Nuclear Engineering and Design 354 (2019) 110165

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Nuclear Engineering and Design

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/nucengdes

Heat removal from RBMK reactor core using non-regular means T

⁎
Algirdas Kaliatka , Eugenijus Ušpuras
Laboratory of Nuclear Installation Safety, Lithuanian Energy Institute, Breslaujos St. 3, LT-44403 Kaunas, Lithuania

A R T I C LE I N FO A B S T R A C T

Keywords: RBMK type reactor is a boiling light-water-reactor with a graphite moderator. Several important design features
RBMK of RBMK are unique and very complex compared with: the fuel assemblies are located in individual channels
Channel type reactor rather than a single pressure vessel, these fuel channels are placed in a massive graphite moderator block; the
Loss of long term cooling rods of reactor control and protection system are placed in different channels, parallel to the fuel channels in
Heat transfer through graphite blocks
graphite moderator block. Such design provides additional opportunity for heat removal from the reactor in the
cases of beyond design-basis accidents. This paper discusses possibility of heat removal from the RBMK-1500
core using weak heat conduction mechanisms: heat removal from outer surface of drum separators and steam –
water piping using air ventilation means; heat removal from graphite stack using direct water supply into reactor
cavity; heat removal from fuel channels through the core graphite structures by control rods cooling system; heat
removal in loss of long term cooling case using de-pressurisation of the reactor coolant system and water supply
using complex of non-regular means. The provided analyses discuss advantages and capacities of these different
means.

1. Introduction: characteristic of RBMK reactor
RBMK reactor (Russian acronym for: “Large-power channel-type
reactor”) belongs to the class of graphite-moderated nuclear power
reactors that were designed in the Soviet Union in the 1950s. Use of
materials with low neutron absorption in RBMK design allows im-
proving the fuel cycle by using cheap low-enriched nuclear fuel. RBMK
reactor is a channel-type boiling water reactor. It has a large graphite
block structure, which functions as a moderator that slows down neu-
trons produced by fission.
There are two types of RBMK reactors with different power outputs:
RBMK-1000 and RBMK-1500. The RBMK-1500 reactor type of
1500 MW electrical power output is the only one at Ignalina Nuclear
Power Plant (NPP). The RBMK-1000 type reactors were commissioned
in Russia and Ukraine. There was a plan to build RBMKP-2400 type
reactor, which has rectangular core instead of cylindrical one. It was
designed to have a electrical power output of 2400 MW. However, no
reactor with this power output has ever been built. Totally 15 RBMK-
1000 type reactors have been built in Russia, Ukraine and two RBMK-
1500 type in Lithuania. The three surviving reactors at Chernobyl NPP
(Ukraine) were shut down (the fourth one was destroyed in the
accident). Units 5 and 6 at Chernobyl NPP were under construction at
the time of the accident; however, further construction was stopped due
to high contamination level at the site and political pressure. In
Lithuania, two reactors at Ignalina NPP were shut down in 2004 and
2009. However, at present time, 11 RBMK reactors are still operating in
Russia (4 reactors in Saint Petersburg, 3 – in Smolensk and 4 – in
Kursk).
The fundamental heat cycle of RBMK is identical to the BWR cycle
and is analogous to the cycle of thermal generating stations. However,
compared to BWRs used in Western power plants, the RBMK-1500 and
RBMK-1000 have a number of unique features. The comparison of
important parameters of the reactor types is presented in Table 1. As it
is presented in the table, the values of specific power per fuel quantity
are very similar for all reactors. The power per fuel rod length of the
RBMK-1500 has the highest value. To reach such high value, specifi-
cally designed additional spacers, which operate like turbulence en-
hancers to improve the heat transfer characteristics, are mounted in the
fuel assemblies of RBMK-1500. Specific power per core volume in
RBMK-1500 is higher than in RBMK-1000 reactor, but in BWR-type
reactors this characteristic is approximately 10 times higher. The core
heat capacity in RBMK is high due to a large amount of graphite. These

Abbreviations: ABWR, Advanced Boiling Water Reactor; AHS, Additional Hold-down System; BWR, Boiling Water Reactor; CPS, Control and Protection System; DS,
Drum Separator; ECCS, Emergency Core Cooling System; FC, Fuel Channel; GDH, Group Distribution Header; MCP, Main Circulation Pump; MSV, Main Safety Valve;
NPP, Nuclear Power Plant; PWR, Pressurised Water Reactor; RBMK, Acronym for Russian type graphite moderated boiling water reactor; RCS, Reactor Cooling
System; SDV, Steam Discharge Valve; SWP, Steam Water Piping; VVER, Water-Water Energetic Reactor
⁎
Corresponding author.
E-mail address: Algirdas.Kaliatka@lei.lt (A. Kaliatka).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nucengdes.2019.110165
Received 29 May 2019; Received in revised form 15 June 2019; Accepted 18 June 2019
Available online 23 June 2019
0029-5493/ © 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/BY/4.0/).
A. Kaliatka and E. Ušpuras Nuclear Engineering and Design 354 (2019) 110165

Table 1
Comparison of BWR and RBMK reactor parameters.
No. Parameter ABWR (Tokyo Electric Power, 2010) RBMK-1000 (Almenas et al., 1998) RBMK-1500 (Almenas et al., 1998)

1. Thermal power, MW 3926 3840 4800

2. Core diameter, m 5.16 11.80 11.80
3. Core height, m 3.71 7.0 7.0
4. Core volume, m3 77.6 765 765
5. Mean specific power per core volume, MW/m3 50.6 5.02 6.27
6. Mean specific power per fuel quantity, MW/t 24.8 20.8 26.0
7. Mean power per fuel rod length, kW/m 19.1 18.3 22.9

parameters have a certain impact on the operation of the reactor during

accidents.
The feature of RBMK type reactor is that each fuel assembly is
placed in its own vertical fuel channel, which is individually cooled by
boiling water that is intended to remove the heat produced in it. Each
Fuel Channel (FC) is placed in graphite columns, collected from gra-
phite blocks, quadratic in cross section. RBMK reactor core consists of
1660 fuel channels housed in an assembly of graphite columns tightly
packed which forms the graphite stack. The FCs are part of the reactor
cooling system and house two fuel assemblies located in a row, as
shown in Fig. 1.
Active core height in RBMK reactors is 7 m. The complete fuel as-
sembly is made up of two bundles, which are joined by means of a
sleeve at the central plane. The lower bundle of the fuel assembly is
supported by an end grid and ten spacing grids. The central tube and
the end spacer are also made from the zirconium-niobium alloy. The
remaining spacers are made from stainless steel and are rigidly fixed
(welded) to the central tube. Apart from the spacers, the upper bundle
also has intensifying grids, which act as turbulence enhancers to im-
prove the heat transfer characteristics. The fuel rods are mounted so
that axial expansion of the upper or lower bundles takes place in the
direction towards the center of the core. Each fuel bundle has an inside
diameter of 8 cm and is composed of 18 fuel rods which are arranged on
two concentric rings with a carrier rod at the center. The active length
of fuel rods is approximately 3.4 m. The fuel cladding material of the
fuel rod is an alloy of zirconium with one percent niobium. The total
mass of uranium in one fuel assembly is approximately 110 kg,
(Almenas et al., 1998).
Reactor Cooling System (RCS) of RBMK-1500 has two identical
loops, which are interconnected via the steamlines and do not have a Fig. 2. Three-dimensional diagram of one loop of reactor cooling system, with
connection on the water part. This is the difference from the vessel-type schematic of compartments, covering main equipment: 1 – drum separators, 2 –
reactors. The location of the reactor core and its main components in water connecting pipes to connect drum separators, 3 – downcomers, 4 – suc-
reactor cooling loop are shown in Fig. 2. The water is supplied to fuel tion header, 5 – pressure header, 6, 7 – MCP suction pipelines, 8, 10 – MCP
pressure pipelines, 9 – MCP tank, 11, 12 – bypass between suction and pressure
headers, 13 – supply pipeline, connecting pressure header with group dis-
tribution header, 14 – group distribution header, 15 – lower water piping, 16 –
fuel channel, 17 – steam water piping, 18 – drainage pipeline of water con-
necting pipes of drum separators, 19 – drum separator compartments, 20 –
graphite stack, 21 – compartments of group distribution headers and lower
water piping, 22 – compartments, covering MCPs, pressure and suction headers.

channels where it is heated to saturation and partially evaporates. The

steam and water mixture then flows to the drum separators (1, see
Fig. 2) of both loops, where the steam is separated from water and
directed to the turbines. The water from the Drum Separators (DS)
flows via downcomers (2) to the main circulation pumps (there 3 par-
allel pumps working during operation at nominal power) suction
header (4) and then by the pumps (9) is supplied to the main circulation
pumps pressure header (5), which is connected to 20 group distribution
headers (14). There are totally 40 group distribution headers (20
headers in each reactor cooling system loop). Each Group Distribution
Header (GDH) through lower water piping (15) provides water to
41–43 fuel channels (16). The fuel channels are made of Zirconium and
Niobium alloy similar to the one used for the fuel claddings. The steam
Fig. 1. Schematic diagram of RBMK reactor core.

2
A. Kaliatka and E. Ušpuras Nuclear Engineering and Design 354 (2019) 110165

– water mixture through steam water piping (17) is supplied to the . . . 55 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 54 . . .

drum separators. Drum separators (1), part of downcomers (2) and z

.
.
54

steam water piping (17) are placed in the drum separator compartments z z z z
z 1
2
3

(19). The equipment and piping of reactor cooling system filled by

z z z z z z z z 4
5
z z z z z z z z z z 6
7

water are placed in compartments covering Main Circulation Pumps z z z z z z z z z 8

9
z z z z z z z z z z 10

(MCP) and pressure and suction headers (22) and compartments cov- z z † z z z z z z z † z z
11
12
13

ering group distribution headers and lower water piping (21). These z z
z

z
z

z
z

z
z

z
z

z
z

z
z

z
z

z
z

z
z

z
14
15
16

compartments are leak tight and form a part of Accident Localisation

17
z z z z z z z z z z z z 18
19

z z z z z z z z z z z 20

System. z z z z z z z z z z z z z
21
22
23

Separated in the drum separators, steam is supplied to the turbines. z z z z z z z z z z z 24

25
z z z z z z z z z z z z 26

After passing turbines, steam is directed to the condensers where it is z z z z z z z z z z z z

27
28
29

condensed. The condensate is supplied to the deaerators from where it z

z
z

z
z

z
z

z
z

z
z

z
z

z
z

z
z

z
z

z
z

z
z

z
30
31
32
33

is directed back to reactor cooling system by the main feedwater z z z z z z z z z z z 34

z CPS channel z z † z z z z z z z † z z
35
36

pumps. z z z z z z z z z z
37
38

FC with FA z z z z z z z z z
39
40
41
z z z z z z z z z z 42

2. Specifics of heat removal from the RBMK core † Channel with AA z z z z z z z ·

43
44
45
z z z z z 46

Radial reflector z
47
48
z 55

The unique design features of reactor, low specific power per core Reflector cooling channel
.
.

volume and high heat capacity of core due to a large amount of gra-
phite, have a certain impact on the heat removal from RBMK reactor
core during beyond design-basis accidents. Unfortunately, the detailed
knowledge of the RBMK system configuration was not spread in the
Western world till the Chernobyl event in 1986. Afterwards, some in-
vestigations were performed in Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania. Very
valuable was the project “Software Development for Accident Analysis
of VVER and RBMK Reactors in Russia (2003–2006)” sponsored by
European Commission, with the participation of RBMK designers in
Russia and the supervision of the national utility and the regulatory
authority, where safety and acceptability of those reactors were ana-
lysed (D’Auria et al., 2005). The long-term investigations of non-regular
means showed four possible alternatively paths for the decay heat re-
moval from reactor core, using non-regular means:
• by ventilation of drum separators compartments,
• by direct water supply into the reactor cavity,
• heat transfer from fuel channels through CPS cooling circuit,
• de-pressurisation of the reactor coolant system and water supply
using non-regular means.
Fig. 3. Distribution of fuel channels, CPS channels and graphite reflector
cooling channels in the reactor core (Almenas et al., 1998).
water supplied by low pressure system totally independent from the
reactor cooling system – this is another specificity of RBMK reactors.
The graphite columns are located in hermetically sealed cavity (see
Fig. 1), which is filled with a helium and nitrogen mixture, to prevent
the oxidation of the graphite (Almenas et al., 1998).
In this paper the advantages and disadvantages of heat removal by
direct water supply into the reactor cavity and heat transfer from fuel
channels through CPS cooling circuit is discussed in Sections 6 and 7
respectively. The complex system of measures (de-pressurisation of the
reactor coolant system and water supply using non-regular means) for
RBMK cooldown in case of long term station blackout are presented in
Section 7.2. The advantage of measures are demonstrated, comparing
consequences without operators actions (analysis presented in Section
4). The analyses are performed for the RBMK-1500 reactor, but re-
ceived conclusions are valid for RBMK-1000 also.

The heat removal from reactor core by ventilation of drum se-
parators compartments was proposed because, as it is presented in
Fig. 2, the 830 steam and water pipes (17) in one cooling loop with
external diameter 76 mm and approximately length 27.4 m each create
the significant heat transfer area. These pipelines are placed in drum
separator compartments (19). Theoretically, by the cooling of steam
water piping, it is possible to remove decay heat form the reactor core.
Such approach of reactor cooldown is used during the maintenance, few
days after the reactor shutdown. The heat from steam water piping is
removed by air employing ventilation system of drum separator com-
partments. Such type of reactor cooldown in technological regulation of
RBMK-1500 is called “cooldown in natural circulation mode” and it
allows to maintain the temperature of water in RCS below 100 °C. The
possibility of heat removal from reactor core by ventilation of drum
separators compartments in case of beyond design-basis accidents is
discussed in Section 5.
The fuel channels, where RBMK fuel assemblies are placed, are
made of Zirconium and 2.5% Niobium alloy. These fuel channels are
placed in graphite stack, which consists of 2488 graphite columns with
the vertical bore openings. These openings are used for positioning of
the channels, which in turn are used for placing fuel assemblies and
several types of instruments into the core (see Fig. 3) (Almenas et al.,
1998). The control rods, which perform the reactor core reactivity
keeping during normal operation and reactor scram in a case of emer-
gency, in RBMK reactors are the main part of Control and Protection
System (CPS). These control rods are placed in the individual channels
in the graphite stack, also. The channels for control rods are filled with
3. Modelling of thermal – hydraulic process in RBMK reactor
For the analysis of thermal hydraulic processes in RCS of Ignalina
NPP with RBMK-1500 reactors the RELAP5 (Fletcher, 1992), RELAP5-
3D (INEEL, 1998) and RELAP/SCDAPSIM (Allison and Wagner, 2001)
codes are used. The use of three codes allows to investigate all aspects
of accident with long-term loss of heat removal from the core: RELAP5
code allows to perform thermal-hydraulic analysis using detailed
RBMK-1500 model; RELAP/SCDAPSIM code is necessary for modelling
of core damage progression; RELAP5-3D code with special “multi-
dimensional heat conduction” model allows to model heat transfer from
hot fuel channels through graphite column in radial direction. The
original RELAP5 computer code (Fletcher, 1992) has been developed by
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory for PWR and BWR reactors. This
is a one-dimensional non-equilibrium two-phase thermal-hydraulic
system code. In the Lithuanian Energy Institute the models for the si-
mulation of RBMK type reactors using RELAP5 code has been devel-
oped and RELAP5 code has been used for Ignalina NPP licensing since
1995.
The general nodalization scheme of the RBMK-1500 model, devel-
oped for RELAP5 code, is presented in Fig. 4. The model of RCS consists
of two loops, each of them corresponds to one loop of the actual circuit.
Two steam drum separators in each RCS loop are modelled by gen-
eralized “separator” element (1). All downcomers are represented by a
single equivalent pipe (2), further subdivided into a number of control
volumes. The pump suction header (3) and the pump pressure header
(8) are represented as RELAP5 “branch” (Fletcher, 1992) elements.

3
A. Kaliatka and E. Ušpuras Nuclear Engineering and Design 354 (2019) 110165

Fig. 4. Full model of Ignalina NPP for thermal-hydraulic analysis of processes in RCS (for RELAP5-3D code): 1 – DS, 2 – downcomers, 3 – MCP suction header, 4 –
MCP suction piping, 5 – MCP, 6 – MCP discharge piping, 7 – bypass line, 8 – MCP pressure header, 9 – GDH, 10 – lower water piping, 11 – reactor core inlet piping, 12
– FC, 13 – reactor core outlet piping, 14 – steam-water piping, 15 – steam lines, 16 – CPS rods cooling channels, 17 – CPS top storage tank, 18 – radial reflector cooling
channel, 19 – CPS bottom storage tank, 20 – water supply to spray system for air humidification in DS compartments, 21 – water supply directly to the reactor cavity,
22 – water supply from ECCS hydro-accumulators, 23 – city water source, 24 – pipe element for simulation of water level measurement, 25 – deaerators.

Three operating Main Circulation Pumps are represented by one
equivalent “pump” element (5) with check and throttling-regulating
valves. The throttling-regulating valves are used for coolant flow rate
regulation through the core. These valves are modelled by employing
“servo valve” elements. The normalized flow area versus normalized
stem position is described in the RELAP5 model. The bypass line (7)
between the pump suction header and the pump pressure header is
modelled with the manual valves closed. This is in agreement with a
modification performed at the Ignalina NPP. All fuel channels of the left
core pass are represented by a few equivalent channels (12) operating
at specific power and coolant flow. The group of 20 Group Distribution
Headers (9) with connecting pipelines is modelled by RELAP5 “branch”
component. The pipelines of the lower water piping (10) are connected
to each FC. Each of these components represents the quantity of pipes
appropriate to the number of elements in the corresponding FC in the
core. The vertical parts of the FC (13) above the reactor core are re-
presented by RELAP5 components “pipes”. The pipelines of the steam-
water piping (14) are connecting the fuel channels with DS. Compared
to the model for the left loop, in the right loop, the MCP system is
modelled with three equivalent pumps. The steam separated in the
separators is directed to turbines via steam lines (15). Two turbine
control valves adjust steam supply to the turbines. The control of these
valves was modelled by “servo valve” elements based on an algorithm
of steam pressure regulators used at Ignalina NPP. There are four Steam
Discharge Valves (SDV) in each loop of the RCS to direct the steam to
the condensers of the turbines (turbine bypass). The pressure of the
steam is controlled at nominal level by two SDV. The peaks of pressure
are eliminated discharging the steam through 12 main safety valves.
The steam through SDVs-A and Main Safety Valves (MSV) is discharged
to the pressure suppression pools of the accident localisation system. All
models of steam discharge valves are connected to the “time depen-
dent” elements, which define boundary conditions in the turbine con-
densers or the pressure suppression pools of the accident localisation
system. The injection of feedwater into the DS and the injection of
Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) water into the GDHs is simu-
lated explicitly using RELAP5 “pipe”, “junction”, “volume” and “pump”
elements (not presented in this paper).
In the RELAP5 model of the Ignalina NPP the core is represented by
a number of equivalent channels. Heat structures of the equivalent fuel
channel simulate only the active region in the reactor core (top and
bottom reflectors are not modelled). The fuel rod is modelled with an
equivalent eight radial node model. Five of these radial nodes are for
the fuel pellet, one for the gap region and two for the cladding. The
vertical bundle option is used in heat structure description of fuel as-
sembly with 18 fuel rods. The fuel channel and the graphite stack are
modelled with an equivalent eight radial node model. Two of these
radial nodes are for the fuel channel wall, two for the gap and graphite
rings region and four for the graphite blocks. Fuel rod, fuel channel,
graphite rings and graphite blocks are modelled with 14 axial segments,
0.5 m in length each. The square graphite stack is represented by an
equivalent cylindrical volume. For the modelling of radiation heat
transfer between outer surface of fuel rods and inner surface of fuel
channel the special radiation/conduction model for RELAP5 was used.
Application of such model allows precisely describe the heat transfer
from the fuel rods to the fuel channel wall and to graphite stack for the
overhead fuel assemblies in case of dry out.
In the presented scheme the circuits of the CPS rods cooling and
radial reflector cooling are modelled explicitly. All 235 CPS rods
cooling channels are represented by one equivalent channel (16). The
elements (18) simulate 156 channels for radial reflector cooling having
a design of “Field’s pipe”. Water passes from CPS top storage tank (17)
and flows into the bottom storage tank (19).
Reactor cavity is formed by a metal structure of the reactor shell
together with bottom and top metal plates. The fuel and CPS channels
are located inside the holes of graphite columns. There are 2488 gra-
phite columns, which construct the reactor graphite stack. In the

4
A. Kaliatka and E. Ušpuras
Fig. 5. Station blackout. No operator actions are taken into account. Behaviour
of core components temperatures (Urbonavičius and Kaliatka, 2010).
presented RELAP5-3D model the graphite stack is simulated as a
thermal structure. Heat transfer among the equivalent fuel and CPS
channels is approximated by the heat transfer through the graphite
moderator gaps to the reactor cavity gas. This heat transfer in radial
direction is shown in Fig. 4 by arrows. This approach considers the
removal of decay heat from the graphite stack to CPS cooling circuit.
Also the heat structures to consider the heat removal from the equip-
ment located in DS compartments and from the pipelines are added to
the models of drum separators, steam-water piping and steam lines.
Thick lines mark the elements with the added heat structures.
The developed model considers four paths for the decay heat re-
moval from reactor core:
• heat removal from steam-water piping and steam drums by air
ventilation and spray of water (20) in drum separators compart-
ments,
• by direct water supply into the reactor cavity (21),
• heat transfer from fuel channels through CPS cooling circuit (17,
19),
• water supply in to the reactor cooling circuit (into GDH) from ECCS
hydro-accumulators (22), deaerators (25) and city water source
(23).
The non-regular sources of water, which could be supplied to RCS in
case of DBA are listed below. ECCS accumulators contain ∼200 m3.
There are 16 accumulators (pressurised tanks) with total volume of
25 m3 each, which is just more than half-full with water of ∼30 °C. The
remaining part of the volume is filled with nitrogen gas at 9.8 MPa
pressure. Approximately 170 m3 of water could be used to replenish
RCS coolant reserves. Because pressure in hydro accumulators is higher
as nominal pressure in RCS, the supply of water can be started even at
high pressure in RCS. After the depressurisation, the water in deaerators
could be used also. There are four deaerators, which contain 480 m3 of
water in one unit of RBMK-1500. Initial pressure in the deaerators is
1.2 MPa, water temperature is ∼190 °C. Also the city water could be
used for water supply to reactor cooling circuit. However, this water
source can be used only after deep depressurisation of RCS because the
excessive pressure in city water supply lines is approximately 0.6 MPa
and water temperature is ∼10 °C.
A more detailed description of the model is presented in articles
(Kaliatka and Uspuras, 2000). Presented models have been bench-
marked against several operational events, such as trip of all MCPs and
spurious opening of three MSVs, inadvertent actuation of ECCS
(Uspuras and Kaliatka, 2006; Urbonas et al., 2003), etc. in order to
provide confidence in the ability of the code to represent the plant re-
sponse to the emergency conditions correctly. The calculation results
obtained using Ignalina NPP RELAP5-3D model agree well with the
5
Nuclear Engineering and Design 354 (2019) 110165
measured plant data (Uspuras et al., 2003; 2004a,b).
4. Consequences of loss of long term cooling for RBMK
The unique design features of RBMK reactor affects the selection of
non-regular means for the reactor cooldown during beyond design-basis
accidents. Usually the means, which could be initiated manually and do
not require regular supply of electricity (passive equipment) are se-
lected. In other words – the selected means should be available in
station blackout case. On the other hand, the failures of core long-term
cooling (station blackout case) dominate above the accidents with loss
of coolant and are the main contributors to core damage frequency for
RBMK reactors. According to the Level 1 probabilistic safety assessment
of the Ignalina NPP, the conditional of Core Damage Frequency for loss
of long-term core cooling is 3.14∙10−6 per year (Uspuras et al., 2007).
Thus, all selected non-regular heat removal means at first should be
checked for the station blackout case. Below are briefly presented
consequences at loss of long term cooling accident without any addi-
tional actions of operators, directed to heat removal from the reactor.
This analysis allows to compare the influence of operator actions, dis-
cussed further in Section 6.
In the station blackout case due to loss of electrical power supply to
MCPs, the pumps of the service water system and feedwater supply are
switched-off. Station blackout case assumes the failure on start-up of all
diesel generators that leads to the unavailability of the ECCS pumps.
The reactor scram signal is activated due to signal of MCP trip. The
water is evaporating in the fuel channels due to decay heat, the gen-
erated steam is removed through main safety valves that keep the
nominal pressure in RCS. At the same time, as the coolant is lost by
evaporation, the cooling conditions of the fuel assemblies in the core
deteriorate. According RELAP/SCDAPSIM calculation, 3 h after the
beginning of the accident the failure of fuel channels is expected, be-
cause the pressure in RCS is nominal, and the critical temperature for
FC wall 650 °C will be reached (see Fig. 5). At that temperature the
zirconium – niobium alloy begins to deform plastically, what leads to
failure of FC walls. In the present analysis the opening of one safety
relief valve at time moment ∼3.8 h after the accident beginning by an
operator to discharge steam was assumed. Due to pressure decrease
after valve opening the rest of coolant in pipelines below reactor core
starts to boil and steam cools down the core for a short time span.
However, at time moment 4.3 h the second (repeated) heating-up of
core elements starts. After the depressurisation the accident scenario
would continue at low pressure in reactor cooling circuit. When the fuel
cladding temperatures increase to more than 900 °C (after 7 h from the
beginning of the accident) the failure of fuel claddings due to bal-
looning occurs. The ballooning occurs because at that time the pressure
in RCS (outside fuel rods) is close to atmospheric and the pressure in-
side fuel rods is high. At higher temperatures the cladding oxidation
(steam – zirconium reaction) starts. This process terminates after the
pressure in RCS, decrease down to atmospheric – this indicates that
there is no steam in RCS, thus, the steam-zirconium reaction is im-
possible. When the fuel claddings and fuel channels temperatures reach
1450 °C (after 20 h from the beginning of the accident), the melting of
stainless steel grids starts (see Fig. 5). Probably, the fuel channels will
fail at the same time. Due to station blackout the cooling of control rods
channels will be lost, thus the process of heat-up of control rods is in
parallel with FCs heat-up. At temperature 1930–2050 °C and 2330 °C
the melting of aluminium oxide (control rods claddings) and boron-
carbide (control rods elements) starts. The formation of ceramic starts
at 2600 °C. The analysis performed using RELAP5/SCDAPSIM code
shows that in case of station blackout the fuel melting starts at low
pressure 55 h after the beginning of the accident (Fig. 5).
A. Kaliatka and E. Ušpuras
5. Analysis of decay heat removal from the reactor core by
ventilation of drum separator compartments
The 830 pipes of SWP in one cooling loop with external diameter
76 mm and approximately length 27.4 m each, which are inside drum
separator compartments, create significant heat transfer area. The DS
compartments are equipped by ventilation system, which is normal
operation safety-related system. This ventilation system provides air
exchange in the reactor hall, directed air flow from reactor hall via slots
of reactor slab floor, removing possible radioactive pollutions in case of
leakage, cooling of servo-drives of control and protection system and
cooling steam water piping and DSs. Prior to being exhausted to the
ventilation stack the air is purified at aerosol filters. This exhaust
ventilation system, removing air with approximately capacity
48000 m3/h, is capable of maintaining necessary air condition in case
of normal reactor operation, when the air temperature in rooms of
drum-separators and steam-water piping is reaching 280 °C. The vo-
lume of air in reactor hall is 37000 m3, in each compartments of DSs
(the first and second cooling loop) – 6420 m3. The presented char-
acteristics of compartments and ventilation system ensures that decay
heat from the shutdown reactor (no earlier than 1 day after the reactor
shutdown) can be removed by employing this ventilation system. Such
type of reactor cooldown in technological regulation of RBMK-1500 is
called “cooldown in natural circulation mode” and it allows to maintain
the temperature of water in RCS below 100 °C.
The disadvantages of DSs compartments ventilation system are not
so high capacity of regular ventilation system and not availability of
such system in station blackout case. However, there is a possibility to
organise ventilation in these compartments based on natural circulation
of air. As it is presented in Fig. 6, there are two DS compartments (one
for each reactor side) at Ignalina NPP. Equipment and piping in the DS
compartments have considerable area of cooling: DS, steam header,
part of the steam lines, part of the downcomers, steam-water piping and
part of the channels, which are above the core. In nodalization, which is
showed in Fig. 4, above discussed equipment and pipes are marked by
thick lines. DS compartments are connected by SWP corridor (Fig. 6).
Both compartments at the top have five rupture panels, which open at
the excessive pressure in the compartments of 2 kPa. The area of panels
are of 20 m2 in each DS compartment. These panels allow to discharged
Fig. 6. DS compartment ventilation. Schematic view of the DS compartments.
6
Nuclear Engineering and Design 354 (2019) 110165
steam – water – air mixture to the accident steam release shaft. In the
ceilings of each steam relief shaft there are one or two pipes for air
release in case of accident. There are nine such 1800 mm diameter pipes
for each DS compartment. Each pipe is covered with a lid, which opens
at the excessive pressure of 1.5 kPa. Each DS compartment has four
doorways of 1.2 m2. Two doorways in each compartment are located at
the bottom and other two – approximately eight meter higher (Fig. 6).
DS compartments are connected with each other via SWP compart-
ments, where there is a connection to the reactor hall through the gaps
between the biological defence blocks – biological shielding. According
to the design, the effective area of gaps is 5 m2.
If mentioned doors, rupture panels and lids of pipe are open, natural
circulation of the air will be created in the DS compartments (it is
marked by arrows in Fig. 6). This natural circulation will be capable of
removing a part of decay heat, generated in the core. The effect will be
higher if the spray system for humidification of air will be installed. The
DS compartments ventilation analysis was performed using CONTAIN
code. The results of calculations with 68.6 kg/s water with temperature
of 30 °C through the spray to one DS compartment represents the total
heat removal capacity of about 10.5 MW.
Analysis of station blackout with DS compartments ventilation was
performed using RELAP5-3D model. It was assumed in the modelling
that approximately 1.5 h after the beginning of the accident (then the
fuel cladding temperature starts to increase) the 10.5 MW of heat starts
to be removed from hot outside surface area of DS, steam header, part
of the steam lines, part of the downcomers, steam-water piping and part
of the channels, which are above the core. The amount of removed heat
is approximately seven times smaller than heat generated in the core at
that time. The behaviour of fuel cladding temperatures in case of station
blackout without operators intervention and in case with ventilation of
DS compartments is compared in Fig. 7. As it is presented, the decrease
of temperatures due to ventilation is negligible.
Analyses results show that implementation of this measure would
not be expedient because:
• heat removal by means of ventilation is not effective;
• technically it is complicated to organise such natural ventilation in
case of station blackout – to equip sprays for air moistening and to
open mentioned doors, rupture panels and lids for air release in case
A. Kaliatka and E. Ušpuras
Fig. 7. DS compartment ventilation. Peak cladding temperature in the FC with
maximum power.
of accident in the case when even emergency diesel-generators are
not operated.
6. Analysis of decay heat removal from the reactor core by direct
water supply into the reactor cavity
The influence of direct water supply into the reactor cavity was
analysed for the station blackout case – as presented in previous Section
3. Sequence of the basic events and operating of the systems during first
1.5 h in the below presented case is similar as in the case with DS
compartments ventilation. It was assumed in the analysis that at the
moment of the beginning of core heat-up (1.6 h after the beginning of
the accident) the supply of water into the top part of the reactor cavity
through cavity venting system starts. Flow rate of water was assumed
equal 68.6 kg/s and temperature 30 °C. In this calculation the interac-
tion of cold water and hot graphite, which might lead to the degrada-
tion of the graphite stack, was not analysed. The aim of the performed
analysis was to evaluate the suitability of such kind of core cooling in
order to assess the possibility to remove the heat-up and melting of the
fuel rods, when other measures do not provide required cooling. This
kind of cooling is used only in the critical case. Advantage of such way
of accident management is that pressure in the RC is close to atmo-
spheric. It means that for water supply it is possible to use any non-
regular water sources at low pressure.
The performed analysis showed that by getting in the top part of
reactor cavity, water flows down along the outer surface of the graphite
stack into ring space between a reactor shell and stack. Gaps between
the graphite columns are very narrow (1.2 mm Almenas et al., 1998),
and the average temperature of the graphite blocks is higher than
400 °C when water supply starts. Because the pressure in reactor cavity
is close to atmospheric, the boiling of water starts and water cannot
penetrate inside the gaps between graphite columns (water flow
downwards along these small gaps is impossible). The calculation
shows that water flows through outside area of the graphite stack into
the bottom part of the reactor cavity and through the pipelines is re-
moved in to the reinforced leak-tight compartments of Accident Loca-
lisation System (see Fig. 8).
Injected water cools the metal structures of reactor cavity, bottom
and top graphite moderator blocks, the outer surface of radial graphite
reflector and is released through membrane safety devices. However,
because the water does not reach deep lines of the graphite blocks, the
rate of the fuel cladding heat up decreases insignificantly using this
water injection (see Fig. 9). Performed analysis results clearly indicate
that due to reactor cavity venting system (Fig. 8) design, proposed so-
lution of heat removal by direct water supply in to reactor cavity is not
feasible.
7
Nuclear Engineering and Design 354 (2019) 110165
Fig. 8. Direct water supply into the reactor cavity. Reactor cavity venting
system: 1 – top steam – gas removal pipes of reactor cavity venting system, 2 –
assumed water supply, 3 – reactor cavity, 4 – bottom steam – gas removal pipes,
5 – membrane safety devices.
Fig. 9. Direct water supply into the reactor cavity. Peak cladding temperature
in the FC with maximum power.
7. Modelling of heat transfer through the core graphite structures
of RBMK
As it was already mentioned, the FC, CPS channels, graphite re-
flector cooling channels and channels for instrumentation in RBMK
reactor core are housed in an assembly of graphite columns tightly
packed and forming the graphite stack (see Fig. 1). A stack of graphite
rings each having a radial slot thermally bridges the annular gap be-
tween FC and graphite block. The graphite columns in stack are sepa-
rated by a small (∼1 mm) gap. In RBMK reactors, during normal op-
eration approximately 95% of nuclear heat is generated in fuel pellets,
while the remaining 5% – in graphite columns.
There is a gas stream passing through the gaps between adjacent
graphite columns and the annular gaps between FCs and graphite
blocks. The gas enters the stack at the reactor cavity inlet and is re-
moved through the fuel channel integrity monitoring system. During
normal operation the reactor cavity is filled by the nitrogen–helium
mixture at 0.5–2 kPa, that allows to improve heat removal from the
graphite stack and protects the graphite stack from oxidation at high
temperatures. The composition of gases could be changed depending on
operational regimes – at full power the content of the mixture is ap-
proximately 40% of helium and 60% of nitrogen by volume fraction
(Almenas et al., 1998). Such design of RBMK core allows to transfer
heat from the channels with higher temperature fuel assembly in radial
direction through graphite blocks and gaps into adjacent channels with
lower temperature.
For modelling of heat transfer in radial direction through graphite
A. Kaliatka and E. Ušpuras
Fig. 10. Heat transfer from FCs to cooled CPS channel: 1 – fuel channel with
fuel assembly, 2 – hole in graphite block, 3 – graphite block, 4 – CPS channel
with control rod.
structures in RBMK reactors the “multidimensional heat conduction
model” in RELAP5-3D code is used (Paik, 1999). Such general lumped
heat conduction enclosure model in RELAP5-3D solves the governing
equation for the heat conduction, which for the i becomes as follows:
Tin + 1 − Tin
M
Tin + 1 − Tin
(ρCp V )i + ∑ Ai Fm = Sin
Δt m=1
hm
where: ρ, Cp, and V represents the density, heat capacitance, and vo-
lume of the graphite column respectively, hm represents the gap re-
sistance between the heat structures and Fm is the fraction of the ad-
jacent heat structure m in contact with the heat structure i. Verification
of the model has been performed by using conceptual problems that
have exact solutions (Fedosov et al., 1994; Davis, 1996).
For establishing the gas gap conductance between the adjacent
graphite blocks (see Fig. 10) the additional calculation was performed.
The problem consists of two graphite blocks separated by a gap. The gas
gap is filled with gas mixture (40% of He and 60% of N2 by volume
fraction). The heat transfer coefficient of gas gap (gap conductance) can
be expressed:
λ
α= e
δ (2)
where:
λ e = λ gas ·εk
In Eq. (3) λgas is the thermal conductivity coefficient of gas, εk is the
convection coefficient.
Convection coefficient is equal to:
εk = c·(Grδ ·Prδ )n
where coefficient c and exponent n depend from Grashof number (Grδ)
and Prandtl number (Prδ) for the gap product. If Grδ·Prδ < 1·103, then
c = 1.0, n = 0.0. If 1·103 ≤ Grδ·Prδ < 1·106, then c = 0.105, n = 0.3.
If 1·106 ≤ Grδ·Prδ ≤ 1·1010, then c = 0.4, n = 0.2.
Since for He and N2 gas Grδ·Prδ < 1·103, then εk = 1 and λe = λgas.
According to RBMK designers (Krajushkin, 1998), thermal conductivity
coefficient can be expressed as follows:
λ gas = (a + b·Tav )·10−3,
where coefficients a and b depend on the He concentration (for the gas
mixture 40% of He and 60% of N2 a = 58 and b = 0.09), Tav – average
gas temperature in the gap (it is assumed that the gas temperature is
Nuclear Engineering and Design 354 (2019) 110165
equal to the average temperature of the graphite surface 750 K).
Using Eq. (5) we obtain that λgas = 0.1255 W/m K. Then heat
transfer coefficient of the gas gap (according to Eq. (2)) α = 104.6 W/
m2 K. This value of the determined heat transfer coefficient was used in
the “Heat Conductance” model of the RELAP5-3D input, set for the si-
mulation of the problem. Such heat transfer coefficient was calculated
for steady state conditions and may be impacted by change of graphite
temperature. Due to high thermal inertia of graphite, the temperature
of graphite columns changes very slowly, thus the calculated value can
be used also for transients. On the other hand, in long-term loss of heat
removal accidents the graphite columns temperature is increasing. This
leads to increase of heat transfer coefficient of the gas gap between
graphite columns. In below presented RELAP5-3D analysis the constant
value of such coefficient was used, thus the calculated amount of
transferred heat is slightly decreased (in other words the results of
calculations are conservative estimated). In the E. Knoglinger et al.
paper (Knoglinger et al., 2015) more precise calculation of conductive
and combined radiative/conductive gap conductance are presented. It
is demonstrated in Knoglinger et al. (2015) that above presented sim-
plified approach, used in RELAP5-3D calculation, gives similar results
as more precise MathCAD calculation.
The above described approach for modelling of heat transfer in
radial direction through graphite structures in RBMK reactors using
RELAP5-3D code allows to evaluate the amount of heat which could be
removed from fuel channels by cooling of CPS channels. On the other
hand, the heat removal by employing CPS channels cooling circuit is
possible. 211 CPS channels in RBMK-1500 are distributed evenly in the
reactor core (see Fig. 3). As it was mentioned, control rods channels are
filled with water supplied by the low pressure system totally in-
dependent from the RCS. Thus, the large break in reactor cooling
(1)
system does not disturb usage of the CPS cooling circuit. The proportion
between channels with fuel assemblies and channels with control rods
for RBMK-1500 reactor is 1661/211 = 7.87. Thus, we can assume that
one CPS channel is environed by 8 FCs. The heat from fuel channels,
where heat is generated, through graphite blocks is transferred in radial
direction to cooled CPS channels (see Fig. 10).
To evaluate all possibilities of heat removal by employing CPS
channels cooling circuit, two cases were analysed:
• When the CPS channels cooling system is in operation;
• In case of long term station blackout.
7.1. Evaluation of amount of heat which could be removed by employing
cooling through CPS channels if CPS cooling system is in operation
For the evaluation of amount of heat, which could be removed by
employing cooling through CPS channels if CPS cooling system is in
operation, the hypothetical large break loss of coolant accident with
(3)
failure of all active emergency core cooling systems was analysed. The
maximum design break for RBMK-1500 is the guillotine break of MCP
pressure header. It is assumed that in this case only two means for re-
actor cool-down are available: injection of ∼180 m3 of water from
ECCS hydro-accumulators and availability of CPS channels cooling
(4)
circuit with capacity of heat removal 28.5 MW. Such heat removal is
possible only in the case if the circulation pumps and heat exchangers in
CPS cooling system are available.
The pathways of coolant flows in case of this event are presented in
Fig. 11. It is assumed in the modelling that before the accident the
reactor operates at maximum allowed thermal power level 4200 MW.
Because we assumed that CPS cooling system was in operation, the
supply of water into CPS channels made the coolant to maintain the
constant temperature in these channels. It was assumed that these
(5)
channels were always filled with boiling water.
The amount of heat which is transferred from fuel channels through
graphite blocks in radial direction to CPS channels, was calculated
using RELAP5-3D code. The calculated behaviour of peak temperatures
8
A. Kaliatka and E. Ušpuras
Fig. 11. MCP pressure header break with failure of ECCS (except ECCS hydro-
accumulators): 1 – pressure header break; 2 – discharge of coolant from drum
separators in the affected loop; 3 – discharge of coolant from bottom part of
reactor cooling circuit in the affected loop; 4, 5 – supply of water from ECCS
hydro-accumulators; 6 – supply of steam from DSs in the intact loop; 7 – circuit
for cooling of rods in reactor control and protection system.
Fig. 12. MCP pressure header break with failure of ECCS pumps. CPS cooling
system is in operation. Behaviour of peak temperatures of fuel, cladding, FC
wall, graphite columns and CPS channel wall. Amount of heat transferred from
fuel channels to 211 CPS channels.
of fuel, cladding, FC wall, graphite columns and CPS channel wall in
this case within the first 16 h is presented in Fig. 12. As it is shown in
this figure, after the temperature in graphite columns with FC starts
increasing, the temperature of graphite columns with CPS also starts to
increase but with some delay. This indicates that the heat from the
overheated fuel channels is transferred in radial direction through the
graphite columns and the gas gaps between these graphite columns into
the cooled CPS channels, as shown schematically in Fig. 11. The heat
transfer coefficient in the gas gap was assumed α = 104.6 W/m2•K
based on the calculations above. The temperature of graphite columns
with CPS channels is always lower than the temperature of graphite
columns with FC. Before the accident (during normal reactor opera-
tion), the temperature difference of the graphite columns with CPS
channels and the graphite columns containing fuel channels is equal to
approximately 100 °C and only approximately 5–6 MW of heat is re-
moved from reactor core by CPS channel cooling system (see Fig. 12).
In case of the accident, after dry-out and overheating of fuel channels
9
Nuclear Engineering and Design 354 (2019) 110165
Fig. 13. MCP pressure header break with failure of ECCS pumps. CPS cooling
system is in operation. Behaviour of fuel, cladding, FC wall and graphite
column temperatures for fuel channels with the average 2.53 MW power level.
(the cooling of CPS channels is available), the temperature difference
between CPS and FC graphite columns starts to increase. This leads to
increasing of amount of removed heat from hot FCs. As it is presented in
Fig. 12, in case of accident, the amount of removed heat increases up to
37 MW. This value was calculated without taking into account the
limitation of the capacity of heat exchangers of CPS cooling circuit. The
maximum capacity of these heat exchangers is 28.5 MW.
The analysis of transient in reactor fuel channels in case of above
mentioned beyond design-basis accident, when part of decay heat is
removed by employing the cooling of CPS channels, was performed
using RELAP5 code full RCS model (see Fig. 4). It was assumed in this
calculation that CPS cooling system could remove up to 28.5 MW heat
from CPS cooling circuit. Thus, the heat from hot FC is removed in
radial direction through the complicated system of core components:
the wall of FC, the graphite column which surround this channel, the
gas gap between adjacent graphite columns, the graphite column which
surround the CPS channel and the wall of CPS channel’s. The tem-
perature behaviour of fuel, cladding, FC wall and graphite column
temperatures for the fuel channel with the initial average 2.53 MW
power level is presented in Fig. 13. It is necessary to mention that at
beginning of the accident in the affected loop the coolant flow rate is
affected by water injection from hydro-accumulators. At approximately
20 – 40 min after beginning of accident the dry-out and overheating of
core components is started due to the loss of coolant in both loops of
RCS. At this moment the heat removal from CPS channels cooling
system remains the only mean for the reactor cooldown. Because the
decay heat rapidly decreases due to the reactor shutdown, after ap-
proximately 15 h from the beginning of the accident the capacity of CPS
cooling system exceeds the decay heat (Fig. 14). This explains, while at
this moment the temperatures of reactor components are stabilized and
later start to be decreased slowly (Fig. 13). The cool down process is
very slow because after the decrease of graphite columns’ temperature
the temperature gradient from fuel channels to control rods channels is
decreasing as well and the amount of removed heat is decreasing.
As it is presented in Fig. 13, due to the removal of heat from CPS
channels, the peak fuel temperatures are below 1000 °C. Failure of fuel
claddings is possible in some fuel channels. The failures are possible due
to ballooning of claddings at high cladding temperature and high
pressure difference across the cladding (high pressure of gases inside
fuel rods and low pressure outside – in RCS). The walls of FCs remains
intact even at high temperatures, because the pressures in RCS and
inside fuel channels is close to the atmospheric pressure. So, the gra-
phite stack is an efficient heat sink and slows down the heat-up of the
core. Conclusively the heat removal using CPS channels cooling circuit
prevents melting and serious damage of reactor core. On the contrary, if
A. Kaliatka and E. Ušpuras
Fig. 14. MCP pressure header break with failure of ECCS pumps. Comparison of
reactor decay heat with capacity of heat removal from core by CPS cooling
circuit.
Fig. 15. MCP pressure header break with failure of ECCS pumps. No operator
actions are taken into account. Behaviour of core components temperatures
(Urbonavičius and Kaliatka, 2010).
heat from the reactor control rods channels is not removed, melting of
fuel starts 45 h after the beginning of such accident (see Fig. 15).
7.2. Evaluation of amount of heat which could be removed by employing
cooling through CPS channels in case of long term station blackout
In the station blackout case all electrical equipment (pumps, elec-
trically operated valves, etc.) are not in operation. Station blackout case
assumes the failure on start-up of all diesel generators, which leads to
the unavailability of the ECCS pumps. Due to station blackout the water
supply in the CPS rods cooling channels is interrupted due to loss of
power to pumps. The control rods will be cooled the first 10 min by
water flow from the top distribution tank of CPS because of water re-
source in this tank. There is only possibility to supply water into control
rods channels from the Additional Hold-down System (AHS), which is
passive system, designed a few years before start of Ignalina NPP de-
commissioning.
For the simulation of heat transfer between fuel channels and CPS
channels the RBMK-1500 model (see Fig. 4), developed by using
RELAP5-3D code (Almenas et al., 1998) was used. The CPS channels
(16) with surrounding graphite column is modelled by “pipe” element
with heat structure. The water is supplied from Additional Hold-down
System water tank, which is elevated 30 m up to the bottom of reactor
core, through bottom distribution header into the bottom part of CPS
10
Nuclear Engineering and Design 354 (2019) 110165
Fig. 16. Station blackout analysis. CPS channels are cooled by water supply
from AHS tank. Behaviour of peak temperatures of fuel, cladding, FC wall,
graphite columns and CPS channel wall.
channels. The water flowing upwards removes the heat from the
channels and starts to boil. The steam from the CPS channel is released
to top distribution header with atmospheric pressure. The heat transfer
from the hot FCs to the cooled CPS channel through the graphite
column and the gas gap in radial direction is modelled by special
“multidimensional heat conduction” model of RELAP5-3D.
In the station blackout case the reactor scram signal is activated due
to signal of MCP trip. All active reactor core cooling and feedwater
supply systems are unavailable. The pressure in RCS remains nominal
after the accident. The water is evaporating in the fuel channels due to
decay heat and the generated steam is removed through partially
opened two SDVs-A, which maintain the nominal pressure in RCS. At
the same time, the water supply in the CPS rods cooling channels is
interrupted due to loss of power to pumps. The control rods will be
cooled during the first 10 min by water flow from the CPS top storage
tank (see element (17) in Fig. 4) because of water resource in this tank.
After emptying this tank the temperature of CPS channels walls is in-
creasing (see Fig. 16). It was assumed that the AHS tank was connected
to CPS channels 1 h after the beginning of the accident. There is a
possibility to replenish this AHS tank by city water system, which uses
another independent supply of electricity. It takes 10 additional min-
utes for water to enter the bottom part of CPS channels. The supplied
water starts to boil and steam will escape through pipelines, connected
to the top part of channels. At the moment the water supply in to CPS
channels is started, the control rods and walls of CPS channels are al-
ready hot. As it is presented in Fig. 16, the CPS channel wall tem-
perature in the bottom part reaches approximately 400 °C. It is because
these channels have received heat from the hot graphite stack. The
temperature of FCs walls is lower (∼300 °C), because the rest of water
from RCS cools fuel channels at this period. After the start of water
supply, the bottom part of CPS channels will be cooled. The water in
CPS channels removes the heat from graphite columns, thus the tem-
perature of the graphite columns of the CPS channel is below the
temperature of graphite columns of the fuel channels (Fig. 16). The part
of heat from FCs is transferred in radial direction through graphite
columns and gaps between graphite columns into the cooled CPS
channels. However, the flow rate of water from AHS tank is not suffi-
cient for effective cooling of CPS channels – as it is presented in Fig. 16,
the temperature of fuel, FC walls, CPS channels walls and graphite in
the top part is continuously increasing, starting from t = 2 h. In the
present analysis the opening of one SDV-A on full capacity (full
opening) at the moment of ∼3.8 h after the accident beginning by an
operator to discharge steam was assumed. This is necessary de-
pressurisation means, which prevents rupture of fuel channels (see
Section 3).
17 h after the beginning of the accident the peak CPS channel wall
A. Kaliatka and E. Ušpuras
Fig. 17. Station blackout analysis. CPS channels are cooled by water supply
from AHS tank. Heat transferred from fuel channels to 211 CPS channels.
temperature reaches 1000 °C (see Fig. 16). To prevent generation of
huge amount of hydrogen, the operator should stop the water supply
into CPS channels at this moment. As it is shown in Fig. 17, the max-
imum capacity of heat removal in such way is equal to 15 MW (the
water is supplied into 211 CPS channels). The decay heat, generated in
the reactor, is decreased down to such power level only approximately
100 h after the beginning of the accident (see Fig. 14). Thus, the eva-
luation of such so called “Weak Heat Conduction Mechanism” (the
water supply from AHS tank into CPS channels) in case of station
blackout is not effective enough and cannot remove all heat from re-
actor core, but such restoration of water supply into CPS channels al-
lows to slowdown the core heat-up process and may be used in parallel
with other measures.
Below is presented an example, how the complex non-regular means
could be used to cooldown the RBMK-1500 reactor in case of station
blackout. Under the non-regular means the water injection into fuel
channels from ECCS hydro-accumulators, deaerators and city water
system is assumed. These non-regular means are modelled in the
Ignalina NPP model of for thermal-hydraulic analysis of processes in
RCS (see elements (22, 25 and 23) in Fig. 4).
Variation of key parameters is presented in Figs. 18–20. The se-
quence of events is presented in Table 2. Change of temperatures of the
core components and heat removal from the reactor core through 211
CPS channels of cooling circuit is presented in Figs. 18 and 19. As it is
presented, the heat removal from FC during normal operation is
5–6 MW and depends on the temperatures difference between graphite
columns of FC and CPS channels. At the moment CPS channels are dry
out and heated up, the heat removal becomes negative – the heat from
graphite columns of CPS channels is transferred into FC. This is because
Fig. 18. Station blackout case. Heat removal using CPS channels, Water supply
from ECCS hydro-accumulators, deaerators and city water system. Heat trans-
ferred from fuel channels to 211 CPS channels.
11
Nuclear Engineering and Design 354 (2019) 110165
at the beginning of the accidents the fuel channels are cooled better and
the temperature of graphite columns with fuel channels are less as
graphite columns with CPS channels. In case of station blackout the
operators can recognize several symptoms indicating loss of power.
There is a developed procedure at Ignalina NPP for operator actions in
case of station blackout. The first signal for operators’ actions is water
level decrease in DSs. This signal indicates the absence of feed water
supply. Thus, it was assumed that shortly after water level decrease in
DSs up to value “–1000 mm” (t = 16 min.), the operator connected
ECCS hydro-accumulators to both loops of RCS. Because of pressure
difference between ECCS hydro-accumulators and GDH, approximately
50 m3 of water from hydro-accumulators is supplied into FC. It was
assumed that at the moment of t = 1 h, operator connected AHS system
tank with the bottom header of PS channels for control rods and
channels cooling. Unfortunately, these measures are not effective en-
ough and the water level in RCS (see element (24) in Fig. 4) is decreased
below the middle of reactor core after approximately 80 min (t = 1.4 h)
from the beginning of accident. As it is presented in Fig. 19, at this time
the temperatures of fuel, fuel rod cladding and FC walls start to in-
crease. The heat up of channels leads to the beginning of slow increase
of graphite columns’ temperature (Fig. 19). Pressure of the coolant in
the main circulation circuit at this time is equal about 7 MPa (see
Fig. 20). The increase of fuel rod cladding temperature up to 400 °C is
the signal for operators, indicating inadequate cooling of fuel assem-
blies. There are two special thermocouples for measuring of fuel rod
cladding temperature in the core of RBMK-1500. Thus, it was assumed
at the modelling that after exceeding of this 400 °C temperature
(t = 1.5 h after the beginning of accident), the operator opens one
steam discharge valve manually. This operator action allows to start
depressurization of RCS and prevents further increase of temperature
and multiple failures of fuel channels. After opening of steam discharge
valve RCS pressure is decreased, which is favourable conditions for
further water supply from ECCS hydro-accumulators (Fig. 20). Totally
approximately 177 m3 of water is supplied from ECCS hydro-accumu-
lators. Additionally, pressure decrease in RCS leads to boiling up of
water in lower water pipelines. Steam is supplied into FC that improves
conditions of cooling. Thus, pressure decrease and water inflow from
ECCS hydro-accumulators for some time period improves the cooling of
core components (Fig. 19). During modelling it was assumed that ap-
proximately 3 h after beginning of accident the operators connected
deaerators to GDH of both RCS loops. Deaerators are connected through
the check valves and water supply from deaerators is started right after
pressure decrease in RCS below the pressure in deaerators. At modelling
was assumed, that initial pressure in deaerators was 1.29 MPa and
water temperature is close to temperature of saturation – 190 °C. These
parameters keep constants by the beginning of water supply from
deaerators. As it is presented in Figs. 19 and 20, the water inflow from
deaerators starts later, approximately 4 h after the beginning of acci-
dent. Water inflow from deaerators stabilizes pressure in RCS. The
water flow rate from deaerators into one RCS loop is about 8.5 kg/s.
Such flow rate of hot water does not sufficiently cool the fuel channels.
The operator knows that the connection of deaerators do not leads to
the fuel temperature decrease. Therefore, for improvement of cooling
conditions it is necessary to increase the flow rate of water from
deaerators by opening of second steam discharge valve. At modelling
was assumed that the operator undertakes such action later about 5 h
after the beginning of accident. The operator is obliged to undertake
such action because the temperature of fuel rod cladding during long-
term period increases above 500 °C (Fig. 19). Opening of second steam
discharge valve leads to increase of water supply from deaerators and to
reduction of temperatures (Fig. 19). Totally approximately 480 m3 of
water is supplied from deaerators in to RCS. At modelling was assumed
that water supply from city water system in fuel channels through GDH
was connected after pressure decrease in RCS up to 0.59 MPa (Fig. 20).
The big difference of pressure between a water source and GDH is
undesirable because of a possibility of water hammer occurrence. As it
A. Kaliatka and E. Ušpuras
Fig. 19. Station blackout case. Heat removal using CPS channels, Water supply from ECCS hydro-accumulators, deaerators and city water system. Behaviour of core
components temperatures.
is presented in the figures, water supply from city water system starts
after approximately 9 h from the beginning of accident and it results
into decrease of temperatures of the core components (Fig. 19). At the
time moment t = 10 h, the ECCS hydro-accumulators and deaerators
are already empty and city water supply system remains only available
non-regular mean for RCS cooling. Later, approximately 12 h after the
beginning of the accident, steam condensation in RCS occurs due to
pressure decrease in RCS (Fig. 20). Due to cooldown of reactor com-
ponent, the flow rate of inflowing city water considerably exceeds the
steam flow rate discharge through two steam discharge valves. This
leads to the beginning of RCS filling by water and this means that re-
actor is cooldown successfully. This clearly shows the suitability of
selected measures to prevent the core damage (see Section 3). In more
detail these accidents management measures are analysed in Uspuras
et al. (2006), Urbonavičius et al. (2010).
8. Conclusions
In this paper the unique design features of boiling, graphite mod-
erator, light water, channel type RBMK reactors are presented. It is
shown that low specific power per core volume and high heat capacity
of core due to a large amount of graphite, have a certain impact on the
Fig. 20. Station blackout case. Heat removal using CPS channels, Water supply from ECCS hydro-accumulators, deaerators and city water system. Behaviour of
pressure in reactor components.
12
Nuclear Engineering and Design 354 (2019) 110165
heat removal from RBMK reactor core during beyond design-basis ac-
cidents. Four possible paths for the decay heat removal from reactor
core were analysed:
• by air ventilation in drum separators compartments,
• by direct water supply into the reactor cavity,
• heat transfer from fuel channels through CPS cooling circuit,
• de-pressurisation of the reactor coolant system and water supply
using complex of non-regular means.
The analysis required employment of a few computer codes: use of
RELAP5 code allowed to perform thermal-hydraulic analysis using de-
tailed reactor cooling system model; RELAP/SCDAPSIM code was ne-
cessary for modelling of core damage progression; RELAP5-3D code
with special “multidimensional heat conduction” model allowed to
model heat transfer from hot fuel channels through graphite column in
radial direction. CONTAIN code was used for the analysis of DS com-
partments ventilation to evaluate the possibility to remove the heat
from outer surface of drum separators and steam – water piping.
The performed analyses showed that decay heat removal from the
core by ventilation of DS compartments and decay heat removal from
the core by direct water supply into the reactor cavity are inexpedient
A. Kaliatka and E. Ušpuras
Table 2
The sequence of events at station blackout.
Time Event
0.0 Station blackout occurs;
10 min. CPS channels are completely dry out;
16 min. The water level in DS from initial decreases to value “–1000 mm”;
17 min. The operator connects ECCS hydro-accumulators to both RCS loops;
1h Water supply from city water system into CPS channels through pipelines of AHS starts. Value of 0.03 kg/s through one channel is reached in 10 min;
1.53 h The peak temperature of fuel rod cladding reaches 400 °C;
1.65 h The operator opens one steam discharge valve manually;
2.58 h The water level in ECCS hydro-accumulators drops on 0.5 m according indication – the operator starts closing valves on the lines of water supply from
ECCS hydro-accumulators into GDH;
2.75 h Pressure in RCS decreases up to 3 MPa;
4h The start of water inflow from deaerators;
5.3 h Opening of second steam discharge valve;
9.1 h The start of water inflow from city water system into FC;
9.3 h Emptying of deaerators;
12.1 h Temperature of graphite decreases down to 200 °C;
for the beyond design-basis accidents management. The ventilation of
drum separator compartments and direct water supply into the reactor
cavity are not sufficient to remove the decay heat from the core. DSs
compartments ventilation could be used when the reactor decay heat is
low (least one day after reactor shutdown). The cooldown of graphite
stack by water is not feasible due to reactor cavity venting system de-
sign, the ventilation of graphite stack using reactor gas circuit is also
very no effective. Because of low specific heat capacity of gases (mix-
ture of nitrogen and helium) the amount of heat, removed using gases is
insignificant, comparing to the reactor decay heat.
The heat removal from FCs through graphite blocks and gas gaps
between blocks to cooled control rods channel could be used if CPS
cooling system is in operation. The maximum capacity of these heat
exchangers is 28.5 MW. Such capacity allows to prevent increase of
reactor structures temperature above 1000 °C. Unfortunately, if CPS
cooling system is not in operation (in case of station blackout) and CPS
channels are cooled by water supply from AHS tank, the maximum
capacity of heat removal is equal to 15 MW. Thus, such non-regular
mean could be used together by water supply from ECCS hydro-accu-
mulators, deaerators and city water system. In long-term loss of coolant
case it is very important to depressurise reactor core cooling circuit. The
opening of steam discharge devices allows to prevent failure of fuel
channel and increase of water supply into fuel channels.
The results of performed analyses were used in preparation of mi-
tigation measures for the RBMK-1500 accident management pro-
gramme. The analyses are performed for the RBMK-1500 reactor, but
received conclusions are valid for RBMK-1000 also.
Funding
This research was funded by the Lithuanian Energy Institute.
Declaration of Competing Interest
None.
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