in the said conjugal properties. However, the
said properties were never partitioned between petitioner and Joselito. After Joselitos
death, petitioners behavior towards respondents, her daughter-in-law and
grandchildren, changed. She claimed absolute ownership over all the properties and
deprived them of the fruits thereof. Thus, respondents prayed that the conjugal
properties of Amado Daffon and petitioner be partitioned and that the one-half share of
Amado be further partitioned between petitioner, on one hand, and the respondents as
heirs of Joselito Daffon, on the other hand.
ISSUE:
WON THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS NEED NOT BE ACKNOWLEDGED AS HEIRS OF THE
DECEASED AMADO DAFFON
RULING:
In the case at bar, the complaint sufficiently alleged that defendant (i.e., petitioner
herein) was married to Amado Quiros Daffon and that they begot an only son in Joselito
Daffon.[11]The complaint further alleged that Joselito Daffon later got married to herein
plaintiff Lourdes Osmea and before the former died on October 25, 1990 he sired the
six (6) children who are now plaintiffs with their mother.[12] This, to our mind, was
sufficient allegation that Joselito Daffon was a legitimate son of the spouses Amado and
Concepcion Daffon; and that plaintiffs (i.e., respondents herein) were likewise legitimate
heirs of Joselito Daffon. Admitting the truth of these averments, there was, therefore, no
need to inquire whether respondent minor children were duly acknowledged by the
deceased Amado Daffon. To be sure, the illegitimacy of the said children and the lack of
acknowledgment are matters which petitioner may raise as a defense in her answer and
threshed out by the court during a full-blown trial.
In the same vein, there is no need for the complaint to specifically allege
respondents claim of co-ownership of the properties. The complaint needs only to allege
the ultimate facts on which the plaintiffs rely for their claim.
213 VILMA G. ARRIOLA and ANTHONY RONALD G.
ARRIOLA,Petitioners, vs. JOHN NABOR C. ARRIOLA,
Respondent.[G.R. No. 177703, January 28, 2008]

Facts:

Fidel Arriola died and is survived by his legal heirs: John NaborArriola (respondent)
,his son with his first wife , and Vilma G.Arriola, his second wife and his other son,
Anthony Ronald Arriola(petitioners).On Feb. 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision
ordering the partition of the parcel of land covered by TCT No 383714 (84191)left by the
decedent Fidel S. Arriola by and among his heirs John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G.
Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola in equal shares of one-third (1/3) each without
prejudice to therights of creditors or mortgagees thereon, if any. However, the parties
failed to agree on how to divide the abovementioned property and so the respondent
proposed to sell it though public auction. The petitioners initially agreed but refused to
include in the auction the house standing on the subject land. The respondent then filed
an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court but was denied by the RTC
for lack of merit. When a motion of reconsideration was still denied by the RTC, the
respondent elevated the case to the CA with a petition for certiorari and prayed that he
be allowed to push through with the auction of the subject land including the house built
on it. The CA granted the petition and ordered the public auction sale of the subject lot
including the house built on it. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA
denied the said motion. Hence this petition for review on Certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the subject house is covered by the judgement of partition
Ruling: The Supreme Court agree that the subject house is covered by the judgment of
partition but in view of the suspended proscription imposed under Article 159 of the
family code, the subject house immediately partitioned to the heirs. Article 152. The
family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of
a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which
it is situated. Article 153. The family home is
deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a
family residence
. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides
therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale
or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by
law. (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, applying these concepts, the subject house as well as
the specific portion of the subject land on which it stands are deemed constituted as a
family home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma from the moment they began
occupying the same as a family residence 20 years back. Article 159. The family home
shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the
family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minorbeneficiary, and
the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling
reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the
property or constituted the family home.
 214. TERESITA S. REYES-DE LEON petitioner, vs. VICENTE B. DEL
ROSARIO, respondent.
FACTS:
The instant case traces its origin to an action for Partition filed by Pantaleon U. del
Rosario and his son, respondent Vicente B. del Rosario, before the Regional Trial
Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 11 of Cebu City. In
3]
the Amended Complaint, petitioner Teresita Reyes-de Leon was impleaded as a
defendant, being one of the heirs of the late spouses Pantaleon S. del Rosario and
Ceferina Llamas. Plaintiffs therein, Pantaleon U. del Rosario and Vicente B. del
Rosario, are cousin and nephew, respectively, of the petitioner. The case involved
several parcels of land collectively grouped as follows: Tupas Properties, Asinan
Properties, Figueroa Property, Barili Properties, Mambaling
Properties, Negros Properties, and Other Properties.[4]Plaintiffs therein claimed that
petitioner executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Vicente B. del Rosario covering
all of her shares in the properties sought to be partitioned.[5]
In her Answer dated 10 November 1998, petitioner claimed that she did not execute
any deed of sale in favor of Vicente B. del Rosario. [6] She further averred that the only
portions of her inheritance she ever sold were her shares in the Asinan
and Negros properties, which she sold in favor of Pantaleon U. del Rosario, and the late
Vicente S. del Rosario.
In December 1999, petitioner filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of deed of
sale with damages before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City.
ISSUE:
whether or not petitioners action for declaration of nullity involves a cause of action
separate or distinct from the cause of action in the partition case pending before it
RULING:
The issue of ownership or co-ownership, to be more precise, must first be resolved
in order to effect a partition of properties. This should be done in the action for partition
itself. As held in the case of Catapusan v. Court of Appeals:[29]

In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the property, unless it
first makes a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. The court must initially settle the
issue of ownership, the first stage in an action for partition. Needless to state, an action for
partition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over the subject property. In fact,
Section 1 of Rule 69 requires the party filing the action to state in his complaint the nature and
extent of his title to the real estate. Until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved,
it would be premature to effect a partition of the properties

215 RAQUEL CHAVEZ, GERARDO GIMENEZ and MANUELA BUENAVISTA VDA.

DE CHAVEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (4th Civil Cases Division), ANTONIO
CHAVEZ, ROSARIO CHAVEZ and CONCEPCION CHAVEZ

FACTS:

The land in question is the paraphernal property of petitioner Manuel Buenavista

(defendant in Civil Case No. 1934 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte)
who had six (6) children, named Antonio, Rosario, Concepcion, Raquel, Presentacion
and Floserpina. The first three were the plaintiffs and the last three, with their mother,
were the defendants in Civil Case No. 1934.

On July 11, 1958, Presentacion Chavez, with the conformity of her mother, Manuela
Buenavista, executed a deed of sale whereby she sold her 1/6 undivided share of the
land in question to her sister, Concepcion Chavez, for P 450.

Two years later, on May 2, 1960, Floserpina Chavez, with the conformity of her mother,
also sold her 1/6 undivided share of the same land to her sister, Concepcion, for the
same price of P450. On May 19, 1960, Raquel, with the conformity of her mother,
likewise sold her undivided 1/6 share of the same property to Concepcion Chavez for
P600. Having acquired the shares of Presentacion, Floserpina and Raquel, Concepcion
thereby became the owner of a total undivided 4/6 share of the land in question with
Antonio and Rosario as owners of the remaining 2/6 shares.

ISSUE:

WON that the partition inter vivos which had been implemented long before the
execution of the said Last Will and TestamenT

RULING:

Article 1080 of the New Civil Code allows a person to make a partition of his estate
either by an act inter vivos or by will and such partition shall be respected insofar as it
does not prejudice the legitimate of the compulsory heirs. While the law prohibits
contracts upon future inheritance, the partition by the parent, as provided in Art. 1080, is
a case expressly authorized by law (Art. 1347, par. 2, Civil Code of the Phil. by Padilla,
1987 Edition, p. 744.) Art. 1080 of the Civil Code clearly gives a person two options in
making a partition of his estate; either by an act inter vivos or by WILL. When a person
makes a partition by will, it is imperative that such partition must be executed in
accordance with the provisions of the law on wills; however, when a person makes the
partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, such partition may even be oral or written,
and need not be in the form of a will, provided that the partition does not prejudice the
legitime of compulsory heirs.

217 Vivencio Legasto vs. Maria Verzosa, Et. Al.

FACTS:
Sabina Almadin executed a will devising certain parcels of land to her four nieces, maria
verosa, oliva verosa, Toribia verosa, and $uperta Palma, designating the parcels to be given
to each. .Almadin partitioned her property among her nieces, executing separate deeds
of assignment and sworn statements as to the purchase of properties and claims for
payment of land tax. The assignee nieces, took possession of their respective parcels
ceded by Almadin and have been the exclusive owners from then on. Almadin passed
away in 22 february 1926, and on 12 march, catalina Almadin, represented by Atty. marino,
propounded her will. vivencio legastio, special administrator appointed by , CFI filed
the complaint claiming the delivery of parcels of land in his complaint. by virtue of CFI
decision, and ffirmed by Court of Appeals, the will was not admitted to probate.

ISSUE: WON the partition made by Almadin among her nieces was valid and
enforceable

RULING:
A testator may, by an act inter vivos partition his property, but he must 0rstma'e a will with
all the formalities provided for by law. without a will, there can be no testator. /t is an
indispensable condition precedent to a testator partitioning his estate inter vivos that he
have made a valid will disposing of said estate among his heirs6 and if this will be
declared null and void, the partition made by the testator in pursuance of its provisions
is likewise null and void, for where these provisions cease to exist, the partition made
inconformity therewith also becomes null and void, as the cessation of the cause implies
the cessation of the e7ect.Almadin8s will was disallowed for the reason that it did not
contain all the essential re9uisites provided by law for its validity. Since Almadin8s will is
null and void for lacK of legal re9uisites, conse9uently, the partition of which she made
of her estate during her lifetime is likewise void.
218 DIZON
219ALEJANDRINO

220 HEIRS OF TEVES VS CA

FACTS:
Marcelina Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves had nine children, namely Teotimo, Felicia,
Pedro, Andres, Asuncion, Gorgonio, Cresenciano, Arcadia and Maria. Andres, however,
predeceased both his parents and died without issue. After Marcelina Cimafranca and Joaquin
Teves died, intestate and without debts, in 1943 and 1953, respectively, their children executed
extrajudicial settlements purporting to adjudicate unto themselves the ownership over two
parcels of land belonging to their deceased parents and to alienate their shares thereto in favor
of their sister Asuncion Teves.
On May 9, 1984, plaintiffs-appellants Ricardo and Arcadia Teves filed a complaint with
the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental for the partition and reconveyance of two parcels of
land located in Dumaguete, designated as Lots 769-A and 6409, against the heirs of Asuncion
Teves. The complaint was subsequently amended to include Maria Teves and the heirs of
Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro, and Gorgonio Teves as plaintiffs and the spouses Lucresio Baylosis and
Pacita Nocete, and Cecilia Cimafranca-Gamos and Cecilia Flor Cimafranca as
defendants.[3] Plaintiffs-appellants alleged that defendants-appellees, without any justifiable
reason, refused to partition the said parcels of land and to convey to plaintiffs their rightful
shares.
ISSUE: won extrajudicial settlements executed by the heirs of Joaquin Teves and
Marcelina Cimafranca are legally valid and binding.

Ruling:
Thus, for a partition pursuant to section 1 of Rule 74 to be valid, the following conditions must
concur: (1) the decedent left no will; (2) the decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all
had been paid; (3) the heirs are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are represented by their
judicial guardian or legal representatives; (4) the partition was made by means of a public
instrument or affidavit duly filed with the Register of Deeds.[21]
We uphold, finding no cogent reason to reverse, the trial and appellate courts factual finding
that the evidence presented by plaintiffs-appellants is insufficient to overcome the evidentiary
value of the extrajudicial settlements. The deeds are public documents and it has been held by
this Court that a public document executed with all the legal formalities is entitled to a
presumption of truth as to the recitals contained therein.[22] In order to overthrow a certificate of
a notary public to the effect that the grantor executed a certain document and acknowledged the
fact of its execution before him, mere preponderance of evidence will not suffice. Rather, the
evidence must be so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all reasonable dispute as to the
falsity of the certificate. When the evidence is conflicting, the certificate will be upheld.[23] The
appellate courts ruling that the evidence presented by plaintiffs-appellants does not constitute the
clear, strong, and convincing evidence necessary to overcome the positive value of the
extrajudicial settlements executed by the parties, all of which are public documents, being
essentially a finding of fact, is entitled to great respect by the appellate court and should not be
disturbed on appeal.

221

ANGELA I. TUASON, ,
vs.
ANTONIO TUASON,

Facts:
In 1941 the sisters Angela I. Tuason and Nieves Tuason de Barreto and their brother Antonio
Tuason Jr., held a parcel of land with an area of 64,928.6 sq. m. covered by Certificate of Title No.
60911 in Sampaloc, Manila, in common, each owning an undivided 1/3 portion. Nieves wanted and
asked for a partition of the common property, but failing in this, she offered to sell her 1/3 portion.
The share of Nieves was offered for sale to her sister and her brother but both declined to buy it. The
offer was later made to their mother but the old lady also declined to buy, saying that if the property
later increased in value, she might be suspected of having taken advantage of her daughter. Finally,
the share of Nieves was sold to Gregorio Araneta Inc., a domestic corporation, and a new Certificate
of Title No. 61721 was issued in lieu of the old title No. 60911 covering the same property. The three
co-owners agreed to have the whole parcel subdivided into small lots and then sold, the proceeds of
the sale to be later divided among them. This agreement is embodied in a document (Exh. 6) entitled
"Memorandum of Agreement" consisting of ten pages, dated June 30, 1941.
Issue:
Won the contract (Exh. 6) should be declared null and void because its terms, particularly
paragraphs 9, 11 and 15 which we have reproduced, violate the provisions of Art. 400 of the Civil
Code
Ruling:
We agree with the trial court that the provisions of Art. 400 of the Civil Code are not
applicable. The contract (Exh., 6) far from violating the legal provision that forbids a co-owner being
obliged to remain a party to the community, precisely has for its purpose and object the dissolution
of the co-ownership and of the community by selling the parcel held in common and dividing the
proceeds of the sale among the co-owners. The obligation imposed in the contract to preserve the
co-ownership until all the lots shall have been sold, is a mere incident to the main object of
dissolving the co-owners. By virtue of the document Exh. 6, the parties thereto practically and
substantially entered into a contract of partnership as the best and most expedient means of
eventually dissolving the co-ownership, the life of said partnership to end when the object of its
creation shall have been attained.