BANAT v.
COMELEC shall be determined only after all party-list
G.R. No. 179295
TOPIC: HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES –
COMPOSITION (PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES
CAVEAT: This topic is procedural. The
procedures in the digest may suffice for
recitation but for full understanding as to how
the seats of party-list representatives are
determined, it is still advised to read the full
text. Refer to table on the last few pages.
FACTS:
● The 14 May 2007 elections, the
COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93
parties under the Party-List System.
● On 27 June 2002, the Barangay
Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) filed a Petition to
Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution,
docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the
National Board of Canvassers(NBC). BANAT filed
its petition because "[t]he Chairman and the
Members of the [COMELEC] have recently been
quoted in the national papers that the
[COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement
the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the
Panganiban formula in allocating party-list
seats".
● On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as
the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-
60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed
thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list
elections. Pursuant to the said resolution, the
COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated
Resolution No. 07-72 which declared three (3)
other parties entitled to one guaranteed seat
pursuant to Veterans Federation Party v.
COMELEC.
● Note: A ruling in Veterans Federation
Party versus COMELEC adopting a formula for
the additional seats of each party, organization
or coalition receiving more than the required
two percent (2%) votes, stating that the same
ballots have been completely canvassed.
● Acting on BANAT's petition, the NBC
promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 denying
the petition for being moot and academic.
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus assailing the said resolution.
● On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and
A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to
reconsider its decision to use the Veterans
formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60
because the Veterans formula is violative of the
Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A.
No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC
denied reconsideration during the proceedings
of the NBC.
ISSUE:
● Is the twenty percent allocation for
party-list representatives provided in Section
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or
is it merely a ceiling?
● Is the three-seat limit provided in
Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
● Is the two percent threshold and
"qualifier" votes prescribed by the same Section
11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
● How shall the party-list representatives
be allocated?
HELD:
1. THE FOUR INVIOLABLE PARAMETERS
The petitions have partial merit. We maintain
that a Philippine-style party-list election has at
least four inviolable parameters as clearly stated
in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:
First, the twenty percent allocation — the
combined number of all party-list congressmen
shall not exceed twenty percent of the total
membership of the House of Representatives,
including those elected under the party list;
Second, the two percent threshold — only those
parties garnering a minimum of two percent of
the total valid votes cast for the party-list system
are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified
party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of
three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two
additional seats;
Fourth, proportional representation — the
additional seats which a qualified party is
entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to
their total number of votes".
2. FORMULA IN VETERANS Ruling
However, because the formula in
Veterans has flaws in its mathematical
interpretation of the term "proportional
representation", this Court is compelled to
revisit the formula for the allocation of
additional seats to party-list
Number of Party-List Representatives: The
Formula Mandated by the Constitution
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 5. (1) The House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under
the party-list. For three consecutive terms after
the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of
the seats allocated to party-list representatives
shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women,
youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector.
The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941
reads:
Section 11. Number of Party-List
Representatives. — The party-list
representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum (20%) of the total number of the
members of the House of Representatives
including those under the party-list.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution states that the "House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law". The House of
Representatives shall be composed of district
representatives and party-list representatives.
The Constitution allows the legislature to modify
the number of the members of the House of
Representatives.
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio
of party-list representatives to the total number
of representatives. We compute the number of
seats available to party-list representatives from
the number of legislative districts. On this point,
we do not deviate from the first formula in
Veterans, thus:
The Number of seats available to party-list
representatives equals:
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠 𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑠
( )
. 80
∗ .20
This formula allows for the
corresponding increase in the number of seats
available for party-list representatives whenever
a legislative district is created by law. Since the
14th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district
representatives, there are 55 seats available to
party-list representatives.
220
( .80 ) ∗ .20 = 550
3. ALLOCATION OF SEATS
After prescribing the ratio of the number of
party-list representatives to the total number of
representatives, the Constitution left the
manner of allocating the seats available to party-
list representatives to the wisdom of the
legislature.
Allocation of Seats for Party-List
Representatives: The Statutory Limits
Presented by the Two Percent Threshold and
the Three-Seat Cap
All parties agree on the formula to
determine the maximum number of seats
reserved under the Party-List System, as well as
on the formula to determine the guaranteed
seats to party-list candidates garnering at least
two-percent of the total party-list votes.
However, there are numerous interpretations of
the provisions of R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation
of "additional seats" under the Party-List
System. Veterans produced the First Party Rule,
and Justice Vicente V. Mendoza's dissent in
Veterans presented Germany's Niemeyer
formula 21 as an alternative.
The Constitution left to Congress the
determination of the manner of allocating the
seats for party-list representatives. Congress
enacted R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of
Section 11 and Section 12 of which provide:
Section 11. Number of Party-List
Representatives. — . . .
In determining the allocation of seats for
the second vote, 22 the following procedure
shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions
shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered
during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the
votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes:
Provided, finally, That each party, organization,
or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats
for Party-List Representatives. — The COMELEC
shall tally all the votes for the parties,
organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide
basis, rank them according to the number of
votes received and allocate party-list
representatives proportionately according to the
percentage
of votes obtained by each party, organization, or
coalition as against the total nationwide votes
cast for the party-list system. (Emphasis
supplied)
We examine what R.A. No. 7941
prescribes to allocate seats for party-list
representatives.
Section 11 (a) of R.A. No. 7941
prescribes the ranking of the participating
parties from the highest to the lowest based on
the number of votes they garnered during the
elections.
Table 1 – xxx
The first clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A.
No. 7941 states that "parties, organizations,
and coalitions receiving at least two percent
(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one seat each". This
clause guarantees a seat to the two-percenters.
In Table 2 below, we use the first 20 party-list
candidates for illustration purposes. The
percentage of votes garnered by each party is
arrived at by dividing the number of votes
garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total
number of votes cast for all party-list
candidates.
Table 2 – xxx
From Table 2 above, we see that only 17
party-list candidates received at least 2% from
the total number of votes cast for party-list
candidates. The 17 qualified party-list
candidates, or the two-percenters, are the party
list candidates that are "entitled to one seat
each", or the guaranteed seat. In this first round
of seat allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed
seats.
4. THE CONTINUED OPERATION OF THE
2% FOR DISTRIBUTION OF ADDITIONAL
SEATS AS FOUND IN THE SECOND
CLAUSE OF SECTION 11(b) OF RA 7941 IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The second clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A.
No. 7941 provides that "those garnering more
than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to
their total number of votes". This is where
petitioners' and intervenors' problem with the
formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the
clause "in proportion to their total number of
votes" to be in proportion to the votes of the first
party. This interpretation is contrary to the
express language of R.A. No. 7941.
We rule that, in computing the allocation of
additional seats, the continued operation of the
two percent threshold for the distribution of the
additional seats as found in the second clause of
Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941 is
unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two
percent threshold makes it mathematically
impossible to achieve the maximum number of
available party list seats when the number of
available party list seats exceeds 50. The
continued operation of the two percent
threshold in the distribution of the additional
seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive
ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives shall consist of party-list
representatives.
We therefore strike down the two percent
threshold only in relation to the distribution of
the additional seats as found in the second
clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two
percent threshold presents an unwarranted
obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5
(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents
the attainment of "the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives"
In determining the allocation of seats for
party-list representatives under Section 11 of
R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be
observed:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions
shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered
during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of
votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1,
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion
to their total number of votes until all the
additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall
be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the
guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at
one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the
remaining available seats for allocation as
"additional seats" are the maximum seats
reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are
disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A.
No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional
seats.
In declaring the two percent threshold
unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation
of additional seats in
Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The
percentage of votes garnered by each party-list
candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of
votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the
total number of votes cast for party list
candidates. There are two steps in the second
round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is
multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38,
which is the difference between the 55
maximum seats reserved under the Party-List
System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-
percenters. The whole integer of the product of
the percentage and of the remaining available
seats corresponds to a party's share in the
remaining available seats. Second, we assign one
party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank
until all available seats are completely
distributed. We distributed all of the remaining
38 seats in the second round of seat allocation.
Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine
the number of seats each qualified party-list
candidate is entitled. Thus:
Table 3 – xxx
Applying the procedure of seat allocation as
illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-
list representatives from the 36 winning party-
list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats
are filled. The additional seats allocated to the
parties with su􀁈cient number of votes for one
whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three
seats for each party, are shown in column (D).
5. MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES NOT
ALLOWED BY MAJORITY DECISION 8-7
The Constitutional Commission adopted
a multi-party system that allowed all political
parties to participate in the party-list elections.
The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission clearly bear this out,
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
state that major political parties are allowed to
establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral
organizations for electoral or political purposes.
There should not be a problem if, for example,
the Liberal Party participates in the party-list
election through the Kabataang Liberal ng
Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The
other major political parties can thus organize, or
a􀁈liate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To
further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can
establish a 􀁈sherfolk wing to participate in the
party-list election, and this 􀁈sherfolk wing can
􀁈eld its 􀁈sherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng
Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for
the urban poor.
The qualifications of party-list nominees
are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:
Quali􀀿cations of Party-List Nominees. —
No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural born citizen
of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident
of the Philippines for a period of not less than
one (1) year immediately preceding the day of
the elections, able to read and write, bona 􀁈de
member of the party or organization which he
seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least
twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector,
he must at least be twenty-􀁈ve (25) but not more
than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the
election. Any youth sectoral representative who
attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall
be allowed to continue until the expiration of his
term.
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not
necessary that the party-list organization's
nominee "wallow in poverty, destitution and
infirmity" 34 as there is no financial status
required in the law. It is enough that the
nominee of the sectoral
party/organization/coalition belongs to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, 35
that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk,
he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee
represents the senior citizens, he or she must be
a senior citizen.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No.
7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20%
allocation of party-list representatives found in
the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph
1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination
of the number of the members of the House of
Representatives to Congress: "The House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, . . . ." The 20% allocation
of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling;
party-list representatives cannot be more than
20% of the members of the House of
Representatives. However, we cannot allow the
continued existence of a provision in the law
which will systematically prevent the
constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled. The three-seat
cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a
qualified party list organization may occupy,
remains a valid statutory device that prevents
any party from dominating the partylist
elections. Seats for party-list representatives
shall thus be allocated in accordance with the
procedure used in Table 3 above.
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to
continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major
political parties from participating in the party-
list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who
voted to continue disallowing major political
parties from the party-list elections joined Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion.
On the formula to allocate party-list seats, the
Court is unanimous in concurring with this
ponencia.
DECISION:
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition.
We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC
dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as
well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC
No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two
percent threshold in the distribution of
additional party-list seats. The allocation of
additional seats under the Party-List System shall
be in accordance with the procedure used in
Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties
are disallowed from participating in party-list
elections. This Decision is immediately
executory. No pronouncement as to costs.
‘ list system.
Justice Puno Separate Opinion on not allowing
Major Political Parties:
There is no gainsaying the fact that the
party-list parties are no match to our traditional
political parties in the political arena. This is
borne out in the party-list elections held in 2001
where major political parties were initially
allowed to campaign and be voted for. The
results con􀁈rmed the fear expressed by some
commissioners in the Constitutional Commission
19 that major political parties would 􀁈gure in the
disproportionate distribution of votes: of the 162
parties which participated, the seven major
political parties 20 made it to the top 50. These
seven parties garnered an accumulated 9.54% of
the total number of votes counted, yielding an
average of 1.36% each, while the remaining 155
parties (including those whose quali􀁈cations
were contested) only obtained 90.45% or an
average of 0.58% each. Of these seven, three
parties 21 or 42.8% of the total number of the
major parties garnered more than 2% of the total
number of votes each, a feat that would have
entitled them to seat their members as party-list
representatives. In contrast, only about 4% of
the total number of the remaining parties, or
only 8 out of the 155 parties garnered more than
2%. 22
In sum, the evils that faced our
marginalized and underrepresented people at
the time of the framing of the 1987 Constitution
still haunt them today. It is through the party-list
system that the Constitution sought to address
this systemic dilemma. In ratifying the
Constitution, our people recognized how the
interests of our poor and powerless sectoral
groups can be frustrated by the traditional
political parties who have the machinery and
chicanery to dominate our political institutions.
If we allow major political parties to participate
in the party-list system electoral process, we will
surely suffocate the voice of the marginalized,
frustrate their sovereignty and betray the
democratic spirit of the Constitution. That
opinion will serve as the graveyard of the party-
IN VIEW WHEREOF, I dissent on the
ruling allowing the entry of major political
parties into the party-list system.
 Table 1

Votes
Rank Party Votes Garnered Rank Party
Garnered

1 BUHAY 1,169,234 48 KALAHI 88,868

2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 49 APOI 79,386

3 CIBAC 755,686 50 BP 78,541

4 GABRIELA 621,171 51 AHONBAYAN 78,424

5 APEC 619,657 52 BIGKIS 77,327

6 A TEACHER 490,379 53 PMAP 75,200

7 AKBAYAN 466,112 54 AKAPIN 74,686

8 ALAGAD 423,149 55 PBA 71,544

9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 56 GRECON 62,220

10 BUTIL 409,160 57 BTM 60,993

11 BATAS 385,810 58 A SMILE 58,717

12 ARC 374,288 59 NELFFI 57,872

13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 60 AKSA 57,012

14 ABONO 339,990 61 BAGO 55,846

15 AMIN 338,185 62 BANDILA 54,751

16 AGAP 328,724 63 AHON 54,522

17 AN WARAY 321,503 64 ASAHAN MO 51,722

18 YACAP 310,889 65 AGBIAG! 50,837

19 FPJPM 300,923 66 SPI 50,478

20 UNI-MAD 245,382 67 BAHANDI 46,612

21 ABS 235,086 68 ADD 45,624

22 KAKUSA 228,999 69 AMANG 43,062

23 KABATAAN 228,637 70 ABAY PARAK 42,282

24 ABA-AKO 218,818 71 BABAE KA 36,512

25 ALIF 217,822 72 SB 34,835

26 SENIOR 213,058 73 ASAP 34,098

CITIZENS

27 AT 197,872 74 PEP 33,938

28 VFP 196,266 75 ABA ILONGGO 33,903

29 ANAD 188,521 76 VENDORS 33,691

30 BANAT 177,028 77 ADD-TRIBAL 32,896

31 ANG 170,531 78 ALMANA 32,255

KASANGGA
 32 BANTAY 169,801 79 AANGAT KA PILIPINO 29,130

33 ABAKADA 166,747 80 AAPS 26,271

34 1-UTAK 164,980 81 HAPI 25,781

35 TUCP 162,647 82 AAWAS 22,946

36 COCOFED 155,920 83 SM 20,744

37 AGHAM 146,032 84 AG 16,916

38 ANAK 141,817 85 AGING PINOY 16,729

39 ABANSE! PINAY 130,356 86 APO 16,421

40 PM 119,054 87 BIYAYANG BUKID 16,241

41 AVE 110,769 88 ATS 14,161

42 SUARA 110,732 89 UMDJ 9,445

43 ASSALAM 110,440 90 BUKLOD FILIPINA 8,915

44 DIWA 107,021 91 LYPAD 8,471

45 ANC 99,636 92 AA-KASOSYO 8,406

46 SANLAKAS 97,375 93 KASAPI 6,221

47 ABC 90,058 TOTAL 15,950,900

Table 2

Votes Garnered over Total

Rank Party Votes Garnered Guaranteed Seat
Votes for Party-List, in %

1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1

2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1

3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1

4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1

5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1

6 A TEACHER 490,379 3.07% 1

7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1

8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1

9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1

10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1

11 BATAS29 385,810 2.42% 1

12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1

13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1

14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1

15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1

16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1

 17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1

Total 17

18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0

19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0

20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0

Table 3

Votes
Garnered over Additional (B) plus (C), Applying the
Guaranteed Seat
Votes Total Votes Seats in whole three seat
Rank Party (First Round)
Garnered for Party List, (Second Round) integers cap
(B)
in % (C) (D) (E)
(A)

1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1 2.79 3 N.A.

2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 N.A.

3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2 N.A.

4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2 N.A.

5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1 1.48 2 N.A.

6 A Teacher 490,379 3.07% 1 1.17 2 N.A.

7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1 1.11 2 N.A.

8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 2 N.A.

931 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.

10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.

11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 1 1 2 N.A.

12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 1 2 N.A.

13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1 1 2 N.A.

14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 1 2 N.A.

15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 1 2 N.A.

16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 1 2 N.A.

17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1 1 2 N.A.

18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 1 1 N.A.

19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 1 1 N.A.

20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 1 1 N.A.

21 ABS 235,086 1.47% 0 1 1 N.A.

22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1 N.A.

23 KABATAAN 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1 N.A.

24 ABA-AKO 218,818 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.

 25 ALIF 217,822 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.

26 SENIOR CITIZENS 213,058 1.34% 0 1 1 N.A.

27 AT 197,872 1.24% 0 1 1 N.A.

28 VFP 196,266 1.23% 0 1 1 N.A.

29 ANAD 188,521 1.18% 0 1 1 N.A.

30 BANAT 177,028 1.11% 0 1 1 N.A.

31 ANG KASANGGA 170,531 1.07% 0 1 1 N.A.

32 BANTAY 169,801 1.06% 0 1 1 N.A.

33 ABAKADA 166,747 1.05% 0 1 1 N.A.

34 1-UTAK 164,980 1.03% 0 1 1 N.A.

35 TUCP 162,647 1.02% 0 1 1 N.A.

36 COCOFED 155,920 0.98% 0 1 1 N.A.

Total 17 55