Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. SB-14-21-J September 23, 2014
[Formerly A.M. No. 13-10-06-SB]
RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE HEARING HELD ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2013 AGAINST
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG, SANDIGANBAYAN
DECISION

PER CURIAM:

The character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.

- Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes

This administrative complaint was filed by the Court En Banc after investigation into certain allegations that surfaced during the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee Hearing indicated prima facie violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct by an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. The investigation
was conducted motu proprio pursuant to the Court's power of administrative supervision over members of the Judiciary. 1

Factual Antecedents

In the middle of 2013, the local media ran an expose involving billions of government funds channeled through bogus foundations. Dubbed as the "pork
barrel scam," as the money was sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund allotted to members of the House of Representatives and
Senate, the controversy spawned massive protest actions all over the country. In the course of the investigation conducted by the Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee), the names of certain government officials and other individuals were
mentioned by "whistle-blowers" who are former employees of the alleged mastermind, Janet Lim-Napoles (Mrs. Napoles), wife of an ex-military officer.
These personalities identified by the whistle-blowers allegedly transacted with or attended Mrs. Napoles' parties and events, among whom is incumbent
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, herein respondent.

Benhur Luy (Luy), a cousin of Mrs. Napoles who had worked for several years with the Napoleses, filed illegal detention charges against Mrs. Napoles
who accused him of double-dealing. When Luy went public with his story about Mrs. Napoles' anomalous transactions and before the warrant of arrest
was issued by the court, she reportedly tried to reach out to the other whistle-blowers for them not to testify against her but instead point to Luy as the
one receiving and distributing the money.

Marina Sula (Sula) executed a Sworn Statement2 before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on August 29, 2013, part of which reads:

32. In the sixteen (16) years that I worked with Ms. Napoles, I witnessed several personalities visit our offices and join us as our special guests
during our parties and other special occasions. 33. These personalities who would either visit our office or join our events and affairs are:
Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Jinggoy Estrada and family, Senator Bong Revilla, Lani Mercado-Revilla, Bryan Revilla, Secretary Rene Villa,
Congressman Pichay and Wife, Congressman Plaza, Congressman Ducut, DAR Director Theresita Panlilio, Catherine Mae Canlas Santos,
Pauline Labayen, Jen Corpuz (Staff of Senator Sotto), Mayor Rene Maglanque, Atty. Dequina, Justice Gregory Ong, x x x.

34. Before the warrant of arrest was issued against Ms. Napoles, she told us that that case could take four to five years to clear. She said,
"Antayin niyo munang ma-clear pangalan ko para makakilos ako at matulungan ko kayo". Sinabi niya na meron na siyang kausap sa
Ombudsman at sa Sandiganbayan.

35. On 28 August 2013 while me and my companions were at the NBI, Janet Lim Napoles called me. She was crying and ask[i]ng me not to
turn my back on her, that we should stay together. She said "kahit maubos lahat ng pera ko, susuportahan ko kayo. Hintay[i]n nyo kasi lalabas
na ang TRO ko."

xxxx

38. Attorney Tan instructed us to implicate Benhur in case we were asked by the NBI. He said "wala naman ipinakita sa inyong masama si
Madam (Janet Lim Napoles). Siguro wala naman kayong sama ng loob kay madam, kaya nga idiin ninyo si Benhur na siya ang nag-utos at
saka sa kanya ninyo ibinibigay ang pera."3(Emphasis supplied.)

The following day, the social news network Rappler published an article by Aries Rufo entitled "Exclusive: Napoles Parties with Anti-Graft Court Justice"
showing a photograph of Senator Jinggoy Estrada (Senator Estrada), one of the main public figures involved in the pork barrel scam, together with Mrs.
Napoles and respondent. The reporter had interviewed respondent who quickly denied knowing Mrs. Napoles and recalled that the photograph was
probably taken in one of the parties frequently hosted by Senator Estrada who is his longtime friend. Respondent also supposedly admitted that given
the ongoing pork barrel controversy, the picture gains a different context; nevertheless, he insisted that he has untainted service in the judiciary, and
further denied he was the one advising Mrs. Napoles on legal strategies in connection with the Kevlar helmet cases where she was acquitted by a
Division of the Sandiganbayan of which respondent is the Chairman and the then Acting Presiding Justice. 4

On September 12, 2013, Sula executed a "Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay " 5 wherein she gave details regarding those persons named in her
sworn statement, alleged to have visited their office or attended their events, thus:

63) T: Ayon sa paragraph Nos. 32 at 33 ng iyong sinumpaang salaysay na may petsang 29 Agosto 2013, nabanggit mo ang mga personalidad na
nakikita mong bumibisita sa inyong opisina o di kaya naman sa tuwing may party o special occacions si JANET NAPOLES ay may mga special guests
kayo na kinabibilangan ng mga malalaking pulitiko at ang iba naman ay may mga katungkulan sa gobyerno. Maari mo bang ilahad ang mga pangyayari
sa mga bawat pagkakataon na nakita mo sila sa iyong pagkaka-alala?

S : Opo, iisa-isahin ko po ang mga pangyayari sa mga pagkakataon na nakita ko po ang mga taong nabanggit ko:

xxxx

w) Justice GREGORY ONG - Isang beses ko po siyang nakitang nagpunta sa office sa 2501 Discovery Centre, Ortigas at nakita ko po silang
magkausap ni Madam JANET NAPOLES sa conference room.

x x x x6

In her testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee on September 26, 2013, Sula was asked to confirm her statement regarding Justice Ong,
thus:

THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Grace.

Isang tanong lang kay Ms. Sula.

Sinabi niyo kanina may tinawagan si Ms. Napoles at sinabi niya, "Malapit na lumabas yung TRO galing sa korte." May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles
sa ltuwes sa korte sa Sandiganbayan? MS. SULA. Hindi ko po alam.

THE CHAIRMAN. Your attention is called sa page –

MS. SULA. Sandiganbayan po, sorry. Mayroon po siyang binanggit na ano po –

THE CHAIRMAN. Nandito sa page 20.

MS. SULA. Si Mr. Ong, po, Justice Ong po.

THE CHAIRMAN. Gregory Ong.

MS. SULA Opo.

THE CHAIRMAN. Sa Sandiganbayan?

MS. SULA. Opo.

x x x7 (Emphasis supplied.)

In a letter dated September 26, 2013 addressed to Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, respondent meticulously explained the controversial
photograph which raised questions on his integrity as a magistrate, particularly in connection with the decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan' s Fourth
Division in the Kevlar helmet cases, which convicted some of the accused but acquitted Mrs. Napoles.

Respondent surmised that the photograph was taken during the birthday of Senator Estrada in February, either in the year 2012 or 2013, but definitely
not in 2010 or earlier. He explained that he could vaguely remember the circumstances but it would have been rude for him to prevent any guest from
posing with him and Senator Estrada during the party. On the nature of his association with Mrs. Napoles, respondent asserted:

(4) I can categorically state, on the other hand, that I have never attended any party or social event hosted by Mrs. Napoles or her family, either before
she had a case with our court, or while she already had a pending case with our court, or at any time afterwards. I have never, to use the term of Mr.
Rufo in his article, "partied" with the Napoleses. (Emphasis supplied.)

As to the Kevlar helmet cases, respondent said it was impossible for him to have been advising Mrs. Napoles, as claimed by Mr. Rufo, as even the
article itself noted that Mrs. Napoles' own brother, Reynald L. Lim, ( a.k.a. Reynaldo L. Francisco), a co-accused in the case, was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan. He stressed that these cases were decided on the merits by the Sandiganbayan, acting as a collegial body and he was not even the
ponente of the decision. Respondent thus submitted himself to the discretion of the Chief Justice such that even without being required to submit an
explanation, he voluntarily did so "to defend [his] reputation as a judge and protect the Sandiganbayan as an institution from unfair and malicious
innuendos."

On October 7, 2013, Chief Justice Sereno wrote the Members of this Court, citing the testimonies of Luy and Sula before the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee "[t]hat the malversation case involving Mrs. Janet Lim-Napoles, Major Jaime G. Napoles, Jenny Lim Napoles, Reynaldo L. Francisco and
other perpetrators was 'fixed' (inayos) through the intervention of Justice Gregory S. Ong of the Sandiganbayan", to wit:

SEN. ANGARA. Sa inyo, hindi niyo a/am kung inayos iyong kaso na iyon? Kasi napakaraming koneksiyon, 'di ba?

xxxx Sige, huwag kang matakot, Benhur.

MR. LUY. Alam ko, inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa Sandiganbayan

SEN. ANGARA. Okay.

xxxx

THE CHAIRMAN. xxx Sinabi niyo kanina na may tinawagan si Ms. Napoles at sinabi niya "Malapit na lumabas yung TRO galing sa korte." May kilala pa
ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa huwes sa korte sa Sandiganbayan?

xxxx

MS. SULA. Si Mr. Ong po, Justice Ong po.

THE CHAIRMAN. Gregory Ong.

MS. SULA. Opo.

THE CHAIRMAN. Sa Sandiganbayan?

MS. SULA. Opo.

Xxxx8
Chief Justice Sereno then requested the Court En Banc to conduct an investigation motu proprio under this Court's power of administrative supervision
over members of the judiciary and members of the legal profession (referring to notaries public who were alleged to have purposely left their specimen
signatures, dry seals and notarial books with Mrs. Napoles to facilitate the incorporation of non-governmental organizations [NGOs] involved in the
scam).9

Under our Resolution dated October 17, 2013, the Court En Banc required respondent to submit his comment and directed the NBI to furnish the Court
with certified copies of the affidavit of Luy. On November 21, 2013, the Court received respondent's Comment. 10 Respondent categorically denied any
irregularity in the Kevlar helmet cases and explained the visit he had made to Mrs. Napoles as testified by Sula.

On Sula's statement, respondent points out that Sula never really had personal knowledge whether respondent is indeed the alleged "contact" of Mrs.
Napoles at the Sandiganbayan; what she supposedly "knows" was what Mrs. Napoles merely told her. Hence, Sula's testimony on the matter is based
purely on hearsay. Assuming that Mrs. Napoles actually made the statement, respondent believes it was given in the context of massive media coverage
of the pork barrel scam exploding at the time. With the consciousness of a looming criminal prosecution before the Office of the Ombudsman and later
before the Sandiganbayan, it was only natural for Mrs. Napoles to assure Sula and others involved in their business operation that she would not leave
or abandon them and that she would do all that she can to help them just so they would not turn their backs on her and become whistle-blowers. Thus,
even if Mrs. Napoles made misrepresentations to Sula regarding respondent as her "connection", she only had to do so in order to convince Sula and
her co-employees that the cases to be filed against them would be "fixed."

As to Sula's statement that she personally witnessed respondent at one time visiting Mrs. Napoles at her office and having a meeting with her at the
conference room, respondent said that at the birthday party of Senator Estrada where the controversial photograph was taken, Mrs. Napoles engaged
him in a casual conversation during which the miraculous healing power of the robe or clothing of the Black Nazarene of Quiapo was mentioned. When
Mrs. Napoles told respondent that she is a close friend of the Quiapo Church's parish priest, he requested her help to gain access to the Black Nazarene
icon. Eventually, respondent, who is himself a Black Nazarene devotee and was undergoing treatment for his prostate cancer, was given special
permission and was able to drape the Black Nazarene's robe or clothing for a brief moment over his body and also receive a fragrant ball of cotton taken
or exposed to the holy image, which article he keeps to this day and uses to wipe any ailing part of his body in order to receive healing. Because of such
favor, respondent out of courtesy went to see Mrs. Napoles and personally thank her. Respondent stressed that that was the single occasion Sula was
talking about in her supplemental affidavit when she said she saw respondent talking with Mrs. Napoles at the conference room of their office in
Discovery Suites.

Respondent maintains that there was nothing improper or irregular for him to have personally seen Mrs. Napoles at the time in order to thank her,
considering that she no longer had any pending case with his court, and to his knowledge, with any other division of the Sandiganbayan at the time and
even until the date of the preparation of his Comment. He thus prays that this Court duly note his Comment and accept the same as sufficient
compliance with the Court's Resolution dated October 17, 2013.

This Court upon evaluation of the factual circumstances found possible transgressions of the New Code of Judicial Conduct committed by respondent.
Accordingly, a Resolution was issued on January 21, 2014 stating that:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to have the instant administrative matter RE-DOCKETED as A.M. No. SB-14-21-J (Re: Allegations Made
Under Oath at tlze Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing held on September 26, 2013 against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan),
and ASSIGNS the same to retired Supreme Court Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez for investigation, report and recommendation within a period of
sixty (60) days from notice hereof.

The Court further resolves to NOTE the letter dated January 7, 2014 of Atty. Joffre Gil C. Zapata, Executive Clerk of Court III, Sandiganbayan, Fourth
Division, in compliance with the resolution of the Court En Banc dated December 3, 2013, transmitting the original records of Criminal Case Nos. 26768
and 26769. Atty. Zapata is INFORMED that there is no more need to transmit to this Court the post-sentence investigation reports and other reports on
the supervisory history of the accused-probationers in Criminal Case Nos. 26768 and 26769.

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Justice

Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, a retired Member of this Court, submitted her report with the following findings and conclusions:

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

1. THE KEVLAR CASE

Two criminal cases were filed with the Sandiganbayan sometime in 2001 - Criminal Case No. 26768 for Falsification of Public Documents and Criminal
Case No. 26769 for Violation of Section 3(e) of the AntiGraft Law. Charged were several members of Philippine Marine Corps and civilian employees
including Ms. Janet L. Napoles (Napoles), her mother Magdalena Francisco (now deceased), her brother Reynaldo Francisco and wife Anna Marie
Dulguime, and her (Napoles') three employees.

These cases are referred to as the Kevlar case because the issue involved is the same - the questionable purchase of 500 Kevlar helmets by the
Philippine Marine Corps in the amount of ₱3,865,310.00 from five suppliers or companies owned by Napoles.

The prosecution alleged inter alia that the accused, acting in conspiracy, released the payment although there was yet no delivery of the Kevlar helmets;
that the suppliers are mere dummies of Napoles; and that the helmets were made in Taiwan, not in the U.S.A.

Napoles' husband, Major Jaime Napoles, was dropped from the two Informations in an Order issued by the Ombudsman on March 18, 2002.

Napoles' mother, brother, and sister-in-law were among those convicted for the lesser crime of Falsification of Public Documents and sentenced to suffer
the penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor and each to pay PS,000.00. They all underwent
probation.

Napoles and six members of the Philippine Marine Corps were acquitted in both cases.

The court ruled that Napoles "was not one of the dealer-payees in the transaction in question. Even if she owns the bank account where the 14 checks
were later deposited, this does not in itself translate to her conspiracy in the crimes charged x x x."

xxxx

THE INVESTIGATION

xxxx

I. During the investigation, Benhur testified that he and Napoles are second cousins. After passing the Medical Technology Licensure Examination in
2002, he was employed in the JLN (Janet Lim Napoles) Corporation as Napoles' personal assistant. As such, he was in charge of disbursements of her
personal funds and those of her office. He was also in charge of government transactions of the corporation and kept records of its daily business
activities.

In the course of Benhur's employment at the JLN Corporation, Napoles mentioned to him the Kevlar case, then pending in the Sandiganbayan, saying
she has a "connect" in that court who would help her.

When asked about his testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee concerning the Kevlar case, Benhur declared that Napoles' "connect" with
the Sandiganbayan is respondent, thus:

Q The question was, Mr. Witness, this is coming from Senator Angara, and I quote, "Kailan ho lumabas yung decision ng Court sa Kevlar?" And just to
refresh your memory, Mr. Witness, then Ms. Sula answered, "I think 2010. Yun po yung lumabas po." And then going forward, Senator Angara referred
to both of you this question: "Sa inyo, hindi ninyo alam kung inayos yung kaso na iyon kasi napakaraming koneksyon, di ba? Baka alam ng ibang
whistleblowers kung nagka-ayusan sa kaso na iyon. Sige, huwag kang matakot, Benhur." Do you remember that question being asked from you?

xxxx

A Yes po.
Q And now Mr. Witness, about this statement of yours at the Blue Ribbon Committee that Ms. Napoles has a certain connect sa Sandiganbayan, who
was this connect you were talking about, if you remember?

Witness Luy

A Si Justice Gregory Ong po.

Q How do you know that Justice Gregory Ong was the connect of Ms. Napoles at the Sandiganbayan?

A Ang sinabi po ... Si Ms. Napoles, pinsan ko po kasi we are second cousins. So kinuwento talaga sa akin ni Madam kung ano ang mga developments
sa mga cases, kung ano ang mga nangyayari. Tapos po, sinabi niya sa akin mismo na nakakausap niya si Justice Gregory Ong at ang nagpakilala raw
sa kanya po ay si Senator Jinggoy Estrada.

Benhur further testified that even before the decision in the Kevlar case was promulgated, Napoles and respondent were already communicating with
each other (nag-uusap na po si!a). Therefore, she was sure the decision would be in her favor:

Q Do you remember the date when the decision (in Kevlar case) was promulgated?

A Ano po, the year 2010 po ma' am.

Q And you met him (Justice Ong) in 2012?

A 2012 po, pero prior to that decision, madam, naririnig ko na po kay madam (Ms. Napoles) kasi kinukwento na po ni madam sa akin na nag-uusap na
po sila ni Justice Gregory Ong.

Q That was after the decision was promulgated?

A Bago po nailabas yung decision, ikinwento po m Ms. Napoles sa akin na nag-uusap na po sila ni Justice Gregory Ong. Kaya kampante po si Ms.
Napoles. Noong lumabas po yung decision, alam niya na po. Yung ang sabi sa akin ni Ms. Napoles.

Going back to the hearing before the Blue Ribbon Committee, Benhur told Senator Angara that Napoles fixed the Kevlar case because she has a
"connect" in the Sandiganbayan:

"Baka alam ng ibang whistle blowers kung nagkaka-ayusan sa kaso na iyon (Kevlar case). Sige huwag kang matakot Benhur."

Benhur Luy: "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa Sandiganbayan."

On how Napoles "inayos" or fixed the Kevlar case, Benhur said that he kept a ledger of the Sandiganbayan case wherein he listed all her expenses in
the sum of P 100 million pesos. He was surprised why she would spend such amount considering that what was involved in the Kevlar case was only
₱3.8 million. She explained that she gave various amounts to different people during the pendency of the case which lasted up to ten years. And before
the decision in the Kevlar case was released, she also gave money to respondent but she did not mention the amount. Thus, she knew she would be
acquitted.

Q You answered Senator Angara this way which we already quoted a while ago, "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa
Sandiganbayan." You stated that the connect is Justice Ong. Can you explain before us what you mean, "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon." What do
you mean by that "inayos"?

A Kasi po ma' am meron kaming ledger ng Sandiganbayan case sa lahat ng nagastos ni Ms. Janet Napoles, nilista ko po yon lahat. Kasi naririnig ko po
kay Janet Napoles, parang pinsan ko po si Janet Napoles, "Paano nagkaroon ng kaso ang ate ko? So nadiscover ko na Jang po na yun pala yung
Kevlar. So, mahigit one hundred million na nagastos po ni Ms. Napoles kasi di Jang naman po si sir Justice Gregory Ong ...

xxx

Q Did you come to know to whom she gave all the money?

A Wala po siyang ... basta ang sabi niya inayos na niya si ... binaggit niya po si ... kasi si madam hindi kasi nagki-keep kasi ako pinsan niya po kasi ako,
nabanggit niya po si Justice Gregory Ong. Sinabi niya nagbigay daw po siya ng pera kay Justice Ong pero she never mentioned kung magkano yung
amount.

xxx

Q Nagbigay ng pera kay Justice Gregory Ong?

A Opo, yung ang sabi niya (referring to Ms. Napoles).

Q To you?

A Yes, madam.

Q Do you remember when she made that kind of statement?

A Bago po ano madam, bago po lumabas yung decision kaya kampante na po si Ms. Napoles bago lumabas yung decision na acquitted siya. Alam na
niya. Sa Kevlar case.

xxx

Justice Gutierrez

Continue counsel.

Witness Luy

Kasi naikwento po madam ni Ms. Napoles na almost PlOO million na ang nagastos niya. Tapos ang sabi ko nga po sa kanya: "Madam, P 100 million na
sa halagang ₱3.8 lang na PO (purchase order) sa Kevlar helmet, tapos P 100 million na ang nagastos mo?"
Q Did she tell you or explain to you to whom this P 100 million was paid? How was it spent?

A Basta ang natatandaan ko ... di ko na po matandaan ang mga dates kasi parang staggered. May ₱5 million sa ibang tao ang kausap niya. Tapos ito
naman tutulong ng ganito. lba-iba kasi madam, eh.

Q But there was no showing the money was given to Justice Ong?

A Wala po pero nabanggit lang po niya (Ms. Napoles) sa akin na nagbigay po siya kay Justice Ong, but she never mentioned the amount.

Continuing with his testimony, Benhur declared that in 2012, respondent went twice to Napoles' office at the Discovery Suites Center, 25 ADB Avenue,
Ortigas, Pasig City. On the first visit, Napoles introduced Justice Ong to Benhur and her other employees.

Benhur narrated what transpired during that visit. According to him, Napoles has so much money being placed at the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and Police Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) which offered 13% interest annually. Napoles called Benhur telling him that respondent would
like to avail of such interest for his BDO check of ₱25.5 million. To arrange this, Napoles informed Benhur that she would just deposit respondent's
₱25.5 million in her personal account with Metro bank. Then she would issue to respondent in advance eleven (11) checks, each amounting to
₱282,000.00 as monthly interest, or a total of ₱3,102,000.00 equivalent to 13% interest. Upon Justice Ong's suggestion, the checks should be paid to
cash. So, Benhur prepared the corresponding eleven (11) checks, thus:

Q With respect to the Kevlar case, what participation did you have, if there was any?

Witness Luy

A Noon 2012 po kasi si Justice Gregory Ong po nasa unit 2501, yung office (of Ms. Napoles), so kami ni Janet Napoles, nandito sa 2502 kasi yun po
talaga ang office namin. Si Ms. Napoles po sinabi niya sa akin, Ben, kasi si Ms. Napoles, may pera siyang madarni na pine-place niya po sa AFPSLAI at
yung AFPSLAI po ay nagbibigay po sa kanya o nagooffer ng 13% interest annually po. So, ang nangyari po <loon, sabi ni Janet Napoles, si Justice Ong
ho raw, gustong magkaroon din ng interest parang ganoon. So tutulungan niya. So ang ginawa po namin x x x. Q Meaning to say, Justice Ong would
like to deposit money?

A Opo.

Q So he could get 13% interest?

A Opo, kasi tapos madam ang nangyari po pumunta na po si Ms. Napoles sa kanyang opisina. Tinawag po niya ako kasi pinasulat na niya sa akin ang
checke. So, ang ginawa po ni Ms. Napoles, yung checke ni .. BDO check po kasi yun. Ang sabi sa akin ni Ms. Napoles, checke daw po yun ni Justice
Gregory Ong. Sa, BDO. So, di ko naman din po nakita Madam yung nakalagay sa ...

Q So it is the check of Justice Ong, not the check of Ms. Napoles?

A Opo, ang amount po ng check madam ay ₱25.5 million ang amount noong BDO check na inissue ...

Q That belongs to Justice Ong?

A Opo. Tapos madam, so ang ginawa po namin ni Ms. Napoles, dahil po 13% interest ang ino-offer ng AFPSLAI, sabi ni Madam ganito na lang, Ben,
ipasok na lang muna natin yung check niya sa personal account ko. Ako na lang muna for the meantime, mag-iissue ng check sa kanya para maavail ni
Justice Ong yung interest. So, ang ginawa nan1in madam, ₱25.5 million times 13% interest, tapos divided by 12, lumalabas ₱282,000.00 or
₱283,000.00 or ₱281,000.00 po madam kasi naground off kami sa ₱282,000.00. So, ang ginawa ni Madam, baga monthly. So eleven (11) checks ang
prinepare namin. Kung hindi po ako nagkakamali po, JLN Corporation check ang ... Ako pa nga po ang nagsulat at saka bago po namin isinulat yung
payee, inalam pa po namin. x x x So, pumunta na naman si madam sa 2501 kasi nandoon si Justice Gregory Ong. Noong bumalik siya, pay to cash na
lang daw. So, makikita po sa records namin ni Ms. Napoles na pumasok ang ₱25.5 million na amount sa kanyang account at the same time nag-issue
siya ng checke na ₱282,000.00 na eleven checks. Nagstart kami madam 2012, siguro sometime July or August or mga ganoong buwan po. Basta 11
checks, hindi nalalayo doon. So, siguro tapos na.

Q But what actually turned out was that the money of Justice Ong was deposited at the bank but the interest was paid in advance by Ms. Napoles, and
actually the bank will pay Ms. Napoles the advanced interest she paid to Justice Ong, is that clear? Is that the arrangement? Do you understand me?

A Kasi ang nangyari po ma'am ganito e: yung ₱25.5 million ipinasok sa personal account ni Ms. Napoles dito sa Metrobank. Metrobank kasi po yun e.

On the second visit of respondent to Napoles' office, they just engaged in conversation. She ordered Chinese food for him which, according to Benhur, is
his (respondent's) favorite.

On cross-examination, Benhur claimed that in his affidavits executed in the NBI, he did not mention respondent's name. However, in his reply-affidavit
filed with the Sandiganbayan, he alleged that Napoles issued ₱282,000.00 (the amount stated in each of the 11 checks) but he did not mention the
name of the payee upon instruction of his lawyer, Atty. Baligod. Nonetheless, he knew that the checks were issued to respondent.

II. Sula, also a whistle blower, testified that she was an employee of JLN Corporation. Her duties included the formation of corporations by making use of
the forms, applying for business licenses, transfer of properties, purchase of cars, and others.

Sula corroborated Benhur's testimony that respondent visited the office of Napoles twice sometime in 2012.

Sula was asked to explain her testimony before the Blue Ribbon Committee during the hearing on September 26, 2013, quoted as follows:

The Chairman (Senator Teofisto Guingona III)

Sinabi ninyo na may tinawagan si Mrs. Napoles at sinabi niya, Malapit nang lumabas yung TRO galing sa korte. May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles
sa huwes sa korte sa Sandiganbayan?

xxx

Ms. Sula

Si Mr. Ong po. Justice Ong po.

The Chairman

Gregory Ong?
Ms. Sula

Opo.

The Chairman

Sa Sandiganbayan?

Ms. Sula

Opo.

The Chairman

Okay. With that, I will just have a closing statement before we leave the hearing.

Sula explained that the TRO mentioned by Napoles refers to the TRO to be issued by the Sandiganbayan in the event the case involving the PIO billion
PDAF scam against her is filed with that court; and that Napoles told Sula and the other employees not to worry because she has contact with the
Sandiganbayan - respondent Justice Ong, thus:

Q Not the illegal detention case?

Witness Sula

A Hindi po, pag nakasuhan na po kami sa Sandiganbayan.

Q Okay, again?

A Sa pagkakaintindi po namin, ang sabi po ni Madam na it takes 4 to 5 years, so hihintayin niya na maacquit, sabi niyang ganoon, ang pangalan niya
para maluwag na tulungan kami. Ito po ang pagkakaintindi namin na sa Sandiganbayan.

Q Yung PDAF?

A Opo, yung PDAF sa Sandiganbayan.

Q Pagdating ng kaso sa Sandiganbayan?

A Opo, kasi po ina-ano po niya, siya po tinitira na ni Benhur - si Madam tungkol sa PlO billion scam. So, pinag-uusapan namin sa bahay niya sa South
Garden Unit na, Madam, paano po yan, pag lahat ng kaso na iyan dadaan sa lawmakers, dadaan yon sa Ombudsman at saka sa Sandiganbayan? Sabi
niya, "Huwag kayong mag-alala. Meron naman akong mga contact doon." Sabi niyang ganoon sa Ombudsman at sa Sandiganbayan.

Q Is that in your affidavit?

A Wala po. Pero sinabi ko po doon sa part na yon (her testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee) na meron na siyang kilala sa Ombudsman,
pero hindi niya nabanggit ang pangalan. Pero sa Sandiganbayan, ang alam namin kilala niya si Justice Ong.

Q Yun ang sagot niya kay Chairman Guingona. Di ba I read it a while ago?

A Opo, doon sa Sandiganbayan.

Sula also testified that every time Napoles talked to her and the other employees, she would say that Justice Ong will help her in the Kevlar case. Sula's
testimony is as follows:

Q x x x you told me that somebody will help in the Kevlar case?

A Opo. Sinabi po niya sa amin every time po pag nagkukwento siya, sinasabi niya na si Justice Ong ang tumulong sa kanya para ma-clear po yung
Kevlar case niya.

Sula likewise testified that Napoles told her and the other employees that she will fix (aayusin) the "PDAF case" in the Sandiganbayan. Then they replied
in jest that her acquaintance in that court is respondent. Napoles retorted, "Ay huag na iyon kasi masyadong mataas ang talent fee."

xxxx

III. Aries Rufo, a Reporter of Rappler, testified that he cannot reveal who gave him the photograph [of respondent beside Napoles and Senator Jinggoy
Estrada] because he is shielded by law and he has to protect his source.

When asked about his comment upon seeing the picture, Rufo said:

Initially, when I saw the picture, since I knew that Justice Ong was one of the members of the division that handled the Kevlar case, it aroused my
curiosity why he was in that picture. Second, because in journalism, we also get to practice ethical standards, I immediately sensed though that a Justice
or a lawyer, that he should not be seen or be going to a party or be in an event where respondent (Ms. Napoles) was in a case under his Division. He
should not be in a situation that would compromise the integrity of his office.

Rufo further testified that on August 27, 2013, he faxed a letter to respondent to "get his side about the photo." The next day, he went to respondent's
office and showed it to him. Respondent was shocked. He explained that it must have been taken during one of the parties hosted by his friend Senator
Jinggoy Estrada; that he did not know that the woman in the picture is Napoles because she did not appear during the hearing of the Kevlar case; and
that such picture must have been taken in one of those instances when a guest would like to pose with celebrities or public figures.

xxxx

Respondent, in his defense, vehemently denied the imputations hurled against him.

1. He asserted that he could not be the contact or "connect" of Napoles at the Sandiganbayan for he never met or came to know her during
the pendency of the Kevlar case;
 2. Challenging Benhur's testimony that he fixed or "inayos" the Kevlar case, respondent claimed that it was decided based on the merits by the
Sandiganbayan Fourth Division as a collegial body. The two other members of the court, Justice Jose R. Hernandez (ponente) and Justice
Maria Cristina J. Cornejo, are independent-minded jurists who could not be pressured or influenced by anybody, not even by their peers;

3. On Benhur's allegation that respondent received an amount of money from Napoles prior to the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar
case, respondent deplored the fact that Benhur was attempting to tarnish his reputation without any proof. And that it is unthinkable for him to
have received money from Napoles considering that her mother, brother, and sister-in-law were convicted;

4. Respondent admitted he went to Napoles' office twice, sometime in March 2012, after the decision in the Kevlar case was promulgated in
2010 and narrated what prompted him to do so, thus:

At the birthday party of Senator Jinggoy Estrada on February 17, 2012, Napoles approached him and introduced herself. She engaged him in a casual
conversation and thanked him for her acquittal in the Kevlar case. Respondent replied she should thank her "evidence" instead, adding that had the
court found enough evidence against her, she would have been convicted. She talked about her charity works like supporting Chinese priests, building
churches and chapels in China, and sponsoring Chinese Catholic priests. He was not interested though in what she was saying until she mentioned the
name of Msgr. Ramirez, former Parish Priest of Quiapo Church.

Respondent became interested because he has been a devotee of the Holy Black Nazarene since he was a little boy. Napoles told him that Msgr.
Ramirez has with him the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene which has a healing power if one wears it. Then respondent asked if he can have access to
the robe so he can be cured of his ailment (prostate cancer) which he keeps only to himself and to the immediate members of his family. Napoles made
arrangement with Msgr. Ramirez until respondent was able to drape the robe over his body for about one or two minutes in Quiapo Church. He also
received a fragrant ball of cotton which he keeps until now to heal any ailing part of his body. That was a great deal for him. So out of courtesy, he visited
Napoles in her office and thanked her. That was his first visit.

Thereafter, Napoles kept on calling respondent, inviting him to her office, but he kept on declining. Then finally after two weeks, he acceded for she
might think he is "walang kwentang tao." They just engaged in a small talk for about 30 minutes and had coffee.

5. Concerning Benhur's testimony that Napoles paid respondent an advanced interest consisting of eleven (11) checks in the amount of ₱282,000.00
each and that he issued to her his BDO check of ₱25.5 million which she deposited in her account, he claimed that "he never issued that check as he
did not intend to invest in AFPSLAI. In fact, he does not have any money deposited there. Inasmuch as he did not issue any BDO check, it follows that
Napoles could not have given him those eleven (11) checks representing advanced interest. He further explained that he found from the internet that in
AFPSLAI, an investor can only make an initial deposit of ₱30,000.00 every quarter or Pl20,000.00 per year. The limit or ceiling is ₱3 million with an
interest of 15% or 16% per annum.

6. The whistle blower's testimony are conflicting and therefore lack credibility. While Sula testified that Napoles told her that she did not want to approach
respondent (should a case involving the pork barrel scam be filed with the Sandiganbayan) because his talent fee is too high, however, both whistle
blowers claimed that he is Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan.

With respect to the Rappler Report, according to respondent, Rufo was insinuating four things: 1. That there was irregularity in the manner the Kevlar
case was decided;

2. That respondent was close to Napoles even during the pendency of the Kevlar case;

3. That respondent was attending parties of the Napoleses; and

4. That respondent was advising Napoles about legal strategies relative to the Kevlar case. Respondent "dismissed all the above insinuations as false
and without factual basis." As to the last insinuation that he advised Napoles about legal strategies to be pursued in the Kevlar case, respondent
stressed that the case was decided by a collegial body and that he never interceded on her behalf.

EVALUATION

xxxx

It bears stressing that before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Benhur initially testified that Napoles fixed or "inayos" the Kevlar case because she
has a contact at the Sandiganbayan, referring to respondent. Sula corroborated Benhur's testimony.

Testifying before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is certainly an ordeal. The witnesses and everything they say are open to the public. They are
subjected to difficult questions propounded by the Senators, supposedly intelligent and knowledgeable of the subject and issues under inquiry. And they
can easily detect whether a person under investigation is telling the truth or not. Considering this challenging and difficult setting, it is indubitably
improbable that the two whistle blowers would testify false! y against respondent.

Moreover, during the investigation of this case, Benhur and Sula testified in a candid, straightforward, and categorical manner. Their testimonies were
instantaneous, clear, unequivocal, and carried with it the ring of truth.

In fact, their answers to the undersigned's probing questions were consistent with their testimonies before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. During
cross-examination, they did not waver or falter. The undersigned found the two whistle blowers as credible witnesses and their story untainted with bias
and contradiction, reflective of honest and trustworthy witnesses.

The undersigned therefore finds unmeritorious respondent's claim that Benhur and Sula were lying.

. . . respondent insisted he could not have intervened in the disposition of the Kevlar case considering that Napoles' mother, brother and sister-in-law
were convicted.

Respondent must have forgotten that Napoles' natural instinct was self-preservation. Hence, she would avail of every possible means to be exonerated.
Besides, respondent's belief that the two members of his Division are independent-minded Jurists remains to be a mere allegation.

xxxx

With the undersigned's finding that there is credence in the testimonies of Benhur and Sula, there is no need to stretch one's imagination to arrive at the
inevitable conclusion that in "fixing" Kevlar case, money could be the consideration ... Benhur testified he kept a ledger (already shredded) of expenses
amounting to P 100 million incurred by Napoles for the Sandiganbayan during the pendency of the Kevlar case which extended up to ten years; and that
Napoles told him she gave respondent an undetermined sum of money.

Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Benhur and Sula are pure hearsay, inadmissible in evidence:

Justice Ong
Your honor, since these are all accusations against me by Luy and Sula, and according to Luy and Sula, these were only told to them by Napoles,
always their statements were ... they do not have personal knowledge, it was only told to them by Napoles, is it possible that we subpoena Napoles so
that the truth will come out? If. ..

xxxx

Justice Gutierrez

That is your prerogative.

Justice Ong

I am willing to take the risk although I know I am not an acquaintance of Napoles. Just to clear my name whether I should be hung or I should not be
hung.

xxxx

Atty. Geronilla

I don't think it would be necessary, your honor.

Justice Gutierrez (to Atty. Geronilla)

Discuss this matter with your client, file a motion, then we will see.

However, respondent and his counsel did not take any action on the undersigned's suggestion. They did not present Napoles to rebut the testimonies of
Benhur and Sula. Significantly, respondent failed to consider that his testimony is likewise hearsay. He should have presented Msgr. Ramirez and
Napoles as witnesses to support his claim regarding their role which enabled him to wear the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene.

x x xx

Respondent's acts of allowing himself to be Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan, resulting in the fixing of the Kevlar case, and of accepting money
from her, constitute gross misconduct, a violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.

xxxx

That Benhur personally prepared the eleven (11) checks which Napoles handed to respondent led the undersigned to conclude without hesitation that
this charge is true. It is highly inconceivable that Benhur could devise or concoct his story. He gave a detailed and lucid narration of the events,
concluding that actually Napoles gave respondent ₱3, 102,000.00 as advanced interest.

According to respondent, the purpose of his first visit was to thank Napoles for making it possible for him to wear the Holy Black Nazarene's robe. Even
assuming it is true, nonetheless it is equally true that during that visit, respondent could have transacted business with Napoles. Why should Napoles
pay respondent an advanced interest of ₱3,102,000.0 with her own money if it were not a consideration for a favor?

Respondent's transgression pertains to his personal life and no direct relation to his judicial function. It is not misconduct but plain dishonesty. His act is
unquestionably disgraceful and renders him morally unfit as a member of the Judiciary and unworthy of the privileges the law confers on him.
Furthermore, respondent's conduct supports Benhur's assertion that he received money from Napoles.

Dishonesty likewise violates Canon 2 (1 and 2) on Integrity of the same Code providing in part that judges must ensure that their conduct is above
reproach and must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the Judiciary.

Indeed, respondent should not stay in his position even for a moment.

xxxx

...From respondent's end, there was nothing wrong when he visited Napoles twice in her office considering that the visits took place long after the
promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case.

Contrary to respondent's submission, such acts also constitute gross misconduct in violation of Canon 4 on Propriety of the same Code. Section 1
provides that judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities .

. . . respondent's reason for his first visit was to thank Napoles for her help in making it possible for him to wear the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene.
Instead of visiting her, respondent could have extended his gratitude by simply calling her by phone. Worse, he visited her again because she may think
he is an unworthy person. This is an extremely frail reason. He was seen by the whistle blowers and their co-workers who, without doubt, readily
confirmed that he was Napoles' contact at the Sandiganbayan and that he "fixed" the decision in the Kevlar case.

Respondent cannot be excused for his unconcern for the position he holds. Being aptly perceived as the visible personification of law and justice, his
personal behavior, not only while in the performance of official duties but also outside the court, must be beyond reproach. A judicial office circumscribes
a personal conduct and imposes a number of inhibitions, whose faithful observance is the price one has to pay for holding an exalted position.

xxxx

On the photograph showing respondent

with Senator Jinggoy Estrada and Napoles.

xxxx

This incident manifests respondent's disregard of the dictum that propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge. This exacting standard of decorum is demanded from judges to promote public confidence in the integrity of the Judiciary.

In joining Senator Estrada and Napoles in a picture taking, respondent gave a ground for reproach by reason of impropriety. It bears reiterating Canon 4
(1) on Propriety of the same Code which provides that judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
Respondent maintained that he did not know Napoles at that time because she was not present before the Sandiganbayan during the hearing of the
Kevlar case for she must have waived her appearance. Respondent's explanation lacks merit. That court could not have acquired jurisdiction over her if
she did not appear personally for arraignment.

Of utmost significance is the fact that this is not the first time that respondent has been charged administratively. In "Assistant Special Prosecutor Ill
Rohermina J Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justices Gregory S. Ong, Jose R. Hernandez and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada, Sandiganbayan,'' the Supreme Court
found respondent Justice Ong guilty of violation of PD 1606 and The Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan for nonobservance of collegiality in
hearing criminal cases in the Hall of Justice, Davao City. Instead of siting as a collegial body, the members of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division
adopted a different procedure. The Division was divided into two. As then Chairperson of the Division, respondent was ordered to pay a fine of
₱15,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

xxxx

...the undersigned cannot hold back her skepticism regarding the acquittal of Napoles. The Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, of which respondent was the
Chairman, held that Napoles did not conspire with the suppliers in the questionable purchase of the Kevlar helmets as she was not one of the "dealer-
payees" in the transaction in question and that there was no proof of an overt act on her part. How could the Fourth Division arrive at such conclusion?
The Decision itself indicates clearly that ( 1) Napoles was following up the processing of the documents; (2) that she was in charge of the delivery of the
helmets; and (3) the checks amounting to ₱3,864,310.00 as payment for the helmets were deposited and cleared in only one bank account, Security
Bank Account No. 512-000-2200, in the name of Napoles.

Considering this glaring irregularity, it is safe to conclude that indeed respondent has a hand in the acquittal of Napoles. All along, the whistle blowers
were telling the truth.

xxxx

RECOMMENDATION

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, It is respectfully recommended, for consideration of the Honorable Court, that respondent Justice Gregory S. Ong be
found GUILTY of gross misconduct, dishonesty, and impropriety, all in violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and be
meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service WITH FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, and WITH
PREJUDICE to reemployment to any government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

xxxx

The Court's Ruling

This Court adopts the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Investigating Justice which are well-supported by the evidence on record.

Based on the testimonies of Luy, Sula and Rufo, the Investigating Justice formulated the charges against the respondent, as follows:

1. Respondent acted as contact of Napoles in connection with the Kevlar case while it was pending in the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division
wherein he is the Chairman;

2. Respondent, being Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan, fixed the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal;

3. Respondent received an undetermined amount of money from Napoles prior to the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case thus, she
was sure ("kampante")of her acquittal; 4. Respondent visited Napoles in her office where she handed to him eleven (ll) checks, each
amounting to ₱282,000.00 or a total of ₱3,102,000.00, as advanced interest for his ₱25.5 million BDO check she deposited in her personal
account; and

5. Respondent attended Napoles' parties and was photographed with Senator Estrada and Napoles. 11

Respondent thus stands accused of gross misconduct, partiality and corruption or bribery during the pendency of the Kevlar case, and impropriety on
account of his dealing and socializing with Napoles after her acquittal in the said case. Additionally, respondent failed to disclose in his September 26,
2013 letter to Chief Justice Sereno that he had actually visited Napoles at her office in 2012, as he vehemently denied having partied with or attended
any social event hosted by her.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character,
improper or wrong behavior; while ·"gross" has been defined as "out of all measure beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be
excused."12 We agree with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez that respondent's association with Napoles during the pendency and after the promulgation of the
decision in the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal, constitutes gross misconduct notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of corruption or
bribery in the rendition of the said judgment.

We cannot overemphasize that in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to
believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant. 13

The testimonies of Luy and Sula established that Napoles had been in contact with respondent ("nag-uusap sila") during the pendency of the Kevlar
case. As Napoles' trusted staff, they (especially Luy who is a cousin) were privy to her daily business and personal activities. Napoles constantly
updated them of developments regarding the case. She revealed to them that she has a "connect" or "contact" in the Sandiganbayan who will help "fix"
the case involving her, her mother, brother and some employees. Having closely observed and heard Napoles being confident that she will be acquitted
even prior to the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case, they were convinced she was indeed in contact with respondent, whose identity was
earlier divulged by Napoles to Luy. Luy categorically testified that Napoles told him she gave money to respondent but did not disclose the amount.
There was no reason for them to doubt Napoles' statement as they even keep a ledger detailing her expenses for the "Sandiganbayan," which reached
Pl 00 million. Napoles' information about her association with respondent was confirmed when she was eventually acquitted in 2010 and when they saw
respondent visit her office and given the eleven checks issued by Napoles in 2012.

Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Luy and Sula were hearsay as they have no personal knowledge of the matters they were testifying, which
were merely told to them by Napoles. Specifically, he points to portions of Sula's testimony indicating that Napoles had not just one but "contact persons"
in Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan; hence, it could have been other individuals, not him, who could help Napoles "fix" the Kevlar case, especially since
Napoles never really disclosed to Sula who was her (Napoles) contact at the Sandiganbayan and at one of their conversations Napoles even supposedly
said that respondent's "talent fee" was too high. Bribery is committed when a public officer agrees to perform an act in connection with the performance
of official duties in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received.14 Ajudge who extorts money from a party-litigant who has a case before
the court commits a serious misconduct and this Court has condemned such act in the strongest possible terms. Particularly because it has been
committed by one charged with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice, it quickly and surely corrodes respect for law and the
courts.15

An accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. The complainant must present a panoply of evidence in support of such an
accusation. Inasmuch as what is imputed against the respondent judge connotes a grave misconduct, the quantum of proof required should be more
than substantial.16 Concededly, the evidence in this case is insufficient to sustain the bribery and corruption charges against the respondent. Both Luy
and Sula have not witnessed respondent actually receiving money from Napoles in exchange for her acquittal in the Kevlar case. Napoles had confided
to Luy her alleged bribe to respondent.

Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act by the respondent, we find credible evidence of his association with Napoles after the
promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case. The totality of the circumstances of such association strongly indicates respondent's corrupt inclinations
that only heightened the public's perception of anomaly in the decision-making process. By his act of going to respondent at her office on two occasions,
respondent exposed himself to the suspicion that he was partial to Napoles. That respondent was not the ponente of the decision which was rendered
by a collegial body did not forestall such suspicion of partiality, as evident from the public disgust generated by the publication of a photograph of
respondent together with Napoles and Senator Jinggoy Estrada. Indeed, the context of the declarations under oath by Luy and Sula before the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee, taking place at the height of the "Pork Barrel" controversy, made all the difference as respondent himself acknowledged. Thus,
even in the present administrative proceeding, their declarations are taken in the light of the public revelations of what they know of that government
corruption controversy, and how it has tainted the image of the Judiciary.

The hearsay testimonies of Luy and Sula generated intense public interest because of their close relationship to Napoles and their crucial participation in
her transactions with government officials, dubbed by media as the "Pork Barrel Queen." But as aptly observed by Justice SandovalGutierrez, the
"challenging and difficult setting" of the Senate hearings where they first testified, made it highly improbable that these whistle blowers would testify
against the respondent. During the investigation of this case, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez described their manner of testifying as "candid, straightforward
and categorical." She likewise found their testimonies as "instantaneous, clear, unequivocal, and carried with it the ring of truth," and more important,
these are consistent with their previous testimonies before the Senate; they never wavered or faltered even during cross-examination.

It is a settled rule that the findings of investigating magistrates are generally given great weight by the Court by reason of their unmatched opportunity to
see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified. 17 The rule which concedes due respect, and even finality, to the assessment of credibility of
witnesses by trial judges in civil and criminal cases applies a fortiori to administrative cases. 18 In particular, we concur with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez's
assessment on the credibility of Luy and Sula, and disagree with respondent's claim that these witnesses are simply telling lies about his association
with Napoles.

Contrary to respondent's submission, Sula in her testimony said that whenever Napoles talked about her contacts in the Ombudsman and
Sandiganbayan, they knew that insofar as the Sandiganbayan was concerned, it was understood that she was referring to respondent even as she may
have initially contacted some persons to get to respondent, and also because they have seen him meeting with Napoles at her office. It appears that
Napoles made statements regarding the Kevlar case not just to Luy but also to the other employees of JLN Corporation. The following are excerpts from
Sula's testimony on direct examination, where she even hinted at their expected outcome of the Kevlar case:

Atty. Benipayo

Q So, Ms. Sula, what were the statements being made by Ms. Janet Lim Napoles regarding her involvement in the Kevlar case, or how she was trying to
address the problem with the Kevlar case pending before the Sandiganbayan?

Witness Sula

A Ang alam ko po kasi marami po siyang kinaka-usap na mga lawyers na binabayaran niya para tulungan siya kay Gregory Ong sa Kevlar case. Tapos,
sa kalaunan po, nasabi na niya sa amin na mcron na po siyang nakilala sa Sandiganbayan na nagngangalang Justice Gregory Ong. Tapos, sabi niya,
siya po ang tutulong sa amin para ma-clear kami. Pero hindi niya sinabi na meron din pong ma ... sasagot sa kaso. Hindi po lahat, kasi po dalawa sa
mga empleyado niya, bale apat, dalawang empleyado niya, isang kapatid niya at sister-in-law ang mag-aano sa kaso pati yung mother niya na namatay
na ay sasagot din sa kaso. Siya Jang at saka yung asawa niya ang bale makli-clear sa kaso.

Q So, she told you that two (2) employees, one (1) sister-in-law and one brother will answer for the case and Janet Lim Napoles and her husband will be
acquitted, is that right?

A Yun po ang aking pagkaka-alam kasi po, nag-petition po kasi sila eh, yung mga officemates ko. Nagkaroon ng probation. Noong lumabas ang hatol,
meron silang probation period.

xxxx

Q Which you told me that somebody will help in the Kevlar case?

A Opo. Sinabi po niya sa amin everytime po pag nagkukwento siya, sinasabi niya na si Justice Ong ang tutulong sa kanya para ma-clear po yung Kevlar
case niya.

x x x x19 (Emphasis supplied.)

As it turned out, Napoles' husband was dropped from the two informations while her mother, brother and sister-in-law were convicted in the lesser
charge of falsification of public documents. Apparently, after her acquittal, Napoles helped those convicted secure a probation. But as stated in our
earlier resolution, the Court will no longer delve into the merits of the Kevlar case as the investigation will focus on respondent's administrative liability.

Respondent's act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on two occasions was grossly improper and violated Section 1, Canon 4 (Propriety) of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct, which took effect on June 1, 2004.

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial and that fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance.20 Public confidence
in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof. Being the
subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen.21

In Caneda v. Alaan,22 we held that:

Judges are required not only to be impartial but also to appear to be so, for appearance is an essential manifestation of reality. Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance of impropriety.

They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for reproach. [Respondent's] acts have been less than circumspect. He
should have kept himself free from any appearance of impropriety and endeavored to distance himself from any act liable to create an impression of
indecorum.

xxxx

Indeed, respondent must always bear in mind that:

"A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct, a price one has to pay for o ccupying an exalted position in the judiciary,
beyond which he may not freely venture. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge to avoid not just impropriety in the performance of
judicial duties but in all his activities whether in his public or private life. He must conduct himself in a manner that gives no ground for reproach."
(Emphasis supplied.)

On this score, our previous pronouncements have enjoined judges to avoid association or socializing with persons who have pending cases before their
court. Respondent cites the case of Abundo v. Mania, Jr. 23 where this Court did not find fault with a judge who was charged with fraternizing with his
lawyer-friend. In that case, we said:

Respondent admits that he and Atty. Pajarillo became close friends in 1989 when they were both RTC judges stationed in Naga City. Since they both
resided in Camarines Norte, Atty. Pajarillo hitched rides with respondent to Daet, Camarines Norte in the latter's car.

In his Comment, respondent claims that he leaves the door to his chambers open to lawyers or parties with official court business, whose requests and
complaints regarding their cases he listens to in full view of his staff, who are witnesses to his transparency and honesty in conducting such dialogues.
He also admits that Atty. Pajarillo has been to his house on several occasions, but only to make emergency long-distance calls to his children in Metro
Manila. He, however, denies that he and Atty. Pajarillo were frequently seen eating and drinking together in public places.

We agree with Justice Buzon's finding that the evidence against respondent on this point was insufficient, viz.:

"On the other hand, the admission of respondent that he attended two public functions where Atty. Pajarillo was also present; that Atty. Pajarillo had
been in his house twice or thrice and used his telephone; and that he receives lawyers, including Atty. Pajarillo, and litigants inside his chambers, the
door to which is always open so that [the] staff could see that no under the table transactions are taking place, is not proof that he is fraternizing with
Atty. Pajarillo. A judge need not ignore a former colleague and friend whenever they meet each other or when the latter makes requests which are not in
any manner connected with cases pending in his court. Thus, Canon 30 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics provides:

'30. Social relations

It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that judges should live in retirement or seclusion; it is desirable that, so far as the
reasonable attention to the completion of their work will permit, they continue to mingle in social intercourse, and that they should not discontinue their
interests in or appearance at meetings of members at the bar. A judge should, however, in pending or prospective litigation before him be scrupulously
careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an element in
determining his judicial course.'"

The factual setting in Abundo v. Mania, Jr. is not similar to the present case because Napoles was not a colleague or lawyer-friend but an accused in a
former case before the Sandiganbayan's Fourth Division chaired by respondent and which acquitted her from malversation charge. What respondent
perhaps want to underscore is the caveat for judges, in pending or prospective litigation before them, to avoid such action as may raise suspicion on
their partiality in resolving or deciding the case. Thus, he emphasized in his Memorandum that he "never knew Napoles on a personal level while she
was still on trial as an accused in Kevlar helmet case." Respondent even quoted Sula's testimony expressing her opinion that she finds nothing wrong
with respondent going to Napoles' office because at that time, the Kevlar case had already been terminated.

We do not share the view that the rule on propriety was intended to cover only pending and prospective litigations.

Judges must, at all times, be beyond reproach and should avoid even the mere suggestion of partiality and impropriety. 24 Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct states that "[p ]ropriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge." Section 2
further provides:

SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen
and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

As we held in Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana25

... Judges, indeed, should be extra prudent in associating with litigants and counsel appearing before them so as to avoid even a mere perception of
possible bias or partiality. It is not expected, of course, that judges should live in retirement or seclusion from any social intercourse. Indeed, it may be
desirable, for instance, that they continue, time and work commitments permitting, to relate to members of the bar in worthwhile endeavors and in such
fields of interest, in general, as are in keeping with the noble aims and objectives of the legal profession. In pending or prospective litigations before
them, however, judges should be scrupulously careful to avoid anything that may tend to awaken the suspicion that their personal, social or sundry
relations could influence their objectivity, for not only must judges possess proficiency in law but that also they must act and behave in such manner that
would assure, with great comfort, litigants and their counsel of the judges' competence, integrity and independence.

In this light, it does not matter that the case is no longer pending when improper acts were committed by the judge. Because magistrates are under
constant public scrutiny, the termination of a case will not deter public criticisms for acts which may cast suspicion on its disposition or resolution. As
what transpired in this case, respondent's association with Napoles has unfortunately dragged the Judiciary into the "Pork Barrel" controversy which
initially involved only legislative and executive officials. Worse, Napoles' much-flaunted "contact" in the judiciary is no less than a Justice of the
Sandiganbayan, our special court tasked with hearing graft cases. We cannot, by any stretch of indulgence and compassion, consider respondent's
transgression as a simple misconduct.

During his testimony, respondent acknowledged his violation of judicial ethics and its serious repercussions, as shown by his answers to the questions
from the Investigation Justice, viz: Justice Gutierrez

What I am thinking Justice, as a Justice holding a very high position, could it not be possible for you to just go to the Church of Quiapo and ask the priest
there to help you or assist you, no longer through Ms. Napoles?

Justice Ong

You cannot do that, your honor. Ever since when I was a small boy, I never got near the image of the Mahal na Poon. Nobody can do that, your honor.

Justice Gutierrez

No, no. What I mean is that you can just go to the priest in Quiapo and make the proper request. Why did you not do that?

Justice Ong

I don't know, your honor.

Justice Gutierrez

Because you have been suffering from that ailment, mass or whatever, and that you are a devotee of the Black Nazarene. You could have gone to the
Office of the priest there and had that request for you to wear that robe of the Black Nazarene?

Justice Ong
Hindi ko po alam na may ganyan, your honor. I was only told by Napoles during that conversation. Had I known that, siguro po pwede ko pong gawin.
Had I known that there is such a robe, maybe I will do that.

Justice Gutierrez

Okay. It happened already. But just to thank Ms. Napoles, I think Justice you should have been very, very careful about your actuations. You should not
have been seen in public, you know, with a woman like her who was an accused before. You could have thanked her simply by calling her. You could
have relayed to her your true feelings that you are so grateful because of her assistance. Were it not for her, you could not have worn that Holy Robe of
the Black Nazarene. You could have simply called her instead of going to her office; instead of, you know, going to the Church of Santuario de San
Antonio in Forbes Park. And you should have been more careful not to be seen by the public with her considering that she was a former accused in that
case.

Justice Ong

I will heed to that advice, your honor.

Justice Gutierrez

Q And you admitted a while ago, during the interview conducted by Mr. Aries Rufo that. "That is a lesson for me; that I should not have associated, you
know, with a former respondent or accused in a case before me." You admitted that? You said you learned you lesson. Was that the first time you
learned that kind of lesson, Mr. Justice? Or even before you took your oath as a member of the Judiciary, you already knew that lesson, isn't it or was
that the first time? That is why you associated yourself with Senator Jinggoy Estrada who was accused before of plunder?

Justice Ong

Your honor, talking about ....

Justice Gutierrez

Q Do you admit you committed a lapse along that line?

Justice Ong

A Yes, your honor. You have to forgive me for that.26 (Emphasis supplied.)

In her report, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez noted that respondent's purported reason for visiting Napoles in her office remains uncorroborated, as Napoles
and the Quiapo parish priest were not presented as witnesses despite her suggestion to respondent and his counsel. On the other hand, Luy's testimony
on what transpired in one of respondent's meeting with Napoles at her office appears to be the more plausible and truthful version. Expectedly,
respondent denied having issued a BDO check for ₱25 .5 million as claimed by Luy, and asserted he (respondent) did not deposit any money to
AFPSLAI. Unfortunately, Luy is unable to present documentary evidence saying that, as previously testified by him before the Senate, most of the
documents in their office were shredded upon orders of Napoles when the "Pork Barrel Scam" controversy came out.

Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez stated that the eleven checks of ₱282,000.00 supposed advance interest for respondent's check deposit to AFPSLAI were
given to respondent as consideration for the favorable ruling in the Kevlar case.1âwphi1 Such finding is consistent with Luy's testimony that Napoles
spent a staggering PlOO million just to "fix" the said case. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to believe that respondent went to Napoles office the
second time just to have coffee. Respondent's act of again visiting Napoles at her office, after he had supposedly merely thanked her during the first
visit, tends to support Luy's claim that respondent had a financial deal with Napoles regarding advance interest for AFPSLAI deposit. The question
inevitably arises as to why would Napoles extend such an accommodation to respondent if not as consideration for her acquittal in the Kevlar case?
Respondent's controversial photograph alone had raised adverse public opinion, with the media speculating on pay-offs taking place in the courts.

Regrettably, the conduct of respondent gave cause for the public in general to doubt the honesty and fairness of his participation in the Kevlar case and
the integrity of our courts of justice. Before this Court, even prior to the commencement of administrative investigation, respondent was less than candid.
In his letter to the Chief Justice where he vehemently denied having attended parties or social events hosted by Napoles, he failed to mention that he
had in fact visited Napoles at her office. Far from being a plain omission, we find that respondent deliberately did not disclose his social calls to Napoles.
It was only when Luy and Sula testified before the Senate and named him as the "contact" of Napoles in the Sandiganbayan, that respondent mentioned
of only one instance he visited Napoles ("This is the single occasion that Sula was talking about in her supplemental affidavit x x x."27).

The Court finds that respondent, in not being truthful on crucial matters even before the administrative complaint was filed against him motu proprio, is
guilty of Dishonesty, a violation of Canon 3 (Integrity) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

Dishonesty is a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray." 28Dishonesty, being a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal
from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and with perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government
service. Indeed, dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no place in the Judiciary.29

Under Section 11(A), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a respondent found guilty of a serious charge may be penalized as follows:

SEC. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including governmentowned or -controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits
shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00. Considering that respondent is not a first time offender and the charges of
gross misconduct and dishonesty are both grave offenses showing his unfitness to remain as a magistrate of the special graft court, we deem
it proper to impose the supreme penalty of dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT, DISHONESTY and
IMPROPRIETY, all in violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, for which he is hereby DISMISSED from the service,
with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch, agency or instrumentality
of the government including government-owned or -controlled corporations.

This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.SO ORDERED.

 SECOND DIVISION

LUCILA TAN, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1563

Complainant, (Formerly A.M. OCA
IPI No. 02-1207-MTJ)

Present:

Puno, J.,
Chairman,
- versus - *Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr.,
Tinga, and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.

Promulgated:
Judge MAXWEL S. ROSETE,
Respondent. September 8, 2004

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

Lucila Tan filed the instant complaint against Judge Maxwel S. Rosete, former Acting Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San Juan,
Metro Manila,[1] for violation of Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019).

The complaint alleged that Lucila Tan was the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 59440 and Criminal Case No. 66120, both entitled
People of the Philippines vs. Alfonso Pe Sy and pending before Branch 58, Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Metro Manila, then presided by
respondent judge. Before the cases were decided, respondent judge allegedly sent a member of his staff to talk to complainant. They met at Sangkalan
Restaurant along Scout Albano, near Timog Avenue in Quezon City. The staff member told her that respondent was asking for P150,000.00 in exchange
for the non-dismissal of the cases. She was shown copies of respondent judges Decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120, both still unsigned,
dismissing the complaints against the accused. She was told that respondent judge would reverse the disposition of the cases as soon as she remits the
amount demanded. The staff member allowed complainant to keep the copy of the draft decision in Criminal Case No. 59440. Complainant, however,
did not accede to respondents demand because she believed that she had a very strong case, well supported by evidence. The criminal cases were
eventually dismissed by respondent judge.[2]

Respondent judge, in his Comment, denied the allegations of complainant. He instead stated that it was complainant who attempted to bribe him in
exchange for a favorable decision. She even tried to delay and to derail the promulgation of the decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120.
Complainant also sought the intervention of then San Juan Mayor, Jinggoy Estrada, to obtain judgment in her favor. Mayor Estrada allegedly talked to
him several times to ask him to help complainant. The former even called him over the phone when he was in New Zealand, persuading him to hold in
abeyance the promulgation of the Decisions in said cases. But he politely declined, telling him that there was no sufficient evidence to convict the
accused, and moreover, he had already turned over the Decisions to Judge Quilatan for promulgation. Respondent further stated that complainant kept
bragging about her close relations with Mayor Estrada who was her neighbor in Greenhills, San Juan, and even insinuated that she could help him get
appointed to a higher position provided he decides the suits in her favor. Respondent judge also claimed that complainant offered to give cash for the
downpayment of a car he was planning to buy. But he refused the offer. Finally, respondent judge denied that a member of his staff gave complainant a
copy of his draft decision in Criminal Case No. 59440. He said that he had entrusted to Judge Quilatan his Decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and
66120 before he left for New Zealand on study leave. Thus, he asserted that it was impossible for him to thereafter change the resolution of the cases
and it was likewise impossible for any member of his staff to give complainant copies of said Decisions. [3]

In a resolution dated December 2, 2002, the Court referred the complaint to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City for
investigation, report and recommendation.[4]

First Vice Executive Judge Edwin A. Villasor conducted several hearings on the administrative case. Only complainant Lucila Tan testified for her side.
She presented as documentary evidence the copy of the unsigned Decision in Criminal Case No. 59440 dated February 23, 2001 which was allegedly
handed to her by a member of respondent judges staff. [5] Respondent judge, on the other hand, presented four (4) witnesses: Josefina Ramos, Rodolfo
Cea (Buboy), Fernando B. Espuerta, and Joyce Trinidad Hernandez. His documentary evidence consists of the affidavits of his witnesses,[6] copy of the
Motion for Reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 59440, [7] and various documents composed of the machine copy of the Order of Arrest in Criminal
Case No. 117219, machine copy of the letter dated December 29, 1997, machine copy of Certification dated Nov 13, 2000, front and dorsal sides of
Check No. QRH-0211804, Bank Statement dated March 31, 1998, Stop Payment Order dated April 6, 1998, Current Account Inquiry, and Transaction
Record, which documents were allegedly given by complainant to respondents witness, Fernando B. Espuerta. [8]

The Investigating Judge summarized the testimonies of the witnesses as follows:

COMPLAINANTS VERSION:

1. LUCILA TAN

Complainant Lucila Tan testified that she knew Respondent Judge because she had a case in Branch 58, MeTC, San Juan, Metro
Manila. She alleged that, in September 1998, she filed two cases involving B.P. 22 and Other Deceits with the Prosecutors Office in
Pasig. After resolution, the cases were filed in the MeTC, San Juan. One case went to Branch 57 and the other one went to Branch
58, where Respondent Judge Rosete was the Presiding Judge. Judge Quilatan was the Presiding Judge of Branch 57. Upon advise
of a friend, she moved for consolidation and the two cases were transferred to Judge Quilatan in Branch 57.Subsequently, in view of
the Motion for Inhibition filed by Complainants lawyer, Judge Quilatan inhibited himself and the two cases were transferred to the
sala of Respondent Judge Rosete (TSN, pp. 9-16, Hearing of March 3, 2003). After several hearings, the Clerk of Court, named
Joyce, called up the Complainant and advised her to talk to San Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada to seek for (sic) assistance. Joyce
gave her the phone number of the Office of the Mayor (TSN, pages 17-18, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant then called up
the Office of the Mayor but her call was intercepted by Josie, the Mayors Secretary. When she told Josie why she called, the latter
asked her if she wanted to meet the Judge and when Complainant answered in the affirmative, Josie made arrangements for
Complainant to meet the Judge (TSN, pages 19-21, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant called up the Office of the Mayor
sometime in November or late October 2000 and she met the Judge on November 10. She, Josie and Respondent Judge met at the
Cravings Restaurant in Wilson, San Juan (TSN, page 22, Hearing of March 3, 2003). During the meeting, Complainant told the
Judge regarding this matter, how this happened and that he will convince the Accused to pay me as soon as possible (TSN, page
23, Hearing of March 3, 2003). When she went to the restroom for a few minutes, Respondent Judge and Josie were left
alone. After she came back, they went home. On the way home, Josie told her to give something to [the] Judge, Sabi niya magbigay
tayo ng kaunti para bumilis iyong kaso mo(TSN, page 24, Hearing of March 3, 2003). At first, Josie did not mention any amount but
when the Complainant asked her how much, the former mentioned Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00). Complainant asked for a
lesser amount, Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) (TSN, page 25, Hearing of March 3, 2003). When Josie agreed, she sent
the amount of P20,000.00 to Josie through her driver after two days (TSN, pages 26-27, Hearing of March 3, 2003). When Josie
received the money, the Clerk of Court, Joyce, also called her (Complainant) on that date. The Clerk of Court asked her if she sent
money. At first, Complainant denied it but the Clerk of Court said that Josie went there and there was money in the drawer (TSN,
pages 28-29, Hearing of March 3, 2003). After that, several hearings were on-going, and before the resolution, Joyce called up the
Complainant again around February 2001. Complainant was in Baguio when Joyce called saying that she had an important thing to
tell to (sic) the Complainant. After Complainant got back to Manila, Joyce called her again and said that she will show Complainant
something. When they were in Complainants car in San Juan, Joyce showed Complainant two unsigned Decisions of the
case[s]. After reading the Decisions, Complainant saw that the cases were dismissed and that it will be dismissed if she will not
accede to Joyces request (TSN, pages 30-33, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant claimed that Joyce asked for Php
150,000.00 for each case. Sabi niya it [was] for Judge daw, kailangan daw ni Judge because he is leaving at that time (TSN, page
34, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant identified the copy of the Decision in Criminal Case No. 59440 for Other Deceits,
dated 23 February 2001, which was marked as Exhibit A for the Complainant (TSN, pages 35-38, Hearing of March 3,
2003). Complainant further alleged Sabi niya, if I will accede to that request of P150,000.00 for each case then they will (sic) going
to reverse the Decision and Si Judge daw will reverse the Decision. Complainant met with Joyce around February 2001 (TSN, page
39, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant further claimed that Joyce told her to go to Mayor because he is a friend of the
Judge. Complainant went again to the Office of the Mayor to seek the Mayors help and she met the Mayor at his Office in San
Juan. The Mayor called up the Judge but he was not around so the Clerk of Court, Joyce, was called. Joyce went to the Office of the
Mayor and when she arrived, she said that the Judge was out of the country (TSN, pages 40-41, Hearing of March 3, 2003). The
Mayor asked for the phone number of Respondent Judge Rosete, which Joyce gave.Mayor Estrada was able to get in touch with
the Judge. While the Mayor was talking in (sic) the phone with the Judge, Complainant was in front of the Mayor (TSN, pages 42-
43, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant heard the Mayor because his voice is very loud. He said, Judge, Saan ka? Sabi niya
New Zealand.When were you coming back? I do not know what is the answer and then he said, you help my friend naswindler siya,
pabilisin mo ang kaso niya para matapos na kasi matagal na iyan (TSN, page 43, Hearing of March 23, 2003). After that they left
the Office of the Mayor and Complainant was not able to approach Mayor Estrada again. Since the Complainant was still carrying
the Decision, and being afraid that it will be promulgated already, she sought the advi[c]e of her friends. The Complainant showed
the decision to the Prosecutor in San Juan at that time (TSN, pages 44-45, Hearing of March 3, 2003). The Prosecutor told the
Complainant that she is going to meet with the Judge when he comes back from New Zealand. Complainant testified that, sometime
in April, in Sangkalan, Quezon City, a night life restaurant, she met Respondent Judge Rosete. She was with two (2)
Prosecutors. When she arrived at Sangkalan at about 8:30 in the evening, Judge Rosete was already in the company of several
men whom she got to know as Fernan and Buboy (TSN, pages 46-48, Hearing of March 3, 2003). After eating and drinking, the
Complainant left at around 10:30 in the evening. While they were inside, Complainant claimed that she did not say anything at all
and it was the Prosecutor who talked in her behalf. She was the one who paid all the bills which amounted to Six Thousand Pesos
(P6,000.00). When Complainant left, only they, three (3) girls, left while the Judge and his company were still there drinking. While
Complainant was waiting for her car outside, a man came over from behind (TSN, pages 49-50, Hearing of March 3,
2003). Complainant did not know him but she asked the Prosecutor later after the man left. The Complainant said that the man
asked if he could have an advance, which she understood as a payment, and she told the Prosecutor. Complainant heard the
Prosecutor say that she already talked to the Judge.The man left and went back inside the restaurant (TSN, page 51, Hearing of
March 3, 2003). Complainant said that when she did not give the money she was still scared because there will already be a
promulgation and she did not know whether it will be in her behalf (sic) or not. Complainant did not give anything aside from
the P20,000.00 because her case was very strong and she had all the papers and evidence and that she promised them that she
will give them after she was (sic) able to collect all the debts. Complainant did not know the actual date of the promulgation but
somebody from the Office of Respondent Judge called her up in her house and told her not to go to the promulgation. When
Complainant asked why, Sabi niya baka mapaiyak daw ako kasi alam na daw nila ang decision. Sabi niya ako na lang ang
magdedeliver ng case ng promulgation. She received the decision when she sent her driver to pick it up. The caller said that the
decision was unfavorable to her (TSN, pages 52-55, Hearing of March 3, 2003).

RESPONDENTS VERSION:

1. JOSEFINA RAMOS

She testified that she was the Private Secretary of Mayor Jinggoy Estrada, the former Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila, since he
was Vice Mayor of San Juan. In 2000 and 2001, she was already the Secretary of Mayor Jinggoy (TSN, page 7, Hearing of
September 9, 2003). She met Lucila Tan when the latter went to the Mayors Office together with Tita Pat, the sister of President
Estrada, but she could no longer remember the year. Lucila Tan went to the Office, together with Tita Pat, and they were seeking
the help of Mayor Jinggoy because they have a case. She did not know the case because they were talking to Mayor Jinggoy. She
could no longer remember how many times Lucila Tan went to the Office of Mayor Jinggoy Estrada. She did not know what Lucila
Tan wanted from Mayor Jinggoy Estrada or how close Lucila Tan was to him (TSN, pages 8-11, Hearing of September 9,
2003). She denied that she met Lucila Tan at the Cravings Restaurant and that she suggested to Lucila Tan to give Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) to Judge Rosete to speed up or facilitate her cases but that Lucila Tan agreed for only Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00). She claimed that she did not know what Lucila Tan was talking about regarding the money. There was no occasion
that she suggested or even intimated to Lucila Tan the idea of giving money to Judge Rosete. She denied that she met with Lucila
Tan and Respondent Judge at Cravings Restaurant along Wilson Street in San Juan, Metro Manila. She identified her Sworn
Statement, subscribed on February 5, 2003, which was marked as Exhibit 1 (TSN, pages 12-16, Hearing of September 9,
2003). She denied that Lucila Tan gave anything to her (TSN, page 17, Hearing of September 9, 2003).

2. RODOLFO CEA

He testified that his acquaintances usually call him Buboy and for about two years or more he had no occupation. Two years before,
he was a Clerk III at Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San Juan. He knows Lucila Tan because, when he was still working as
Clerk in San Juan, she approached me and asked if I can introduce her to Judge Rosete and eventually asked for a favorable
decision against her case. He could not remember anymore when that was because it was a long time ago (TSN, pages 6-7,
Hearing of September 22, 2003). It was when he was still with the MeTC, Branch 58, San Juan, Metro Manila. He met Lucila Tan
at the corridor of the Metropolitan Trial Court when she approached him and asked if he can introduce her to Judge Rosete. He
agreed to introduce Lucila Tan to Judge Rosete but he was not able to actually introduce Lucila Tan to Judge Rosete because aside
from the introduction, she wants me to ask Judge Rosete for a favorable decision against (sic) her case and I told her that Judge
Rosete dont (sic) like his staff (to) indulge on that kind of transaction (TSN, pages 8-9, Hearing of September 22, 2003). As far as
he knows, the meeting he had with Lucila Tan in the corridor of the Court in San Juan was the first and the last time. When asked
about the claim of Lucila Tan that he approached her and demanded from her a sum of money to represent an advance payment for
a favorable decision in her cases then pending before Judge Rosete, he answered I dont know about that, sir. (TSN, page 10,
Hearing of September 22, 2003.) He identified the Sworn Statement, subscribed on February 6, 2003, and confirmed and affirmed
the truthfulness of the contents of the Affidavit, which was marked as Exhibit 2 (TSN, pages 11-12, Hearing of September 22,
2003). He denied that he met the Complainant at Sangkalan Restaurant around 8:30 in the evening of an unspecified date (TSN,
page 13, Hearing of September 22, 2003).

3. FERNANDO B. ESPUERTA

He testified that he is a government employee employed at the Supreme Court with the position Budget Officer III since November
9, 1981. His first job was Casual and he became Budget Officer in 1997 (TSN, page 46, Hearing of September 22, 2003). He
recalled having met Lucila Tan sometime just before Christmas in October or November 2000. The first time he saw Lucila Tan was
in a restaurant in Quezon City where she was introduced to him by Fiscal Reyes. He went to the restaurant alone. He was invited by
Judge Rosete because they had not been together for a long time and they were long time friends. They ate at the restaurant.When
he arrived, Judge Rosete and Buboy were already there. They stayed in the restaurant until 11:00 [eleven] oclock in the
evening (TSN, pages 47-49, Hearing of September 22, 2003). He met Lucila Tan in that restaurant when Fiscal Reyes pointed him
to Lucila Tan as Fernan of the Supreme Court. When he arrived there, Buboy and Judge Rosete were already there. Later, the three
(3) girls arrived, namely: Fiscal Reyes, Lucila Tan and the sister of the Fiscal (TSN, page 50, Hearing of September 22,
2003). They ordered and ate but they were in a separate table. He recalled that Judge Rosete paid for their bill because he saw him
get a credit card and sign something. He did not know about Mrs. Tan but he saw Judge Rosete sign and give to the waiter. The
incident where he met Lucila Tan in the restaurant in Quezon City came before the incident when she went to his Office (TSN,
pages 51-52, Hearing of September 22, 2003). He could not remember the month when Lucila Tan went to his Office but he
remembers that it was nearing Christmas in 2000. Pumunta siya sa akin parang may ipinakiusap siya sa akin, katunayan nandito po
dala ko. Lucila Tan asked him to help her in her case with Alfonso Sy. Meron siyang inalok sa akin. Sabi bibigyan niya ako ng three
hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) para iabot kay Judge Rosete. Ang sagot ko nga sa kanya, hindi ganun ang aking
kaibigan. Matagal na kaming magkaibigan niyan noong nagpapractice pa yan. Iyon ang sagot ko sa kanya. He told Judge Rosete
about that and the latter got mad at him. In their second meeting, Lucila Tan gave him papers. He presented a Motion for
Reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 59440, which was marked as Exhibit 3 (TSN, pages 53-56, Hearing of September 22,
2003). He presented the papers actually given to him by Lucila Tan. He claimed that the xerox copy was the exact same document
given to him by Lucila Tan when she went to his Office. The other documents that Lucila Tan gave to him when she went to his
Office were marked as Exhibit 4 and submarkings (TSN, pages 57-63, Hearing of September 22, 2003). Lucila Tan told him the
contents of the documents and how the case against Alfonso Sy came about. When Lucila Tan asked him, he answered her that his
friend (Respondent Judge) was not like that and they had been together for a long time and it is not possible. When he told Judge
 Rosete about that, the latter got mad at him. Lucila Tan also mentioned to him that she knew the son of the Chief Justice (TSN,
pages 64-66, Hearing of September 22, 2003). Lucila Tan was insisting that he give Judge Rosete so that her case will win but he
answered that his friend was not like that (TSN, pages 67-68, Hearing of September 22, 2003).

4. JOYCE TRINIDAD HERNANDEZ

She testified that she was a government employee connected with the Judiciary at the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San
Juan, Metro Manila. She knew Complainant Lucila Tan because in the year 2000 she had a case in their court. She first came to
know Lucila Tan when the latter went to their Office with Ellen Sorio, the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 57, who introduced Lucila
Tan to her. Ellen Sorio said, may kaso ito sa inyo, pinapasabi ni Mayor kay Judge (TSN, pages 7-11, Hearing of September 29,
2003). She did not say anything but Lucila Tan asked may tumawag na ba sa Mayors Office? and she said yes, maam. After that
there was a hearing and the sister of former President Estrada went to their Office looking for Judge Rosete. She told her that Judge
Rosete was on a hearing and the former told her to tell Judge Rosete about the case of Lucila na pinakikiusap ni Mayor (TSN, page
12, Hearing of September 29, 2003). She told Judge Rosete about the things that the sister of the former President told her and
that Judge Rosete said nothing. She denied the testimony of Complainant on March 3, 2003 that, sometime in November 2000, she
(Joyce Hernandez) called up Lucila Tan by telephone and said that she saw money stuffed inside the drawer of the Respondent in
his Office and that she asked the Complainant whether the latter was the one who sent the money stuffed inside the drawer. What
she remembers is that Lucila Tan called her and asked if Josie went to their Office and she told Lucila Tan that Josie never went to
their Office. She also denied that she called up Lucila Tan sometime in February 2001 and claimed that Lucila Tan was the one who
called her up and told her that she (Lucila Tan) was going to show her something. Lucila Tan showed her a copy of the Decision and
she was surprised when the former showed her the copy. When she asked where Lucila Tan got the copy, the latter did not answer
and said that Mayor Jinggoy wanted to talk to her (TSN, pages 13-16, Hearing of September 29, 2003). She immediately went to
the Office of the Mayor with Lucila Tan and Mayor Jinggoy talked to her. The Mayor asked her where Judge Rosete was and she
answered that he was in New Zealand on study leave. When the Mayor asked if she knew the telephone number of the Judge, she
gave him the telephone number in New Zealand. She was present when the Mayor called up Respondent Judge and talked to
him (TSN, page 17, Hearing of September 29, 2003). He said Pare ko, ano na itong kaso na pinakikiusap ko sa iyo? I dont know
what was your answer(ed) [sic] to him, you were talking and then he said ganun ba? then Mayor Jinggoy said o sige, okay naand
then we left the Office. She denied that she gave two advance copies of the Decisions in Complainants two cases inside the latters
parked car in San Juan, Metro Manila and claimed that Complainant was the one who showed her the copy in their Office. She
likewise denied the testimony of the Complainant that she allegedly demanded Php150,000.00 for each of the two cases then
pending before Branch 58, which were decided by Respondent Judge, in return for a favorable decision (TSN, pages 18-21,
Hearing of September 29, 2003). She claimed that it was the Complainant who offered to her. She identified her Sworn Statement,
subscribed and sworn to on February 5, 2003, which was marked as Exhibit 5, and confirmed and affirmed the truthfulness of all the
contents thereof (TSN, pages 22-25, Hearing of September 29, 2003).[9]

The Court is now faced with two opposing versions of the story. Complainant claims that respondent judge, through his staff, required her to pay the
amount of P150,000.00 for him to render judgment in her favor in the two criminal cases she filed against Alfonso Pe Sy. Respondent judge, on the other
hand, asserts that it was complainant who attempted to bribe him by offering to pay for the downpayment of the car he was planning to buy, and she
even sought the intervention of then San Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada to persuade him to rule for the complainant in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and
66120.

The issue in this administrative case thus boils down to a determination of the credibility of the parties evidence.

After a thorough evaluation of the testimonies of all the witnesses, as well as the documentary evidence presented by both parties, we find the
complainants version more trustworthy. Not only did she testify with clarity and in full detail, but she also presented during the investigation the unsigned
copy of the draft decision of respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 59440 given to her by a member of his staff. Said documentary evidence supports
her allegation that a member of complainants staff met with her, showed her copies of respondent judges draft decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440
and 66120, and demanded, in behalf of respondent judge, that she pays P150,000.00 for the reversal of the disposition of said cases. It would be
impossible for complainant to obtain a copy of a judges draft decision, it being highly confidential, if not through the judge himself or from the people in
his office. And an ordinary employee in the court cannot promise a litigant the reversal of a cases disposition if not assured by the judge who drafted the
decision.

The respondents evidence did not overcome the facts proved by complainant. We note that the testimonies of two of respondents witnesses contradict
each other. Fernando Espuerta confirmed complainants claim that she met respondent judge and his two companions, Espuerta himself and Rodolfo
Cea (Buboy), at Sangkalan Restaurant in Quezon City. Rodolfo Cea, on the other hand, denied that he met complainant at Sangkalan Restaurant and
swore that he never went out with respondent judge in non-office functions.The Investigating Judge observed:
Thus, there is an apparent inconsistency in the testimony of the Respondent Judges two witnesses, Rodolfo Cea and
Fernando B. Espuerta, regarding the incident at Sangkalan Restaurant in Quezon City where Complainant claimed that she met
Respondent Judge, a certain Fernan, and Buboy, while she was with two Prosecutors. Fernando B. Espuerta testified that he was at
Sangkalan Restaurant with Respondent Judge and Buboy (Rodolfo Cea), while the latter (Rodolfo Cea) denied that he met the
Complainant at Sangkalan Restaurant.[10] (citations omitted)

Hence, we are more inclined to believe complainants version that she met with respondent judge and his companions at Sangkalan Restaurant
sometime in April 2001.

We have also observed that respondent judge has not been very candid with the Court as regards the dates when he went to New Zealand and when he
came back to the Philippines. Respondent asserts that he was already in New Zealand at the time when complainant claims that he met with
her. However, the evidence he presented only shows his New Zealand visa and the dates when he entered said country. [11] He did not show to the
investigating body the dates when he left and returned to the Philippines.Apparently, he entered New Zealand on two dates: March 4, 2001 and May 1,
2001. We may therefore infer that complainant was in the Philippines before May 1, 2001, which is consistent with complainants testimony, as well as
that of Fernando Espuerta, that she met with respondent judge and his companions, Fernando and Buboy in April 2001.

We have repeatedly admonished our judges to adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct. They must be the embodiment of competence, integrity
and independence. Like Caesars wife, a judge must not only be pure but above suspicion. This is not without reason. The exacting standards of conduct
demanded from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary because the peoples confidence in the
judicial system is founded not only on the magnitude of legal knowledge and the diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the highest standard
of integrity and moral uprightness they are expected to possess. When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of any law which he is sworn to
apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary
itself. It is therefore paramount that a judges personal behavior both in the performance of his duties and his daily life, be free from any appearance of
impropriety as to be beyond reproach.[12]

Respondents act of sending a member of his staff to talk with complainant and show copies of his draft decisions, and his act of meeting with litigants
outside the office premises beyond office hours violate the standard of judicial conduct required to be observed by members of the Bench. They
constitute gross misconduct which is punishable under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, Respondent Judge Maxwel S. Rosete is SUSPENDED from office without salary and other benefits for FOUR (4) MONTHS.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

[A.M. No. MTJ-98-1144. July 22, 1998]

FLORIDE DAWA, NORALIZ L. JORGENSEN, FEMENINA LAZARO-BARRETO, complainants, vs. Judge ARMANDO C. DE ASA, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 51, Caloocan City, respondent.

[A.M. No. MTJ-98-1148. July 22, 1998]

Clerk of Court MONA LISA A. BUENCAMINO, complainant, vs. Judge ARMANDO C. DE ASA Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 51, Caloocan
City,respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Armando C. de Asa, the presiding judge of Branch 51 and acting executive judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, was charged
with sexual harassment and/or acts of lasciviousness in a letter-complaint[1] dated August 15, 1997, filed by Floride Dawa,[2] Feminina Lazaro-
Barreto[3] and Noraliz L. Jorgensen.[4] In view of the allegations in the Complaint, this Court, in a Resolution dated December 10, 1997, placed
respondent judge under preventive suspension; and referred the case to retired Justice Romulo S. Quimbo, a consultant of the Office of the Court
Administrator, for investigation, report and recommendation.[5]

Meanwhile, Atty. Mona Lisa A. Buencamino,[6] who assisted the aforementioned complainants, also filed, on September 5, 1997, an affidavit-
complaint[7] against Judge Armando C. de Asa, for sexual harassment under Republic Act No. 7877/acts of lasciviousness, grave or serious misconduct,
and [for] violation [of] the high standard of moral[s] demanded by judicial ethics x x x. In our Resolution dated March 18, 1998,[8] we resolved to
consolidate her Complaint with the earlier one and to refer it likewise to Justice Romulo S. Quimbo for inclusion in his investigation, report and
recommendation.

After conducting a thorough investigation, the investigating officer submitted his Report, dated March 16, 1998, which contained the following
exhaustive and detailed summary of the testimonies of the witnesses for both the complainants and the respondent:

1. Floride Y. Dawa is a 24 year-old single girl employed as a stenographic reporter in Branch 52 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC for brevity) of
Caloocan City. She affirmed under oath the sworn statement (Exhibit A, Record, pp. 2-3 of the Record) she executed August 15, 1997. She related that
on August 8, 1997, while on her way to the ladies toilet, she had seen respondent, Judge Armando C. de Asa, talking with a man at the backdoor of his
chamber. Out of respect for respondent, being the Acting Executive Judge of the MeTC, she had nodded to him before entering the ladies comfort
room. When she emerged from the same, she saw that respondent was still at the backdoor of his office although this time he was alone. Upon seeing
Dawa, respondent casually asked her whether the toilet was clean. She answered that it was dirty. Respondent called her and she approached
him. When she neared the respondent, the latter put his arm on her shoulder and led her into his chamber. Once inside and while she was standing near
the edge of respondents office table, he placed his arm around her shoulder and suddenly held her jaw and kissed her on the lips.

Dawa was taken by surprise and was shocked by the act of the respondent. Before she could recover herself, respondent once again held her shoulder
and chin and kissed her on lips. She forcibly pushed the respondent away. Respondent asked her where she lived and with whom but she hurriedly left
respondents office.

Upon Dawas return to the staff room of Branch 52, Maria Teresa Carpio, who also works in Branch 52 asked her what the matter was because she
noticed that Dawa looked dazed (tulala). She first said that nothing was the matter but upon [Carpios] insistent questioning, she haltingly related her
harrowing experience in respondents office.

That same day, she related the incident to Judge Delfina Hernandez-Santiago, the presiding judge of Branch 52 who, although [she] was then on leave,
had gone to her office on the invitation of Danilo Silverio, one of her coworkers in Branch 52, who was celebrating his birthday. Judge Santiago, after
listening to Dawas story, advised her to go home and relate the incident to her parents before deciding to do anything further. Dawa went home but did
not tell her parents who were sickly. Instead, she told her sister.

The next Tuesday (she had absented herself on Monday), Dawa went to see Atty. Mona Lisa Buencamino, the Clerk of Court, and related her story. She
was told that she was not respondents first victim but that Noraliz Jorgensen and the Clerk of Court herself had been objects of respondents amorous
advances.

Dawa saw Noraliz Jorgensen. The latter assured her that if Dawa would file a complaint, she would follow suit.

Dawa and Jorgensen decided to file charges against the respondent. Upon the advice of Atty. Buencamino, the two complainants saw Atty. Calalang, a
city councilor. The latter advised them to go to the police and have their complaints entered in the police blotter. Calalang brought them to the office of
Councilor Manlapig, a former police colonel. The latter called for a police investigator and SPO2 Rey Domingo came and interviewed them. That same
afternoon, the two complainants went to the police station to have their complaints recorded in the police blotter (Exhibits 7 and 7-A; Record, pp. 16-17).

Dawa came to the Supreme Court with Atty. Buencamino, Noraliz Jorgensen and Femenina Lazaro-Barreto where they filed the letter-complaint (Exhibit
X).

Respondent personally cross-examined Dawa. She insisted on her story although she admitted that respondent had gone to Branch 52 that same day.

2. Noraliz L. Jorgensen is 28 years old and married to a policeman. She affirmed under oath her sworn statement (Exhibit C, pp. 6-7 of the
Record). The following is her story:

Jorgensen was and still is a casual employee in the Office of the Mayor of Caloocan City and detailed to the Office of the Clerk of Court, (OCC for short),
MeTC, Caloocan City. Among her duties was the preparation and follow up of the payrolls for RATA and gasoline allowances of the Metropolitan Trial
Judges. Upon the approval of said payrolls, it was her duty to receive the cash from the cashier and deliver them to the individual judges.

Sometime on January 3, 1997, at about 10:00 oclock in the morning, she had gone to the office of respondent Judge Armando C. de Asa, who presides
Branch 51 of the Court, for the purpose of securing his signature on the payroll for the judges allowances. Upon entering the respondents office, the
latter approached her and suddenly kissed her on the cheek. Jorgensen immediately left respondents office after having secured his signature on the
payroll.

Again, on March 31, 1997, at about 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, Jorgensen had returned to the respondents office to deliver the cash representing his
allowances for the months of January, February and March. Upon entering the respondents office, the latter immediately stood up, held her two arms,
and suddenly kissed her and licked her left ear, saying I love you. Jorgensen was surprised and afraid. She asked respondent, Judge, what is this, at the
same time endeavoring to free herself from his hold but she could not because his grip was strong. Respondent then said, Dont make noise lest we be
heard outside. At the same time, respondent held her jaw and kissed her on lips. He said, Open your mouth as her continued to hug and kiss her while
she tried to free herself. He did not heed her pleas although she was then trembling with fear.
On May 26, 1997, Jorgensen again entered respondents office to secure his signature on the payroll for June. Again he kissed her before he signed
it. After he had signed the payroll, respondent invited Jorgensen to eat with him at the Max Restaurant on EDSA the next Saturday. When she asked
him why he was inviting her, he answered, You are no longer a child, you ought to know.

Jorgensen could only cry. She asked Atty. Buencamino not to send her again to the respondent and she told Buencamino of what had happened to
her. Atty. Buencamino told Jorgensen that if she wanted to complain, Buencamino would support her. Jorgensen was afraid that nothing would come out
of any complaint because respondent was a Judge and powerful.

On August 4, 1997, having delivered the allowances of all judges except the respondent, Jorgensen tried to look for someone who could deliver the
money to him but she could find no one. So she waited until she knew that someone else was inside respondents office. At about 3:00 oclock, while
Roderick Corral was inside respondents office, she entered but respondent immediately threw to Corral the paper he had brought for his signature, in
effect dismissing him. Corral immediately stepped out leaving Jorgensen alone in respondents chambers. When they were alone, respondent stood up
and held Jorgensens jaw kissing her on her lips at the same time saying Open your mouth. Jorgensen immediately left respondents office in tears.

On August 8, 1997, Jorgensen learned that Floride Dawa, a stenographer in Branch 52, was the latest victim of the respondent. Jorgensen reported her
experience to Judge Santiago, the Executive Judge, and she informed the good judge that she was ready to file a complaint against respondent in order
to obtain justice.

Respondent personally cross examined Jorgensen who admitted that before August, 1997, she had gone to respondents office with Baby Mapue in
response to his call and while there they were shown an anonymous letter (Exhibit 2) which mentioned [the] alleged misconduct on her part.

3. Femenina Lazaro-Barreto is a thirty-year old married woman who is a Court Stenographer II in Branch 53 of the Caloocan City MeTC. During her
direct examination by Atty. Roberto Abad, she identified her sworn statement (Exhibit E found on pp. 4-5 of the Record).

On July 22, 1997, she was assigned to Branch 51 because Judge Romanito Amatong of Branch 53 was on leave. While attending the session at Branch
51, respondent dictated an Order in open court. Her stenographic notes are found in Exhibit F. She transcribed these notes (Exhibits F-1) and left them
with the Branch Clerk Gina Amatong. When she returned after lunch, Gina told her there were some corrections so she again typed and submitted
Exhibit F-2. After typing one more draft (Exhibit F-3), she brought the final draft (Exhibit F-4) to respondents office for his signature. After respondent
signed the Order, he stood up and while Barreto was looking at the Order, he held her chin and kissed her. Barreto asked, What are you
doing? Respondent kissed her again and tapped her shoulder saying, Sigue na, Nina. Okay na, dismissing her. Barreto went out of the office and wiped
her lips with her hand. Margo, a stenographer in Branch 51 saw her. She did not relate the incident to her husband but he learned about it from the
newspapers.

4. Atty. Mona Lisa A. Buencamino is an unmarried forty-year-old lawyer who is presently the Clerk of Court of Caloocan City MeTC. Her first
appointment was on June 18, 1987 as Branch Clerk of Court for Branch 51, presided by Judge Filemon Mendoza, now retired. After she became a
lawyer in 1996, she was promoted to her present position as Clerk of Court.

Buencamino is acquainted with the three complainants. She first came to know Jorgensen when she assumed office as Clerk of Court because
Jorgensen was detailed to her office. She had known Barreto since 1992 or 1993 and she personally came to know Dawa when the latter, accompanied
by Jorgensen, approached her on August 12, 1997 and related her harrowing experience in the office of respondent.Jorgensen herself related similar
experiences. Buencamino advised the two ladies that she would refer that matter to Judge Santiago, the executive judge, who was then on leave. She
reasoned that being a woman and the executive judge, Judge Santiago would understand the complainants situation. Dawa and Jorgensen told Atty.
Buencamino that they had already seen Judge Santiago and the latter had advised them to consult their families before taking any step. They further
told the Clerk of Court that they had consulted their families and were decided to file an administrative case against respondent judge. At this juncture,
sheriff Noli Calalang informed the complainants Dawa and Jorgensen that his brother, Councilor Gil Calalang, was willing to help them.

On August 13, 1997, at about 1:30 oclock in the afternoon, complainants Dawa and Jorgensen were advised that Atty. Gil Calalang was in his
office. Buencamino and the two complainants proceeded to Calalangs office who, after hearing their stories, advised them to report the matter to the
police. Atty. Calalang was willing to handle their case provided permission was obtained from Mayor Malonzo.Buencamino and the two complainants
were brought to the office of Councilor Manlapig, a former police colonel, and there they were interviewed by SPO2 Santiago. The latter asked what
cases could be filed against the judge and Atty. Buencamino answered that a case for violation of the new Anti-Sexual Harassment Law or for Acts of
Lasciviousness under the Penal Code could be filed against respondent.At 5:30 oclock that same afternoon, Dawa and Jorgensen repaired to the
Caloocan Police Station to have their complaints logged (Exhibits 7 and 7-A; Record; pp. 46-47).

On August 14, 1997, Feminina Lazaro-Barreto, accompanied by her sister, saw Atty. Buencamino and told her that she, too, was one of respondents
victims. Ms. Barreto decided to file an administrative charge against respondent and requested David Maniquis, the deputy clerk of court, to accompany
her to the police station to have her complaint recorded. (Exhibits 7-B and 7-C, Record, pp. 48-49).

Buencamino admitted that she had accompanied the three complainants to the Office of the Court Administrator to file the present case. Upon request of
Atty. Perez of the Office of the Court Administrator, she had administered the oaths of the three complainants and had signed the original complaint.

5. Cielito M. Mapue, 33 years old, married and employed as Clerk III, OCC, MeTC, Caloocan City, took the stand for the complainants to corroborate
their testimonies. She declared that --

She was in charge of releasing the cash bonds to the bondsmen when they were no longer needed. In this connection, she had to prepare the vouchers
and the breakdown of checks and she had to go to the office of the respondent in order to secure his signature. In 1997, she remembers having been
requested once by Jorgensen to bring a payroll for the signature of respondent. After respondent signed the documents she had brought to him,
respondent stood up, went around his table and abruptly kissed her. She immediately left with Emily Rose Clemente, staff member of Branch 51 and
never again went to see respondent alone. Mapue admitted that she and Jorgensen had been called by respondent in relation to a complaint of Judge
Santiago. Asked by respondent where he had kissed her, she retorted in the vernacular, Sa bibig, hindi mo ba natatanda-an? Made to explain why she
had not complained, she answered that she did not want anyone to know. As a matter of fact, her husband did not know of the incident even as she was
testifying.

6. Maria Teresa G. Carpio, 37 years old, married, a casual employee of the City Mayors office and detailed to Branch 52 of the MeTC had the following
to say:

She had known Floride Dawa to be a happy girl. On August 8, 1997, she was rather in good spirits because it was the birthday of one of their
officemates and there was some sort of a party. At about 10:00 oclock that morning, Dawa had gone to the womens comfort room. When Dawa returned
a few minutes later, Carpio noticed that she was pale and fidgety. She kept wringing her hands and was on the verge of tears. Carpio asked her what
the matter was but Dawa answered that nothing was the matter. After some prodding, Carpio asked Dawa to go with her to the court room and there
asked what really the matter was as she was no longer her gay self. Dawa cried and told the story of how the respondent had twice kissed her on the
lips.

At lunch time, Judge Delfina H. Santiago, the presiding judge of Branch 52, came to join the birthday party. She was told by Esper Cabiling, another
stenographer in Branch 52, that Floride Dawa wanted to see her in private. Judge Santiago brought Dawa to her private chambers.

On cross examination, Carpio admitted that respondent appeared at Branch 52 and asked if everything was okay, at which juncture, Dawa,
accompanied by Rowena Martin, went to the courtroom.

7. David Maniquiz, deputy clerk of court, Caloocan City MeTC, declared that on August 14, 1997, he had been requested by Femenina L. Barreto, to
accompany her to police headquarters to lodge a complaint against the respondent. Noli Calalang, Joselito Bedana, Noraliz Jorgensen and Floride
Dawa were with them in the police station.
8. Ma. Victoria Soriano-Cruz, an interpreter in respondents court, was originally reluctant to testify. She, however, appeared in the afternoon of
February 18, 1998, to give testimony. She declared that she knew the complaints and that she [was] directly under the respondent who preside[d]
Branch 51. On August 12, 1997, she learned from others that Floride Dawa was kissed by the respondent. She also learned that Jorgensen had also
been kissed by respondent. She admitted that the respondent has the inclination for imposing fines on employees who were late or made mistakes. She
identified Exhibit G as an order where [sic] requiring her to pay a fine.

9. Judge Delfina Hernandez Santiago the presiding judge of Branch 52, Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, was the last witness to testify for the
complainants. The following is her story:

She had been sick and had been on leave since March of last year. For this reason, the respondent, who had been designated Vice Executive Judge,
had to act in her stead.

Judge Santiago affirmed the contents of a verified eight-page letter (Exhibit I, I-1 to I-7; Record, pp. 17-24) which she had sent to the Court
Administrator. This was submitted as her direct testimony.

In her letter, Judge Santiago stated that five ladies had unburdened themselves to her not only in her capacity as executive judge but because she was
a woman. On Friday, August 8, 1997, she had gone to her office because she had been invited to lunch by birthday celebrants, Danilo Silverio and
Esperancilla Kabiling. Upon her arrival, Ms. Kabiling had approached her and told her that Floride Dawa, one of her stenographers, urgently wanted to
tell her something in confidence. Dawa entered the judges office red[-]eyed, red-faced and with a shiny nose. She kept clasping and unclasping her
hands and could not stand still. She spoke in an incoherent and shaking voice which Judge Santiago could scarcely understand. She asked Dawa to sit
down and compose herself. Dawa sat down and began to cry, so that her story could hardly be understood. Between sobs, the judge was able to piece
out the fact that Dawa had been embraced and forcibly kissed twice on her lips by the respondent sometime that morning.

Dawa sought Judge Santiagos help to transfer to another court and she wanted her to talk to the respondent in order that the incident would not be
repeated. Judge Santiago could not promise Dawa but she advised her to go home as she obviously was not herself. She further advised Dawa to think
the matter over during the weekend and to talk to her parents about it. Judge Santiago promised to talk to Dawa again the next week.

After Dawa had left, Judge Santiago learned that Noraliz Jorgensen, a casual employee detailed to the OCC had had the same experience. To verify the
truth, the judge went to the Office of the Clerk of Court and bluntly asked Noraliz Jorgensen whether it was true that she had been kissed by the
respondent. Noraliz blushed and became red[-]eyed and told the judge of the several instances that the respondent had forcibly embraced and kissed
her on the lips.

Judge Santiago sought out Judge Belen Ortiz who presides Branch 49. She related the stories of Dawa and Noraliz and asked Judge Ortiz whether she
know of anyone from her branch who may have undergone the same experience. Judge Ortiz asked Jean Marie Lazo and the latter told them that there
was one instance when she and Zenaida Reyes, another employee of the court, were seated on a bench near the door of their court and respondent sat
between them and placed his arms on their shoulders and kissed them both on the cheeks. Jorgensen informed Judge Santiago that if Dawa would
complain, she too would file a complaint. Judge Santiago advised her to seek the counsel of her parents and her husband and to see her again the next
week.

In the afternoon of August 13, 1997, Femenina Lazaro-Barreto, a court stenographer in Branch 53, accompanied by her sister, Jean Marie, came to see
Judge Santiago. Femenina confessed to Judge Santiago that she, too, had been kissed and embraced by the respondent twice. In between sobs and
with her handkerchief almost torn to shreds by her shaking hands, she related how she had harbored her shame in silence and her guilt at not being
able to tell her husband.

That same week, Atty. Mona Lisa Buencamino also related her own story to Judge Santiago how she was forcibly embraced and kissed on the lips by
the respondent.

Mrs. Maria Victoria Cruz was the last one to tell Judge Santiago about the instances that the respondent had kissed her on her cheeks. Mrs. Cruz sought
the assistance of Judge Santiago to transfer to another branch to escape the respondent."[9]

The investigating justice summarized the testimonies of respondents witnesses in this wise:

1. Arniel Apostol, is 38 years old, married and the sheriff in respondents branch. He affirmed the contents of his sworn statement (Exhibits 9 and 9-A;
Record, pp. 56-57). He declared that he had been with the MeTC, Caloocan City, since 1980. In 1995, he was detailed to Branch 51 and later became
its permanent sheriff.

In his sworn statement, Apostol declared that the respondent was an official who was faithful to his job. He observed office hours religiously. He was
friendly and helpful to his personnel and was very approachable whenever they needed anything. The workers in his branch were free to enter his office,
it being always open. It [was] not soundproof such that if anything improper happened inside, it could be heard outside.

Apostol further declared that since the respondent assumed office as judge, he had not heard of him being guilty of any improper conduct. On the other
hand, he was the object of praise in his work even as a lawyer and as a fiscal.

Apostol continued saying he was surprised to learn that the respondent had been charged administratively by Nina (Femenina Barreto), Nora (Noraliz
Jorgensen) and Flor (Floride Dawa) because he had not seen the respondent do anything indelicate to the three women. Whenever Nina came to
Branch 51 to see the respondent, she would greet him with a Hello Judge, I am sexy now. On the other hand, whenever Noraliz brought in documents
for respondents signature, she was always smiling going in and coming out of respondents office. Apostol declared that he had seen Floride Dawa go to
respondents office only once and she was in company with other employees of Branch 52.

On cross examination, Apostol admitted that respondents office ha[d] a back door and the same [was] locked with a main lock and two barrel bolts. It
was his daily chore to open this back door from the inside by unlocking the barrel bolts. After he had done this he would go down to the street to await
the arrival of the respondent.

2. Liza Moreno, 47 years old, married, was respondents second witness. She is a court stenographer in Branch 51 presided by respondent. She had
been with the MeTC since January 2, 1969. She affirmed the sworn statement consisting of two pages (Exhibits 10 and 10-A) which she had jointly
executed with Lina V. Cara, a clerk in the same branch who had been in the service for 17 years.

She said that during the almost five years that she had been under the respondent, no one had charged him administratively. She described him as
friendly and helpful to those working under him. His office was always open to his subordinates. The same is not sound proof such that if anything
untoward happened inside or [if there was] any loud conversation [it] would be noticed by those in the staff room.

During these past days she was stunned to learn that Judge de Asa had been charged [with] sexual harassment by Nina, Nora and Flor because she
had not seen the respondent do anything indecent to these three women. Everytime Nina saw the Judge, she would smilingly greet him with such
remarks as Hi, Judge or sometimes Hello, Im sexy now.

She learned about the charges on August 8, 1997 when she [went] to the Office of the Clerk of Court to fetch Fe Apostol. She [was] told by the
employees thereat about the incident. She said that she [went] up to Branch 51 [o]n the third floor to ask her coworkers whether they had heard the
news that the respondent had kissed someone. Those who were still in replied that they had not.
Moreno further declared that Barreto used to come to Branch 51 to have papers signed by respondent and sometimes she came to cut the hair of
certain employees, including the respondent himself. On the other hand, she had seen Dawa only once when she came with her co-employees at
Branch 52 to have their daily time records signed.

3. Mario Muncal, respondents third witness is 47 years old and single. He affirmed the contents of his sworn statement (Exhibit 11; Record, p. 53).

Muncal stated that on August 7, 1997, he had gone to see the respondent about a job in the MeTC. When he entered respondents office, Atty.
Buencamino was with him. De Asa introduced Muncal to Buencamino telling her about his application for a job in the court. Atty. Buencamino told
Muncal to wait for her at her office. When Muncal saw Buencamino, the latter told him that he would have to undergo an observation period of one to two
weeks. She further told him that although he had been recommended by respondent, she would be his direct superior and he was admonished not to
relate anywhere else whatever he heard or saw in her office.

Muncal was taken aback by this admonition knowing that respondent, as executive judge, was her superior and was entitled to know everything that
happened in the clerk of courts office. He left after Buencamino had told him to return on August 11 to begin his observation period. He returned to the
respondent to thank him for his assistance.

Muncal learned that Atty. Buencamino had another candidate for the vacant position so that he had second thoughts about returning to her. However, on
August 16, 1997, after reading in the papers that respondent was being charged with sexual harassment upon the instigation of Atty. Buencamino, he
decided to see respondent and relate to him what had happened on August 11, 1997.

4. Respondent Judge Armando C. de Asa, took the stand in the afternoon of February 24, 1998. He affirmed his nine-page answer to the present
charges (Exhibit 12; Record, pp. 37-45).

Respondent declared that while there [was] a back door to his private office, the same [was] locked from the inside with two barrel bolts besides a main
lock. Every day, he would use this door for entering his office as well as going out of it in order to avoid ambush talks with people. It was the duty of
Arnel Apostol to draw the barrel bolts before respondent arrived at his office so that when he came, he could open the main lock with his key and have
no difficulty in entering the said office. Whenever Apostol was absent, it was Fernandez who did the opening for respondent.

In his written answer to the charges, respondent claimed that all these charges were obviously instigated and altogether orchestrated. He accused the
Clerk of Court, Atty. Mona Liza Buencamino, as the prime mover of this cabal and that aside from her there were other people behind the conspiracy
who ha[d] yet to be uncovered.

Respondent further claimed that the complaints were set up, hatched and designed, to destabilize and destroy the good image of the undersigned
created in the minds of party litigants, government, local as well as private concerns, in Caloocan City. Although, known to be strict [in] fining lawyers,
litigants, court personnel and even himself, for unsatisfactory and unexpected justifications for violations of court rules and procedures, he had gained
respect and admiration for his reasonable, well[-]balance[d], compassionate and well[-]meant application of the rule of law.

As a possible reason for the animosity of Atty. Buencamino toward him, the respondent stated in his Answer, the following:

Accordingly, as acting executive judge, work concerns and attitudes, were honed up if not altogether dramatically changed. Misconceptions have been
straightened up. It was emphasized that the Office of the Clerk of Court [was] not an independent body. It must be the secretariat or unit that should
serve and cater not only to its own concern, but that of all the administrative as well as functional requirements of the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, thereat. Not because, it is called the Office of the Clerk of Court, would mean that the clerk of court installed, is a co-equal of the judges
thereat. It was made clear that it was for this reason why an Executive Judge/Vice Executive Judge is designated, to fill up this impasse. Further, as
clerk of court, functionally, such a position is under the direct control and supervision of all judges thereat. Accordingly, except those as provided for
under the rules and applicable circulars, when a clerk of court can act independently, any action, movement, process and exercise, taken, with national,
local as well as private agencies must bear the imprimatur of the executive Judge. This directive apparently was not observed. Either it was
misunderstood, taken lightly, seriously resisted or even disregarded. But its non-observance cannot be excused or countenanced.

Monthly meeting[s] with all clerks of court were scheduled and designed to update and enhance their working knowledge on assigned task[s]. Important
concerns and problems of their offices [were] supposed to be taken up.

Hours of work were strictly implemented, loitering/roaming around during office hours was prohibited, time records of the Clerk of Court. Clerks of Court
of branches including its [sic] personnel, with presiding judges on leave or vacant, must after, its being authenticated, must [sic] be signed by the
Executive Judge.

Reports of immoral acts and loose moral values were received, specifically in the office of the clerk of court. Ms. Buencamino was apprised and directed
to closely monitor such problem. Before the staging of this hatchup, the undersigned received reports of its unabated occurrences. However, either
these were treated with tolerance or viewed with blind eyes.

Most importantly, for purposes of effective control, an installation of an office for the Executive Judge was conceived. This project was apparently
disliked. It was about the last week of July or first week of August, 1997, that Judge Santiago informed the undersigned, that we ha[d] to implement such
a scheme. The plan was to get the room of Atty. Buencamino, to house the Executive Judge[s] office, as its perimeter, appeared easily organizable with
least renovation and expense, for a conference room and a library, folded into one. Buencamino, in turn, would take the room of David Maniquis, deputy
clerk of court, who should occupy the executive table used by the former, located outside, along with OCC personnel for proper monitoring and active
control of the affairs in the office.

As related to me by Judge Santiago, she told Mona Lisa about it and insinuated to her, to follow first before talking with me, have the room vacated,
place pertinent documents/papers, to be signed and attended to, locked [sic] it, if the Executive Judge, [was] not around. Atty. Buencamino approached
me in disgust, proposing an alternative. She submitted a plan for renovation, as she insisted in maintaining her present location. She suggested to move
the Executive Judge[s] office in the middle, the end part, housing the office of Maniquis, [to] be the one to be converted as conference room and
library. For her to occupy David Maniquis[] office was bad punsoy (feng shui). However, Judge Santiagos directive was firm. Mona Lisa must have to
comply first. The matter of renovation, to be further studied. The suggested sketch plan with scribblings from Judge Delfina Santiago dated August 6,
1997, is likewise hereto attached as annex 7. Mrs. Buencamino vacated her office, refused David Maniquis room and stayed [at] her table outside with
the OCCs personnel.

Also during the occasion, as there was a vacancy for the position of a sheriff in the said office, the undersigned recommended one Mario Muncal, Jr. y
de Castro, telling Ms. Buencamino that for the more than four (4) years that he stayed in the office, he was not given the privilege of appointing one of
his own choice. She retorted to try Muncal as an understudy for about one (1) to two (2) weeks. The undersigned acceded. Mr. Muncal followed Ms.
Buencamino to her office where he was interviewed, advised and instructed by the latter. He came back before he left and informed me of the
developments but he never showed up at the designated time. He reappeared after reading the accounts in the newspapers about the complaints
lodged against me, with revealing statements why he gave a second thought [about] returning or not. His affidavit is attached as Annex 8 (pp. 3-5,
Exhibit 12; pp. 39-41 of the Record). (Underscoring supplied).

Considering the above, respondent believed that Ms. Mona Lisa Buencamino, took all my actions, with disdain, suspicion, more so, with
resistance. On her face, she regretted the fact of my designation as Acting Executive Judge. She is not used to being controlled. She would want to
maintain her madrina and godmother (i.e. influential, wealthy, etc.) image not only among the employees but also among the judges as well. Thus, these
pathos, comics. (p. 5, Exhibit 12, Record, p. 41).

On the witness stand respondent vehemently denied the story of Floride Dawa. He stated that on August 8, 1997, he had come to work between
9:30 and 10:00 oclock in the morning.Neither Apostol nor Fernandez met him. He found that his back door was still closed and could not be opened with
his key. For this reason he had to enter through his courtroom. He said he did not see Floride Dawa near the comfort room that morning. He saw her at
11:45 when he made his rounds as executive judge.
 The above testimony is also in respondents Exhibit 12 where he stated that:

The Floride Dawa story, that she was seen by the undersigned after coming from the public toilet located along the third floor hallway obliquely facing
the backdoor exit of the undersigneds chamber, asking her whether said comfort room was cleaned, to which she retorted in the negative, thereafter
calling her up, placing the judges arm around her shoulders, led her to his room and twice kissed her, to which she reportedly resisted. Afterwards,
conversing with him, answering questions, as the latter sat comfortably at his seat, as though nothing had transpired. This is quite indeed a long process
to lend credence to such prevarication. Aside from the fact, that the backdoor of the undersigneds office was not shown to have been closed on the date
the alleged sham had happened, a verification of the site where the reported incident took place would show that the backdoor of the undersigneds
office leads to a wide public hallway fronting directly the stairs servicing the second and third floor[s] of said building, where people come and go. The
circumstances of persons, time and place cannot fit under such a frame set.[] (pp. 6-7, Exhibit 12; pp. 42-43 of the Record).

As regards the charges of Noraliz Jorgensen, he expressed surprise that Buencamino believed her story. The following is what he said:

[]Surprisingly, Mona Lisa coddled Noraliz L. Jorgensen, a casual employee, x x x detailed at the office of the Clerk of Court, and believed her story. Ms.
Jorgensen is reportedly separated from her husband.Her credibility throughout the courts environs appears highly questionable, especially among her
staff in the Office of the Clerk of Court. In fact, an unsigned letter was sent not only to the undersigned but also with Judge Santiago, divulging, her
unchaste relationship with a co-employee, also assigned in the office of the Clerk of Court. x x x Ms. Buencamino, as her immediate superior, was
advised, to closely monitor on [sic] this. Despite thereof [sic], the illicit relationship appeared to have continued. Nonetheless, she was convinced by
Buencamino to execute and swear to a statement, which [was] maliciously and boldly concocted. x x x. Be that as it may, the story of victim Noraliz
borders the realm of illusion and fiction. In no less than three (3) occasions, the dates of which, to lend credibility, were fixed to coincide when the
allowances were allegedly released and given to the respective judges, she claimed to have been licked at her ear, her mouth forced open, and kissed
by the undersigned. If one was indeed a victim of such sexual harassment or lascivious conduct, why would she, after the first incident (January 31,
1997) return for the second (May 26, 1997) and third time (August 4, 1997) and allow herself to suffer the same fate[?] This indeed, is preposterous. It
does not have the rings of truth to it. Her lame excuse, that no one could do her assigned chore, does not have any legal as well as factual leg to lean
on.As far as the undersigned can remember, there was Roderick Corral (Odi) who can do it. One Baby Mapue had occasion to do the same chore. Even
others in the OCC can perform such feat. Such signing is not the exclusive affair of Noraliz L. Jorgensen. Even the August 4, 1977 incident, would not
dissuade [sic] a person in her right mind, that she will still allow herself to be left behind by a co-employee (Roderick Corral) whom she saw ahead of her
inside the judges office and be subjected to the same alleged indignant act. This is plainly ABSURD. (pp. 5-6, Exhibit 12, pp. 41-42 of the Record).

Regarding the story of Femenina Lazaro, respondent said the following:

[]Lastly, the Femenina Lazaro Barreto account appear[s] to be a mere patch up. Under the principle that in numbers there is strength, they blended
another scenario consistently claiming that they were kissed, their mouths forcibly opened. In Barretos version, she claimed that she went to the office of
the undersigned to have an order signed as their Presiding Judge was then, on leave. Immediately thereafter, the judge stood up, approached her and
kissed her. This was allegedly repeated[,] she reportedly resisted. Then she left.

The size and arrangement of the undersigneds chamber, would rule out such hallucination. The undersigned ha[s] developed the attitude of
transparency, in his dealings with the public and his personnel. His room [is] always open. Everybody come[s] and go[es]. His staff can go inside, any
time they wish, without even knocking at his door, [get] cold water and even [use] his private comfort room. How then could this be possible.

In all these instances, nothing unusual was seen or heard, much less substantiated, except the self serving narrations of the alleged offended parties
themselves. If there was really any commotion or resistance that occurred, the same could not escape the ears of my personnel, whose tables are
constrictedly [sic] placed and immediately outside. In fact, even the dates alluded to, were even tailored to fit and coincide, just to give credence, to the
presence of the complainants, in the alleged places of incident.[] (p. 7, Exhibit 12; p. 43, Record)."[10]

After evaluating all the pieces of evidence presented by the parties, Justice Romulo S. Quimbo arrived at a conclusion, the salient portions of
which are reproduced below:

1. There is sufficient evidence to create a moral certainty that respondent committed the acts he is charged with. The testimonies of the three
complainants were not in any manner emasculated by the lengthy and thorough cross examination personally conducted by the respondent. Incidentally,
the undersigned had to recess the investigation several times to give complainants time to compose themselves as they invariably broke down in tears
as they were required to relate the repeated violations of their persons and their honors by respondent.

Complainants declarations were also fully corroborated by the persuasive testimony of Judge Santiago who had the opportunity of hearing Dawas story
soon after it had occurred and the uninhibited retelling by the other complainants. Judge Santiago, on her own accord, wrote a verified letter to the Court
Administrator (Exhibits I, I-1 to I-7; Record, pp. 17-24), wherein she narrated all that she knew of the different incidents. x x x. [11]

xxxxxxxxx

2. Respondent has not proven any vicious motive for complainants to invent their stories. It is highly improbable that the three complainants would
perjure themselves only to accommodate Atty. Buencamino who may have had some real or imagined resentment against respondent. Moreover, the
reason given by respondent for the ill will that Atty. Buencamino felt against him is too superficial to genuinely cause such malevolence, specially
because it was Judge Santiago who insisted on the relocation of Atty. Buencamino so that her office could be used by the executive judge.[12]

xxxxxxxxx

The fact that respondent was strict in requiring the employees of the court to perform their duties and to observe office hours and his prohibition against
loitering and idleness in the premises of the court is not enough to motivate [the] three women into exposing themselves to ridicule and chastisement,
not to mention criminal prosecution, by relating false stories that would also be derogatory to them.

Jorgensen may have entertained some hostility at respondents calling her attention to an anonymous letter which mentioned her indiscretions with
another employees of the OCC who was also married. We are not convinced that this would move her into fabricating a story as shocking as the one
she related under oath. x x x.[13]

xxxxxxxxx

Respondent may have committed an error of judgment when he misjudged the young Floride Dawa to be fair game. Feeling perhaps that the nod Dawa
gave him, when she saw him as she was about to enter the comfort room, was an invitation, he took advantage of the young maiden and forced himself
on her. Perhaps because Dawa was nave and innocent, she panicked and became near hysterical prompting Carpio to question her. This broke the
dam, so to speak. When it became known that Floride Dawa was going to file a case against respondent, a slew of indignant women surfaced also
wanting to file charges against respondent for his many indiscretions. How many more remain who prefer to suffer their humiliation in silence, we can
only speculate.[14]

3. Respondents denials cannot overcome the probative value of the positive assertions of complainants and their witnesses. This is elementary. Neither
were the negative observations of respondents witnesses sufficient to belie the complainants declarations. All his witnesses could attest to was that they
had not seen respondent do anything obscene to the complainants nor to others. The fact that they did not see such lewd acts is not proof that they did
not occur specially so because they were all done in the privacy of respondents chambers.[15]

xxxxxxxxx
PREMISES CONSIDERED and in line with the decisions in Junio vs. Rivera, Jr., supra and Talens-Dabon vs. Arceo, supra, we regretfully recommend
that respondent be dismissed from the service for gross misconduct and immorality, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch of the government, including government owned or controlled corporations.[16]

The Court reviewed the entire record of the instant administrative case and found the findings, conclusion and recommendation of the
investigating justice to be adequately substantiated by the evidence presented by the parties and anchored on applicable law and jurisprudence. Thus,
with no need to rehash the reprehensible indiscretions of the respondent judge, we adopt the conclusion and recommendation of the investigating
justice.

The peoples confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the magnitude of legal knowledge and the diligence of the members of the
bench, but also on the highest standard of integrity and moral uprightness they are expected to possess.[17] More than simply projecting an image of
probity, a judge must not only appear to be a good judge; he must also appear to be a good person.[18] It is towards this sacrosanct goal of ensuring the
peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary that the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates the following:

CANON 1

A JUDGE SHOULD UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY.

RULE 1.01. -- A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence.

xxxxxxxxx

CANON 2

A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.

RULE 2.02. A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

The Canons of Judicial Ethics further provides: A judges official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal
behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.

By the very nature of the bench, judges, more than the average man, are required to observe an exacting standard of morality and decency. The
character of a judge is perceived by the people not only through his official acts but also through his private morals, as reflected in his external
behavior. It is therefore paramount that a judges personal behavior, both in the performance of his duties and in his daily life, be free from the
appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach.[19] For this reason, [t]he Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the
judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times.[20] This mandate has special import for municipal and metropolitan trial court judges, like herein
respondent, since they are the front-liners of the judiciary who serve more people at the grass-roots level of society.[21]

In the present case, we find totally unacceptable the temerity of the respondent judge in subjecting herein complainants, his subordinates all, to his
unwelcome sexual advances and acts of lasciviousness. Not only do the actions of respondent judge fall short of the exacting standards for members of
the judiciary; they stand no chance of satisfying the standards of decency even of society at large. His severely abusive and outrageous acts, which are
an affront to women, unmistakably constitute sexual harassment because they necessarily x x x result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
environment for the employee[s].[22] Let it be remembered that respondent has moral ascendancy and authority over complainants, who are mere
employees of the court of which he is an officer.

In view of the stature of respondent judge, as well as his authority and official responsibility over the complainants, who were his subordinates in
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, the Court concludes with moral certainty that he acted beyond the bounds of decency, morality and
propriety and violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. The bench is not a place for persons like him. His gross misconduct warrants his removal from
office.[23] In resolving this administrative matter, we deem it apt to iterate our pronouncement in Talens-Dabon vs. Arceo, viz.:

Respondent has failed to measure up to these exacting standards. He has behaved in a manner unbecoming of a judge as a model of moral
uprightness. He has betrayed the peoples high expectations and diminished the esteem in which they hold the judiciary in general.

x x x x x x x xx

The actuations of respondent are aggravated by the fact that the complainant is one of his subordinates over whom he exercises control and
supervision, he being the executive judge. He took advantage of his position and power in order to carry out his lustful and lascivious desires. Instead of
being in loco parentis over his subordinate employees, respondent was the one who preyed on them, taking advantage of his superior position. [24]

WHEREFORE, Respondent Judge Armando C. de Asa is hereby DISMISSED from the service for gross misconduct and immorality, with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the government, including government-owned
or controlled corporations.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

[A.M. No. 97-2-53-RTC. July 6, 2001]

RE: COMPLAINT OF MRS. ROTILLA A. MARCOS AND HER CHILDREN AGAINST JUDGE FERDINAND J. MARCOS, RTC, BR. 20, CEBU CITY

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

In a hand written letter dated December 9, 1996[1] addressed to the Honorable Andres Narvasa, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Mrs. Rotilla
A. Marcos, the wife of Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos, and their children Joshua A. Marcos and Hazel Faith Marcos Barliso complained against Judge
Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20 at Cebu City, alleging that ever since Ferdinand J. Marcos was appointed judge of the
Regional Trial Court at Cebu City, Branch 20, his family had never seen nor took hold of his cheques; that they have only been receiving a minimal
amount which was insufficient for their education and for their sustenance; that they were made to believe that he was only receiving a small
remuneration as an RTC Judge; that it was only in August 1996 when they got hold of his RATA, JDF and basic salary cheques; that these were not
even enough to pay his obligations with the CFI Community Cooperative and other private persons; that he was enjoying his extra-ordinary allowance,
local and city allowances, bonuses, amelioration pays, and 14th month pays; that he even got his second quincena of November direct in Manila when
he was enjoying his one-week leave of absence with his mistress.

Mrs. Rotilla A. Marcos and her children Joshua and Hazel prayed that all the remuneration due Judge Marcos from the Supreme Court be directly
released to Mrs. Marcos at the school where she has been serving for 20 years (the Abellana National School) to prevent his mistress from getting
them. They added that Judge Marcos was still receiving local and city allowances and a salary from the Southwestern University where he teaches in
the College of Law. They likewise stated that it would be advisable for him to resign from the bench, as reassigning him to other judicial regions would
eventually deprive them of support for he will definitely take along his ambitious mistress, or she would follow him and might pressure him to go into graft
and corruption.

In the resolution, dated March 18, 1997, the Court required Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos to file his comment on the complaint. [2]

In his comment, dated May 15, 1997,[3] Judge Marcos denied his failure to support complainants and alleged that during the first few months of
assuming his job on the bench, he faithfully and regularly gave to his wife the total amount of P15,000.00; that he alone spent for their daily
transportation and for the daily miscellaneous expenses of their son, Joshua A. Marcos, a medical student at the time, notwithstanding the fact that his
wife also earns a salary as a public school teacher; that the amount he gave to his wife was sufficient for her and their family's needs; that the loan
contracted with the CFI Community Cooperative did not pose a serious problem to the financial standing of his family because it was made during his
first five (5) months in the judiciary when he had not yet received his salary; that most of the proceeds of the said loan were for the tuition fee of their son
Joshua; that said loan was payable in affordable monthly installments and that he hoped it would be fully paid before the end of the year 1997; that he
was not indebted to any private person, not even when he was still a private law practitioner; that he had no idea why his wife thought that he would be
better off resigning from the judiciary; that even if he were transferred to another sala his regular support to his family will continue; that the issue of his
having a mistress is not true as he has never been linked extra-maritally with another woman; that his wife and children had already signed a letter
withdrawing their letter/complaint against him; and he had signed a letter of undertaking to give all the checks due him from the Supreme Court to his
wife. He prayed among other things, for the dismissal of the complaint against him as they were living in one roof as a family and as this administrative
case is becoming a wedge of hostility between them.

On July 29, 1997, this Court issued a resolution referring the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation.[4]

In his report dated October 17, 1997,[5] Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo P. Abesamis recommended that the complaint be considered closed
and terminated, it appearing that the complaint against Judge Ferdinand Marcos was already threshed out and there being no more compelling reason
to proceed against him. He based his report on the letter-withdrawal dated January 10, 1997 submitted by the complainants and the letter of undertaking
signed by Judge Marcos.

In their letter/withdrawal dated January 10, 1997,[6] the complainants stated that they wanted to withdraw their letter/complaint against Judge
Marcos as he had made an undertaking that Mrs. Rotilla A. Marcos shall receive all the checks due him from the Supreme Court; and that the issue of
the alleged mistress grew out of unconfirmed reports and had already been thoroughly discussed by the family council. They requested that the matter
contained in their letter/complaint be treated as a closed matter.

On the other hand, Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos, in his letter of undertaking, offered no objection to his wife getting all the checks due him from the
Supreme Court and gave her the authority to get them directly from the Supreme Court or from the Clerk of Court of RTC, Cebu City. He strongly denied
having any relationship with any woman when he talked with his wife and children. His alleged relationship sprung from unconfirmed reports from the
media.[7]

As the report of DCA Abesamis was not approved by the Court Administrator and the latter did not report the matter to the Court En Banc, the
case remained suspended until the Honorable Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. reported to the Court En Banc on August 14, 2000, the scandalous
incident he witnessed at the Fun Run sponsored by the Philippine Judges Association held on August 11, 2000.Among the RTC judges who attended
and joined the Fun Run was Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos. A woman who was reported to be his querida accompanied him. Judge Marcos and
the querida joined the Judges at the temporary place reserved for the Judges and during the latter's breakfast thereat were seated near each other.

Chief Justice Davide pulled Judge Marcos aside to validate the facts about the latter's illicit relationship with the woman. Judge Marcos admitted,
among other things, that he had been living with the woman, Mae Tacaldo, for three (3) years already, and that he was separated from his wife. Judge
Marcos was the one who supplied the name of the woman.

In view of this admission, the Chief Justice recommended the referral of the case for investigation to OCA Consultant, Justice Pedro Ramirez, and
the suspension from office of Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos.

Adopting the recommendation of the Chief Justice, the Court issued a resolution on August 15, 2000 ordering the suspension of Judge Marcos
from office until further orders from this Court, in view of the confirmed continuing illicit and scandalous relations between him and a certain Mae Tacaldo
and the referral of the case to Justice Pedro Ramirez, Consultant, Office of the Court Administrator, for investigation, report and recommendation. But
because Justice Ramirez had to leave for the United States of America, the matter was referred to Justice Romulo S. Quimbo, Consultant, Office of the
Court Administrator.

Justice Quimbo issued notices to the parties that the case will be heard at the Office of the Executive Judge in Cebu City from November 13 to 15,
2000.[8]

On November 13, 2000, the case was called in the private chambers of the Executive Judge of Cebu City. Only the respondent and his counsel
appeared because the notices did not arrive soon enough in Cebu City. For that reason, the Process Server of RTC, Cebu City, Branch 18, was
requested to serve the notices on the complainants.

The next day, November 14, 2000, both parties appeared at the office of the Executive Judge. Complainant Rotilla Marcos came alone while
respondent appeared with his counsel. Complainant manifested that her counsel was unavailable due to previous commitments. Counsel for the
respondent begged to be excused as he also had personal commitments. Thus the case was reset for the next day.

On November 15, 2000, complainants presented Judge Meinrado Paredes of Branch 13, RTC, Cebu City. After he was discharged, complainant
Rotilla Marcos took the stand herself. Since her testimony (direct examination) was not completed the hearing was continued the next day. Her direct
testimony was completed on November 16, 2000 but her cross-examination was deferred to December 5, 6, and 7, 2000.

On December 5, 2000, respondent appeared without his counsel and personally cross-examined the complainant. After her testimony,
complainants introduced four other witnesses, namely: Maximo Abing, Orencio Tarongoy, Leoncio M. Balangkig, and Lerma Eguia, all of whom
appeared in obedience to subpoenas issued by the hearing officer-designate. These witnesses were presented principally to identify certain documents
that were marked and later formally offered in writing.

Complainants' documentary evidence consisted of Exhibits "A" -picture of Maydelane Tacaldo, the alleged mistress of the respondent; "B" -the
letter/complaint received by the Court on December 12, 1996; [9] "C" -RCPI telegram directing respondent to attend a PJA stay-in seminar on June 20-22,
1996 in Mandaluyong; "D" -Islacom Statement of Account dated June 3, 1996; "D-1" -address of respondent at 615 ZA P. del Rosario Extension, Cebu
City; "E" -handwritten letter of one Mrs. E. Dandan, dated October 3, 1995 addressed to respondent demanding payment of the account of May in the
sum of P11 ,400; "E-1" -a portion thereof; "F" -RCPI social telegram addressed to respondent purportedly from Mae Tacaldo; "F-1" -a portion thereof;
"G" -Bankard Statement of Account dated September 10, 1997 addressed to respondent; "G-1 " -page 2 thereof; "H" -unsigned Certification of Tenant;
"I" -Invoice issued by Paramount General Insurance Corporation (Paramount, for brevity) for a "Toyota Revo" Model 1999 allegedly owned in common
by respondent and Maydelane Tacaldo; "I-1" -portion showing the names and addresses of the insured as "Marcos, Ferdinand J. and Tacaldo,
Maydelene B. of Rodriguez St., Zosa Compound, Capitol Site, Cebu City"; "I-2" -particulars of the vehicle insured; "J" -Order issued by respondent on
January 24, 2000, in Civil Case No. CEB- 19070; "J-1", "J-2", "J-3", and "J-4" -portions thereof; "K" -October 28, 2000 issue of "THE FREEMAN"; "K-1"
and "K-2" -portions thereof; "L" -October 20, 2000 issue of the "SUN STAR CEBU"; "L-1", "L-2", and "L-3" -portions bracketed; "M" -SUN STAR SUPER
BALITA issue of October 20, 1996; "M-1" and "M-2" -portions thereof; "N" -October 28, 1996 issue of SUN STAR SUPER BALITA; "N-1" and "N-2" -
portions thereof; "O"-SUN STAR issue of December 18, 1996; "O-1" and "O-2" -portions thereof; "P" -Affidavit of Bienvenido O. Marcos; "P-1" -
paragraph 7 thereof; "Q" -Affidavit of Anacleta Marcos; "Q-1 ", "Q-2", and "Q-3" -portions thereof; "R" -Resolution of the Supreme Court En Banc dated
August 15, 2000 in the present administrative matter[10]; "R-1" -portion thereof; "S" -Petition filed by respondent in Civil Case No. CEB- 25511 for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to complainant Rotilla C. Ares; "T" -Marriage Contract of complainant and respondent dated December 31, 1971;
"U" -Subpoena Duces Tecum issued to PCI Leasing and Finance Inc.; "V" -Certificate of Registration No.15676143 issued on August 4,2000 in the
name of respondent and Maydelane Tacaldo with address at Capitol Site, Cebu City; "V-1" -portion thereof; "W" -copy of Certificate of Registration of a
"Toyota Revo" in the name of respondent and Maydelane Tacaldo with address at B. Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City; "W -1 " -portion showing
owners' names; "X" - Motor Vehicle Inspection Report re: "Toyota Revo"; "X-1" -portion regarding ownership; "Y" -Deed of Sale of one "Toyota Revo"
executed by one Leticia Cabanes; "Y-1 " -portion showing vendees being respondent and Maydelane B. Tacaldo; "Y-2" -date of execution; "Z" -PNP
Motor Vehicle Clearance Certificate; "Z-1 " -portion showing purpose of certificate; "AA" - Subpoena Duces Tecum issued to Paramount; "BB" -Invoice
No.135580 covering a "Toyota Revo"; "BB-1 " -name and address of respondent as insured; "CC"-policy schedule; "CC-1" -name and address of
respondent; "CC-2" - Private Car Policy No. CEB-PC-25687; "CC-3" -signature of Paramount's Cebu Service Office Manager; "DD" -Paramount's
Memorandum showing change of mortgagee; "DD-1 ", "DD-2", and "DD-3" -portions of the same; "EE" -fax message received by Paramount re:
inclusion of Maydelane Tacaldo as one of the insured; "FF" -Chattel Mortgage executed by respondent and Maydelane B. Tacaldo; "FF-1" -page 2
thereof; "FF-2", "FF-3", "FF-4", "FF-1-A", and "FF-1-B" - portions thereof; "GG" -Motion for inhibition of respondent in Civil Case No. CEB-19070; "GG-1",
"GG-1-A", and "GG-2", -portions bracketed; "HH" - Comment of Atty. Francis Zosa on the motion for inhibition; HH-1" and "HH-2" - portions of the same;
II" -Deed of Sale jointly executed by respondent and Maydelane B. Tacaldo conveying a "Toyota Revo"; II-1" and "II-2" -portions thereof; JJ" -correction
made by Paramount as to who are the assured in CEB- PC-25687; "JJ-1" -the assured were the respondent and Maydelane B. Tacaldo; "KK" - Counter-
Affidavit of complainant on the charge of adultery filed against her by the respondent; KK-1" to "KK-10" -pages 2 to 11 thereof; "KK-11 " to "KK- 23" -
annexes to Exhibit "KK"; "LL" -opposition to motion to disqualify Atty. Gloria Lastimosa-Dalawampu as counsel for Mrs. Marcos in Civil Case No. CEB-
25511; "LL-1 " -page 2 thereof; "LL-1-A" and "LL-2" -portions of the same.

From the evidence presented it appears that complainant Rotilla A. Marcos is married to the respondent. Their marriage was celebrated on
December 31, 1971 at the First Baptist Church, Cebu City and was officiated by Asclepiades Curro, a Minister of the Gospel. [11] When they got married,
Judge Marcos was waiting for the results of the Bar exams and did not have a job. Since she was already working as a teacher in Catmon she
supported Judge Marcos. They stayed in the house of her grandparents. They have two children: Joshua who is now 28 years old and Hazel Faith who
is 26 years old.

When he became a lawyer he did not go into private practice right away so she supported him and the children. In fact, he stayed home and
looked after the children.

Judge Marcos became a member of the Judiciary in June 1993. He was appointed presiding judge of Branch 20 of the Regional Trial Court at
Cebu City. After his appointment, she noticed a change in his conduct towards her. He became cold and no longer performed the usual acts of a
husband, referring to sexual relations, because he was very busy. What's more they no longer slept in one room. In March 1996, they were living in San
Jose Village, Lawaan 3, Talisay, Cebu.

In June 1996 she was informed through an anonymous letter written in the Cebuano dialect, about her husband's infidelity. While she could no
longer produce the letter at the time of the trial, she could still remember its contents. In English it read: "You are a stupid wife. Until now, you have not
learned that your husband has a mistress. If you don't believe me, go to the office of the RTC, Branch 20, right now. You go there-to Branch 20. Ask the
people there if there is a convention in Manila to be participated in by RTC judges. He already bought two plane tickets."

Immediately she went to Branch 20 to inquire about the judges' convention in Manila. She found a telegram in Judge Marcos' attache case from a
Mario Umali designating respondent as a participant in a "stay-in" seminar sponsored by PJA to be held at the Mandaluyong Justice Building on June 20
- 27, 1996.[12]

She inquired from Atty. Monalila Tecson, the Clerk of Court of Branch 20, about the convention (seminar). Atty. Tecson asked her if she was not
informed of the convention to which she replied in the negative. Atty. Tecson told her to ask her husband if he was going. She asked Judge Marcos that
night. He told her that he was going and that it was exclusively for the judges. She told him not to go, as she was afraid he was going to take along
another woman. He replied that he would not go. But, at dawn, he told her that he must leave as he had to get the supplies and equipment that would be
distributed in the Supreme Court.

She never dared to find out if her husband was indeed with a woman when he went to attend the convention but she was sure there was a
woman.

Complainant found other incriminating documents in the office of respondent. Somebody in Branch 20 gave her a Statement of Account from
Islacom.[13]

The Islacom Statement of Account was dated June 3, 1996. It was addressed to Ferdinand J. Marcos at 615 ZA P. del Rosario Extension, Cebu
City, and not to San Jose Village, Lawaan 3, Talisay, Cebu, where he and his family lived. They have never resided at 615 ZA P. del Rosario Extension,
Cebu City, nor had they any telecommunication facility with Islacom. Judge Marcos neither has a cell phone nor a telephone line with Islacom.

Complainant searched for the address given in the Statement of Account. It took her two months to find it. She discovered that Maydelane (Mae)
Tacaldo and er parents were living in that house. A Mrs. Jennylind Enriquez gave her the information. Mrs. Enriquez, one of her co-teachers, lives next
door to the Tacaldos.

She confronted her husband in his office over the Islacom bill. He told her to stay for a while in the office, as he will go out for 20 minutes. She
wanted to go with him but he refused to take her as the place was only near the office. He would consult somebody. When he came back, he told her
that they would go to Islacom and declare that the cell phone was lost.

She insisted on a confrontation between her, Maydelane Tacaldo and her parents. The confrontation took place in the Social Hall of the
Capitol. Maydelane, her parents, her brother and his wife, Rotilla Marcos, her mother, her brother Jerry and his wife, and her sister were all present
then. Rotilla Marcos asked Maydelane why the cell phone was in the name of Ferdinand J. Marcos but the billing address was that of the Tacaldos, and
why she was using the cell phone of Judge Marcos. The latter said that they were friends. The latter did not reply when asked why Judge Marcos paid
P9,000.00 for the cell phone's bill when they were only friends.

Complainant found inside respondent's attache case that was in his office a yellow sheet of paper, dated October 3, 1995, addressed to
respondent. It was a bill for the payment of P11,400.00 for "May's Acct."

As she and Judge Marcos were still living together at the time, she kept her discovery a secret because she already had an inkling that he had a
relationship with another woman.

She found a birthday card/social telegram [14] addressed to Judge Marcos inserted between the pages of a law book on a table in the latter's
office. It read, among other things, "MT cares a lot, you know," and "It's wonderful to share my life with you." She discovered it two weeks after his
birthday, which was July 7, 1996. She kept it with the other evidences. She did not show him the card, as it would precipitate another quarrel.

Further proof of her husband's infidelity was the Statement of Account issued by Bankard dated September 10, 1997. [15] One of the credit
purchases was made at the Agencia Nina and Jewelry. She never saw the item purchased in the said shop. Neither was it given to her daughter. One of
the "purchases" reflected in the Statement of Account was made at Cafe Laguna. There was no occasion when she dined at Cafe Laguna with her
husband. Another item in the Statement of Account was groceries bought at Gaisano Metro. The groceries purchased at Gaisano Metro were not for
their house, as respondent was no longer going home in 1997. Respondent judge left the conjugal home in 1997 and has not returned since then.

Rotilla Marcos found out where Judge Marcos was staying: at the Zosa compound located at Don Pedro Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu
City. She went to the apartment he was renting. She saw Maydelane Tacaldo there but not Judge Marcos because she did not go inside. Maydelane
Tacaldo left the apartment, in a car. She drove their (the Marcos) family car and the station wagon, at times.
 She suspected that he lives there because she saw outside one of the rooms respondent's slippers, and empty water dispenser of a brand similar
to what they have at their own place, and the laundered clothes (pants and polo shirts) of Judge Marcos hanging.

She asked the building administrator if her husband was living in the apartment she went to, and the latter replied in the affirmative. Judge Marcos
and Maydelane were using aliases as the room was registered in the name of a Victorino Timol. She obtained a Certification of Tenant from the
Zomer Development Company.[16] It was dated May 18, 1998, and showed that a Mr. Victorino Timol was an occupant and tenant of Amville-1 Bldg.
located at Zosa Compound, Don Pedro Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City from May 8, 1996 to October 14, 1997. Ma. Theresa Zosa, the General
Manager of the said company, refused to sign it as she wanted to avoid trouble.

The matter of the illicit relationship between Judge Marcos and Maydelane Tacaldo was even published in the newspapers.

Complainant offered as exhibits certain clippings from local newspapers (Exhibits "K", "L", "M", "N", and "O") where the affair of respondent with
Maydelane Tacaldo was mentioned. In Exhibit "K" (October 28, 2000 issue of The Freeman) former Executive Judge Priscila Agana was quoted as
saying that respondent was not even discreet about his alleged illicit relationship and that other Judges were complaining of his behavior. In Exhibit "L"
(October 28, 2000 issue of the Sun Star Cebu) Judge Agana was once more quoted as having said that she had warned respondent that his affair was
going to destroy him and that the latter never kept his relations with the law student a secret.

After the complainants wrote a letter to the Supreme Court about Judge Marcos failure to give them support, the latter executed an authority for
them to collect his salary from January 1997 up to January 1998. But he revoked the authority in February 1998. Since then they no longer received any
support from him.

Complainant did not know that the reason why Judge Marcos stopped her authority from getting the checks was because he allegedly discovered
that she had a paramour. She verbally complained to Judge Priscila Agana (former Regional Trial Court Executive Judge) about the stoppage of the
checks. She did not complain to the Supreme Court because he told her that she was just an ordinary classroom teacher with a small salary and that he
would use his power as a judge against her.

Mrs. Rotilla Marcos no longer lives in their conjugal home. The reason why she left was because respondent judge threatened to kill her.

Judge Meinrado Paredes, when called to testify, admitted knowing Maydelane Tacaldo, upon seeing her picture. He had seen her twice: the first
time during the wake of the late Sandiganbayan Justice German Lee, and the second time at the convention of the Philippine Judges Association held in
a hotel in Manila (Hyatt Regency) sometime in June, 1999. Both times he did not see her with a companion.

At the hotel lobby of the Hyatt Regency he saw her approaching a gathering of wives of some RTC judges. He knew her to be a law student. He
did not think that she was a member of the Judiciary, the wife of a judge, or an employee of the court.

Complainants presented other witnesses who appeared and identified copies of documents, the originals of which were in their possession.

Maximo Abing, an account officer of the PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. (PCI, for short), brought a photocopy of the certificate of registration
(Exhibit "V") of a Toyota Revo with Motor No. 7K-0279834 issued by the Land Transportation Office in favor of Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos and
Maydelane Tacaldo, with residence at Capitol Site, Cebu City as joint owners.

Orencio Goles Tarongoy, an employee of the Land Transportation Office (LTO, for brevity), Cebu City, brought to the hearing and identified the
following documents: (1) the office copy of Certificate of Registration No.59442704 (Exhibit "W") issued by the LTO in the names of Judge Ferdinand J.
Marcos and Maydelane Tacaldo with address at P. Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City; (2) a Motor Vehicle Inspection Report (Exhibit "X") regarding a
Toyota Revo owned by Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos and Maydelane Tacaldo of P. Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City; (3) a Deed of Sale (Exhibit "Y")
executed by one Leticia R. Cabanes on July 27, 2000 in favor of Judge Ferdinand Javier Marcos and Maydelane B. Tacaldo conveying a Model 1999
Toyota Revo; (4) a PNP Motor Vehicle Clearance Certificate (Exhibit "Z") covering a 1999 Toyota Revo owned by Leticia Cabanes, for the purpose of
transferring the ownership thereof to Judge Ferdinand Javier Marcos and Maydelane B. Tacaldo.

Leoncio M. Balangkig, an employee of Paramount General Insurance Corporation brought to the investigation copies of certain documents which
he identified, to wit: Exhibit "BB" as the invoice for the insurance coverage of a Toyota Revo issued in favor of Ferdinand Marcos with residence at P.
Rodriguez St., Zosa Comp., Capitol Site, Cebu City; Exhibit "C" as the Policy Schedule forming part of the policy which was also issued in favor of the
insured Marcos, Ferdinand of P. Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City; Exhibit "DD" as an endorsement (No.2603748 dated October 4, 2000) of the
aforementioned policy No. CEB-PC-25687 that included the name of Maydelane B. Tacaldo as an insured party. An earlier endorsement (Exhibit "JJ,"
No. 2603400 dated July 25, 2000), gave the insured as "Marcos, Ferdinand J., and Tacaldo, Maydelane B." According to the witness, this change was
made upon the advice of PCI Brokers. On cross-examination the witness reiterated that the change was occasioned by a verbal order they received
from the PCI Brokers. He further admitted that he had no knowledge as to whether respondent was notified of the change.

The Chattel Mortgage of the same Toyota Revo (Exhibit "FF") executed and signed by respondent and Maydelane B. Tacaldo, both residing at
Zosa Cmpd., P. Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City, in favor of PCI Leasing was likewise presented as evidence.

Lerma Eguia of PCI Equitable Insurance Broker, formerly PCI Broker, identified the Deed of Sale (Exhibit II) of the same Toyota Revo in favor of
Amina G. Advincula. The same document appeared to have been signed by the respondent and Miss Tacaldo, and acknowledged by them before
Notary Public Rolando C. Grapa, who entered it in his Notarial Register as Document No.385, Page No.78, Book No.220, Series of 2000. Another
document this witness identified was Exhibit " JJ" which was an endorsement issued by Paramount indicating therein the assured as "Marcos, Ferdinand
J., and Tacaldo, Maydelene B".

Upon the other hand, respondent offered his oral testimony and identified and marked Exhibits "1" (affidavit of desistance executed by the
complainants); "2" (letter of respondent directing the Clerk of Court to deliver all his checks to complainant); "3" to "3-Y" (savings account remittance
slips to respondent's son Joshua); "4" (electric bill); "5" (PLDT bill); "6" (credit application submitted to PCI Leasing); "6-A" (address indicated therein);
"6-B" (stamp of "closed account"); "7" to "7-TT" (postdated checks issued by Maydelane Tacaldo ); "8" [representative (sic) complaint for adultery
together with affidavits]; "9" (reply-affidavit filed with Provincial Prosecutor); "10" (amended complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage); "11" (Order
dated February 22, 2000); "11-A" and "11-B" (portions thereof); "12" (promissory note dated August 22, 2000); "12-A" and "12-B" (portions thereof); "13"
(original complaint for declaration of nullity in Civil Case No CE8-25511 ); "13-A" (portion thereof); "14" (letter/complaint to Provincial Prosecutor); "14-A",
"14-B", and "14-C" (affidavits supporting his complaint) and "15" (certificate issued by Dr. Manuel Tornilla). These documents, however, were not
formally offered nor transmitted to Justice Quimbo.

Respondent declared that, contrary to complainant's testimony, he was never remiss in the support of his family. He alleged that he had supported
her and their children, except at the time that she abandoned the conjugal home in March 1998; that he was giving her P22,000.00, more or less,
monthly; that the reason why Mrs. Marcos filed the letter/complaint against him was because she suspected that he was not giving her the correct
amount since he did not show her the checks from the Supreme Court; that he revoked his undertaking to give to his wife all the checks due him from
the Supreme Court because he discovered that she had a paramour, his cousin Mariano Marcos; that he alone supported their children and her
daughter's family from 1998 until the time he was suspended; that he spent for the maintenance of their home by paying their electric and phone bills.

He presented evidence regarding the transmittal of funds to his son Joshua who was a medical student (Exhibits "3" to "3- Y"). While assigned in
Toledo City, he stated that he was remitting to Joshua, a medical student, the sum of P12,000.00 monthly. When his son found a job in the year 2000,
he reduced his monthly support to P4,000.00. To his daughter Hazel Faith, he gave P1,500.00 weekly while he was in Toledo City; but when he was
transferred to Cebu City, he increased her weekly support to P2,000.00.

He averred that the jewelry he purchased at Agencia Nina in the amount of P5,000.00 was given to his daughter Hazel Faith Marcos as a birthday
gift. The groceries bought at Gaisano Metro were bought and brought to their house in Talisay, Cebu, especially for his granddaughter. It was his
practice, even when he was still a private practitioner, to purchase all the groceries for the needs of his family.

He never received any birthday card/social telegram because his Clerk of Court screened all his communications. As to the birthday card found
tucked between the pages of a law book in his chambers, he denied that it came from Maydelane Tacaldo as her name did not appear in the card -only
the initials M.T. His Clerk of Court, Monalila Tecson also has the initials M.T. but as his Clerk of Court, he didn't expect Monalila Tecson to send him a
card with the dedication "M.T. cares a lot, you know", and "It's wonderful to share my life with you."

He disclaimed any knowledge of the note found in his office requesting payment of May's account by a Mrs. Dandan. He replied that he did not
know any Mrs. E. Dandan, nor the Bebot to whom the payment should be given. He had never incurred any unsettled account with anybody when he
was still with Branch 20. He believed the note to be spurious and manufactured by his complainant-wife, it being undated and because he didn't
recognize the penmanship. However, he admitted that the note was not in his wife's handwriting but surmised that it could have been the penmanship of
the person who was asked by complainant-wife to write it.

He denied living in Zosa Compound, Don Pedro Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City, as he has always lived in Talisay, Cebu where his conjugal
home was situated. As to the claim that his slippers and empty plastic water container were found outside one of the rooms in the Zosa Compound, he
contended that he usually didn't wear slippers and, if he did, his slippers were always left at home and in his chambers. There were many consumers of
mineral water in the province of Cebu: not only in Talisay but also in Cebu City. He denied having any dealings with Techie (Ma. Teresa) Zosa of the
Zosa Compound and using the alias Victorino Timol.

With regards to the news item [17] wherein Judge Agana was quoted to have said that he was not even discreet about his alleged illicit relationship,
he believed this to be not true because Judge Agana had never investigated him for any wrongdoing.

He denied that he was the one referred to in the news item that came out in the Sun Star Super Balita. [18] He likewise denied that he and
Maydelane Tacaldo lived together in Toledo City where he was transferred from July 1997 to September 1999. When he had to stay overnight in Toledo
City he usually stayed in the house of his Process Server, an Arthur Camonggan.

The Tacaldo family purchased the motor vehicle, Toyota Revo, as they wanted to have a "for-hire" motor vehicle plying Cebu City and Toledo
City. The Tacaldos requested him, being a close friend, to have his name included in the registration of the motor vehicle. Since he was a judge in
Toledo City, he could help the Tacaldos get a slot in the Coop Multi-Purpose, a cooperative that accepts motor vehicle units for plying the Toledo,
Balamban, and Cebu City routes.

As the registered owner of a motor vehicle, he was aware that if the vehicle figured in an accident or there was a damage caused to a third party,
he as the owner would be held responsible. He averred that he felt safe because the vehicle was insured. Though the car was insured it did not cover
damages to third parties. He was likewise aware that if there would be a foreclosure of the chattel because the chattel mortgage was not sufficient, or if
the promissory note was not paid, he would be held liable. He put himself at risk because he wanted to accommodate the Tacaldos because they are
very close family friends.

The down payments for the purchase of the motor vehicle came from the Tacaldos. The address at P. Rodriguez, Zosa Compound, Cebu City was
the address of Miss Tacaldo. In some of the documents, like the credit application submitted before PCI Leasing and the promissory note he executed
with the same company, he gave his address as San Jose Village, Lawaan 3, Talisay, Cebu.

The address in the Deed of Sale over the Toyota Revo, Model 1999, was that of Miss Tacaldo, not his. He and Maydelane Tacaldo did not jointly
own the motor vehicle, although it appears on paper that it was registered in both their names but he had no hand in the preparation of the insurance
policy nor of the policy schedule. Thus, he was not aware that his address was shown to be at Zosa Compound, Capitol Site, Cebu City. He did not have
it changed as it was only during the hearing that he first saw the insurance policy.

The name of Miss Tacaldo appeared in the documents as a guarantee that the Tacaldos have invested in said motor vehicle. In fact, Miss Tacaldo
issued several checks to guarantee payment of the balance of P300,000.00.

The plan to have the motor vehicle unit ply Toledo, Balamban to Cebu City was aborted because after his suspension, the vehicle was shown on
television. The Tacaldo family was afraid that the motor vehicle might be involved in a case between him and the complainants.

He denied having an illicit relationship with Miss Tacaldo. He stressed that his wife had a paramour as early as March 1998 and he had told her
that he would file the corresponding adultery cases once he had sufficient evidence against her and her paramour. And this he did. He filed 13 counts of
adultery cases against his wife with the Municipal Trial Court of Balamban, Cebu and 21 counts of adultery before the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor. All these cases, including the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, were filed only after the Court suspended him on August 15, 2000.

He denied maltreating his wife. If he had beaten her, she would have been hospitalized, as he has a bigger build than her.

He was suffering from Diabetes Mellitus, Type II, and he was already insulin-dependent. He was diagnosed with diabetes in 1992. As a diabetic,
most of his vital organs were affected, especially his sexual capacity. He was already sexually impotent as early as 1993, when he was first appointed to
the Judiciary. His sexual impotency was complete and he could not have sex anymore. He was being treated for diabetes and sexual impotency. A
medical certificate issued by Dr. Manuel Tornilla, dated December 6, 2000, stated, among others, that Judge Marcos had been under his (Dr. Tornilla)
medical professional care since September 15, 1995 up to that time, and he has been diabetic since 1992, and was on maintenance medication.

His wife was upset with his physical condition but he could not do anything about it because his diabetes caused his sexual impotency.

In Civil Case No. CEB-19725, a motion for inhibition was filed which was denied. In his order dated February 22, 2000, he denied the motion for
reconsideration because it was not true that he was living in the property of Atty. Zosa.

While Maydelane Tacaldo was present during the Fun Run in Cebu City, she was not with him. Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. confronted him
and asked him whether Maydelane Tacaldo had a job and whether he had a child with her. He replied that he didn't know if she had a job and that he
didn't have a child with her. The Chief Justice told him, "That is bad for the judiciary." Before he was able to explain the Chief Justice had already left.
The Chief Justice did not ask him whether that woman who went there was with him.

He did not see Maydelane Tacaldo at the convention in June 1996. He first met her at a seminar of Judges at the penthouse of the San Miguel
Corporation in Mandaue City. She was then the secretary of Judge Vestil.

He was a friend of Maydelane Tacaldo's father. The Tacaldos lived somewhere near Aznar Coliseum but he had never visited their house.

The Islacom Statement of Account was mistakenly sent to him, as it should have been sent to a certain Urgello. He didn't have an account with
Islacom. Neither did he have a cell phone although he had, at one point, entertained the idea of buying one. When he went to the Islacom office
regarding the allegedly erroneous billing, he did not ask as to who the real account holder was. All he did was to execute an Affidavit of Loss, per advice
of Islacom.

Respondent admitted that a confrontation occurred between him. Maydelane Tacaldo, the parents of Maydelane, his wife, and the brothers and
sisters of his wife because of the Islacom Statement of Account. He didn't know if Maydelane Tacaldo used the cell phone because during the
confrontation, Miss Tacaldo denied she had a cell phone. The father of Maydelane also said he did not see his daughter with a cell phone. Miss Tacaldo
expressly denied having any relationship with him. He also told the group during the confrontation that he was not related to her, in any
way. Complainant-wife instigated the confrontation.

He never received the amount of more than P500,000.00 from the sale of the Toyota Revo. The buyer paid P300,000.00 loan to PCI and
P250,000.00 to the Tacaldos.

We agree with and therefore uphold the findings and conclusions of Justice Romulo Quimbo, as contained in his Report. We find the details of his
findings amply supported by the evidence on record leaving us no doubt in our minds that a very special relationship existed between Judge Ferdinand
J. Marcos and Maydelane Tacaldo (a.k.a. Mae Tacaldo) -that their illicit relationship started even before he separated from his wife Rotilla Marcos in
1997.

Consider the following evidence:

The Islacom Statement of Account dated June 3, 1996 was addressed to Judge Marcos not in his conjugal dwelling at San Jose village, Lawaan
3, Talisay Cebu, but at 615 ZA P. del Rosario Ext., Cebu City that Mrs. Marcos later discovered to be the residence of Maydelane Tacaldo. While Judge
Marcos denied owning a cell phone there is an improbability that Islacom would send a phone bill to him if he were not the real owner thereof.

Service providers like phone companies rely on the information given by the applicant desirous of its services. Islacom would not have sent Judge
Marcos a Statement of Account if he did not apply for a phone line nor sent it to an address he did not furnish them.

If he did not really own the cell phone was it not expected of him, being a judge and all, to have stood his ground and insisted that as he did not
own nor lose a cell phone, it is preposterous of him to execute an Affidavit of Loss.

Moreover, we find it hard to believe that he would have been satisfied with an explanation that the bill was erroneously sent to him without raising
hell, so to speak, in finding out the identity of the Islacom employee who was at fault, especially so when this Statement of Account was the catalyst in
the confrontation between him, his wife Rotilla and Ms. Tacaldo.

Someone with the initials M.T. sent Judge Marcos for his birthday on July 7, 1996, the social telegram/birthday card, but was delivered on July 5,
1996. This person could be Maydelane Tacaldo or Monalila Tecson. Although Judge Marcos' Branch Clerk of Court has these initials we, as well as
Judge Marcos, do not believe that she would send Judge Marcos a card with the greeting -"It is wonderful to share my life with you." -and ending it with -
"MT cares a lot, you know." Only a person who is truly intimate with Judge Marcos would send such a card.

We do not put any trust in Judge Marcos's denials that he had never seen said card. The book was found tucked between the pages of a law book
lying on top of his office table. He is the most logical person to have inserted said card in the law book.
 The Bankard Statement of Account dated September 10, 1997 reflected that Judge Marcos bought, presumably, jewelry/ies at the Agencia Nina &
Jewelry, and groceries at the Gaisano Metro, and dined at Cafe Laguna.

Mrs. Marcos denied receiving jewelry/ies and dining out with Judge Marcos at the said restaurant. She testified that her daughter also did not
receive jewelry/ies from her father. They also did not receive any groceries from Judge Marcos, as he was no longer going home then.

Complainant Mrs. Rotilla Marcos declared that she searched for the apartment where her husband was staying. When she found it she saw her
husband's slippers and laundered clothes outside the place.Having been married to him for about 26 years she would have known her husband's
preferences as to wearing apparel and personal items, and would have been able to recognize them upon seeing them.

In Civil Case No. 19070, a motion for respondent to inhibit himself was filed based on the fact that he was residing in one of the units in the Zosa
Compound that belonged to Atty. Zosa, counsel for one of the parties. Atty. Zosa, in his comment, did not categorically deny the allegation. Neither did
respondent, in his Order denying the motion, categorically deny the allegation.

Although the Certification of Tenant was unsigned and did not cite Judge Marcos and Ms. Tacaldo as one of the tenants at Zosa Compound, the
fact that they lived together was apparent in the different documents they executed pertaining to the Toyota Revo, for the address they both gave for
these documents was Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City. Zosa Compound, by the way, is located at Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City.

We are not swayed by the denials made by respondent judge that he and Ms. Tacaldo were the owners of a Toyota Revo.

Judge Marcos and Ms. Tacaldo jointly bought a motor vehicle -a Toyota Revo -and had it registered in their names as co-owners. They obtained
insurance for the same vehicle with them as joint beneficiaries. They executed a chattel mortgage over the same in favor of PCI Leasing and Finance,
Inc. and when they finally sold the same vehicle on September 18, 2000 to Amina Advincula, they both signed the Deed of Sale as joint owners. These
actions clearly indicate that they were the joint owners of the Toyota Revo.

We are likewise not persuaded by the averment made by Judge Marcos that he accommodated the Tacaldos in their desire to get a slot in the
cooperative because they are very close family friends. If they are indeed close, it is surprising to hear that he had never been to the house of the
Tacaldos. In fact, he was not even sure as to the exact location of the Tacaldo residence.

Respondent judge wanted us to believe that if his name was put in the motor vehicle's registration, the Tacaldos' entry in the cooperative's
business of running public utility vehicles would be assured. He went to extraordinary lengths to help the Tacaldos by having the vehicle registered in his
and Ms. Tacaldo's names.

There is nothing in the records to show that it was essential for respondent to be registered as an owner in order that the motor vehicle could ply
the Toledo City -Cebu City routes. A simple phone call/oral request by Judge Marcos to the cooperative officers would have been sufficient, to our mind,
to allow the Tacaldos' entry to the cooperative business of transporting passengers.

Respondent's posture that Mrs. Marcos is also guilty of immorality does not excuse nor even mitigate his actions. It is respondent's private action
that is being investigated not his wife's.

We cannot gloss over the incident that happened during the Fun Run as recounted by Chief Justice Davide. Judge Marcos candidly and frankly
admitted to the Chief Justice that he had been living with Ms. Tacaldo for the last three years as he was already separated from his wife. Bringing Ms.
Tacaldo to public functions was not in good taste considering that Judge Marcos was still very much married even if he and his wife Rotilla were already
living separately. He had no right to flaunt Maydelane Tacaldo as if she was his wife. This conduct is certainly unbecoming of a judge whose conduct
must at all times be beyond reproach.

As held in GALANG VS. SANTOS,[19] the personal behavior of a judge should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal
behavior, not only in the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.

"The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his
judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by
his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave
with propriety at all times. As we have very recently explained, a judge's official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal
existence. Thus: Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen. A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge,
both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion."[20]

In LEYNES VS. VELOSO,[21] it was held that if good moral character is required of a lawyer, with more reason is the requirement exacted of a
member of the judiciary who at all times is expected to observe irreproachable behavior and is bound not to outrage public decency.[22]
Keeping a mistress is certainly not an act one would expect of a judge who is expected to possess the highest standard of morality and decency. If
a judge fails to have high ethical standards, the confidence and high respect for the judiciary diminishes as he represents the judiciary.
Jurisprudence is rich in cases where the Court has inflicted on judges the punishment of dismissal for immorality especially when it is committed
openly and flagrantly, causing scandal in the place where his court is situated.
"In Dy Teban Hardware and Auto Supply Co. vs. Tapucar (102 ISCRA 493 [1981]), the Court laid down the rationale why every judge must
possess moral integrity, thusly:
"The personal and official actuations of every member of the judiciary must be beyond reproach and above suspicion. The faith and confidence of the
people in the administration of justice can not be maintained if a judge who dispenses it is not equipped with the cardinal judicial virtue of moral integrity
and if he obtusely continues to commit affront to public decency. In fact, moral integrity is more than a virtue; it is a necessity in the judiciary.[23]
No position exacts a greater demand on the moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary. A magistrate of the
law must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that
looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice. [24]
The Court once again reminds all those who don judicial robes to maintain good moral character and at all times observe irreproachable behavior
so as not to outrage public decency.[25]
Herein respondent cannot find comfort in the "affidavit of desistance" signed by his wife and children.

"Generally, the Court attaches no persuasive value to affidavits of desistance, especially when executed as an afterthought xxx. As held in People v.
Ubina[26]: It would be a dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken before the courts of justice simply because the witnesses who had
given them later on changed their mind for one reason or another; for such rule would make solemn trials a mockery and place the investigation of truth
at the mercy of unscrupulous witness(es)."[27]

Again, in the case of IMBING VS. TIONGSON,[28] the Court once more held that:

"The fact that complainant has lost interest in prosecuting the administrative case against herein respondent judge will not necessarily warrant a
dismissal thereof. Once charges have been filed, the Supreme Court may not be divested of its jurisdiction to investigate and ascertain the truth of the
matter alleged in the complaint. The Court has an interesting the conduct of members of the Judiciary and in improving the delivery of justice to the
people, and its efforts in that direction may not be derailed by the complainants desistance from further prosecuting the case he or she initiated.

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos has demonstrated himself to be wanting of moral integrity. He has violated the code of Judicial Conduct which requires
every judge to be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence and to avoid the appearance of impropriety in all activities as to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

The charge of immorality proven against respondent judge demonstrates his unfitness to remain in office and continue to discharge the functions
and duties of a judge.

Having tarnished the image of the Judiciary, respondent must be meted out the severest form of disciplinary sanction - dismissal from the service.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City is DISMISSED
from the service, with prejudice to his reinstatement or appointment to any public office including government owned or controlled corporations, and
forfeiture of his retirement benefits, if he is entitled to any.

This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

August 30, 2016

A.M. No. P-16-3541

[Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3915-P]

SYLVIA G. CORPUZ, Complainant vs.

CEFERINA B. RIVERA, COURT STENOGRAPHER III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURTOF DAVAO CITY DAVAO DEL SUR, BRANCH 12, Respondent

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court's resolution are four (4) consolidated administrative cases, namely: (1) A.M. No. P-16-3541 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3915-P); (2) A.M.
No. P-16-3542 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4049-P); (3) A.M. No. P-16-3543 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4074-P), respectively initiated by Sylvia G. Corpuz
(Corpuz), Presiding Judge Rufino S. Ferraris, Jr. (Judge Ferraris, Jr.) of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Davao City, Branch 7, and Irineo F.
Martinez, Jr. (Martinez, Jr.), against Ceferina B. Rivera (Rivera), Court Stenographer III of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City (RTC), Branch 12
concerning the latter's money-lending business; and (4) OCA IPI No. 14-2731-MTJ initiated by Rivera against Judge Ferraris, Jr. regarding his complicity
to the said money-lending business.

The Facts

In the Complaint in A.M. No. P-16-3541 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3915- P), 1 it was alleged that in February 2011, Rivera convinced Corpuz to invest
the aggregate amount of P252,500.00 in the former's money-lending business with the promise that Corpuz will earn a monthly interest of two and a half
percent (2.5% ), which interest will be deposited to her account at the end of each month. Rivera never fulfilled her promise, which prompted Corpuz to
verify Rivera's aforesaid business. After discovering that no such money-lending business existed, Corpuz immediately demanded the return of her
money, and in response, Rivera gave her two (2) checks amounting to P130,000.00 each. However, the checks were dishonored for being drawn
against insufficient funds. After her demands for payment went unheeded, Corpuz filed two (2) counts of Esta/a and violation of Batas Pambansa Big.
222 against Rivera, 3 as well as the instant administrative complaint.

Similarly, the affidavit-complaints in A.M. No. P-16-3542 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4049-P)4 and A.M. No. P-16-3543 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4074-
P)5 alleged that Rivera convinced Judge Ferraris, Jr. and Martinez, Jr. to invest in her money-lending business the respective amounts of Pl00,000.00
and ₱50,000.00 with the promise that their money would earn monthly interest of five percent (5%). As guarantee, Rivera issued checks to Judge
Ferraris, Jr. and Martinez, Jr. corresponding to their investments in her business. After paying Judge Ferraris, Jr. and Martinez, Jr. the agreed interest for
four (4) and three (3) months, respectively, Rivera failed to pay the succeeding interests and even the principal amounts. Judge Ferraris, Jr. and
Martinez, Jr. then tried to encash their respective checks, but both were dishonored for being drawn against a closed account. Ultimately, Rivera failed to
pay her liabilities despite demands, thus, constraining Judge Ferraris, Jr. and Martinez, Jr. to file separate criminal cases against her.6

For her part,7 Rivera openly admitted having engaged in money-lending activities, albeit offering the excuse that her business was done in good faith
and with no intention of blemishing the good name of her office, as the same was done mainly to augment her meager salary and accommodate the
monetary needs of other court personnel. She likewise explained that her business took a downward spiral when majority of her borrowers failed to pay
their monthly obligations. Worse, she herself suffered financial troubles when her family and relatives were hit by the Typhoon Pablo in 2012, which took
much of her time and financial resources in order to support them. 8 As a result, she defaulted in her obligations to Judge Ferraris, Jr., Martinez, Jr., and
Corpuz. Rivera also averred that Judge Ferraris, Jr. went to her office several times while she was on leave and threatened to have her killed if she did
not pay up. 9 Lastly, she clarified that she had already amicably settled her obligations with Judge Ferraris, Jr., Martinez, Jr., and Corpuz resulting in the
provisional dismissal of the criminal case Corpuz filed against her; 10 and the affidavits of desistance executed by Judge Ferraris, Jr. 11 and Martinez,
Jr. 12 withdrawing their criminal complaints against her. 13

In view of Rivera's claim that she received threats from Judge Ferraris, Jr., the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that: (a) Rivera's
counter-affidavits in A.M. No. P-16-3542 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4049-P) and A.M. No. P-16-3543 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4074-P) be treated as a
separate administrative complaint against Judge Ferraris, Jr. to determine his involvement in Rivera's money-lending business; and (b) Judge Ferraris,
Jr. be ordered to comment on the administrative case against him. 14 Said recommendations were approved and adopted by the Court in its Resolution
dated October 8, 201415 and the counter-affidavits were, thereafter, docketed as OCA IPI No. 14-2731-J.

Pursuant to the Court's directive, Judge Ferraris, Jr. submitted a CounterAffidavit 16 dated September 17, 2015, vehemently denying Rivera's accusation
that he threatened Rivera's life. He then clarified that after finding out that Rivera has other creditors who were after her, he merely commented that
"good that she is not in the danger of being killed by reason of her non-payment of her account to other creditors." 17

In view of the similarities in the factual milieu of the complaints, the OCA further recommended that the four (4) administrative cases be
consolidated. 18 Thus, the Court, in its Resolutions dated October 1, 2014, 19 October 8, 2014,20 and March 18, 2015, 21 ordered, inter alia, the
consolidation of the said cases and the referral of the same to the First Vice Executive Judge of the RTC for a joint investigation, report and
recommendation. 22

In a Report and Recommendation23 dated October 4, 2015, First Vice Executive Judge Retrina E. Fuentes (Judge Fuentes) found both Rivera and
Judge Ferraris, Jr. administratively liable, and accordingly, recommended that they be meted the penalties of suspension of six (6) months and
reprimand, respectively.

Judge Fuentes found that Rivera was indeed engaged in money-lending activities as she herself had admitted, and as attested to by various court
employees. According to Judge Fuentes, Rivera's actions constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as her money-lending business
put the image of the judiciary in a bad light, especially in view of the fact that she performs her transactions during office hours and within the court's
premises.24

Anent Judge Ferraris, Jr., Judge Fuentes did not find any evidence that would show his active participation in Rivera's money-lending activities or that he
exploited his position in order to gain monetary benefit therefrom. These notwithstanding, Judge Fuentes opined that Judge Ferraris, Jr. should have
known that engaging in money-lending activities is directly prohibited under prevailing Civil Service Rules and, thus, should have taken steps to prevent
Rivera from doing such activities. On the contrary, he even invested capital therein. Consequently, he should be reprimanded for his lack of concern in
the moneylending activity of Rivera and his act of investing therein.25

The OCA's Report and Recommendation

In a Memorandum26 dated March 30, 2016, the OCA recommended, inter alia, that: (a) Rivera be held administratively liable for her money-lending
activities, and accordingly, be meted the penalty of one (1)-month suspension without pay with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely; and (b) the complaint against Judge Ferraris, Jr. be dismissed, but he be admonished for tolerating and not taking
steps to prevent Rivera from engaging in such business. 27

The OCA ratiocinated that as a court employee, Rivera is required to serve with maximum efficiency and with the highest degree of devotion to duty in
order to maintain public confidence in the judiciary. Thus, Rivera's act of engaging in her money-lending business cannot be countenanced as it tends to
distract her from devoting her entire time to official work so as to ensure the efficient and speedy administration of justice. However, considering that this
was Rivera's first offense in her more than thirty-six (36) years of government service, the OCA deemed it appropriate to impose upon her the penalty of
one (1)-month suspension without pay.28

As regards Judge Ferraris, Jr., the OCA agreed with the conclusion of Judge Fuentes that there is not enough evidence to show that he took advantage
of his position as a judge in order to receive any monetary gain from Rivera's money lending business. This notwithstanding, the OCA recommended
that Judge Ferraris, Jr. be admonished for his lack of concern in taking steps to prevent Rivera from conducting her trade and even expressly supporting
it by investing money therein.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue raised for the Court's resolution is whether or not Rivera and Judge Ferraris, Jr. may be held administratively liable for Rivera's money-lending
activities.

The Court's Ruling

The Court agrees with the findings and conclusions of the OCA, except as to the penalty to be imposed on Rivera.1âwphi1

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public
officer. To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must
imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment and must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the public
officer's official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office. In order to
differentiate gross misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established
rule, must be manifest in the former. 29 Stated differently, if the misconduct does not involve any of the aforesaid qualifying elements, the person charged
is only liable for the lesser offense of simple misconduct.30

In this case, Rivera ought to have known that as a public servant, she is expected at all times to exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity, as
expressly commanded by no less than Section 1, Article XI 31 of the 1987 Constitution.32 Moreover, as an employee of the Judiciary, she should be well
aware that the nature of her work demands her highest degree of efficiency and responsibility, and that she would only be able to meet this demand by
devoting her undivided time to government service. Essentially, this is the reason why court employees have been enjoined to strictly observe official
time and to devote every second or moment of such time to serving the public so as to ensure that undue delays in the administration of justice and in
the disposition of court cases be avoided.33

In admittedly engaging in her unauthorized business, Rivera fell short of the standard required of Judiciary employees, let alone public servants in
general. Her money-lending activities - which were done even during office hours and within the court premises - surely put the integrity of her office
under suspicion, as it gave the impression that she took advantage of her position and abused the confidence reposed in her in doing her
business.34 However, absent any showing that her inappropriate acts were tainted with corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of
established rule, Rivera should only be held administratively liable for Simple Misconduct.

Under Section 46 (D), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, 35 simple misconduct is a less grave offense which
merits the penalty of suspension for a period ranging from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense and dismissal from
service for the second offense. Considering that this is Rivera's first offense in her more than thirty-six (36) years of government service,36 the Court
deems it appropriate to impose upon her the penalty of suspension without pay for a period of one (1) month and one (1) day, with a stem warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

As regards Judge Ferraris, Jr., suffice it to say that the OCA correctly recommended the dismissal of the case against him as there is not enough
evidence to show that he exploited his position to receive monetary benefit from Rivera's money-lending activities. However, he must nevertheless be
admonished for his lack of concern in taking steps to prevent Rivera from conducting her trade and, in fact, condoned it by investing money into the
same.

It is well to reiterate that "those in the Judiciary serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and
dignity of the Judiciary and the people's confidence in it. The Institution demands the best possi~le individuals in the service and it had never and will
never tolerate nor condone any conduct which would violate the norms of public accountability, and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the
people in the justice system. As such, the Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables who undermine its efforts towards an effective and
efficient administration of justice, thus tainting its image in the eyes of the public." 37

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Ceferina B. Rivera, Court Stenographer III of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Davao del Sur, Branch
12 GUILTY of Simple Misconduct. Accordingly, she is hereby SUSPENDEDwithout pay for a period of one (1) month and one (1) day, and is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Further, the Court DISMISSES the administrative case against Presiding Judge Rufino S. Ferraris, Jr. of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Davao City,
Branch 7, docketed as OCA IPI No. 14-2371-MTJ, for lack of sufficient evidence. This notwithstanding, he is hereby ADMONISHED to be more vigilant
in taking steps to prevent officials and employees of the Judiciary from engaging in prohibited activities.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

I.P.I. No. 16-244-CA-J, September 06, 2016

Re: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF CATALINA Z. ALILING AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MA. LUISA C. QUIJANO-PADILLA, COURT OF
APPEALS, MANILA RELATIVE TO CA-G.R. CV NO. 103042

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This resolves the verified complaint1 filed by Catalina Z. Aliling (Complainant) against Justice Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla (Justice Padilla) of the Court
of Appeals (CA) of Manila for gross ignorance of the law or procedure and gross misconduct constituting violations of Rules 1.01 and 3.01 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. The complaint stemmed from the Decision2 of Justice Padilla in CA-G.R. CV No. 103042.

Antecedent Facts

On 28 October 1997, Asuncion Zamora Jurado (Jurado) and Catalina Zamora Aliling (Aliling) filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (trial
court), Santiago City, Isabela for the determination of the true origin and ownership of a 7,086-square meter parcel of land, described as Lot No. 4900.
Jurado and Aliling alleged that they, together with their deceased brother Fernando M. Zamora, are the registered owners of Lot No. 4900 covered by
TCT No. T-65150 of the Registry of Deeds of Isabela. They claimed to have inherited the subject land from their father, Dominador Zamora, who holds
the property under the previous title, TCT No. T-2291, after having acquired this from the previous owners, spouses Antonio Pariñas and Maura Balbin.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 36-2438.

Jurado and Aliling alleged that sometime in 1997, they learned that defendants in the case were able to cause the subdivision of Lot No. 4900 into
several titles in the names of: Vicente Chai, married to Carmen Chai; Eduardo Sarmiento, married to Josefina M. Sarmiento; Anastacio Pallermo; and
Leonora Pariñas and Margarita Pariñas, married to Melecio Pinto. Claiming absolute and lawful ownership over the subject property, plaintiffs prayed for
the nullification of the aforesaid titles.

After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment holding, among others, that there was an irregularity in the reconstitution proceedings relative
to OCT No. 3429 from which defendants' titles were derived and that defendants, particularly appellants Spouses Chai, could not be considered as
purchasers in good faith.

The plaintiffs filed their Motion for Partial Reconsideration while the defendants filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the 25 February 2014 decision.
The trial court denied both of their motions.

On intermediate appellate review, the CA reversed and set aside the trial court's decision in Civil Case No. 36-2438. It held that while it affirms the trial
court's ruling on the irregularity of the reconstitution of OCT No. 3429, it cannot sustain the finding that appellants are not purchasers in good faith. The
CA concluded that defendant Spouses Chai exercised the due diligence required of them to be rightfully adjudged as buyers in good faith. The decision
was penned by Justice Padilla and concurred in by Associate Justices Normandie B. Pizarro and Samuel H. Gaerlan.

On 7 June 2016, plaintiffs-appellees Jurado, Aliling and the heirs of their brother Fernando M. Zamora, filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the
CA decision.

Pending resolution of their Motion for Reconsideration, Aliling on 27 June 2016 filed the instant administrative complaint against Justice Padilla.

Our Ruling

Although complainant asserted that she is not assailing the CA decision in the administrative complaint, it is evident that the error she is attributing to
respondent Justice Padilla pertains to the latter's ruling in CA-G.R. CV No. 103042. This Court has maintained that errors committed by a judge in the
exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed through judicial
remedies.3chanrobleslaw

The assailed ruling of Justice Padilla was issued in the proper exercise of her judicial functions, and as such, should not be subject to administrative
disciplinary action. Well entrenched is the rule that a judge may not be administratively sanctioned from mere errors of judgment in the absence of
showing of any bad faith, fraud, malice, gross ignorance, corrupt purpose, or a deliberate intent to do an injustice on his or her part. 4 Judicial officers
cannot be subjected to administrative disciplinary actions for their performance of duty in good faith. 5 As a matter of public policy, a judge cannot be
subjected to liability for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial
office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment.6chanrobleslaw

To be held liable for gross ignorance of the law, the judge must be shown to have committed an error that was gross or patent, deliberate or
malicious.7 In her ponencia, Justice Padilla explained, citing evidence and jurisprudence, why she arrived at her conclusion that defendants were
purchasers in good faith. Even assuming that she erred in her ruling, still complainant failed to establish that she was moved by ill-will or malicious
intention to violate the law or jurisprudence. Moreover, it should be noted that it was arrived at after deliberation by a collegial body, thus, not solely the
ruling of the respondent justice.

Complainant should be reminded that unfavorable rulings are not necessarily erroneous. If she disagrees with the ruling, there are judicial remedies to
be exhausted under existing rules. As in fact, it was noted that complainant, together with the other plaintiffs-appellees, had already filed their motion for
reconsideration of the CA decision. The CA has yet to rule on the motion when complainant filed the instant administrative complaint.

This Court has settled the rule that administrative complaints against judges cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to
parties aggrieved by the erroneous orders or judgments of the former. Administrative remedies are neither alternative to judicial review nor do they
cumulate thereto, where such review is still available to the aggrieved parties and the cases not yet been resolved with finality.8 It is only after the
available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or
administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed.9 Clearly, the subject civil case has not yet reached its finality and the instant administrative
complaint has no leg to stand on.

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the instant administrative complaint filed by Catalina Z. Aliling against Justice Ma. Luisa C.
Quijano-Padilla, Court of Appeals, Manila for ignorance of the law or procedure and gross misconduct constituting violations of Rules 1.01 and 3.01 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200 April 2, 2014
(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2834-RTJ)
ANTONIO M. LORENZANA, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MA. CECILIA I. AUSTRIA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Batangas City, Respondent.
DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve in this Decision the administrative complaints 1 filed by Antonio M. Lorenzana (complainant) against Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria
(respondent), Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2, Batangas City.

The records show that the administrative complaints arose from the case "In the Matter of the Petition to have Steel Corporation of the Philippines
Placed under Corporate Rehabilitation with Prayer for the Approval of the Proposed Rehabilitation Plan," docketed as SP. Proc. No. 06-7993, where the
respondent was the presiding judge. The complainant was the Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Steel Corporation of the
Philippines (SCP), a company then under rehabilitation proceedings.

i. Complaint

In his verified complaint dated January 21, 2008, the complainant alleged that in the course of SP. Proc. No. 06-7993, the respondent committed Gross
Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Gross Misconduct, Grave Incompetence, Irregularity in the Performance of Duty, Grave Bias and
Partiality, Lack of Circumspection, Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, Failure to Observe the Reglementary Period and Violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, as shown by the following instances:

1. The respondent appointed Atty. Santiago T. Gabionza, Jr. as rehabilitation receiver over SCP’s objections and despite serious conflict of
interest in being the duly appointed rehabilitation receiver for SCP and, at the same time, the external legal counsel of most of SCP’s creditors;
he is also a partner of the law firm that he engaged as legal adviser.
2. The respondent conducted informal meetings (which she termed as "consultative meetings" in her Order 2dated May 11, 2007) in places
outside her official jurisdiction (i.e., a first class golf club, a hotel and sports club facilities in Metro Manila) and where she arbitrarily dictated
the terms, parameters and features of the rehabilitation plan she wanted to approve for SCP. She also announced in the meetings that she
would prepare the rehabilitation plan for SCP.
3. The modified rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza is a replica of what the respondent dictated to him. Thus, the respondent
exceeded the limits of her authority and effectively usurped and pre-empted the rehabilitation receiver’s exercise of functions.
4. The respondent ordered that the proceedings of the informal meetings be off-record so that there would be no record that she had favored
Equitable-PCI Bank (EPCIB).
5. The respondent had secret meetings and communications with EPCIB to discuss the case without the knowledge and presence of SCP and
its creditors.
6. The respondent appointed Gerardo Anonas (Anonas) as Atty. Gabionza’s financial adviser and, at the same time, as her financial adviser to
guide her in the formulation and development of the rehabilitation plan, for a fee of ₱3.5M at SCP’s expense. Anonas is also the cousin-in-law
of the managing partner of Atty. Gabionza’s law firm.
7. The respondent encouraged EPCIB to raise complaints or accusations against SCP, leading to EPCIB’s filing of a motion to create a
management committee.
8. When requested to conduct an evidentiary meeting and to issue a subpoena (so that SCP could confront EPCIB’s witnesses to prove the
allegation that there was a need for the creation of a management committee), the respondent denied SCP’s requests and delayed the
issuance of the order until the last minute.
9. At the hearing of September 14, 2007, the respondent intimidated SCP’s counsel, Atty. Ferdinand Topacio; blocked his every attempt to
speak; refused to recognize his appearances in court; and made condescending and snide remarks.
10. The respondent failed to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation
(Rules). She approved the rehabilitation plan beyond the 180 days given to her in the Rules, without asking for permission to extend the period
from the Supreme Court (SC).
11. The respondent erroneously interpreted and applied Section 23, Rule 4 of the Rules (the court’s power to approve the rehabilitation plan)
to include the power to amend, modify and alter it.
12. The respondent took a personal interest and commitment to decide the matter in EPCIB’s favor and made comments and rulings in the
proceedings that raised concerns regarding her impartiality.
13. The respondent adamantly refused to inhibit herself and showed special interest and personal involvement in the case.

ii. Supplemental Complaint

The complainant likewise filed a supplemental complaint3 dated April 14, 2008 where he alleged that the respondent committed an act of impropriety
when she displayed her photographs in a social networking website called "Friendster" and posted her personal details as an RTC Judge, allegedly for
the purpose of finding a compatible partner. She also posed with her upper body barely covered by a shawl, allegedly suggesting that nothing was worn
underneath except probably a brassiere.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in its 1st Indorsement 4 dated March 18, 2008, referred the complaints to the respondent for comment.

a. Comment to January 21, 2008 Complaint

The respondent vehemently denied the allegations against her. While she admitted that she crafted a workable, feasible rehabilitation plan best suited
for SCP, she maintained that she did so only to render fairness and equity to all the parties to the rehabilitation proceedings. She also submitted that if
indeed she erred in modifying the rehabilitation plan, hers was a mere error of judgment that does not call for an administrative disciplinary action.
Accordingly, she claimed that the administrative complaints were premature because judicial remedies were still available. 5

The respondent also argued that the rules do not prohibit informal meetings and conferences. On the contrary, she argued that informal meetings are
even encouraged in view of the summary and non-adversarial nature of rehabilitation proceedings. Since Section 21, Rule 4 of the Rules6 gives the
rehabilitation receiver the power to meet with the creditors, then there is all the more reason for the rehabilitation judge, who has the authority to approve
the plan, to call and hold meetings with the parties. She also pointed out that it was SCP which suggested that informal meetings be called and that she
only agreed to hold these meetings on the condition that all the parties would attend.

As to her alleged failure to observe the reglementary period, she contended that she approved the rehabilitation plan within the period prescribed by law.
She argued that the matter of granting extension of time under Section 11, Rule 4 of the Rules 7 pertains not to the SC, but to the rehabilitation court.

The respondent likewise refuted the allegations of bias and partiality. First, she claimed that her denial of the complainant’s motion for inhibition was not
due to any bias or prejudice on her part but due to lack of basis. Second, she argued that her decision was not orchestrated to favor EPCIB, as
evidenced by the fact that EPCIP itself (as some other creditors did) promptly appealed her decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). Third, she did not
remove Atty. Gabionza as SCP’s rehabilitation receiver because she disagreed that the grounds the complainant raised warranted his removal.

She also found no merit to the allegation of conflict of interest. Lastly, she maintained that the rest of the complainant’s allegations were not
substantiated and corroborated by evidence.
The respondent further alleged that she did not gravely abuse her authority in not issuing a subpoena as Section 1, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules on
Corporate Rehabilitation of the Rules specifically states that the court may decide matters on the basis of affidavits and other documentary evidence.

On the allegation of conflict of interest, she maintained that the allegations were not proven and substantiated by evidence. Finally, the respondent also
believed that there was nothing improper in expressing her ideas during the informal meetings.

b. Comment to April 14, 2008 Supplemental Complaint

In her comment8 on the supplemental complaint, the respondent submitted that the photos she posted in the social networking website "Friendster"
could hardly be considered vulgar or lewd. She added that an "off-shouldered" attire is an acceptable social outfit under contemporary standards and is
not forbidden. She further stated that there is no prohibition against attractive ladies being judges; she is proud of her photo for having been aesthetically
made. Lastly, she submitted that the ruling of the Court in the case of Impao v. Judge Makilala 9 should not be applied to her case since the facts are
different.

On July 4, 2008, the complainant filed a reply,10 insisting that the respondent’s acts of posting "seductive" pictures and maintaining a "Friendster"
account constituted acts of impropriety, in violation of Rules 2.01, 11 2.0212 and 2.03,13 Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

In a Resolution14 dated September 9, 2009, the Court re-docketed the complaints as regular administrative matters, and referred them to the CA for
investigation, report and recommendation.

The CA’s Report and Recommendation

On November 13, 2009, Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, the Investigating Justice, conducted a hearing, followed by the submission of memoranda by
both parties. In her January 4, 2010 Report and Recommendation,15 Justice Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complaints were partly meritorious. She
found that the issues raised were judicial in nature since these involved the respondent’s appreciation of evidence.

She also added that while the CA resolved to set aside the respondent’s decision in the rehabilitation proceedings, it was not by reason of her ignorance
of the law or abuse of authority, but because the rehabilitation plan could no longer be implemented in view of SCP’s financial predicament.

On the allegation of grave bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation proceedings, Justice Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complainant failed to
present any clear and convincing proof that the respondent intentionally and deliberately acted against SCP’s interests; the complaint merely relied on
his opinions and surmises.

On the matter of the respondent’s inhibition, she noted that in cases not covered by the rule on mandatory inhibition, the decision to inhibit lies within the
discretion of the sitting judge and is primarily a matter of conscience.

With respect to the respondent’s informal meetings, Justice Gonzales-Sison found nothing irregular despite the out-of-court meetings as these were
agreed upon by all the parties, including SCP’s creditors. She also found satisfactory the respondent’s explanation in approving the rehabilitation plan
beyond the 180-day period prescribed by the Rules.

The foregoing notwithstanding, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the respondent’s unnecessary bickering with SCP’s legal counsel and ruled that her
exchanges and utterances were reflective of arrogance and superiority. In the words of the Justice Gonzales-Sison:

Rather than rule on the manifestations of counsels, she instead brushed off the matter with what would appear to be a conceited show of a prerogative
of her office, a conduct that falls below the standard of decorum expected of a judge. Her statements appear to be done recklessly and were uncalled
for. xxx. Section 6[,] Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that: judges shall maintain order and decorum in all
proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others whom the judge deals in an
official capacity. Judicial decorum requires judges to be temperate in their language at all times. Failure on this regard amounts to a conduct
unbecoming of a judge, for which Judge Austria should be held liable.16

On the respondent’s Friendster account, she believes that her act of maintaining a personal social networking account (displaying photos of herself and
disclosing personal details as a magistrate in the account) – even during these changing times when social networking websites seem to be the trend –
constitutes an act of impropriety which cannot be legally justified by the public’s acceptance of this type of conduct. She explained that propriety and the
appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge and that judges shall conduct themselves in a manner consistent
with the dignity of the judicial office.

Finally, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the CA’s May 16, 2006 Decision17 in CA-G.R. SP No. 100941 finding that the respondent committed grave abuse
of discretion in ordering the creation of a management committee without first conducting an evidentiary hearing in accordance with the procedures
prescribed under the Rules. She ruled that such professional incompetence was tantamount to gross ignorance of the law and procedure, and
recommended a fine of ₱20,000.00. She also recommended that the respondent be admonished for failing to observe strict propriety and judicial
decorum required by her office.

The Action and Recommendation of the OCA

In its Memorandum18 dated September 4, 2013, the OCA recommended the following:

RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended for the consideration of the Honorable Court that:

1) the Report dated January 4, 2010 of Investigating Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison be NOTED;

2) respondent Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, Branch 2, Regional Trial Court, Batangas City, Batangas, be found GUILTY of conduct
unbecoming a judge and for violation of Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct;

3) respondent Judge Austria be FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (Php20,000.00); and

4) respondent Judge Austria be ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of impropriety with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
any similar act will be dealt with more severely.19

In arriving at its recommendation the OCA found that the respondent was not guilty of gross ignorance of the law as the complainant failed to prove that
her orders were motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.

The OCA also found that the charges of bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation proceedings were not supported by evidence. It accepted the
respondent’s explanation in the charge of failure to observe the reglementary period.

Lastly, the OCA maintained that the allegations of grave abuse of authority and gross incompetence are judicial in nature, hence, they should not be the
subject of disciplinary action. On the other hand, on allegations of conduct unbecoming of a judge, violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code), lack of circumspection and impropriety, the OCA shared Justice Gonzales-Sison’s observations that the respondent’s act of posting seductive
photos in her Friendster account contravened the standard of propriety set forth by the Code.
 The Court’s Ruling

We agree with the recommendation of both Justice Gonzales-Sison and the OCA for the imposition of a fine on the respondent but modify the amount as
indicated below. We sustain Justice Gonzales-Sison’s finding of gross ignorance of the law in so far as the respondent ordered the creation of a
management committee without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The absence of a hearing was a matter of basic due process that no magistrate
should be forgetful or careless about.

On the Charges of Grave Abuse of Authority;

Irregularity in the Performance of Duty; Grave
Bias and Partiality; and Lack of Circumspection

It is well settled that in administrative cases, the complainant bears the onus of proving the averments of his complaint by substantial evidence.20 In the
present case, the allegations of grave abuse of authority, irregularity in the performance of duty, grave bias and partiality, and lack of circumspection are
devoid of merit because the complainant failed to establish the respondent’s bad faith, malice or ill will. The complainant merely pointed to
circumstances based on mere conjectures and suppositions. These, by themselves, however, are not sufficient to prove the accusations. "[M]ere
allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof."21

"[U]nless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice, [the] respondent
judge may not be held administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial
functions and duties, particularly in the adjudication of cases."22

Even granting that the respondent indeed erred in the exercise of her judicial functions, these are, at best, legal errors correctible not by a disciplinary
action, but by judicial remedies that are readily available to the complainant. "An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every
irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration or an
appeal."23 Errors committed by him/her in the exercise of adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings but should be
assailed instead through judicial remedies.24

On the Charges of Grave Bias and Partiality

We likewise find the allegations of bias and partiality on the part of the respondent baseless. The truth about the respondent’s alleged partiality cannot
be determined by simply relying on the complainant’s verified complaint. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, in light especially of a judge’s sacred
obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without respect to the person, and to give equal right to the poor and rich.25 There should be clear
and convincing evidence to prove the charge; mere suspicion of partiality is not enough. 26

In the present case, aside from being speculative and judicial in character, the circumstances cited by the complainant were grounded on mere opinion
and surmises. The complainant, too, failed to adduce proof indicating the respondent’s predisposition to decide the case in favor of one party. This kind
of evidence would have helped its cause. The bare allegations of the complainant cannot overturn the presumption that the respondent acted regularly
and impartially. We thus conclude that due to the complainant’s failure to establish with clear, solid, and convincing proof, the allegations of bias and
partiality must fail.

On the Charges of Grave Incompetence

and Gross Ignorance of the Law

We agree with the findings of the OCA that not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his official duties renders him liable. 27 "[A]s a
matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even
though such acts are erroneous."28

In the present case, what was involved was the respondent’s application of Section 23, Rule 4 of the Rules, which provides:

Sec. 23. Approval of the Rehabilitation Plan. - The court may approve a rehabilitation plan even over the opposition of creditors holding a majority of the
total liabilities of the debtor if, in its judgment, the rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible and the opposition of the creditors is manifestly unreasonable.29

The respondent approved the rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza, subject to the modifications she found necessary to make the plan viable.
The complainant alleged that in modifying the plan, she exceeded her authority and effectively usurped the functions of a rehabilitation receiver. We find,
however, that in failing to show that the respondent was motivated by bad faith or ill motives in rendering the assailed decision, the charge of gross
ignorance of the law against her should be dismissed. "To [rule] otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the
facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment." 30

To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the decision, order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties is
contrary to existing law and jurisprudence. It must also be proven that he was moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption 31 or had committed an
error so egregious that it amounted to bad faith.

In the present case, nothing in the records suggests that the respondent was motivated by bad faith, fraud, corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in
rendering her decision approving the modified rehabilitation plan. Besides his bare accusations, the complainant failed to substantiate his allegations
with competent proof. Bad faith cannot be presumed32 and this Court cannot conclude that bad faith intervened when none was actually proven.

With respect to the action of the respondent in ordering the creation of a management committee without first conducting an evidentiary hearing for the
purpose, however, we find the error to be so egregious as to amount to bad faith, leading to the conclusion of gross ignorance of the law, as charged.

Due process and fair play are basic requirements that no less than the Constitution demands. In rehabilitation proceedings, the parties must first be
given an opportunity to prove (or disprove) the existence of an imminent danger of dissipation, loss, wastage or destruction of the debtor-company’s
assets and properties that are or may be prejudicial to the interest of minority stockholders, parties-litigants or the general public.33 The rehabilitation
court should hear both sides, allow them to present proof and conscientiously deliberate, based on their submissions, on whether the appointment of a
management receiver is justified. This is a very basic requirement in every adversarial proceeding that no judge or magistrate can disregard.

In SCP’s rehabilitation proceedings, SCP was not given at all the opportunity to present its evidence, nor to confront the EPCIB witnesses. Significantly,
the CA, in its May 16, 2006 decision, found that the respondent’s act of denying SCP the opportunity to disprove the grounds for the appointment of a
management committee was tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. As aptly observed by Justice Gonzales-Sison:

[T]he acts of the respondent judge (Judge Austria) in creating a MANCOM without observing the procedures prescribed under the IRPGICC clearly
constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.34

Indeed, while a judge may not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for every erroneous order that he renders, this does not mean that a judge
need not observe due care in the performance of his/her official functions. 35 When a basic principle of law is involved and when an error is so gross and
patent, error can produce an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law. 36 On this basis, we conclude that the
respondent’s act of promptly ordering the creation of a management committee, without the benefit of a hearing and despite the demand for one, was
tantamount to punishable professional incompetence and gross ignorance of the law.

On the Ground of Failure to Observe

the Reglementary Period
On the respondent’s failure to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Rules, we find the respondent’s explanation to be satisfactory.

Section 11, Rule 4 of the previous Rules provides:

Sec. 11. Period of the Stay Order. – xxx

The petition shall be dismissed if no rehabilitation plan is approved by the court upon the lapse of one hundred eighty (180) days from the date of the
initial hearing. The court may grant an extension beyond this period only if it appears by convincing and compelling evidence that the debtor may
successfully be rehabilitated. In no instance, however, shall the period for approving or disapproving a rehabilitation plan exceed eighteen (18) months
from the date of filing of the petition.37

Under this provision, the matter of who would grant the extension beyond the 180-day period carried a good measure of ambiguity as it did not indicate
with particularity whether the rehabilitation court could act by itself or whether Supreme Court approval was still required. Only recently was this
uncertainty clarified when A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC, the 2008 Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation, took effect.

Section 12, Rule 4 of the Rules provides:

Section 12. Period to Decide Petition. - The court shall decide the petition within one (1) year from the date of filing of the petition, unless the court, for
good cause shown, is able to secure an extension of the period from the Supreme Court. 38

Since the new Rules only took effect on January 16, 2009 (long after the respondent’s approval of the rehabilitation plan on December 3, 2007), we find
no basis to hold the respondent liable for the extension she granted and for the consequent delay.

On the Ground of Conduct

Unbecoming of a Judge

On the allegation of conduct unbecoming of a judge, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:

SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants,
witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff
and others subject to their influence, direction or control. 39

A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity, independence and respect for himself/herself, the Court and the
Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint.40 He should choose his words and exercise
more caution and control in expressing himself. In other words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas.41

As held in De la Cruz (Concerned Citizen of Legazpi City) v. Judge Carretas, 42 a judge should be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who
come to his court; he should always keep his passion guarded. He can never allow it to run loose and overcome his reason. Furthermore, a magistrate
should not descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments.

Similarly in Attys. Guanzon and Montesino v. Judge Rufon,43 the Court declared that "although respondent judge may attribute his intemperate language
to human frailty, his noble position in the bench nevertheless demands from him courteous speech in and out of court.

Judges are required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in language."

Accordingly, the respondent’s unnecessary bickering with SCP’s legal counsel, her expressions of exasperation over trivial procedural and negligible
lapses, her snide remarks, as well as her condescending attitude, are conduct that the Court cannot allow. They are displays of arrogance and air of
superiority that the Code abhors.

Records and transcripts of the proceedings bear out that the respondent failed to observe judicial temperament and to conduct herself irreproachably.
She also failed to maintain the decorum required by the Code and to use temperate language befitting a magistrate. "As a judge, [she] should ensure
that [her] conduct is always above reproach and perceived to be so by a reasonable observer. [She] must never show conceit or even an appearance
thereof, or any kind of impropriety."44

Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.

In these lights, the respondent exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge and thus violated Section 6, Canon 6 and Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct.

On the Ground of Impropriety

We are not unaware of the increasing prevalence of social networking sites in the Internet – a new medium through which more and more Filipinos
communicate with each other.45 While judges are not prohibited from becoming members of and from taking part in social networking activities, we
remind them that they do not thereby shed off their status as judges. They carry with them in cyberspace the same ethical responsibilities and duties that
every judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday activities. It is in this light that we judge the respondent in the charge of impropriety when she
posted her pictures in a manner viewable by the public.

Lest this rule be misunderstood, the New Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit a judge from joining or maintaining an account in a social
networking site such as Friendster. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to
freedom of expression. This right "includes the freedom to hold opinions without interference and impart information and ideas through any media
regardless of frontiers."46 Joining a social networking site is an exercise of one’s freedom of expression. The respondent judge’s act of joining Friendster
is, therefore, per se not violative of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, however, also imposes a correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of
expression, they should always conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of
the Judiciary.

This rule reflects the general principle of propriety expected of judges in all of their activities, whether it be in the course of their judicial office or in their
personal lives. In particular, Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct prohibit impropriety and even the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities:

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
Based on this provision, we hold that the respondent disregarded the propriety and appearance of propriety required of her when she posted Friendster
photos of herself wearing an "off-shouldered" suggestive dress and made this available for public viewing.

To restate the rule: in communicating and socializing through social networks, judges must bear in mind that what they communicate – regardless of
whether it is a personal matter or part of his or her judicial duties – creates and contributes to the people’s opinion not just of the judge but of the entire
Judiciary of which he or she is a part. This is especially true when the posts the judge makes are viewable not only by his or her family and close friends,
but by acquaintances and the general public.

Thus, it may be acceptable for the respondent to show a picture of herself in the attire she wore to her family and close friends, but when she made this
picture available for public consumption, she placed herself in a situation where she, and the status she holds as a judge, may be the object of the
public’s criticism and ridicule. The nature of cyber communications, particularly its speedy and wide-scale character, renders this rule necessary.

We are not also unaware that the respondent’s act of posting her photos would seem harmless and inoffensive had this act been done by an ordinary
member of the public. As the visible personification of law and justice, however, judges are held to higher standards of conduct and thus must
accordingly comport themselves.47

This exacting standard applies both to acts involving the judicial office and personal matters.1âwphi1 The very nature of their functions requires behavior
under exacting standards of morality, decency and propriety; both in the performance of their duties and their daily personal lives, they should be beyond
reproach.48 Judges necessarily accept this standard of conduct when they take their oath of office as magistrates.

Imposable Penalty

Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious
charge. Under Section 11(A) of the same Rule, a serious charge merits any of the following sanctions:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations; provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits
shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3), but not exceeding six (6), months; or

3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00, but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.

On the other hand, conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. It is penalized under
Section 11(C) thereof by any of the following: (1) A fine of not less than ₱1,000.00 but not exceeding ₱10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and ( 4)
Admonition with warning.

Judge Austria's record shows that she had never been administratively charged or found liable for any wrongdoing in the past. Since this is her first
offense, the Court finds it fair and proper to temper the penalty for her offenses.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria guilty of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW for which she is FINED Twenty-One Thousand
Pesos (₱21,000,00). Judge Austria is likewise hereby ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of IMPROPRIETY and to refrain from CONDUCT
UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
[A.M. No. MTJ 98-1168. April 21, 1999]
LUALHATI M. LIWANAG, complainant, vs. JUDGE PATERNO H. LUSTRE, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, Calamba,
Laguna, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

On September 19, 1995, complainant Lualhati M. Liwanag sent a letter to the Court [1] praying that respondent Judge Paterno H. Lustre be
dismissed from the service due to gross immorality and grave misconduct unbecoming of his profession. [2] Attached to her letter was a sworn statement,
reproduced verbatim hereunder, which details how respondent allegedly molested her sexually.

SWORN STATEMENT

I, LUWALHATI LIWANAG, of legal age, Filipino and a resident of Karunungan Road, Pamana Homes, Calamba, Laguna, after being duly sworn,
according to law, hereby depose and state:

1. Prior to July, 1994, my husband, Jose B. Zafra filed twelve (12) counts of violation of B.P. 22 against Oscar Chua, Dante Chua and
Rowena Chua for issuing checks amounting to approximately 3.5 million pesos, that were dishonored when presented for payment.

2. On July 22, 1994, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna filed twelve (12) informations for violation of BP 22 against Oscar Chua,
Dante Chua and Rowena Chua, charging each of them with three (3) counts of Violation of BP 22. Copies of the informations are hereto
attached for reference.

3. The said cases were assigned at the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna presided by Judge Paterno Lustre.

4. After the informations were filed, the accused posted bail. However, their arraignment were (sic) postponed several times at the instance
of the accused.

5. The case was set for hearing for November 16, 1994. However, when the date came, Judge Lustre was not present. Hence, the hearing
was reset to December 15, 1994.

6. On November 17, 1994 at about 8:30 A.M., I went to see Judge Lustre at his chamber to inquire about the case filed by my husband, why
the accused have not yet been arraigned. At that point, I asked Judge Lustre if it is possible to schedule hearings in January and
February, 1995 and every month thereafter and to order the arraignment of the accused. He responded in the affirmative and told me to
come back after the hearing on December 15, 1994, at about 7:00 A.M. in his chamber.

7. The date of the hearing arrived, Dec. 15, 1994 at 1:30 P.M. The representative of Atty. Buted, counsel for the accused, arrived with a
Motion to Transfer the scheduled hearing. Judge Lustrethen reset the hearing on Jan. 17, Feb. 1, 9 and 23, 1995.

8. As requested, on December 16, 1994, one day after the hearing, at about 7:00 A.M., I went to see Judge Lustre at his chamber. There, he
told me that he prepared an order for the accused. I thanked him and I told him that if the accused will pay us, my husband and I will
give him five (5%) percent of it as token of gratitude. At that point, he stood up and told me he does not need money. While he was
giving me a copy of the order, he touched my shoulder, down to my breast. I froze and could not do anything. He was telling me that he
acceded to my request. Later, he told me that he is available during Mondays and Fridays as there are no scheduled hearings and for
me to come back to him before the hearing on January 17, 1995.

9. I did not go back to see Judge Lustre as per his request before the hearing on Jan. 17, 1995 because of what he did to me, he took
advantage of the situation to molest me.

10. Came the date of the hearing on Jan. 17, 1995. Despite the previous order setting the case for hearing for Feb. 1, 9 and 23, 1995, he
cancelled hearings on all dates as per request of the counsel for the accused. Instead, he reset the same on Feb. 22, 28 and March 7,
1995.

11. When the hearing on Feb. 22, 1995 came, Judge Lustre cancelled the one set on Feb. 28, 1995.

12. By the way things were going, I could sense that Judge Lustre is delaying the case, granting postponement after postponement, despite
objections from our lawyer. The case was already dragging and nothing was happening. We were running out of money and we needed
to have the case terminated right away in order to get paid for the money the accused have swindled us.Because of this dilemma, I
decided to see Judge Lustre.

13. On March 6, 1995, Monday, at about 10:00 A.M., I went to see Judge Lustre. I asked him why he cancelled the hearings. He responded
that I fooled him since I did not come to him as per his request, whereas he acceded to my earlier request. He then told me that I must
obey his wishes if I want our case to go smoothly since he is the only one who will decide our cases. After that, he told me that he was
already free and for me to wait for him outside the courtroom. We boarded his white Toyota car, with Plate No. PLN-513 and he brought
me to Canlubang Tollway. While in the car, he kissed me on the lips and caressed my breast. I was repulsed and disgusted but I could
not do anything since our cases are with him and he was deliberately delaying the hearings. At that instant, I told him to set hearings for
April and May, 1995 since according to his staff, there would be no hearings in May and in April. He told me, he will take care of it and
ordered me to come to his office on March 13, 1995 at 7:00 A.M. and we will talk about the settings.

14. On March 13, 1995, Monday, as ordered, I went to see Judge Lustre at his office at around 7:10 A.M. There was no one there except
him. I saw him waiting just outside his chamber. He ushered me inside, but I had barely entered the room, when he kissed me on the
lips and caressed my body, particularly my breast. He exposed his penis and ordered me to masturbate him. I could not do anything but
obey. There was a fluid that oozed from his penis, which was somewhat bloody. I felt dirty. While doing that, he told me to tell my lawyer
to file a motion to set hearing for April and May, 1995. He then asked me to go with him to Laguna de Bay Inn. I refused, he got
angry. He retorted that the fate of our case is on his hands and told me to see him on March 23, 1995 at 7:00 A.M. at Laguna de Bay Inn
in Sucat since his house is near the area.

15. After that, my lawyer filed a Motion to Set Case for Hearing. But I did not go and see Judge Lustre at Laguna de Bay Inn. Thus, on
March 28, 1995 hearing, no schedule was set for April and May. Instead, he made the setting in June, 1995.

16. On April 10, 1995 I received a new subpoena for pre-trial and arraignment of the new cases we filed, scheduling the same for May 3,
1995. The following day, April 11, Tuesday, I went to see Judge Lustre to inquire why our case was not scheduled on May 3, at any rate,
there is arraignment of our new case filed on the same date. He responded that he was early at Laguna de Bay Inn on March 23, and he
waited for me at 7:00 A.M. but I did not come. He told me not to fool him, "masama daw siyang magalit."

17. The June 6 hearing proceeded, that of June 13 was cancelled at the instance of the accused's lawyer.

18. On June 15, 1995, Thursday, at around 7:00 A.M., I went to Judge Lustre in his office because I was told that our next hearing would be
in September despite previous settings. I requested Judge Lustre to give us monthly hearings, in July and August. He told me that he
would oblige if I would follow his wishes. As he was saying that, he was already touching my breast. He exposed his penis at told me to
perform "fellatio." I refused. I was then told to return the following day, the same time and he will wait for me.

19. I came back on June 16, around 7:00 A.M. As ordered, I proceeded to the Calamba Church to wait for Judge Lustre. He fetch (sic) me
from there on board his white Toyota car and he brought me to Riverview Resort and Sports Complex in Crossing, Calamba, Laguna. I
could not refuse because of the threat about our case. Inside the room at Riverview, he told me there will be a setting for July and
August. Then he undressed himself and ordered me to do the same. I knew I was selling myself to the devil but our blood money is at
stake. It is for the future of my son and I was willing to do anything for my family. Perhaps I was too stupid to do it, but at that time, I felt
helpless. He ordered me to perform "fellatio" on him and I obeyed. There was blood that oozed from his penis. I also saw black rashes
on his body, especially on his legs. Before we left, he told me to see him again on July 10 in his office.

20. On June 23, 1995, the same thing happened. I went to his office at 7:00 A.M. Judge Lustre brought me to Riverview Resort and Sports
Complex and I was again ordered to perform "fellatio" on him.
 21. The June 28 hearing proceeded. But I did not go and see Judge Lustre on July 10 as requested. I just called him and presented an
alibi. He told me to just come the following day, July 11 at 7:00 A.M. at Jollibee, Calamba and he will wait for me. As parting words, he
told me not to fool him.

22. I did not see him on July 11 because I already felt so dirty and used. I never realized before I was capable of doing such a thing for my
family, until the time came. But I could not take it anymore.

23. On July 27, the hearing proceeded. But the previous schedules were cancelled and instead hearing was set in November, 1995.

24. On August 15, 1995 at 7:00 A.M., I went to his office to get an order for the referral of the specimen signatures of Rowena Chua to the
NBI. Again, he kissed me and touched me. I could not refuse for fear of retaliation.

25. I could see that Judge Paterno H. Lustre is deliberately delaying the prosecution of our cases to prolong his abusive acts towards me. As
can be seen from the transcript of the hearings, he is not leaning in our favor. What we are asking only is for the continuous setting of
the trial because we cannot afford a long drawn out proceedings. But instead, he is delaying the trial. He has even shown hostility
towards my husband when he was testifying and towards my lawyer, allegedly because he was jealous.

26. This kind of judge gives the judiciary a bad name. There must be a stop to this evil doings. I am not the only victim of Judge Lustre. I
know at least two (2) other women who are similarly situated are being used and abused by him. But they do not want to complain
because of fear and the possible consequence to their cases. As for me, I am emboldened by disgust and frustration. I now seek the
intervention of the Honorable Supreme Court to give justice to the victims and rid the judiciary of the likes of Judge Paterno H. Lustre.

27. I know the shame I have to bear but I have to expose the wrong doings of a judge who is supposed to uphold the law and morality. But
instead, he preys on hapless and those who are not learned in law as his victims.

28. What I have narrated here are true, which I would never have revealed were it not for my better sense of judgment. I know I made a
mistake by becoming a willing victim. But I did it for my family as I thought that is the only way I can help my husband get back his
money for our future.[3]

Apart from the letter and the sworn statement, complainant also sent the Court 11 photographs showing her and respondent together in various
places. Five of these were allegedly taken at the Riverview Resort in Calamba, Laguna. She also submitted a receipt issued by said resort dated June
23, 1995 and two transcripts of phone conversations she had with respondent.[4]

Respondents defense is anchored on denial. In a 2nd Indorsement[5] he sent to the Court, by way of answer to the complaint, he strongly
denie(d)[6] the charges leveled against him and dismissed them as the vile products of (complainant's) malicious and prejudiced mind. [7] According to
him, complainant and her common-law husband thought of filing charges against him when he refused to bend to, and accommodate, (their) haughty
and arrogant demands to hastily schedule, try continuously, finish and decide arbitrarily within a very short period of time[8] the B.P. 22 (Bouncing
Checks Law) cases filed by complainants husband. The complaint was, according to respondent, likewise prompted by respondents refusal to accept
complainants offer to reward him with five percent of the P3.5 million her husband seeks to recover.

Respondent claimed that he could not have been in his chambers as early as 7:00 in the morning as alleged by complainant since he usually
arrives for work some five to ten minutes before 8:00 in the morning. Moreover, he said the door to his room is never locked -- thus, the impossibility of
him engaging in illicit sexual conduct within its confines -- since the only comfort room in the courtroom is inside his room and anyone who wants to use
it may enter his room freely.

Respondent further pointed out that at age 67, with a heart ailment and diabetes, (s)ex is beyond (his) physical capacity. [9] He said he is no longer
capable of what ordinary men indulge in, lest (he) die in the attempt.[10] He sought the dismissal of the complaint filed against him.

In support of his claims, respondent submitted the following documentary evidence: (1) affidavit executed by Rodelio A. Alcaraz, a utility worker,
stating that respondent usually arrives at the office at 7:45 in the morning; (2)affidavit executed by Atty. Benjamin A. Alonzo, Sr., a private practitioner
based in Calamba, attesting to respondents fine work ethics and moral uprightness; and (3) certification from Dr. Elmer S. Sayoc stating that respondent
is being treated for coronary artery diseases, atrial fibrillation, and diabetes mellitus. [11]

In response to respondents averments, complainant alleged that respondent had set their meetings at 7:00 in the morning since he knew that
nobody from his staff reported for work that early. She said respondent was very particular about the time she left his office, which must be before 7:30
in the morning. As for respondents health condition, complainant pointed out that, indeed, he did not engage in sexual intercourse with her but only
engaged in foreplay and asked her to perform oral sex on him; and while diabetes might have diminished respondents sexual urge, it did not totally
erase the same.[12]

In a resolution dated January 17, 1996, this Court resolved to refer the matter to Judge Norberto Geraldez, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Calamba, Laguna, for investigation, report and recommendation. In the same resolution, respondent was directed to inhibit himself from hearing the B.P.
22 cases filed by complainants husband.

On January 8, 1997, Judge Geraldez requested that he be allowed to inhibit himself from hearing the case because complainant raised the matter
of his friendship with respondent.[13]The Court, however, in a Resolution dated June 9, 1997, denied his request and directed him to resolve the case
with dispatch.[14]

In his report dated October 6, 1997, Judge Geraldez recommended dismissal of the complaint against respondent since complainant failed to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Judge Geraldez observed that:

In the B.P. 22 cases pending before Judge Lustre, Jose Zafra was never assured that he could recover the amount of P3.5 million even if the sexual
demands were satisfied. Jose Zafra and Ms. Liwanag were aware of this. Consequently, it is surprising why the complainant, no matter how desperate
she may have been, would submit to oral sex. And, why Jose Zafra allowed it.

The B.P. 22 cases are simply not classic cases where the courts decision would be so vital, that the judge can demand his price.

There is a rather large disparity in the value of the B.P. 22 cases vis-a-vis the seriousness and mess of the sexual demand. Ms. Liwanags allegations
are beyond comprehension. It borders on the very credibility of the sexual allegations. This is specially true with respect to the allegations of oral sex
with its blood secretions. And, according to her she did it more than once. If indeed there were blood secretions the first time, the claim of a second time
is beyond relief (sic).

Ms. Liwanag claimed that Judge Lustre, on August 15, 1995, simply kissed and touched her. But human nature would demand another oral sex as they
had done before. Moreover, in her complaint dated September 19, 1995, Ms. Liwanag failed to advance any reason why they stopped at oral sex.[15]

Judge Geraldez concluded that the evidence presented by complainant is not credible in itself.

Moreover, Judge Geraldez pointed out that complainant merely relied on the photographs showing her and respondent together, which, however, do not
establish the acts complained of.Despite having the opportunity to do so, according to the report, complainant failed to testify to substantiate her claims,
thereby depriving respondent of his right to cross-examine her.

Judge Geraldez recommended that the complaint be dismissed for lack of evidence.

The Court thereafter referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report, and recommendation.

The OCA, in its Memorandum dated September 1, 1998, took a position directly opposite that of Judge Geraldez.

The OCA noted that:

xxx we cannot help discerning here an effort to gloss over a charge against respondent which the investigating judge himself admitted to be serious. His
investigative work and his subsequent report reveal a perfunctory treatment and analysis of the submissions of the parties, particularly the complainant
herein, and an egregious misapplication of the law and jurisprudence.

xxx

We find credible the allegations of complainant Lualhati M. Liwanag. Her narration bears the earmarks of truth, for the incidents giving rise to the acts
complained of are so finely etched by her as to preclude any suspicion of wild imagining or other similar fictive handiwork. It is an essential baring of
rage, revulsion and disgust: xxx

The OCA recommended that the case be formally docketed as an administrative complaint and that respondent be dismissed from the service
with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the government, including government-owned and -
controlled corporations.

Clearly, we have to review the records of this case for a comprehensive view of the entire controversy. Moreover, it is essential to lay stress on
basic canons of conduct applicable to judges, in whatever level of the judicial hierarchy they may be.

As a rule, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary in deciding administrative cases. Only substantial evidence is required,[16] as clearly
provided for under Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence:[17]

Sec 5. Substantial evidence. -- In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by
substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

Given this requirement, we find that there is enough evidence on record to sufficiently establish complainants case against respondent.

The photographs submitted by complainant to this Court show her and respondent in various places. The first two show them talking beside an
outlet of Andoks Litson Manok, another shows respondents car parked by a sidewalk, its front passenger door open. The car is seen leaving in the next
photograph. In the next two photographs, the car is seen in the driveway of what appears to be one of a row of rooms. On top of this rooms doorway is
the letter "D". Next are five photographs which show complainant and respondent coming out of the room together and heading towards respondents
parked car. [18]

Complainant claims that the photographs were taken when respondent took her to the Riverview Resort in Calamba, Laguna.

In a Manifestation dated September 2, 1996, respondent pointed out that nothing indecent is portrayed in the photographs. They did not show any
act constituting immorality or grave misconduct. He denied that the pictures showing him and complainant leaving a room together were taken at the
Riverview Resort. He added that the receipt issued by the resort did not indicate that he was with complainant at said resort.

Respondent took his own set of photographs at the Riverview Resort.[19] On the basis of his own pictures, he concluded that complainants
photographs could not have been taken at that resort. When he testified on his behalf, he said:

" when I went to the place those letters were not there, I have photographs there because I personally went there to have these photographs but this
(sic) sign boards were not there, sir."[20]

A sign prohibiting vandalism, noticeable in complainant's pictures, was missing in respondents pictures.

Respondent avers that the real intention of complainant in filing the complaint -- which she has denied -- is to extort money from him as she
allegedly made an outrageous demand[21]for P3.5 million to settle the case.

We are not convinced, however, that respondents conduct in this case is entirely blameless, nor that complainants alleged intent would excuse
respondents wrongdoing.

It is true that the pictures do not show respondent and complainant actually engaging in any form of sexual congress. However, this is
understandable since by their very nature, such acts are not proper subjects of photographs. Often, as in this case, what is available to us is only the
narration of the parties involved.

Respondent denies that the photographs were taken at Riverview. He took pictures of the resort himself to prove his contention. He said his
pictures are different from those of complainants.

We note, however, that respondent does not deny that he is the one appearing with complainant in the photographs. He conveniently testified that
somebody else had posed for the photograph,[22] but this is obviously an afterthought. Respondent made this assertion almost a year after complainant
filed her complaint. He could have done it as early as October 1995 in his comment to complainants charges.

If the pictures were not taken at Riverview, where were they taken and why was respondent with complainant at that time? If, indeed, there was a
legitimate reason for complainant and respondent to be seen together at the time and place depicted in the photographs, respondent would have wasted
no time explaining where they were taken and under what circumstances, in order to extricate himself from his present predicament. This, he failed to
do. The reason for this, we believe, is that he could not simply offer any plausible explanation why he was seen with complainant coming out of what is
apparently a private room.

Respondent claims that the charges hurled against him are products of complainants vindictiveness. Again, this claim raises more questions than
it answers. It opens the door to undue speculation. Thus, why should she resent his actions? Was it only because of repeated postponements of the
hearing of her cases?Complainant may have harbored ill feelings towards respondent due to the unjustifiable delays in the hearing of their B.P. 22
cases. But would she falsely accuse respondent with sexual molestation only to get back at him? This goes against the grain of human nature and
therefore unlikely. She should know that by revealing her sexual misadventures with respondent, graphically describing each and every detail, she would
only be exposing herself and her family to shame and ridicule. She would stand to gain nothing from the exercise, save the hope that her dignity may
somehow be vindicated in the process.

As for complainants failure to testify on her own behalf, this is of no moment. Complainants affidavit stands in lieu of her testimony; the
investigating judge even had her re-subscribe and re-affirm her sworn statement and let the same be adopted as part of complainants evidence. [23]

Complainant could have been cross-examined based on her affidavit. That she was not cross-examined by respondent is not her fault but
respondents.

As the records now stand, we are constrained to agree with the Court Administrators assessment that respondent has failed to live up to the high
standard of conduct required of members of the bench. He grossly violated his duty to uphold the integrity of the judiciary and to avoid impropriety not
only in his public but in his private life as well. [24] All to the grave prejudice of the administration of justice, indeed.

The Court cannot countenance any act or omission, on the part of the officials at every level in the administration of justice, which erodes rather
than enhances the publics faith and trust in the judiciary. Respondents disgraceful conduct surely merits sanctions even if he has already retired as of
November 1, 1998.[25] For the serious misconduct of respondent, the penalty provided for in Rule 140, Section 10, of the Rules of Court, by way of fine in
the maximum amount should be imposed.[26]

We are not in accord with the OCAs recommendation, however, as regards forfeiture of all retirement benefits due respondent. We note that
implementation of this penalty, while directed at respondent, might adversely affect innocent members of his family, who are dependent on him and his
retirement gratuity. It is our considered view that, given the circumstances of this case, the maximum fine of P40,000.00 would be sufficient penalty.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hereby find respondent GUILTY of gross misconduct. As he has already retired from the service and
thus could no longer be dismissed nor suspended, we hereby order that a FINE of P40,000.00 be imposed upon him, to be deducted from his
retirement benefits. Further, he is hereby barred from any employment in all branches of the government including government-owned and -controlled
corporations.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

RE: ORDER DATED 21 DECEMBER 2006 ISSUED BY JUDGE A.M. No. 07-2-93-RTC
BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, LAS
PIAS CITY, BRANCH 275, SUSPENDING LOIDA M. GENABE,
LEGAL RESEARCHER, SAME COURT. versus -
LOIDA M. GENABE, LEGAL RESEARCHER, SAME COURT.
Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

This administrative matter against Loida M. Genabe (Genabe), Legal Researcher II of the Regional Trial Court (trial court), Branch 275, Las Pias City,
stemmed from a Letter dated 22 December 2006 addressed to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) filed by Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda
(Judge Maceda) of the same trial court. Judge Maceda attached his Order dated 21 December 2006 suspending Genabe for 30 days by reason of
neglect of duty for attending a two-day seminar despite a pending assignment.In the letter, Judge Maceda requested that the salary of Genabe be
withheld for the period 21 December 2006 to 20 January 2007 since the suspension was immediately executory.
The Facts
On 20 November 2006, Atty. Jonna M. Escabarte (Atty. Escabarte), Branch Clerk of Court of the same trial court, issued an Inter-Office Memorandum to
Genabe referring to her neglect, in leaving for Baguio City on 16 to17 November 2006 to attend a seminar for legal researchers, without finishing her
assigned task. The assigned task required Genabe to summarize the statement of facts in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0059 to 03-0063 entitled People of the
Philippines v. Marvilla, et al., set for promulgation on 21 November 2006.Atty. Escabarte reminded Genabe that such act could not be tolerated and that
similar acts in the future would be meted an appropriate sanction.

On 22 November 2006, Genabe submitted her explanation regarding the unfinished assigned case. She stated that she was not able to complete the
summary due to lack of transcript of stenographic notes (TSN). Genabe added that she be absolved for humane considerations.

On 29 November 2006, Judge Maceda called a staff meeting to discuss several matters in the agenda, including the inter-office
memorandum. Allegedly, even before the staff meeting, Genabe resented the issuance of the memorandum and became disrespectful to the court staff,
including the clerk of court. At the meeting, Genabe allegedly continued her combative behavior in total disregard of the presence of Judge Maceda.
On 30 November 2006, Judge Maceda ordered Genabe to show cause why she should not be cited in contempt by the court and why she should not be
administratively sanctioned for conduct unbecoming, neglect of duty and misconduct.

In her Answer dated 11 December 2006, Genabe denied that she neglected her duty and explained with counter-charges. Genabe stated that Atty.
Escabarte did not give her the opportunity to be heard and that she was not given sufficient lead time to finish the five consolidated informations of the
criminal case assigned to her. Genabe attributed the lack of stenographers, which was beyond her control, as the cause of the delay in the transcriptions
of the minutes of the meeting. As a counter-charge, Genabe claimed that Judge Maceda disciplines his staff on a selective basis.
On the same day, Judge Maceda conducted a fact-finding investigation inside his chambers. The agenda of the investigation focused on the charges of
contempt, conduct unbecoming, neglect of duty, and misconduct against Genabe. Judge Maceda directed all members of the staff, including Genabe, to
attend. However, Genabe did not appear despite notice. Later, she appeared to say that she was waiving her right to be present in the investigation.

On 21 December 2006, Judge Maceda issued the Suspension Order against Genabe for neglect of duty.

In a Letter dated 22 December 2006, Judge Maceda furnished the Office of the Court of Administrator (OCA) with a copy of the Order dated 21
December 2006. Judge Maceda suspended Genabe for a period of 30 days, using as authority the power given to appropriate supervisory officials in
disciplining personnel of their respective courts as provided in Article II, Section A(2)(a) of Circular No. 30-91 dated 30 September 1991. Judge Maceda
declared that the suspension was to take effect immediately and would not be stayed even if appealed to the Supreme Court. Judge Maceda then
requested that following the suspension order, Genabes salary be withheld for the period 21 December 2006 to 20 January 2007.

The OCA received a letter dated 12 January 2007 sent by Atty. Zandro T. Bato, Clerk of Court VI of the same trial court, returning the salary check of
Genabe following the suspension order issued against her. On 22 January 2007, Genabe reported back to work after serving the 30-day suspension
order of Judge Maceda.

On 18 January 2007, Judge Maceda endorsed his Investigation Report and Recommendation to the OCA, even without any directive from the latter. The
report mainly focused on the alleged unruly conduct of Genabe during the staff meeting of Branch 275 on 29 November 2006. Judge Maceda submitted
the following recommendations:

1. Pending determination of the instant matter by the Honorable Supreme Court, Ms. Loida M. Genabe, Legal Researcher, RTC,
Branch 275, Las Pias City, be immediately placed under preventive suspension, and thereafter dismiss her from the service;
and
2. Allow the undersigned to recommend a replacement to enable RTC Branch 275 to function normally soonest.[1]

In a Letter dated 18 April 2007, several staff members of the same trial court, headed by the Branch Clerk of Court, assailed the alleged inaction of the
OCA on the Investigation Report and Recommendation dated 18 January 2007 submitted by Judge Maceda as well as the request for the detail of
Genabe to another post.

In a Resolution dated 23 May 2007, this Court resolved to:

1. NOTE the letter dated 22 December 2006 of Presiding Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda x x x x;
2. TREAT the Order dated 21 December 2006 issued by Judge Bonifacio [Sanz] Maceda as an administrative complaint
against Loida M. Genabe under a separate docket number, A.M. No. P-07-2320 x x x x;
3. DIRECT Ms. Loida M. Genabe to REPORT BACK TO WORK pending resolution of the administrative complaint
against her, unless another administrative case directs otherwise; and
4. REQUIRE Judge Bonifacio [Sanz] Maceda to EXPLAIN, within ten (10) days from notice, why no disciplinary sanction
should be imposed against him for having violated A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC entitled Guidelines on the Selection and Appointment of
Executive Judges and Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and Duties approved on 27 January 2004 and became effective on 15
February 2004.[2]

Judge Maceda submitted his Explanation dated 29 June 2007, in compliance with the Courts Resolution dated 23 May 2007. Judge Maceda reasoned
that there were other charges against Genabe, such as conduct unbecoming and grave misconduct, which called for the imposition of a higher
penalty. Thus, he endorsed the determination of such other charges to the OCA, including whether the heavier penalty of dismissal or replacement
might be warranted. Judge Maceda prayed that his explanation be considered as sufficient compliance and that he be absolved of any disciplinary
sanction.

On 22 August 2007, the Court resolved to refer to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation the (1) Order dated 21 December 2006 and (2)
Explanation dated 29 June 2007, both made by Judge Maceda.
On 29 August 2007, the Court resolved to inform the staff members of the same trial court, in consideration of the Letter dated 18 April 2007, that until
Genabe has been formally charged with contempt, conduct unbecoming and misconduct, which are not light offenses, the propriety of suspending
Genabe pending investigation of the charges against her cannot be properly evaluated, and to await the outcome of A.M. No. P-07-2320.

On 19 November 2007, the staff members of the same trial court, headed by the Branch Clerk of Court, filed their Manifestation dated 15 October 2007,
that Genabe had been formally charged with contempt, conduct unbecoming and misconduct as contained in the Investigation Report and
Recommendation dated 18 January 2007 submitted by Judge Maceda to this Court.
In a Resolution dated 16 January 2008, the Court resolved to require the parties to manifest their willingness to submit the matter for decision on the
basis of the pleadings filed.Judge Maceda and Genabe respectively filed their compliance on separate dates.

In a Resolution dated 4 June 2008, the Court resolved to:

1. APPROVE the previous recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator, as contained in its Agenda Report
dated 24 January 2007 particularly items no. 5 and 6.Accordingly, (a) the Financial Management Office is DIRECTED to pay the
salary of Ms. Loida M. Genabe pending resolution of the administrative case against her by the Court; and (b) the Office of the
Administrative Services-Leave Division is DIRECTED not to deduct the number of absences incurred by Ms. Genabe from her leave
credits since the order of suspension is unauthorized; and
2. GRANT the application of Ms. Loida M. Genabe for leave for a period of five (5) months starting 1 May to 30
September 2008 for purposes of taking the bar examination, this, however, is without prejudice to the action that the Committee of
the Education Support Program may take on her application.[3]

The OCAs Report and Recommendation

In its Report dated 23 October 2007, the OCA found Judge Macedas explanation unsatisfactory. The OCA stated that Circular No. 30-91 had been
impliedly amended by the Guidelines on the Selection and Appointment of Executive Judges and Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and Duties as
contained in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, which became effective on 15 February 2004. The OCA added that it was clear from the Guidelines that Judge
Maceda had no authority to directly penalize a court employee. As an Executive Judge, he only had the right to act upon and investigate administrative
complaints involving light offenses. The power to decide and impose a penalty, even for light offenses, rests with the Supreme Court. Thus, the OCA
recommended that Judge Maceda be fined P12,000 payable immediately and be sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future
would merit a severe penalty.

The Courts Ruling

After a careful review of the records of the case, we find reasonable grounds to hold both Genabe and Judge Maceda administratively liable.

In A.M. No. P-07-2320, we find Genabe guilty for simple neglect of duty. Simple neglect of duty has been defined as the failure of an employee to give
attention to a task expected of him and signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.[4]

Genabe had been permitted to attend a two-day seminar in Baguio City on the premise that no work would be left pending. She was assigned to
summarize the testimonies of three defense witnesses for a criminal case set for promulgation. The records reveal that Genabe was only able to
summarize the TSN of one witness consisting of 46 pages and failed to finish the TSN of the other two witnesses consisting of 67 pages. Before leaving
for Baguio, Genabe had three working days to complete the task. However, the assignment remained unfinished. When such task was assigned to
another court employee, it only took the other employee two and a half hours to complete the TSN of the two witnesses.

Further, Judge Maceda stated that this was not the only time Genabe had been remiss in her duties. In Criminal Case No. 98-926 entitled People of the
Philippines v. Russel Javier, et al., Genabe failed to include in the statement of facts the detail on the prosecutors waiver of the cross examination and
more importantly, neglected to include the testimony of the accused Russel Javier upon completing his testimony. Also, in Criminal Case Nos. 02-0713
and 02-0714, entitled People of the Philippines v. Alberto Ylanan, Genabe included the testimony of an alleged poseur when his testimony, upon motion,
had been stricken off the record per Order dated 29 July 2003.

From these instances, we find that Genabes actuations constitute simple neglect of duty. As a first offense under civil service law, we impose the penalty
of suspension without pay for a period of one month and one day. [5] The suspension imposed upon Genabe under the Order dated 21 December 2006
shall be considered as the penalty imposed. The remaining balance of one day suspension must be served upon finality of this decision.

With regard to the other charges of contempt, conduct unbecoming and misconduct, we find no sufficient basis to hold Genabe accountable for these
offenses based on her alleged unruly conduct at the staff meeting held on 29 November 2006. In administrative proceedings, the burden is on the
complainant to prove by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint.[6] Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. The standard was not met in this case. The Order dated 21 December 2006 and
Investigation Report dated 18 January 2007 submitted by Judge Maceda centered mainly on Genabes neglect of duty in not completing her assigned
task on time. The other charges had been touched on in a sporadic manner. While the law does not tolerate misconduct by a civil servant, suspension,
replacement or dismissal must not be resorted to unless there is substantial evidence to merit such penalties. In the absence of substantial evidence to
the contrary, Genabe cannot be held accountable for the other charges against her.

In A.M. No. 07-2-93-RTC, we find that Judge Maceda failed to observe due process in ordering the suspension of Genabe and withholding her salary
from 21 December 2006 to 20 January 2007.

Judge Maceda suspended a court personnel directly under his supervision by relying on the authority laid down in Article II, Section A(2)(a) of Circular
No. 30-91 which provides:

2. Lower Court Personnel

a. Light Offenses
(1) Disciplinary matters involving light offenses as defined under the Civil Service law (Administrative Code of 1987 and the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (Rep. Act. 6713) where the penalty is reprimand,
suspension for not more than thirty days, or a fine not exceeding thirty days' salary, and as classified in Civil Service
Resolution No. 30, Series of 1989, shall be acted upon by the appropriate supervisory official of the lower court
concerned.
(2) The appropriate supervisory officials are the Presiding Justices/Presiding Judge of the lower collegiate courts and the Executive
Judges of the trial courts with respect to the personnel of their respective courts, except those directly under the individual
Justices and Judges, in which case, the latter shall be their appropriate supervisory officials.
(3) The complaint for light offenses whether filed with the Court, the Office of the Court Administrator, or the lower court shall be
heard and decided by the appropriate supervisory official concerned. x x x
The reliance of Judge Maceda on the provisions of this circular is misplaced. Judge Maceda found Genabe to have neglected her duty in November
2006. The guidelines in effect at that time were already those found in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, which took effect in 2004 or two years before the
administrative charge of neglect of duty was made against Genabe. Judge Maceda should have applied these new guidelines and not Circular No. 30-
91.

Section 1, Chapter VIII of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, which provides the guidelines for administrative discipline of court employees over light offenses, states:

SECTION. 1. Disciplinary jurisdiction over light offenses. The Executive Judge shall have authority to act upon and investigate
administrative complaints involving light offenses as defined under the Civil Service Law and Rules (Administrative Code of 1987),
and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (Republic Act No. 6713), where the penalty is
reprimand, suspension for not more than thirty (30) days, or a fine not exceeding thirty (30) days salary, and as classified in
pertinent Civil Service resolutions or issuances, filed by (a) a judge against a court employee, except lawyers, who both work in the
same station within the Executive Judges area of administrative supervision; or (b) a court employee against another court
employee, except lawyers, who both work in the same station within the Executive Judges area of administrative supervision.
In the preceding instances, the Executive Judge shall conduct the necessary inquiry and submit to the Office of the Court
Administrator the results thereof with a recommendation as to the action to be taken thereon, including the penalty to be
imposed, if any, within thirty (30) days from termination of said inquiry. At his/her discretion, the Executive Judge may
delegate the investigation of complaints involving light offenses to any of the Presiding Judges or court officials within his/her area of
administrative supervision.
 In the case of a complaint (a) filed against court employees who are lawyers, or (b) filed by private complainants against court
employees, lawyers and non-lawyers alike, the same shall be forwarded by the Executive Judge to the Office of the Court
Administrator for appropriate action and disposition. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The guidelines clearly provide that the authority of judges to discipline erring court personnel, under their supervision and charged with light offenses, is
limited to conducting an inquiry only. After such inquiry, the executive judge is required to submit to the OCA the results of the investigation and give a
recommendation as to what action should be taken. An executive judge does not have the authority to act upon the results of the inquiry and thereafter,
if the court employee is found guilty, unilaterally impose a penalty, as in this case. It is only the Supreme Court which has the power to find the court
personnel guilty or not for the offense charged and then impose a penalty.

In the present case, Judge Maceda suspended Genabe for the offense of neglect of duty. Under Section 52(B), Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,[7] simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense which carries a penalty of one month and one day to six
months suspension for the first offense.[8] Under A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, an executive judge may only conduct an investigation for all offenses. After the
investigation, the executive judge is mandated to refer the necessary disciplinary action to this Court for appropriate action.[9]

Even under Circular No. 30-91, Judge Maceda should have referred to Section A(2)(b) of Circular No. 30-91 which provides:
b. Grave or Less Grave Offenses

All administrative complaints for grave or less grave offenses as defined in the Codes hereinbefore referred to shall be
immediately referred to the Court En Banc for appropriate action within 15 days from receipt by the Court Administrator if filed
directly with him, otherwise, within 15 days likewise from receipt by him from the appropriate supervisory officials concerned.

Thus, under Circular No. 30-91, a court employee charged with a less grave offense could not be directly penalized by an executive judge. Judge
Maceda had no authority to suspend Genabe outright for a less grave offense of simple neglect of duty even under Circular No. 30-91. Clearly, Judge
Maceda exceeded his authority when he issued the 21 December 2006 suspension order against Genabe.

Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides that a violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars constitutes a less serious charge in
the discipline of judges of regular courts:

Sec. 9. Less Serious Charges.

xxxx
4. Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars;
xxxx

Accordingly, Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides the sanctions to be imposed if one is found to be guilty of a less serious charge:

Sec. 11. Sanctions.

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B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
xxxx

We hold that the penalty of fine in the amount of P12,000 is commensurate to Judge Macedas violation of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC. We sternly warn him
that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

WHEREFORE, in A.M. No. P-07-2320, we find Loida M. Genabe, Legal Researcher II of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch
275, GUILTY of simple neglect of duty. We SUSPEND her for one month and one day without pay. The 30-day suspension imposed upon Loida M.
Genabe under the Order dated 21 December 2006 issued by Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda shall be considered as a partial service of the penalty
imposed. The remaining balance of the penalty of one day suspension shall be immediately served upon finality of this decision. Respondent Loida M.
Genabe is sternly warned that commission of similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

In A.M No. 07-2-93-RTC, we find Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 275, GUILTY of violation of A.M.
No. 03-8-02-SC.Accordingly, we FINE him P12,000, with a stern warning that commission of similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.