26.

Aquino vs Tible, 65 SCRA 207

Facts:

Petitioner, Jose C. Aquino filed a claim Aquino in the amount of P30,000.00 against the estate of
the deceased, Emilio M. Tible. He claims that Emilio Tible bought from him 2,000 hectares of his
timberland in Agusan for P107,000.00 and that Tible still owed him a balance of P30,000.00 representing
the unpaid balance of the consideration of the sale of the timberland at the time of Tible's death. The
payment of the balance of P30,000.00 is subject to the condition that payment would depend upon Tible's
operation of the timberland. The lower court dismissed his claim. Upon appeal, the decision was reversed.
Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the conditional obligation that payment of those promissory notes would depend upon
the operation by Tible of the timberland.

Held:

Yes. There is a void conditional obligation where the efficacy of the contract depends on the will
of the debtor.—The court did not see any reason to disagree with respondent Appellate Court’s ruling
that “the condition that payment of amounts embodied in the promissory notes shall be dependent upon
Tible’s operation of the forest concession be acquired from Aquino is undoubtedly a void conditional
obligation since its fulfillment is made to depend upon the exclusive will of the debtor, Tible (Art. 1115,
Civil Code)”. The payment of the remaining balance of the purchase price of the 2,000 hectares of
timberland cannot be made to depend on the exclusive will of the debtor, Tible, whether or not he will
operate the timber concession.

40. VELASCO v MERALCO, 42 SCRA 556

FACTS:

Velasco sold two (2) of his lots to Meralco and maintained the third one as his residence. Meralco
constructed on their lots a sub-station at a distance of 10-20 meters away from appellant’s house. An
unceasing sound emanates from the substation, caused by transformers. Such, appellent contends,
constitute a nuisance which has worsened his health condition and has lowered the value of his property.
It was found that the sound exceeded the average intensity levels of residences. Meralco was ordered
either to transfer the facilities or reduce the produced sound; and they were also ordered to pay Velasco
damages. In his motion for reconsideration, Appellant Velasco claims that the damages awarded him are
inadequate considering the present high cost of living, and calls attention to Article 1250 of the present
 Civil Code, and to the doctrines laid down in People vs. Pantoja, G.R. No. L-18793, 11 October 1968, 25
SCRA 468.

ISSUE:

W/N Article 1250 of the New Civil code is applicable in this case

HELD:

NO. Article 1250 states that:

“In case an extraordinary inflation or deflation of the currency stipulated should supervene, the value of the
currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of payment, unless there is an
agreement to the contrary.”

It can be seen from the employment of the words “extra-ordinary inflation or deflation of the currency
stipulated” that the legal rule envisages contractual obligations where a specific currency is selected by the
parties as the medium of payment; hence it is inapplicable to obligations arising from tort and not from
contract, as in the case at bar, besides there being no showing that the factual assumption of the article has
come into existence.

It should not be forgotten that the damages awarded to herein appellant were by no means full
compensatory damages, since the decision makes clear that appellant, by his failure to minimize his damages
by means easily within his reach, was declared entitled only to a reduced award for the nuisance sued upon;
and the amount granted him had already taken into account the charged economic circumstances.

120. Cronico vs JM Tuason & Co., Inc. 78 SCRA 331

Facts:

Appellant J. M. Tuason & Co. Inc. was the registered owner of Lot No. 22, Block 461, Sta. Mesa
Heights Subdivision. Cronico and Ramirez offered to buy the lot from the appellant. On March 20, 1962,
the appellant company sent separate reply letters to prospective buyers including plaintiff Cronico and
defendant-appellant Ramirez. On March 21, 1962, Cronico was tipped off that the reply letter of the
company to prospective buyers been mailed, so went to the post office in Manila to get the letter
presented the same to the company on the same day. On March 22, 1962, appellant Ramirez received
from the post office the reply letter and on April 2, 1962, the J. M. Tuason & Co. Inc., and Claudio R.
Ramirez executed a contract to sell subject to the terms and conditions therein set forth. On April 28,1962,
plaintiff Florencia Cronico filed a suit to annul and set aside the contract to sell executed by and between
appellant company and appellant Ramirez contending that she has become the obligee or creditor of the
respondent company because she was the first to comply with the terms of the letter-offer.
Issue:

Whether or not petitioner has better right to purchase the subject property than appellant Ramirez.

Held:

NO. The act of the petitioner in taking delivery of her letter at the entry section of the Manila post
office without waiting for said letter to be delivered to her in due course of mail is a violation of the "first
come first served" condition imposed by the respondent J. M. Tuason & Co. Inc., acting through Gregorio
Araneta Inc. In order that a unilateral promise may be binding upon the promisor, Article 1479, Civil Code
of the Philippines, requires the concurrence of the condition that the promise be "supported by a
consideration distinct from the price. The petitioner, Florencia Cronies, has not established the existence
of a consideration distinct from the price of the lot in question. The petitioner cannot claim that she had
accepted the promise before it was withdrawn because, as stated above, she had violated the condition
of "first, come, first served”.

165. Velez vs Wassmer, 12 SCRA 648

Facts:

Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love decided to get
married on September 4, 1954. On the day of the supposed marriage, Velez left a note for his bride-to-be
to postpone their wedding because his mother opposes it then, he never returned. Beatriz sued Velez for
damages and Velez failed to answer and was declared in default. Judgement was rendered ordering the
defendant to pay plaintiff P2.000 as actual damages P25,000 as moral and exemplary damages, P2,500
as attorney’s fees. Later, an attempt by the Court for amicable settlement was given chance but failed,
thereby rendered judgment hence this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not a breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong.

Held:
 Yes. Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. It must not be
overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity,
is not limitless for Article 21 of the New Civil Code provides that “any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damage. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But
formally set a wedding and go through all the necessary preparations and publicity and only to walk out
of it when matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably
contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with
Article 21 aforesaid. Hence, although Velez did not violate any law in abandoning his fiancée, he was
ordered to pay damages because he exhibited behavior that was contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy.